The Okinawa Problem

The Governor of Okinawa Denny Tamaki will be in the U.S. the week of September 8th. He will be speaking publicly at in Washington, DC at the Hudson Institute on the 9th and George Washington University's Sigur Center on the 11th and in New York City at Columbia University on the 12th.

Okinawans must not be overlooked in new US–Japan counter-crime forum 

By Alexis Dudden, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies at the National University of Singapore, and APP Member.

First Published in the East Asian Forum, 6 September 2024.

On 22 July 2024, US Forces Japan Commander Lieutenant General Ricky Rupp announced the creation of a new joint US–Japan forum to address the endemic issue of crimes committed off base by US military personnel stationed in Okinawa — particularly sex crimes.

How Rupp’s forum will differ from the Cooperative Working Team established in October 2000 to address similar concerns is not clear. The Cooperative Working Team met 27 times until petering out in April 2017. It brought together representatives from the US military and government, Japanese foreign and defence ministries, the Okinawan prefectural government and police, as well as members of the prefecture’s chambers of commerce and bar association. Since its dissolution, active-duty US servicemen in Okinawa have committed several well-documented rapes, abductions and assaults — including against children.

The task force must acknowledge Okinawan elected officials’ right to immediate and accurate information about crimes US soldiers commit. This fundamental step does not require changing existing protocols. Instead, it requires that the US government, US military and the Japanese central government adhere to procedures established in the 1997 US–Japan Joint Committee Agreement. This document augmented Okinawans’ rights with regard to Article XVII of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan, which concerns jurisdiction over crimes committed on Japanese territory.

Notably indiscernible on the Japanese Foreign Ministry website, the Okinawan Prefectural Government wants more publicity for the Agreement’s ‘Notification Channel Details for Okinawa-related Issues’. According to protocol, in the aftermath of a crime committed by a US service member or civilian attached to the US military, the commander responsible must notify the duty officer at command headquarters and the Naha Defence Facilities Administration Bureau.

The US side then moves up through military and diplomatic chains of command to the US Embassy in Tokyo, while the Japanese side moves from the Naha-based agency — Okinawa’s capital city — and simultaneously notifies the Okinawan prefectural government, Defence Administration Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Okinawa Office, who then convey information to the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo.

This did not happen during the first half of 2024, leading Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki to emphasise during his press conference on 7 August at Tokyo’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan that he cannot be sure how many crimes he and previous Okinawan prefectural officials have never even learned about.

Tamaki accused the Japanese central government of ignoring his right to information about these crimes as Okinawa’s highest elected official. Referencing the 24 December 2023 abduction and rape of an Okinawan minor as well as the 26 May 2024 sexual assault of an Okinawan woman, Tamaki gave a full explanation of the 1997 Notification Channel Details and the Japanese government’s wilful failure to abide by them.

The repetitious nature of the crimes against Okinawan women and girls, and the US and Japanese government’s botched response to them — specifically the failure to notify the Okinawan prefectural government about crimes against their citizens — highlights the need for Commander Rupp’s forum to do something different from the prior Working Team. Reforms are urgent, with a third instance of sexual assault reported on 6 September 2024.

Speculation continues concerning Tokyo’s rationale for withholding information from the Governor. The central government may have feared that Okinawans would protest against the dominant presence of the US military, as they did in 1995 following three US servicemen’s abduction and gang rape of an elementary schoolgirl.

Such protests could have adversely affected the Okinawa elections held on 16 June 2024. Tokyo’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party wanted victory for the Governor’s opponents in order to resume construction on the unpopular new US base at Henoko, that Tamaki and his supporters blocked. Tamaki’s opponents won the election, and Tokyo ordered construction of the base to recommence despite ongoing local protests.

During the press conference Tamaki also underscored the challenge of overcoming the central government’s perennial disdain for Okinawans’ place in structural matters involving the US–Japan Alliance, despite the centrality of the territory and its people to this calculus. Taking umbrage with Tokyo’s use of ‘privacy’ as justification for not sharing information, Tamaki reiterated his 10 July 2024 Letter of Protest to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and requested ‘that all crimes, incidents, and accidents involving US military service members and related personnel be reported, without fail, to the prefectural government’.

In September, Governor Tamaki will visit Washington to drive home his concerns to members of the US Congress and related bureaucracies. The governor will explain the disproportionate burden he and his constituents bear vis a vis US bases in Japan under the United States’ broader ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’. Noticeably, this policy emphasises a ‘rules-based order’. For these words to have any meaning at all, the Japanese government and the United States government and military must include Okinawans as equals.

Monday Asia Events, March 22, 2021

BUILDING BACK DIPLOMACY: THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION STRIDES INTO ASIA. 3/22, 9:30-11:30am, LIVE WEBCAST. Sponsors: Wilson Center; Hyundai Motor-korea Foundation Center For Korean History And Public Policy; Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. Speakers: J. Stapleton Roy, Distinguished Fellow, Founding Director Emeritus, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States; Abraham Denmark, Director, Asia Program; Robert Daly, Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States; Shihoko Goto, Deputy Director for Geoeconomics and Senior Associate for Northeast Asia, Asia Program; Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia; Jean H. Lee, Director, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Journalist and former Pyongyang Bureau Chief, Associated Press; Charles Edel, Global Fellow, Senior Fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney; Rui Zhong, Program Associate.

ISIS AND THE FUTURE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 3/22, 10:30am-Noon (EDT). WEBCAST. Sponsors: United States Institute of Peace (USIP); Wilson Center (WWC). Speakers: James F. Jeffrey, Chair, Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS; Ali Soufan, Chairman and CEO, Soufan Group; Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Author and Columnist, The New Yorker.

CSIS COMMISSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE. 3/22, 11:00am-12:15pm, ZOOM WEBINAR. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Vincent Brooks, Former Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK; Wendy Cutler, Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Former Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative; Randall Schriver, Chairman, Project 2049 Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense; Kathleen Stephens, President & CEO, Korea Economic Institute of America; Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea; John J. Hamre, CSIS President and CEO, and Langone Chair in American Leadership; Joseph S. Nye Jr., CSIS Trustee; Victor Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair; Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair; Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair; Katrin Fraser Katz, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Korea Chair.

SENATOR DEB FISCHER ON THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION. 3/22, 11:30am-Noon (EDT). VIRTUAL EVENT. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speaker: The Honorable Deb Fischer (R-NE), United States Senator; Moderator: Patty-Jane Geller, Policy Analyst, Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense, Heritage Foundation.

TIME FOR A NEW NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM FOR DEFENSE AND COMPETITIVENESS. 3/22, 1:00-2:30pm (EDT). WEBINAR. Sponsor: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Speakers: Adam Smith, US Representative (D-WA); Michael Brown, Director of the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), United States Department of Defense; Scott Stapp, Corporate Vice President & CTO, Northrop Grumman; Matt Turpin, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution, and Senior Advisor, Palantir Technologies; General Stephen Wilson, Former Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; Moderator: Robert D. Atkinson, President, ITIF.

CHINA’S NEW LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: UNPACKING CHINA’S “TWO MEETINGS”. 3/22, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), LIVE WEBCAST. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia; Director, China Power Project; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies.

THE POLITICS OF MASS VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 3/22, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT). WEBCAST. Sponsors: Wilson Center (WWC); National History Center (NHC). Speakers: Laura Robson, Oliver-McCourtney Professor of History, Penn State University; Laila Parsons, Professor of Modern Middle East History, McGill University; Ussama Makdisi, Professor of History and the first holder of the Arab-American Educational Foundation Chair of Arab Studies, Rice University; Moderators: Christian F. Ostermann, Director, History and Public Policy Program, Cold War International History Project, North Korea Documentation Project, and Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, WWC; Eric Arnesen, Professor of History, George Washington University, and Director, National History Center of the American Historical Association.

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DONIA HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER DISCUSSION. SHARED SOVEREIGNTY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FRAGILE STATES. 3/22, 4:30-5:30pm, (EDT) ZOOM WEBINAR. Sponsor: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan. Speakers: John D. Ciorciari, Associate Professor, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan; Susanna Campbell, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University. 

TECHNICAL ISSUES OF FUTENMA REPLACEMENT FACILITY. 3/22, 5:00-5:45 (EST), ZOOM WEBINAR. Sponsor: Okinawa Prefecture Washington, DC Office. Speaker: Dr. Shoji Kamao, Associate Professor, Nihon University. 

MOTOSHIGE ITOH (GAKUSHUIN UNIVERSITY), "JAPAN’S GROWTH STRATEGY IN THE 2020S: DEMAND- AND SUPPLY-SIDE DIMENSIONS". 3/22, 8:00-9:00pm (EDT), ONLINE ONLY. Sponsors: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School. Speakers: Motoshige Itoh, Professor, the Faculty of International Social Sciences, Gakushuin University; Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo. Moderator: Christina Davis, Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations; Professor of Government; and Susan S. and Kenneth L. Wallach Professor, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University.

An Alternative to Henoko as a Marine Corps Air Base

A NEW VISION FOR OKINAWA AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NEW DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE (ND)

Wednesday, July 12 

2:00 PM – 3:30 PM

East-West Center in Washington
1819 L St, NW, Washington, DC

Sixth Floor Conference Room

This event is free and open to the public.

Seminar will be broadcast live. 

Copies of the report will be available at the seminar.

REGISTER HERE by 5 PM EST July 11.

SPEAKERS

Tomohiro Yara
ND Board Member and ND Senior Researcher; Member of the ND Okinawa Project

Shigeru Handa
Member of the ND Okinawa Project

Sayo Saruta
Director, New Diplomacy Initiative (ND)
Dr. Mike M. Mochizuki (Discussant)
ND Board Member; Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

☵

With the start of seawall construction for land reclamation on the shores of the Henoko area of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, persistent resistance from Okinawans is strengthening with more legal action being undertaken by Governor Takeshi Onaga to stop the construction. Opposition may extend to other US military installations, including the highly important Kadena Air Base, which could undermine the US presence in Okinawa as well as the US-Japan alliance.

For the past three years, New Diplomacy Initiative (ND), a Japanese think tank established in 2013, has hosted study sessions for diplomacy, defense, and security experts to analyze and research the military role of the US Marines in Okinawa and the state of “deterrence.”

Since February 2016, ND has continued its research on the deployment of the US Marines in Okinawa, using US documents and facts about Marine operations as sources, and has held regular study sessions to compile a counterargument against the assertion that Henoko is the only option for the Futenma relocation. This report contains the results of those discussions, and sets forth a solution that will equally benefit Japan, the United States and Okinawa.

☵

Tomohiro Yara is a Board Member and Senior Researcher at New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) as well as a member of the ND Okinawa Project. He graduated from the University of the Philippines and thereafter worked at the Okinawa Times, where from 1992 he covered US military base issues. After working at the Okinawa Times Tokyo Bureau, he served as an editorial writer and social section chief. In order to research the 2006 US military defense posture review, from 2007 he spent one year at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, as a visiting researcher. He left the Okinawa Times in June 2012 and is currently a freelance writer.

Shigeru Handa is a member of the ND Okinawa Project. After working at the Shimotsuke Shimbun, he joined the Chunichi Shimbun in 1991, and serves as an editorialist and senior staff writer at the Tokyo Shimbun. He is also an adjunct professor at Dokkyo University as well as Hosei University. He has been covering the Defense Agency since 1992. In 2007, he was awarded the 13th Peace and Cooperative Journalist Fund of Japan award (main prize) for his column "New Guardian Thought" [新防人考], which was published in the Tokyo Shimbun and the Chunichi Shimbun.

Sayo Saruta is the Director of New Diplomacy Initiative (ND), a think tank in Tokyo, and an Attorney at Law in Japan and the State of New York. After graduating from Waseda University, she received her Master’s degree from Colombia University Law School as well as her second Master’s degree in International Relations from American University in Washington, DC. Regarding U.S.-Japan diplomacy and other political issues, she has aided in providing opportunities for various voices of Japan to speak on various debates between Japan, the U.S. and other East Asian countries. She has arranged for Japan’s Diet members and local groups visit to Washington DC. to discuss topics such as Okinawa base issues, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear energy. Her research interest is in the establishment theory of the U.S.-Japan diplomacy and her published works include Future Shape of US-Japan Diplomacy: Delivering Diverse Voices on Okinawa, Security, Nuclear Issues and TPP to Washington [Atarashii Nichibei Gaikou wo Kirihiraku] (Shueisha) and Voluntary Dependence on the US [Jihatsuteki Taibei Juzoku] (Kadokawa) (both English-language publication titles are provisional).

Mike M. Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University. Professor Mochizuki was associate dean for academic programs at the Elliott School from 2010 to 2014 and director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies from 2001 to 2005. He co-directs the “Rising Powers Initiative” and the “Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific” research and policy project of the Sigur Center. Previously he was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was also Co-Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND and has taught at the University of Southern California and Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. His books include Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia (co-editor and co-author, 2017); Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes (co-editor and author, 2016); The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the US-Japan Alliance, and Regional Security (co-editor and author, 2013); China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (co-author, 2013); Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (co-editor and author, 2007), and Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (co-author, 2003). He has published articles in such journals as The American Interest, Asia Pacific Review, Foreign Affairs, International Security, Japan Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Nonproliferation Review, Survival, and Washington Quarterly.

The suicide politics of Futenma relocation

Prospects on the MCAS Futenma Issue

By Ms. Yukie Yoshikawa, Adjunct Fellow, Edwin O. Resichauer Center, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University and APP member

First appeared in Nikkei Business, September 17, 2015 in Japanese

Newly elected Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga, supported by both conservatives and reformists, which is quite a rare phenomenon in Okinawa, announced his team leaders on the US military base issues at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015. Mr. Mitsuo Ageta, the former speaker of the Naha City Assembly, was appointed as Vice Governor (VG) in charge of base issues--the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) has two vice governors. Mr. Masaru Machida was appointed Director General of the Governor’s Office. He had been an executive at the Okinawa Churashima Foundation, an affiliated organization of the OPG. VG Ageta used to be a member of the Okinawa Chapter of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), yet left after the party switched its policy on the Henoko plan from "against" to "accommodation." He formed the Shimpuh-kai (New Wind Group) as a counter. 

The Regional Security Policy Division, of which I was a member, is still alive. People wondered whether this section could survive the Onaga administration, since it was created by his predecessor, Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima. Gov. Onaga replaced this division with one named to clearly express its intent that is to deal with “the issue on the construction of new Henoko base” and called it more directly the Henoko Base Construction Countermeasures Division [ 辺野古新基地建設対策課].

Onaga can play only “All-or-Nothing” negotiation
Despite his landslide victory in the November 2014 gubernatorial election, Gov. Onaga’s power base is not solid. As his slogan during the campaign was “all-Okinawa,” Mr. Onaga limits his own maneuverable space to the minimum. In other words, all he can say  “No Henoko” and “No Ospreys” are acceptable by all Okinawans, including supporters of the US military bases. “All-Okinawa” does not indicate any realistic compromise. Should he make a statement beyond “No Henoko” his power base shatter.

In other words, Gov. Onaga can only play an “all-or-nothing” game, namely accept everything he says or no deal. Thus, he cannot be a reasonable negotiator with either the Government of Japan (GOJ) or the US Government (USG).

Since the inauguration of the Onaga administration in December 2014, senior officials of the GOJ have refused to meet Gov. Onaga. This was considered  “extra-ordinary.” (Other governors rarely meet with the prime ministers.) This “all-Okinawa” phenomenon has never happened since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. People speculated that Tokyo viewed Naha, the capital of Okinawa Prefecture, cautiously, wondering whether the Governor could maintain his power base with both conservatives and reformists.

Nevertheless, Gov. Onaga and senior officials of the GOJ did start to meet in April 2015. In August, the two parties held a series of meetings discussing how to reduce Okinawa’s hosting responsibility and on the economic development. The last one was September 7th. It ended with no conclusion.

During the meetings, Gov. Onaga did not step back from his “No Henoko” stance, however hard the Abe cabinet tried. In office barely a half year--out of four--it is unreasonable to expect the governor to destroy his power base by backing down. This would be political suicide.

Gov. Onaga has few options to take
What can Gov. Onaga do to stop the landfill at Cape Henoko? Gov. Onaga’s advisory committee issued a report in July 2015 concluding that there were flaws in the process of Gov. Nakaima’s approval. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) resumed its boring investigation on September 12th, soon after the break-up of the intensive August and September meetings between the GOJ and the OPG. Gov. Onaga reacted to this by starting a procedure to cancel the landfill authorization on September 14th. This legal process is expected to take about a month.

Still, the OPG is powerless if the Abe cabinet simply ignores it. The OPG can appeal to the court to stop the landfill, but the court has no authority to interrupt the boring investigation and its ensuing landfill until a verdict is given. this could be months or years. Should the OPG win at the court after the landfill is completed, the result is that no one can bring back the nature as before. Thus, Gov. Onaga’s cancellation of the landfill is nothing other than a political performance.

Left in Gov. Onaga’s hand is un-approving any petitions for changes and additions to the original plan. The plan was submitted by the MOD to Gov. Nakaima in March 2013. At the time, the MOD did not anticipate working with an unfriendly OPG to develop or alter the plan.  The results of the boring investigation are certain to cause construction changes. Onaga could use these changes to stop the landfill and slow down the project.

Driving Gov. Onaga to the corner simply drives Okinawans to protests
Gov. Onaga has very limited options. Is it politically productive to force him to say yes to the Henoko plan? Sure, he might approve change petitions to smooth the landfill.

On the other hand, once the Okinawans hear that Gov. Onaga has succumb to the Abe cabinet, the anger demonstrated at the gubernatorial election in 2014 would explode at Cape Henoko. Okinawan people have made clear their rejection of the Henoko plan many times through elections. LDP administrations, however, have forced their leaders to “flipflop.” Okinawans view this as negligence against their will. If their voices raised democratically are unheard, they believe they have no choice but to resort to force at the construction site.

In Tokyo, I am often asked whether the protesters at Cape Henoko are non-Okinawans, mostly “professional” protesters similar to those during the construction of Narita Airport. There is no official and accurate data on where these protesters come from and I doubt such question is relevant for two reasons:

1. First, during the American Occupation (1945-72), the islanders in Ie-Island and other parts of Okinawa protested and succeeded in stopping the construction of  US military bases and expansion. Okinawans can protest with success by themselves, without the help from others.
2. Second, casualties caused by wrestling with the police and Coast Guard during protests or lying before the bulldozers and circling the landfill site with small  boats (slight injuries have already occured), would encourage  Okinawans to massively and aggressively embrace anti-base sentiments and demand the removal of all base, regardless of where the hometown of the casualty is.

If this happened would the Abe cabinet have the capability to deal with such situation? Also, would the USG, especially the US Forces in Okinawa (USFO), want to expand such anti-base sentiments in Okinawa? The USG wants the GOJ to manage prudently Okinawa to keep the islands safe enough to deploy its forces. The USG should not want to miss the forest (the USFO, especially Kadena Air Base) from the trees (the Futenma Air Station).

Paradoxically, the more the Abe cabinet pushes Gov. Onaga into a corner, the more Okinawans are driven to resort to force, which is a political suicide to the GOJ. The worst scenario can be avoided only by understanding this logic in Okinawa, by seriously searching for alternatives to the Henoko plan, and by seriously addressing the necessity to reduce the heavy hosting responsibility of Okinawa.

U.S.-Japan Okinawa Agreement Not a Breakthrough

George Washington University Professor Mike Mochizuki, an APP Board Member, was interviewed on April 11th by Peter Ennis for Toyo Keizai On-Line and Dispatch Japan regarding the "new" agreement to set a timetable for the return of some property to Okinawa.

DISPATCH JAPAN: What is the significance of the recently-announced agreement between Washington and Tokyo concerning the return of some territory in Okinawa?

MOCHIZUKI: This is a last-ditch effort by the US and Japanese governments to alter base politics in Okinawa so that the Futenma Replacement Facility can be constructed at Henoko Bay.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is this a genuine breakthrough on the issue?

MOCHIZUKI: If by “genuine breakthrough,” you mean that the agreement will succeed in fundamentally altering current political dynamics in Okinawa, I would say it is not a breakthrough. Moreover, the agreement does not entail a significant acceleration in the timetable for returning U.S. facilities south of Kadena Air Force Base, which has been sought by Okinawans.

DISPATCH JAPAN: It seems that Tokyo is trying to “buy off” Okinawa. Can that tactic work anymore?

MOCHIZUKI: Okinawa of course welcomes the financial aid from the central government in order to promote development. But this aid does not necessarily translate into local willingness to accept a new Marine Air Station within the prefecture.

DISPATCH JAPAN: So much of the new agreement depends on construction of replacement facilities, which has been one reason for the impasse of many years. So where is the “breakthrough?”

MOCHIZUKI: There is no substantive breakthrough. But I think that by recommitting themselves to the return of Futenma as well as the return of facilities south of Kadena, the U.S. and Japanese governments hope to turn around public opinion in Okinawa. After the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama, the political executives of every city, town, and village of Okinawa –whether conservative or progressive-- have declared their opposition to the Henoko FRF plan. So what the Abe government would like to do is at least win the support of conservatives in Okinawa for the current Futenma relocation plan. But when Okinawans read the fine print of the agreement and consider the conditions and the probable schedule for the return of U.S. military facilities, there is not much to cheer about.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Do you see any change in the attitude of Governor Nakaima? There are top-level MOD officials who believe that since the governor is an LDP member, he will eventually alter his opposition to the Henoko plan.

MOCHIZUKI: I think Governor Nakaima wants to maintain a good rapport with the Abe government, and he is wisely refraining from rejecting central government initiatives out of hand. But I don’t think this means that he is now prepared to accept the Henoko plan. He is being cautious, and he has stated that he needs to find out how local communities that will be affected by the latest agreement feel.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The MOD and the Kantei seem to think they can out-maneuver Mayor Inamine by somehow winning the support of a majority of assembly members. Do you see that as feasible?

MOCHIZUKI: Winning over the majority of the Nago City Assembly is an ambitious goal for the MOD and Kantei. But what is key is whether or not Mayor Inamine, who has vehemently opposed the Henoko plan, wins re-election in 2014.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is there a different attitude toward the Henoko project between the local Henoko residents vs. the other sections of the prefecture? The OPG staff seems to think that the Henoko community favors the project, but all other sections of Okinawa remain opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Because there has been so much money flowing into the communities closest to Henoko Bay, it is not surprising that these communities tend to favor the FRF project. But those sections of Nago City away from Henoko Bay tend to be opposed. And public opposition to the Henoko plan remains pretty robust in the rest of Okinawa Prefecture.

DISPATCH JAPAN: How would you characterize the Abe government’s approach toward Okinawa? Tokyo seems intent on using the period of review of the landfill application to win over a significant portion of Okinawa sentiment that, up to now, has been opposed.

MOCHIZUKI: Through both financial aid and the promise of future closures of U.S. military facilities in attractive areas for development, the Abe government hopes to win over the hearts and minds of conservative Okinawans who are pro-development and more supportive of the security alliance with the United States. Unfortunately, the latest agreement tends to take a piecemeal approach so the effect on these Okinawans is unlikely to be dramatic.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Has the tension with North Korea had any significant impact on how the long-standing stalemate for FRF? (Putting pressure on Okinawa to agree to Henoko…)

MOCHIZUKI: Tensions with North Korea as well as tensions with China over the Senkakus may have increased support for the US-Japan alliance among some Okinawans. But this does not necessarily mean that they will now embrace the Henoko plan. Rather many Okinawans are probably asking that if US military forces are so important for Japanese security, why don’t other prefectures offer to host those forces?

DISPATCH JAPAN: According to the new agreement, Futenma would remain open for at least another 9 years (2022). Is it wise to keep such a controversial facility open for such a long time?

MOCHIZUKI: The target date of 2022 is probably frustrating and depressing for Okinawans. Remember that under the original 1996 agreement, the goal was to have Futenma returned between 2001 and 2003. 2022 would be at least 19 years after the target date. That’s a whole generation. Moreover, the April 2013 agreement does not declare Futenma will be returned in 2022 at the latest. The document instead states “2022 or later.” So there is a strong possibility that the 2022 target year will not be met.

DISPATCH JAPAN: The plan to relocate a large number of US Marines to Guam seems to be in question, as construction of new facilities on Guam is caught up in cost-overruns, underestimation of costs, questions in Congress, and now the sequestration. How can the overall base realignment move forward if the US can’t deliver on the Guam side of the deal?

MOCHIZUKI: That’s a good question. Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings and I, however, have an answer to that. We propose relocating these Marines back to bases on the continental United States. If we pre-positioned equipment in Japan and elsewhere in the region, we can easily and rapidly fly Marines back into the region during a contingency. Moreover, Marines can maintain a regular regional presence through rotational deployments.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Is the US Marine presence on Okinawa really of strategic importance, or is the real motivation more mundane bureaucratic considerations?

MOCHIZUKI: If Okinawa were willing to host 20,000 Marines permanently, I would acknowledge that there may be strategic benefits of such a presence. But that is not the case. Therefore, we have to recognize the political strain that such a Marine presence poses on the alliance. Moreover, having Futenma Marine Air Station located in a crowded urban area increases the probability of a tragic accident.If such a tragedy were to occur, this would have a devastating effect on the alliance. It is strategically important to maintain support in Okinawa for hosting more vital facilities like Kadena Air Force base. I am not arguing that all the Marines should leave Okinawa. But I believe that we can dramatically reduce the Marine presence on Okinawa without undermining the US security role in the Asia-Pacific.