The LDP Presidential Campaign Begins

The LDP Enters the Policy Discussion Phase of its Presidential Election

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 22, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) kicked off its presidential election campaign on September 22. Five lawmakers officially submitted their candidacies to the party on the 22nd with only a 15 minute window to file. The deadline for entries has now passed. All five were losers in the last election a year ago.
 
Having lost the majority in both Houses of the Diet under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the presidential election should be about how to regain power through reforming the party. Yet the candidates are not talking much about reform.  They are instead focusing on their economic policies for households or maneuvers to attract support from the opposition parties.
 
One of the biggest reasons for the defeats in the 2024 Lower House election and the 2025 Upper House election was the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. It revealed LDP’s mismanagement of political funds without transparency. The opposition parties called for stricter regulation of donations from companies and organizations, which have been the financial lifeline for the LDP.  After receiving protests from LDP lawmakers, Ishiba did not reach a consensus with the opposition on the issue. Ishiba announced his resignation as the LDP president on September 7.
 
The LDP set the presidential election for October 4 and opened the starting gate for campaigns on September 22. Five people have entered the race. They are: former Minister on Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Minister on Economic Security Sanae Takaichi, and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Each has his or her own platform.
 
Kobayashi is running on three key issues. First, he supports a temporary income tax cut with a fixed rate. The tax cut would provide greater benefits to high-income taxpayers than to low-income ones. Kobayashi would offset the cut with surplus tax revenue in the current year. Second, reflecting his hawkish perspective, Kobayashi supports an increase in the defense budget to more than 2 percent of GDP. Finally, he advocates greater regulation of foreign intervention in communications in Japan.
 
Announcing his candidacy immediately after Ishiba’s announcement, Motegi promises that he will pursue economic growth policies that will increase the annual income of each worker by 10 percent within three years. While other candidates prioritize policy talks with the opposition parties, Motegi aims to assemble a coalition to secure a majority in the Diet.
 
Hayashi would continue the policies of the Ishiba administration in the hope of attracting the votes of Ishiba and his allies. Setting a target of one percent growth in real wages each year, Hayashi would establish a Japanese version of “universal credit,” a social security payment which the United Kingdom has introduced. In addition, to reform the party, he would create a digital platform for real-time communications with the public. He would also amend the party constitution.
 
In her campaign speech at the LDP headquarters, Takaichi emphasized her conservative agenda. This includes greater regulation of foreigners in Japan, limiting the line of succession to the imperial throne to male offspring in the male line, and amendments to Japan’s Constitution. Unusually, however, she would pursue economic policies that include positions held by the opposition parties. These include a refundable tax credit system, a gasoline tax cut, and an increase in the income threshold for tax liability.
 
Finally, Koizumi has actually distanced himself from his platform a year ago. Party “reform” is no longer at the center of his campaign. He has also withdrawn his support for a different surname system and the deregulation of worker dismissals. Instead, Koizumi promises a one-million-yen increase in the annual average wage by FY2030 and domestic investment up to 135 trillion yen. These economic policies were already part of the Ishiba administration’s agenda.
 
Remarkably, none of the five candidates has offered a plan that would settle the dispute over regulation of (or prohibitions on) donations from companies and organizations. The opposition parties have proposed new regulations on and even the abolition of this kind of fundraising. If the LDP insists on this traditional form of fundraising, the party will retain its negative image as an old-line party.
 
In the polls by news organizations, Takaichi has the greatest popularity among general voters. However, among LDP supporters, Koizumi has the greatest support, and only LDP members will vote in the election. There is no certainty that the party election results will be consistent with the popularity of the candidates among the public voters.
 
Five is the largest number of candidates in the history of LDP presidential elections except for the 2024 election, which had nine. Since a candidate can win only with a majority vote, it is almost certain that the election will go to a run-off. Negotiations over policies among the candidates may determine the winner; there is no way to predict which of the five will emerge victoriously.

LDP Rematch

Consolation Match for the Five LDP Presidency Candidates

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 15, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

A week after Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation, the campaign for the next president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began. It has turned into a race with five entrants – all of whom lost in the last election a year ago. The race is likely to be about which candidate can “change” the ailing party’s culture through political funding reform and can manage Diet affairs without a majority in either chamber.
 
Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, resigned last September, in the face of public criticism of the kickback fund scandal by some factions in the LDP. Ishiba succeeded Kishida in the expectation that he would reform a party that relied heavily on donations from companies and business organizations. Ishiba was caught in the middle of a party struggle over whether to ban those donations.
 
Ishiba had promised last December that he would have a legislative solution to reform political donations by the end of March, but he did not deliver. Instead, he continued to discuss reforms with the opposition parties, some of which demanded the total abolition of donations from companies and organizations.
 
In the Lower House election last October, the LDP lost its majority. Responsibility for the loss fell largely on Kishida since the election took place shortly after Ishiba assumed the PM position. Ishiba could not, however, avoid responsibility when the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House election last July. “I could not meet the expectation for change,” Ishiba said in his resignation press conference.
 

The LDP called a presidential election on October 4. Candidates must file entry forms on September 22, when the party will officially open the election. Five candidates are reportedly willing to run for the president.
 
Former Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi was the first to step forward. In his press conference to announce his candidacy, Motegi emphasized his economic policy that would increase take-home pay for many Japanese. This policy resonates with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). Motegi also mentioned the possibility of building a leading coalition with the DPP or the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) that would hold a majority in the Diet.
 
Motegi is running with the support of former colleagues in his now defunct faction, many of whom were leading the anti-Ishiba movement in the LDP after the Upper House election. He also met one-on-one with former prime minister Taro Aso, who openly opposed Ishiba. Polls have shown, however, that many Japanese did not believe that Ishiba should have resigned. This polling data may force Motegi to explain his differences with Ishiba. Motegi will have to develop a plan for party reform.
 
Other candidates try to catch up Motegi. Former Minister on Economic Security, Takayuki Kobayashi, announced his candidacy on September 16. As a candidate in the age of 50, representing young generation, Kobayashi upheld policies for young generation, including income tax cut. His team is headed by former Minister of Defense, Yasukazu Hamada, who is elected from Chiba, the same prefecture as Kobayashi.
 
Two ministers in Ishiba Cabinet showed apparent interest in the election on the same day. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi, revealed that he had told his candidacy to his supporters in his hometown, Yokosuka. Although official announcement will be later this week, it is surprising that Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead Koizumi’s team, instead of running for the president.
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi, also told his intention to run for the president in his regular press conference. As a core member of Ishiba Cabinet, Hayashi insisted on succeeding policies of Ishiba administration. Supporters for Hayashi consist of lawmakers with former Kishiba faction, supposedly with backing of Kishida himself. He is expected to have another press conference to publicize his policies.
 
Former Minister on Economic Security, Sanae Takaichi, is expected to officially announce her bid for the president later this week. She mainly receives supports from the conservative lawmakers who were frustrated with Ishiba administration. Reiterating a phrase of “rebuild backbone of the party,” Takaichi hopes to restore the cause of conservatives, which gained momentum in the time of former prime minister Shinzo Abe.
 
Takaichi and Koizumi currently dominate. In the election last November, Takaichi finished second and Koizumi third. Both enjoyed broad public support in and did not rely on a specific faction. Takaichi has a firm base of support among conservatives. Koizumi has the support of former premier Yoshihide Suga and younger party members.
 
But neither one is likely to win in the first round. To win in the first round, a candidate must garner at least 296 votes: a majority of all 590 votes: 295 for lawmakers and 295 for local party members. In any subsequent run-off election local party members have only 47 votes. The successful candidate must win at least 171 votes out of 342.
 
If the run-off pits Takaichi against Koizumi, conservative votes, including those who have supported Kobayashi, will go for Takaichi. Koizumi does not have a similar natural group of supporters. Instead, he must appeal to Ishida’s supporters. This is a tall order because Koizumi had urged Ishiba to step down. With this history, support from some of Ishiba’s allies may be hard to get. Koizumi does have the advantage of a close relationship with the leader of Ishin, Hirofumi Yoshimura. Takaichi expects cooperation from conservative parties, such as Sanseito.

Motegi and Hayashi both rely on the power of former factions. Motegi cannot count on support from Ishiba, and Hayashi expects Ishiba’s support since he was the deputy in the prime minister’s office. But the presidential election last year proved that factions, including the Aso faction, will not suffice as voting units. The LDP factions represented outmoded politics. 
 
The opposition parties have accused the LDP of creating a political vacancy in the election process. Encouraged by public opinion polls showing that the replacement of Ishiba will not raise the LDP’s credibility, the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, degraded this LDP presidential election as “a consolation match” of the previous election a year ago.

Ishiba Confronts Trumps Tariffs

Ishiba Builds His Team on Tariffs


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 14, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

After the FY2025 budget was approved on March 31, Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba turned to dealing with the Trump Administration tariffs. While Ishiba has been organizing his negotiating team, the opposition parties have separately been calling for policies to support businesses and households. Their policy demands are designed to garner public support for the coming Upper House elections.

Ryosei Akazawa, the Economic Revitalization Minister, was named the top negotiator. He arrives in Washington April 16 for three days of meetings with U.S. officials who include Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Akazawa’s mission is to have the Trump administration rethink its tariff policy. He will emphasize Japan’s role as the top foreign investor in the U.S.

Ishiba also launched a task force on U.S. tariff policy, co-headed by Akazawa and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, in the general headquarters on tariffs in the Ishiba Cabinet. “Under the leadership of Akazawa and Hayashi, we will construct an all-Japan organization in which the officers work on negotiation with the U.S. and measures for domestic industries beyond the border of ministries,” said Ishiba at the announcement of the task force.

Ishiba is concerned not only about trade and domestic industries but also about foreign exchange. Trump has been complaining about the devaluation of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar. As a founder of a hedge fund, Bessent is an expert in foreign exchange. It is likely that the exchange rate will be one of the talking points in the negotiations between Japan and the U.S. later this week. The Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead the currency negotiations. Kato plans to visit Washington for the annual spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank later in April. Although his schedule has not fixed, Kato hopes to have a meeting with Bessent during his visit.

National security is another topic. Trump reiterated that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is unfair because the U.S. pays hundreds of billions of dollars to defend Japan, but Japan does not pay anything. The Ishiba administration will explain that the Japanese government has provided extensive host nation support for the U.S. Forces in Japan. In anticipation of this discussion, Ishiba has included National Security Advisor, Masataka Okano, in the taskforce. Trump seems unaware of Japan’s constitution that prohibits engaging in non-defense war fighting.

Rice will also be a priority topic in the negotiations. “We feel like we could have more and better agricultural market access,” said Greer in pre-negotiation remarks. Because rice is the staple food in Japan, the government strictly controls the rice trade inside the country. The U.S. argues that Japan’s rice trade is not transparent and hard for foreign countries to access. Although the Japanese government is reluctant to open its rice market, the recent price hikes of rice in Japan may increase demand for foreign rice.

It is inevitable that Trump’s tariffs will have a negative impact on the Japanese economy. Beyond the “reciprocal” tariffs, the 25 percent tariffs on cars and other specific products are certain to reduce exports from Japan to the U.S. “The greatest concern is about financing of small and mid-size entrepreneurs,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda. All political parties in Japan share a common interest in supporting business sectors.

Meanwhile, the parties are fighting over how to help households: should there be a cash handout or a tax cut? On the one hand, cash handouts could be delivered soon after the Diet passes the supplemental budget, while tax cuts would be part of the perennial debate over tax reform. A decision on tax cuts could not be made until the end of this year. On the other hand, a tax cut is more helpful for the families than a cash handout since the cut would last for several years. A cash handout is a one-time event, which has limited and temporary effects.

The parties have different views. The Liberal Democratic Party is leaning toward a cash handout in the hope of immediate effects shortly before the elections. Its coalition partner, Komeito, is urging both a handout and a tax cut. The Democratic Party for the People is promoting reduction of the consumption tax rate from 10 percent to 5 percent. Reiwa Shinsengumi wants to abolish the consumption tax entirely. Noda is reluctant to cut the consumption tax, even though some members of his party support a tax cut.

All parties are motivated to deliver an economic stimulus plan in time for the Upper House election expected to be held in July. To do so, the Diet must pass a supplemental budget by the end of the current Diet session on June 22. Passing a budget bill is hard work for a minority government. Ishiba nevertheless plans to deliver an economic policy package, which may require a supplemental budget.

Who Does Washington Want To Be Japan's Prime Minister

Someone who speaks English? But probably doesn't understand it.

By Daniel Sneider,  Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University and APP member

First published in Toyo Keizai, September 12, 2024

As Liberal Democratic Party members struggle to pick the next Prime Minister of Japan, there is a vote that will not be counted but matters a lot – who does Washington want to be Japan’s next leader?

The most obvious answer to that question is that Washington doesn’t care. At the senior levels of government and policymakers, “they could care less,” a former senior government official who remains deeply engaged with Japan told Toyo Keizai. “At the expert level, there are preferences. But no one in Washington is talking about it all.”

One reason for this lack of interest is also obvious – Americans are deeply engaged with their own, highly contested election. But the unique nature of the Japanese party election makes it confusing, not least because of the very large field of candidates. And ultimately, Americans assume, perhaps wrongly, that the result of the election is not going to change Japan’s foreign and domestic policy.

Still, for American policymakers and experts, it matters who emerges as Japan’s next leader. What is most important for the United States is “who can be an effective leader that re-energizes the Japanese public, that delivers an economic agenda that is sustainable, that allows Japan to keep up its defense expenditures and encourages the Japanese economy to be a key hub in global supply chains,” says Mireya Solis of the Brookings Institution, one of the premier Japan experts in Washington.

“Folks in Washington are looking for somebody who will continue the Abe [Shinzo] alliance policies, expanding the alliance, and expanding what Japan can do within the alliance,” says Amb Joseph Donovan, Jr, a former senior State Department official with extensive experience in Japan.

Along with that, Americans are looking for “somebody who can work with the ROK (South Korea), and somebody who has strong domestic support, who can bring the LDP back together.”

That said, Donovan and others I spoke to offer a “huge caveat” – what might happen if leadership changes in the U.S.

If Democrat Kamala Harris prevails, she “will be looking for the strongest possible Japanese Prime Minister,” says the former senior official, who wished to remain anonymous. “Whereas Trump will be looking for which Prime Minister he can manipulate.”

Abe was able to “both impress the U.S. President and also stand up for Japan. It is really important that whoever meets with Trump is able to exude self-confidence as a global leader.”

Within that broad framework, Japan offers its own views on who might best fit those requirements.

How Washington sees the candidates

Leaving aside the question of the ability to project a reformist image that can rally voters back to the scandal-tarnished conservative ruling party, American policymakers tend to favor the most experienced figures in the LDP, particularly those who have long interacted with Washington.

“Everyone in Washington DC would be thrilled if it were Hayashi [Yoshimasa],” said Tobias Harris, the biographer of Abe and author of the widely read “Observing Japan” newsletter.

“Obviously, he has lots of friends here. He worked on the Hill (Congress). He is the continuity candidate. If you like what the Kishida government has been doing, then Hayashi is your guy.”

Washington knows the other candidates well: former Foreign Minister and current LDP Secretary General Motegi Toshimitsu, the current Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko, and former Foreign and Defense Minister Kono Taro. The former senior government official offered this frank, off-the-record assessment of the three, based in part on personal contact.

Motegi’s experience with Washington comes mainly in the trade area, as the negotiator of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and dealing with the Trump administration.

“He is smart, effective, a little bit aggressive – not a typical Japanese, but Americans can deal with that,” says the former official. “He is abrasive, but that doesn’t matter in international affairs.”

As for Kamikawa, “she is the opposite. It's so nice, vanilla-flavored. Washington would think she is chosen because of her gender and being fluent in English.”

Kono is also a potential Prime Minister with long experience in Washington, someone fluent in English, “spends a lot of time with Americans and knows the U.S. reasonably well,” the former official says.

But there are concerns about Kono, particularly in the Pentagon but also the State Department, mainly arising out of his time as Defense Minister and the abrupt cancellation of the Aegis Onshore missile defense program, which shocked Washington. “Kono thinks Americans like him, but that is not true.”

As things stand now, however, none of the ‘experienced’ candidates seem likely to make the final two. That leaves a set of candidates who are not at the top of American lists—former Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru, former Economic Security Minister Kobayashi Takayuki, Koizumi Shinjiro, and current Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae.

None of these possible leaders is considered a serious problem for alliance relations—except for rightwing stalwart Takaichi, who has positioned herself as the ideological heir to Abe’s more nationalist agenda.

“Takaichi would make everyone nervous,” says Harris. Her provocative stance on wartime history issues, including plans to make official visits to the Yasukuni shrine to Japan’s war dead, “would upset the apple cart on trilateral ties with the Koreans.” Those worries extend to Koizumi and Kobayashi, who might also visit Yasukuni and sour relations with Korea.

Takaichi appeals to more hawkish elements in Washington, particularly among Trump backers, who see her as more willing to militarily confront China. “She is going to want the same things that some people in Washington want, and they will find a way to work with her,” says Harris.

That view does not extend to other experienced Japan hands in Washington. “It is hard to be too hawkish in Washington these days, but she might be too hawkish for the Washington crowd, at least among Japan hands,” predicted the former senior official.

Ishiba is perhaps the most intriguing and potentially difficult leader for Japan among Americans. Although he garners considerable attention in Japan, he is not that well known in the U.S. He has some support in the Pentagon from his experience as Defense Minister and his interest in weapons development. But he has a reputation as a Japanese Gaullist, someone willing to forge a more independent path for Japan.

“Ishiba is sincere,” comments Harris. “He says what he thinks, and he comes from this tradition that is not going to do what the U.S. wants if it is not in Japan’s interests.”

Harris compares him to Kono, noting that both men have been critical of the protectionist decision to bar Nippon Steel’s purchase of U.S. Steel. Both men represent “a Japan that can say no, maybe politely, but still say no.”

Ishiba reflects more openly a widely held worry in Japan about U.S. reliability, particularly under a second Trump administration. “He and Trump together talking about burden sharing would be an interesting conversation,” says the former senior official. “He will give as good as he gets.”

The other candidate coming out of the former Abe faction, Kobayashi, is garnering more interest in Washington where some think he could emerge as the second-place candidate. Compared to Takaichi, he is viewed more favorably.

Kobayashi is “very bright, a good communicator, with U.S. experience,” says the former official.

“He is young, interesting, probably someone the U.S. could work with, but who is really going to make decisions if he is Prime Minister.” His interest in economic security is much appreciated by Washington policymakers.

The Koizumi question

That brings us to the last viable option and the current front-runner in opinion polls – Koizumi Shinjiro, the son of the former Prime Minister. He is clearly popular and offers the best chance to restore the damaged image of the LDP.

He has had little to say on foreign policy, focusing almost entirely on internal issues of political reform and encouraging entrepreneurial-led growth.

Koizumi is well-known in American policy circles. His graduate education at Columbia University was followed by an invaluable internship at the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, working closely with veteran Japan alliance manager Michael Green. But there are questions about both his lack of experience and his policy views.

“He doesn’t get deep on policy very often,” the former official told Toyo Keizai. “People here would think they have chosen someone attractive to voters, but let’s see if he can handle the job.”

Nonetheless, in a second-round contest between Koizumi and either Ishiba or Takaichi, the Washington experts would tend to favor the young politician.

They assume he would have the backing of the LDP’s heavyweight kingmakers like Aso Taro and Suga Yoshihide and would represent a unified party.

For American Japan hands, the bottom line is to have a leader that can continue to project a more assertive role in global affairs.

“If you have a leader that is not strong, that could mean Japan is not going to be as proactive as it has been in the past,” says Brookings’ Solis, author of an important new book on Japan’s leadership role.

Japan has become a key voice in opposition to the deepening of economic nationalism that is “flourishing in the U.S.” and the growth of xenophobic populism. The possibility of a return to isolationism under Trump underlines the importance of Japanese leadership, she says.

None of the possible candidates for LDP leadership would be as disruptive as the experience with the brief period of Democratic Party of Japan rule.

“It is more a question of what kind of Prime Minister is more adept at taking the reins of government in Japan, of providing good economic management assuring that the LDP can get through its agenda.

“If you see a weakening of that control power that we got used to, that brought a more decisive Japan, that would be a challenge.”

Kishida Administration Grilled by Opposition Parties

CCS Hayashi

And it is inconclusive

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 10, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

In the Japanese Diet, the Budget Committees of both Houses are where the hottest political issues are discussed between lawmakers and government officials. Last week, starting on February 5, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was grilled by members of the Lower House Budget Committee over his handling of political reform within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and his appointment of cabinet ministers connected to the controversial Unification Church. Kishida’s strategy is to give the opposition parties vague and inconclusive answers.

The Budget Committee hearings are the highlight of the Diet session every year and are ordinarily scheduled a week after the Q&A in the plenary session after the Prime Minister’s annual policy speech. While the Q&A in the plenary session is in the form of prepared questions and answers, a Budget Committee hearing is an unscripted debate within the time allocated to every party. The hearing is nominally about the budget bill submitted to the Diet, but the opposition parties ask about everything, because the budget bill deals with everything.

In the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives (Lower House), the opposition parties demanded to know the purpose of contributions by the LDP to its leaders. It was reported that former Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai had received ¥5 billion from that fund over five years. While LDP is continuing to investigate the failures to disclose cash distributions from each LDP faction to its members, the party’s own fund, which covers “policy activities expenses,” has been untouched by the slush fund scandal because this fund is not subject to disclosure requirements.

Kishida asserted a principle of “freedom of political activity” to defend the secrecy of the LDP’s expenses. “Freedom of political activity and people’s right to know should be balanced,” Kishida told the Secretary General for the Constitutional Democratic Party, Katsuya Okada. “Once the fund was disclosed,” Kishida argued, “it reveals business secrets of companies or organizations, and strategic plan of party will be leaked to the rivals in politics, or even to foreign countries.”

It is hard to understand why Kishida so strongly opposes disclosures about the LDP fund. The opposition parties are skeptical about the money, supposing that it must be used for things they cannot explain. It is not strange for people to imagine that the money must have ultimately been handed to local supporters, just as in the bribery cases of Katsuyuki Kawai in Hiroshima or Mito Kakizawa in Tokyo.

The opposition parties even referred to a possibility of tax evasion. Yuichi Goto (CDP) insisted that the leaders who received funds from the LDP may well have evaded income taxes, if they took unused funds and failed to report them on tax returns. A witness from Ministry of Finance testified that the receipt of surplus cash from the LDP may be a taxable event. Kishida reiterated that he would not explain the use of the fund.

Opposition party attacks on Kishida’s leadership have not been limited to reforms in response to the slush fund scandal and have spread to his appointments of ministers of his administration. Asahi Shimbun reported that the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Masahito Moriyama, had received the support of the Federation for World Peace (FWP), an organization connected to Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU, better known as the Unification Church), in the 2021 election. In October 2023, Moriyama’s ministry sought a court order to disband the FFWPU.

According to a series of reports by the Asahi, Moriyama accepted support from FWP for his election campaign, including a telephone bank staffed by FWP members, urging voters to vote. The newspaper also reported that Moriyama had signed a policy accord with FWP before his appointment. The accord included an agreement to support legislation to amend the constitution to enhance security as well as legislation to teach family values and to give children a moral education. He was also asked to caution voters against promoting LGBTQ rights and same sex marriage.

Moriyama’s ministry oversees religious corporations. Once entering into a policy accord with the FWP, Moriyama became responsible for implementing these policies even after he became minister. Obviously, the ministry’s neutrality on these policies was compromised.

In the hearing before the Lower House Budget Committee, Moriyama vaguely recalled that he had received some support from FWP. The next day, however, he refused to provide clear answers about the nature of his relationship with the FWP, repeating “I have no memory of it.” Kishida rejecting a request to replace Moriyama, said that Moriyama had terminated his relationship with FWP.

When the fact of a meeting with a person connected to FFWPU in 2019 was revealed last December Kishida said that he did not know who was in the meeting. The memory of Kishida also has a certain ambiguity.

Questions surrounding that meeting involve not only Moriyama but also another minister closer to Kishida. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi, admitted to having a meeting with FWP officials before the 2021 election. In his daily press conference, Hayashi said that he was not sure about who was there in the 2019 meeting and what they talked about. The Harvard grad also has memory issues.

Watching Kishida’s mounting troubles, some LDP leaders have begun to act. Former Minister of Defense and former LDP Secretary General, Shigeru Ishiba, held a meeting with his colleagues, which he maintains as policy study group. The minister in charge of Economic Security, Sanae Takaichi, gave a lecture to a conservative group.

The activities of these quasi-factions in the LDP began only one week after the largest group, the Abe faction, and some other factions announced their dissolution. These are inconvenient facts for Kishida who will base his leadership on ending factions and promoting political reform in the LDP when he seeks reelection as LDP president this fall. More questions will be coming from the Upper House Budget Committee in its hearing with the Prime Minister in March.

The Kishida Administration’s Second Anniversary:

Few Accomplishments Lots of Politics

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, retired Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 9, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

Two years have passed since Fumio Kishida became Prime Minister on October 4, 2021. During this time, no outstanding achievements can be seen except for adherence to the political agenda set by former administrations: namely, expanding the security budget and discharging radioactive Fukushima processed water into the sea. Unsurprisingly, public support for the Kishida Cabinet is low and declining. As seen in the recent reshuffling of his Cabinet and the appointment of new leaders of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kishida is still struggling to maintain his administration.

Kishida faced two historical challenges last year: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Kishida boldly and directly accused Russia of “aggression.” This response might have been milder and more diplomatic if Abe were still in office.

Kishida’s hardline policy toward Russia hurt future negotiations with Russia. But it may have been worth the price. Kishida’s leadership at the Group of Seven (G7) summit meeting in Hiroshima this past May, in which the world leaders stood together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy against Russia, increased his popularity in the polls.

Kishida was tested as a national leader when Abe was shot to death last summer. Kishida was unable to generate a broad discussion in the Diet about whether the administration would decide to have a national funeral for Abe. As a result, Kishida only considered the emotions of conservative groups in the LDP. Once it became clear that the shooter’s motivation was a grievance against the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Kishida was slow in disclosing the relationship between the religious organization and LDP.

Polls show that the support for the Kishida administration, which rose gradually at the beginning, declined steeply after the assassination of Abe. This volatility has continued. Public support lifted again in the first half of this year when Kishida was the chairman of the G7, but it fell again with public frustration with the implementation of the My Number identification card and with money scandals of LDP lawmakers.

A litmus test for a political leader is how it handles controversial issues. Kishida renewed the three major documents for defense last December, enabling the Self-Defense Force to have a capability of attacking enemy bases. While it has a possibility of violating the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy the constitution requires, Kishida avoided discussing the constitutionality of the capability in the Diet. Kishida administration decided to expand defense budget to ¥43 trillion in next five years. But he has not explained how to accumulate the budget to that level. Taxpayers are worried about additional tax increase, dubbing Kishida “the tax raiser wearing glasses.” Anyway, those defense policies are in the agenda that Kishida inherited from Abe administration.

The list of administration scandals has swollen. Some Ministers of Kishida Cabinet stepped down last year because of complex relationships with FFWPU, gaffes, or money scandals. The most recent revelation was of an inappropriate relationship between a LDP lawmaker and a businessman involved in wind power generation. Kishida did not exercise leadership to improve ethical aspect of political activities of his colleagues.

Because the Kishida administration lacks clear policy goals, public support has remained low. At the beginning of his administration, Kishida insisted on reviving his faction of the LDP, the Kochi-kai. His predecessor, Abe, led a different faction, the Seiwa-kai, which stood for strong leadership and invited controversy on its hawkish stance. By contrast, Kishida’s Kochi-kai faction focuses more on the economy than security. Kishida has proposed some policies, such as doubling people’s income or “the garden city concept,” which traced the projects of former Kochi-kai leaders such as Hayato Ikeda and Masayoshi Ohira. These policies have not, however, worked out well in Kishida administration.

Such modest policies were not the high-profile goals of the second Abe administration that began in December 2012. Soon after he took the office, Abe announced the “three arrows” of Abenomics: bold monetary policy, mobilization of fiscal policy and growth strategy. He appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as Governor of Bank of Japan, who continuously issued surprising monetary easing policies. Abe also did not hide his intention to amend the constitution, particularly to allow amendments on the basis of a simple majority rather than the two-thirds supermajority required in Article 96.

Kishida is more interested in the ordinary life of the people rather than in state management. Wage hikes or increases in the birth rate are less economic policy and more moderate conservative social policy. But those policies do not hold strong appeal because they take a long time to show results. For example, the government’s increased support for young couples will not raise the birth rate anytime soon.

In an administration with low popularity, political manipulations take center stage. Removing Yoshimasa Hayashi as Foreign Minister in the recent Cabinet reshuffle was a tactic by Kishida to help his reelection next year as LDP president. Hayashi’s main job now is to enhance solidarity within the Kochi-kai and establish firm support within the LDP for Kishida’s reelection.

The good news for Kishida is the unpopularity of the opposition parties. No party other than the LDP has more than ten percent support in the opinion polls. Even though Kishida is unpopular, the opposition parties will not be able to achieve victory in next general election. The upcoming by-elections on October 22 in the Tokushima-Kochi District for the House of Councillors and in the Nagasaki 4th for the House of Representatives will be a good gauge of the public’s approval of Kishida’s policies. The results promise to influence the prime minister’s decision on whether to hold a much-discussed snap election.