Sunday, September 29, 2024

Monday Asia Events September 30, 2024

XINJIANG: SUPPORTING VICTIMS AND ADVANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RECOMMENDATIONS. 9/30, 8:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Location: 57th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland. Speakers Include: Priya Gopalan, Vice-Chair on Follow-Up and member for the Asia-Pacific region, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; John Fisher, Deputy Director for Global Advocacy, Human Rights Watch. 

THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY. 9/30, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Doctoral Researcher, Peace Research Institute of Oslo; Pamela Kennedy, Research Analyst, East Asia Program. 

THE POLITICS OF NON-POLITICS IN POST-1960S JAPAN. 9/30, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speaker: Nick Kapur, Associate Professor of History, Rutgers University. 

ON DAY ONE": A U.S. ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A TAIWAN CRISIS. 9/30, 12:30-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Eyck Freymann, Hoover Fellow, Stanford University, Non-resident Research Fellow, China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College; Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS; Hugo Bromley, Research Associate, Centre for Geopolitics, Cambridge. 

PRICE STABILITY IN AN AGE OF EMERGENCIES: REVISITING THE CASE FOR BUFFER STOCKS. 9/30, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Maurice Obstfeld, C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow, PIIE; Isabella M. Weber, Associate Professor, Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 

OBJECTIONS OF DISRUPTION: OPPRESSION IN THAILAND. 9/30
, 3:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center, George Washington University. Speaker: Pavin Chachavalpongpun, professor, Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, chief editor, online journal, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia

BOOK TALK: WEAPONS IN SPACE: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. 9/30
, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speaker: author Aaron Bateman, Assistant Professor, History, International Affairs, George Washington University. 
PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47BX3Nu

BOOK TALK: WEAPONS IN SPACE: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. 9/30, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speaker: author Aaron Bateman, Assistant Professor, History, International Affairs, George Washington University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47BX3Nu

Thursday, September 26, 2024

CDP Elects A New Leader

And its Yoshihiko Noda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
Special to Asia Policy Point, September 23, 2024

Japan’s largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), elected former prime minister Yoshihiko Noda as its president in an extraordinary national convention on September 23. Noda’s goal is to take back the administration of the government from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Noda is entering a competition against the leading coalition in the election of House of Representatives, which is expected to be held soon after the LDP decides new president later this week.
 
The CDP Electoral Process
Four groups are eligible to vote for the CDP leader: 1) CDP lawmakers, 2) registered candidates for the next election of the Diet (for example, a former lawmaker who lost in last election but now plans to run in next election), 3) local assembly members registered to CDP, and 4) rank-and-file party members and supporters who have paid a membership fee.
 
CDP has 136 lawmakers in both Chambers of the Diet, each of whom has two points. Total points for the lawmakers are 272. Each of the 98 registered candidates for Diet election has one point, which amounts to 98 points. A total of 370 points is available.
 
Local assembly members of the CDP and rank-and-file members/supporters also have a total of 370 points. The CDP has about 1,200 local assembly members and about a 100,000 rank-and-file members and registered supporters in all over Japan. In the first round, each group has 185 points, totaling another 370. The points are allocated to the candidates pro rata, depending on the percentage of votes received.
 
In the second round, if no one secures a majority in the first round, lawmakers (with two points for each), registered candidates (one point for each) and delegates from CDP’s prefectural branches, which amount to 47 (one point for each), would vote.
 
The victorious candidate must receive at least 371 votes of the 740 available in round one. In the second round, the winner must obtain at least 209 of the 417 points.
 
The Election
Four candidates entered the race. Of the four, Noda received the largest number of votes from CDP lawmakers and rank-and-file members of the party. He collected 267 points in total: 128 points from lawmakers and registered candidates, and 139 points from local assembly members and rank-and-file members/supporters. The former head of CDP, Yukio Edano, received a total of 206 points with 83 and 123, respectively. Noda thus received stronger support among CDP lawmakers than did Edano, but both were well below the majority threshold of 371 votes. The other two candidates, the current head of the CDP, Kenta Izumi, and Harumi Yoshida were left behind by a wide margin.
 
Since no candidate secured the necessary 371-vote majority in the first round, Noda and Edano competed in a second-round runoff election. Noda secured 232 points, defeating Edano with 180 points. It was clear from the runoff that registered candidates preferred Noda to Edano.
 
Noda’s Policies
Noda’s victory reflects the party members’ appreciation of Noda’s political skill as a veteran lawmaker and his experience as prime minister. Of course, Noda is also known as the prime minister who, in calling a snap election in 2012, handed the administration back to Shinzo Abe and the LDP for many years. Still, neither Edano nor Izumi has a brilliant record as the head of the CDP.
 
In the Diet discussion about the LDP’s slush fund scandal, Noda argued forcefully against Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and demanded fundamental reforms of the political activity funds. Yet Noda also delivered an impressive eulogy in the Diet in October 2022, regretting Abe’s early death before the CD took back the administration from the LDP. “I do not want to accept this end with your win,” said Noda.
 
It is likely that CDP members have accepted such LDP-friendly activities of Noda because he is one of the leaders of the party. He emphasizes his stance to reach out to moderate conservatives. Some in the CDP recognized his stance as workable as a strategy for next general election.
 
Noda has said that regime change would be the greatest reform of the LDP’s activities. He has criticized lawmakers in the LDP who have inherited political assets without the imposition of any tax. Noda is challenging LDP politics deeply rooted in inheritance of seats in the Diet from father to son.
 
The CDP platform is unequivocally opposed to nuclear power plants, but Noda’s commitment to the goal is less clear. “It is how we promote realistic policies with embracing our ideal,” Noda said about the issue of nuclear power plants.
 
Noda has not supported immediate change to security legislation that was introduced by Abe administration, but that has been criticized as unconstitutional. While Edano, Izumi and Yoshida would revise the status of forces agreement with the United States, Noda has only said that he would talk with U.S. on the issue, respecting opinions of the people in Okinawa.
 
These political stances may cause friction with the CDP’s left flank. It is possible for Noda to seek cooperation with other opposition parties, especially conservative ones, but the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) has been reluctant to do so. The CDP and Ishin compete with each other in a large number of Lower House electoral districts. The Democratic Party for the People is watching Noda’s handling of the CDP.
 
Noda’s concept for cooperation marks the sharpest difference from Edano. Edano ran for the CDP leadership premised on an administration run solely by the CDP. But Noda thinks that exclusive CDP administration is unrealistic. He instead hopes to maximize the seats of all opposition parties to push the LDP into a minority. 
 
However, a coalition government may not be especially realistic either. The conservative Noda has not sought to cooperate with the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The JCP has already announced that it would field candidates in some electoral districts where the CDP has its own candidates. Whether Noda can unite the CDP and the opposition parties remains to be seen.
 
Noda’s People
On September 24, Noda, picked Jun-ya Ogawa for the CDP’s Secretary General. He also selected Kazuhiko Shigetoku for Chairman of the Policy Research Council and Hirofumi Ryu for Chairman of the Diet Affairs Committee. Hiroshi Ogushi stays as the Chairman of Election Strategy Committee. Noda appointed Ogushi, Akira Nagatsuma, and Kiyomi Tsujimoto as Deputy Heads of the party. By appointing members younger than himself as board members, Noda hopes to give a fresh face to the party for voters in the coming House of Representatives’ general election.
 
Nagatsuma, 64, is known as a specialist of welfare issues, dubbed as “Mr. Pension System,”and Tsujimoto, 64, positions herself on the left side of the party, who is known as a liberal lawmaker starting her political career as a member of the Social Democratic Party.
 
Ogawa, Shigetoku, and Ryu supported Noda in the leader’s election of the CDP. While Noda had a choice to appoint other candidates to the board to demonstrate unification of the party, he rather chose to exclude his contenders from his team. The leadership with like-minded lawmakers may make policy promotion easier, but it can leave some instability in the party for internal struggle over basic policies.
 
Ogawa, 53, is known as a liberal lawmaker who frequently stood for questioning in the committees of the Diet. He formerly worked for Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications. In 2021, he ran in the leader’s election losing to Kenta Izumi. Ogawa worked for Izumi as the Chairman of Policy Research Council. Although Ogawa has built a framework of electoral cooperation with some other opposition parties, including Japan’s Communist Party, in Kagawa 1 district, JCP announced that it would field its own candidate in the district, indicating termination of its cooperation.
 
Shigetoku, 54, is a member of House of Representatives, and the head of a CDP policy group called the Chokkan-no Kai (Group of Remonstration). The group has between 10 to 12 members, many who demanded that Noda run in the leadership election. He was a bureaucrat in Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications before becoming a member of the Diet, and formerly affiliated to Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai).
 
Hirofumi Ryu, 59, is a specialist in Diet affairs. He had been a TV Asahi political journalist. He joined the Party of Hope, led by the Governor of Tokyo Yuriko Koike, in 2017. He joined CDP in 2021.
 
Hiroshi Ogushi, 59, has been the chair of election strategy under the leadership of Izumi from 2021. Because there might soon be a snap election, Noda decided not to change the party’s election chief.

Sunday, September 15, 2024

Monday Asia Events September 16, 2024

A NEW COLD WAR? CONGRESSIONAL RHETORIC AND REGIONAL REACTIONS TO THE U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY. 9/16
, 9:00am-12:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers Include: Xinru Ma, Research Scholar, Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab; Gidong Kim, Post-doctoral Fellow, Korea Program, Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab. 

A CONVERSATION ON RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES WITH NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE OLEKSANDRA MATVIICHUK. 9/16, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Matthew Boyse, Senior Fellow, Center on Europe and Eurasia, Director, Center for Civil Liberties, Kyiv; Oleksandra Matviichuk, Director, Center for Civil Liberties, Kyiv. 

MAPPING CHINA'S STRATEGIC SPACE. 9/16, 2:00-3:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Speakers: Mr. Mark Lambert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Taiwan, U.S Department of State; Dr. Jacqueline Deal, Long Term Strategy Group; Dr. Aaron Friedberg, Princeton University. Dr. April Herlevi, Center for Naval Analyses; Ms. Nadège Rolland, NBR; Ms. Alison Szalwinski, NBR.

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA: MILESTONES REACHED AND THE PATHWAY AHEAD. 9/16, 3:30-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Aparna Pande, Research Fellow, India and South Asia, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources; Richard R. Verma, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. 

WOMEN AND POLITICS IN INDIA: A CONVERSATION WITH SMRITI IRANI. 9/16, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Observer Research Foundation America. Speaker: Smriti Irani, former Indian Minister of Minority Affairs, Minister of Women and Child Development, Minister of Textiles, Miniter of Information of Broadcasting, Minister of Human Resource Development.

Saturday, September 14, 2024

Who Does Washington Want To Be Japan's Prime Minister

Someone who speaks English? But probably doesn't understand it.

By Daniel Sneider,  Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University and APP member

First published in Toyo Keizai, September 12, 2024

As Liberal Democratic Party members struggle to pick the next Prime Minister of Japan, there is a vote that will not be counted but matters a lot – who does Washington want to be Japan’s next leader?

The most obvious answer to that question is that Washington doesn’t care. At the senior levels of government and policymakers, “they could care less,” a former senior government official who remains deeply engaged with Japan told Toyo Keizai. “At the expert level, there are preferences. But no one in Washington is talking about it all.”

One reason for this lack of interest is also obvious – Americans are deeply engaged with their own, highly contested election. But the unique nature of the Japanese party election makes it confusing, not least because of the very large field of candidates. And ultimately, Americans assume, perhaps wrongly, that the result of the election is not going to change Japan’s foreign and domestic policy.

Still, for American policymakers and experts, it matters who emerges as Japan’s next leader. What is most important for the United States is “who can be an effective leader that re-energizes the Japanese public, that delivers an economic agenda that is sustainable, that allows Japan to keep up its defense expenditures and encourages the Japanese economy to be a key hub in global supply chains,” says Mireya Solis of the Brookings Institution, one of the premier Japan experts in Washington.

“Folks in Washington are looking for somebody who will continue the Abe [Shinzo] alliance policies, expanding the alliance, and expanding what Japan can do within the alliance,” says Amb Joseph Donovan, Jr, a former senior State Department official with extensive experience in Japan.

Along with that, Americans are looking for “somebody who can work with the ROK (South Korea), and somebody who has strong domestic support, who can bring the LDP back together.”

That said, Donovan and others I spoke to offer a “huge caveat” – what might happen if leadership changes in the U.S.

If Democrat Kamala Harris prevails, she “will be looking for the strongest possible Japanese Prime Minister,” says the former senior official, who wished to remain anonymous. “Whereas Trump will be looking for which Prime Minister he can manipulate.”

Abe was able to “both impress the U.S. President and also stand up for Japan. It is really important that whoever meets with Trump is able to exude self-confidence as a global leader.”

Within that broad framework, Japan offers its own views on who might best fit those requirements.

How Washington sees the candidates

Leaving aside the question of the ability to project a reformist image that can rally voters back to the scandal-tarnished conservative ruling party, American policymakers tend to favor the most experienced figures in the LDP, particularly those who have long interacted with Washington.

“Everyone in Washington DC would be thrilled if it were Hayashi [Yoshimasa],” said Tobias Harris, the biographer of Abe and author of the widely read “Observing Japan” newsletter.

“Obviously, he has lots of friends here. He worked on the Hill (Congress). He is the continuity candidate. If you like what the Kishida government has been doing, then Hayashi is your guy.”

Washington knows the other candidates well: former Foreign Minister and current LDP Secretary General Motegi Toshimitsu, the current Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko, and former Foreign and Defense Minister Kono Taro. The former senior government official offered this frank, off-the-record assessment of the three, based in part on personal contact.

Motegi’s experience with Washington comes mainly in the trade area, as the negotiator of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and dealing with the Trump administration.

“He is smart, effective, a little bit aggressive – not a typical Japanese, but Americans can deal with that,” says the former official. “He is abrasive, but that doesn’t matter in international affairs.”

As for Kamikawa, “she is the opposite. It's so nice, vanilla-flavored. Washington would think she is chosen because of her gender and being fluent in English.”

Kono is also a potential Prime Minister with long experience in Washington, someone fluent in English, “spends a lot of time with Americans and knows the U.S. reasonably well,” the former official says.

But there are concerns about Kono, particularly in the Pentagon but also the State Department, mainly arising out of his time as Defense Minister and the abrupt cancellation of the Aegis Onshore missile defense program, which shocked Washington. “Kono thinks Americans like him, but that is not true.”

As things stand now, however, none of the ‘experienced’ candidates seem likely to make the final two. That leaves a set of candidates who are not at the top of American lists—former Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru, former Economic Security Minister Kobayashi Takayuki, Koizumi Shinjiro, and current Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae.

None of these possible leaders is considered a serious problem for alliance relations—except for rightwing stalwart Takaichi, who has positioned herself as the ideological heir to Abe’s more nationalist agenda.

“Takaichi would make everyone nervous,” says Harris. Her provocative stance on wartime history issues, including plans to make official visits to the Yasukuni shrine to Japan’s war dead, “would upset the apple cart on trilateral ties with the Koreans.” Those worries extend to Koizumi and Kobayashi, who might also visit Yasukuni and sour relations with Korea.

Takaichi appeals to more hawkish elements in Washington, particularly among Trump backers, who see her as more willing to militarily confront China. “She is going to want the same things that some people in Washington want, and they will find a way to work with her,” says Harris.

That view does not extend to other experienced Japan hands in Washington. “It is hard to be too hawkish in Washington these days, but she might be too hawkish for the Washington crowd, at least among Japan hands,” predicted the former senior official.

Ishiba is perhaps the most intriguing and potentially difficult leader for Japan among Americans. Although he garners considerable attention in Japan, he is not that well known in the U.S. He has some support in the Pentagon from his experience as Defense Minister and his interest in weapons development. But he has a reputation as a Japanese Gaullist, someone willing to forge a more independent path for Japan.

“Ishiba is sincere,” comments Harris. “He says what he thinks, and he comes from this tradition that is not going to do what the U.S. wants if it is not in Japan’s interests.”

Harris compares him to Kono, noting that both men have been critical of the protectionist decision to bar Nippon Steel’s purchase of U.S. Steel. Both men represent “a Japan that can say no, maybe politely, but still say no.”

Ishiba reflects more openly a widely held worry in Japan about U.S. reliability, particularly under a second Trump administration. “He and Trump together talking about burden sharing would be an interesting conversation,” says the former senior official. “He will give as good as he gets.”

The other candidate coming out of the former Abe faction, Kobayashi, is garnering more interest in Washington where some think he could emerge as the second-place candidate. Compared to Takaichi, he is viewed more favorably.

Kobayashi is “very bright, a good communicator, with U.S. experience,” says the former official.

“He is young, interesting, probably someone the U.S. could work with, but who is really going to make decisions if he is Prime Minister.” His interest in economic security is much appreciated by Washington policymakers.

The Koizumi question

That brings us to the last viable option and the current front-runner in opinion polls – Koizumi Shinjiro, the son of the former Prime Minister. He is clearly popular and offers the best chance to restore the damaged image of the LDP.

He has had little to say on foreign policy, focusing almost entirely on internal issues of political reform and encouraging entrepreneurial-led growth.

Koizumi is well-known in American policy circles. His graduate education at Columbia University was followed by an invaluable internship at the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, working closely with veteran Japan alliance manager Michael Green. But there are questions about both his lack of experience and his policy views.

“He doesn’t get deep on policy very often,” the former official told Toyo Keizai. “People here would think they have chosen someone attractive to voters, but let’s see if he can handle the job.”

Nonetheless, in a second-round contest between Koizumi and either Ishiba or Takaichi, the Washington experts would tend to favor the young politician.

They assume he would have the backing of the LDP’s heavyweight kingmakers like Aso Taro and Suga Yoshihide and would represent a unified party.

For American Japan hands, the bottom line is to have a leader that can continue to project a more assertive role in global affairs.

“If you have a leader that is not strong, that could mean Japan is not going to be as proactive as it has been in the past,” says Brookings’ Solis, author of an important new book on Japan’s leadership role.

Japan has become a key voice in opposition to the deepening of economic nationalism that is “flourishing in the U.S.” and the growth of xenophobic populism. The possibility of a return to isolationism under Trump underlines the importance of Japanese leadership, she says.

None of the possible candidates for LDP leadership would be as disruptive as the experience with the brief period of Democratic Party of Japan rule.

“It is more a question of what kind of Prime Minister is more adept at taking the reins of government in Japan, of providing good economic management assuring that the LDP can get through its agenda.

“If you see a weakening of that control power that we got used to, that brought a more decisive Japan, that would be a challenge.”

Tuesday, September 10, 2024

The Okinawa Problem

The Governor of Okinawa Denny Tamaki will be in the U.S. the week of September 8th. He will be speaking publicly at in Washington, DC at the Hudson Institute on the 9th and George Washington University's Sigur Center on the 11th and in New York City at Columbia University on the 12th.


Okinawans must not be overlooked in new US–Japan counter-crime forum 

By Alexis Dudden, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies at the National University of Singapore, and APP Member.

On 22 July 2024, US Forces Japan Commander Lieutenant General Ricky Rupp announced the creation of a new joint US–Japan forum to address the endemic issue of crimes committed off base by US military personnel stationed in Okinawa — particularly sex crimes.

How Rupp’s forum will differ from the Cooperative Working Team established in October 2000 to address similar concerns is not clear. The Cooperative Working Team met 27 times until petering out in April 2017. It brought together representatives from the US military and government, Japanese foreign and defence ministries, the Okinawan prefectural government and police, as well as members of the prefecture’s chambers of commerce and bar association. Since its dissolution, active-duty US servicemen in Okinawa have committed several well-documented rapes, abductions and assaults — including against children.

The task force must acknowledge Okinawan elected officials’ right to immediate and accurate information about crimes US soldiers commit. This fundamental step does not require changing existing protocols. Instead, it requires that the US government, US military and the Japanese central government adhere to procedures established in the 1997 US–Japan Joint Committee Agreement. This document augmented Okinawans’ rights with regard to Article XVII of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Japan, which concerns jurisdiction over crimes committed on Japanese territory.

Notably indiscernible on the Japanese Foreign Ministry website, the Okinawan Prefectural Government wants more publicity for the Agreement’s ‘Notification Channel Details for Okinawa-related Issues’. According to protocol, in the aftermath of a crime committed by a US service member or civilian attached to the US military, the commander responsible must notify the duty officer at command headquarters and the Naha Defence Facilities Administration Bureau.

The US side then moves up through military and diplomatic chains of command to the US Embassy in Tokyo, while the Japanese side moves from the Naha-based agency — Okinawa’s capital city — and simultaneously notifies the Okinawan prefectural government, Defence Administration Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Okinawa Office, who then convey information to the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo.

This did not happen during the first half of 2024, leading Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki to emphasise during his press conference on 7 August at Tokyo’s Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan that he cannot be sure how many crimes he and previous Okinawan prefectural officials have never even learned about.

Tamaki accused the Japanese central government of ignoring his right to information about these crimes as Okinawa’s highest elected official. Referencing the 24 December 2023 abduction and rape of an Okinawan minor as well as the 26 May 2024 sexual assault of an Okinawan woman, Tamaki gave a full explanation of the 1997 Notification Channel Details and the Japanese government’s wilful failure to abide by them.

The repetitious nature of the crimes against Okinawan women and girls, and the US and Japanese government’s botched response to them — specifically the failure to notify the Okinawan prefectural government about crimes against their citizens — highlights the need for Commander Rupp’s forum to do something different from the prior Working Team. Reforms are urgent, with a third instance of sexual assault reported on 6 September 2024.

Speculation continues concerning Tokyo’s rationale for withholding information from the Governor. The central government may have feared that Okinawans would protest against the dominant presence of the US military, as they did in 1995 following three US servicemen’s abduction and gang rape of an elementary schoolgirl.

Such protests could have adversely affected the Okinawa elections held on 16 June 2024. Tokyo’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party wanted victory for the Governor’s opponents in order to resume construction on the unpopular new US base at Henoko, that Tamaki and his supporters blocked. Tamaki’s opponents won the election, and Tokyo ordered construction of the base to recommence despite ongoing local protests.

During the press conference Tamaki also underscored the challenge of overcoming the central government’s perennial disdain for Okinawans’ place in structural matters involving the US–Japan Alliance, despite the centrality of the territory and its people to this calculus. Taking umbrage with Tokyo’s use of ‘privacy’ as justification for not sharing information, Tamaki reiterated his 10 July 2024 Letter of Protest to Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and requested ‘that all crimes, incidents, and accidents involving US military service members and related personnel be reported, without fail, to the prefectural government’.

In September, Governor Tamaki will visit Washington to drive home his concerns to members of the US Congress and related bureaucracies. The governor will explain the disproportionate burden he and his constituents bear vis a vis US bases in Japan under the United States’ broader ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’. Noticeably, this policy emphasises a ‘rules-based order’. For these words to have any meaning at all, the Japanese government and the United States government and military must include Okinawans as equals.

Monday, September 9, 2024

Monday Asia Events September 9, 2024

FUTURE SECURITY FORUM 2024: GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE NEXT DECADE. 9/9-10, HYBRID. Sponsors: Arizona State University, New America, Security, and Defence PLuS. Speakers Include: Adm. Christopher W. Grady, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; LTG (ret.) H.R. McMaster, fmr. National Security Adviser, Author, At War with Ourselves, Distinguished University Fellow, ASU; Major General Borys Kremenetskyi, Defense Attaché, Ukrainian Embassy, US; Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King’s College, Author, Command and The Future of War: A History; Evelyn Farkas, Executive Director, The McCain Institute, ASU, fmr. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia; Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau (US Navy, Ret.), President, Naval Postgraduate School; Elizabeth Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. State Department; Roger Carstens, Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs, U.S. State Department; Sir Simon Gass, Senior Advisor to SC Strategy, fmr. British diplomat, Chair, UK Joint Intelligence Committee; Anne-Marie Slaughter, CEO, New America, Professor of Practice at Arizona State University, fmr. Director of Policy Planning, State Department. 

REACHING NET ZERO: THE POWER OF ALIGNING NDCS WITH LONG-TERM STRATEGIES. 9/9, 8:00-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: World Resources Institute. : Aloisio Lopes P. de Melo, Director of Climate Policy, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Brazil; Anna Amalia, Associate Planner, Directorate of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of National Development Planning, Indonesia; Jongikhaya Witi, Chief Director, Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa; Rachel Harris, Branch Head, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Australia. 

INSIGHTS FROM OKINAWA: GOVERNOR DENNY TAMAKI ON BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP. 9/9, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speaker: Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki. 

VOICES FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE. 9/9, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Aida Touma-Sliman, Member of the Knesset; Nadav Weiman, Executive Director, Breaking the Silence; Dahlia Scheindlin, Political Strategist and Public Opinion Researcher. 

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN AFRICA'S JUST ENERGY TRANSITION. 9/9, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Gloria Majiga-Kamoto, Program Officer, Centre for Environmental Policy and Advocacy; 2021 Goldman Prize Winner; Samantha Atukunda Kakuru Mwesigwa, Executive Director and Legal Counsel, Greenwatch, Uganda; Emmanuella Doreen Kwofie, Lawyer, Green Climate Fund, Climate Negotiator; Mazi Choshane, Attorney, Centre for Applied Legal Studies. 

EXPOSING CHINA'S COMPLICITY IN AMERICA'S FENTANYL CRISIS. 9/9, 10:30-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Carrie Filipetti, Executive Director, and The Vandenberg Coalition, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Andrés Martínez-Fernández, Senior Policy Analyst, Allison Center for National Security; The Hon. Steve Yates, Senior Fellow and Chair, China Policy Initiative.

MANAGING U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION IN AN ERA OF RISING TENSIONS. 9/9, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for American Progress (CAP). Speakers: Adam Conner, CAP Vice President for Technology Policy; Emily Kilcrease, Center for a New American Security Senior Fellow and Director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program. 

ACCELERATING INNOVATION FOR CLIMATE AND PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS. 9/9, 11:00am-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CGD). Speakers: Major General (Ret.) Dr. Paul Friedrichs, Director, Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response, The White House; Rachel Glennerster, Incoming President, CGD; Dr. Javier Guzman, Director, Global Health Policy Program and Senior Policy Fellow, CGD; Dr. Charles Kenny, Senior Fellow, CGD; Michael Kremer, Economics Nobel Laureate, 2019, University Professor in Economics, University of Chicago; Dr. Stephanie Psaki, U.S. Coordinator for Global Health Security, The White House; Nan Ransohoff, Head of Climate, Stripe; Christopher Snyder, Joel Z. and Susan Hyatt Professor of Economics, Dartmouth. 

THE STRUGGLE FOR TAIWAN: A HISTORY OF AMERICA, CHINA, AND THE ISLAND CAUGHT BETWEEN. 9/9, 4:00-5:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Sulmaan Khan, Denison Chair, International History and Chinese Foreign Relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; Shihoko Goto, Director, Indo-Pacific Program; Hsiao-ting Lin, Research Fellow, Curator of East Asian Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 

THE EU-US PERCEPTION OF THE RISE OF CHINA AND TAIWAN'S RESILIENCE. 9/9, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speakers: Hung-dah Su, Professor and Jean Monnet, Chair of Department, Political Science at National Taiwan University, Director General of the European Union Centre in Taiwan. 

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A THREAT MULTIPLIER: IMPLICATIONS FOR US DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY. 9/9, 4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speaker: Sherri Goodman, Secretary General, International Military Council on Climate and Security. 

CAMPBELL AND OTHERS ON HOW TO GOVERN A WARMING PLANET. 9/9, 5:00-6:00pm (BST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Ana Yang, Executive Director, Sustainability Accelerator, Environment and Society Centre; Rt Hon Kim Campbell, Former Prime Minister of Canada; Pascal Lamy, Former Director General of the World Trade Organization. 

Thursday, September 5, 2024

LDP's September 27 Presidential Election

Unusual Developments in the LDP’s Presidential Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 2, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point


As the campaign season for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enters its initial stages, an unprecedentedly substantial number of candidates – twelve – emerged. Some of them have secured the support of the 20 lawmakers necessary for nomination, while others are still searching. However, it is unclear whether the LDP can demonstrate that it has turned away from its old-style politics that have included obscure political funds and a balance of power among factions. 
 
The day after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said that he would not pursue another term, he encouraged the Ministers in his Cabinet not to hesitate to run in the LDP presidential election. “There must be someone who will consider running in the presidential election. I hope you can make fair discussions as far as it does not disturb your work,” Kishida told them in a Cabinet Meeting on August 15.
 
Kishida’s comment ignited the race. Some ministers immediately expressed their desire to run. “I hope I can make use of my experiences as minister someday,” said Digital Minister Taro Kono. Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa expressed determination to take action for her candidacy with deliberation. Even Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito stepped forward, revealing that some of his colleagues expect him to run.
 
Those moves accelerated the decisions of other possible candidates. The next day, Kono met with the boss of his faction, Taro Aso, to request his endorsement. Aso received a similar request from LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi. Aso approved Kono’s candidacy and told Motegi that he would not have the support of the faction as a whole.
 
Others announced their candidacies within the following days. In addition to Kono, former Minister for Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former Defense Minister and LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi all said that they would run.
 
Former Minister of Environment Shinjiro Koizumi and Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi followed. As did former Minister for Women’s Empowerment Seiko Noda, former Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare Katsunobu Kato, and conservative lawmaker Shigeharu Aoyama.
Among those 12, Kobayashi, Ishiba and Kono held press conferences before the end of August. Hayashi, Motegi, Koizumi, Takaichi and Kato will hold theirs in early September. Those eight lawmakers are reportedly confident that they have secured the endorsement of 20 LDP members in the Diet, as required in the LDP presidential election rules. Noda, Aoyama, Kamikawa, and Saito have not yet collected.
 
Under the rules of presidential election, each LDP lawmaker has one vote for a total of 367 votes. Local party members also may vote, but, regardless of the number of local voters, their votes are aggregated to create a pool of votes that are equivalent to 367 of the lawmaker votes. The pool votes are then allocated among the candidates on pro rata basis.
 
Election to the presidency requires a simple majority of the total votes of lawmakers and local, which will be 734, in the first round. If there is no victor in that round, the party will hold a runoff between the two top candidates. While the Diet members still have total 367 votes in the second round, the votes of local party members are reduced to 47, representing each prefectural branch of the party. Each of 47 local votes will go to a candidate who was number one in the prefecture in the first round.
 
A candidate’s prospects can vary considerably between the first and later round. A popular candidate has advantage in the first round because the local votes carry significant weight. But in the later rounds, coalitions among the groups or factions matters can control a majority of the votes because the local member vote is significantly reduced. 
 
When the campaign officially starts on September 12, some of the 12 possible candidates may have dropped out of the race. Not all the candidates will have 20 endorsements. Even among those who do so far, supporters may shift their endorsements from one candidate to another by September 12.
 
If a candidate drops out, his or her supporters will move to other candidates, changing structure of the race. Some candidates will have a first-round advantage and will aggressively seek victory then. Others, however, will shoot for the second round, leading to elaborate arrangements among different groups. That is, the strategy for the second round will be based on factional politics.
 
The biggest topic of discussion so far is Koizumi’s entry into the race. As a young and hopeful lawmaker, whose father is former – and popular – prime minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi, Shinjiro Koizumi has changed the trend of the polls and overtaken Ishiba among the responders who would support the LDP, not necessarily the members of the LDP.
 
In the poll of Asahi Shimbun late August, Koizumi held 28 percent among the LDP supporters, leaving Ishiba (23 percent) behind. Former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, who had been the guardian of an earlier trilateral coalition of Ishiba, Koziumi and Kono, announced that he would support Koizumi this time.
 
Since local LDP leaders tend to be older, there is a speculation that the veteran Ishiba has the advantage over the young and unexperienced Koizumi in the local members’ voting on September 27.
 
For the candidates who lack broad popular support, how to survive the first round is a great concern. While they campaign among the local party members as much as they can, they and their supporters must consider how to vote in the second round if they are not one of the top two vote getters.
 
Negotiations for the runoff are ongoing behind the scenes right now. Typically, in an LDP presidential election, some leaders who support different candidates in the first round will seek to form a coalition to take united action in the second-round runoff.
 
Possible candidates for LDP presidential election

NameAgeCabinet Minister ofLDP BoardFormer JobUniversity
ISHIBA, Shigeru67Defense, Agriculture, Local RevitalizationSecretary General,Mitsui BankKeio
KONO, Taro61Digital, MOFA, Defense, Administrative ReformPublic AffairsFuji XeroxGeorgetown
KOIZUMI, Shinjiro43Environment
Father’s
Secretary
Kanto Gakuin
KOBAYASHI, Takayuki49Economic Security
MOFTokyo
MOTEGI, Toshimitsu68MOFA, METI, Economic RevitalizationSG, Election StrategyMcKinseyTokyo
HAYASHI, Yoshimasa63CCS, MOFA, Defense, Education, Agriculture
Mitsui & Co.,
Secretary
Tokyo
TAKAICHI, Sanae63Economic Security, Internal AffairsPolicy ResearchNewscasterKobe
KATO, Katsunobu68MHLW, CCS, ChildbirthGeneral CouncilMOFTokyo
KAMIKAWA, Yoko71MOFA, Justice, Childbirth
Mitsubishi ResearchTokyo
NODA, Seiko63Internal Affairs, Women’s Empowerment, PostalGeneral CouncilImperial HotelSophia
SAITO, Ken65METI, Justice, Agriculture
METITokyo
AOYAMA, Shigeharu72

Kyodo NewsWaseda

(Incumbent is underscored)
 
CDP Race with Old Faces
The leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), will hold its leader’s election on September 23. A former head of the party Yukio Edano and former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda have announced their bids. The incumbent head, Kenta Izumi, plans to run for a second term. He is still collecting endorsements in the party.
 
Although Edano and Noda have secured 20 endorsements (the same threshold as the LDP’s), Izumi still struggles to gather enough. There is little chance for any new face to emerge. A freshwoman, Harumi Yoshida, and some others hope to run, but have little confidence that they can secure 20 endorsements.
  
Noda has said that the election should not be a race of the old faces – yet he has sought and received the support of the veteran kingmaker Ichiro Ozawa. Edano meanwhile is backed by the biggest faction in the CDP, called Sanctuary.
 
In their press conferences for their candidacies, Edano and Noda made clear their intent to take administration back from the LDP. But the way forward is not clear. They try to approach the Democratic Party for the People and Japan. But the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) still rejects cooperation with the CDP. A coalition with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is not a realistic choice, but Edano and Noda have not denied cooperation with the JCP in some districts.
 
Behind the race between the two veteran leaders, CDP members are frustrated that the party has not achieved an obvious boost in the polls because of the LDP’s slush fund scandal.   
 
The greatest concern for the CDP is not attracting the public attention away from the LDP.

 
Possible candidates for CDP leader’s election

NameAgeCabinet PositionParty BoardFormer JobUniversity
EDANO, Yukio60CCS, METI, Administrative ReformHeadLawyerTohoku
NODA, Yoshihiko67Prime Minister, MOFHead (DPJ)Chiba Prefectural AssemblyWaseda
IZUMI, Kenta50
HeadSecretaryRitsumeikan
YOSHIDA, Harumi52

SecretaryRikkyo
MABUCHI, Sumio64MLITDiet AffairsGeneral, Co.Yokohama National
EDA, Kenji68
SG (Your Party)METITokyo

(Incumbent is underscored)