Asia Policy Events, Monday May 18, 2026

BEYOND THE SAHEL: RUSSIA’S TOOLBOX FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. 5/18, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Anna Borshchevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mvemba Dizolele, Adjunct Lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Kate Johnston, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS; David McKenzie, Communications Director, CNAS.

IGP RAPID RESPONSE: US-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT. 5/18, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics (IGP), Columbia University. Speakers: Isaac Arnsdorf, White House Bureau Chief, Washington Post, Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, IGP Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, Pritzker Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA; Julian Gewirtz, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Former Senior Director, China and Taiwan Affairs, US National Security Council, author of Never Turn Back; Liza Tobin, Managing Director, Garnaut Global, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Former NSC China Director. Moderator: Zongyuan Liu, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Author of Sovereign Funds.

BOOK TALK: IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 5/18, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: author Sina Azodi, Assistant Professor of Middle East Politics, Director, Middle East Studies MA Program, George Washington University; Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4nK3MNt

Japanese Wagyu in the American Market

Japan’s Wagyu Quest and the Case for Reciprocal Beef Trade

by Phil Seng, Affiliate Professor in the Department of Animal Sciences at Colorado State University, Past President & CEO of the U.S. Meat Export Federation, and Past President of the International Meat Secretariat, and APP Member.

First Published March 10, 2026 on Meatingplace. PDF version here.

N.B.: This issue was not discussed at the Summit.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi and President Donald Trump will meet on March 19, where both leaders are expected to reaffirm their commitment to fair and reciprocal trade. For decades, U.S. presidents urged Japan to open its tightly restricted beef market, which once symbolized the closed nature of the Japanese economy.

Today, the roles are reversed. Prime Minister Takaichi should urge the United States to remove restrictions that limit Japanese Wagyu beef exports to the American market. Japan now finds itself in the unusual position of having a bilateral trade agreement with the United States — yet still faces a trade-distorting tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports, including the 26.4% out-of-quota tariff currently applied once the quota is triggered.

Implemented in 2020 through executive authority rather than a comprehensive congressional free trade agreement, the current U.S.–Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA) delivered important tariff reductions, but it did not resolve the structural barrier that Wagyu exporters now face in the U.S. market.

Japan’s Longstanding Support for U.S. Agriculture
Beef access may not rank among the top issues in the broader U.S.–Japan relationship. Yet a closer look reveals that liberalizing the U.S. market for Japanese Wagyu would reinforce a mutually beneficial agricultural partnership. Thirty-five years ago, Japan eliminated its own beef import quota, and 20 years ago it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis. Expanding access for Wagyu today would strengthen a supply chain that significantly benefits American farmers. More than 80% of the feed used by Japanese livestock consists of imported grains and oilseeds, much of it from the United States.

A compelling argument for reform lies in Japan’s longstanding role as a cornerstone customer for U.S. agriculture. For more than 75 years, Japan has been one of the most reliable buyers of American feed grains and oilseeds — imports that sustain Japan’s livestock sector and directly support U.S. farmers. Japan consistently imports roughly 10–15 million metric tons of corn annually from the United States, along with significant volumes of soybeans, wheat, and sorghum.

In other words, a thriving livestock sector in Japan directly supports U.S. agriculture, from Midwestern grain farmers to the broader feed supply chain that underpins livestock production. This raises the natural question of why isn’t there stronger support among U.S. grain producers for more liberalized Japanese beef access when their own export success depends so heavily on Japan’s livestock industry?

Tariff-Rate Quotas and Market Challenges
When the USJTA entered into force in 2020, Japan’s previous country-specific quota of 200 metric tons was folded into the broader “All Others” quota of 65,005 metric tons. At the time this appeared workable because Japan had not historically filled the quota.

That changed when Brazil, previously ineligible to export beef to the United States, gained U.S. market access and was included in the same quota category. Since then, Brazil has repeatedly fillednearly the entire quota. In 2025 the quota was triggered after just 17 days, and  in 2026 it was exceeded on Jan. 6, with approximately 99% of the quota filled by Brazilian shipments. As a result, Japanese Wagyu exporters and U.S. importers face steep tariffs almost immediately each year.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has approved specific quota arrangements or allocations for other countries. The U.S.–UK trade agreement created a 13,000-metric-ton carve-out for British beef within the same quota framework, while Argentina recently received a 100,000-metric-ton allocation. In contrast, Japanese Wagyu imports face the 26.4% tariff once the TRQ is filled, even though Japan remains one of the United States’ closest economic and strategic partners.

For American importers, the consequences are significant. Wagyu beef can be five to 10 times more valuable than commodity beef, meaning the ad valorem tariff becomes proportionally more expensive for importers, foodservice operators, and retailers. The quota also creates uncertainty in the marketplace, forcing importers to speculate about when tariffs will take effect and limiting decisions about product range, quality grades, and whether to import frozen or chilled beef.

This uncertainty discourages participation across the supply chain, from importers and distributors to restaurants and retailers, ultimately reducing availability for American consumers w,tarhile pushing prices higher for one of the world’s most prized beef products.

Japan’s Track Record as a Trusted Trade Partner
Japan has repeatedly strengthened the bilateral agricultural relationship over the past four decades. It liberalized its beef market between 1988 and 1991, reforms that later served as a model for market-opening agreements in Korea. Japan also reformed its retail and distribution laws, allowing U.S. exporters to sell directly into the Japanese market. In 1995 Japan decoupled domestic pork prices from import pricing, enabling a surge in chilled U.S. pork exports. In 2006 it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis, restoring one of America’s most valuable export destinations.

The results speak for themselves: Over the past 50 years Japan has imported more than $100 billion in U.S. red meat and by-products and remains one of the most dependable markets for American agriculture.

At the same time, Japanese beef represents an almost negligible presence in the U.S. market, accounting for less than 0.003% of total U.S. beef imports. Japanese Wagyu also occupies a highly specialized ultra-premium niche that complements rather than competes with the mainstream U.S. beef market. In practical terms, expanded Wagyu access would be economically negligible for U.S. producers but symbolically important for maintaining credibility in reciprocal agricultural trade.

Why Equal Treatment Matters
Japan is not seeking special treatment — only equal treatment. For decades, Japan has opened its markets, invested in American agriculture, and supported the livelihoods of U.S. farmers and ranchers. Ensuring fair access for Japanese Wagyu to the United States would acknowledge the depth of this partnership while reinforcing a trade relationship that benefits both countries.

Trade between allies should reflect trust, reciprocity, and long-term partnership. When nations invest in each other’s success, market access should move in both directions. That is how trade becomes durable, balanced, and mutually beneficial.

A Gift for the Future
It is customary when heads of state meet to exchange gifts. In this case, the United States could offer one with lasting value — leveling the playing field for Japanese Wagyu in the American market. After all, Japan has already made the down payment.

Embracing Trump

If surviving Trump meeting was goal: Takaichi leaves DC a winner

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published March 20, 2026 on Responsible Statecraft.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s high-stakes meeting with President Donald Trump began with a warm embrace and opening remarks that established a favorable mood.

Takaichi declared that “Donald” is the only person who can achieve peace and prosperity throughout the world, and that she intends to reach out to other countries to support his efforts. Trump congratulated Takaichi for her historic electoral victory, called her a “powerful woman,” and thanked her for all she has done.

But despite the positive atmosphere, this summit revealed the risks of Japan’s policy of clinging to the United States while allowing its relations with China to deteriorate.
Because of Japan’s assessment of the Chinese security threat, Takaichi seeks to lock-in Japan’s alliance with the United States by flattering Trump and appeasing as much as possible his demands on defense and economic issues.

When Takaichi originally requested a summit with Trump, her aim was to get reassurance from Trump before his scheduled trip to China (which has now been postponed). Last November, Takaichi’s imprudent remarks about how a Taiwan crisis could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” that might warrant a Japanese military response, triggered a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Her statements wiped away the improvement in ties with China that had been achieved under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi’s immediate predecessor.

Rather than defending Takaichi as Japan-China tensions escalated, Trump reportedly told her in a phone call that she should tone things down because he wanted to avoid a conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. Trump’s cool response prompted Takaichi to seek assurances from Trump that he would not make deals with Xi Jinping that might undermine Japan’s interests. She also wanted to deepen bilateral cooperation to strengthen economic resilience in response to Chinese coercion.

The U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, however, complicated Takaichi’s original game plan and entrapped Japan in a severe dilemma.

On the one hand, Trump wants Japan “to step up” to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz by deploying naval vessels. From Trump’s perspective, Japan should take on this mission because Japan is more dependent on energy supplies passing through the strait than any other country. Given her landslide electoral victory in February, Takaichi ironically does not have the excuse of domestic political constraints to deny Trump’s request. Furthermore, Japan’s acute fear of China makes it hard for Takaichi to say “no” to Trump.

On the other hand, Takaichi faces strong domestic pressures not to comply with Trump. 82 percent of the Japanese public oppose the U.S. attack against Iran, and most Japanese strategic experts — including those who have stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance — believe that Trump’s war against Iran is an illegal and illegitimate strategic blunder. Japan’s legal and constitutional obstacles for deploying naval ships to a war zone are extremely high.

Furthermore, Iran has indicated that states that send naval ships to the area would be considered to have joined the American and Israeli side in this war and would be seen as hostile. Iran has, however, shown a willingness to allow oil tankers headed for countries that are not involved in the conflict and friendly toward Iran to pass through the strait. It is therefore in Japan’s energy security interests not to deploy naval ships into the area.

Although a joint press conference is usually held after U.S.-Japan summits, for some reason no Takaichi-Trump press briefing took place after their meeting. Instead, Takaichi held a solo press conference with the Japanese media on Thursday. She revealed that there was a discussion of the importance of ensuring the safety of the Strait of Hormuz and that she explained in detail what Japan can and cannot do within its legal constraints.

By refraining from mentioning at all any bilateral differences, she seemed to want to avoid giving the impression that there was any friction between her and Trump. And by not holding a joint press conference, both leaders perhaps sought to prevent the media from probing any discord between the U.S. and Japan.

So what should Takaichi do after this U.S.-Japan summit?

First, she should work energetically with other countries to facilitate an early termination of the Iran war. With the negative impact on gas prices and the strong American public opposition to the war, Trump should welcome such an effort because he wants a good off-ramp well before the November mid-term elections so that he can proclaim victory and mission accomplished.

More challenging will be convincing Iran to end the conflict. Not only does Iran want to avenge the killing of its top leaders and the death and destruction caused by Israel and the United States, it also wants solid international guarantees that it will not be attacked again and that its sovereignty will be protected. Among the G-7 countries, Japan maintains the best relations with Iran. Therefore, Takaichi should use this asset to promote serious diplomacy to explore viable ways to end this war.

Second, Takaichi should engage in proactive diplomacy to stabilize and improve relations with China. Although improving Japan’s own defense capabilities and deepening its ties with like-minded countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are important to counter China and to hedge against the uncertainty of the U.S. security commitment, they are no substitute for direct diplomacy with China to stabilize the regional security environment. An emphasis on military deterrence to the neglect of diplomacy will only fuel an arms race that will favor China given the asymmetry in material capabilities and China’s geographic advantages.

As a first step, the Japanese government should publicly clarify its basic stance regarding the Taiwan issue rather than simply repeating that there has been no change in policy. In addition to reaffirming the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan-China normalization communique, Japan should state that it does not support the independence of Taiwan and that it supports any resolution of the Taiwan issue that is peaceful and achieved without coercion and accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

This is necessary to reassure Beijing that Tokyo is not surreptitiously seeking the independence of Taiwan or the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

In addition, with an eye on the next Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled in China in November 2026, Tokyo should expeditiously initiate discussions with Beijing on a broad range of issues. Rather than sticking to its current passive approach of simply leaving the door open for dialogue, Takaichi should dispatch to Beijing an influential political leader who is trusted by China to restart bilateral discussions. The agenda could include maintaining and strengthening a “rules-based” order, restraining the weaponization of economic interdependence, promoting stability and security of critical supply chains, cooperating more to address climate change, and enhancing confidence-building and crisis prevention measures.

Takaichi has touted that “Japan is back.” By engaging the above two diplomatic challenges, she can establish herself as one of the world’s most important leaders and upgrade Japan’s international status and influence.

Protected by the Constitution

Escaping from Trump’s Request to Dispatch Troops

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 23, 2026
 
The White House might have turned into a haunted house for Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Luckily, she managed to leave without infuriating the resident, U.S. President Donald Trump. She explained the legal requirements that limit Japan’s ability to send troops to the Strait of Hormuz. This work left no time for Takaichi to rebuild a common strategy with the U.S. and against China. After all was said and done, the summit meeting produced no obvious progress.
 
Pushing the Legal Constraints Forward
The greatest challenge for Takaichi in the meeting with Trump was how to deal with his demand for U.S. allies to help protect ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Trump had previously called on countries, including Japan, to send warships to keep the strait open.
 
Takaichi deliberated with her diplomatic staff on how to respond to Trump at the meeting. Their conclusion was that Japan could not send its Self-Defense Force to the Strait. They considered three options: 1) a determination that events in the Strait present a “survival threatening situation” in which Japan can deploy its armed forces to assist the U.S. forces in the region; 2) a determination that Iran’s activities in the strait were a “significant influence situation,” in which case Japan could provide logistic support; and 3) a determination that activities in the strait warranted “maritime security operations” under Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, in which Japanese forces  take necessary action to protect life and property.
 
None of these theories work for action in the Strait, however. The situation in Iran does not threaten Japan’s survival, at least not so far. Japan cannot provide logistical support (on the basis of a significant influence situation) in any area where actual battle is ongoing. Maritime security operations extend only to Japanese vessels. Takaichi and her staff realized that, with the limits on their use, she could do little to satisfy Trump.
 
After her meeting with Trump, Takaichi explained to the press that she had told him what Japan “can and cannot do” in the Middle East. What she could do was to join with the U.S. in refusing to tolerate Iran’s nuclear development, blame Iran for its de facto blockade of the Strait, and promote a joint Japan-U.S. project for oil reserves. What she could not do was to send troops to the Strait. Asahi Shimbun reported that she cited Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as the constraint on dispatching self-defense forces.
 
Two hours before the White House meeting, European leaders together with Takaichi issued a joint statement expressing their willingness to make “appropriate efforts” to ensure safe passage through the Strait. The statement ensured that Takaichi was not seen as acting alone but rather as a member of a group of U.S. allies although their rationales differed. The Europeans take the position that the conflict in the Strait is not their war while legal requirements preclude Japan from participating in the conflict. 
 
Takaichi returned to Japan with homework: how to define “appropriate efforts.” The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimutsu Motegi, suggested sending self-defense forces for mine sweeping in the Strait after a ceasefire. Obviously, Takaichi will need to find a reason to explain to the opposition parties in the Diet why Japan would take on this chore.
 
The China Issue Is Left Behind
For Japan, the summit meeting was originally set to discuss China. Takaichi made a careless comment last November on a “Taiwan contingency,” which exacerbated Japan-China tensions. As Trump scheduled his visit to Beijing in April, Takaichi had to talk with Trump beforehand to encourage him to keep the U.S. engaged in security activities in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is afraid that Trump would lose interest in Asia if he were to reach a deal with Xi Jinping. In the event, the Trump-Xi meeting was postponed, as Trump continued to grapple with the war.
 
At the White House, Takaichi and Trump reconfirmed that they would closely consult with each other on with issues relating to China, based on the time-honored concept of a “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOIP).” Takaichi said that Japan would always be open to China, and Trump replied that he would be “speaking Japan’s praises” when he visits Beijing. But nobody knows when that will be.
 
It is notable that the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community took Takaichi’s Taiwan comment seriously. “Her comments represent a significant shift for a sitting Japanese prime minister,” the document said. Takaichi does not seem to have been successful in impressing on the president that her position on the Taiwan contingency is the same as that of her predecessor prime ministers.
 
Takaichi and Trump did reach three economic agreements. A joint announcement on bilateral investment included a commitment by the Japanese to construct small module reactors in Tennessee and Alabama and natural gas generation facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas. These proposals constituted the second wave of Japan’s promised investments that were part of the Japan-U.S. agreement in July 2025, related to Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs on Japanese products.
 
The agreement for certain Japanese investments must have been the biggest souvenir of Takaichi’s trip to the U.S., regardless of whether Trump was satisfied with it or not. Japan announced the first wave of investments in February, which included the manufacture of industrial synthetic diamonds, construction of the U.S. crude oil export infrastructure, and natural gas generation. Takaichi tried to demonstrate Japan’s willingness to implement the July 22 agreement. The two waves represent about 20 percent of the promised $550 billion investment.
 
Charming, Flattering, and Ignoring
Takaichi presented her unique style of her diplomacy during the trip. Video footage of Takaichi’s arrival at the White House entrance was repeatedly broadcast in Japan. She approached Trump, who was standing at the entrance, and hugged him with her arms embracing his shoulder and waist. It was closer to tackling than hugging. Although she might have been trying to charm Trump, a former Japanese diplomat described it as “embarrassing.” One would have to search long and hard to find any evidence of another world leader hugging Trump.
 
At the beginning of summit meeting, Takaichi praised Trump as a distinguished leader. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” said Takaichi. In view of the U.S. military operations to replace the Venezuelan leader and to launch a surprise attack on Iran, most Japanese recognized her remarks on Trump-as-peacemaker as explicit flattery.
 
Japanese leaders have sometimes used “haragei (腹芸),” a performance dealing with issues not based on words or actions but on guts, in its relations with the U.S. Former prime minister Eisaku Sato was renowned for his haragei, as seen in his negotiations for the return of the U.S.-occupied Okinawa and in the textile deal. But Takaichi has yet to reach his skill level: the audience in Japan could easily perceive that she just did not want to piss Trump off.
 
Asked by the press why the U.S. did not give Japan advance notice of the first attack on Iran, Trump reached back 85 years, five years before he was born. “Who knows better about surprise than Japan, OK? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” Trump answered. Takaichi – who understands the English language just fine – waited for the interpreter’s translation and made no verbal reply. She ignored Trump’s irrelevant joke; a surprise attack would not be announced to the target.
 
Takaichi has not had much diplomatic or international negotiation experience over trade deals before becoming prime minister. It is not easy for the leader of a country to conduct negotiations with national interests at stake by acting like a girl in love with a strong man.

Trump-Lee Summit

Security Agenda for Trump-Lee Summit May Renew Abandonment Concerns

First Published August 13, 2025 in The Peninsula Blog of the Korean Economic Institute.

By Daniel C. Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member.

The upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is shaping up to be a crucial moment in the more than seventy-year-long alliance.

The two leaders inked a vague agreement on trade and investment late last month, which appears to have opened the door to good relations, and President Lee has eagerly sought this meeting to strengthen his legitimacy and demonstrate his diplomatic skills.

But the summit also has the potential to imperil the alliance. While some economic issues remain—not least the U.S. tariffs on automobiles and semiconductors—the meeting is more likely to focus on a range of contentious security issues, including U.S. demands for greater South Korean contributions to defense costs and pressures for South Korea to commit to join military contingencies in Taiwan and subordinate its policies to an aggressive U.S. stance toward China.

All of these issues are now joined under two broad policy umbrellas the Trump administration calls “alliance modernization” and “strategic flexibility.”

Both concepts embody the idea of shifting the alliance away from its sole focus on deterring North Korea toward a broader regional approach that prioritizes confrontation with China, including the use of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in a Taiwan contingency. China is the number one strategic threat to the United States, and allies and partners must “do more,” according to an interim strategic guidance document the U.S. Department of Defense issued in July.

“Strategic flexibility” means that in the event of a clash with China, U.S. military forces based in South Korea will be withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. It demands that South Korea take on the preponderant burden of defense against potential North Korean aggression.

USFK Commander Xavier Brunson recently stated that the “USFK must be able to move to other locations and perform other missions at any time” and that South Korea must “play a great role in responding to North Korea, and USFK demonstrate flexibility to perform other missions.”

General Brunson acknowledged South Korea’s desire to connect any moves in this direction with the completion of a plan to reform the current system of operational control (OPCON), which places South Korea’s military under U.S. command during wartime. OPCON transfer to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for South Korea, particularly under progressive administrations. If the United States shifts its focus, then “the transition of wartime operational control in which South Korea leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula, must also be expedited,” argued the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun.

But Brunson pushed back against accelerating this process, telling reporters that “taking shortcuts to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control could jeopardize the readiness of the Korean Peninsula’s military.”

This has not stopped the Trump administration from preparing to push for South Korea’s acquiescence to their demands. An early draft of a U.S.-South Korea agreement sets a goal for the upcoming talks to compel South Korea to “issue a political statement supporting flexibility for USFK force posture to better deter China while continuing to deter [North Korea],” according to the Washington Post. This is to be paired with pressures to boost South Korea’s defense spending to 3.8 percent of GDP—up from 2.6 percent last year—and to vastly increase its support for the cost of basing U.S. forces.

Defense planners linked to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have pushed more specific plans to drastically cut the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea from the current level of 28,500 to 10,000. This would be done by effectively removing all ground troops from South Korea, leaving only air units that can easily be deployed elsewhere.

The United States has maintained the right to deploy its forces anywhere, and reductions in troop levels are hardly unprecedented. But in return, the United States accepted the South Korean stance that “it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”

More profoundly, the United States’ plans undermine the basic pledge to defend South Korea in a war—a commitment that underlies the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The presence of U.S. ground forces is the famously labeled “tripwire” to guarantee the U.S. commitment.

“The continued presence of US troops at existing levels on the Korean Peninsula is more important than documents discussing ‘strategic flexibility’ or ‘modernized alliance,’” Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation Bruce Klingner told this writer. “Maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea is a tangible manifestation of American commitment to the defense of its treaty partner. As such, they continue to be an integral part of Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command. In a conflict with North Korea, the American public and Congress would not allow a U.S. president to abandon them, particularly after casualties.”

The Trump administration faces resistance not only from South Korea but also from Congress, where support for the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula and opposition to downsizing the current troop levels remain strong, even among Republicans. The National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, prohibits a reduction in the U.S. military posture or a change in wartime OPCON until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that “such action is in the national interest.” It also directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and USFK to carry out an independent assessment of any such changes.

The North Korea Connection
The push to refocus the U.S. regional presence away from North Korea and toward China could potentially be linked to another sensitive issue shaping the upcoming Trump-Lee summit—relations with North Korea.

Rumors and hints of a resumption of talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have surfaced again in recent weeks. The Lee administration is supportive of such dialogue, as such moves are consistent with its desire to ease tensions with North Korea and revive serious engagement. But such talks are likely to only take place if Trump is heading seriously toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and acceptance of Kim’s demand that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.

“At some point, the ROK is going to pay a price for U.S.-DPRK dialogue if the U.S. under Trump decides to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state,” former senior Department of State official and Korea expert Evans Revere told KEI.

“The deeply progressive government in Seoul cannot possibly give the U.S. what it wants — agreement that the ROK will support the U.S. militarily in a China- or Taiwan-related contingency and agreement to allow the U.S. to use Korea-based forces against China,” argues Revere, who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “And the U.S. does not wish to give the ROK what it wants — an open-ended commitment that Korea-based U.S. forces will be solely dedicated to the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.”

Summit Disasters of the Past
The possibility that the upcoming summit could lead to a serious clash is well understood in Seoul, based on past experience and the much-publicized Oval Office encounters between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other world leaders. In the case of South Korea, the 1993 meeting between presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam and the 2001 summit between presidents George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples of what could happen if things go wrong.

“In both cases, the meeting went badly because of North Korea,” recalls former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, who was a key participant in both summits. “In my mind they went badly because the Koreans failed to prepare carefully and understand where our president was.”

There are lessons for Lee Jae Myung, Hubbard told this writer in an interview. North Korea is not the problem now, as both Trump and Lee want to engage with North Korea. “The issue this time will be security relations, host nation support, and I don’t think anyone really knows where Trump is going to come down on troop levels in Korea. Lee Jae Myung is a progressive who wants to reach out to China but I think he is afraid Trump is going to make demands on troop reductions that will undercut him in Korea.”

Trump’s belief that there is no rationale to keep U.S. forces in South Korea is long-standing and unchanged. It is not hard to imagine a moment in the upcoming summit when Trump will once again raise this issue.

“I never took the strategic flexibility dispute seriously,” says Ambassador Hubbard, “but the danger is we push them too hard on Taiwan, on the relations with China, and at the same time raise questions about our strategic commitment.”

That could put the United States on a slippery slope toward abandoning its ally—something no South Korean leader would want to happen.

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PREVIEW OF THE TRUMP-LEE SUMMIT. 8/18, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Korea Chair, CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS; William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair Emeritus, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS; Timothy Martin, Korea Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal. https://www.csis.org/events/impossible-state-live-podcast-preview-trump-lee-summit

TRILATERALISM THROUGH TRANSITION: PROSPECTS OF STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. 8/18, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Eun A Jo, Assistant Professor of Government, William and Mary; Shihoko Goto, Senior Fellow, Mansfield Foundation. https://keia.org/event/trilateralism-through-transition-prospects-of-strengthening-u-s-south-korea-japan-partnership/

Ishiba meet Trumps

No Surprise Is the Greatest Surprise 

 By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun. You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba did not bungle his first meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Indeed, he returned with a renewed U.S. commitment to security in the Indo-Pacific region. Although Ishiba was not able to get Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel over the finish line, he did elicit a favorable statement from Trump encouraging possible passive Japanese investment in U.S. Steel. More importantly for Ishiba in domestic politics, the opposition parties gave his diplomacy a positive review. Still, Ishiba returned to Tokyo with a stack of homework.

The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement reaffirmed that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which commits U.S. to the defense of Japan, would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. The statement also confirmed the continuity of regional multilateral security frameworks through the QUAD (with Australia and India) and trilateral cooperation arrangements with the Republic of Korea and the Philippines. These arrangements were established or enhanced under former President Joe Biden.

As is now the practice in Washington, U.S. government action comes at a price. The price of the U.S. commitments to Japan is one trillion dollars, although Japan was already on course to pay most of that price. Ishiba pledged in the meeting to raise Japan’s investments in the U.S. from $800 billion to an unprecedented $1 trillion. The statement provides that the two leaders will seek to promote business opportunities and significantly increase bilateral investment and employment.

Ishiba framed Nippon Steel’s takeover of U.S. Steel, which had been rejected by Biden, not as an acquisition but as an investment. “Investment to U.S. Steel produces goods contributing to the world with Japanese technology. I share a notion with the president that Japan’s investment does not cause unilateral benefit of one of us,” said Ishiba in the joint press conference. Trump did not reverse Biden’s decision, but did open the door, for now, Nippon Steel to have a non-controlling investment.

Assessments of Ishiba’s debut in bilateral diplomacy with Trump were respectable Although most people in Japan were skeptical of Ishiba’s ability to build a close personal relationship with Trump, Ishiba succeeded in avoiding any hard demands from Trump such as higher tariffs on Japanese products or greater defense spending.

“No surprise was the greatest surprise,” said one of the lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Ken Saito. A leader of the LDP Upper House members welcomed the outcome of the summit meeting and expected a positive impact on the Upper House elections this summer. Even the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, acknowledged Ishiba’s achievements.

Ishiba’s success, if limited, was the product of at least four factors. First, Ishiba put money in front of Trump. Calculating Japan’s current investment in the U.S at 800 billion dollars, Ishiba offered up a new investment goal of one trillion dollars. Ishiba may also have proposed an investment of $2.7 billion by Nippon Steel directly in U.S. Steel on top of the $14.1 billion purchase price. At least that seemed to the story in Asahi Shimbun, which reported that the CEO of U.S. Steel had made a new proposal in a meeting with Trump on the day before the summit meeting.

Second, Ishiba took advantage of personal connections. For example, to prepare to explain Japan’s investment in the U.S., Ishiba met with his high school classmate, the chairman of Toyota Motor Co., Akio Toyoda. Ishiba also consulted with the founder of SoftBank, Masayoshi Son, who had announced a $100 billion investment in the U.S. Son is an old friend of the foreign minister Takeshi Iwaya, Ishiba’s closest political ally.

Ishiba also relied on the friendship between his former political enemy, Shinzo Abe, and Trump. Ishiba told Trump that “the very close relationship between Japan and the U.S. was built by the president and late prime minister Shinzo Abe.” Ishiba stressed that Japan would continue its firm commitment to Abe’s policy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Third, seeking a religious connection with Trump as fellow Protestants, Ishiba praised Trump as “chosen by God” when Trump was shot by a sniper and firmly stood on the stage with his fist raised to the blue sky. It was obvious that Ishiba hoped to establish a personal friendship through explicit flattery.

Fourth, Ishiba carefully prepared for the summit meeting. He rehearsed the meeting with the staff from both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, so that he could speak to Trump without a written script. He brought the same interpreter that Abe had used in his discussions with Trump. Ishiba also brought maps of the U.S. cities in which Japan has invested to explain Japan’s contribution to U.S. economy.

Whether the meeting was successful or not ultimately depends on how Ishiba is able to follow up. Opposition parties have criticized Ishiba for not raising any concern about Trump’s attacks on the sovereignty of Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Ishiba’s pledge to purchase American LNG may deviate from Japan’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In any case, so long as the LDP is a minority party in the Diet, Ishiba’s diplomatic gains may not translate into long-term better approval ratings.

A postscript: Two days after Ishiba’s visit, Trump said that he would impose a 25% tariff on all steel and aluminum imports from all countries, including Japan. Trump also plans to announce reciprocal tariffs later this week although the range of affected imports is unclear. Trump is not aiming the new tariffs at Japan in particular, but at Japan’s steel producers (and other yet unknown manufacturers) will be affected. The history of tariffs under the Trump Administration has yet to be written; it is impossible to predict under what circumstances the tariffs may go up or down. In the meantime, the tariff announcements are sure to temper the public approval gains that Ishiba has been looking for.