Japan and South Korea Grow Closer

The Trump effect on Japan–South Korea relations

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 12, 2026 at the East Asian Forum.

The August 2023 Japan–South Korea–US trilateral summit at Camp David provided powerful impetus for Tokyo and Seoul to restore warm ties, an undertaking initiated by former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol.

The momentum in Japan–South Korea relations has continued, surviving changes in leadership in all three countries. Even the potentially disastrous pairing of a conservative nationalist government in Tokyo and a progressive administration in Seoul has not slowed the pace of the bilateral partnership’s deepening.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung sit at two ends of the political spectrum, but their May 2026 meeting in Lee’s hometown of Andong on 18-19 May, was marked by a spirit of warmth. Even Lee’s critics, who feared that his long-held harsh views on the legacy of Japanese colonial rule would reverse progress, were pleased.

Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo was ‘quite impressed with how [Lee] handled South Korea–Japan relations after taking office’, noting that the meeting in Andong ‘went very well’ — a view shared by senior South Korean officials in off-the-record discussions.

This success can be credited to Japan and Korea’s shared challenges of hedging against both China and an unpredictable United States, with US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and military interventions sending shocks across both economies. Lee’s decision to avoid past sources of contention like wartime history issues with Japan can be read as a calculated effort to use closer ties with Tokyo to insulate South Korea from growing chaos in an unpredictable security environment.

The most powerful factor in this is the prospect of US withdrawal from global leadership under Trump 2.0. Another South Korean senior official noted off the record that South Korea and Japan have ‘shared anxieties about Washington’ and that ‘it is not about China’.

Senior South Korean officials are discussing the need for closer security ties with Japan in response to US retreat, including potentially finessing the territorial disputes by signing a non-aggression pact and moving towards a mutual defence treaty. While this would go beyond what most South Koreans would tolerate — and much less in Japan — its mere consideration is a remarkable sign of the impact of Trump-driven uncertainty.

This tightening is taking place without active US involvement at the highest level. While trilateral meetings are still being held among senior officials and statements are being issued with common views on regional and global security issues like North Korea, this is the product of institutional inertia created by former US president Joe Biden’s administration. There is no evidence of a connection between those official pronouncements and the White House and Trump has never expressed any interest in trilateral cooperation, nor is he eager to follow in Biden’s footsteps.

Despite the factors impelling closer ties, there are serious concerns in Seoul and Tokyo that the rhetoric of bilateral partnership has not been sufficiently reflected in concrete actions.

The most cited example of this is the potential admittance of South Korea to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which could forge closer trade and investment alliances and counter US mercantilism. While Seoul has expressed its interest in joining, it has yet to formally apply. Domestic politics remain a constraint, reflected in the ongoing restrictions on the purchase of Japanese seafood due to the Fukushima nuclear accident and its aftermath.

A similar dynamic is visible in the arena of defence cooperation. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro visited Seoul in June 2026 and reaffirmed tightening defence ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. But he was unable to get Seoul to sign off on a long-sought military logistics pact which would institutionalise joint operations. Lee told reporters earlier in June that public sentiment on history issues were the obstacle to signing what would otherwise be a logical agreement.

Beyond immediate issues, two policy areas — China and North Korea — could also drive the neighbours apart.

Lee has been careful to maintain good ties with Beijing, both in the economic realm and in potentially seeking China’s help in dealing with North Korea. The divergence between Lee’s policy towards China and the hostile state of Japan–China relations was noted at the Andong meeting.

Both governments share a commitment to the eventual denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. But Lee seems ready to back a possible Trump summit with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un which could offer de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Japan has always been fearful that this outcome could lead to a separation of the Korean peninsula from US extended deterrence commitments and leave Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The relationship also remains marred by the lingering issues of wartime history and justice that have been carefully put aside but not resolved. Compensation cases against Japanese companies for wartime workers in Japanese mines and factories continue to make their way through South Korean courts. Takaichi has carefully avoided doing anything to inflame Seoul, but it would only take a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine — something she did regularly for several decades — to relight the fires of South Korean patriotism.

For now, the path to improved ties looks open, thanks in large part to Trump and to a lesser extent to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the question of how long it will remain so is far less certain.

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

China Strategy Isolates Japan

 Takaichi Goes It Alone at the G7

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 21, 2026
 
At this month’s annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit Meeting in Evian-les-Bains, France, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made it clear that she had a quite different concern on international issues than the other leaders did. The summit is traditionally a forum to reconfirm unity of the group to lead the world. Such was the case this year when the group reviewed progress to end the war in Iran. Takaichi, however, emphasized the vulnerability of industrial supply chains and competition with China’s trade strategy. Her tack gained no enthusiastic supporters among the G7 as an explicit supply chain policy would strain rather than ease international tensions.
 
It was obvious at the outset that the Iran war would dominate the discussions. Just before the leaders’ meeting began, the United States and Iran reached an apparent 60-day ceasefire (although not nearly a permanent solution). The memorandum of understanding (MOU) obligates Iran to use its best efforts to ensure safe passage of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days. (In fact, Iran has now closed the Strait.) To Iran’s benefit, the MOU also includes – again for a 60-day period – termination of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, plans (but no financial commitments) for a $300 billion reconstruction program, waivers of U.S. sanctions crude oil exports from Iran, and the return of frozen assets to Iran.
 
On the nuclear issue, Iran “reaffirmed” that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons; that is, Iran confirmed an earlier commitment. Iran and the U.S. also committed to develop a mechanism to dispose of Iran’s “stockpiled enriched material,” which could mean on-site down-blending, but the MOU does not rule out other disposition methods such as removal. The MOU allows – for the 60 days it is in effect – Iran to maintain its nuclear program and without any new sanctions from the U.S. The MOU does not mention missiles. By many accounts, the MOU considered a victory for Iran.
 
The G7 countries welcomed the deal as an attempt to normalize international relations and the oil trade. A leaders’ statement stressed that the deal was “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump,” noting efforts by France and the United Kingdom to resume maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The G7 chairman, French President Emmanuel Macron, described the summit as “a moment of unity, of quality discussion, and of genuine cooperation of the leaders.”
 
Upon receiving the news of the U.S.-Iran agreement, Takaichi welcomed it as a major step toward settling the situation in the Middle East. She emphasized the importance of implementing the agreement. But she did not offer any commitment by Japan to the reconstruction of Iran, including mine-sweeping in the strait. “Nothing has been determined for dispatching the Self-Defense Force,” Takaichi stated in a press conference. As readers know, the Constitution of Japan strictly limits sending troops to a battlefield.
 
On the sidelines of the summit, Takaichi had a five-minute conversation with Trump. In his press conference afterward, Trump limited his warmth to Japan by characterizing Takaichi as his “biggest fan.” Otherwise, Trump said, “I’ll be honest, Japan was not willing to get involved during the war.” There was no report that Takaichi affirmed her compliment of Trump in her visit to the White House in March, which was that “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world.”
 
Instead, Takaichi tried to pursue Japan’s interest by connecting the war in Iran with pressure on China. She put economic security at the center of Japan’s views in the G7 rather than joining with the other members in focusing on ending the war in Iran or post-war reconstruction. Although she proposed building a system of oil reserves for developing countries, Takaichi’s clear goal was to gain support for stockpiling critical minerals and lessening dependence on China. The G7 issued a declaration on supply chains for critical minerals, but it went only as far as to say that the group “will work together with partners to reduce critical dependencies and ensure that attempts or threats to weaponize economic dependencies fail.”
 
China immediately responded to that statement. “It’s leader’s latest G7 remarks on China were particularly obtrusive, exposing that its attempt to rally allies and stir up confrontation wins no support and is bound to fail,” said China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian. Lin said that Takaichi’s posture against China was a “glaring self-contradiction” and an instance of “Japan’s hypocrisy.” Despite her stated willingness to talk, Takaichi has made no serious effort to resume bilateral leaders’ talks and normalize economic relationship with China. Takaichi’s G7 diplomacy seems to have only exacerbated tensions with China.
 
It has not helped Takaichi that other G7 countries, suffering from Trump’s tariff policies, have approached China about trade deals that might restore their economic performance to the pre-U.S. tariff levels (or beyond). Macron visited China last December, calling for efforts to promote multinationalism with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing last January and agreed with Xi on advancing a strategic partnership between the two countries. Carney described relations with China as “more predictable” than those with the Trump administration.
 
Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Xi in Beijing also in January. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China in February. And Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to China in July 2024.
 
Even worse, from Takaichi’s perspective, Trump himself visited China in May, agreeing with Xi on building a relationship of strategic stability between the two countries. Takaichi is the only G7 leader who has not made a visit to China. All that she has been able to do was to visit the White House before Trump visited China. Japan finds itself uniquely isolated in its adversarial China policy. It is time for Takaichi to emulate her G7 colleagues and improve bilateral relations with China.

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

The Future of Japan's Constitution

articles on Constitution

The Leading Coalition Accelerates a Constitutional Amendment

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 1, 2026

The leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) has accelerated its effort to amend the Constitution of Japan to deal with emergencies. The two parties claim that the discussion of proposed amendments is nearly wrapped up. However, some opposition parties expect further discussion. Even LDP lawmakers are divided over whether the Lower House or the Upper House should be the primary forum for debate. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi encourages the discussion, presenting herself as a brave leader grappling with a divisive issue – but with no clear hope of success.
 
An amendment to address emergencies that prevent the Diet from acting have taken at least two forms. One was a rough draft of an amendment that the Lower House Legislation Bureau submitted to the Commission on the Constitution of the House on May 14. The draft primarily would add a clause to the constitution that would, in the event of certain emergencies, allow Diet members to remain in office even after their terms expire. The amendment recognizes four categories of emergency: a major natural disaster, a major spread of infectious disease, social disorder by civil war and an armed attack of foreigners.
 
According to the draft, each of these emergencies can create an “election difficulty situation”: a time in which a national election cannot be held in broad geographic areas for a certain long period. Members of the Lower House have four-year terms, and six years are given to those elected to the Upper House. The draft of the amendment states that these terms will be extended in emergency. An election difficulty situation will be declared in advance by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet.
 
A second type of response to an emergency is also in the draft. It includes a controversial provision to authorize the Cabinet to issue an “emergency ordinance.” “In a special occasion in which it cannot afford to wait for legislation by the Diet,” the draft says, “the Cabinet can enact an emergency ordinance which is equivalent to a law.” Although the draft requires approval of the Diet after the ordinance is declared, there is no time limit on Diet action and thus no time limit on an emergency ordinance.
 
A member of the Lower House commission who represents the LDP, Yoshitaka Shindo, commented to the press that most parties agreed on the extension of terms of lawmakers in emergency and that issue can be said to be “pinned down.” Another commission member from the JIP, Nobuyuki Baba, said that all the talking points on the amendment have now been proposed and discussed. The two parties in the leading coalition hope to proceed to the next step of drafting a provision to initiate an amendment.
 
Opposition parties do not want to rush the process. The Centrist Reform Alliance disagreed with Baba’s notion that the discussion was over and that new measures were necessary to maintain the ordinary functions of the Diet in an emergency. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan already provides that the Cabinet can convoke an emergency session of the Upper House in a national emergency. The opposition parties believe that this existing power to gather the Upper House in an emergency session will ensure that the Diet will function even if the Lower House is empty.
 
Opposition parties are further skeptical about introducing the emergency ordinance. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, argued that the proposal for an emergency ordinance power was dropped in an agreement of five parties, including the LDP and the JIP, in 2024. Moreover, a situation in which the Diet would not work at all was unimaginable if lawmakers’ terms could be extended. The Japan Communist Party has pointed out that there was an imperial emergency ordinance in pre-war Japan that was issued in Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. That power confirmed that the emperor had the highest state power.
 
This concept of imperial authority ended after World War II. Article 41 of the constitution states that the Diet is “the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” If the Cabinet obtains the power to issue ordinances that are equal to a statute passed by the Diet, the relationship between the legislative and executive branch under the constitution will fundamentally be changed. The introduction of the executive branch’s power to declare an emergency ordinance would erode the status of the Diet as the supreme organ of state power.
 
An unignorable fact in the discussion over the constitutional amendment is that the leading coalition does not have even a simple majority in the Upper House. A super majority – a two-thirds vote – in each House of the Diet is necessary for a constitutional amendment to move forward. While the LDP and the JIP have that majority in the Lower House after the LDP’s sweeping victory in the February elections, they do not have even a simple majority in the Upper House.
 
The Upper House is focused on an entirely different constitutional issue. In the meeting of the Upper House Commission on the Constitution on May 20, the main topic of discussion was not the emergency clause but the election system. In Upper House elections, each prefecture has had its own seats. But with the decline of eligible voters, the districts of Tottori and Shimane were integrated into a single district, just as the Tokushima and Kochi were combined, for the 2016 election and thereafter. Members of the Upper House from both sides of the aisle have urged the elimination of such integrated districts
 
The LDP accordingly has proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish integrated prefectural districts. However, the top opposition party in the Upper House, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), does not believe that an amendment is necessary; rather, the Diet can achieve this end simply by amending the election laws. Komeito, as a partner of the CDPJ in the Lower House, supports this view.
 
The LDP and JIP have different priorities regarding a constitutional amendment. The JIP is focused on an emergency clause that would enhance executive power in a time of crisis. The LDP is going in a different direction, prioritizing electoral system reform in the Upper House. The LDP thinks it will be easier to reach a consensus there on election reforms than on the emergency clause amendment. 
 
As a lawmaker in the conservative bloc, PM Takaichi has presented herself as a firm proponent of the theory of constitutional amendments. “The constitution should occasionally be updated to meet contemporary demands,” said Takaichi to a recent meeting of supporters for constitutional amendment. She did not, however, provide any details on which provisions should be amended adding uncertainty to how the debate should proceed.

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Can the Food Consumption Tax be eliminated?

Takaichi Faces the Food Consumption Tax Problem

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 4, 2026
 
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is having difficulty living up to her campaign commitment to eliminate the consumption tax on food for two years. Takaichi plans to introduce a tax cut bill by the end of fiscal year 2026, that is, by the end of March 2027, but the sales registration system cannot be adjusted to reflect the elimination within that timeframe. The leading parties are discussing a one percent tax rate, which the system can manage, but which is different from what Takaichi committed to in February’s Lower House election.
 
When Takaichi decided this past January to have a Lower House snap election in February to strengthen her political base in the Diet, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) included this policy in its campaign platform. The LDP said that “we accelerate considering the exclusion of food from the consumption tax for two years.” It was a countermeasure to the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposal to permanently eliminate the consumption tax on food.
 
After the party achieved a sweeping victory in the election, Takaichi explained that she would accelerate discussion on a zero-percent consumption tax on food for two years as a temporary measure until a refundable tax credit bill was introduced. The food consumption tax cut and the refundable tax credit are intended to support low-income families.
 
To implement these policies, Takaichi launched the National Conference on Social Security in late February, which includes members of some opposition parties. During a series of meetings, the Conference realized that elimination of the consumption tax has a technical problem. Major software engineering companies testified in April before the Conference that it would take nine to twelve months to adjust retailers’ sales registration systems to include elimination of the consumption tax on food. The system could not readily include zero-percent taxation. This timeframe would not meet Takaichi’s deadline.
 
The engineers assured the Conference, however, that they could modify the system within three months if the adjustment were to one percent rather than zero percent. Reducing tax rate from the current eight percent to one percent eases the tax rate by a substantial amount. The chairman of the conference and the chief of the LDP Research Commission on Tax System, Itsunori Onodera, reportedly said “That’s a good idea.” So, the one percent consumption tax on food suddenly appeared on the table.
 
The size of the cut notwithstanding, one percent, is totally different to the public from zero percent. Citizens have already taken account of a zero percent tax. Indeed, they believe it to be one of Takaichi’s core promises to the voters in the February Lower House election. If she fails to implement it, the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating will fall; indeed, this consequence is already showing up in current polls.
 
The consumption tax cut has other problems besides the registration system. Restaurants will be adversely affected because consumers will prefer buying untaxed food in supermarkets to more expensive restaurant dinners. Local governments will lose revenue since the national government now sends 40 percent of the consumption tax proceeds to them. 
 
Despite these hurdles, Takaichi still plans on zero percent. She envisages a schedule in which the national Conference concludes its work in early summer, the cabinet submits tax elimination bills in the Diet’s fall session, and the Diet passes the bills by the end of 2026. The two-year hiatus of the food tax rate would take effect at the end of the fiscal year next March.
 
Takaichi’s ideas on the consumption tax cut have occasionally changed. In May 2005, two months before the Upper House election, Takaichi told her disappointment on negative stance on consumption tax cut by then prime minister Shigeru Ishiba. She proposed no consumption tax on foods. Then, when she ran for the LDP presidency last September, she became reluctant to push for the elimination. Her reluctance was based on her view that, given current price inflation, elimination of the tax would not be an efficient way to fight inflation. Moreover, she already understood the considerable length of time that would be required to change the retailers’ sales registration system. Observers believe that she opposed a total elimination to garner the support of an LDP heavyweight, Taro Aso, who also opposed a tax cut. She at least acknowledged the practical difficulties of a consumption tax cut at this time.
 
But Takaichi then confirmed her original position in January 2026 when she called the dissolution of the Lower House. She began to say that a consumption tax cut had been her long-cherished wish. But the remarkable fact is that Takaichi has never explicitly said that she has decided to introduce zero percent consumption tax on food. She has only said that she would accelerate consideration of a full if temporary elimination.
 
The consumption tax issue has destroyed some previous administrations. The LDP lost in the 1979 Lower House election when prime minister Masayoshi Ohira considered introducing a major indirect tax, including a food consumption tax. The defeat ignited a sharp division in the LDP, and Ohira died of fatigue the following year.
 
It was former prime minister Noboru Takeshita who introduced a consumption tax for the first time at three percent. But it became one of the reasons that the approval rating for him fell into the single digits. A later prime minister who decided the consumption tax rate from five percent to ten was not Shinzo Abe but Yoshihiko Noda in 2012. Noda led a three-party consensus of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the LDP, and Komeito to push for an integrated reform of social security and taxes in 2012, but his DPJ lost its government in the Lower House election later that year.
 
The consumption tax has been introduced as a fiscal resource to support senior citizens as Japan becomes an increasingly aging society. However, the Japanese people have been complaining about the tax on their daily consumption. The function of the tax and the popular desire to eliminate it are incompatible. Like other prime ministers, Takaichi is now facing this political tension.

Japanese Wagyu in the American Market

Japan’s Wagyu Quest and the Case for Reciprocal Beef Trade

by Phil Seng, Affiliate Professor in the Department of Animal Sciences at Colorado State University, Past President & CEO of the U.S. Meat Export Federation, and Past President of the International Meat Secretariat, and APP Member.

First Published March 10, 2026 on Meatingplace. PDF version here.

N.B.: This issue was not discussed at the Summit.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi and President Donald Trump will meet on March 19, where both leaders are expected to reaffirm their commitment to fair and reciprocal trade. For decades, U.S. presidents urged Japan to open its tightly restricted beef market, which once symbolized the closed nature of the Japanese economy.

Today, the roles are reversed. Prime Minister Takaichi should urge the United States to remove restrictions that limit Japanese Wagyu beef exports to the American market. Japan now finds itself in the unusual position of having a bilateral trade agreement with the United States — yet still faces a trade-distorting tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports, including the 26.4% out-of-quota tariff currently applied once the quota is triggered.

Implemented in 2020 through executive authority rather than a comprehensive congressional free trade agreement, the current U.S.–Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA) delivered important tariff reductions, but it did not resolve the structural barrier that Wagyu exporters now face in the U.S. market.

Japan’s Longstanding Support for U.S. Agriculture
Beef access may not rank among the top issues in the broader U.S.–Japan relationship. Yet a closer look reveals that liberalizing the U.S. market for Japanese Wagyu would reinforce a mutually beneficial agricultural partnership. Thirty-five years ago, Japan eliminated its own beef import quota, and 20 years ago it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis. Expanding access for Wagyu today would strengthen a supply chain that significantly benefits American farmers. More than 80% of the feed used by Japanese livestock consists of imported grains and oilseeds, much of it from the United States.

A compelling argument for reform lies in Japan’s longstanding role as a cornerstone customer for U.S. agriculture. For more than 75 years, Japan has been one of the most reliable buyers of American feed grains and oilseeds — imports that sustain Japan’s livestock sector and directly support U.S. farmers. Japan consistently imports roughly 10–15 million metric tons of corn annually from the United States, along with significant volumes of soybeans, wheat, and sorghum.

In other words, a thriving livestock sector in Japan directly supports U.S. agriculture, from Midwestern grain farmers to the broader feed supply chain that underpins livestock production. This raises the natural question of why isn’t there stronger support among U.S. grain producers for more liberalized Japanese beef access when their own export success depends so heavily on Japan’s livestock industry?

Tariff-Rate Quotas and Market Challenges
When the USJTA entered into force in 2020, Japan’s previous country-specific quota of 200 metric tons was folded into the broader “All Others” quota of 65,005 metric tons. At the time this appeared workable because Japan had not historically filled the quota.

That changed when Brazil, previously ineligible to export beef to the United States, gained U.S. market access and was included in the same quota category. Since then, Brazil has repeatedly fillednearly the entire quota. In 2025 the quota was triggered after just 17 days, and  in 2026 it was exceeded on Jan. 6, with approximately 99% of the quota filled by Brazilian shipments. As a result, Japanese Wagyu exporters and U.S. importers face steep tariffs almost immediately each year.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has approved specific quota arrangements or allocations for other countries. The U.S.–UK trade agreement created a 13,000-metric-ton carve-out for British beef within the same quota framework, while Argentina recently received a 100,000-metric-ton allocation. In contrast, Japanese Wagyu imports face the 26.4% tariff once the TRQ is filled, even though Japan remains one of the United States’ closest economic and strategic partners.

For American importers, the consequences are significant. Wagyu beef can be five to 10 times more valuable than commodity beef, meaning the ad valorem tariff becomes proportionally more expensive for importers, foodservice operators, and retailers. The quota also creates uncertainty in the marketplace, forcing importers to speculate about when tariffs will take effect and limiting decisions about product range, quality grades, and whether to import frozen or chilled beef.

This uncertainty discourages participation across the supply chain, from importers and distributors to restaurants and retailers, ultimately reducing availability for American consumers w,tarhile pushing prices higher for one of the world’s most prized beef products.

Japan’s Track Record as a Trusted Trade Partner
Japan has repeatedly strengthened the bilateral agricultural relationship over the past four decades. It liberalized its beef market between 1988 and 1991, reforms that later served as a model for market-opening agreements in Korea. Japan also reformed its retail and distribution laws, allowing U.S. exporters to sell directly into the Japanese market. In 1995 Japan decoupled domestic pork prices from import pricing, enabling a surge in chilled U.S. pork exports. In 2006 it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis, restoring one of America’s most valuable export destinations.

The results speak for themselves: Over the past 50 years Japan has imported more than $100 billion in U.S. red meat and by-products and remains one of the most dependable markets for American agriculture.

At the same time, Japanese beef represents an almost negligible presence in the U.S. market, accounting for less than 0.003% of total U.S. beef imports. Japanese Wagyu also occupies a highly specialized ultra-premium niche that complements rather than competes with the mainstream U.S. beef market. In practical terms, expanded Wagyu access would be economically negligible for U.S. producers but symbolically important for maintaining credibility in reciprocal agricultural trade.

Why Equal Treatment Matters
Japan is not seeking special treatment — only equal treatment. For decades, Japan has opened its markets, invested in American agriculture, and supported the livelihoods of U.S. farmers and ranchers. Ensuring fair access for Japanese Wagyu to the United States would acknowledge the depth of this partnership while reinforcing a trade relationship that benefits both countries.

Trade between allies should reflect trust, reciprocity, and long-term partnership. When nations invest in each other’s success, market access should move in both directions. That is how trade becomes durable, balanced, and mutually beneficial.

A Gift for the Future
It is customary when heads of state meet to exchange gifts. In this case, the United States could offer one with lasting value — leveling the playing field for Japanese Wagyu in the American market. After all, Japan has already made the down payment.