A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 4, 2026

WHAT’S NEXT FOR JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY AND U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS? PERSPECTIVES FROM THE DIET. 5/4, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, Member of the House of Representatives, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Chairperson, Research Commission on the Tax System; Former Minister of Defense; Fumitake Fujita, Member of the House of Representatives, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Secretary-General, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Asei Ito, Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo; Moderator, Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, Associate Professor, University of Oxford.

IS AMERICA WINNING OR LOSING IN IRAN? 5/4, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jon Finer, Former Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Co-Host, The Long Game Podcast; Victoria Coates, Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Middle East and North African Affairs, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Vice President, Davis Institute for National Security, The Heritage Foundation; Moderator: Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, MEI. 

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MEGA CHOKEPOINTS: JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RESET. 5/4, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Keiro Kitagami, Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Liberal Democratic Party; Keitaro Ohno, Chief Secretary, Promotion of Economic Security Headquarters, Liberal Democratic Party, Former State Minister of Economic Security; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies; Akihisa Shiozaki, Director General, Headquarters for Intelligence Strategy, Liberal Democratic Party; Moderator: Mireya Solís, Director, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies.

MEETING STRATEGIC DEMAND FOR BATTERIES. 5/4, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. Speakers: Joseph Majkut, Director, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Ray Cai, Associate Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Speakers from U.S. Department of Energy, J.P. Morgan, Google.

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APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Cold War Comrades: An Emotional History 

of the Sino-North Korean Alliance

By Gregg A. Brazinsky, Professor of History and International Affairs, 

George Washington University

PURCHASE BOOK 1/8/2026

Brazinsky argues that neither the PRC nor the DPRK would have survived as socialist states without the ideal of Sino-North Korean friendship. Chinese and North Korean leaders encouraged mutual empathy and sentimental attachments between their citizens and then used these emotions to strengthen popular commitment to socialist state building. He explains why the unique relationship that Beijing and Pyongyang forged during the Korean War remained important throughout the Cold War and how it continues to influence the international relations of East Asia today.

Narrowing Sea: Fukuoka, Pusan, and the Rise 

and Fall of an Imperial Region

By Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor of History, 

Yale University

PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

Shepherd examines the shared histories of Pusan and Fukuoka over the eight decades from Japan's forced opening of Korea's ports in 1876 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. Wars, colonization, and capitalist industrialization forged intimate connections between the two, knitting together an imperial region that transcended its maritime boundaries. She challenges traditional views of empire and urban growth and shows how local networks, migration, and capital flows shaped the region's exploitative and uneven geographies.

Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: 

Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War

By Sean Wiswesser, Former Senior Operations Officer,

Central Intelligence Agency

PURCHASE BOOK 4/21/2026

Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. He breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights.

Japanese Rebels: Non-Conformists in a Conformist Society

By David McNeill, Former Correspondent, The Independent 

and The Economist

&

Stephen McClure, Freelance Journalist, Former Asia Bureau Chief, Billboard

PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Japan is often seen through the lens of an unusually resilient stereotype that it is a nation of risk-averse conformists. McNeill and McClure deconstruct that stereotype by showing that there have always been Japanese people who have rejected the status quo, challenged injustice, and fought for personal freedom. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Monday Asia Events October 21, 2024

SECURING ENERGY BY RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER - POWER VERSUS RULE. 10/21, 9:00am-1:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Reischauer Center, SAIS, Johns Hopkins; Japan Economic Foundation. Speakers: Yukari Niwa Yamashita, Managing Director, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Hirotaka Ishii, Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security; Christopher Elsner, Associate Director in Energy-Wide Perspectives for S&P Global Commodity; Dr.Jennifer F. Sklarew, George Mason University, the Department of Environmental Science and Policy; Kenta Hirami; Associate Professor, University of Nagasaki; Kiyoshi Tanigawa, Executive Director, Keidanren USA; Ambassador David Shear. fmr. Ambassador to Vietnam, Senior Advisor, Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS); Ambassador Kenneth Juster, fmr. Ambassador to India, Distinguished Fellow, CFR. 

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE. 10/21, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), LIVESTREAM. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Dr. Park Jin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea from 2022 to 2024; Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Mark Lippert, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS. 

RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE UDHR TO DIGNITATIS HUMANAE. 10/21, 1:00-5:00pm, 10/22, 9:00am-1:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Georgetown University. Speakers: M. Cathleen Kaveny, Darald and Juliet Libby Professor, Boston College; José Casanova, scholars, senior fellow, Berkley Center; Meghan J. Clark, associate professor, moral theology, St. John’s University, New York; Mary Doak, associate professor of theology and religious studies, University of San Diego; Linda Hogan, professor of ecumenics, School of Religion, Trinity College Dublin; Rev. David Hollenbach, S.J., Pedro Arrupe Distinguished Research Professor, Walsh School of Foreign Service; senior fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs; affiliated professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University; Dr. Pantelis Kalaitzidis, director, Volos Academy for Theological Studies (Volos, Greece), member, Executive Committee, European Academy of Religion (Bologna, Italy); David Little, research fellow, Georgetown University’s Berkley Center; Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love, tenured professor of international relations, Catholic University of America, expert, international security and peacebuilding. 

GEOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS. 10/21, 9:00am-4:35pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Peterson Institute (PIIE), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), WTO. Speakers Include: Richard Baldwin, IMD Business School, PIIE; Linda S. Goldberg, Federal Reserve Bank, New York; Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Mary E. Lovely, PIIE; Susan M. Lund, International Finance Corporation; Ralph Ossa, WTO; Adam S. Posen, PIIE; Hyun Song Shin, BIS; Yeo Han-koo, PIIE. 

BARRIERS AND BREAKTHROUGHS: BUILDING AND FUTURE U.S. MANUFACTURING WORKFORCE. 10/21, 9:00-10:00am (EDT). IN-PERSON. Sponsor: Semafor. Speakers include: Neera Tanden, Domestic Policy Advisor to President Biden, White House; Christian Meisner, Chief Human Resources Officer, GE Aerospace. 

ASIAN-AMERICANS EYE THE U.S. ELECTIONS: A VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL WITH CONGRESSMAN DON BEYER. 10/21, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: US-Philippines Society, Vietnam Society, United States-Indonesia Society. Speaker: Congressman Don Beyer (D-VA). 

AIRPOWER OPTIONS FOR JAPAN. 10/21, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University. Speaker: Eric Heginbotham, Principal Research Scientist, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

NAVIGATING NEW GLOBAL DYNAMICS: CHALLENGES AND POLICIES. 10/21, 2:30-4:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, jointly with the Korea Development Institute (KDI). Speakers: Richard E. Baldwin, Professor of International Economics, IMD Business School, Lausanne, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU; Eswar Prasad, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings; Laura Tyson, Distinguished Professor, University of California, Berkeley, fmr. Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, Director, National Economic Council., Daehee Jeong, Senior Fellow and Senior Director, Department of Macroeconomic and Financial Policies - Korea Development Institute. 
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ON XI JINPING WITH AMBASSADOR KEVIN RUDD. 10/21, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: author Amb. Kevin Rudd, Australian Ambassador to the United States, former Australian Prime Minister; John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS; Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair, China Studies.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47PQRll

PUTIN'S RED LINES: DOES HE MEAN WHAT WE THINK WE HEARD? 10/21, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES), The Russia Program at GW. Speakers: TBA. 

REMARKS BY MINISTER MOHAMMED AL-JADAAN OF SAUDI ARABIA. 10/21, 5:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). 

HOW “SUPERSTAR FIRMS” SHAPED SOUTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE. 10/21, 5:00pm (PDT), 8:00pm (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsors:  Seoul National University and the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Speakers: Jaedo Choi, Economist, Federal Reserve Board; Seula Kim, Assistant Professor, Pennsylvania State University (Discussant); Munseob Lee, Assistant Professor, Director of the Korea Pacific Program, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy (Moderator). 

BOOK TALK: THREAT MULTIPLIER: CLIMATE, MILITARY LEADERSHIP, AND THE FIGHT FOR GLOBAL SECURITY. 10/21, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Women's Foreign Policy Group. Speakers: author Sherri Goodman, leader, senior executive, lawyer, director, national security, climate change, energy, science, oceans, environment; Meaghan Parker, Executive Director, Council for the Advancement of Science Writing. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/487cEoG

CLIMATE CHANGE AT THE CROSSROADS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES. 10/21, 5:00-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Speaker: Richard R. Verma, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. 

WILL U.S. LEADERSHIP IN ASIA AND THE WORLD LAST? 10/21, 6:30-7:30pm (EDT). IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Amb. Wendy R. Sherman, Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State; Stephen Biegun, Senior Vice President, Global Public Policy, Boeing Company; Daniel Russel, Vice President, International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute.  Fee.

Drive-by Summits

TOKYO REPORT FOR NELSON REPORT, APRIL 25, 2019

by Dan Sneider, Stanford University, Associate Editor Nelson Report, APP member

This week's Tokyo Report will focus on two summit meetings - the Kim-Putin encounter in Vladivostok earlier today (April 25) and the Abe-Trump meeting at the White House tomorrow (April 26). Both summits fall more into the realm of symbolism than substance but neither are without significance. Let's start with the events on the Pacific rim - and a reminder that your correspondent comes to this from a deep involvement with Russia, beginning with four years as Moscow Bureau Chief for The Christian Science Monitor and continuing today to regular visits to Russia. I have a long acquaintance with Vladivostok, having first visited the Pacific port in 1990 as one of the first American correspondents to go there after the previously closed city was opened to foreigners.

In recent years, I went there twice, including lecturing at the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU), where the Kim-Putin summit took place, and carrying out a study of regional cooperation in the Russian Far East. I joined my son, who is the Moscow correspondent of The Economist, in a reporting trip that took us to rundown border crossings with China and a glittering Chinese-built casino outside of Vladivostok, as well as conversations with local officials who manage the railway line to the Russian docks at the North Korean warm water port at Rajin.

THE DRIVE BY VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT
A visit by Kim Jong Un to Russia has been rumored, and even planned, many times over the last few years. Both Moscow and Pyongyang were interested in a meeting, which would have been the first between Putin and Kim, but it was never a high priority for either leader. What finally took place was a Russian version of a drive-by summit - not a grand official visit to Moscow, with all the pomp and circumstance that entails, but a short train hop across the border to Vladivostok for Kim.

For Putin, the Vladivostok summit was a stopover at one his favorite haunts - the beautiful modern campus of the Far Eastern Federal University spread out along the shores of Russky island, built to host the 2012 APEC summit - on his way to a far more strategically important summit in Beijing of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Putin had already moved on to Beijing by the night, leaving Kim to wander around Vladivostok on his own for a day - a charming and historic city that is highly recommended for all global travelers!

The two men spent a couple of hours together, followed by a meeting with senior officials, and then by an official banquet. Only Putin talked to the gathered media. Kim presumably had little to say, especially compared to his loquacious appearance in Hanoi. There was no joint statement, no formal declarations, no announcements of new economic projects, no diplomatic initiatives. No hugs were exchanged - from the body language to the imagery of the meetings, it was a somewhat formal affair. So why hold this drive-by summit?

For Kim, the decision to finally go, but not too far, to Russia has a transparent logic. He is now engaged in a somewhat desperate attempt to recover the bargaining leverage that was squandered in Hanoi. He is eager to remind the United States, China, and even South Korea, that he can still command a world stage. Kim may have hoped as well for some sign that Moscow was prepared to ease economic sanctions - there has been some of that taking place in unofficial fashion, mainly in the form of allowing North Korean coal exports to be transshipped via Russian Far Eastern ports and some sales of oil.

Very important to North Korea's thirst for hard currency are the remittances of North Korean workers who at one point reached the level of 40,000 plus in Russia. These are no longer just the North Koreans sealed off in labor camps doing forestry work - a legacy of Soviet days - but North Korean construction workers whose work ethic and honesty (and low wages) make them the favored choice for Russians remodeling their apartments in Vladivostok or building a new dacha. Russia has cut back their numbers greatly as part of UN sanctions enforcement but at least 10,000 or more remain. Pyongyang was seeking to keep them in place and there is great demand for them in the labor-short Russian Far East.

For Putin, North Korea mainly is viewed within the broader context of the less than successful effort to promote its role as a global player and also as a Pacific power, an age-old Russian obsession. The location of the meeting at FEFU, which is the symbol of the hopes for development of the Russian Far East, was deliberate. Out in the region, though, there is a healthy dose of cynicism about this. Little money is coming from Moscow these days, with regional authorities encouraged to seek investment from China, South Korea and Japan. The business with North Korea is a minor part of that. There is no pot of gold waiting for Kim in Russia.

Russia of course wants to be part of the diplomatic game, which is formalized in its participation in the six-party talks, which exist in name only. But Putin's main focus is on China, whose dominance in the Korean peninsula is readily acknowledged by Moscow. Putin, in his comments after the Kim meeting, did not really call for resuming the six party talks as some misreported. He was more precise in saying that the structure could play a role in providing a broader security guarantee for any deals reached bilaterally - in fact, the role it played before.

"I don't know if we should resume six-party talks right now, but if we get to the point where we will have to come up with guarantees for [North Korea], we will certainly need international guarantees," Putin told reporters.

For an excellent analysis of Russian policy, I recommend very highly the writings of Alexander Gabuev and Dmitri Trenin of Carnegie's Moscow Center. In an analysis published ahead of the summit, Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula, Gabuev writes:

The summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in the Russian city of Vladivostok brings Moscow back into the diplomatic game focused on the Korean Peninsula. This symbolic breakthrough aside, however, Russia doesn't have a very strong hand among all the global and regional powers involved in the crisis resolution. The tools Russia has at its disposal are too limited to have an impact on the calculations and behavior of North Korea or the U.S. As asymmetry in the Sino-Russian entente gradually grows in China's favor, Moscow is increasingly receptive to Beijing's agenda and prepared to play bad cop in an unofficial division of labor on the Korean Peninsula. Russia could, however, be an indispensable partner in a broader conversation on security mechanisms in Northeast Asia, including offensive missiles and missile defense systems. The current lack of this broader conversation makes a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue less likely, if not impossible. 

In the short term, there were only a few visible crumbs on the table for Kim Jong Un to dine upon. Putin referred to the long-discussed project, heavily promoted by South Korea, to create rail and pipeline links that would run up through the peninsula into Russia, allowing rail freight to be transshipped on the Trans-Siberian and bringing Russian natural gas to South Korea.

As TASS reported it:

"I spoke about it before. It is not the first year we have been talking about it," the President said, answering a question about possible joint projects between Russia and two Koreas. "In particular this includes a direct rail link between the south of the Korean Peninsula, the north, and Russia, with access to the Trans-Siberian Railway. This also includes the possibility of laying pipelines, if we talk about oil and gas and possible construction of new power lines," the Russian leader said.

Putin also made clear that these projects will have to await a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, on which Moscow remains firm in its own belief that dismantlement is the only acceptable final outcome. As is his custom, Putin did not miss an opportunity to take a shot along the way at the U.S. and its security presence in the region, again as reported by TASS.

"All this is possible. Moreover, in my opinion, it is in the interests of the Republic of Korea. But there seems to be a lack of sovereignty in making final decisions, there are some allied obligations of the Republic of Korea to the US, and at some point everything stops," the Russian leader noted. "If these projects and the similar ones were implemented, this would create necessary conditions for building trust, which is so needed for solving the key issues."

The only thing left was a hint that Moscow would allow some North Korean workers to remain in Russia - "those Korean laborers work well in Russia, they're diligent, law-abiding people" - by possibly trying to exploit the loophole in UN sanctions allowing for humanitarian aid. Russian press reports make it clear that Moscow is ready to support an easing of sanctions at the UN, but it will not act unilaterally, except in very marginal ways.

It is not much yield for a summit, but then again, there was not much invested either in this drive-by summit. Not even the class schedule at FEFU was disrupted, so no loss there. One hopes that Comrade Kim, as Putin nostalgically referred to him, will enjoy his visit to the metropolis of Vladivostok. Maybe next visit, he can spare some time for a trip to the marbled gaming rooms at the Ho family casino in the woods outside the city, where Chinese high rollers go to lose their money to the beautiful Russian lady blackjack dealers.

ABE'S OWN FLY-BY SUMMIT
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo will be in DC for his own version of a quick visit/summit - he stops on his way from Europe, and will also visit Canada. Trade negotiators Lighthizer and Motegi met again today in DC (see elsewhere in the Nelson Report for updates on this) and there is still talk of a quick path to a trade deal. But your correspondent, based on touching base with veteran Japanese political reporters back in Tokyo, would guess that Abe's mind, not unlike that of our own Supreme Leader, is focused like a laser on his own domestic political situation.

Everything is heading toward a possible double election in July - the Upper House has a schedule vote for part of its seats but Abe is increasingly inclined to dissolve the Lower House in hopes of not only increasing voter turnout, which he believes will favor the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic and Komei parties, but perhaps set him up to extend his time in office beyond current plans to leave in 2021. The opposition parties are accelerating their own talks aimed at a partial merger in preparation for this vote, well aware that the split in their ranks almost guarantees an easy LDP victory.

The double loss suffered by the LDP in the by-elections for two open Lower House seats in Okinawa and Osaka had some negative impact for Abe - it cracked a bit the six-year long myth of invincibility that he so carefully cultivates. That myth is important not only for keeping the opposition confined to the role of gadflies but perhaps more crucially in restraining the ambitions of those inside the LDP who are eager to have their own turn in power. But the election losses were too driven by local issues - bases in Okinawa, the call to merge the city and prefectural governments of Osaka, a la Tokyo - to be seen as harbingers of a national trend. Even though there has been turmoil in Tokyo with the resignation of two gaffe prone and incompetent members of Abe's cabinet, this does not seem to have harmed his poll ratings.

All this makes Abe more likely to go for double elections, confident that even with higher turnout, the voters will not be in a mood to punish him. But in Japanese political culture, there has to be an ostensible reason to call an early election. One idea was to reach a territorial deal with Moscow and call the election to ratify that diplomatic triumph. But that seems out of reach now, thanks to Putin.

This leaves the tried and true - it was used before for the same purpose - gambit of delaying the planned hike in the value added tax to 10 percent in October. The Finance Ministry is opposed of course, as are some in the business community and even within the LDP, where fiscal policy concerns remain strong. But the signs of a slowdown in the economy are feeding the argument that a tax hike at this time could send the economy into recession. So Abe can plausibly portray himself as coming to the relief of poor Japanese consumers and households. Of course, many will see this - justifiably - as a cynical ploy. But that is not likely to stop Abe.

That brings us to tomorrow's meeting in DC. Whatever the ostensible agenda is said to be - or what the Japanese media is told by the Prime Minister's Office and dutifully reports as if it is true - the actual purpose of this meeting, and the current tour of Europe, is to show off Abe as the irreplaceable leader of a Japan that is again emergent on the world scene. That includes Japan as the leader and defender of the liberal world order and the internal trading system. So a bad trade deal, one that does not reinforce the TPP and remove the threat of auto sanctions, is not in Abe's interest.

Abe's political future is now linked to the new Imperial era going forward and the showcase for that is to be the official visit of Trump to Japan in late May, for the first audience of the new Emperor with a foreign visitor, and other dog and pony show moments (Sumo tournaments, a visit to Japan's own de facto aircraft carrier, soon to be equipped with American-made F35B short take and landing jets, and whatever else they can come up with). That will be followed in June by hosting the G20 meeting in Osaka. The meeting with Trump is all to prepare for this "grand political gala in May/June," as a veteran Japanese journalist told me, "as long as Trump behaves."

And that, as is always the case, is the rub.

Trump is 1930s

Timothy Snyder, Housum Professor of History at Yale, has just published On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. If you missed any of his book lectures, one is above and the one he gave to the Wilson Center in Washington is HERE.

In his New York Times op ed before the election (9/20/16) he describes the Russian fascist philosophy of Ivan Ilyin behind Putin's desire to crush Western democracy. A desire for an ordered world is more important than geo-political power. Snyder's is must reading for our troubling era.

click to order

How a Russian Fascist Is Meddling in America’s Election

By TIMOTHY SNYDER

NEW HAVEN — The president of Russia, Vladimir V. Putin, once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “geopolitical catastrophe.” But the political thinker who today has the most influence on Mr. Putin’s Russia is not Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Communist system, but rather Ivan Ilyin, a prophet of Russian fascism.

The brilliant political philosopher has been dead for more than 60 years, but his ideas have found new life in post-Soviet Russia. After 1991, his books were republished with long print runs. President Putin began to cite him in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly, the Russian equivalent of the State of the Union address.

To complete the rehabilitation, Mr. Putin saw to it that Ilyin’s corpse was repatriated from Switzerland, and that his archive was returned from Michigan. The Russian president has been seen laying flowers on Ilyin’s Moscow grave. And Mr. Putin is not the only disciple of Ilyin among the Kremlin elite.

Vladislav Y. Surkov, Moscow’s arch-propagandist, also sees Ilyin as an authority. Prime Minister Dmitri A. Medvedev, who served as president between 2008 and 2012, recommends Ilyin to Russian students. Ilyin figures in the speeches of the foreign minister, the head of the constitutional court and the patriarch of the Orthodox Church.

What are the ideas that have inspired such esteem?

Ilyin believed that individuality was evil. For him, the “variety of human beings” demonstrated the failure of God to complete the labor of creation and was therefore essentially satanic. By extension, the middle classes, political parties and civil society were also evil, because they encouraged the development of personalities beyond the single identity of the national community.

According to Ilyin, the purpose of politics is to overcome individuality, and establish a “living totality” of the nation. Writing in the 1920s and ’30s after his expulsion from the Soviet Union, when he became a leading emigré ideologue of the anti-Communist White Russians, Ilyin looked on Mussolini and Hitler as exemplary leaders who were saving Europe by dissolving democracy. His 1927 article “On Russian Fascism” was addressed to “My White brothers, the fascists.” Later, in the 1940s and ’50s, he provided the outlines for a constitution of a fascist Holy Russia governed by a “national dictator” who would be “inspired by the spirit of totality.”

This leader would be responsible for all functions of government in a completely centralized state. Elections would be held, with open voting and signed ballots, purely as a ritual of support of the leader. The reckoning of votes was irrelevant: “We must reject blind faith in the number of votes and its political significance.”

In the light of Ilyin’s rehabilitation as Russia’s leading ideologue, Moscow’s manipulations of elections should be seen not so much as a failure to implement democracy but as a subversion of the very concept of democracy. Neither the parliamentary elections of December 2011 nor the presidential elections of March 2012 produced a majority for Mr. Putin’s party or for Mr. Putin personally. Votes were therefore added to produce a decisive result.

Russians who protested the fixed elections were branded as national enemies. Nongovernmental organizations were forced to register as “foreign agents.” Mr. Putin even claimed that Hillary Clinton, then secretary of state, “gave the signal” to the Russian opposition to go on the streets. The notion that defending democracy meant betraying Russia was perfectly consistent with Ilyin’s view.

Since then, Mr. Putin has relied on Ilyin’s authority at every turning point in Russian politics — from his return to power in 2012 to the decision to intervene in Ukraine in 2013 and the annexation of Ukrainian territory in 2014. Last spring, he claimed that the American intelligence services would intervene in the Russian parliamentary elections held this past weekend and in the Russian presidential elections of 2018. The question of whether anyone in the Kremlin actually believes this is beside the point. These claims of constant American interference are intended to show that the democratic process is nothing more than a geopolitical game.

While Russian leaders consciously work to hollow out the idea of democracy in their own country, they also seek to discredit democracy abroad — including, this year, in the United States. Russia’s interventions in our presidential elections are not only the opportunistic support of a preferred candidate, Donald J. Trump, who backs Russian foreign policy. They are also the logical projection of the new ideology: Democracy is not a means of changing leadership at home, but a means of weakening enemies abroad. If we see politics as Ilyin did, Russia’s ritualization of elections becomes a virtue rather than a vice. Degrading democracy around the world would be a service to mankind.

If democracy is merely an invitation to foreign influence, then hacking a foreign political party’s email is the most natural thing in the world. If civil society is nothing but the decadent opening of a rotting society to foreign influence, then constant trolling of media is obviously appropriate. If, as Ilyin wrote, the “arithmetical understanding of politics” is harmful, then digital meddling in foreign elections would be just the thing.

For a decade, Russia has been sponsoring right-wing extremists as “election observers” — most recently, in the farcical referendums in the Crimea and in the Donbas region of Ukraine — in order to discredit both elections and their observation. Since democracy is a sham, as Ilyin believed, then it is right and good to imitate its language and procedures in order to discredit it. It is noteworthy that the Trump campaign has now imitated this very practice, supplying both its own private “observers” and the advance conclusion about the fraud they will find.

The technique of undermining democracy abroad is to generate doubt where there had been certainty. If democratic procedures start to seem shambolic, then democratic ideas will seem questionable as well. And so America would become more like Russia, which is the general idea. If Mr. Trump wins, Russia wins. But if Mr. Trump loses and people doubt the outcome, Russia also wins.

From Moscow’s point of view, it is easier to bring down democracy everywhere than it is to hold free, fair elections at home. Russia will seem stronger if other states follow its course of development toward a cynicism about democracy that allows authoritarianism to thrive. So we might as well get used to the interference, and take sensible precautions. It no longer makes sense to carry out elections and regulate campaign finance as if such matters were of no interest to hostile foreign powers.

Americans have plenty of other reasons to reform the democratic process, but protecting their integrity should take priority. Paper ballots for every voter and public financing of campaigns, to give two examples, would make sense both for citizens and for the electoral system. A simpler democracy would be a more secure one — and a more exemplary one.