Showing posts with label Park Yu-ha. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Park Yu-ha. Show all posts

Sunday, November 26, 2017

Japan’s Pyrrhic Victory Over ‘Comfort Women’ Commemoration

Blocking comfort women documents from UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register could do Japan more harm than good.

By Edward Vickers, Professor of Comparative Education at Kyushu University, Japan. He is a member of the War Memoryscapes in Asia Partnership (WARMAP), funded by the Leverhulme Trust and coordinated by Mark Frost of Essex University. His latest book, Education and Society in Post-Mao China, was published by Routledge in 2017.

The Diplomat, November 25, 2017

October was a good month for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Following his crushing electoral victory came a further triumph highly prized by Japanese rightists: the stymieing of attempts to inscribe documents relating to “comfort women” — wartime sex slaves of the Japanese military — on UNESCO’s “Memory of the World Register.”

An international alliance had submitted an application, “Voices of the Comfort Women,” in May 2016. But on October 27, inscription was declared “postponed” pending “dialogue” between the applicants and the Japanese government.

This decision is portrayed by Abe’s supporters as endorsing his efforts to close the book on the wartime past, and restore Japan to a “normal” role in world affairs. But does Japan’s UNESCO diplomacy really serve this end? Or does it rather ensure that controversy over wartime atrocities continues to fester, imperiling Japan’s security by lending ammunition to anti-Japan nationalists?

Over many decades, Japan has invested heavily in UNESCO, which it joined in 1951, five years before becoming a full member of the UN itself. From 2011, following withdrawal of U.S. funding, it became the biggest contributor to the organisation’s budget. UNESCO has served as a rare arena for Japanese diplomatic leadership; it was largely at Japanese instigation, for example, that UNESCO declared 2004-2014 the “Decade of Education for Sustainable Development.” Through such initiatives, Japan built up a reputation for responsible global citizenship.

But the Abe administration claims that in recent years other states — specifically China and South Korea — have sought to “politicize” the organisation, in particular its heritage listing process. In 2015, China secured “Memory of the World” inscription for documents relating to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre. Shortly thereafter, Japan suspended its financial contribution to UNESCO in protest.

Japan also sought to buy South Korea’s silence over the “comfort women” issue. A bilateral agreement in December 2015 offered compensation to surviving victims, in return for the South Korean government’s defunding campaigns for further recognition — specifically the application to UNESCO. But far from resolving tensions, the agreement exacerbated them. This was due not least to the blatantly disingenuous nature of the Japanese stance: half-hearted contrition for foreign consumption, alongside intensifying revisionism within Japan itself. Under Abe, discussion of “comfort women” has all but disappeared from school textbooks.

This does not mean that the history of wartime sex slavery simply pits Japanese villainy against Korean or Chinese victimhood. As the South Korean scholar Park Yu-ha has controversially pointed out, Chinese and Korean gangs trafficked women for the Japanese military; some girls were sold into prostitution by their impoverished families; and while most were tricked or coerced, there were exceptions. Trafficking in women for sex is nothing new, and continues across Asia and beyond. For example, China’s skewed sex ratio — a by-product of the One Child Policy — is today fueling an upsurge in trafficking along its southern borders.

Nor were Japan’s imperial forces unique in deploying sexual violence. The Soviet advance into Germany at the end of World War II witnessed an orgy of rape and assault on women, as troops took revenge for suffering inflicted by the Germans on their compatriots. And as Japanese revisionists like to point out, American military bases in South Korea and Japan today are liberally serviced by local sex workers.

However, the “comfort women” system was a particularly coordinated, institutionalized, and brutal form of sexual exploitation. Moreover, for many campaigners, the continuing abuse of women today is precisely the point. The activists at the Women’s Active Museum of War and Peace in Tokyo, for example, see a failure to acknowledge the iniquity of the “comfort women” system as symptomatic of the entrenched chauvinism of Japanese society. For many, securing recognition for wartime sex slaves is partly about drawing attention to the widespread persistence of the kinds of attitudes toward women that underpinned that system. This aim would seem eminently consistent with UNESCO’s humanitarian mission.

But UNESCO is an organization in crisis. In parts of its decrepit Paris headquarters, rusty reinforcing rods can be seen poking through the crumbling concrete. A lack of UNESCO funding left the German government to cover my group’s travel costs when recently visiting to launch a UNESCO-commissioned report on education in Asia. One official whispered fears that Japan might follow the United States in withdrawing completely. Meanwhile, Chinese influence is rapidly filling the void, leaving many UNESCO insiders desperate somehow to restore political balance.

This is the context for the recent “Memory of the World” decision. In 2015, a related Chinese application was turned down, despite the fact that the International Advisory Committee adjudged the submitted documents to have “met the criteria” for registration. In light of the transnational nature of the issue, the committee recommended that groups in various affected countries (not just China) jointly submit a more comprehensive collection of documents. Hence the subsequent South Korean-led 14-country application, the documents submitted by which were described earlier this year by UNESCO’s Register Sub-Committee as “irreplaceable and unique.”

Japan was meanwhile fiercely pressing for revision of the criteria for inscription. It finally secured a commitment to pursue “dialogue” in cases where an application is contested — the principle cited in the recent “postponement” decision. However, as the alliance supporting registration noted in an October 31 press release, this potentially amounts to a perpetrator’s veto: “It means that documents related to colonial regimes should be negotiated with the colonizers, and the damage suffered by victims of war should be discussed with the perpetrators.”

UNESCO’s eagerness to placate Japan is apparent elsewhere, too. This July, the island of Okinoshima off the coast of Kyushu was declared a “World Heritage Site,” along with related shrines on the mainland. The island is a repository of thousands of ancient artifacts from South Korea, China and beyond, mysteriously deposited over the centuries. Intensive Japanese lobbying persuaded the UNESCO committee to override an expert recommendation to register only the island itself, and agree instead to inscribe the mainland sites as well. Moreover, the official description of the site notes neither a “traditional” ban on women landing on Okinoshima, nor the island’s association with nationalistic annual commemorations of a nearby 1905 naval battle.

Not all recent decisions have gone Japan’s way. An application to inscribe as “Memory of the World” documents relating to Sugihara Chiune, the wartime Japanese consul in Latvia who helped save several thousand Jews, was rejected. The reasons were not divulged, but celebrating an instance of wartime Japanese humanitarianism while denying inscription to “comfort women” documents was probably seen as politically unwise.

Given threats from a nuclearizing North Korea and an increasingly assertive China, the project of pursuing a more “normal” constitutional position for Japan’s armed forces has much to recommend it. However, to seek constitutional reform alongside historical revisionism is both ethically indefensible and strategically insane. It needlessly sullies Japan’s international reputation and awards easy propaganda points to nationalists elsewhere intent on portraying Japanese as unrepentant militarists.

And Japan’s actions threaten UNESCO’s reputation, too. In squandering much of the goodwill acquired over decades of involvement in UNESCO, it has exacerbated the very process of “politicization” it claims to lament. Denying inscription to records of wartime atrocities brings discredit both to Japan, for its bullying and mendacity, and to UNESCO, for buckling under pressure and subverting its own processes.

The international alliance has pledged to continue its campaign to inscribe “comfort women” documents, declaring its readiness to enter whatever form of dialogue UNESCO mandates. It remains to be seen whether Japan will approach such an exercise as more than a means of blocking and obfuscation. But for truly meaningful dialogue with its neighbors over this and other aspects of the wartime past, what Japan needs first of all is a long-overdue dialogue with itself.

Sunday, January 10, 2016

Monday in Washington, January 11,2016

Coming of Age Day in Japan Holiday

JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. ROLE IN HISTORICAL RECONCILIATION IN EAST ASIA. 1/11, 9:00am-Noon. Sponsor: Asia Program, Wilson Center. Speakers (Panel 1): Toyomi Asano, Former Wilson Center fellow, Professor of Political Science, Waseda University; Alexis Dudden, Professor of History, University of Connecticut; Sung-Yoon Lee, Professor in Korean Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts University; Park Yu-ha, Professor, Sejong University; Moderator: Robert Hathaway, former Asia Program director, Wilson Center. Speakers (Panel 2): Christine Kim, Associate Professor of Asian Studies, Georgetown University; Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science, George Washington University; Naoyuki Umemori: Professor of Political Science, Waseda University; Moderator: Jordan Sand, Professor of Japanese History, Georgetown University.

MAKING PARIS HAPPEN: CARBON MARKETS, TAXES, AND OTHER POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR CLIMATE ACTION. 1/11, 11:30 - 1:00pm. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CGD). Speakers: Vitor Gaspar, Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund; Michele de Nevers, Senior Associate, Center for Global Development; Mary Nichols, Chair, California Air Resources Board; Catrina Rorke, Director of Energy Policy and Senior Fellow, R Street Institute; Vikram Widge, Head, Climate and Carbon Finance, World Bank Climate Change Group; Host: Rajesh Mirchandani, Senior Director for Communications and Policy Outreach, Center for Global Development.

SPACE WEAPONS AND THE RISK OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. 1/11, Noon. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Mallory Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security Challenges and Defense Policy Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State; Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; Nancy Gallagher, Senior Research Scholar, Interim Director, CISSM School of Public Policy, University of Maryland; Joan Freese, Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College; Gaurav Kampani, Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.

NPC LUNCHEON WITH ADMIRAL JOHN RICHARDSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, USN. 1/11, 12:30- 2:00pm. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speaker: Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, USN, Fee.

CURRENT MIDDLE EAST MELTDOWN: THE VIEW FROM ISRAEL. 1/11, 4:00-5:00pm. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speaker: Dore Gold, Director General, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TRADING VIEWS: REAL DEBATES ON KEY ISSUES IN TPP. 1/11, 4:00-5:30pm, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs ranking member Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio; and House Ways and Means ranking member Sander Levin, D-Mich., hold a roundtable discussion on "Trading Views: Real Debates on Key Issues in Trans-Pacific Partnership," examining the automotive supply chain, with a particular focus on the auto rules of origin.

Saturday, November 28, 2015

Asia mostly backsliding on democratic values

BY Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan and APP member

THE JAPAN TIMES,  November 28, 2015 

In Japan, lawyers are fortunately not arrested by the state for doing their job, as they are in China. Nor are academics faced with indictment for challenging mainstream history narratives, as in South Korea.

We tend to expect the worst when it comes to China, but in democratic South Korea it is troubling to learn that professor Park Yu-ha is being subjected to a witch-hunt over her recent book, which challenges the official story of the “comfort women.” Whether she is right or not is irrelevant; in a functioning democracy scholars should have the political space needed to voice their opinions even if their ideas are unpopular.

Combined with President Park Geun-hye’s recent initiative to reassert a state monopoly on high school textbooks by 2017, and the arrest of a Japanese journalist for what amounted to shoddy journalism — thereby transforming him into an undeserving icon for press freedom — clearly the South Korean government is working overtime to tarnish that nation’s hard-won image for robust democracy. The good news is that large-scale demonstrations against the president’s gambit to white-wash history show that citizens zealously guard these rights and are not going to tolerate any conservative backsliding on South Korea’s praetorian history.

Park must envy Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. He has promoted patriotic education and imposed new guidelines that give the state inordinate control over what is written in Japan’s textbooks; when it comes to touchy subjects like territorial disputes or comfort women, they must conform with government views. And Abe has accomplished this without sparking mass protests about the history lobotomy he is administering. Perhaps this is because Abe’s Japan is a target-rich environment for progressive activists as he propels reactionary agendas across the board ranging from welfare for the wealthy — aka “Abenomics” — to nuclear restarts, collective self-defense, shoving a new U.S. military base at Henoko down the throats of Okinawans, arms exports, moral education, faux “womenomics,” visits to Yasukuni Shrine and so on. With so many targets, it’s hard to focus public disaffection.

Abe’s signature initiatives and grandstanding gestures may not be popular, but a weak and fragmented opposition gives him a free hand. The mass protests this past summer, in which demonstrators rallied in defense of the Constitution and against his security legislation, followed protests against his 2013 state secrets legislation, a remarkable rollback of what limited transparency has ensued since a national information disclosure law was passed in 2001.

The government seems paranoid over international scrutiny of this secrecy legislation, as the planned December visit of David Kaye, the U.N. special rapporteur charged with examining Japan’s record on transparency and accountability, has been postponed indefinitely. No doubt the officials charged with designating state secrets are so busy making sure that none of the dirty linen sees the light of day for 60 years — yes, that is the inscrutably lengthy period for which government documents can be withheld from public scrutiny — that making time to welcome an unwelcome visitor is a low priority.

So next month, when Abe visits Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, he can offer moral support for New Delhi’s recent stonewalling of visits by U.S. State Department officials regarding human trafficking and LGBT rights. Given that Modi’s star is fading rapidly in India, underscored by a monumental setback at the state polls earlier this month in Bihar, where he had campaigned extensively, he could use a bit of Abe-teflon. Increasingly Modi has fallen back on the dark agenda of Hindutva (Hindu chauvinism) to offset the growing disenchantment with his mounting failures on the promises of national rejuvenation encapsulated in the “India Shining” propaganda. As with Abe’s historical revisionism, support for the Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) and Yasukuni visits, Modi finds the temptations of the primordial are hard to resist and is also dumbing down India’s textbooks. Abe will try to seal the deal on exporting Japanese nuclear technology to India and Shin Maywa’s amphibious U-2 planes, which can track Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean. He will also try to get New Delhi to buy Japanese high-speed rail technology.

China’s recent snatching of the Indonesian high-speed rail contract came as an unpleasant surprise given close bilateral ties between Indonesia and Japan since World War II and lingering animosity toward Beijing in Jakarta for alleged (and unsubstantiated) support for a so-called communist coup in 1965. In the aftermath, the military mounted a real coup under former President Suharto (1967-98), who, with the aid of Islamic youth groups and paramilitary organizations and gangs, unleashed a wave of terror that killed up to 1 million Indonesians.

This slaughter remains controversial in Indonesia, where President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has not carried through on his pledges for a full reckoning. This might be somewhat easier now, after the U.S. State Department in September declassified materials related to Washington’s involvement in fingering targets for the death squads. But Jokowi is politically weak and has also been unable to follow through on promises to open the troubled province of Papua to journalistic scrutiny because security forces there want to keep their repressive operations under wraps. And his “boss,” Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, is now trying to kill the anti-corruption commission in one of the most corrupt nations in the world.

At a November conference in Berlin on Sino-Japanese rivalry, discussion of Abe’s recent tour through central Asia singled out his visits to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where Abe disappointed human rights activists by shifting toward a more pragmatic stance similar to China’s. Unlike his predecessors, Abe came up short by ignoring widespread concerns about political repression. Given that China’s energy deals overshadow Japan’s by far, Abe had little to lose and much to gain by standing tall on democratic values and human rights. Alas, Abe decided that “success” depended on acting more like Beijing and cozying up to despots.

Myanmar is one of the bright spots for democracy in Asia, after Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy won a resounding landslide victory in the October election. It now faces the impossible task of meeting unreasonably high expectations. She doesn’t have a magic wand, however, and has to deal with ethnic problems that have proven intractable for the entire post-WWII independence period. She also needs to cope with militant Buddhist monks eager to whip up anti-Muslim violence.

Yet, the people voted out the military-backed junta for the second time in 25 years, and this time the generals indicate they will respect the outcome, a belated reward for citizens’ perseverance under a despotic regime. There is, however, an urgent need for donors to open the spigots of aid and the flow of technical assistance required to help them climb out of the very deep hole dug by an inept kleptocracy that has misruled for way too long.

Saturday, November 21, 2015

‘Japan Lobby’ takes the gloves off in PR battle

BY  Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan and APP member

First published in THE JAPAN TIMES, October 31, 2015

The Sankei Shimbun advocates a more aggressive diplomatic stance on history issues and this dovetails with the mission of Japan Conference, a reactionary organization that includes numerous lawmakers. From their perspective, Japan has been too reticent and polite on the world stage and the gloves need to come off.

It never seems to occur to them that this might be a counterproductive strategy and that on history issues it leaves Japan vulnerable to criticisms of promoting an exonerating narrative that glorifies wartime and colonial excesses.

But Japan is not exactly a public-diplomacy wallflower. The Japanese government, foundations and firms have developed an influential network in the United States that dates back to the 1970s. That era of acrimonious trade frictions spawned what American scholar Robert Angel has dubbed the “Japan Lobby,” a multipronged public- and private-sector effort to shape U.S. policy and attitudes. ProPublica estimates that total Japanese spending on lobbying and public relations was a whopping $4.2 billion in 2008, putting Japan third behind the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, while South Korea ranked eighth with $2.9 billion.

Like many of my university colleagues in Japan and the U.S., in September I was sent copies of two books from Liberal Democratic Party Upper House lawmaker Kuniko Inoguchi — “History Wars: Japan — False Indictment of the Century,” which was compiled and published by the Sankei Shimbun [and written by Yoshihisa Komori, Sankei reporter-at-large in Washington, DC], and “Getting Over It! Why Korea Needs to Stop Bashing Japan,” by Takushoku University professor Sonfa Oh. It turns out that this thinly veiled attempt at propaganda was also sent to the foreign press corps in Tokyo, but it’s not clear which organization paid for this extravagant gesture. The U.S.-registered nonprofit Global Alliance for Historical Truth, however, claims credit for the distribution of “History Wars” on its website.

It is unlikely that these polemical jeremiads will convince anyone to change their mind. The tone of the Sankei book is closer to unhinged ranting rather than reasoned argumentation and stretches credulity in asking to be taken seriously. It trots out the familiar assertion that there is no documentary proof of coerced recruitment of “comfort women,” but undermines its own case by acknowledging that Dutch women were coercively recruited by force. The soldiers involved were convicted solely on the testimony of these white comfort women while testimony by Korean comfort women about coercive recruitment is dismissed outright — an unseemly double-standard that speaks volumes about Sankei’s bias.

The Sankei book also points out that in 1993 when the Kono statement acknowledging state responsibility for coercive recruitment of comfort women was issued, the government clearly defined coercion as including threats and intimidation. This is an awkward point given the Sankei’s disingenuous efforts to downplay the comfort women issue by focusing exclusively on denying coercive recruitment involving physical force. The Sankei apparently thinks that if it can redefine coercion and convince everyone that there were no comfort women recruited at bayonet point, then Japan can wriggle off this hook of history as if the entire sordid system is not the issue.


Korean scholar Park Yu-ha, who is often cited by Japanese conservatives, refers to archival documents that prove private recruiters, including Japanese civilians dressed in military uniform, recruited comfort women through intimidation and deception at the behest of Japanese military authorities. She believes the Korean women who testify that they were coercively recruited, and also maintains that Chinese women and others across Asia were pressed into sexual service through coercion. Park also wants the Diet to issue an apology to the comfort women.

Moreover, scholar C. Sarah Soh also found that in battlefront areas wherever Japanese troops were stationed, local women were forced to serve in improvised comfort stations. It is also documented that the military transported the comfort women to the comfort stations on military bases where they were denied freedom of movement. So what exactly is the Sankei’s point?

The Sankei is also up in arms about China’s alleged backing of a comfort woman statue and Pacific War Museum in San Francisco [WWII Pacific War Memorial Hall, the first overseas anti-Japanese war memorial, VIDEO], apparently misunderstanding the local politics that drive these initiatives. It conveniently overlooks how, in 2013, Toru Hashimoto, as mayor of Osaka, sister city of San Francisco, drew the ire of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and city residents with his apologist comments about the comfort women system.

Raising the alarm about ongoing “History Wars” being waged in the United States, the Sankei asserts that China is orchestrating discord between the U.S. and Japan over history. If so, Beijing is doing a lousy job as more Americans by far distrust China: Only 38 percent of Americans have a high opinion of China while 74 percent have a favorable view of Japan. Tokyo’s best bet here is just to get out of the way and enjoy China’s self-inflicted wounds. It’s time Tokyo grasped that attacking criticism of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his historical views as anti-Japanese, makes it look both paranoid and malicious.

San Francisco Bay Area activists assert that before the board unanimously approved the comfort women memorial in September, the Japan Lobby was vigorously working behind the scenes to kill the resolution. Locals privately assert that there was an anti-statue campaign of disinformation, and that local Japanese-American organizations were pressured to lobby against the resolution, with continued Japanese corporate funding hanging in the balance.

The board disregarded allegations about incidents of discrimination and bullying targeting ethnic Japanese children in Glendale, California, after a comfort woman statue was erected there. Glendale authorities dismissed these unsubstantiated claims by opponents to the statue, pointing out there were no reports to schools or police at the time. It seems that Japan would do better to shrug off these comfort women statue and memorial initiatives because intervention seems to backfire, throwing fuel on the fires of recrimination over the shared East Asian past thereby ensuring that more will be built.

So what should we make of the newly established organization Voices of Vietnam, a well-funded group that has hired former Minnesota Sen. Norm Coleman [lobbyist with Hogan Lovells, Embassy of Japan's longtime lobbying firm] to serve as point-man in demanding President Park Geun-hye apologize for Vietnamese comfort women who served some 320,000 South Korean soldiers fighting at the behest of Washington in the Vietnam War? This organization held a press conference on Oct. 15 in connection with Park’s summit with U.S. President Barack Obama. In a Fox News op-ed published on the eve of the summit [President Park should publicly apologize for South Korea's sexual violence in Vietnam], Coleman demanded Park apologize to the Vietnamese victims of Korean sexual predations: “Failing to make such an unequivocal apology would only undermine President Park’s moral authority as she presses Japan to apologize for the sexual violence perpetrated against South Korean ‘comfort women’ during World War II.”

Apparently whacking Park is the main mission of an organization that seems, rather curiously, to have sprung up out of nowhere, according to sources in the Vietnamese diaspora in the U.S.

Certainly, amends to these women — there are an estimated 800 survivors — and the thousands of children of mixed ancestry born to them, are in order, but why hasn’t Coleman spoken out about the far larger, similar problem involving U.S. soldiers? And, given the expense of hiring ex-senators to be lobbyists, as the Japanese government has already done with Tom Daschle, who is paying the bills here?

Sunday, July 26, 2015

Japanese deniers distort the Comfort Women narrative they support

Comfort Women at US Congress
Rightists distort author Park Yu-ha’s views on ‘comfort women’

BY Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan.

SPECIAL TO THE JAPAN TIMES, JULY 25, 2015

Park Yu-ha, an academic at Sejong University in Seoul, is the darling of the Japanese right because of her alleged stance on the “comfort women” system. But their cherry-picking of her writings distorts her views and twists them into support for the revisionists’ vindicating and exonerating narrative.

Park presents a nuanced analysis of the comfort women system, one that challenges the prevailing consensus in South Korea, but she is also quite critical of the role Japan played.

Regarding the controversial issue of whether women were recruited through coercion, Park notes in an essay she sent to me that there is no evidence that this was official policy, but maintains that there was “structural coercion” due to colonial subjugation.

Via an additional email exchange in Korean, she adds that she wants Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to deliver an apology to the comfort women in his Aug. 15 speech on the 70th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II and Korea’s liberation. She is pessimistic that he will do so, however, and says this is partly Seoul’s fault.

Park agrees that Japanese reactionaries are invoking her name unscrupulously in conveying partial truths. For example, a recent article in The Japan Times suggested she believes that Japanese colonialism in Korea was moderate, but she says this is a misleading reading of her book “Teikoku no Ianfu” (“Comfort Women of the Empire”).

“If ‘moderate’ is used to imply colonization was not bad, I disagree,” she says, noting that during the colonial era “those who opposed Japan’s modern system and national policies — including the emperor system — were tortured and jailed.”

The history of the comfort women issue has become intensely politicized in South Korea, making it difficult for scholars to publish objective analysis that doesn’t conform to the master narrative of victimization. Park had her book pulled from the shelves by court order and was required to redact passages deemed unacceptable. Public discourse in South Korea elides the role of Korean collaborators who served as recruiters and focuses exclusively on Japanese responsibility. Park is vilified in South Korea as an apologist for Japan, even though she argues that the system was cruel and inhumane and has refused to exonerate Japan.

“Japan is not exempt from its responsibility for the comfort women, who were taken to ‘comfort stations’ against their will and experienced pain,” she noted in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun earlier this year.

In the unpublished essay we received (written in English), Park says there was no monolithic system and distinguishes between what she calls “comfort women” — meaning only Koreans and Japanese — and other Asian “women who were provided on battlefields and were forced to work in the form of semi-constant rape” and victims of one-time rape on the battlefields” that she says should not be referred to as comfort women.

“The foremost premise in discussing the comfort women issue,” she adds, “is to recognize that women made to engage in sex work were always the socially weak, that most of them were susceptible to disease and that they found themselves in a miserable plight in which they faced a constant risk of death.”

Park asserts that most Korean comfort women were from the lower classes and were not recruited under Japan’s school-level national mobilization program, known as teishintai, a point that has caused some confusion. The fact that they have insisted they were recruited through this program has been cited by Japanese revisionists to accuse them of lying and dismiss the comfort women’s testimony entirely. Park disagrees and says there are good reasons for this misunderstanding, stressing she doesn’t believe the comfort women were lying.

Koreans, she says, believed they were forcibly recruited because “recruiters in military uniforms (who acted as civilian employees of the military) deceived them into becoming comfort women by telling them that they were being taken to serve in the teishintai (forcibly, albeit as part of the national mobilization facilitated by the creation of laws, but ‘voluntary’ in form).”

Thus, she concludes that “women with such experiences perceived them as forcible recruitment. In other words, rather than former comfort women telling lies, it is highly likely that recruiters … had lied.”

And for Japanese deniers, she inconveniently points out that “it appears that recruiters were often pairs of Japanese and Korean men.”

Overall, Park blames these recruiters most for the misery endured by the women they treated like sex slaves, but she does not absolve the Japanese military.

“Some Korean comfort women, while traveling with troops on the front lines, underwent the inhumane experiences of being subjected to the insatiable carnal appetite of Japanese soldiers in the line of fire on battlefields and falling victim to gunfire and shelling,” she writes in the essay.

Based on Korean comfort women’s testimony, Park believes that recruitment was largely based on deception rather than coercion, but she believes the consequences for all these women were horrific; none were free to leave once recruited and all were subject to military discipline. The comfort stations were closely monitored by the Japanese military and the comfort women “had no freedom of movement, no freedom to get out of the business and no freedom even to defend their lives.”

In contrast, she writes that “for Dutch and Chinese women, the military was directly involved in the grouping and segregation of them for sexual labor, and the military’s actions literally represented forcible recruitment (for) the purpose of continuous rape of enemy women who were conquered.”

Park also takes issue with recent efforts by politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party to discredit the 1993 Kono statement, which acknowledges Japan’s responsibility for the comfort women system.

“The Kono statement noted that the process of being transferred was against their will and that sexual labor at comfort stations was not of their own choice, thus acknowledging the nature of structural coercion,” she writes. Thus, it “accurately acknowledged that the existence of Korean comfort women was the result of Japan’s colonial occupation, since the ‘involvement of the military authorities of the day’ in the establishment and management of comfort stations is a fact.” Therefore, she concludes, “there should be no need to review the Kono statement.”

In Park’s view, the Diet should go further and adopt a resolution of apology, but in the context of “Abenesia” and the self-righteous nationalism prevailing in the LDP today, such a mea culpa is unthinkable.