Monday in Washington, January 29, 2018

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM DONALD TRUMP’S FIRST STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS. 1/29, 10:00-11:15am. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Camille Busette, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Governance Studies, Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings, Director, Race, Prosperity, and Inclusion Initiative; John Hudak, Deputy Director, Center for Effective Public Management, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Molly E. Reynolds, Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Jon Valant, Fellow, Governance Studies, Brown Center on Education Policy, Brookings. Moderator: E.J. Dionne, W. Averell Harriman Chair, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings.

MODERNIZING TRADE RULES: THE TPP AND BEYOND. 1/29, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsor: Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings. Speakers: Tsuyoshi Kawase, Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Sophia University, Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), Maki Kunimatsu, Chief Policy Analyst, Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Strategic Management, Chuo University; Joshua Meltzer, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings; Amy Porges, Principal, Porges Trade Law PLLC. Moderator: Mireya Solís, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, Senior Fellow & Co-Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings.

A CONVERSATION WITH US SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY KIRSJEN M. NIELSEN. 1/29, 11:30am-Noon. Sponsors: Wilson Center (WWC); Aspen Institute Homeland Security Group. Speakers: Jane Harman, Director, President, & CEO, WWC; Hon. Kirstjen M. Nielsen, US Secretary of Homeland Security. 

MARITIME STRATEGY IN A NEW ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION. 1/29, Noon-1:30pm. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Seth Cropsey, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson; Walter Russell Mead, Distinguished Fellow, Hudson, James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities, Bard College, Former Editor-at-Large, The American Interest; Bryan McGrath, Assistant Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson, Managing Director, FerryBridge Group LLC.

MEDIA AND IDEOLOGY IN XI’S CHINA. 1/29, 1:30-3:00pm. Sponsor: China Reality Check Series, Freeman Chair, China Studies, CSIS. Speakers: Maria Repnikova, Assistant Professor, Global Communication, Director, Center for Global Information Studies, Georgia State University; Kaiser Kuo, Host & Co-Founder, Sinica Podcast, Former Director, International Communications, Baidu Inc. Moderator: Christopher K. Johnson, Senior Adviser, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS.

Are Fears of Trump giving China free rein in East Asia misplaced?

APP member Daniel C. Sneider, an associate director of research for Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an authority on US, Japan and Korea relations thinks we might be overreacting.

He outlines his views in a recent interview in the Asia Times with DOUG TSURUOKA, published February 24, 2017.

Q: On a long strategic view, can China and Japan ever get on the same page? For that to happen, does the US have to get out of the middle?

While I think rivalry fundamentally remains the driver of relations between China and Japan, framing that story only in terms of rivalry is inconormplete. The Chinese are trying to assert that they are the dominant power in the region. There’s almost a psychological element to this — to remind the Japanese that they are the inferior party and to drive wedges between Japan and the US. A Japan that’s isolated from the US is exactly what China seeks. It’s a Japan that’s more likely to bandwagon with China and it weakens the American strategic posture in the region.

The Japanese are desperate to preserve their alliance with the US. It’s the only guarantee of Japanese security. Unless the Japanese are willing to go nuclear — they can’t ever afford to give [that alliance] up, and I don’t think the Japanese are ever going to go nuclear — though they retain that latent capability.

But does that mean the China-Japan relationship means only rivalry? Of course not. These are two countries that are intertwined with each other in countless ways, not just the economic one. It’s not wholly a hostile relationship. They have a lot of overlap. So can they ever get on the same page? No. But they could be reading the same book now and again.

Q: Is it possible that China will be given the run of the region under Trump?

In Japan there is this worry, and I’ve heard it repeatedly in Tokyo, about a G2 redux — the idea that Trump will make a deal with the Chinese and that this is why he fleetingly put the One-China policy on the table. The Japanese think this because Trump is a guy who believes that he’s a great dealmaker. The fear is that he would be willing to sit down with the Chinese and that part of that deal would be a kind of let’s talk about [dividing] East Asia between us. The Japanese have this fear of abandonment. It’s deep-seated in Japanese strategic thinking.

But do I believe that the Chinese will be handed the keys to the palace? I think that if Donald Trump ever tried to do that it would probably trigger a coup d’etat in the United States, I just don’t see that.

Q: What are Trump’s options on North Korea following Pyongyang’s February 12 missile test and what is he likely to do?

I think the options regarding North Korea today are no different than they were under the Obama administration, or for that matter, the Bush administration. It’s an unpalatable set of limited options. It’s the same options that are on the table and being considered by the Trump administration.

The first is the broad engagement option — let’s go back and resume negotiations with the North Koreans with the aim of gaining some form of freeze on the missile and nuclear programs. Then there’s the let’s get the Chinese to do it option; let’s persuade the Chinese or pressure the Chinese to pressure the North Koreans to whatever end, whether it’s a freeze or something more ambitious than that. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson raise the same argument to his Chinese counterpart recently, saying, ‘we would like the Chinese to put more pressure on the North Koreans.’

The other two options are the ones that make most people uncomfortable. But they are the ones to which we’re heading for lack of anything else. One is the military option. That is, responding to the possible test of a North Korean ICBM missile by either attempting to take it out on the launch pad or shoot it down through anti-missile defense systems which hopefully might work, though we don’t know that they will. Or some form of fostering regime change. I prefer the word regime “transformation.” Some way of trying to bring about internal change in North Korea that makes it more likely they’ll give up their nuclear option.

Q: What are the other options?

The last option is the one that I wish we were thinking about more, and more creatively. It could include elements of engagement, but also pressure. Sanctions, for example, have encouraged the forces of change from within North Korea by forcing them to pursue economic reforms that they’d have to do if they were really cut off from sources of capital and trade on the outside.

Q: Did Trump discuss North Korea with Abe during their summit and how aware is Trump of the North Korean nuclear issue?

I don’t know what [Abe and Trump] talked about. But I do know this — the president and people around him — if they weren’t aware that the North Korean nuclear missile program was a serious security issue when they were campaigning, they became aware of it very quickly after the election was over. I think from [Trump’s] first meeting with president Obama it was conveyed that this was going to be a problem that it would be pretty much at the top of his agenda. I believe that Trump made some reference to North Korea after that meeting — almost with surprise.

I don’t think [Trump] had thought much about the issue until then. I have the sense from conversations I’ve had that [the administration] was mainly worried that North Korea was going to force them to respond to some kind of provocation and disrupt their planning for other things regarding their foreign security policy.

Q: Is Trump mulling a policy change toward North Korea?

There was a report that [the administration] has ordered a review of North Korea policy, but I see no evidence of a review going on. When you do a review, you have a sense that it’s going on because experts on the outside are being drawn in. But to my knowledge, it hasn’t taken place.

This should be a very important element. Most importantly, it should be part of our review of our overall force posture in the Western Pacific. It relates to the problem of base issues in Japan — the still determined effort by the US with the support of the Abe government to relocate the Marine air station at Futenma to another part of Okinawa.

Q: What are the military steps, in concert with Japan and South Korea, that Trump should take to strengthen deterrence against North Korea and a Chinese military buildup in the region?

I think it’s high time that we looked at the foreign base issue in Japan in a broader context. The problem is we have an inertia about an investment we’ve made in fixed facilities that is hard to change. If you look at the base structure in Japan and South Korea, it’s pretty much unchanged since the Cold War.

The people I talk to who think about these issues have brought up whether we want to augment our naval and air forces based in Japan and Korea, [as opposed to] preserving our ground presence, even a Marine infantry presence in Okinawa. The purpose would be to make more credible our extended deterrence commitments to both Japan and South Korea.

For instance, there is the idea of adding a second carrier battle group to be home ported in the Western Pacific — that’s a big shift and we’re probably talking about Japan. We’re already increasing somewhat our nuclear-powered submarine basing in Japan, and that is an area from a deterrence point of view where we should be thinking of adding capability. [That would include] attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines.

We should think about adding an entire strike fighter wing to the air base in Misawa, Japan, which has a capacity to take an added presence. That would give us added capability against both China, North Korea and also to deal with increased activity by the Russian Air Force in that area.

This would, in some ways, compensate for a decision I would like to see to finally take most of the 3rd Marines out of Okinawa and move them to Guam. That’s a long-delayed move that needs to be accelerated. The obstacle to that reflects an inability of our services to cooperate with each other rather than any technical or even political problem on the island. We need to re-think more broadly where our force structure ought to be.

Q: Will anything of substance replace TPP?I don’t know what Trump is likely to do. Is [THAAD] something he would trade off for something else? 

I have no idea. [Secretary of Defense James] Mattis during his brief visit to Seoul reiterated the US desire to and commitment to go ahead with the THAAD deployment. The latest missile tests show the North Koreans want to demonstrate a survivable capability to deliver nuclear weapons. The logic of deploying THAAD is even stronger than it was before.

I noticed in an Abe-Trump joint statement [after the summit] that they referred to discussions, both on a bilateral basis as well as some regional framework. I gather from friends that that was language the Japanese wanted in there. This was to give the Japanese the freedom to continue to pursue a TPP without the US or a revival of the TPP with the US , or [in the context of] other regional trade structures.

The Japanese feel very strongly that TPP without the US is useless, so the big question is can you find other kinds of formulations that would be politically acceptable to Trump? The door is open for some kind of bilateral discussion. [But] I don’t see much enthusiasm in Tokyo for a full-scale, bilateral Free Trade Agreement.

Q: Can you give an example of something that might replace the TPP?

There could be a mini-lateral structure, for example, one that could include Vietnam and Japan. I hope somebody is thinking creatively about this.

Q: What stands out about the recent Trump-Abe summit?

I was frankly stunned that Abe comes to Washington and you have these people [on the US side] who had said, ‘We want to raise currency manipulation and market-access issues.’ They signaled this, including the president, and they did nothing. From what I’m told, the Japanese came prepared and were ready to talk about currency issues, for example and they were surprised that nobody [on the US side] raised it. Even on something where the Trump administration seemed to have a cogent policy view — there was no implementation.

Can Asia survive the shock of Trump-ageddon?

Or will he be pragmatic?

BY JEFF KINGSTON, director of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan Campus and APP member

The Japan Times, November 19, 2016

Donald Trump made some outlandish promises to win the U.S. presidential election. America and the world will survive, but he poses significant risks to the global economy and the peace that has prevailed in East Asia since 1979. His denial of global warming also means America will provide no leadership on climate change and the world will likely pay a high price for his ignorance.

If he does rip up the North American Free Trade Agreement and start a trade war with China, Trump will spark a global financial meltdown. Post-Brexit markets are already jittery, especially given concerns about the troubled state of China’s economy. In this context, Trump’s “America first” strategy (aka “Wrexit”) could have catastrophic consequences.

His transition team is currently in damage-control mode as they try to walk back some of his more unsettling proposals. Having proved the media and pollsters wrong about the election, can Trump prove the critics wrong about his leadership qualities and policy agenda?

He has a deep hole to climb out of because of his hatemongering. This is the reason why most Americans did not vote for him: he pandered to the primordial impulses that lurk in the dark soul of America, playing people like a revivalist promising redemption and a return to glory. But he showed us he is a callow charlatan and shyster carrying a huge chip on his shoulder. And worse, he is easily provoked into mistakes. Trump imperils the world with his vengeful short fuse.

Now his advisers are trying to convince us to ignore all that campaign nastiness and hope he won’t be as bad as we fear. Given Trump can’t surprise on the downside, can he pull off some positive surprises? Perhaps he will accept adult supervision and we will avoid the nightmare of Loony Donald doing what he promised and sparking a global economic meltdown, but that means Lying Donald would betray his supporters by not delivering what he promised — and probably blaming everyone but himself.

Asian leaders are scrambling to respond to President-elect Trump. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has pinned his legacy on strengthening security ties with the U.S. and rejuvenating the Japanese economy through his Abenomics strategy. But Abenomics has been a dismal failure, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade accord represented the last hope for meaningful structural reform in Japan — the “third arrow” of Abe’s three-pronged strategy. Trump wants no part of TPP so there will be no final arrow.

Abe also saw TPP as part of a geopolitical strategy to keep the U.S. engaged in Asia as a counterweight to China. That is also why he signed the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines in 2015 and rammed unpopular security legislation through the Diet to ease constitutional restrictions on Japan’s armed forces. Abe likely sees Trump’s isolationist and protectionist impulses as a menace to everything he has tried to accomplish. Yet Abe has terrible chemistry with U.S. President Barack Obama, so he is seeking closer personal ties with Trump by fawning on him. He understands that the president-elect is a brittle creature, desperate for praise and attention, who suffers from zero credibility on the world stage. Peevish Trump rewards friends and lashes out against those who disdain him.

Thus, a worried Abe rushed to meet Trump on Nov. 17 to seek reassurance that the new president remains committed to the alliance. Abe did Trump a great favor by pronouncing him trustworthy. It’s likely he reiterated that Japan is not a free-rider on U.S. defense — it pays close to $2 billion a year for hosting U.S. military bases, about 75 percent of all costs, considerably more than in South Korea (40 percent) and Germany (33 percent). But if Trump has his way, Japan will have to up the ante.

Typhoon Trump puts wind into the sails of Abe’s agenda for constitutional revision: The U.S. security umbrella that helped make the war-renouncing Article 9 possible is looking ragged. In 2015, a Genron poll indicated that only 9.2 percent of Japanese regard the U.S. as a “very reliable” ally, but judging from the Japanese dismay that greeted Trump’s victory, that figure has no doubt declined. Does the U.S. have Japan’s back? A post-election NHK poll revealed only 5 percent of Japanese think U.S. relations will improve under Trump.

Trump’s rhetoric has generated uncertainties among U.S. friends and allies in Asia and reinforced a sense of American decline. Perceptions shape reality, so his loose talk about South Korea and Japan developing nuclear weapons, accusations of free riding and thinking aloud about reconsidering U.S. security commitments has set off alarm bells. Seoul is preoccupied by a leadership crisis and Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons — problems complicated by Trump’s heedlessness. His perfunctory phone calls and advisers’ bromides provide little reassurance.

Trump’s cavalier remarks have done a great favor to China by sowing seeds of doubt about U.S. intentions and resolve in Asia. However, this is destabilizing and increases the chances of a miscalculation in the region. The peace that has prevailed in Asia since 1979 is at risk, not only because security arrangements are being recalibrated, but also because Trump may trigger major economic upheaval and stoke bellicose nationalism.

Asian diplomats I have spoken to are putting on a brave face, hoping that Trump will be transactional and pragmatic on foreign policy. They have survived other nescient buffoons — former presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush — and expect that U.S. foreign policy will settle back into old patterns.

Malaysia’s corrupt leader and Thailand’s authoritarian regime will be happy to see the last of Obama and will hope the negative scrutiny abates under Trump. Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi was close to Obama, but it is hard to imagine that she can build similar rapport with a misogynist such as Trump. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will welcome another demagogue to the growing fraternity while his Hindu chauvinist supporters revel in Trump’s Islamophobia. But this prejudice won’t play well in Pakistan, Bangladesh or Indonesia, the nation with the world’s largest Muslim population. Singapore frets about reckless moves on trade and security while the Philippine’s erratic President Rodrigo Duterte will meet his match. Despite concerns about a trade war, Beijing has to be gloating about the weakened U.S. influence in Asia gifted by Trump. And the rest of Asia? Nervously imagining a Pax Sinica.

GOP Foreign Policy Elites and Trump

Ruinous

Most Republican foreign policy elites were sure that Hillary Clinton would be president. And they were sure that there would be a continuity in American foreign policy. They were so sure, that they were willing to go on the record denouncing Donald Trump as unfit to be a world leader. Whereas their views were heart-felt, they were also tinged with ample self-interest. The Republican signatories of the many letters and articles of condemnation all wanted to be considered for positions in a Democratic Clinton administration.

This is a point unlikely to be missed by the Trump team who have demonstrated a deeply personal and ideologically protective approach to vetting the President-elect's advisers and appointees.

The letters and interviews dismissive of Trump by prominent Republican foreign policy experts have the potential to turn into a "hit list." Trump may chose vengeance over expertise and ban, ostracize, or just simply ignore these people.

All the signatories of the "never Trump" letters have considerable, hands-on foreign policy experience combined with deep ties to the elites of the countries of their expertise. They are people in which foreign capitals rely upon for access to Washington and to smooth the way for good relations.

This has now disappeared. For those who follow Asia policy, this is especially true. Asian states have been particularly reliant upon long-cultivated friends who move seamlessly between government and either consulting or think tanks to provide consistency and inside information. They are the "alliance managers." Relationships are maintained by consulting contracts and conferences.

It appears that Trump will drain this onsen.

Here links to the letters signed by GOP insiders.

A Letter From G.O.P. National Security Officials Opposing Donald Trump. New York Times. 8 August 2016.

Preserving U.S. Credibility in Asia: An Open Letter. Foreign Policy. 15 August 2016.

Republican Asia experts call Trump ‘ruinous'. Financial Times. 15 August 2016.

Statement by Former Republican Members of Congress. P2016. 6 October 2016..

Open Letter On Donald Trump From GOP National Security Leaders. War on the Rocks. 2 March 2016.

GOP Asia specialists have been quite alarmed and outspoken in their criticism of Trump. A number signed multiple letters. They took their lead from the titular "dean" of Washington Asia hands, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who said "I have nothing but disdain for Mr. Trump and what he says and the way he acts."

INTERVIEW: I'd choose Clinton over Trump: Armitage by Naoya Yoshino, Nikkei Asian Review. 11 March 2016.

He followed “If Donald Trump is the nominee, I would vote for Hillary Clinton,” Armitage told POLITICO in a brief interview. “He doesn't appear to be a Republican, he doesn't appear to want to learn about issues. So, I’m going to vote for Mrs. Clinton.”

Exclusive: Armitage to back Clinton over Trump by Michael Crowley, POLITICO. 16 June 2016.

Among the Asia experts, the most outspoken, with the greatest number of letters signed and interviews given to raise the alarm about a Trump presidency, was Michael Green, the Japan Chair at CSIS, Bush II's NSC Asia desk director, and Richard Armitage protegee. He is considered the go-to Japan specialist in Washington. Reportedly, the prime minister of Japan and other prominent Japanese officials have his personal number on their phone direct dial.

In After TPP: the Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific (Washington Quarterly 9 September 2016), Michael Green and his CSIS colleague Matthew Goodman defend the importance of TPP by using Trump as an example of the ignorant opposition: "When presidential candidate Donald Trump argued in the Republican primary debates on November 10, 2015, that the TPP is “a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone,” the other candidates reminded him that China is not in TPP, and that the whole point is to build alliances and partnerships to better enable the United States to compete with China." (pg. 24)

He also gave the following interviews to explain his position.

INTERVIEW/ Michael Green: Trump lacks judgment to be U.S. president by Taketsugu Sato, The Asahi Shimbun, 18 October 2016.

Why I Joined Other Republican Security Experts in Endorsing Hillary Clinton by Richard Katz, Tokyo Business Today, 9 September 2016. Full Interview

Six Reasons Why Trump Meeting With Kim Jong Un Is a Very Bad Idea, Foreign Policy, 18 May 2016.

The Repudiation of American Internationalism and What It Means for Japan

Op ed by Daniel Sneider, Associate Director of Research of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University and APP member

First appeared on Tokyo Business Today, November 11,2016

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has apparently decided to hold an urgent meeting with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump in New York, on his way to the Asia Pacific Economic summit in Peru. It is far from clear what the Prime Minister hopes to accomplish, or whether such a meeting will even be a good idea, so early in the transition process. But one thing is surely true – the Prime Minister needs to go into that meeting with a clear understanding of what has happened in the U.S. and what it could mean for U.S.-Japan relations.

The election of Trump as the president of the U.S. is not merely a devastating defeat for the Democratic party and for the political establishment, including within the ranks of the Republican party. More stunningly, it represents a clear repudiation of the interventionist internationalism that has dominated the foreign policy of both major parties since the Cold War.

From the first moments of his campaign announcement in Trump Tower on June 16, 2015, Trump took aim at some of the most sacred foundations of that internationalism – a commitment to a global free trade system, our alliance systems in Europe and Asia, and our opposition to authoritarianism and defense of democratic rights.

In repeated interviews, speeches, debates and even Tweets, Trump articulated this world view, a nationalism that veered openly into isolationism, tinged with a xenophobic racism that aimed not only at Mexicans, but Muslims, Asians and ultimately all ‘foreigners.’ On November 8, enough Americans embraced that ideology to win him the Presidency.

Now what does that mean for Japan – and for all of Asia? Just listen to Trump’s words on that first day of his campaign:

“Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories anymore. We used to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time. When did we beat Japan at anything? They send their cars over by the millions, and what do we do? When was the last time you saw a Chevrolet in Tokyo? It doesn’t exist, folks. They beat us all the time.”

On the campaign trail, Trump vowed to stop the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and to renegotiate, if not repudiate, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a deal which led to the construction of Japanese factories in Mexico to export to the American market.

A few months later, in an interview in September with The Economist, Trump elaborated that attack on Japan for unfair trade and ‘stealing jobs’ by questioning the value of our security alliance. Why are we defending Japan against China, he wondered:

“You know the pact we have with Japan is interesting. Because if somebody attacks us, Japan does not have to help, If somebody attacks Japan, we have to help Japan. That’s the kind of deals we make.”

Trump took his questioning of the value of our security alliance a leap further in an interview with the New York Times in March. If Japan and South Korea should do more in its own defense, he was asked, would he object if they developed nuclear weapons to deal with China and North Korea? Trump was almost casual about the idea of junking long-standing American opposition to nuclear proliferation. At some point, Trump answered, given the state of American resources, “it could mean nuclear.”

Trump seems almost ignorant of the historical roots of the American alliances in Northeast Asia. As has been pointed out in American media, Trump ignores the significant contribution that Japan and South Korea make to the support of the forces based in those countries. More significantly, he simply does not seem to understand the strategic role those forces play in maintaining the peace and stability of all of East Asia.

Trump’s views are by now, well known in Japan. For months, American foreign policy makers have been reassuring Japanese, and other Asian leaders and policy makers, that these are just the heated rhetoric of the campaign. If Clinton wins, they told them, she will find a way to return to the TPP, despite her commitment, under pressure from Bernie Sanders and from Trump, to oppose the agreement.

Now those same policy elites are rushing, within hours of the shocking vote, to back Trump and reassure allies and friends that Trump will put these views aside and return to the fold of postwar internationalism, effectively consigning the making of foreign policy to the old elites. Familiar names, such as Richard Armitage, are floated as possible senior officials in a Trump administration, despite the fact that he and others denounced the candidate during the campaign.

This is a comforting idea and perhaps it could come to pass. Trump has few in his inner circle who are capable of running foreign and security policy, or even international economic policy. He will have to draw on the huge well of establishment Republicans to fill many positions, people who still hold to the classic policy prescriptions of internationalism and even assertive American interventionism abroad.

But there are more compelling reasons to believe that Trump will not outsource his foreign policy to the Republican establishment. First, he owes nothing to those elites. He was elected despite their opposition, without their money, and with a campaign staff composed of a hard core of loyalists, some of them even more deeply committed to his anti-internationalist ideology than he has been. He is the triumphant leader of a Republican party that has been transformed in ideology and in its base of support by him.

The most important reason to believe he will not throw away these ideas is that he has been personally voicing these views, on a consistent basis, since at least the days of the U.S.-Japan trade wars of the late 1980s. These are not slogans created just to appeal to former steelworkers in Pennsylvania. These are the deeply held beliefs of Donald Trump and he shows no signs of abandoning them.

In Trump’s ghost written book, “The Art of the Deal,” his manifesto of how to do business published in 1987, he complained about how difficult it was to do business with Japanese. That year he paid for a full-page ad in the New York Times, Washington Post and Boston Globe that denounced the Japanese, saying that while the U.S. paid for their defense, they built a strong economy, based on a deliberately weak yen.

As he told a television host the following year, “we let Japan come in and dump everything into our markets. It’s not free trade. If you ever go to Japan right now and try to sell something, forget about it.”

In a must read interview with Playboy magazine in 1990, amidst the boom of Japanese high profile purchases of Manhattan real estate, Trump was almost vitriolic in his portrayal of Japan as untrustworthy, even duplicitous allies:

“The Japanese have their great scientists making cars and VCRs and we have our great scientists making missiles so we can defend Japan. Why aren’t we being reimbursed for our costs? The Japanese double-screw the U.S., a real trick: First they take all our money with their consumer goods, then they put it back in buying all of Manhattan. So either way, we lose.”

In his language, and his understanding of Japan, it is clear that Donald Trump is simply frozen into the same place he reached in the 1980s. Nothing has changed that view of Japan – the only difference is that now he extends this to others such as Korea, China, and Vietnam in Asia. It would be an act of willful self-delusion to believe that upon entering the White House, with Republican policy elites whispering in his ear, Trump will now cast those views overboard.

Still it is legitimate to question whether Trump will give a priority to implementing those views. When it comes to trade, it is unimaginable that Trump will support ratification of the TPP. At best, he would see a complete renegotiation of the agreement. At worst, he will simply repudiate it. It is only slightly less likely that he will pursue the renegotiation, and possible repudiation of NAFTA as well. The Japanese government must understand that reality, though it is a painful one. For Japanese business, it could mean a drastic change in the conditions that led to plant construction in Mexico and Canada.

What is harder to predict is the future of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Pentagon officials are sure to try to explain to Trump the essential nature of that alliance in meeting the challenge of a rising China. There is already wide spread speculation that the retreat into semi-isolationism by a Trump administration could lead to a more assertive effort by China to take advantage of the opportunity. China might flatter Trump, a la Putin, while exploiting his ignorance of China, wrote James Palmer in Foreign Policy. This will cause some in Asia to bandwagon with China while others, such as Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, propelled by a fear of American abandonment, might seek to develop nuclear weapons to replace the American guarantees of extended deterrence.

It is possible that some in a new Trump administration, wrapped in rhetoric of muscular nationalism, would seek to challenge China. And in that vein, the traditional value of the U.S.-Japan security alliance would be again evident, despite Trump’s complaints about free loading allies. Chinese policy makers will hesitate, however, to provoke Trump who talked about slapping massive tariffs on Chinese goods and blocking American firms from moving factories overseas.

For China, globalization is essential to its own economic survival. And Trump too may not be eager to take on China in the security realm, in areas such as the South China Sea or even to bolster the defense of the East China Sea.

For an Abe administration that has invested heavily in reinforcing the alliance, and in asserting a wider security role in the region, the election of Donald Trump could not come at a worse time. Abe has already pushed to pass the TPP in the Diet and has risked the opposition of the Japanese public by asserting a more robust Japanese defense role, within the framework of the alliance. If Trump undermines both of those pillars, where does Abe go? To Moscow, which surely will be seeking its own deal with Putin’s favorite American politician?

Japanese policy makers may comfort themselves that Trump will not act on his own beliefs, a view perhaps being already pushed to the Prime Minister’s office by friends in Washington. They would be wise to heed the words of Daniel Drezner, a professor of international relations at Tufts University and a regular contributor to the Washington Post who tried to answer the question last week: “What campaign promises would a President Trump try to keep?” Drezner concluded:

“If you think Donald Trump won't try to fulfill his core foreign policy promises as president than you are fooling yourself,” he wrote. And if you hope that ‘friends of Japan’ will emerge by his side to guide him, “Trump will empower advisors who seem to be even crazier than himself.”

HOW TRUMP’S ASIA ADVISERS SEE IT

Donald Trump’s Peace Through Strength Vision for the Asia-Pacific
How the Republican nominee will rewrite America’s relationship with Asia.

BY ALEXANDER GRAY, PETER NAVARRO
First appeared in Foreign Policy, November 7, 2016

In 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced with great fanfare in Foreign Policy that the United States would begin a military “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. This beating of the American chest was done against the backdrop of China’s increasing assertiveness in the region and the sense among many longtime American allies that the United States had lost sight of Asia’s strategic importance during 10 years of Middle Eastern wars.

President Barack Obama’s administration was right to signal reassurance to our Asian allies and partners. However, this pivot (and later “rebalance”) failed to capture the reality that the United States, particularly in the military sphere, had remained deeply committed to the region. This pivot has also turned out to be an imprudent case of talking loudly but carrying a small stick, one that has led to more, not less, aggression and instability in the region.

Initially, Clinton’s pivot and the Obama administration’s stated interest in countering China’s rising clout were met with general bipartisan agreement in Congress. Inside the Beltway, the analyst community also appeared to share a similar consensus that the global financial crisis had emboldened China. As one of Washington’s leading experts on Chinese foreign and security policy, Bonnie Glaser, told one of the authors in an on-camera interview: “The Chinese saw the United States as weakened by the financial crisis; and it created opportunities for China to test the United States and to try and promote its interests in its periphery in the hopes that the United States would not respond forcefully.”

With China’s multi-decade military modernization program bearing fruit — fueled ironically in no small part by the fruits of its large trade surplus with the United States — Beijing was in a prime position to flex its muscles. Washington’s pivot seemed to be an appropriate and timely response.

It did not take long, however, for the pivot to falter. Initially, it would mostly feature token gestures of American diplomatic and military support, for example, sending littoral combat ships to Singapore and 2,500 Marines to Darwin, Australia. However, over time, the administration would drastically cut the U.S. military — particularly by shrinking a U.S. Navy expected to be the tip of the pivot spear. Upon doing the pivot math, U.S. Naval War College professor Toshi Yoshihara soberly concluded in an interview that a “shrinking fleet” would “nullify our attempts to pivot to Asia.” His colleague and co-author James Holmes would more bluntly say in a separate interview that the pivot was “bush league.”

Curiously, the one aspect of the rebalance that seemed to most energize the administration was an economic rather than military gambit. This was pushing for passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade mega-deal involving 12 Pacific Rim countries accounting for “nearly 40 percent of global GDP.” Clinton herself called it the “gold standard” of trade deals. Against the backdrop of the pivot, the TPP deal was sold to the American public not as a way to increase urgently needed economic growth. (Voters have become increasingly immune to that failed siren song as millions of American jobs have been shipped overseas.) Rather, Obama and Clinton billed the TPP as a national security measure to help contain a rising China. As Ash Carter, Obama’s current defense secretary, asserted, passing TPP is as “important to me as another aircraft carrier.”

Of course, none of this — neither the shrinking “small stick” U.S. Navy nor a new “talk loudly” pivot — was lost on a rapidly militarizing China. While the United States continues to endure both a shrunken force and a readiness crisis brought about by sequestration, Beijing has created some 3,000 acres of artificial islands in the South China Sea with very limited American response. Beijing has also unilaterally declared an “air defense identification zone” in the East China Sea, expanded its illegitimate territorial claims everywhere from India to Indonesia, and further worsened its already loathsome human rights record.

It’s not just that Secretary Clinton’s weak pivot follow-through has invited Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas. She also faithfully executed the Obama administration’s failed policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea — a foreign-policy doctrine that has produced nothing but heightened instability and increased danger.

Indeed, since Obama took office, the North has conducted four nuclear tests and sunk a South Korean navy vessel. It has also pursued a vigorous ballistic missile program that has put Pyongyang on the path to both miniaturizing a warhead and developing a missile capable of reaching America’s West Coast. Today, despite repeated American warnings and U.S. entreaties to China to bring its wild child under control, the Kim regime remains firmly in power, the North Korean people remain oppressed and poverty-stricken, and the danger to America and its allies is more acute. So much for patience.

American allies and partners in the region have been disheartened by a foreign policy that has veered from feckless to mendacious. The Philippines’s recent high-profile rejection of American leadership, and open courtship with China, is a further setback in Asia for the Obama-Clinton foreign policy. This setback may be traced directly back to Hillary Clinton. Few in Washington remember that the Obama administration pointedly refused to intervene in 2012 when China blatantly violated a diplomatic agreement brokered by Secretary Clinton’s right-hand man in the region, Kurt Campbell; Beijing shredded that agreement by brazenly seizing Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines after agreeing to stand down. Washington’s utter failure to uphold its obligations to a longtime, pivotal ally during one of its most humiliating crises has no doubt contributed to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s low opinion of American security guarantees — and his recent move toward a China alliance.

Obama’s infamous “red line” pronouncement in Syria likewise was perceived throughout the Asia-Pacific region as an open invitation for aggression against U.S. allies and partners. Obama’s meekness cast doubt on Washington’s willingness to enforce long-standing security commitments in the face of Chinese or North Korean aggression. This disastrous mistake has been further compounded by a string of failures in our bilateral relations with key countries since 2009. Indeed, the litany of allies and partners mistreated under this administration is distressingly long, and the cumulative effect has been a clear diminution in U.S. regional clout relative to China.

For example, Thailand, a key U.S. treaty ally with a chaotic and unstable domestic political situation, was unceremoniously booted from Washington’s embrace following a military coup. It is now aligning itself more closely with Beijing, even in security matters.

The Obama administration’s treatment of Taiwan has been equally egregious. This beacon of democracy in Asia is perhaps the most militarily vulnerable U.S. partner anywhere in the world. As far back as 2010, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency warned that the balance of power in the skies above the Taiwan Strait was shifting toward Beijing. Yet Taiwan has been repeatedly denied the type of comprehensive arms deal it needs to deter China’s covetous gaze, despite the fact that such assistance is guaranteed by the legally binding Taiwan Relations Act.

Fortunately, the United States has tremendous opportunities to reclaim its geostrategic position in Asia. This is due mainly to China’s own miscalculations and the overplaying of its hand.

Almost in spite of the Obama administration’s repellant policies, U.S. partners like Japan, South Korea, India, and even Myanmar and Vietnam continue to seek closer ties with Washington across the spectrum. They view Beijing as a bully and potential aggressor that must be balanced against. The next administration will be well-placed to seize these strategic opportunities — if it has the will and vision to do so.

To turn this situation around, the White House will require a leader who understands the challenges we face while boldly seizing openings to further our interests. If past is prologue, Hillary Clinton’s position overseeing the failed pivot has revealed that she is wholly unsuited to rebuild an Asia policy that she has already helped severely wound.

Donald Trump has been clear and concise on his approach to U.S. foreign policy. It begins with a clear-eyed appraisal of U.S. national interests and a willingness to work with any country that shares our goals of stability, prosperity, and security.

Trump’s approach is two-pronged. First, Trump will never again sacrifice the U.S. economy on the altar of foreign policy by entering into bad trade deals like the North American Free Trade Agreement, allowing China into the World Trade Organization, and passing the proposed TPP. These deals only weaken our manufacturing base and ability to defend ourselves and our allies.

Second, Trump will steadfastly pursue a strategy of peace through strength, an axiom of Ronald Reagan that was abandoned under the Obama administration. He knows, however, that this will be a difficult task. As former Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne has warned:

Under the Obama administration, the Navy has shrunk to its smallest size since World War I. The Army is the smallest it has been since before World War II. The Air Force is the smallest in its history, and its aircraft are the oldest. Readiness levels across the services are the worst in a generation, with pilots facing significantly reduced cockpit time and deferring critical maintenance, Navy ships and crews deploying as long as 10 months, and Army units are deferring critical training before deployments. The horror story of naval aviators taking spare aircraft parts from museums to keep their planes flying is simply unacceptable for those who wear our nation’s uniform.

Trump has pledged to work with Congress to repeal defense sequestration, a cause with bipartisan support in both chambers. He has laid out the most detailed plan for rebuilding our military of any recent presidential nominee. This is in stark contrast to Clinton’s near total silence on the issue.

Lee Kuan Yew, the legendary founder of Singapore, was candid about what the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific meant for security. Noting that the stability provided by the U.S. defense presence benefited the entire region, including China, Lee once said the U.S. military presence is “very necessary” and essential for liberal values like freedom of the seas to prevail.

Trump will rebuild the U.S. Navy, now at 274 ships. His goal is 350 ships, a fleet in line with the up to 346 ships endorsed by the bipartisan National Defense Panel.

The U.S. Navy is perhaps the greatest source of regional stability in Asia. It currently protects $5 trillion of annual trade across the South China Sea and acts as an albeit faltering check on China’s growing ambitions. With the Chinese already outnumbering the U.S. Navy in Pacific-based submarines and projected to have 415 warships and nearly 100 submarines by 2030, the mere initiation of the Trump naval program will reassure our allies that the United States remains committed in the long term to its traditional role as guarantor of the liberal order in Asia.

Much has been made of Trump’s suggestion that U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea contribute their fair share to the cost of sustaining a U.S. presence in their countries. Japan is the world’s third-largest economy, with a GDP of more than $4 trillion. South Korea is the world’s 11th-largest economy, with a GDP of more than $1.3 trillion. The U.S. taxpayer not only rebuilt both countries after devastating wars, but American money and blood has allowed these allies the space to grow into mature democracies and advanced economies over the last half-century. It’s only fair — and long past time — for each country to step up to the full cost-sharing plate.

There is no question of Trump’s commitment to America’s Asian alliances as bedrocks of stability in the region. Trump will simply, pragmatically, and respectfully discuss with Tokyo and Seoul additional ways for those governments to support a presence all involved agree is vital — the same discussions will occur in Europe to bolster the critical NATO alliance.

Trump has demonstrated during his candidacy for the presidency a clear understanding of the building blocks for a successful foreign policy in Asia and globally. A cornerstone is undiminished American strength in support of U.S. national interests, where words have meaning and allies and competitors alike can be confident that the U.S. president stands by what he says. In a Donald Trump administration, these qualities will contribute to a far more stable Asia-Pacific — one that fully and peacefully serves the interests of America and its allies and partners.

Monday in Washington November 7, 2016

TAIWAN, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. 11/7, 9:00-10:30am. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Lotta Danielsson, Vice President, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council; Harry Krejsa, Research Associate, Asia-Pacific Security Program, CNAS; Robert S. Wang, Senior Policy Advisor, Covington & Burling, LLC; Moderator: Seth Cropsey, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson.

FIFTH GENERATION AIR COMBAT: THE OPERATOR'S PERSPECTIVE. 11/7, 9:30-10:30am. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speakers: Maj Gen Glen VanHerck, USAF, Commander, United States Air Force Warfare Center; Lt Col David Berke, USMC, F-35B Pilot; Lt Col Scott Gunn, USAF, F-35A Pilot; Maj David Deptula, USAF, F-22 Pilot; Maj Andrew Stolee, USAF, F-22 Pilot.

ELECTIONS IN HARD TIMES: BUILDING STRONGER DEMOCRACIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY. 11/7, 10:00-11:00am. Sponsor: Wilson Center (WWC). Speakers: Thomas Edward Flores, Co-Author, Associate Professor, Conflict Resolution and Political Science, George Mason University; Irfan Nooruddin, Co-Author, Director, India Initiative, Georgetown University, former Fellow, WWC; William J. Pomeranz, Deputy Director, Kennan Institute, WWC. PURCHASE
BOOK: http://amzn.to/2fnTt3j

US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NEW COLD WAR. 11/7, Noon, Lunch. Sponsor: Women’s Foreign Policy Group. Speaker: Angela Stent, Professor, Director, Center for Eurasian, Russian & East European Studies, Georgetown University. Fee

HOW CHINA IS COVERING THE U.S. ELECTION. 11/7, Noon-1:00pm. Sponsor: Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy, University of Southern California. Speakers: Jim Laurie, Consultant, CCTV America; Mike Ottey, China Daily, Beijing. 

IS ISLAMIC LAW COMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS? 11/7, 12:30pm. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Hauwa Ibrahim, Scholar, Sharia and Human Rights, Harvard Divinity School; Moataz El Fegiery, Protection Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa, Front Line Defenders; Amb. Frederic C. Hof, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Geneive Abdo, Author, The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Shi’a-Sunni Divide, Atlantic Council. 

FOREIGN POLICY: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX. 11/7, 12:30-2:00pm. Sponsor: Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (GWU). Speaker: Author Amitai Etzioni, Professor, International Affairs, Director, Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. 

PHILIPPINES PRESIDENT DUTERTE, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. 11/7, 1:00-2:00pm. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University (GWU). Speaker: Renato Cruz De Castro, Professor, International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila.

STOPPING NORTH KOREA, INC.: SANCTIONS EFFECTIVENESS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES. 11/7, 2:30-4:00pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: John Park, Faculty Affiliate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; Jim Walsh, Research Associate, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Jonathan Pollack, Senior Fellow, Interim SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings; Moderator: Richard Bush, Senior Fellow, Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings.

ICELAND'S RETREAT FROM FINANCIAL MARKETS. 11/7, 3:00-4:30pm. Sponsor: Richard and Sue Ann Masson Policy Center, Cato Institute. Speakers: Arturo Porzecanski, Distinguished Economist in Residence, American University; Ike Brannon, Visiting Fellow, Cato Institute; Mark A. Calabria (Moderator), Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute.

FROM EMPIRE TO HUMANITY: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIANISM. 11/7, 4:00-5:30pm. Sponsors: History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center; National History Center of the American Historical Association. Speaker: author Amanda Moniz, Associate Director, National History Center of the American Historical Association.

THE BLURRING DEFINITIONS OF WAR. 11/7, 6:00-8:00pm. Sponsor: rethinking Seminar Series, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins. Speaker: Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Law Center, Associate Dean, Graduate Program, Georgetown University, Author, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything – Tales from the Pentagon. 

Prime Minister of Japan’s Schedule July 20-27, 2015

Monday, July 20, 2015 

AM 

09:11 Depart private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo

09:23 Arrive and deliver address Grand Opening Ceremony for Special Events in Commemoration of the 20th Marine Day at the Capital Hotel [SPEECH]
09:59 Depart hotel
10:18 Arrive at Tokyo Coast Security Guard’s vessel base at Aomi, Tokyo.
10:24 Depart on a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel, ‘Matsunami’, accompanied with Commandant of Japan Coast Guard, Sato Yuji
10:41 Observes Japan Coast Guard Drills
11:44 End observation
11:46 Arrive at Yokohama Maritime Disaster Prevention Base
11:48 Encourage members of the Japan Coast Guard
11:52 Finish his words of encouragement
11:53 Lunch meeting with Mr. Sato and other generals on the patrol vessel Matsunami, visit

PM 

00:34 End lunch meeting with Mr. Sato and other generals
00:40 Observe rescue drill at the base
01:11 End observation
01:12 Observe Japan Coast Guard Museum, Yokohama
01:27 End observation
01:28 Depart location
01:30 Arrive at the patrol vessel ‘Akitsushima’
01:38 Depart ‘Akitsukishima’ via helicopter
01:51 Arrive at official residence’s heliport
01:55 Depart office
02:09 Arrive at office
03:57 Depart office
04:14 Arrive at Fuji TV headquarters in Sendai, Tokyo
04:52 Appear on news program
06:23 Finish filming news program
05:36 Depart from Fuji TV
07:02 Arrive at private residence
07:03 Dinner meeting with Chairman of Ushio electronics company, Ushio Jiro and LDP Lower House member, Kishi Nobuo
09:41 End of dinner meeting with Mr. Ushio and Mr. Kishi

Tuesday, July 21, 2015 

AM 

08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
08:42 Depart from private residence
08:55 Arrive at office
09:02 Cabinet meeting starts
09:10 Cabinet meeting ends
09:13 Headquarters for Healthcare and Medical Strategy Promotion
09:25 Meeting ends
10:06 Depart office
10:16 Arrive at Nippon TV at Shinbashi, Tokyo
10:30 Start filming of BS Nippon News Program TV
11:17 Filming ends
11:21 Depart
11:31 Arrive at office 

PM 

01:00 Meet with Japan Community Broadcast Association, Director of Tominaga Youichi
01:10 End meeting with Mr. Tomigaya
01:43 Meet with LDP Upper House member, Ejima Kiyoshi
01:53 End meeting with Mr. Ejima Kiyoshi
02:15 Meet with Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Takaichi Sanae
02:30 End meeting with Mr. Takaichi
02:31 Meet with MOFA’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka and Director-General of Intelligence and Analysis Service Oka Hiroshi
02:57 Mr. Oka leaves
03:01 Mr. Saiki leaves
03:42 Depart office
03:52 Arrive at hotel Grand Hyatt Tokyo in Roppongi, Tokyo. In Grand Ballroom, attend and deliver address at Sports and Culture World Forum Public-Private Collaboration Implementation Committee
04:10 Depart from hotel
04:20 Arrive at office
04:47 Ministerial Council for the Further Consideration of the New National Stadium Construction Plan
04:55 Meeting ends
05:06 Ministerial Council on the Monthly Economic Report and Other Relative Issues
05:20 Meeting ends
05:31 Meeting of Expert panel on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the World War II
05:58 Meeting ends
06:00 Meet with Director of National Security Council, (NSC) Yachi Shotaro and MOFA’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka
06:29 End meeting with Mr. Yachi and Mr. Saiki
06:38 Depart office
06:39 Arrive at official residence. Dinner with meeting with experts from panel hosted by Mr. Abe
08:26 To see off members
08:27 Finish seeing off members

Wednesday, July 22, 2015 

AM 

08:00 At official residence (no morning visitors)
09:25 Depart official residence
09:26 Arrive at office
09:36 Meet with LDP Lower House member, Kawamura Takeo
10:03 End meeting with Mr. Kawamura
10:04 Meet with Director of NSC, Yachi Shotaro, MOFA’s Director- General of Foreign Policy, Hiramatsu Kenji and Ministry of Defense, Director-General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Kuroe Tetsuro and Chief of Staff for Maritime Self-Defense, Kawano Katsutoshi
10:30 End meeting with Mr. Yachi, Mr. Hiramatsu, Mr. Kuroe and Mr. Katsutoshi
10:31 Meet with Director of NSC, Yachi Shotaro
10:52 End meeting with Mr. Yachi
11:13 Meet with MOFA’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka
11:58 End meeting with Mr. Saiki 

PM 

01:40 Meet with LDP House member, Kawai Katsuyuki
01:58 End meeting with Mr. Kawai
01:59 Meet with LDP House member, Imamura Masahiro and Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Kimura Taro
02:21 End meeting with Mr. Imamura and Mr. Kimura
02:23 Record video message for World Assembly for Women
02:34 End recording
02:38 Meet with Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Amari Akira, and Cabinet members: Vice-Minister, Matsuyama Kenji and Director-Generals for Policies on Cohesive Society, Maekawa Mamoru, Habuka Shigeki and Tawa Hiroshi
03:01 End meeting with Mr. Amari, Mr. Matsuyama, Mr. Maekawa, Mr. Habuka and Mr. Tawa
03:10 Meet with Ministry of Finance’s Vice-Minister, Tanaka Kazuho and Director-General of International Bureau, Asakawa Masatsugu
03:35 End meeting with Mr. Tanaka and Mr. Asakawa
03:36 Meet with Chairman of Science and Technology in Society Forum, Omi Koji
04:04 End meeting with Omi
04:20 Meet with the former President of Philippines Japanese descent association, Carlos Teraoka
04:36 End meeting with Mr. Teraoka
05:15 Meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
05:51 Meeting ends
06:31 Reception and commemorative photo with President of Honduras, Mr. Juan Orlando Hernández Alvarado. Japan-Honduras Summit Meeting and Other Events
06:32 Ceremony by the guard of honor
06:39 Ceremomy ends
06:41 Summit Conference with President of Honduras, Mr. Hernandez
07:16 Summit ends
07:19 Join declaration signing ceremony
07:21 Ceremony ends
07:22 Joint press release
07:38 Press release ends
07:39 Depart office
07:40 Arrive at official residence, dinner meeting hosted by Mr. Abe and his wife, Akie
08:44 See off President of Honduras, Mr. Hernandez
08:46 Finish seeing off Mr. Hernandez

Thursday, July 23, 2015

AM 

08:00 At official residence (no morning visitors)
08:27 Depart official residence
08:30 Arrive at The Capitol Hotel Tokyu. Breakfast meeting with JR Tokai Honorary President, Kasai Yoshiyuki
09:51 Depart hotel
09:53 Arrive at office
09:54 Interview open to all media: regarding ‘the successful launch of Soyuz spaceship that astronaut, Yui Kimiya took.’ Mr. Abe comments, ‘Yui san is a middle-age star. I hope that he flourishes in his pursuits and capitalizes on experiences.’
10:08 Meet with Minister in charge of Abduction Issue, Yamatani Eriko
10:44 End meeting with Ms. Yamatani
10:45 Meet with Cabinet Advisor, Fuji Satoshi
11:13 End meeting with Mr. Fuji
11:14 Meet with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Kimura Taro
11:24 End meeting with Mr. Kimura
11:30 Meet with Minister for Reconstruction, Takeshita Watara and Vice-Minister for Reconstruction, Okamoto Masakatsu
11:51 End meeting with Mr. Takeshita and Mr. Okamoto
11:52 Meet with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Aso Taro and Ministry of Finance’s Deputy Vice-Minister, Fukuda Junichi

PM 

12:00 End meeting with Mr. Aso and Mr. Fukuda
12:02 Meeting of the Government and Ruling Parties on the FY2016 Guidelines for Budget Requests
00.10 Meeting ends
01:26 Meet with Minister in charge of TPP, Amari Akira, Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Minagawa Yoshitsugu and Governmental Headquarters for TPP members: Chief Domestic Coordinator, Sasaki Toyonari, Deputy Chief Negotiator, Oe Hiroshi
02:06 End meeting with Mr. Sasaki and Mr. Oe
02:07 National Security Council meeting. Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Miyazawa Yoichi also attends
02:41 Meeting ends
02:42 Meet with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Aso Taro
02:52 End meeting with Mr. Aso
02.53 Meet with Minister in charge of Tokyo Olympic and Paralympics, Endo Yuko and Cabinet advisor, Okamoto Masakatsu
03:10 End meeting with Mr. Endo and Mr. Okamoto
03:11 Meet with the Chairman of the Caucus ‘Protect national interest against TPP negotiations’ that is organized by LDP’s Diet members, Etou Taku, and his collegues
03:28 End meeting with Mr. Etou
03:35 Depart office
03:42 Arrive at Nippon Broadcasting System in Yuraku-cho, Tokyo
04:00 Appear on radio programme
04:32 Finish radio programme
04:34 Depart
04:40 Arrive at office
05:23 Receives a courtesy call from Young Descendants of Former Inhabitants of the Northern Territories of Japan
05:32 Courtesy call ends
05:42 Meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
06:09 Meeting ends
06:10 Meet with MOFA’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka and Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau, Hiramatsu Kenji
06:30 Meeting ends
06:31 Depart office
06:32 Arrive at official residence

Friday, July 24, 2015 

AM 

08:00 At official residence (no morning visitors)
08:45 Depart official residence
08:46 Arrive at office
08:52 Headquarters for the Promotion of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games
09:10 Meeting ends
09:16 Cabinet meeting
09:37 Cabinet meeting ends
09:38 Meet with former LDP Secretary-General, Takebe Tsutomu
10:01 End meeting with Mr. Takebe
10:02 Receive a proposal from the LDP on National Resilience and Related Matters
10:21 Finish receiving the proposal
10:27 Meet with Japan-China Economic Association members, Muneoka Shoji and Chairman, Cho Fujio
10:57 End meeting with Mr. Muneoka and Mr. Cho
10:58 Meet with MOFA’s Vice Minister, Saiki Akitaka and Director-General of Intelligence and Analysis Service, Oka Hiroshi
11:39 End meeting with Mr. Saiki and Mr. Oka
11:40 Meet with African Development Bank, President Kaberuka
11:51 End meeting with Mr. Kaberuka

PM 

12:03 Meet with LDP Secretary General Tanigaki Sadakazu
12:36 End meeting with Mr. Tanigaki
01:42 Meet with Director of Cabinet Intelligence, Kitamura Shigeru
02:17 End meeting with Mr. Kitamura
02:18 Meet with Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture, Nakamura Hodo
02:29 End meeting with Mr. Nakamura
02:32 Meeting amongst Main Ministers on the TPP
02:42 Meeting ends
02:47 Meet with Director of NSC, Yachi Shotaro, MOFA’s Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau, Hiramatsu Kenji and Ministry of Defense members: Director-General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Kuroe Tetsuro, Director-General of Bureau of Operational Policy, Miyama Nobuaki, and Chief of Staff for Joint Staff Council, Kawano Katsutoshi
03:11 End meeting with Mr. Yachi, Mr. Hiramatsu, Mr. Kuroe, Mr. Miyama and Mr. Kawano
04:28 Depart office
04:56 Arrive at Zensho-an in Taito, Tokyo. Zazen with LDP Lower House member, Yamamoto Yuji
06:06 Depart temple
06:37 Arrive at Hotel New Otani in Kioichio, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with actor, Tsugawa Masahiko at a sushi restaurant ‘Kyubey’.
09:27 Depart hotel
09:48 Arrive at private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo

Saturday, July 25, 2015

AM
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
Stay at private residence throughout the morning 

PM
No visitors and stay at private residence in the afternoon
05:41 Depart private residence
05:56 Arrive at official residence
06:09 Meet with Chairperson of LDP Policy Research Council, Inada Tomomi
08:21 End meeting with Ms. Inada

Sunday, July 26, 2015

AM
09:52 Depart official residence
10:07 Arrive at Hotel Grand Pacific Le Daiba in Daiba, Tokyo. Attend, give lecture and take commemorative photo at The International Conference for Women in Business
10:31 Depart hotel
10:48 Arrive at Hanada airport. Lunch with ministerial secretary in private room at Excel Hotel Tokyo 

PM
00:17 Board Japan Airlines flight no. 3971
01:29 Arrive at Kitakyushu City airport
01:36 Depart airport
02:48 Arrive at ‘Michinoeki Ofuku’ in Mineshi City in Yamaguchi prefecture. Purchase soft serve ice cream
02:58 Depart
03:28 Arrive at Rapportyuya cultural facilities. Attend ‘Agricultural Art Festival 2015.’
04:37 Depart
04:59 Arrive at ‘Nakatohonjin’ Izakaya. Dinner meeting with Mayor of Nagato City, Onishi Kurao and Ministeral Secretary
05:37 Depart
06:52 Arrive at Yamaguchi Ube airport
07:29 Board Japan Airlines flight no. 296
08:46 Arrive at Haneda airport
08:58 Depart from from airport
09:24 Arrive at private residence at Tomigaya, Tokyo

Provisional translation by Kelly Ing

Monday in Washington, May 16, 2016

EXAMINING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION’S ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICIES. 5/16, 10:45am-2:00pm. Sponsor: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). Speakers: Karim El Mokri, Senior Economist, OCP Policy Center; Abelaaziz Ait Ali, Economist, OCP Policy Center; Theodore Moran, Nonresident Senior Fellow, PIIE.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY: AN ASSESSMENT. 5/16, 11:00am-1:00pm. Sponsor: George Washington University (GWU). Speakers: Congressman James R. Langevin (D-RI), Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee; Michael Papay, Vice President and Chief Innovation Security Officer, Northrop Grumman Corporation; Charles Snyder, Senior Advisor for Cyber Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense; Maj. Gen. Christopher P. Weggeman, Director, Plans and Policy (J5), U.S. Cyber Command; Mark Young, IronNet Cybersecurity and CCHS Senior Fellow.

THE LURE AND PITFALLS OF MIRVS: FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE. 5/16, 11:00am-2:30pm. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Alexey Arbatov, Chair at Carnegie Moscow Center’s Nonproliferation Program; Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati; Lynn Davis, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation; Jeffrey G. Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Middlebury Institute; Michael Chase, Senior political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Jaganath Sankaran, Research Scholar, CSIS; Mansoor Ahmed, Stanton Nuclear Security junior Faculty Fellow; editor Michael Krepon, Co-Founder, Stimson Center.

ON THE NEW ARAB WARS: UPRISINGS AND ANARCHY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 5/16, Noon-1:30pm. Sponsor: Carnegie Endowment. Speakers: Marc Lynch, Nonresident Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie; William J. Burns, President, Carnegie; Michele Dunne, Director and Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie.

ENHANCING THE U.S.-KOREA SECURITY ALLIANCE AND ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP. 5/16, 2:00-4:30pm. Sponsors: Korean-American Club (Hanmi Club); Korea Economic Institute (KEI). Speakers: Donald Manzullo, President and CEO, KEI; David Pong, Chairman, Hanmi Club; Ahn Ho-young, Ambassador, Republic of Korea; James Goldgeier, Dean, School of International Service, American University; Hyun Oh-seok, Chair Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Lee Sang-seok, Vice Chairman, Hankook Ilbo and Korea Times; Kang Chan-ho, Editorial Writer, Joong-ang Ilbo; James Miller, President, Adaptive Strategies, LLC; Matthew P. Goodman, Chair in Political Economy, CSIS; Yang Young-eun, Anchor, KBS News; Yoon Kyung-ho, Editorial Writer, Maekyung Daily.

THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT AT 100: RETHINKING THE MAP OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST. 5/16, 2:00-4:30pm. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Elliott Abrams, Council on Foreign Relations; Ryan Crocker, Former Ambassador to Iraq and Syria; Adeed Dawisha, Miami University; Olivier Decottignies, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Martin Indyk, Brookings; Robert Kagan, Brookings; Danielle Pletka, AEI; Michael Rubin, AEI; Dan Yergin, HIS.

MANAGING COMPLEXITY: ECONOMIC POLICY COOPERATION AFTER THE CRISIS. 5/16, 3:00-4:30pm. Sponsor: Brookings Institution. Speakers: Co-Editor Tamim Bayoumi, Visiting Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Kermal Dervis, Vice President and Director, Global Economy and Development; Fred Bergsten, Senior Fellow and Director Emeritus, Peterson Institute; Heidi Crebo-Rediker, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Vito Gaspar, Director, Financial Affairs Department, IMF.

TPP: A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE – A CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN. 5/16, 5:00pm. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Adm. Michael Mullen, 17th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gov. Jon M. Huntsman Jr., Chairman, Atlantic Council.

USJI Week in Washington February 22-26, 2016

US-JAPAN RESEARCH

ESTABLISHING A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: Emerging opportunities for international collaboration on SDG’s. 2/23, 10:30-11:50am, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute. Speakers: Fumiko Kasuga, Visiting Professor, Integrated Research System for Sustainability Science, University of Tokyo; Jon Padgham, Capacity Building Lead, Future Earth Secretariat hub in Colorado; Maria Uhle, Program Director, International Activities, Directorate, Geosciences, National Science Foundation (NSF); Moderator: Hassan Virji, Executive Director, International START Secretariat USA. Location: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office, 2001 L St., NW, Suite 1050.

REFUGEES UNWILLING TO RETURN: Cases of the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Great East Japan Earthquake, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy. 2/24, 10:00am-Noon, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI). Carl Bruch , Senior Attorney, Co-Director, International Programs, Environmental Law Institute(ELI); Nicholas S. Bryner, Visiting Associate Professor, George Washington University; Heather Croshaw, Visiting Attorney, Environmental Law Institute (ELI); Moderator, Mikiyasu Nakayama, Operating Advisor, USJI, Professor, The University of Tokyo. Location: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office, 2001 L St., NW, Suite 1050.


PLANT SCIENCE RESEARCH FOR GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY. 2/24, 1:00-2:30pm, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI). Speakers: Jocelyn Kenneth Campbell Rose, Professor, Cornell University; James J. Giovannoni, Professor, Cornell University; Tohru Ariizumi, Associate Professor, University of Tsukuba; Moderator: Hiroshi Ezura, Professor, University of Tsukuba. Location: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office, 2001 L St., NW, Suite 1050.

ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLICIES IN EAST ASIA. 2/25, 10:00am-Noon, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI). Speakers: Tomoaki Watanabe, Assistant Professor, Kyushu University; Nobuhiro Horii, Associate Professor, Kyushu University; Masaki Takahashi, Senior Power Engineer, World Bank; Joanna Lewis, Associate Professor, Georgetown University; David Livingston, Associate, Carnegie’s Energy and Climate Program; Moderator: Toru Oga, Associate Professor, Kyushu University. Location: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office, 2001 L St., NW, Suite 1050.

REJUVENATING JAPAN'S ECONOMY AND INDUSTRIES - Abenomics in the Long Run. 2/25, 1:00-3:00pm, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI). Speakers: Glen S. Fukushima, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, University Professor, Waseda University; Junichi Mori, Vice Chair, U.S.-Japan Research Institute, Professor, Vice President, International Relations, Kyoto University; Yoshinori Hara, Professor, Kyoto University; Moderator, Takashi Hikino, Associate Professor, Kyoto University. Location: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Washington Office, 2001 L St., NW, Suite 1050. Contact:

COMPETING OR COMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC VISIONS? REGIONALISM AND THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE, TPP, RECEP AND THE AIIB. 2/26, 10:30am-Noon, Washington, DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI); Wilson Center’s Asia Program. Speakers: Mauricio Moreira, Principal Economic Advisor, Trade and Integration Sector, Inter-American Development Bank; Takashi Terada, Professor of International Relations, Doshisha University; Kent Huges, Wilson Center. Location: Ronald Reagan Building, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, 6th Floor Auditorium.

BUILDING THE TOMODACHI GENERATION: Engaging U.S. and Japanese University Students in Social Problem-Solving. 2/26, 10:00am-12:30pm, Washington DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute (USJI). Speakers: Katsuichi Uchida, President, USJI, Assistant to the President, Global Affairs, Waseda University; Christopher Joseph Cook, Chief Compliance Officer, Keel Point Advisors. Location: Washington Center Residential and Academic Facility, 1005 3rd St., NE.

There will also be a series of events only open to students. Please check the homepage for details.