History, the hardest easy problem for Japan to resolve

How China Uses Wartime History Against Japan

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published October 7, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Beyond all the pageantry, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a strategic goal for his Washington visit – to undermine the American relationship with Japan. Xi succeeded, perhaps beyond his expectations.

Japanese policy makers saw this coming. They arranged a brief meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly between Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Donald Trump ahead of Xi’s arrival.

The meeting was empty of content but seemed reassuring. But the next day, Trump welcomed Xi by fondly recalling “the greatness that we had together fighting in World War Two” without mentioning the postwar alliance with Japan.

Xi followed the next day at the official banquet, making clear who was their common enemy. “Over 80 years ago, the Chinese and American people stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors,” Xi said, deliberately obscuring the fact that wartime China was led by the Nationalists, not their Communist foes. The official statements issued by both governments echoed the language of their status as wartime allies.

“Clearly, Beijing would like to drive a wedge between Trump and Takaichi,” respected scholar Mike Mochizuki told Toyo Keizai, “but Takaichi clings to Donald while Donald does not return the favor by calling her Sanae.”

This Chinese use of the wartime past is part of a broader campaign to increase diplomatic pressure on Japan and the Takaichi administration over the Prime Minister’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency and to push the Chinese characterization of Japan’s defense buildup as a renewal of Japanese wartime “militarism”.

Trump, thrilled by his role as a host to Xi, either ignored the Chinese strategic intent, or simply failed to understand the trap he had stepped into.

“Trump’s failure to grasp that the United States had allied with a different China and fought a different Japan will only invite more Chinese coercion,” commented Mireya Solis, the senior Japan expert at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington.

The Chinese wedge strategy may not be entirely effective. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains anchored in security establishments whose bonds have “deepened enough to prevent a U.S.-Japan estrangement even under Trump,” notes Mochizuki, affiliated with the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

But Japanese officials are clearly rattled. The Prime Minister’s office felt compelled to tell the Yomiuri Shimbun that during a short phone call between Takaichi and Trump after the Xi visit, the American president reassured her that he had not sided with the Chinese leader in his criticism of Japan and urged him to hold talks with the Japanese Premier. “I’d be surprised if Trump spoke in detail about Japan with Xi,” a recently retired senior State Department official told this writer.

China’s war on Takaichi

China’s criticism of Japan intensified in response to Takaichi’s victory in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election last October. Even before her remarks on a possible use of Japanese military forces in a Taiwan crisis, the Chinese were warning about the dangers of her administration as a triumph of the ‘new conservatives’ who favor defense buildup and cultivate close ties to pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Takaichi’s unapologetic views on the war were well known in Beijing. She made a splash in the Diet early in her career, in 1994, challenging then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi for his bold statements acknowledging the war as an act of aggression. Later Murayama issued his statement on the 50th anniversary of the war apologizing for Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression.”

For Takaichi, this was unacceptable. “You can’t just apologize on my behalf without my consent,” she said in the Diet exchange, making it clear that she viewed the war as “legally justifiable.” In a later interview, she pledged to revise the Murayama statement, saying that Japan “fought wars for self-preservation and self-defense.”

When Takaichi met Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Korea in late October, shortly after she took power, the Chinese leader pointedly challenged these views.

“We should widely promote the spirit of the Murayama Statement,” he reportedly told her, “which reflected on the history of aggression and apologized to victimized countries.”

In that sense, Takaichi herself has created the opportunity for China to use the wartime past to try to isolate and pressure Japan.

“Takaichi shares (former Prime Minister) Abe’s revisionist views of history but lacks Abe’s pragmatic and prudent judgement,” says Japan scholar Mochizuki. “So it is not surprising that China has linked Taiwan, Japanese imperialism, and Japan’s defense buildup together to criticize what they see as Japan’s neomilitarism.”

The Chinese use of the wartime past continued with the late September visit of former Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi linked the moment to the anniversary of the Tokyo war crimes trials.

"If Japan does not learn lessons from history and challenges the postwar 'Peace Constitution,' tries to revive its history of aggression and resurrect war criminals, it will not even be able to face the world, let alone move toward the future, and it will have no future," Wang said.

Behind this war talk, the Wang Yi talks with Iwaya are an effort to reach out to forces within Japan that believe Takaichi’s anti-China stance, and her overreliance on the relationship with the unreliable Trump, are a mistake. Iwaya, along with former Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, is among those clearly opposed to the Prime Minister’s policies toward China. Even more intriguing is the recent interview in Shincho by special advisor Imai Takaya calling on Takaichi to change her language on Taiwan and take a strategic view that does “not rely on the US for everything.”

The upcoming APEC summit meeting in China may provide a window to repair relations. But it will require Japan to act, a Japan that is increasingly isolated by China.

China’s use of the wartime past is nothing new

However the current maneuvers play out, it is important to recognize that the Chinese use of the wartime past is hardly new. In a comparative study of the formation of wartime historical memory that we conducted at Stanford University, our research detailed how the Chinese Communist Party shifted in the last few decades to construct a patriotic narrative to replace one that focused on the struggle against their Nationalist enemies.

In this patriotic narrative, the war serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it allows the current Chinese leadership to assume the role of a great power that helped found the United Nations and was part of a global “anti-fascist” struggle. And it emphasizes the struggle of a unified Chinese people against the Japanese invader, claiming to have been victors in that war.

“There is a growing sense in China that its suffering and its contribution to the overall victory in World War II haven’t been sufficiently appreciated,” historian Rana Mitter, the author of several important books on the war and Chinese memory, told The Wire China in a 2020 interview. “World War II has enabled the state to say, look, this is when China was able to stand up for itself and fight back against invasion.”

In recent years, “history is used by China, including war history and the history of the United Nations, to make the case for Chinese global leadership since 1945,” Harvard Kennedy School historian Mitter told a recent seminar in Europe. The message is that in the current turbulence of the world order, China can play the role it played in 1945 in creating that order.

Beyond the claim to global leadership, the Chinese have not hesitated to use the wartime memories to target Japan.

Last September, the Chinese hosted a huge commemoration of the 80th anniversary, featuring a military parade attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Xi chose this moment to again emphasize the war against Japan and the creation of a “national united front against Japanese aggression established at the initiative of the Communist Party of China.”

Paired with the celebration, the Chinese film industry premiered two slickly produced blockbuster films, both of which were aimed not only at the Chinese audience but also distributed globally, including on streaming services like Netflix. “Dead to Rights” was yet another account of the Nanjing Massacre, done relatively artfully. But “731,” an account of the infamous secretive Japanese biological and chemical warfare unit that performed ghastly experiments on Chinese and foreign prisoners, was directly aimed at Japan. The depiction of Japanese as evil barbarians, and the failure of the United States to prosecute these war crimes, was garishly depicted.

This clash surfaced at the United Nations in what seems like an obscure issue – the existence of a clause in the UN charter which refers to “enemy states,” namely Japan and Germany, allowing the Allied powers from World War II to take action against those former Axis powers without prior Security Council approval. It was designed as a temporary safeguard against the resurgence of militarism but is widely recognized as obsolete and without effect. The General Assembly voted twice to remove the clause but it requires an amendment of the Charter that China and Russia can block.

Prime Minister Takaichi called on the UN to remove this clause. After her address to the General Assembly, China’s deputy ambassador to the UN, Sun Lei, defended its existence, pointing to “proof that Japan’s re-militarization has become a real threat to regional and global peace and stability.”

These history wars are decades long, and they shift in response to the needs of foreign policy, in both Beijing and Tokyo. China has played the history card, again, and it remains to be seen how Japan will respond. For Japan, the U.S. under Trump is increasingly an unreliable actor. But however this plays out, the past will never really be forgotten.

Asia Policy Events, Monday September 28, 2026

TAKEAWAYS FROM THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT: THE ECONOMIC SECURITY ANGLES. 9/28, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Sujai Shivakumar, Director and Senior Fellow, Renewing American Innovation, CSIS; Philip Luck, Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair, International Business, CSIS; Kate Koren, Deputy Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair, International Business, CSIS; Ilaria Mazzocco, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Lauryn Williams, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, CSIS.

THE SECOND TRUMP-XI SUMMIT: TAKEAWAYS FROM THE US, CHINA, AND RUSSIA. 9/28, 9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Director, China Program, Stimson Center; Peter Slezkine, Senior Fellow and Director, Russia Program, Stimson Center.

AF BRIG. GEN. TIMOTHY M. HELFRICH. 9/28, 1:00-2:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speaker: Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Helfrich, Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fighters and Advanced Aircraft, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Air Force Materiel Command; Moderator: Heather Penney, Director of Studies and Research, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

PROTECTING UKRAINE'S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE, FOCUSING ON WINTER, WAR, AND LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. 9/28, 2:00pm, 188 Russell Senate Office Building. Sponsor: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission). Speakers: Meredith Berger, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations, and Environment); Michael Kofman, senior fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Alex Riabchyn, Chief International and Sustainability Officer, Naftogaz Ukraine. 

BOOK TALK: IS CHINA'S ECONOMY BROKEN? 9/28, 4:00-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS. Speakers: author Logan Wright, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS, Broken China: How the Economic Miracle Shattered and What It Means for the World; Dinny McMahon, Head of China Markets Research, Trivium China; Tianlei Huang, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE); Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR); Moderator: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS. PURCHASE BOOK

CHINA’S LAW ON PROMOTING ETHNIC UNITY AND PROGRESS. 9/28, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speakers: Aaron Glasserman, Distinguished Fellow, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Tenzin (Tendor) Dorjee, Director of Research & Advocacy, Tibet Action Institute; Rayhan Asat, Senior Legal and Policy Advisor, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

JAPAN’S RESIDENCY RULES: WHAT HAS REALLY CHANGED AND HOW DO THEY COMPARE WITH OTHER PLACES? 9/28, 6:00-9:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS); Japan Expert Insights. Speakers: Yuta Kato, Certified Administrative Procedures Legal Specialist (Immigration Attorney), IMS Legal Professional Corporation; Maximilien Xavier Rehm, Postdoctoral Assistant, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto; Ben Tanaka, Founder, RetireJapan; Moderator: John Bradford, Executive Director, YCAPS.

Japan and South Korea Grow Closer

The Trump effect on Japan–South Korea relations

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 12, 2026 at the East Asian Forum.

The August 2023 Japan–South Korea–US trilateral summit at Camp David provided powerful impetus for Tokyo and Seoul to restore warm ties, an undertaking initiated by former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol.

The momentum in Japan–South Korea relations has continued, surviving changes in leadership in all three countries. Even the potentially disastrous pairing of a conservative nationalist government in Tokyo and a progressive administration in Seoul has not slowed the pace of the bilateral partnership’s deepening.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung sit at two ends of the political spectrum, but their May 2026 meeting in Lee’s hometown of Andong on 18-19 May, was marked by a spirit of warmth. Even Lee’s critics, who feared that his long-held harsh views on the legacy of Japanese colonial rule would reverse progress, were pleased.

Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo was ‘quite impressed with how [Lee] handled South Korea–Japan relations after taking office’, noting that the meeting in Andong ‘went very well’ — a view shared by senior South Korean officials in off-the-record discussions.

This success can be credited to Japan and Korea’s shared challenges of hedging against both China and an unpredictable United States, with US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and military interventions sending shocks across both economies. Lee’s decision to avoid past sources of contention like wartime history issues with Japan can be read as a calculated effort to use closer ties with Tokyo to insulate South Korea from growing chaos in an unpredictable security environment.

The most powerful factor in this is the prospect of US withdrawal from global leadership under Trump 2.0. Another South Korean senior official noted off the record that South Korea and Japan have ‘shared anxieties about Washington’ and that ‘it is not about China’.

Senior South Korean officials are discussing the need for closer security ties with Japan in response to US retreat, including potentially finessing the territorial disputes by signing a non-aggression pact and moving towards a mutual defence treaty. While this would go beyond what most South Koreans would tolerate — and much less in Japan — its mere consideration is a remarkable sign of the impact of Trump-driven uncertainty.

This tightening is taking place without active US involvement at the highest level. While trilateral meetings are still being held among senior officials and statements are being issued with common views on regional and global security issues like North Korea, this is the product of institutional inertia created by former US president Joe Biden’s administration. There is no evidence of a connection between those official pronouncements and the White House and Trump has never expressed any interest in trilateral cooperation, nor is he eager to follow in Biden’s footsteps.

Despite the factors impelling closer ties, there are serious concerns in Seoul and Tokyo that the rhetoric of bilateral partnership has not been sufficiently reflected in concrete actions.

The most cited example of this is the potential admittance of South Korea to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which could forge closer trade and investment alliances and counter US mercantilism. While Seoul has expressed its interest in joining, it has yet to formally apply. Domestic politics remain a constraint, reflected in the ongoing restrictions on the purchase of Japanese seafood due to the Fukushima nuclear accident and its aftermath.

A similar dynamic is visible in the arena of defence cooperation. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro visited Seoul in June 2026 and reaffirmed tightening defence ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. But he was unable to get Seoul to sign off on a long-sought military logistics pact which would institutionalise joint operations. Lee told reporters earlier in June that public sentiment on history issues were the obstacle to signing what would otherwise be a logical agreement.

Beyond immediate issues, two policy areas — China and North Korea — could also drive the neighbours apart.

Lee has been careful to maintain good ties with Beijing, both in the economic realm and in potentially seeking China’s help in dealing with North Korea. The divergence between Lee’s policy towards China and the hostile state of Japan–China relations was noted at the Andong meeting.

Both governments share a commitment to the eventual denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. But Lee seems ready to back a possible Trump summit with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un which could offer de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Japan has always been fearful that this outcome could lead to a separation of the Korean peninsula from US extended deterrence commitments and leave Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The relationship also remains marred by the lingering issues of wartime history and justice that have been carefully put aside but not resolved. Compensation cases against Japanese companies for wartime workers in Japanese mines and factories continue to make their way through South Korean courts. Takaichi has carefully avoided doing anything to inflame Seoul, but it would only take a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine — something she did regularly for several decades — to relight the fires of South Korean patriotism.

For now, the path to improved ties looks open, thanks in large part to Trump and to a lesser extent to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the question of how long it will remain so is far less certain.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 18, 2026

BEYOND THE SAHEL: RUSSIA’S TOOLBOX FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. 5/18, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Anna Borshchevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mvemba Dizolele, Adjunct Lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Kate Johnston, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS; David McKenzie, Communications Director, CNAS.

IGP RAPID RESPONSE: US-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT. 5/18, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics (IGP), Columbia University. Speakers: Isaac Arnsdorf, White House Bureau Chief, Washington Post, Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, IGP Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, Pritzker Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA; Julian Gewirtz, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Former Senior Director, China and Taiwan Affairs, US National Security Council, author of Never Turn Back; Liza Tobin, Managing Director, Garnaut Global, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Former NSC China Director. Moderator: Zongyuan Liu, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Author of Sovereign Funds.

BOOK TALK: IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 5/18, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: author Sina Azodi, Assistant Professor of Middle East Politics, Director, Middle East Studies MA Program, George Washington University; Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4nK3MNt

PM Takaichi’s Week of Diplomacy

Staying the Abe Course

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.

November 3, 2025

The last week of October 2025 was Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s diplomatic debut. Inaugurated barely a week before, she spoke with world leaders and attended multi-lateral conferences. Takaichi hoped to project Japan’s importance in international community. While she is still on her way to that goal, it became clear that her foreign policy will be based on that of her predecessors – mainly, Abe.

The Golden Age of Alliances
Takaichi prepared for her diplomatic week by focusing on U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit from October 27 to 29. In her meeting with Trump, Takaichi reminisced about his old friend and her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. She gave Trump a golf putter used by Abe and a set of gold-gilded golf balls, acknowledging Trump’s fondness of golf and gold. The two signed a document titled “Toward a NEW GOLDEN AGE,” named after a sentence in Trump’s inaugural address in January: “The golden age of America begins right now.”

In addition to the gift-giving, and without any explicit request from Trump, Takaichi described to him Japan’s initiative to increase its defense spending. Takaichi earlier had announced to the Diet that Japan would reach its defense budget target of two percent of GDP earlier than expected. Japan also will revise three defense documents signed in 2022 to increase its purchases of military equipment from the U.S. On this latter commitment, Takaichi took a page from Abe’s book. In 2018, as Trump was considering higher tariffs on Japanese cars, Abe bought F-35 fighter jets and other military equipment from the U.S.

Both leaders labeled the bilateral tariff agreement in July as a “great deal.” They exchanged a joint factsheet on the anticipated 60 trillion yen of investments in the U.S. by Japanese companies. The factsheet shows only “interest from companies.” One example of a possible investment is the construction of nuclear reactors and small modular reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. Notwithstanding the lack of firm commitments, the factsheet was a diplomatic card that Trump could play in a summit talk with President Xi Jinping of China after he left Japan.

Helped by Pragmatic Diplomacy
Abe’s legacy was not a resource for Takaichi in her meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Lee Jae Myung, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju on October 30. During his time in office, Abe had brought Japan-ROK relations to their lowest level since 1965, when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Note that while Abe was in office, a liberal, Moon Jae In, headed the ROK government. Moon was a political mentor of President Lee, just as Abe was of Takaichi.

The stage thus was set for renewed antagonism between the heirs to the Abe and Moon administrations. That drama did not take place, however. Takaichi was lucky enough on three points. First, Lee holds to the principle of “pragmatic diplomacy” and is trying to solidify relations with foreign countries. Second, Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, had improved bilateral relations with the ROK and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol. Finally, Japan and the ROK need to reinforce their trilateral security framework with the U.S. to counter the growing military alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea.

Takaichi and Lee promised to maintain a “shuttle diplomacy” with frequent visits to each other. In the ROK, Takaichi is widely considered a hawkish leader, who frequently visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, and who disagrees with both the Murayama Statement, which is an apology for Japan’s wartime aggression, and the Kono Statement, which admits the Japanese Imperial Armed Force’s role in trafficking women and girls. Avoiding these issues, Takaichi tried to build a personal relationship with Lee, expressing her preferences for Korean seaweed, Korean cosmetics, and Korean TV drama.

An Unusual Exchange on Domestic Issues
Takaichi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju on October 31 did not go as smoothly as the meetings with Trump and Lee. Both leaders met and shook hands without a smile.

Takaichi is one of the lawmakers who are close to Taiwan. She had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te in April. Lai immediately congratulated Takaichi on her election as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in early October, and her colleagues brought a message from her to Lai in their visit to Taiwan. Takaichi obviously is not a preferable counterpart for Xi.

Xi referred to the Murayama Statement as embodying a spirit of contrition that should be upheld. Takaichi expressed serious concerns over China’s escalation of maritime survey and military activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Island and in the South China Sea. She also criticized China’s oppression in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It was unusual for the leaders to discuss the domestic issues of their counterparts.

Although Takaichi hoped to make progress on some concerns, such as easing regulations on the import of sea products from Japan and taking greater safety measures for the Japanese in China, Xi did not offer any clear commitment. They at least agreed on maintaining an old bilateral diplomatic principle, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” a term originated in the first Abe administration.

Distance from Center Stage
In her first policy speech to the Diet on October 24, Takaichi invoked the Abe policy of a “Japanese diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.” The diplomatic week was the premiere of Takaichi’s role on that stage. It is a work in progress, as Takaichi insisted in her press conference at the end of the week that her diplomacy had just begun.

In one instance, on October 26, at the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Takaichi prompted collaboration between the Free and Open Asia Pacific (FOIP) and another framework, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The FOIP concept was invented by Abe in 2016. However, Takaichi’s proposed collaboration remains focused on traditional economic cooperation for building infrastructure. ASEAN still faces a choice between Japan and China as the country to cooperate with.

At another meeting, the APEC summit at Gyeongju on October 31, Takaichi proposed active investment to support innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology in order to enhance resilience in responding to natural disaster. In her policy speech to the Diet, Takaichi spoke of “investment for crisis management” and promised to make Japan “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” Nevertheless, there is no AI in Japan that is as prevalent in the world as ChatGPT or Copilot. So far, it is unclear how she will have Japan flourish on the world’s stage.

Monday Asia Events November 18, 2024

FUTURE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF DIVISION. 11/18, 2:00-4:00pm (JST) MIDNIGHT-2:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Forum on International Relations (N.B. Conservative Nationalist funded by Worldmate). Speakers Include: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kazutoshi Suzuki, Professor, Sophia University; Kristi Govella, Associate Professor, Oxford; Saori Tezuka, Associate Professor, Nanzan University. 

COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BY JOHNSTONE AND DENMARK. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (JST); Midnight-1:00am (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Managing Principal, The Asia Group; Abraham Denmark, Senior Advisor, The Asia Group. 

WILL CHINA’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES KEEP LISTENING OUTSIDE THE MAINLAND? 11/18, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Guiyang Laura Wu, Associate Professor in Economics, Nanyang Technological University Singapore; Wendy Liu, Managing Director, Global Market Strategy, J.P. Morgan Asia. 

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY FORUM. 11/18, 9:00am-7:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institue for Peace & Diplomacy. Speakers: Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chair, Gulf Research Center; Shira Efron, Senior Director, Policy Research, Israel Policy Forum; Daniel Mouton, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council; Jon Hoffman, Research Fellow, Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute; Randa Slim, Director, Conflict Resolution & Track II Dialogues, Middle East Institute; Nawaf Bin Mubarak Al-Thani, Former Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché of the State of Qatar to the United States of America, Canada, and Mexico; H.E. Stephan Klement, European Union Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Special Adviser on the Iran Nuclear Issue; Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Heidi Matthews, Assistant Professor, Osgoode School of Law, York University; Mai El-Sadany, Executive Director, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Jeremy Wildeman, Fellow, Human Rights Research & Education Centre, University of Ottawa; Arif Lalani, Former Canadian Ambassador to Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan & the United Arab Emirates; Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament; Jon Allen, Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel; Andrew Latham, Senior Washington Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Miloud Chennoufi, Chair, Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College.

ELECTIONS AFTERMATH: EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. 11/18, 9:00am-4:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Keio Institute of East Asia Studies; Columbia-Harvard China and the Wolrd Program; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, Columbia University. Speakers: Duy Linh Nguyen Tu, Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia University; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Director, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Yuichi Hosoya, Director, Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Junya Nishino, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Politics, Keio University; Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, Global Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates; Scott Snyder, President & CEO, Korea Economic Institute of America; Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Columbia University; Gerald Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Columbia University; Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Ambassador Masafumi Ishii, Special Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University; Ken Jimbo, Managing Director, International House of Japan; Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University​; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Dorothy Borg Associate Professor of the History of American-East Asian Relations, Columbia University; Ann Marie Murphy, Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University; Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University; Thomas Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University; Satoru Mori, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University; Ayumi Teraoka, Postdoctoral Research Scholar and Lecturer, Columbia University; George Miller, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs and Adjunct Professor, Columbia’s Journalism School; Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Merit Janow, Professor of Practice in International Economic Law and International Affairs, Columbia University. 

FOURTH ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL LAW & POLICY CONFERENCE. 11/18, 9:45am-5:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal. Speakers Include: Darius Sultani, Doctoral Researcher, Potsdam Institute, Climate Impact Research, Sequencing Carbon Dioxide Removal into the EU ETS; Ingrid Udd Sundvor, Co-Founder, Director, Carbon Balance Initiative; Danny Cullenward, Senior Fellow, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy; Senior Fellow, Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, American University. 

BOOK TALK: AI SNAKEOIL. 11/18, 10:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School, George Washington University. Speaker: author Sayashi Kapoor, Ph.D candidate, Princeton University and member of Times 100 most influential on AI.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Cp6Dry

THE RETURN OF DONALD TRUMP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/18, 10:00am-11:00am (EST),VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS). Speakers: Robert Sutter, Professor Practice of International Affairs, Elliot School, George Washington University; Zhuqun Zhu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Bucknell University; Nong Hong,, Senior Fellow, National Institue for China Sea Studies; Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow & Head, Trade 'n Technology Program, ICAS. 

PULSE CHECK ON TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE. 11/18, 10:30am-2:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University (GWU). Speakers: Dr. Chiaoning Su, Associate Professor, Communication, Journalism, Public Relations, Oakland University; Dr. Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, Associate Professor, Political Science, Sam Houston State University; Dr. Austin Horng-En Wang, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr. Li-Yin Liu, Associate Professor, Political Science, Tunghai University in Taiwan; June Lin, Senior Program Manager, Asia-Pacific Programs, National Democratic Institute (NDI); Dr. Kharis Templeman, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution. 

AMERICA’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA. 11/18, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University. Speakers: Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 

EVIDENCE BASE FOR POLICY: EXPLORING NEW DATA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECOLOGICAL THREATS AND CONFLICT. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (EST). HYBRID. . Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: David Bonnardeaux, Director, Environment and Energy, Pact; Michael Collins, Executive Director, Institute for Economics & Peace; Jade Cooper, Deputy Director of Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace; Tracy Hart, Lead Environmental Specialist, Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice, World Bank; Andrew Hyde, Director and Senior Fellow, Multilateral Financial Diplomacy, Powering Peace, Stimson Center; Cassandra Schneider, Senior Climate, Environment, and Conflict Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace; Natalie Fiertz, Research Associate, Environmental Security, Stimson Center (Moderator).

BOOK TALK: ON XI JINPING. 11/18, 3:30-5:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific. Speaker: Dr. Kevin Rudd, Ambassador to US, Australia. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4fnHwnt

PENSION FUNDS AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS. 11/18, 6:00-7:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Columbia Business School Center on Japanese Economy and Business. Speakers: Terezie Hesounova Trivell, Director, Private Markets, United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund; Suyi Kim, Ex-Senior Managing Director, Head, Private Equity, CPP Investments.