Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Politics. Show all posts

Sunday, July 12, 2026

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 
The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II
By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York
PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.



1942: Crux of War
By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 
US Naval War College
PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.



Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail
By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,
European Council on Foreign Relations
PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.


*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*
Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement
They are simply new and interesting.

Sunday, June 7, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 8, 2026

JAPAN'S CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN BUSINESS OWNERS. 6/8, 1:30-2:30pm (JST), 12:30-1:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Sakura Uchikoshi, Member of the House of Councillors; Kazuki Yuda, Touch Immigration Law Firm.

2026 JAPAN–PHILIPPINES FRIENDSHIP YEAR COMMEMORATIVE SYMPOSIUM. 6/8, 2:30-6:00pm (JST), 1:30-5:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tokyo. Speakers Include: H.E. Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines; H.E. Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Defense, Member of the House of Representatives; Sen. Juan Miguel Fernández Zubiri, Senator, the Republic of the Philippines; Yoshiaki Wada, Member of the House of Representatives, Japan; Maryjun Takahashi; Shun Ohno, Affiliated Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; Ines Yamanouchi Mallari, School President, Philippine Nikkei Jin Kai International School, School President, Mindanao Kokusai Daigaku.

PETRO DIPLOMACY 2026: ENERGY IN CRISIS. 6/8, 9:00am-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Phillip Cornell, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Mason Hamilton, Vice President of Economics and Research, American Petroleum Institute; Ben Cahill, Nonresident Fellow, AGSI; Ambassador William Roebuck, Executive Vice President, AGSI; Sarah Ladislaw, Founding Director, New Energy Industrial Strategy Center, Former Senior Director for Climate and Energy, U.S. National Security Council.

GAZA UPDATE: REALITIES, RISKS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD. 6/8, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jaser Abu Mousa, Senior Fellow, MEI; Natan Sachs, Senior Fellow, MEI; Moderator: Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Senior Fellow, MEI.

THE END OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY?: ERDOĞAN'S ATTEMPTS TO NEUTER THE LAST OPPOSITION PARTY. 6/8, 3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Amb. Eric Edelman, Distinguished Scholar, JINSA, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Svante E. Cornell, Scholar, Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, JINSA; Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy, JINSA. Exclusively for JINSA National Leaders in good standing, program participants, congressional and administration staff, U.S. military, press, and select members of the policy community.

FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND THE FUTURE OF AID IN TURBULENT TIMES. 6/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Development Department, CSIS. Speakers: David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue Committee (IRC); Rabih El Chammay, Head, National Mental Health Programme, Ministry of Health, Lebanon; Roya Rahmani, Director of Global Engagement, World Bank Group; Moderator: Enoh T. Ebong, President, Global Development Department, CSIS.

FROM YORKTOWN TO PHILADELPHIA: GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. 6/8, 6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Hillsdale College [MAGA]. Speaker: Paul A. Rahe, Professor of History, Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair, Western Heritage, Hillsdale College.

KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY. 6/8, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: Xavier Brunson, General Commander UNC/CFC/USFKs, United States Army.

FISCAL POLICY FORUM: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISES. 6/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University, School of Public Policy and Management at Korea Development Institute. Speakers: Tom Ramage, Fellow/Economic Policy Analyst, Korea Economic Institute of America; Tami Overby, Partner, DGA Group Government Relations; Taesuk Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Finance and Social Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI); Younghyun Kim, Director, Budget Communication Cooperation Division, Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Planning and Budget; Moderator: Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.

Sunday, May 10, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 11, 2026

SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA SYMPOSIUM. 5/11, 9:00am-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC), University of Pennsylvania. Speakers include: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Kyle Chan, Fellow, Brookings Institution; Yangyang Cheng, Research Scholar, Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Junmin Wang, Professor, The University of Memphis; Joshua Freedman, Foreign Affairs; Susan Greenhalgh, Professor Emerita, Harvard University; Wanheng Hu, Stanford University; Yuchen Chen, Baruch College; Ke Li, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Larry Au, The City College of New York; Lizhi Liu, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University; Jamie Wong, Princeton University; Abigail Coplin, Vassar College; Lizzi Lee, Asia Society; Graham Webster, Stanford University; Paul Triolo, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Samm Sacks, New America/Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Scott Moore, University of Pennsylvania; Deborah Seligsohn, Villanova University.

A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH KEVIN RUDD & IAN BREMMER. 5/11, 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society, New York. Speakers: Kevin Rudd, Former Australia’s 26th Prime Minister and returning to the Asia Society as its 10th President & CEO; Ian Bremmer, President and Founder, Eurasia Group. FEE

POWERING GLOBAL COOPERATION: INNOVATION, SECURITY, & GEOPOLITICS IN A CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE. 5/11, 4:30pm-6:00pm (PDT), 7:30pm-9:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hoover. Speakers: Condoleezza Rice, Director, Hoover Institution; Arun Majumdar, Dean, Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability; David C. Mulford, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution. Moderator: Šumit Ganguly, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution.

Friday, April 24, 2026

Imperial Succession

Diet Discussion on the Imperial Family Resumes


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026


Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
 
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
 
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
 
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
 
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
 
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
 
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
 
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
 
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
 
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
 
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
 
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
 
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947.  However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.

Sunday, April 19, 2026

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖


Cold War Comrades: An Emotional History 
of the Sino-North Korean Alliance
By Gregg A. Brazinsky, Professor of History and International Affairs, 
George Washington University
PURCHASE BOOK 1/8/2026

Brazinsky argues that neither the PRC nor the DPRK would have survived as socialist states without the ideal of Sino-North Korean friendship. Chinese and North Korean leaders encouraged mutual empathy and sentimental attachments between their citizens and then used these emotions to strengthen popular commitment to socialist state building. He explains why the unique relationship that Beijing and Pyongyang forged during the Korean War remained important throughout the Cold War and how it continues to influence the international relations of East Asia today.



Narrowing Sea: Fukuoka, Pusan, and the Rise 
and Fall of an Imperial Region
By Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor of History, 
Yale University
PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

Shepherd examines the shared histories of Pusan and Fukuoka over the eight decades from Japan's forced opening of Korea's ports in 1876 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. Wars, colonization, and capitalist industrialization forged intimate connections between the two, knitting together an imperial region that transcended its maritime boundaries. She challenges traditional views of empire and urban growth and shows how local networks, migration, and capital flows shaped the region's exploitative and uneven geographies.

Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: 
Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War
By Sean Wiswesser, Former Senior Operations Officer,
Central Intelligence Agency
PURCHASE BOOK 4/21/2026

Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. He breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights.


Japanese Rebels: Non-Conformists in a Conformist Society
By David McNeill, Former Correspondent, The Independent 
and The Economist
&
Stephen McClure, Freelance Journalist, Former Asia Bureau Chief, Billboard
PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Japan is often seen through the lens of an unusually resilient stereotype that it is a nation of risk-averse conformists. McNeill and McClure deconstruct that stereotype by showing that there have always been Japanese people who have rejected the status quo, challenged injustice, and fought for personal freedom. 


*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*
Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement
They are simply new and interesting.

Saturday, April 18, 2026

Takaichi Moves Forward without Concensus

PM Takaichi Grapples with a Divisive Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 13, 2026

 
Having passed the FY2026 budget bill, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will spend the rest of the Diet’s current session promoting her conservative agenda. This may include establishing a National Intelligence Council, criminalizing the destruction of Japan’s national flag, and reviewing Japan’s three critical security documents. Takaichi characterizes her agenda as “policies dividing public opinion into two.” Takaichi seems to have decided to be a divisive leader, uninterested in uniting the nation. 
 
On January 19, Takaichi announced the dissolution of the House of Representatives. “I’m going to boldly grapple with issues that may divide national opinion,” Takaichi said, explaining her decision to dissolve the House. She interpreted the sweeping victory of her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House election on February 8 as total public support for her agenda.
 
Takaichi may have meant that she would tackle controversial issues without compromise, that is, to perform as the leader who makes progress toward her own ambitious goals. However, it soon became clear that her “divisive agenda” meant conservative policies, certain to meet opposition from liberal parties in the Diet.  Having no majority in the Upper House, it is unclear how she and the LDP will bring her controversial policies to fruition.
 
National Intelligence Council
The Takaichi Cabinet has submitted to the Diet a bill to establish a National Intelligence Council (NIC). The council would research and discuss national security, including potential terrorist activity and foreign espionage in Japan. Members of the council would be the prime minister and her cabinet members whose ministries deal with national security issues. 
 
The council would be supported by a bureaucratic organization called the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) -- the Japanese version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It would be an upgraded organization from the current Cabinet Intelligence and Research Agency and would integrate the functions of some intelligence sections in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the police agency. It is still unclear whether these ministries can share with another body the information that they collected for their own purposes. 
 
Debate on the bill started in the Diet in early April. The minority parties are concerned that the new NIA will collect information about their political and campaign activities that would oppose the government that is in office. Takaichi insists that the legislation would not allow the government to violate the privacy of individuals and would not target the activities of civil groups.
 
However, the legislation contains no provision for oversight of the NIC’s activities, nor does the bill enable the Diet to operate as a check on the NIC or the NIA.
 
The Takaichi administration has proposed additional anti-espionage legislation to reinforce security against foreign spies. The coalition agreement between the LDP and Japan Innovation Party (JIP) last October included work on legislation that would require foreign agents to register with the government and to disclose their lobbying.
 
Punishment for Damaging the National Flag
Article 92 of Penal Code penalizes a person who damages the flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country with up to two years imprisonment or a fine of two hundred thousand yen. Although Article 92 is a part of the criminal law that deals with crimes against diplomacy, some right-wingers claim it is unreasonable for Japan’s criminal code not to include any punishment for damaging the flag of Japan.
 
This argument has resonated with Takaichi, and the LDP-JIP agreement from last October affirmed that they would pursue legislation to create the “crime of damaging Japan’s flag” during the 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. An opposition party, Sanseito, also support criminalizing damage to Japan’s flag as part of their “Japan First” agenda. This legislation is a high priority for the conservative voters who have supported Takaichi.
 
The LDP held its first meeting on the issue in late March. The legislative team, headed by former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, examined examples of similar legislation in foreign countries and anti-flag-desecration measures by former administrations in Japan. When Japan legislated Hinomaru (日の丸) as the national flag and Kimigayo (君が代) as the national anthem in 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that he did not intend to make damage to the Japanese flag a criminal offense.


The LDP and JIP hope to conclude their discussion of a bill by late April. However, they have not yet reached an agreement on what kind of damage to the Japanese flag should be punished. There are skeptics about criminalization. Liberal groups argue that doing so may violate freedom of thought or freedom of expression as described in Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Japan. Even some LDP members believe that the act should be remained in conceptual provisions and damaging Japanese flag should not be criminalized.
 
Arms Exports
Takaichi tends to see security policy in the context of money. Her administration is promoting arms exports since they contribute to economic growth. She intends to reduce the regulation of shipments that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology now cover. The implementation guidelines of the Three Principles allow arms exports for only five purposes: rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping.
 
The Takaichi government presented to the LDP in early April a draft of a regulation to ease restrictions on arms exports. The draft would replace the five functional categories with an export control regime that distinguishes between exports of “arms” and “non-arms.” “Arms” are weapons and lethal systems; the draft regulation would allow exports to partner countries. There would be no restrictions on exports of non-arms. The National Security Council is planning to revise the guidelines in late April with approval of the leading parties.
 
A controversial point in the draft is how the Diet is engaged in the decision on arms exports. The draft would require the administration to report to the Diet on arms exports only after the equipment has been exported. Post hoc reporting of arms sales is unusual. In the United States, the executive branch must give Congress advance notice and an opportunity to review proposed arms sales. In the UK, Parliament and even the courts have had roles in reviewing arms sales before they are concluded.
 
Takaichi’s idea is based on a notion that Japan can earn money and promote her conservative agenda by expanding arms exports. However, strictly refraining from these exports has been Japan’s traditional policy as a pacifist nation—an ethos adopted in the wake of the devastation of the war. One Komeito lawmaker quoted a 1976 comment by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Miyazawa: “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons.” No such pride or moral authority as a leader of Japan can be seen in Takaichi.

Thursday, February 26, 2026

Takaichi's Special Diet Session

Special Diet Session Started

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 23, 2026


The 221st session of the Japanese Diet was convoked on February 18. This is a 150-day special session after the February 8 general election of the Lower House. After the success of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in that election, both chambers reelected Sanae Takaichi as Prime Minister – although her reelection in the Upper House required two rounds of voting. She then reappointed all her ministers and gave a policy speech.  This speech made almost no policy changes from her speech last October after her first election in the Diet. But one thing has changed: the party structure in the Lower House.
 
Takaichi dissolved the Lower House on January 23, the first day of the 220th session, and the session was closed on that day. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan requires a general election within 40 days after dissolution. Takaichi accelerated the process, holding an election just 16 days later on February 8. Article 54 also requires the Diet to hold a special session within 30 days after a general election. For Takaichi, only ten days passed between the election and the convocation.
 
A special session after a general election usually closes in a few days after the Diet elects the prime minister. This time, however, Takaichi called for 150 days to discuss the FY2026 budget bill and other items on her political agenda. Both the LDP and the opposition parties agreed. Takaichi hopes to pass the budget bill before the end of March.
 
The first Takaichi Cabinet resigned on February 18, and she formed her second cabinet on the same day she was reelected as prime minister. She reappointed all her ministers. Takaichi also confirmed that she will maintain the LDP’s leading coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). JIP is expected to join the Takaichi Cabinet in the coming fall at Takaichi’s request.
 
On February 20, a few days after convoking the new Diet session, Takaichi delivered her policy speech to the Diet. She would have given the speech in January had she not dissolved the Lower House. The speech fleshed out her campaign slogan, “responsible and proactive public finances” – but it contained no new policy. She had already discussed the slogan in another policy speech to an extraordinary session of the Diet in October 2025.
 
In the February 18 speech, Takaichi promised to promote domestic investment, which has fallen short of the government’s expectations. She also will work for “strategic investment,” including economic security, food security, energy security, health-medical security, and cyber security. Takaichi said that these policies represent her reformist agenda, but it is unclear what kind of reforms the policies will bring.
 
In her speech, Takaichi also declared that she would not deliver a supplemental budget in the coming fall, a standard practice of other prime ministers. She is forgoing a supplemental budget to enhance the predictability of the national budget for the private sector and local governments, but she did not explain how this reform would contribute to Japan’s economy. It is curious why she is so persistent in changing the budgetary process.
 
On diplomacy, Takaichi abandoned the phrase “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage” that she had used in her policy speech last fall. Instead, she has begun to refer to “responsible Japanese diplomacy,” a strategy to create peace and prosperity. She seems to have realized that Japan would not be able to “flourish” in a world where a major power can go into and disregard the sovereignty of another country. [Ed. See: The Disintegration of the World Order and Its Reconstruction as Japan’s Mission by Prof. Akio Takahara, Nippon.com., Feb 19, 2026]
 
It is doubtful that Takaichi properly recognizes the consequence of her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November. She has so far offered no realistic measures to improve bilateral relations with China, which has continued to pressure Japan after her comment. In her policy speech, she limited her remarks on China to the promotion of “a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” that would keep open a channel of talks.
 
While Takaichi’s February 18 speech revealed no major changes in the policy agenda that she had been pursuing after taking office last fall, the political backdrop in the Diet has been drastically transformed. Her LDP occupies 316 seats in the Lower House – more than a two-thirds majority. This super majority gives her the power to control future of any bill because a two-thirds majority in the Lower House can enact a bill even if the Upper House has rejected it. The LDP does not have a majority in the Upper House.
 
LDP members chair 23 of 27 committees in the Lower House. It will not be easy for the opposition parties in the Committee on the Budget to accuse LDP lawmakers of wrongdoing, since an LDP member will chair this committee. Indeed, in appointing Yasutoshi Nishimura, who was deeply involved in the LDP’s slush fund scandal, as chair of the LDP election committee, Takaichi shows her indifference to ethics in the Lower House (or anywhere else). 
 
Takaichi appointed hawkish Keiji Furuya to chair the Lower House’s Commission on the Constitution to accelerate potential constitutional amendments. With a two-thirds majority the LDP can initiate any constitutional amendment without the consent of any other party. However, the LDP still lacks even a simple majority in the Upper House, meaning that the party cannot originate constitutional amendments there.
 
Notably, Takaichi failed to win the first vote in the Upper House. She was successful in the run-off that followed. Her failure in the first vote demonstrated that she still would need basic support from opposition parties if the legislative process is to move smoothly. The LDP’s super-majority will test the Diet’s ability to exercise its checks-and-balances function.

Sunday, June 29, 2025

Japan's Ordinary Diet Session Ends


Japan’s PM Ishiba Survives the Ordinary Diet Session 2025


By Takuya Nishimura
, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 23, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Ordinary Session of the Diet closed on June 22. Despite the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) minority in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba survived: the Diet passed the FY2025 budget bill by the end of March, and Ishiba avoided a no-confidence resolution. As he had to make concessions to the opposition parties, Ishiba failed to complete parts of his agenda such as political funds control and the separate surname system. The vulnerability of Ishiba’s position may affect the coming Upper House election in July.

The recently concluded session was the first time in over thirty years that the leading parties had to deal with a minority government in the House of Representatives. The last time was in 1994 when an anti-LDP coalition led by Tsutomu Hata lost its majority when the Socialist Party’s seceded from the coalition government. In the ordinary session this year, the LDP and its partner Komeito were able to accommodate enough policy concerns of some opposition parties to gain a majority to pass the FY2025 budget. The budget was the critical issue in the first half of the session.

Although Ishiba was at first not able to find an opposition party to vote for the budget, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) eventually offered a helping hand. This support came after Ishin, the LDP, and Komeito reached a deal to add support for high school tuition to the bill. The Diet enacted the bill in the nick of time, by the end of March when FY2024 ended.

Ishin’s co-leader in charge of Diet affairs, Seiji Maehara, who had been the head of a small party advocating free education before joining Ishin last October, paved the way for the deal. Maehara was a minister in the administration of Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012) when Ishiba was the policy chief of the LDP, which was then an opposition party. Maehara and Ishiba had debated policy in the Diet and have maintained their personal relationship since then.

Maehara also played a key role in the second half of the ordinary session. It is not unusual for the opposition parties to consider a no-confidence resolution at the end of a session. Maehara blocked this adventure. As the leader of one of the major opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, was reaching a final decision whether to move forward with the resolution, Maehara announced that he thought Ishiba would dissolve the Lower House and go to a double election of both Houses as soon as a no-confidence resolution bill was submitted.

The Constitution of Japan states that the prime minister must resign when the Diet passes a "non"-confidence resolution -- unless the Lower House is dissolved. Maehara said that Ishiba would immediately dissolve the Lower House as soon as a no-confidence resolution bill was submitted without waiting for a House vote on the resolution. The Constitution empowers the prime minister to dissolve the Lower House at any time.

Noda ultimately refrained from the submission of a no-confidence resolution bill, afraid of a political vacancy brought by the double election at a particularly uncertain time in Japan and the world. That is, the security situation in the Middle East is worsening, tariff negotiations with the Trump administration are dragging on, and rice prices in Japan are highly volatile.

Ishiba cannot be said to have been successful in pushing his agenda through the Diet session. He failed to make good on his promise to enact legislation on political donations from companies and organizations by the end of March. Five opposition parties and the LDP each submitted bills to revise the Political Funds Control Act. But none of them garnered majority support. The bill was postponed to the next session.

Other items fell by the wayside. The LDP could not conclude internal discussion over creating a separate surname system for married couples, although the opposition parties were ready for it. The party also failed to wrap up debate on stable succession to the Imperial Throne, an issue that the Speakers of both Houses had hoped to enact legislation by the end of this Diet session. The conservatives in the LDP were reluctant to change rules for surnames and royal succession.

The failures may affect the Upper House election, which will take place July 20. In the recent election of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (June 22), the LDP lost a considerable number of seats due to voters’ complaints about mismanagement of political funds. In the absence of substantial support for the LDP, opposition parties were able to scoop up votes, but the results did not show that voters favored a particular party over the others. By all appearances, Ishiba has yet to establish a stable voter base for the Upper House elections, which will determine his administration’s fate. 

Sunday, May 11, 2025

Monday Asia Policy Events, May 12, 2025

CONVERSATION WITH FORMER USTRS. 5/12, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Michael Froman, Former USTR (2013-2017); Ronald Kirk, Former USTR (2009-2013); Susan Schwab, Former USTR (2006-2009); Robert Portman, Former USTR (2005-2006); Charlene Barshefsky, Former USTR (1997-2001); Mickey Kantor, Former USTR (1993-1996); Carla A. Hills, Former USTR (1989-1993); William Alan Reinsch, Senior Advisor and Scholl Chair Emeritus. 

PUSHING BACK AND MOVING FORWARD: A CONVERSATION WITH SEN. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN. 5/12, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Center for American Progress. Speaker: Chris Van Hollen, Senator, Democratic Party, Maryland.  

SHIFTING TRADE DYNAMICS: TRUMP’S TRADE POLICY & ITS IMPACT. 5/12, 12:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society. Speaker: Michael Beeman, Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC. Membership.

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. 5/12, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Columbia University Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Shamila Chaudhary, fmr. National Security Council Director, Pakistan and Afghanistan; Jon Finer, fmr. Assistant to the President, Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, IGP Carnegie Distinguished Fellow, Columbia SIPA; Rajan Menon, Emeritus Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair in Political Science, City College of New York, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA; Mike Pompeo, 70th Secretary of State; IGP Carnegie Distinguished Fellow, Columbia SIPA; Rumela Sen, Lecturer and Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, South Asia Institute Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia University.

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2025: A TRANS-ATLANTIC LOOK AHEAD. 5/12, 2:30–3:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program; CSIS Defense and Security Program. Speakers: Emily Harding, Vice President, CSIS Defense and Security Department; Daniel Möckli, Head of Think Tank, Center for Security Studies (ETH Zürich); Gorana Grgić, Senior Researcher, Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team, CSS; Névine Schepers, Team Head and Senior Researcher, Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team, CSS; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy for Research and Teaching, CSS. 

TRUMP AND THE COURTS: WILL OUR GUARDRAILS HOLD? 5/12, 3:00–3:45pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Speakers: Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Jack Goldsmith, Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program. 

REVOKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF JEWS IN VICHY FRANCE. 5/12, 7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: US Holocaust Memorial Museum. Speaker: Dr. Claire Zalc, Research Director, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, France), Professor, École des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, France). 

BOOK TALK: THE TIME OF LAUGHTER: COMEDY AND THE MEDIA CULTURES OF JAPAN. 5/12, 9:00pm (EDT) 5/13, 10:00am (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: author Dr. David Humphrey, Associate Professor, Japanese, Global Studies, Michigan State University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3RAF4jt

Saturday, December 21, 2024

2024: The Making of an Epoch in Japan

An opposition emerges

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 16, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point
 
The year 2024 will be remembered as a time of major transition in Japanese politics. An epoch-making event was the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss of its majority in the House of Representatives, which resulted in a hung parliament. It is likely that politics in Japan has entered an era in which the LDP can no longer enjoy unilateral dominance, and no policy decision can be made without the support of other parties.
 
Since December 2012, when it retook leadership of the Diet from the Democratic Party of Japan, the LDP has maintained its leadership with the help of a coalition partner, Komeito. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expanded the political base of the LDP by focusing on the growth-oriented economic policy known as Abenomics. Abe also introduced the tactic of early snap elections before opposition parties are ready for them.
 
After Abe stepped down in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, the LDP’s decline became apparent. Abenomics proved unable to raise the real wages of workers. Revelations about the Abe faction’s unlawful management of political funds led to a miserable defeat in the general election of the Lower House in October 2024. The assassination of Abe in 2022 and political confusion afterward marked the end of LDP-dominant politics.
 
Kishida tried to leave Abe-politics behind. He relied on his liberal principles and his Kochi-kai faction. He failed, however, to control the conservative colleagues of Abe. Ishiba, an outspoken opponent of Abe, is promoting moderate politics and listening to voices from the opposition parties. This stance became possible from the decline of conservative power in the LDP caused by the slush fund scandal and the party losing its majority in the Lower House.
 
One event that symbolized the coming of a new political era in 2024 was the revision of a budget bill, for the first time since 1996, in the extraordinary session of the Diet in December. The budget bill, coupled with the threat of a non-confidence resolution, is recognized as the most important issue, and the leading parties and the oppositions may be sharply at odds over it. The leading party would not easily accept amendments to a budget bill once it has been submitted to the Diet.
 
In the case of this year’s supplemental budget bill, the opposition leader, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), criticized the bill for including unnecessary spending and lacking sufficient financial support for reconstruction in the Noto Peninsula following last January’s earthquake. The Ishiba Cabinet resubmitted the bill with a reduction in the total budget from 13.9 trillion yen to 12.5 trillion yen.
 
Nevertheless, the CDPJ did not vote for the revised budget bill in the Plenary Session in an effort to establish itself as the principal opposition party. Two other opposition parties, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined with the LDP to pass the bill.
 
The LDP considers the DPP the opposition power most open to its appeals for legislative action. The DPP principal concern is tax policy, including expansion of the tax credit. The LDP and Komeito found support among members of the DPP to raise the threshold for imposing income tax from 1.03 million yen in annual income to 1.78 million yen beginning in FY 2026. Gaining the support of one or more opposition parties for each piece of legislation will become the new mission for the minority government of the LDP and Komeito.
 
Although the LDP managed to maintain its control of the government by replacing Fumio Kishida with Ishiba, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet in the polls has not risen. In the polls of major newspapers in December, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 36 percent in Asahi Shimbun, 30 percent in Mainichi Shimbun and 39 percent in Yomiuri Shimbun. These percentages represent a significant decline from October, when the Ishiba administration took power, by ten to sixteen percentage points.
 
On political reform, the LDP has yet to meet the expectations of the Japanese public.    Seventy-three percent of those polled in Asahi and 86 percent in Yomiuri disapproved of Ishiba’s handling of changes to political fundraising and expenditure. Ishiba wants to add greater transparency to the Political Funds Control Act before the end of this year, but he seems to have no viable strategy for accumulating the necessary majority of votes.
 
As to another reform topic, the future of the policy activities fund, the LDP agreed with the CDPJ on abolishing it. Although the LDP wanted to reserve some exceptions of disclosure for spending in diplomatic activities, it finally withdrew its proposal after receiving consistent resistance from the opposition parties.
 
The leading parties and the opposition also reached a deal in which they would conclude on the abolition of political contributions by companies and organizations by March 2025. This means that they could not settle the most controversial issue in political reform by the end of the year.
 
This kind of struggle over legislation will be the order of the day in the Diet for the next year. In the ordinary session of the Diet, expected to be convoked in January, the debate among the parties over the FY 2025 budget will be contentious. It is too early to say whether the Ishiba Cabinet will survive to the election of the Upper House next summer.

Saturday, October 19, 2024

Japan’s House of Representatives Dissolved

Now What?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba dissolved the House of Representatives (Lower House) on October 9. All the seats were immediately open for election. The general election campaign begins on October 15, and voting takes place on October 27.
 
With the negative impact of the slush fund scandal, it is predicted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will lose seats. However, the opposition parties have not established an effective framework for cooperation that would outmaneuver the LDP’s leading coalition. The LDP defines its victory in this election as securing a simple majority of 233 seats with its coalition partner, Komeito.
 
Prime Minister Ishiba has long questioned the power of a prime minister to unilaterally dissolve the Lower House. He wrote in his blog in June about importance of learning from the wisdom of predecessors in the House, quoting the words of former Speaker of House of Representatives, Shigeru Hori, that criticized the arbitrary dissolution in 1978.
 
Nevertheless, Ishiba dissolved the House only eight days after he was elected as prime minister. He explained that he thought a new prime minister should be judged by voters as soon as possible. The opposition parties criticized Ishiba for his shortcut, which ignored the custom of pre-election policy discussions in the Diet.
 
The biggest issue in the election is political reform, stemming from the slush fund scandal that led Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, to step down. The LDP decided to exclude members who had received heavy penalties in the scandal from its slate of candidates in the coming general election. Cutting candidates from the slate necessarily will make it harder for the LDP to retain power.
 
Back in April, the LDP found that 85 of its members had failed to report kickback funds from their factions. Of these, 55 planned to run in next general election. Six of the 55 then dropped out. On October 9, the LDP removed 12 of the remaining 49 from the slate. The 12 members had received major penalties in the scandal.
 
The party included in its slate 34 members with minor penalties in the slush fund scandal. The official endorsement of a party is a great advantage in a race for a Lower House seat. A candidate with an official endorsement from his or her party can receive financial support from the party, broadcast his/her opinions through the public TV and radio program, and distribute more flyers than an independent candidate can.
 
The 34 members have, however, lost one benefit: they may not receive “double nominations.” A double nomination means that an LDP member who loses in a single-seat constituency may still run as one of several proportional representatives. LDP members not implicated in the scandal may still receive double nominations. Several members felt that the exclusion from double nominations was too heavy a sanction. To sooth those ruffled feathers, Ishiba excluded himself and other four major positions in LDP board – Secretary General and Chairs of the General Council, Policy Research Council and Election Strategy Committee – from double nominations.
 
The 12 members removed from the LDP slate and the 34 members ineligible for a double nomination are all candidates in single-seat constituencies. Three other members involved in the scandal are candidates for proportional representatives, and they declined to be included in the LDP slate. One of the three is running in a single-seat constituency as an independent candidate, and another will seek election to the House of Councillors next year.
 
Despite Ishiba’s cutting back the slate, there is a trick that may help the LDP. Even after the election, it is not unusual for a party to include victorious candidates as additional members of its slate. Ishiba did not rule out the possibility of adding independent winners to the LDP slate. If the LDP does so, it likely would include some independent winners who originally were excluded from the slate due to the scandal.
 
The opposition parties do not consider the decisions of the LDP to pare down the slate and bar double nominations as meaningful penalties for the members involved in the scandal. “Most of them would be on the slate. It cannot be understood by the people,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) Yoshihiko Noda to Nikkei Shimbun. The head of the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), Nobuyuki Baba, said that the LDP members should testify before the Political Ethics Council in the Diet. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) demanded the resignations of those LDP lawmakers.
 
According to the counting of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), LDP fielded 342 candidates (266 for single-seat constituencies and 76 for proportional representatives excluding the double nomination). Komeito has 50 (11 and 39). LDP did not field any candidate in a district where Komeito has its own.
 
The number of candidates of the opposition parties are as follows; CDP: 237 (207 and 30), Ishin: 164 (163 and 1), JCP: 236 (213 and 23), Democratic Party for the People: 42 (41 and 1), Reiwa Shinsengumi: 35 (19 and 16), Social Democratic Party: 17 (10 and 7), and Sanseito: 95 (85 and 10).
 
Most of the JCP’s candidates will compete with CDP or Ishin candidates. It is likely that the votes against LDP will be divided among some opposition parties, but the parties are not working together to defeat LDP candidates. Although Noda hoped to lead negotiations to establish a cooperative framework among the opposition parties, time has run out with the LDP strategy of an early call of a snap election.
 
LDP held 256 seats in the House of Representatives before the general election was proclaimed, and Komeito held 32. The coalition of these two parties thus controlled 288 seats – 55 seats above the simple majority of 233. If this coalition loses 56 seats or more in the election, they will lose the majority. In this event, the coalition will have to add unaffiliated, independent voters or find additional coalition partners. So far, no opposition party has shown any interest in joining the coalition with the LDP and Komeito.
 
The possibility of LDP and Komeito losing the administration is widely estimated as low because the approval rating for the LDP rose after Ishiba replaced Kishida and because the opposition parties have not formed a united front against the leading coalition. This possibility is not zero, however: LDP candidates who had been involved in the slush fund scandal will face very difficult campaigns, even if they are included in the LDP slate. No one can deny a possibility of political turmoil following the election.
 
Explaining the Election System for the House of Representatives
Dissolution of the House of Representatives is made under the name of the Emperor. Article 7 of the Constitution of Japan states that dissolution is one of the acts in matters of state by the Emperor. However, the Emperor does not have political power, and the acts in matters of state are exercised with the advice and approval of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is led by the Prime Minister. So, the provision has been interpreted as vesting Prime Minister with the power to dissolve the House of Representatives at any time.
 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of the House of Representatives within 40 days from the date of dissolution under Article 54 of the Constitution. The general election in 2024 will be held 18 days after the dissolution.
 
The House of Representatives has 465 seats. 289 seats are from single-seat constituencies in all over Japan. The remaining 176 seats are from eleven blocks with several representatives that are allocated to parties on pro rata based on the number of votes.
 
Each voter has two votes in election; one is for writing a name of a candidate in a single-seat constituency, and the other is for writing the name of a party (and not an individual candidate) for proportional representatives.
 
In each single-seat constituency the system is first-past-the-post: whoever receives the most votes wins the seat. The winning proportional representatives are selected from the slate of each party, according to the number of seats allocated to them. Each party makes a list of candidates in order of priority. If a party wins 10 seats in a block of proportional representatives, the candidates from number 1 to 10 on the list will take the seats.
 
What makes this system complicated is that one candidate can be nominated for both kinds of seats. A candidate with a double nomination can take a seat as a proportional representative, even if he/she loses the single-seat constituency.
 
Moreover, a party can nominate multiple candidates in the same position on the list of proportional representatives. It is usual that, say, ten or twenty candidates who also are candidates in single-seat constituencies are nominated in the number one position. As between the candidates in this position, the candidate with the smallest margin of defeat in the single-seat constituency takes priority. If candidate A lost by 5 percentage points to his or her opponent, and candidate B lost by 10 percent, A is superior to B when seats are allocated to proportional representatives.

Sunday, June 23, 2024

LDP Drops Constitutional Amendment in This Session

They were not enthusiastic anyway


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 17, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point


The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gave up submitting a draft constitutional amendment to the Diet by the end of current session on June 23. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had announced that he would move forward with the amendment within his term as president of the LDP, which expires at the end of September. It is now unlikely that he can fulfill this commitment. Conservatives in the party will criticize him for this, adding to the challenges that his reelection campaign faces.

It was during his campaign for the LDP presidency in the fall of 2021 that Kishida promised a constitutional amendment. In the press conference at which he announced his candidacy, Kishida declared that he hoped to finish the amendment within his term ending September 2024. “Amendment of the Constitution should be surely promoted to deal with changes in our time,” said Kishida.

Having been a member of the dovish LDP faction, Kochi-kai, Kishida was not known as a major proponent of a constitutional amendment. In his bid for support from LDP conservatives, whose votes would control election results, Kishida emphasized the amendment as one of his core policies. His approach was to incorporate “realism” to cope with political reality.

Leaving negotiation over the policy to the Diet members of the LDP, Kishida repeated that he would do his best to complete the amendment within three years. In his policy speech at the beginning of current ordinary session of the Diet in January, Kishida insisted that he would release a draft and accelerate discussions to bridge the differences of parties.

The LDP focused on adding an emergency clause to the Constitution in the current session of the Diet, which would extend the term of members of the Lower House in a state of emergency. In April, the LDP proposed establishing a drafting committee in the Commission on the Constitution of the House of Representatives.

However, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) opposed the formation of a drafting committee. CDP members of the Commission argued that the lawmakers who had been involved in the slush fund scandal should be ineligible to participate in discussions over the constitutional amendment. Several LDP members would be disqualified.

Given the resistance of the opposition parties, the LDP considered submitting a draft to the Diet with the approval only of proponents of the amendment, such as the Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), Komeito, and the Democratic Party for the People. The LDP leaders decided not to pursue that option because it would have undermined work on Kishida’s highest priority – amendment of the Political Funds Control Act. The LDP finally gave up on a constitutional amendment in the current session.

The required timeline and prerequisites for a constitutional amendment work against Kishida. Submission of a draft of a constitutional amendment requires the approval of over 100 members in the Lower House and 50 in the Upper House. A two-thirds majority in both houses is then necessary to hold a national referendum. A referendum will occur 60 to 180 days after the Diet’s approval. A simple majority of the popular vote is all that is needed to formally amend the constitution.

To meet these deadlines by the end of his presidential term, Kishida must obtain the Diet’s approval in July at the latest. But Kishida still plans to close the Diet session in June without extension to avoid further inquiries into the slush fund scandal. Kishida thus cannot live up to his campaign promise of three years ago.

The conservatives in the LDP, led partly by Ishin, moved so hastily on proposing an amendment that they failed to achieve a broad consensus. The proposed drafting committee and the idea of a draft amendment stiffened the resolve of the opposition parties. Article 54 of the Constitution empowers the Cabinet to convene a special session of the Upper House in a national emergency. Upper House members, including from Komeito, are skeptical of any amendment, because the Diet can work during an emergency with a special session, even if the Lower House members are absent.

One of the ranking members of the Lower House commission, Gen Nakatani, revealed his private “draft” in the commission’s meeting on June 13. His proposal defined an emergency as an “election difficulty situation,” such as a natural disaster, pandemic, or armed attack. The draft would have extended the term of the Lower House members for as long as six months to a year.

However, Nakatani’s idea received no buy-in from the other parties. His draft is unclear about who would declare an election difficulty situation. There could be room for extending terms in the Lower House in the event of significant weather conditions or infectious diseases, although the prior approval of a two-third majority of both Houses would be essential.

The conservatives in the LDP who have been the driving force behind the constitutional amendment are affiliated with the former Abe faction. But the faction was dissolved after the slush fund scandal and lost political power. Kishida can safely ignore any pressure from this faction to pursue the amendment.

However, Kishida has shown a decline of his own political power over his efforts to amend the Political Funds Control Act. In a mid-June Asahi Shimbun pollthe approval rate for Kishida Cabinet was 22 percent, the lowest level of his administration, and support for the LDP marked new record low of 19 percent.

Frustrated conservatives may turn to another candidate in the presidential election. There appear to be various moves in the LDP to discuss power sharing after the Diet is adjourned and after the LDP presidential election. Kishida’s chances for reelection are shrinking.