China Strategy Isolates Japan

 Takaichi Goes It Alone at the G7

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 21, 2026
 
At this month’s annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit Meeting in Evian-les-Bains, France, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made it clear that she had a quite different concern on international issues than the other leaders did. The summit is traditionally a forum to reconfirm unity of the group to lead the world. Such was the case this year when the group reviewed progress to end the war in Iran. Takaichi, however, emphasized the vulnerability of industrial supply chains and competition with China’s trade strategy. Her tack gained no enthusiastic supporters among the G7 as an explicit supply chain policy would strain rather than ease international tensions.
 
It was obvious at the outset that the Iran war would dominate the discussions. Just before the leaders’ meeting began, the United States and Iran reached an apparent 60-day ceasefire (although not nearly a permanent solution). The memorandum of understanding (MOU) obligates Iran to use its best efforts to ensure safe passage of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days. (In fact, Iran has now closed the Strait.) To Iran’s benefit, the MOU also includes – again for a 60-day period – termination of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, plans (but no financial commitments) for a $300 billion reconstruction program, waivers of U.S. sanctions crude oil exports from Iran, and the return of frozen assets to Iran.
 
On the nuclear issue, Iran “reaffirmed” that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons; that is, Iran confirmed an earlier commitment. Iran and the U.S. also committed to develop a mechanism to dispose of Iran’s “stockpiled enriched material,” which could mean on-site down-blending, but the MOU does not rule out other disposition methods such as removal. The MOU allows – for the 60 days it is in effect – Iran to maintain its nuclear program and without any new sanctions from the U.S. The MOU does not mention missiles. By many accounts, the MOU considered a victory for Iran.
 
The G7 countries welcomed the deal as an attempt to normalize international relations and the oil trade. A leaders’ statement stressed that the deal was “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump,” noting efforts by France and the United Kingdom to resume maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The G7 chairman, French President Emmanuel Macron, described the summit as “a moment of unity, of quality discussion, and of genuine cooperation of the leaders.”
 
Upon receiving the news of the U.S.-Iran agreement, Takaichi welcomed it as a major step toward settling the situation in the Middle East. She emphasized the importance of implementing the agreement. But she did not offer any commitment by Japan to the reconstruction of Iran, including mine-sweeping in the strait. “Nothing has been determined for dispatching the Self-Defense Force,” Takaichi stated in a press conference. As readers know, the Constitution of Japan strictly limits sending troops to a battlefield.
 
On the sidelines of the summit, Takaichi had a five-minute conversation with Trump. In his press conference afterward, Trump limited his warmth to Japan by characterizing Takaichi as his “biggest fan.” Otherwise, Trump said, “I’ll be honest, Japan was not willing to get involved during the war.” There was no report that Takaichi affirmed her compliment of Trump in her visit to the White House in March, which was that “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world.”
 
Instead, Takaichi tried to pursue Japan’s interest by connecting the war in Iran with pressure on China. She put economic security at the center of Japan’s views in the G7 rather than joining with the other members in focusing on ending the war in Iran or post-war reconstruction. Although she proposed building a system of oil reserves for developing countries, Takaichi’s clear goal was to gain support for stockpiling critical minerals and lessening dependence on China. The G7 issued a declaration on supply chains for critical minerals, but it went only as far as to say that the group “will work together with partners to reduce critical dependencies and ensure that attempts or threats to weaponize economic dependencies fail.”
 
China immediately responded to that statement. “It’s leader’s latest G7 remarks on China were particularly obtrusive, exposing that its attempt to rally allies and stir up confrontation wins no support and is bound to fail,” said China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian. Lin said that Takaichi’s posture against China was a “glaring self-contradiction” and an instance of “Japan’s hypocrisy.” Despite her stated willingness to talk, Takaichi has made no serious effort to resume bilateral leaders’ talks and normalize economic relationship with China. Takaichi’s G7 diplomacy seems to have only exacerbated tensions with China.
 
It has not helped Takaichi that other G7 countries, suffering from Trump’s tariff policies, have approached China about trade deals that might restore their economic performance to the pre-U.S. tariff levels (or beyond). Macron visited China last December, calling for efforts to promote multinationalism with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing last January and agreed with Xi on advancing a strategic partnership between the two countries. Carney described relations with China as “more predictable” than those with the Trump administration.
 
Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Xi in Beijing also in January. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China in February. And Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to China in July 2024.
 
Even worse, from Takaichi’s perspective, Trump himself visited China in May, agreeing with Xi on building a relationship of strategic stability between the two countries. Takaichi is the only G7 leader who has not made a visit to China. All that she has been able to do was to visit the White House before Trump visited China. Japan finds itself uniquely isolated in its adversarial China policy. It is time for Takaichi to emulate her G7 colleagues and improve bilateral relations with China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 22, 2026

SHADOW OF CATASTROPHE AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. 6/22, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Speakers: Colin Kahl, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford; Janice Stein, Founding Director, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Chief, Norwegian Intelligence School. Moderator: Ulrich Kuehn, Head of Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, University of Hamburg.

PHILIPPINES ASEAN CHAIRSHIP 2026: ADVANCING REGIONAL RESILIENCE AND U.S.-ASEAN COLLABORATION. 6/22, 3:00-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: US-ASEAN Center; Embassy of the Philippines; US-Philippines Society. Speakers include: Jose Manuel G. Romualdez, Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States; Hunt VanderToll, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Hans Siriban, Economic Minister and Consul, Philippine Embassy to the U.S.; Heather Variava, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

STABILITY MULTIPLIERS: FOOD AND CLIMATE SECURITY IN A FRACTURED WORLD. 6/22, 6:00-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks; Strategic Climate Risks Initiative; Ditchley Foundation; Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University. Speakers: TBA; Moderator: Erin Sikorsky, Director, Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks.

WOMEN ARTISTS IN ACTION: VISUALIZING THE 1970S WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. 6/22, 6:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Workshop. Speaker: Kanako Tajima, PhD Candidate, Columbia University. 

TAIWAN’S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND THE FUTURE OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS. 6/22, 6:30-8:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Speakers: Tom Chih-Chiang Lee, Director-General, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office; Shihoko Goto, Vice President of Programs and Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Chris Estep is a Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Aaron Stein, President, FPRI; Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI.

A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Reviving Nuclear Power in Japan

Japan Depends on Nuclear Power

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 27, 2026

The military attack on Iran by the United States and Israel and the ensuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have had a major impact on Japan’s economy. A shortage of naphtha, which must be shipped through the Strait, has limited Japan’s manufacture of medical equipment, and it is unclear how long the governmental subsidy on gasoline will last. While Sanae Takaichi’s government has said that Japan has enough oil reserves for the time being, the government is accelerating the resumption of nuclear power generation.
 
Energy has traditionally been the weakest point in Japan’s national security strategy. Japan has said that it attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 to secure oil in Southeast Asia without U.S. interference. As fuel for power generation shifted from coal to oil in the post-war era, Japan increasingly relied on oil imports from the Middle East. Currently, over 95 percent of imported oil comes from the Middle East, and most of it passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
 
An alternative to oil is nuclear power. Through 2010, Japan had built 54 reactors for nuclear power generation that supplied about 30 percent of all electric power in Japan. In 2011, however, the Great East Japan Earthquake severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant when protective structures failed, leading to several deaths and mass evacuations. The event seriously undermined Japan’s energy strategy. The government began to set strict limits for power companies to operate nuclear reactors or construct new ones. 
 
Japan nevertheless took the course of resuming transmission at as many of the existing reactors as possible to secure stable and powerful electricity. The government did not take an alternative course developing renewable energy as European countries had done after the accident in Chernobyl 40 years ago this month.
 
The restart two weeks ago of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is an epoch-making event for energy supply in Japan. Reactor 6 at the plant began its commercial operation on April 16, 2026, for the first time since it paused operations in March 2012. The plant is known as one of the biggest nuclear power plants in the world with seven reactors that have the capacity for 8,212 megawatts of power.
 
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant is owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which was responsible for the inadequate defenses of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to the 2011 earthquake and for the ensuing deaths and evacuations.  Restarting the plant has been controversial. Although two reactors out of seven passed the examination by the Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) in 2017, the NRA issued an order to prohibit their operation in 2021 because of failure to take anti-terrorist measures.
 
The NRA lifted the prohibition order in 2023, and in December 2025, the governor of Niigata, Hideyo Hanazumi, approved resumption of the plant’s operation. TEPCO restarted Reactor 6 in January 2026 but paused the operation at least twice due to an unexpected alarm from a control rod and a leak of electricity on the land surface. Those malfunctions delayed commercial operation of Reactor 6, damaging TEPCO’s credibility. Reactor 7 is expected to start up again in 2029.
 
Even with the restart of Reactor 6, there is no place for nuclear waste to go. Japan has no final disposal site. Mutsu city, Aomori, has an interim storage facility to keep used nuclear fuel until it can be transferred to a nuclear recycling factory, which is planned to be finished in Rokkasho village, Aomori.
 
Although the interim facility in Mutsu was expected to accept 60 metric tons of used nuclear fuel from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in FY2026, the Governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, announced that he would not approve any new transfers of used nuclear fuel to the Mutsu facility in FY2026. Miyashita believed it was unpredictable whether the recycling factory in Rokkasho could pass an examination by the NRA. Japan thus has not established a credible recycling system for used nuclear fuel.
 
The government of Japan, meanwhile, is looking for a site to build a final disposal facility somewhere in the country. The government decided in 2000 that nuclear waste from nuclear power plants should be buried underground, a method known as geological disposal, but the government has not decided on a site.
 
To decide on a location, the government must take three steps: a survey of technical literature, a preliminary investigation, and a detailed investigation. The government will grant a two-billion-yen subsidy to a municipality that accepts the literature survey. Another seven billion yen is provided for a preliminary investigation.
 
The government has identified three possible sites: Suttsu Town and Kamoenai Village in Hokkaido, and Genkai Town in Saga. Ogasawara Village, Tokyo, has emerged as a fourth candidate, and the government on April 21 decided to have a literature survey which will take about two years. Although the three earlier candidates voluntarily stepped forward to accept the survey, Ogasawara has left the decision of accepting the survey to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). It made the first example to conduct a literature survey with initiative of the national government.
 
METI expects to survey Minamitorishima Island (Marcus Island) in the administrative area of Ogasawara village. Marcus Island is a tiny saucer-like coral atoll with a raised outer rim of between 5 and 9 m (16 and 30 ft) above sea level. It is 2,000 kilometers from mainland Japan.
 
The chief of Ogasawara village, Masaaki Shibuya, has reserved his decision on whether to go forward with a preliminary investigation after the literature survey is finished. There is no one among other three front runners that has decided to proceed to a preliminary investigation. METI is still far from deciding the location for final disposal site, which is needed for operating nuclear power plants in Japan.
 
It is obvious that the effort to build a whole new nuclear power generation system, including a disposal locale for nuclear waste, will not ameliorate the current concerns about energy supply. Construction will take many years. Nevertheless, the government of Japan does not want to stop focusing on nuclear power generation, fearing that it will lose its status as a major economic power in the world.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Cold War Comrades: An Emotional History 

of the Sino-North Korean Alliance

By Gregg A. Brazinsky, Professor of History and International Affairs, 

George Washington University

PURCHASE BOOK 1/8/2026

Brazinsky argues that neither the PRC nor the DPRK would have survived as socialist states without the ideal of Sino-North Korean friendship. Chinese and North Korean leaders encouraged mutual empathy and sentimental attachments between their citizens and then used these emotions to strengthen popular commitment to socialist state building. He explains why the unique relationship that Beijing and Pyongyang forged during the Korean War remained important throughout the Cold War and how it continues to influence the international relations of East Asia today.

Narrowing Sea: Fukuoka, Pusan, and the Rise 

and Fall of an Imperial Region

By Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor of History, 

Yale University

PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

Shepherd examines the shared histories of Pusan and Fukuoka over the eight decades from Japan's forced opening of Korea's ports in 1876 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. Wars, colonization, and capitalist industrialization forged intimate connections between the two, knitting together an imperial region that transcended its maritime boundaries. She challenges traditional views of empire and urban growth and shows how local networks, migration, and capital flows shaped the region's exploitative and uneven geographies.

Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: 

Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War

By Sean Wiswesser, Former Senior Operations Officer,

Central Intelligence Agency

PURCHASE BOOK 4/21/2026

Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. He breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights.

Japanese Rebels: Non-Conformists in a Conformist Society

By David McNeill, Former Correspondent, The Independent 

and The Economist

&

Stephen McClure, Freelance Journalist, Former Asia Bureau Chief, Billboard

PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Japan is often seen through the lens of an unusually resilient stereotype that it is a nation of risk-averse conformists. McNeill and McClure deconstruct that stereotype by showing that there have always been Japanese people who have rejected the status quo, challenged injustice, and fought for personal freedom. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 20, 2026

ISHIGAKI RESORT DEVELOPMENT AND THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (JST), Midnight-1:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Seiji Hayama, Director, Wild Bird Society of Japan; Tomoko Oda, Field Project Leader, Wildlife Group, Conservation Division, WWF Japan.

THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, FOUR DECADES LATER. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (JST), 2:00-3:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speaker: Karel van Wolferen, Former President, FCCJ.  PURCHASE BOOK

PAKISTAN AT THE CENTER: A YEAR OF CHANGE AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR ISLAMABAD. 4/20, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Christopher Clary, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University at Albany; Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center; Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center. Moderator: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center.

STRATEGIC FORCES PRIORITIES: A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR DEB FISCHER. 4/20, 9:30-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS, HTK Series, Aerospace Security Project, Missile Defense Project, Project on Nuclear Issues, Defense and Security. Speakers: Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE), Chair, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces; Heather Williams, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department.

THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN WAR ON TURKEY. 4/20, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Serhat Güvenç, Head of Faculty of Economics, Administrative, and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University; Jason Campbell, Senior Fellow, MEI; Gönül Tol, Senior Fellow, MEI. 

HOW THE IRAN WAR IS SHIFTING REGIONAL DYNAMICS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Yasmine Farouk is the Project Director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at International Crisis Group; Mirette F. Mabrouk is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute; Kenneth M. Pollack (Moderator) is Vice President for Policy at the Middle East Institute.  

AI AND NATIONAL SECURITY: WHO'S REALLY IN CONTROL? 4/20, 6:00-7:15pm (BST), 1:00-2:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Joyce Hakmeh, Associate Fellow, International Security Programme; General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, Senior Consulting Fellow, International Security Programme; John Thornhill, Innovation Editor, Financial Times; Katja Bego, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme.

LESSONS FROM CANADA ON ALLIED BURDEN-SHARING IN GLOBAL WMD THREAT REDUCTION. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Troy Lulashnyk, Director General, Peace and Security Programs, Global Affairs Canada; Timothy Edwards, Director, Weapons Threat Reduction Program, Global Affairs Canada; Moderator: Brian Finlay, President and CEO, Stimson Center.

THE CHINESE ECONOMY AND FUTURE OF SINO-US ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 4/20, 3:30-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: School of International Service, American University. Speakers: Liqing Zhang, Professor of Economics, Director of Center for International Finance Studies and Former Dean of School of Finance with Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in Beijing, China; Randall Henning; Professor of International Economic Relations (IER) at SIS. 

WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IMPACT ON ASIA'S SEA LANES. 4/20, 10:00am (SGT), 10:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speakers: Collin Koh Swee Lean, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS); John Bradford, Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnerships Fellow, Executive Director, YCAPS, Adjunct Senior Fellow, RSIS; Fang Yang, Asia Maritime Security Analyst at Ambrey; Adrian Ang U-Jin, Research Fellow and Coordinator, US Program within the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, RSIS, Nanyang Technological University. 

Nuclear Latency: Deterrent or Invitation to War?

How the War in Iran Reshapes South Korea and Japan’s Nuclear Strategy

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published March 13, 2026 on The Peninsula.

The Iran war has delivered a verdict on nuclear latency, or the strategy of possessing the capability to develop a nuclear weapons program while stopping short of crossing the weaponization threshold. There are significant implications for Northeast Asia, as South Korea and Japan are pursuing such a strategy amid eroding confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. And both may have latent capability close enough to alarm adversaries but insufficient to deter them.

However, if nuclear latency proves to catalyze rather than prevent conflict, the foundational assumptions underpinning nonproliferation strategy require a fundamental reassessment.

The Failure of Nuclear Latency in Iran

Nuclear latency is defined as having the capability to rapidly develop nuclear weapons—having the fissile material to make a bomb, the technology to construct a warhead, and the means to deliver the weapons—without crossing the threshold. In theory, nuclear latency acts effectively as a deterrent against external attack without ever paying the costs, both material and diplomatic, of acquiring nuclear weapons.

“The theory behind the threshold strategy had a certain appeal: maintain latent capability as a deterrent, avoid the diplomatic costs of overt weaponization, preserve the Supreme Leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons, keep the door open to negotiations, and explore if you might be able to manifest non-weaponized nuclear deterrence effects of some kind,” Stanton Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Ankit Panda wrote of Iran.

But latent deterrence depends on two conditions—making your adversary believe you can rapidly cross the threshold if attacked and offering a diplomatic alternative to war. But Iran constructed what Panda described as the worst possible nuclear posture: proximate enough to a weapon to justify preventive attack, “yet unwilling to cross the threshold that might have actually prevented one.”

Parallel Paths in Seoul and Tokyo

Despite its singular historical experience as the only nation subjected to a nuclear attack, Japan has maintained a deliberate hedging strategy for decades. For example, it has a stockpile of forty-five tons of weapons-grade plutonium (eight tons of it held in Japan), the capability to enrich uranium, ballistic-missile technologies developed under its satellite-launch programs, and advanced fighter aircraft with nuclear delivery potential. A recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency observed that Japan’s latency hedges against regional threats while simultaneously functioning as diplomatic leverage against the United States—an implicit signal that weakening security guarantees could trigger rapid proliferation.

South Korea has long sought capabilities similar to Japan’s but has been thwarted by the 123 Agreement with the United States, a civil nuclear pact that restricts Korea’s ability to produce fissile material and develop potential delivery systems. The Lee Jae Myung administration is negotiating changes to the agreement, specifically regarding uranium enrichment to build nuclear-powered submarines. What was once a predominantly conservative aspiration now spans the political spectrum.

For both South Korea and Japan, the unstated driver for nuclear latency is not only the threat from China, North Korea, and Russia, but increasing doubts about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence.

“The U.S. role in the world is changing in fundamental ways as Washington takes deliberate steps away from the rules-based order that it helped build in the years following World War II,” states a joint report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, published in February 2026. “These shifts…have also yielded new questions regarding the enduring nature of the U.S. commitment to the alliance.”

The Erosion of Restraint

Historically, two forces constrained South Korean and Japanese nuclear ambitions: a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella and a U.S. non-proliferation policy that actively opposed any steps in this direction. Both of those restraints are now in question.

Extended deterrence “was never completely credible to the Japanese which is why they keep going back to ask for us to give them more assurance,” Richard Samuels, professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who has written extensively on this issue, told this writer. “We would be foolish to imagine that the Japanese are not having second thoughts,” Samuels warned, drawing a direct parallel to conversations in Germany and France.

Former Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi, a senior government advisor, went further. “It is impossible to prove extended deterrence is valid,” he explained to this writer. “Deterrence is about how we feel. It was questionable during the Cold War. Now I don’t believe in any kind of deterrence.”

If the Donald Trump administration no longer opposes allied proliferation, as Trump himself has signaled at times, then both South Korea and Japan can move more openly down the road of a robust nuclear latency without triggering the consequence of diplomatic isolation.

“Suppose you don’t get the blowback from the Americans,” former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker told this writer, “that takes away a lot of the negatives for South Korea, and for Japan.”

The Window of Vulnerability

The critical question is whether adversaries might act as the United States and Israel have done and attempt to destroy South Korea and Japan’s nuclear capability before it crosses the threshold.

“At the end of the day, the people you have to convince are not the Japanese or the Koreans,” comments Professor Samuels. “The people you have to convince are the adversaries—the Chinese and the Russians. We might have been looking in the wrong place.”

Nuclear expert Panda wrote that China and Russia may initially resort to gray-zone tactics. These could include cyberattacks such as those launched against Iran previously. If the United States maintains a limited nuclear umbrella, he told this writer, they might want to stop short of the use of force.

The biggest problem will be what analysts call the “window of vulnerability,” the gap in time between when South Korea and Japan clearly move toward weaponization and when they cross that threshold. That window widens significantly if the goal is tangible deterrence that requires a survivable arsenal with submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Japan holds a substantial advantage. Hecker, a plutonium metallurgist by training with deep knowledge of China, North Korea, and Russia’s nuclear programs, assessed that Japan could direct the assembly of a uranium weapon in six months to a year. A plutonium weapon would likely take up to two years. South Korea faces a longer timeline, according to the former Los Alamos director—two-plus years to produce fissile material alone. But they may be further along in the technical research needed to construct a working weapon, Panda added.

One unconventional scenario includes a South Korea-Japan partnership where South Korea contributes weaponization expertise and Japan supplies fissile material. “It would be a marriage made in heaven,” says Panda.

Conclusion

Nuclear latency may prove to be an accelerant to precisely the conflicts it was designed to prevent. “The North Koreans may pull the Russians in to do something,” suggests Hecker, if South Korea and/or Japan move toward a weapons threshold. “China will be incensed…if there is one thing that gets the Chinese exercised, it’s Japan and a potential nuclear program,” he added.

But the question is whether policymakers in South Korea and Japan will read Iran as a cautionary tale or conclude that, with eroding alliance guarantees and a deteriorating threat environment, they have no better option.

Alliance Burden Sharing in Asia

South Korea Redefines Alliance Burden Sharing 

After Trump’s Asia Visit

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published November 11, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korea’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit showcased a tightening defense partnership with the United States. The U.S. push for allies to shoulder greater security burdens converged with South Korean efforts to deepen autonomy and prepare for long-term uncertainty about U.S. commitments, creating a mix of deeper operational integration and quiet hedging.

The Trump administration, under the umbrella of “alliance modernization,” is pushing for increased South Korean defense spending and a shift in U.S. focus from solely countering North Korea to “strategic flexibility,” which would allow U.S. forces in South Korea to assume regional missions aimed mainly at China. South Korea is expanding defense investment, accelerating transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), and pursuing nuclear fuel capabilities, all while reiterating that it will not be dragged into a broader confrontation with China.

The upshot is a more capable, forward-leaning alliance that is also more transactional, competitive, and sovereignty-driven. The question for policymakers is whether this becomes the new normal of the alliance or the first phase of a more fragmented Indo-Pacific.

Another Layer

A similar tightening of ties occurred in parallel between President Donald Trump and new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as well as her surprisingly warm meeting with Korean President Lee Jae Myung on the sidelines of APEC. Beneath this official narrative of drawing closer, however, there is another layer to security developments.

“Both Korea and Japan are trying to keep the Americans locked in while they are preparing for the day when America doesn’t care enough to protect you,” says a Seoul-based observer familiar with the thinking of both Korean and Japanese senior officials, who preferred to comment on background. “The trade and investment deal components of this are ultimately protection money,” he added. “They wouldn’t be doing it if there wasn’t the risk of losing security guarantees from the U.S.”

The trade pressures may reinforce the need to tighten security ties, but they also undermine confidence in the alliance, some experts believe.

“U.S. expressions of support for allies are in the context of helping them to assist the U.S. coalition against China,” says Bruce Klingner, senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and former CIA analyst. “Yet, that effort is undermined by Trump’s arbitrary, protectionist tariffs, which pummeled allies worse than opponents.

The United States, Klingner added, forced South Korea “into a disadvantageous trade deal” that violates the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA).

Nuclear Submarines?

The centerpiece of an apparent new level of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation is an agreement for joint production of nuclear-powered submarines at a South Korean-owned shipyard in Philadelphia.

“South Korea will be building its Nuclear Powered Submarine in the Philadelphia Shipyards, right here in the good ol’ U.S.A.,” Trump proclaimed in a October 29 post on Truth Social. “Shipbuilding in our Country will soon be making a BIG COMEBACK.”

Some experts claimed this was a breakthrough toward strategic interdependence.

“This move dismantles the old anmi-gyeongjung (security with the United States, economy with China) framework,” wrote Seong-Hyon Lee, a senior fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, in The Interpreter. “South Korea is no longer merely buying American security; it is integrating its industrial base with that of the United States to form a single, strategic-economic bloc,” argued Lee.

But subsequent developments call this into question. Senior executives at Hanwha, the South Korean firm that has taken ownership of the Philly Shipyard, admitted that the facility is not capable of building a nuclear-powered submarine, not only technically but also because of insufficient security to conduct such secret work.

Senior South Korean officials have since told the National Assembly that the intention is, in fact, to build those submarines in South Korea, with the clear goal of enhancing the country’s defense capabilities, independently of the United States.

“Investing in a submarine facility at the Hanwha Philly Shipyard would not be realistic, and neither would it be realistic to contract with an American company like General Dynamics to build the submarines,” National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac told the National Assembly’s House Steering Committee. While paying due respect to the alliance, “we’re emphasizing defense autonomy as we seek to take on a bigger role and make greater contributions,” Wi said.

The Greater Prize

Behind the nuclear submarine agreement lies a deeper, and more significant, agenda for the Lee administration: a revision of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, known as the 123 Agreement, to give South Korea the ability to enrich nuclear fuel and reprocess spent fuel, both of which are important to the expansion of the country’s nuclear power industry but also needed to operate submarine reactors. While the submarine agreement has gotten most of the media attention, the 123 Agreement’s revision is the greater prize.

South Korea has long sought this goal but has been blocked by the United States, which saw this as a doorway to potential nuclear weapons proliferation. By framing this as an issue of civilian nuclear power development, however, South Koreans in both conservative and progressive camps saw this as a means of acquiring near-threshold capability to go nuclear, without yet crossing the line—what some refer to as nuclear latency.

South Korean officials, in this view, understood that an appeal to build their nuclear power industry was not going to appeal to President Trump and his senior officials. But it could gain support if packaged as part of taking more responsibility for their own defense.

“Mr. Trump either did not understand the implications, or did not care,” wrote The Economist. “South Korea’s moves toward an insurance policy betray great unease about the future of its alliance with America.”

If the president did not understand what he signed off on in Seoul, national security officials in Washington with long experience on these issues are apparently aware of the Pandora’s box that was being opened. According to Korean media reports, the delay in publishing a written joint document detailing the agreements reached on tariffs and national security issues is due to an internal review in Washington.

A senior official in the South Korean government told the Hankyoreh newspaper that “the US Department of Energy is apparently upset with how many concessions Korea received in regard to the two countries’ nuclear energy agreement.”

OPCON transfer and the China question

The delay in issuing a joint statement following the Security Consultative Meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and South Korean Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back, along with senior officials, may have partly been due to a lack of detailed agreement on key issues.

The two sides discussed the transfer of wartime OPCON, based on a previous plan that set out three phases to verify the operational capabilities of a future Combined Forces Command under a South Korean commander. The transfer has been stalled due to delays in U.S. verification and the lack of urgency by the previous conservative government.

In the joint meeting and in a direct meeting between Hegseth and Lee, the South Korean leader expressed his desire to complete the second phase by 2026 and move rapidly toward finalizing the transfer. Lee pitched this as a gesture toward the Trump administration’s expressed desire to shift its defense role.

“The early recovery of wartime operational control within my term will be an important opportunity to further deepen and develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance,” Lee reportedly told Hegseth. “If our military capabilities are significantly strengthened and we take the lead in defending the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. defense burden in the Indo-Pacific region will also be reduced.”

Hegseth made no specific commitments on concluding the verification process on South Korea’s desired timetable. There was similar ambiguity on the issue of “strategic flexibility,” an issue that has long been discussed between the two allies. The term refers to the idea that U.S. forces based in South Korea might be deployed out of the peninsula for missions other than the defense against North Korean aggression.

The two sides have sidestepped this issue by agreeing in general terms that U.S. forces can be moved wherever the U.S. commander-in-chief wants, while retaining the understanding that those forces are there to defend South Korea against a North Korean attack. South Korea has long insisted that the 28,500 U.S. forces based in South Korea are essential for the defense against a potential North Korean attack, but also as the trigger for deploying massive U.S. forces committed under joint operational plans.

Behind this issue lies South Korean concerns that the Trump administration might seek a peace deal with North Korea that could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Hegseth and senior U.S. military officials have pledged to maintain the force commitment in South Korea. But he also alluded to their use in contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula, most likely around Taiwan.

“At the same time, we need to enhance flexibility to respond to other contingencies in the region,” Hegseth said following the security talks. He called for deeper coordination between the two countries to expand the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

South Korea, however, is not committed to a wider confrontation with China. Lee, while shoring up ties with the United States, has cultivated closer relations with China, particularly in the realm of economic cooperation. The APEC sideline meeting between Lee and Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly featured extensive discussions and personal warmth. It was notably different in tone from the brief thirty-minute meeting between Xi and Takaichi, which was clearly frosty.

“There will be disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea on China policy, but a greater similarity of views on North Korea because both Trump and Lee want to engage North Korea,” observes Klingner. “On China, Lee will still try to straddle the fence.” The meeting with Xi focused on the restoration of economic relations and a plea to Xi to encourage North Korea to resume engagement.

The goal of pairing security ties with the United States and economic ties with China has been a consistent feature of South Korean foreign policy, including under the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which was also careful about offering overt support for military contingencies around Taiwan.

“As the role of U.S. Forces Korea expands, it is crucial to establish safeguards through sufficient consultation to ensure that South Korea is not drawn into regional conflicts against its will,” Donga Ilbo commented.

Multilayered Policy

The effort by South Korean leaders to balance the competing demands of their ally, the United States, and the pursuit of national interests in Northeast Asia is not new. The goal of greater defense self-reliance has also been long-standing, particularly by progressive South Korean administrations. The difference now lies mostly in the volatile nature of the Trump administration and uncertainty about its policy direction. That drives South Korea and Japan, and other U.S. allies, to increasingly think about lessening dependency on the United States.

“Unpredictability makes everyone nervous, and it leads them to consider other alternatives,” says Klingner.