Takaichi Moves Forward without Concensus

PM Takaichi Grapples with a Divisive Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 13, 2026
 
Having passed the FY2026 budget bill, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will spend the rest of the Diet’s current session promoting her conservative agenda. This may include establishing a National Intelligence Council, criminalizing the destruction of Japan’s national flag, and reviewing Japan’s three critical security documents. Takaichi characterizes her agenda as “policies dividing public opinion into two.” Takaichi seems to have decided to be a divisive leader, uninterested in uniting the nation. 
 
On January 19, Takaichi announced the dissolution of the House of Representatives. “I’m going to boldly grapple with issues that may divide national opinion,” Takaichi said, explaining her decision to dissolve the House. She interpreted the sweeping victory of her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House election on February 8 as total public support for her agenda.
 
Takaichi may have meant that she would tackle controversial issues without compromise, that is, to perform as the leader who makes progress toward her own ambitious goals. However, it soon became clear that her “divisive agenda” meant conservative policies, certain to meet opposition from liberal parties in the Diet.  Having no majority in the Upper House, it is unclear how she and the LDP will bring her controversial policies to fruition.
 
National Intelligence Council
The Takaichi Cabinet has submitted to the Diet a bill to establish a National Intelligence Council (NIC). The council would research and discuss national security, including potential terrorist activity and foreign espionage in Japan. Members of the council would be the prime minister and her cabinet members whose ministries deal with national security issues. 
 
The council would be supported by a bureaucratic organization called the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) -- the Japanese version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It would be an upgraded organization from the current Cabinet Intelligence and Research Agency and would integrate the functions of some intelligence sections in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the police agency. It is still unclear whether these ministries can share with another body the information that they collected for their own purposes. 
 
Debate on the bill started in the Diet in early April. The minority parties are concerned that the new NIA will collect information about their political and campaign activities that would oppose the government that is in office. Takaichi insists that the legislation would not allow the government to violate the privacy of individuals and would not target the activities of civil groups.
 
However, the legislation contains no provision for oversight of the NIC’s activities, nor does the bill enable the Diet to operate as a check on the NIC or the NIA.
 
The Takaichi administration has proposed additional anti-espionage legislation to reinforce security against foreign spies. The coalition agreement between the LDP and Japan Innovation Party (JIP) last October included work on legislation that would require foreign agents to register with the government and to disclose their lobbying.
 
Punishment for Damaging the National Flag
Article 92 of Penal Code penalizes a person who damages the flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country with up to two years imprisonment or a fine of two hundred thousand yen. Although Article 92 is a part of the criminal law that deals with crimes against diplomacy, some right-wingers claim it is unreasonable for Japan’s criminal code not to include any punishment for damaging the flag of Japan.
 
This argument has resonated with Takaichi, and the LDP-JIP agreement from last October affirmed that they would pursue legislation to create the “crime of damaging Japan’s flag” during the 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. An opposition party, Sanseito, also support criminalizing damage to Japan’s flag as part of their “Japan First” agenda. This legislation is a high priority for the conservative voters who have supported Takaichi.
 
The LDP held its first meeting on the issue in late March. The legislative team, headed by former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, examined examples of similar legislation in foreign countries and anti-flag-desecration measures by former administrations in Japan. When Japan legislated Hinomaru (日の丸) as the national flag and Kimigayo (君が代) as the national anthem in 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that he did not intend to make damage to the Japanese flag a criminal offense.

The LDP and JIP hope to conclude their discussion of a bill by late April. However, they have not yet reached an agreement on what kind of damage to the Japanese flag should be punished. There are skeptics about criminalization. Liberal groups argue that doing so may violate freedom of thought or freedom of expression as described in Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Japan. Even some LDP members believe that the act should be remained in conceptual provisions and damaging Japanese flag should not be criminalized.
 
Arms Exports
Takaichi tends to see security policy in the context of money. Her administration is promoting arms exports since they contribute to economic growth. She intends to reduce the regulation of shipments that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology now cover. The implementation guidelines of the Three Principles allow arms exports for only five purposes: rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping.
 
The Takaichi government presented to the LDP in early April a draft of a regulation to ease restrictions on arms exports. The draft would replace the five functional categories with an export control regime that distinguishes between exports of “arms” and “non-arms.” “Arms” are weapons and lethal systems; the draft regulation would allow exports to partner countries. There would be no restrictions on exports of non-arms. The National Security Council is planning to revise the guidelines in late April with approval of the leading parties.
 
A controversial point in the draft is how the Diet is engaged in the decision on arms exports. The draft would require the administration to report to the Diet on arms exports only after the equipment has been exported. Post hoc reporting of arms sales is unusual. In the United States, the executive branch must give Congress advance notice and an opportunity to review proposed arms sales. In the UK, Parliament and even the courts have had roles in reviewing arms sales before they are concluded.
 
Takaichi’s idea is based on a notion that Japan can earn money and promote her conservative agenda by expanding arms exports. However, strictly refraining from these exports has been Japan’s traditional policy as a pacifist nation—an ethos adopted in the wake of the devastation of the war. One Komeito lawmaker quoted a 1976 comment by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Miyazawa: “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons.” No such pride or moral authority as a leader of Japan can be seen in Takaichi.