Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Embracing Trump

If surviving Trump meeting was goal: Takaichi leaves DC a winner

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published March 20, 2026 on Responsible Statecraft.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s high-stakes meeting with President Donald Trump began with a warm embrace and opening remarks that established a favorable mood.

Takaichi declared that “Donald” is the only person who can achieve peace and prosperity throughout the world, and that she intends to reach out to other countries to support his efforts. Trump congratulated Takaichi for her historic electoral victory, called her a “powerful woman,” and thanked her for all she has done.

But despite the positive atmosphere, this summit revealed the risks of Japan’s policy of clinging to the United States while allowing its relations with China to deteriorate.
Because of Japan’s assessment of the Chinese security threat, Takaichi seeks to lock-in Japan’s alliance with the United States by flattering Trump and appeasing as much as possible his demands on defense and economic issues.

When Takaichi originally requested a summit with Trump, her aim was to get reassurance from Trump before his scheduled trip to China (which has now been postponed). Last November, Takaichi’s imprudent remarks about how a Taiwan crisis could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” that might warrant a Japanese military response, triggered a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Her statements wiped away the improvement in ties with China that had been achieved under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi’s immediate predecessor.

Rather than defending Takaichi as Japan-China tensions escalated, Trump reportedly told her in a phone call that she should tone things down because he wanted to avoid a conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. Trump’s cool response prompted Takaichi to seek assurances from Trump that he would not make deals with Xi Jinping that might undermine Japan’s interests. She also wanted to deepen bilateral cooperation to strengthen economic resilience in response to Chinese coercion.

The U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, however, complicated Takaichi’s original game plan and entrapped Japan in a severe dilemma.

On the one hand, Trump wants Japan “to step up” to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz by deploying naval vessels. From Trump’s perspective, Japan should take on this mission because Japan is more dependent on energy supplies passing through the strait than any other country. Given her landslide electoral victory in February, Takaichi ironically does not have the excuse of domestic political constraints to deny Trump’s request. Furthermore, Japan’s acute fear of China makes it hard for Takaichi to say “no” to Trump.

On the other hand, Takaichi faces strong domestic pressures not to comply with Trump. 82 percent of the Japanese public oppose the U.S. attack against Iran, and most Japanese strategic experts — including those who have stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance — believe that Trump’s war against Iran is an illegal and illegitimate strategic blunder. Japan’s legal and constitutional obstacles for deploying naval ships to a war zone are extremely high.

Furthermore, Iran has indicated that states that send naval ships to the area would be considered to have joined the American and Israeli side in this war and would be seen as hostile. Iran has, however, shown a willingness to allow oil tankers headed for countries that are not involved in the conflict and friendly toward Iran to pass through the strait. It is therefore in Japan’s energy security interests not to deploy naval ships into the area.

Although a joint press conference is usually held after U.S.-Japan summits, for some reason no Takaichi-Trump press briefing took place after their meeting. Instead, Takaichi held a solo press conference with the Japanese media on Thursday. She revealed that there was a discussion of the importance of ensuring the safety of the Strait of Hormuz and that she explained in detail what Japan can and cannot do within its legal constraints.

By refraining from mentioning at all any bilateral differences, she seemed to want to avoid giving the impression that there was any friction between her and Trump. And by not holding a joint press conference, both leaders perhaps sought to prevent the media from probing any discord between the U.S. and Japan.

So what should Takaichi do after this U.S.-Japan summit?

First, she should work energetically with other countries to facilitate an early termination of the Iran war. With the negative impact on gas prices and the strong American public opposition to the war, Trump should welcome such an effort because he wants a good off-ramp well before the November mid-term elections so that he can proclaim victory and mission accomplished.

More challenging will be convincing Iran to end the conflict. Not only does Iran want to avenge the killing of its top leaders and the death and destruction caused by Israel and the United States, it also wants solid international guarantees that it will not be attacked again and that its sovereignty will be protected. Among the G-7 countries, Japan maintains the best relations with Iran. Therefore, Takaichi should use this asset to promote serious diplomacy to explore viable ways to end this war.

Second, Takaichi should engage in proactive diplomacy to stabilize and improve relations with China. Although improving Japan’s own defense capabilities and deepening its ties with like-minded countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are important to counter China and to hedge against the uncertainty of the U.S. security commitment, they are no substitute for direct diplomacy with China to stabilize the regional security environment. An emphasis on military deterrence to the neglect of diplomacy will only fuel an arms race that will favor China given the asymmetry in material capabilities and China’s geographic advantages.

As a first step, the Japanese government should publicly clarify its basic stance regarding the Taiwan issue rather than simply repeating that there has been no change in policy. In addition to reaffirming the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan-China normalization communique, Japan should state that it does not support the independence of Taiwan and that it supports any resolution of the Taiwan issue that is peaceful and achieved without coercion and accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

This is necessary to reassure Beijing that Tokyo is not surreptitiously seeking the independence of Taiwan or the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

In addition, with an eye on the next Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled in China in November 2026, Tokyo should expeditiously initiate discussions with Beijing on a broad range of issues. Rather than sticking to its current passive approach of simply leaving the door open for dialogue, Takaichi should dispatch to Beijing an influential political leader who is trusted by China to restart bilateral discussions. The agenda could include maintaining and strengthening a “rules-based” order, restraining the weaponization of economic interdependence, promoting stability and security of critical supply chains, cooperating more to address climate change, and enhancing confidence-building and crisis prevention measures.

Takaichi has touted that “Japan is back.” By engaging the above two diplomatic challenges, she can establish herself as one of the world’s most important leaders and upgrade Japan’s international status and influence.

An Alternative to Henoko as a Marine Corps Air Base

A NEW VISION FOR OKINAWA AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NEW DIPLOMACY INITIATIVE (ND)

Wednesday, July 12 

2:00 PM – 3:30 PM

East-West Center in Washington
1819 L St, NW, Washington, DC

Sixth Floor Conference Room

This event is free and open to the public.

Seminar will be broadcast live. 

Copies of the report will be available at the seminar.

REGISTER HERE by 5 PM EST July 11.

SPEAKERS

Tomohiro Yara
ND Board Member and ND Senior Researcher; Member of the ND Okinawa Project

Shigeru Handa
Member of the ND Okinawa Project

Sayo Saruta
Director, New Diplomacy Initiative (ND)
Dr. Mike M. Mochizuki (Discussant)
ND Board Member; Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

☵

With the start of seawall construction for land reclamation on the shores of the Henoko area of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, persistent resistance from Okinawans is strengthening with more legal action being undertaken by Governor Takeshi Onaga to stop the construction. Opposition may extend to other US military installations, including the highly important Kadena Air Base, which could undermine the US presence in Okinawa as well as the US-Japan alliance.

For the past three years, New Diplomacy Initiative (ND), a Japanese think tank established in 2013, has hosted study sessions for diplomacy, defense, and security experts to analyze and research the military role of the US Marines in Okinawa and the state of “deterrence.”

Since February 2016, ND has continued its research on the deployment of the US Marines in Okinawa, using US documents and facts about Marine operations as sources, and has held regular study sessions to compile a counterargument against the assertion that Henoko is the only option for the Futenma relocation. This report contains the results of those discussions, and sets forth a solution that will equally benefit Japan, the United States and Okinawa.

☵

Tomohiro Yara is a Board Member and Senior Researcher at New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) as well as a member of the ND Okinawa Project. He graduated from the University of the Philippines and thereafter worked at the Okinawa Times, where from 1992 he covered US military base issues. After working at the Okinawa Times Tokyo Bureau, he served as an editorial writer and social section chief. In order to research the 2006 US military defense posture review, from 2007 he spent one year at the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, as a visiting researcher. He left the Okinawa Times in June 2012 and is currently a freelance writer.

Shigeru Handa is a member of the ND Okinawa Project. After working at the Shimotsuke Shimbun, he joined the Chunichi Shimbun in 1991, and serves as an editorialist and senior staff writer at the Tokyo Shimbun. He is also an adjunct professor at Dokkyo University as well as Hosei University. He has been covering the Defense Agency since 1992. In 2007, he was awarded the 13th Peace and Cooperative Journalist Fund of Japan award (main prize) for his column "New Guardian Thought" [新防人考], which was published in the Tokyo Shimbun and the Chunichi Shimbun.

Sayo Saruta is the Director of New Diplomacy Initiative (ND), a think tank in Tokyo, and an Attorney at Law in Japan and the State of New York. After graduating from Waseda University, she received her Master’s degree from Colombia University Law School as well as her second Master’s degree in International Relations from American University in Washington, DC. Regarding U.S.-Japan diplomacy and other political issues, she has aided in providing opportunities for various voices of Japan to speak on various debates between Japan, the U.S. and other East Asian countries. She has arranged for Japan’s Diet members and local groups visit to Washington DC. to discuss topics such as Okinawa base issues, nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear energy. Her research interest is in the establishment theory of the U.S.-Japan diplomacy and her published works include Future Shape of US-Japan Diplomacy: Delivering Diverse Voices on Okinawa, Security, Nuclear Issues and TPP to Washington [Atarashii Nichibei Gaikou wo Kirihiraku] (Shueisha) and Voluntary Dependence on the US [Jihatsuteki Taibei Juzoku] (Kadokawa) (both English-language publication titles are provisional).

Mike M. Mochizuki holds the Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University. Professor Mochizuki was associate dean for academic programs at the Elliott School from 2010 to 2014 and director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies from 2001 to 2005. He co-directs the “Rising Powers Initiative” and the “Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific” research and policy project of the Sigur Center. Previously he was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was also Co-Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy at RAND and has taught at the University of Southern California and Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. His books include Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia (co-editor and co-author, 2017); Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes (co-editor and author, 2016); The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the US-Japan Alliance, and Regional Security (co-editor and author, 2013); China’s Military and the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (co-author, 2013); Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (co-editor and author, 2007), and Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (co-author, 2003). He has published articles in such journals as The American Interest, Asia Pacific Review, Foreign Affairs, International Security, Japan Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Nonproliferation Review, Survival, and Washington Quarterly.

Comfort Women "Her"story in Washington

Korean, Chinese, Filipino, Dutch former sex slaves

On December 28, 2015, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and South Korea issued a joint statement on the issue of ‘comfort women’. In the December statement, Japan acknowledges that the Comfort Women existed because of “an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time” and passed on Prime Minister Shnizo Abe’s “sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.” 

The statement committed the Japanese government to contributing to a fund to assist surviving South Korean former ‘comfort women’. South Korea, in turn, pledged to refrain from discussing the Comfort Women issue in public and, possibly, to remove from the entrance of the Japanese embassy in Seoul a statue symbolizing the Comfort Women. The agreement is to ensure that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.”

The statement ,which reflects no written agreement, is controversial. It will not be approved by the Japanese Cabinet, thus it exists in the same legal limbo as the Kono Statement, a 1993 apology to the Comfort Women. It is unclear when the funds will be delivered to South Korea, whether the survivors will accept it, and whether there will remain any survivors. In addition, the agreement is not applicable to all the other survivors throughout Asia (at least 27 nationalities) who were forced into becoming sex slaves.

Also concerning is the Japanese Government’s statement on February 16 to the meeting of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that no documentation exists describing the forcible taking of women, that the women were not sex slaves, and that the Japanese military was not responsible for recruitment. The Japanese government response is significant as it is likely the first time that such a senior Japanese government official has addressed CEDAW.

In addition, eight ad hoc Japanese Comfort Women denier groups submitted their opinions for the record to the CEDAW meeting. These are less cautious, often racist repeats the government position. Four groups also spelled out what the Japanese government meant when it said it found no documents regarding the Comfort Women in the U.S. National Archives. This is a reference to an inaccurate interpretation of the work of the Congressionally-mandated Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group at the National Archives.

A number of prominent scholars who research the history, sociology, and politics of the Imperial Japan’s sex slave system will be in Washington, DC the week of February 29th to participate in a series of seminars and programs. In addition to private briefings on Capitol Hill and a private screening of the Song of the Reed, a documentary on Taiwanese Comfort Women hosted by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Organization (TECRO), they will speak at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS and George Washington University on March 1 and 3. The schedule is as follows:

Unfinished Apologies

Imperial Japan’s Sex Slaves of Wartime Asia

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

8:30am-3:00pm

Johns Hopkins University, SAIS

REGISTER HERE 

WEBCAST through this link

Speaker Biographies

8:30-9:00am – Registration/light breakfast, purchase books

9:00-9:15am – Welcome
Jae Ku – Director US-Korea Institute, SAIS
Mindy Kotler – Director, Asia Policy Point

9:15-10:30am - Framing the Comfort Women History – Japanese Comfort Women and their Antecedents

Dr. Caroline Norma, Associate Professor in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, author, The Japanese Comfort Women and Sexual Slavery during theChina and Pacific Wars (2016)

Discussant: Dr. Katharine (Kathy) H.S. Moon - inaugural holder of the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and senior fellow at the Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies; author, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations(1997)

10:30-10:45am – Break

10:45am-12:30pm – The Comfort Women of Japan’s Occupied Asia

Dutch, Indonesian, Australian, British and American – Ms. Griselda Molemans, Dutch investigative reporter and researcher, founder of the Task Force for Dutch Indies War Reparations (Dutch acronym: TFIR; Task Force Indisch Rechtsherstel) author of Erfgenamen van Indië [Heirs of the Dutch East Indies] (2004), Zwarte huid, Oranje hart [Black Skin, Orange Heart] (2010), and Opgevangen in andijvielucht [Welcomed by the Smell of Endive] (2014), and the forthcoming Levenslang oorlog [A Lifetime of War] (end of 2016)

Indonesian/Dutch – Ms. Hilde Janssen, Dutch journalist and anthropologist; author Schaamte en Onschuld [Shame and Innocent] (2010) and Troostmeisjes/ComfortWomen with photographer Jan Banning, bilingual Dutch and English photo book (2013)

China – Dr. Peipei Qiu, Professor of Chinese and Japanese on the Louise Boyd Dale and Alfred Lichtenstein Chair, Vassar College, author ChineseComfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves (in collaboration with Shanghai Normal University professors Su Zhiliang and Chen Lifei, 2014)

Philippines – Ms. M. Evelina Galang, Professor of English, University of Miami, author, Angel de la Luna and the 5th Glorious Mystery (2013) and the forthcoming nonfiction Lolas’ House: Women Living with War

Pacific Islands – Dr. Caroline Norma, Associate Professor in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Australia

Taiwan -  Daniel Kuo-ching Chen, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States.

Moderator: Dr. Yukiko Hanawa, Senior Lecturer of East Asian Studies at New York University

12:30-2:00pm - Lunch & Keynote

1:15 - Keynote: Women in Warfare, how far have we come? Taina Bien-Aimé, Executive Director, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
Introduction: Dr. Jae Ku, US-Korea Institute

click to order

2:00-3:00pm - Book signing of Speakers’ books Norma, Qiu, Janssen, Galang, and Stetz/Oh books

The Japanese Comfort Women and Sexual Slavery during the China and Pacific Wars – Caroline Norma

Chinese Comfort Women: Testimonies from Imperial Japan's Sex Slaves – Peipei Qiu

Troostmeisjes/Comfort Women - Jan Banning, with an introduction by Hilde Janssen, bilingual Dutch and English photo book

Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II – Co-editors: Margaret D. Stetz, Mae and Robert Carter Professor of Women's Studies and Professor of Humanities at the University of Delaware and Bonnie B.C. Oh, retired as the Distinguished Professor of Korean Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, the University’s Main Campus Ombuds Officer, and a past director of Women’s Studies at Georgetown University. (2001)

Angel de la Luna and the 5th Glorious Mystery – M. Evalina Galang

Researching and documenting 

the Comfort Women History

What documents exist and where; 

how one analyzes them; working with oral history

Thursday, March 3, 2016

12:45-2:00pm

Sigur Center, George Washington University

Register Here

Researching Japanese
War Crimes, NARA
click to order

Mr. Christopher Simpson, professor of journalism, School of Communications, American University, adviser to the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial GovernmentRecords Interagency Working Group of the National Archives; editor of the Holmes & Meier series on Science and Human Rights of which the first book was Comfort Women Speak (edited by Christopher Simpson and Sangmie Choi Schellsted), contemporary photographs by Soon Mi Yu.

Ms. Griselda Molemans, Dutch investigative reporter and researcher, founder of the Task Force for Dutch Indies War Reparations (Dutch acronym: TFIR; Task Force Indisch Rechtsherstel) author of Erfgenamen van Indië [Heirs of the Dutch East Indies] (2004), Zwarte huid, Oranje hart [Black Skin, Orange Heart] (2010), and Opgevangen in andijvielucht [Welcomed by the Smell of Endive] (Amsterdam: Quasar Books, 2014), and the forthcoming Levenslang oorlog [A Lifetime of War] (end of 2016)

Ms. Hilde Janssen, Dutch Journalist and anthropologist, author Schaamte en Onschuld [Shame and Innocent] (2010) and Troostmeisjes/Comfort Women (2013) with photographer Jan Banning, bilingual Dutch and English photo book

Ms. M. Evelina Galang, professor of English, University of Miami, author, Angel de la Luna and the 5th Glorious Mystery (2013) and the forthcoming Lolas’ House: Women Living with War

Host/moderator: Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur, George Washington University

Japan-ROK pact on ‘comfort women’

all three ships eventually became
troop/POW transports

Will it help heal the wounds?

by Dr. Mike M. Mochizuki, holds the Japan-US Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at George Washington University. He co-directs the “Memory and Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific” research and policy project of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. He is co-editing a book entitled Reconciling Rivals: War, Memory, and Security in East Asia. He is a board member of APP.

First published in The Oriental Economist, January 2016.

On December 28th, instead of signing a written document, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan and Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se of the Republic of Korea (ROK) read carefully crafted statements regarding their respective government’s understanding of a bilateral agreement to address the “comfort women” issue. Comfort women is the euphemism used to describe women coerced into providing sexual services for the Japanese military during World War II. Soon after this public announcement, Prime Shinzo Abe of Japan and President Park Geun-Hye of the ROK spoke on the phone to confirm their intention to implement the agreement and to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Like most international deals forged after difficult negotiations, this agreement entailed a delicate compromise. Its political viability will depend on perceptions of fairness on both sides about the concessions made and expectations about the outcomes achieved.

A delicate compromise
During the negotiations, the South Korean government sought to address as much as possible the demands of the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery for Japan (hereafter Korean Council) and the comfort women survivors whom this non-governmental organization represented. The Korean Council had been insisting that the Japanese government give an official and irreversible apology to the comfort women, admit legal responsibility, and provide compensation legally designated as reparations. From the Korean Council’s perspective, an official and irreversible apology would ide- ally be a resolution passed by the Japanese Diet, the highest organ of state power; but the council appeared open to an apology that had the imprimatur of a Japanese Cabinet decision like the August 15, 1995 Murayama Statement.

In the December 28 agreement, Tokyo did not provide an apology that was explicitly approved by the Japanese Cabinet or the National Diet, did not admit to legal responsibility, and did not offer legal reparations. But it went a bit further than the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) initiative, which was inaugurated by Japan in 1995. Under the AWF program, Japanese Prime Ministers sent letters to former comfort women that extended their “most sincere apologies and remorse” and acknowledged Japan’s “moral responsibilities” as well as “an involvement of the Japanese military authorities.”

In making the new agreement, Prime Minister Abe not only reiterated the language of the previous apology and acknowledgment of Japanese military involvement, but also declared “the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective.” While the Japanese statement of December 28 refrained from referring to legal responsibility, it was explicit about the government’s awareness of responsibilities. By not using the modifier “moral,” which was included in the Prime Minister’s apology letters under the AWF, Abe’s apology implied that the government’s responsibilities were not just moral in nature.

In the AWF program, state funds had been allocated to provide medical and welfare support—¥3 million ($25,000) per person—to Korean comfort women survivors, and private contributions were to be used for “atonement” money, ¥2 million ($17,000) per person. Arguing that this amounted to charity rather than legal reparations, many Korean comfort women survivors with the encouragement of the Korean Council refused this Japanese contribution. This time around, the Japanese government agreed to make “a one-time contribution” of ¥1 billion yen ($8.3 million) from the public budget to a foundation established by the South Korean government to provide support to the comfort women (there are just 46 still alive) and to engage in Japan-ROK cooperative projects “for recovering the honor and dignity and healing the psychological wounds of all former comfort women.”

“No more demands for apologies”
The Abe government was seeking an agreement that would be final. In the view of many Japanese, Japan had addressed the issue of its colonial and wartime responsibility with South Korea on previous occasions, such as through the 1965 normalization process and the 1995 Asian Women’s Fund; but rather than finalizing the issue, South Korea kept “moving the goal post.” Not only did Japan want a new agreement to resolve the comfort women issue once and for all, but also it did not want to undermine the parameters of the 1965 Normalization Treaty by acknowledging legal responsibility or offering legal reparations. Moreover, Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party sought to have the statue of a girl depicting a comfort woman, located across the street from the Japan Embassy in Seoul, removed and, if possible, bring an end to building comparable comfort women statues and memorials in the US. Finally, Tokyo wanted to stop criticisms of Japan in UN–related bodies as well as other international organizations. It was irritated that South Korea was preparing materials concerning comfort women to be included in UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register.

As already noted, Japan succeeded in avoiding “legal responsibility” and “legal reparations” in the deal. It also got Foreign Minister Yun to state that the “issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.” Moreover, the fact that the new foundation would be established by South Korea made it difficult for Seoul to backtrack. Although South Korea made no public promise to remove the comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese Embassy, it acknowledged Japan’s concern about the statue “from the viewpoint of preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity,” and it agreed to “strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organizations.” The ROK government also declared that it would refrain, together with the Japanese government, from “accusing or criticizing each other regarding this issue in the international community, including at the United Nations” under the condition that the Japanese government would implement the bilateral agreement.

In short, both sides made concessions while achieving an outcome that moved toward their original objectives. South Korea acquiesced to Japan’s opposition to legal responsibility and legal reparations, but it did get Japan to commit public funds to establish a South Korean foundation to address the comfort women issue and to have the Japanese Prime Minister express “his heartfelt apology and remorse” and acknowledge government responsibilities. Moreover, the irreversibility of the agreement suggested that Abe and other like-minded Japanese conservatives would have to refrain from future moves to repeal or dilute the 1993 Kono Statement of apology toward comfort women. Japan acquiesced to an acknowledgment of Japanese military involvement and government responsibility, but it did get South Korea to state that the agreement was final and that the government would refrain from criticizing Japan in the international community.

Public reaction: Japan vs. Korea
With only 46 Korean comfort women survivors alive, both Seoul and Tokyo recognized the urgency of reaching an agreement. Washington was also encouraging the two sides to resolve this issue, not only for humanitarian and moral reasons, but also for geopolitical ones. Given North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and provocative behavior and the increasing assertiveness of a rising China, US policymakers have been concerned that continuing animosity between its two Northeast Asian allies would have major opportunity costs for promoting regional security cooperation and could even encourage South Korea’s strategic drift toward China. Although President Park had initially rebuffed Japanese overtures to improve bilateral relations, growing concerns about her country’s economy as well as the North Korean threat probably convinced her to assume the risks of negotiating an agreement on the comfort women issue with the Abe government. The ambiguities in the agreement and different expectations on each side, however, will make its implementation politically challenging.

On the Japanese side, the political reception has been generally positive. Even liberal and leftist leaders who have been critical of Abe have expressed their support of the agreement. Most of the grumbling has come from the conservative camp. Several prominent Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians have insisted that the comfort woman statue near the Japanese Embassy in Seoul must be removed expeditiously, and a few have complained that the agreement did not mention the comfort women statues and memorials in the United States or that Abe did not need to apologize and compromise since South Korea is entirely to blame for the deterioration in bilateral relations. Despite this discontent, given his nationalist credentials, Abe should be able to manage and deflect intra-LDP opposition.

President Park faces a more serious political predicament. Although her ruling Saenuri Party has come out in support of the agreement, the opposition Minjoo Party has called for rescinding it and renegotiating with Japan. With a National Assembly election scheduled for April 2016, the opposition will be tempted to make this an election issue. According to Korean opinion surveys conducted soon after the agreement was announced, most South Koreans are critical of the agreement and question the sincerity of Abe’s apology. According to one poll, 74% are opposed to moving the comfort woman statue.

Much hinges on whether the Korean Council and the comfort women survivors will be able to block implementation of the agreement. The Korean Council has publicly denounced the agreement and expressed its strong opposition to removing the statue, which the organization erected in 2011 to commemorate the thousandth time demonstrators staged their regular Wednesday protest in front of the Japanese Embassy. In a dramatic display of anger, comfort women survivors affiliated with the Korean Council criticized a senior Korean diplomat, who visited to explain the agreement, for not consulting them before reaching the accord. A Korean diplomatic spokesperson later revealed during a press briefing that the government had been consulting with former comfort women and their support organizations during the negotiations.

The handling of the comfort woman statue could unravel the agreement. Some Japanese media outlets have reported that the Japanese government sees the statue’s removal as a precondition for the allocation of public funds for the foundation in South Korea. Korean officials have vehemently dismissed such reports as notorious attempts to unravel the accord. Given the current Korean sentiment against moving the statue, a decision by Japan to withhold funding until the statue issue is resolved would likely intensify Korean public opposition to the pact itself. A better course would be to see a resolution of the statue issue as a possible outcome of a healing and reconciliation process that a Japanese state-funded foundation in South Korea would promote. Prime Minister Abe faces a difficult decision whether or not to go ahead with funding the new South Korean foundation even without progress on the statue issue. To save the agreement, he might have to go against his own preferences while simultaneously finding a way to placate his nationalist political base.

A path to historical reconciliation
Successful implementation of the December 28 accord may open the way to regular Japan-South Korea summit meetings, greater bilateral security cooperation, and deeper economic relations. But just as the October 1998 historic summit between then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and President Kim Dae-Jung failed to promote long-term historical reconciliation, the recent comfort women agreement will be insufficient. Reconciliation requires more than interstate bargains built on compromises. The societies of both nations must be engaged and involved to foster empathy and trust. All too often, Japanese leaders and citizens focus on what it would take to bring an end to historical issues and to make relations with South Korea truly future-oriented. Deep reconciliation at the societal level, however, is not some diplomatically established goal post, but rather an ongoing and never-ending process. State-to-state agreements can facilitate the process, but actions and processes that resonate with the public are essential.

Prime Minister Abe, representing the country that is responsible for the comfort women’s suffering, should personally visit the comfort women survivors and directly express his apologies and remorse. Of course, such an act would involve substantial political risks, but it is precisely the riskiness of it that would make the apologies powerful and sincere. The new foundation to be established in South Korea with Japanese money could also embrace the “Butterfly Fund” proposed by several comfort women survivors and established by the Korean Council. This fund now allocates donations received in honor of the comfort women to victims of sexual violence during war in other countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Vietnam. Japan could even consider an additional contribution specifically to this fund as part of Prime Minister Abe’s campaign to promote women’s rights and empowerment throughout the world.

Finally, Japan together with South Korea and the United States should promote non-governmental international institutions for research, exchanges, and education regarding not only the comfort women issue, but also the many other historical issues that cause tensions in East Asia. Such an initiative would be consistent with Abe’s August 14, 2015 statement in which he declared, “We Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humility, and pass it on to the future.”

Scholars adamant that Yoshida memoirs had no influence in US

Joint Response to Mainichi article on Congress and the Comfort Women Resolution

September 25, 2014 issued in The Nelson Report

On September 11^th, the centrist Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun published an article that connected international condemnation of Japan’s Comfort Women system to a discredited memoir. The Mainichi article provides extensive information on the dismissal of accounts by former Imperial Army soldier Seiji YOSHIDA that he abducted Korean women to become prostitutes for the Japanese military.  However, the article also implies strongly that Yoshida's original claim was an important source of Western misunderstanding of the Comfort Women system.

Furthermore, the article suggests that the Asahi Shimbun’s reporting of the Yoshida story disseminated this misinformation on Comfort Women to the West. By doing so, the article gives support to the view that the Asahi articles were a major rationale behind the 2007 Comfort Women resolution, H. Res. 121 and Western belief that the Comfort Women system was forced prostitution or worse.  

This implied conclusion contradicts what Mainichi reporters were told by those involved in the process that culminated in the passage of the 2007 Comfort Women resolution.

Reporters spoke to Dennis Halpin who in 2006 was the senior policy Asia staffer to Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL), Chairman of House International Relations Committee (HIRC). In 2006, Congressman Hyde shepherded through the Committee H. Res. 759, which was the precursor of the 2007 Comfort Women Resolution, H. Res. 121. The 2006 resolution was approved by the Committee via unanimous consent on September 13, 2006,  Mr. Halpin held a similar staff position in 2007 to Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) who was the Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (name changed from HIRC in 2007). The Committee passed its Comfort Women resolution, H. Res. 121, on June 26, 2007 and the Resolution passed the House of Representative by unanimous consent on July 30, 2007.

Reporters also spoke to Mindy Kotler of Asia Policy Point who worked with Congressional staff to help them draft and defend both the 2006 and 2007 Comfort Women resolutions; George Washington University Professor Mike Mochizuki who was part of a team of American, Australian and Japanese scholars who advised members of congress on issues regarding Comfort Women and Japanese politics; and Larry Niksch who as a senior Congressional Research Service (CRS) staffer prepared memos for members of congress in 2006 (April 10) and 2007 (April 3) regarding the Comfort Women issue.

Hours of interviews by Mainichi journalists resulted in one sentence: “A document explaining the comfort women system to congressmen, which was attached to the draft resolution, also mentions Yoshida's book.” After corrections from several of us, the Mainichi revised the English to read: “At one point a memorandum issued explaining the comfort women system to Congress members also mentioned Yoshida's book.” There does not appear any notation on the current article that there was a revision. Either way, this sentence suggests that the 2006 memorandum written by Dr. Niksch was influenced by the Yoshida memoir and Asahi reporting and, by implication, proving that these reports shaped the thinking of members of the U.S. Congress.  In fact, the original Mainichi article in Japanese misleadingly makes an even more direct link between the 2006 CRS memorandum and the House resolution on comfort women. [この決議案の議員説明用の資料にも途中段階で吉田氏の著書が出てくる。A literal translation of the Mainichi reference would be something like this: “Even in an explanatory document for members of Congress regarding this resolution, [a reference to] Yoshida’s book appears in the middle [of this document].”]

All of us were astonished.

We had unequivocally told the reporters that the Yoshida memoir and Asahi’s reporting of it were not factors in the consideration, drafting, or defense of the H. Res 121 or H. Res 759 (2006).  Mindy Kotler informed the Mainichi reporter that she and the academic advising team made a concerted effort not to reference or even review publications that were controversial to Japanese historical revisionists, such as the George Hicks’ 1994 book The Comfort Women and the 1996 UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences [the Coomaraswamy Report].

We emphasized that one discredited source would not form the basis of research for Congress. There was ample documentary and testimonial evidence from across the Indo-Pacific region to support the fact that Imperial Japan organized and managed a system of sexual slavery for its military as well as for its colonial officials, businessmen and overseas workers. Furthermore, outside of the formal government-sponsored trafficking of women, it was well-documented that Imperial Japan’s armed forces used rape and sexual slavery to intimidate and subjugate local populations.

The Mainichi reporters focused on a 2006 memorandum that Dr. Niksch wrote in response to questions from some members of congress where he did note the Yoshida account. No specific member of congress requested this memo.  The Asian Women’s Fund’s website has a link to a version of this 2006 memo (It is without the official CRS logo in the upper left corner). The website does not, however, have a link to Dr. Niksch’s 2007 Memorandum on the Comfort Women where he drops any reference to Yoshida’s discredited memoir and lists other facts and numerous documents supporting the existence of a government-sponsored Comfort Women system. Dr. Niksch did give a Mainichi reporter a copy of the 2007 memorandum (which can also be found on the Internet). 

We are thus disappointed by Mainichi's limited reporting. The newspaper needs to examine and report all the facts and evidence, which will refute the view of the Japanese history revisionists and the Abe Administration* that the Yoshida memoir, as reported by the Asahi Shimbun, colored all understanding of the comfort women tragedy.

This is simply not true.

We are further troubled that the Abe Administration appears to adhere to this view. The Prime Minister and his Chief Cabinet spokesmen have started calling on the Asahi to correct the record. Most recently, in September 17th press conference, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu KATO said that the Asahi Shimbun needed to makes efforts to correct the false impression caused by its reporting on so-called comfort women that were carried in the paper. “We hope” he said “The Asahi Shimbun will make efforts to dispel the impact of the reports based on erroneous information.”

We are also concerned that the focus of reporting is on Korea as the source for Comfort Women. Koreans and Taiwanese may have been the source of the greatest number of formally trafficked women. However, it is likely that the greater majority of those forced into sexual slavery were girls and boys across the Indo-Pacific region—including Europeans some of who have testified publicly—who were acquired through opportunity.

We hope that the Mainichi Shimbun will do a follow-up article better reflecting our interviews and the extensive research and documentation presented by Dr. Niksch in his 2007 CRS memorandum.

Mr. Dennis Halpin

US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins

Ms. Mindy Kotler

Asia Policy Point

Dr. Mike Mochizuki

George Washington University

Dr. Larry Niksch

CSIS

*Whereas there are many statements by Abe and his cabinet members prior to December 12, 2012 condemning the Yoshida testimony, the newer, more official statements began to appear this month, September. SEE these examples:

Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga’s press conference September 5^th, Official translation of the morning,

REPORTER: I have a question regarding the issue of the recognition of history. Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka, former Special Rapporteur on violence against women, who prepared the 1996 United Nations (UN) report in which she identified the former Japanese military’s use of “comfort women” as sexual slavery and advised the Government of Japan to apologize and pay compensation, sat down for an interview with us. In the interview, Ms. Coomaraswamy expressed that there was no need to revise the report. Can you please comment on behalf of the Japanese Government?

CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY SUGA: First of all, with regard to the Report of the Special Rapporteur, it is regrettable that the report did not take into account Japan’s basic position concerning this issue, as well as the efforts Japan has made to date. In our opinion, there is no mistake that parts of this report were influenced by the content of the articles which Asahi Shimbun recently retracted. Japan has not confirmed any objective sources proving “forceful recruitment.” Furthermore, at the recent meeting of the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva, Japan noted that the reference to “sexual slavery” was inappropriate. Japan will continue to carefully explain its position to the international community, including to the UN.

However, it is the afternoon that is not translated that is more explicit and notes that no women, even in Indonesia, were forcibly recruited. SEE Memo on press conference.

Also see:

Suga press afternoon conference September 12^th

Abe: Incorrect reports tarnished Japan’s honor overseas, Yomiuri 9/12/14, This article is an English-language summary of reports of Prime Minister Abe's remarks.

On the September 14th Abe told the NHK, “The Asahi reported on Mr. Seiji Yoshida’s evidence as if it were true…Then the Asahi articles were carried around the world, including of course to South Korea, as if they were true.” JiJi press reporting of Abe Sept 14^th comments regarding Asahi and Yoshida article. 

More direct transcript of NHK interview: “It is true that as a result of Asahi’s reports, Japanese soldiers have been viewed as kidnappers who kidnapped [Korean] children to use as comfort women. It is also true that monuments condemning Japan [over the matter] have been built around the world. Asahi must explain patiently to the world that its reports were erroneous…. It is not easy to change fixed narratives once they have become prevalent and caused diplomatic problems.”

[See: 5'25" to 7'22", "Sunday Debate." 日曜討論]

[Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary] Kato calls on Asahi to make amends, The Yomiuri Shimbun, September 19, 2014