By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member.
First Published August 12, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has doubled down on his military and strategic alliance with Vladimir Putin and the Russian regime, betting that this axis will strengthen his own position for now. However, Kim’s strategic calculus depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and its economic and political impact on Russia.
The flow of arms and soldiers from North Korea to Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to escalate, accompanied by a growing supply of North Korean labor to fill the gaps in Russia’s war-strained economy. And the North Korean economy is increasing its reliance on a largely unofficial transfer of Russian resources—food, energy, cash and military technology—offered as compensation for its support.
The latest sign of this deepening relationship came from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who revealed in a late July address that Russia planned to bring in an additional 30,000 troops and deadly ballistic missile launchers.
“Russia wants to receive another 30,000 troops from North Korea. Since June, preparations have been under way in Russia’s Voronezh region to receive them,” Zelenskyy said, though he did not reveal the source for this information, and it has not yet been independently confirmed.
A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks on Ukraine, an official at Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said on August 6.
The unit comprises about ninety North Korean personnel and is expected to be based in Russia’s Voronezh region, the official said. The United States is aware of the North Korean deployment, a source familiar with the issue told Reuters.
Forty North Korean missiles have already been supplied, at least two of which were launched at Ukraine last week during a deadly strike, the Ukrainian official said.
“This is a threat not only to Ukraine,” Zelenskyy said in his radio address. “Russia is helping North Korea learn how to wage war, improve its weapons and gain real combat experience in using them.”
The Changing Nature of War in Ukraine and North Korea’s Role
There is some skepticism about these reports, as they have not been confirmed by other intelligence agencies. They also reflect Ukraine’s interest in pushing for more military support to counter missile strikes that are increasingly penetrating Ukrainian defenses, including calling on South Korea to lift restrictions on the sale of missile defense equipment directly to Ukraine.
“In my view, the Republic of Korea should have closer cooperation with Ukraine. We are open to this. We would very much like to receive support from South Korea in an area where we have a shortage. That is air defense systems,” Zelenskyy said in an interview with Ukrainian media posted to X on August 8.
But analysts point out that these possible new deployments are consistent with the changing nature of warfare in Ukraine. When North Korea’s military assistance began more than two years ago, it first consisted of a huge flow of artillery shells and artillery guns, providing crucial help when Russian stocks were depleted by intense exchanges of artillery fire. It was followed by the deployment of 12,000–16,000 North Korean troops to help push back Ukraine’s incursion into the Russian territory of Kursk, carefully avoiding conflict within Ukrainian territory itself.
Now drones have partially replaced heavy artillery, with static lines of engagement on the ground and heavy casualties, combined with long-range deep attacks using missiles.
“Russia and Ukraine are currently engaged in two battles,” explains Aihiro Makino, a security expert for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun. “Trench warfare on the front lines centered on the Donbas region, and long-range attacks targeting each other’s deep territories.”
North Korea has a role to play in both battles, says Makino, a long-time specialist on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean missiles are joining attacks on Ukrainian cities, and North Korea can send troops to the Donbas region, as it recognizes Donbas as Russian territory (despite being seized from Ukraine)—although such a move would risk high casualties.
There are political risks for Kim if casualty levels reach tens of thousands. But he has already decided to embrace the several thousand deaths from the earlier deployment as a heroic mission. In April, the regime opened a lavish “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations,” which includes war trophies such as U.S. and German tanks and the graves of some 2,288 North Korean soldiers who fought in Kursk.
“Kim’s regime does not care about human lives,” says Fyodor Tertitskiy, a North Korea expert and author of Pyongyang on the Brink, now teaching at South Korea’s Ewha Womans University. “It does, however, care about its own survival, and it has calculated that Putin’s favor outweighs the risks,” he told this writer.
One added element to North Korea-Russia ties is the rapidly growing dispatch of North Korean workers, in the tens of thousands, many of them filling serious labor shortages in factories and other roles across Russia.
“Demand for North Korean labor remains high and is likely to stay high for the foreseeable future,” widely respected expert Andrei Lankov, who teaches at South Korea’s Kookmin University, told this writer. “North Korean workers are already widely employed in the civilian economy, where labor shortages are severe. They can also be used in areas close to the front line and employed in certain military industries.”
Kim’s Strategic Calculus
“The strategic calculus remains the same,” says Tertitskiy. “Putin wants to conquer Ukraine and welcomes Kim’s help, while Kim wants economic assistance and a counterbalance to China.”
Kim has so far managed to intensify his relationship with Moscow while also keeping close ties to North Korea’s traditional ally, China. High-level visits from senior Chinese officials have cemented their ongoing role in North Korea’s economy.
Measured by official trade statistics, China remains the overwhelming dominant player in North Korea’s foreign trade. China accounts for over 98 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade.
But official statistics do not calculate the huge, and in some cases larger, volume of unofficial trade, mostly to evade UN sanctions. Official data for Russia shows a tiny amount of trade—some USD 35 million in 2023, for example. But a recent report from South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy calculated that North Korea earned up to USD 14.4 billion from Russia from August 2023 to the end of 2025, mostly from payments for its arms and soldier supplies but also other illegal exports of food and fuel.
This does not count transfers of advanced military technology that have been kept secret but may already include air defense systems, satellite technology, drones, and early warning aircraft.
At the moment, Russian input into North Korea’s modest economic boom of late has been crucial. But in the longer run, argues Lankov, the two economies are not compatible. On the other hand, he says, “China needs many of the goods that North Korea is capable of exporting and therefore has a natural economic interest in buying North Korean minerals, seafood, and other products. In addition, China’s strategic interests require a stable North Korea. Beijing has a strong interest in preserving the status quo and maintaining a buffer zone along its border. For Russia, by contrast, North Korea’s strategic value is considerably lower.”
Implications of the Ukraine War
Kim’s investment in the alliance with Moscow is clearly a successful bet for now. But what happens if the war goes badly and the Russians are forced into a de facto political defeat in the form of a settlement that favors Ukraine? Or a prolonged stalemate that weakens Russia both politically and economically?
Even then, North Korea watchers all agree that the Kim regime is likely to survive that turn of events.
At this moment, the regime has not told the North Korean public that the war has reached a stalemate, says Makino. “Even if Russia is defeated, the public will be told that ‘Russia has won.’ North Korea’s rule is that ‘the Supreme Leader does not make wrong decisions.’”
Lankov shares that view. “North Korea is not tied to Putin’s Russia, and it never will be,” Lankov told this writer. “It is now in the ideal position of having two sponsors. North Korea, while living on a stable but modest Chinese pension, has won the Russian lottery. If the lottery money runs out, it will be bad, but hardly the end of the world, since the Chinese pension is here to stay.”But For the time being, the North Korea-Russia partnership remains strong and beneficial for both parties and likely to weather the changing nature of the war in Ukraine.
