By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 16, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
On June 11, Japan’s Diet enacted a law to convert the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) from an independent consultative body to a special public corporation with stronger governmental oversight. The new law enables the Japanese government to participate in the selection of the council’s new members.
The Council historically has represented Japan’s scientific community. The new law takes effect in October 2026. The changes to the Council’s membership are controversial: some scholars are adamantly opposed, dubbing the law the “SCJ Control Act.”
The SCJ was established in 1949 as a special organization of the government of Japan to provide a scientific perspective on government actions. “Based on a belief that science constructs the basis of cultural state, SCJ is hereby established with consensus of scientists, upholding mission of peaceful reconstruction of our country, contributing welfare of human society, and supporting academic progress connected with world academy,” as the current SCJ Act states.
The Japan Academy (Nippon Gakushi-in) is another government-authorized academic organization. The Meiji government established Gakushi-in in 1879 to reward scientists who had made outstanding scientific breakthroughs. While the members of Gakushi-in have life-time membership, SCJ is limited to 210 members, who are frequently replaced.
One unusual decision of a prime minister in 2020 prompted proposals to reform the SCJ. Then Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga rejected six scientists as new members of the SCJ. The SCJ Act provides that the prime minister appoints the members of the SCJ based on recommendations from the council. Former prime ministers had previously approved all members recommended by the council as a matter of course. The six scientists rejected in 2020 were known to be critical of some government policies, and they are not the members of the SCJ up until now.
In March 2025, the government of Japan submitted the bill for the new law to replace current SCJ Act. Reflecting the view of the leading parties, mainly conservative ones, that a government organization contribute to the government, the bill stripped from the SCJ its status as a special organization in the Cabinet Office, which makes independent decisions and receives sufficient financial support.
The new law includes provisions to establish new sections in the council. They include a Member Candidate Selection Committee, a Selection Advisory Committee, and a Management Advisory Committee. The law requires the SCJ to abide by various conditions in selection of new members. In addition, the law sets up an SCJ Evaluation Committee in the Cabinet Office. This committee will evaluate SCJ’s annual self-assessment report on its activities, as well as reviewing the mid-term plans of the council.
The SCJ argued that the law should maintain the SCJ as a national academy in its statement in April. The statement proposed five elements necessary for the SCJ to be a true national academy: status as an academic representative of the state, public qualification, a stable financial base in the form of funding in the government’s budget, independence from government regulation of its activities, and autonomy and independence in selecting members.
Six former presidents of the SCJ issued a statement in May that the SCJ Act would not include those five elements and urged that the bill be abandoned.. They recommended maintenance of a cooptation system in the selection of new members, arguing that the new law would erode the SCJ’s academic independence with the government’s intervention in the management of the council.
The government never explained, even in the Diet discussion, why former prime minister Suga rejected the six scientists as new members in 2020. It merely repeated that the new law would guarantee higher independence and autonomy. Although the leading coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito, did not have a majority in the Lower House, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined them in passing the bill in the Lower House on May 13 and the Upper House on June 11.
At a press conference after the bill passed the Diet, one of the six former presidents who opposed the bill, Juichi Yamagiwa, the former President of Kyoto University, labeled the new law the “SCJ Disorganization Law.” “The reason for Suga’s rejection has not made clear and the law entails stricter control on academism,” said Yamagiwa.
The Suga administration was a loyal successor to the Shinzo Abe administration. Abe worked aggressively for constitutional amendment, but in the face of criticism by liberal scholars, his efforts failed. It is likely that the conservative lawmakers and the loyalist bureaucrats close to Abe were frustrated with the academic community in Japan.
Knowing that Suga’s rejection of the six scientists was an arbitrary decision against liberal scholars, they might have thought that they could control the SCJ by reviving the law. They did not choose a course of correcting Suga’s decision. Today’s Japanese government, not unlike the Trump administration in the U.S., appears not to appreciate scholarly advice from experienced scientists on national policies.
Showing posts with label Conservatives. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conservatives. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 18, 2025
Japan's Science Council Politicized
Transformation of Japan’s National Academy through Governmental Oversight
Wednesday, July 17, 2024
No Conclusion on Stable Imperial Succession
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| Empress Suiko (推古天皇) (554 – 15 April 628) |
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point
The Diet failed to act on stable imperial succession by the end of the ordinary session of this year. Although the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the House of Councillors looked for a way to increase the members of the Imperial House, the parties could not reach an agreement.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was late in wrapping up their internal opinions, due to the slush fund scandal and its consequences. Looking at the opinions submitted by the parties, it is not easy to find a consensus between the conservatives and the other sectors of the Diet.
The Imperial House of Japan has 17 members, 12 of whom are female. They share official duties such as attending public events or visiting foreign countries. According to the Imperial House Law, only male members may succeed to the throne. Female members leave the House when they marry. Currently, Prince Hisahito of Akishino, a son of Crown Price Fumihito, is the youngest in the line of succession.
A supplementary resolution in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication in 2017 required the Diet to achieve “a full consensus of the legislative branch” for measures to stabilize imperial succession. The resolution also directed the government of Japan to consider allowing for a female-headed Imperial family.
In March 2021, former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga assembled an expert panel to examine succession issues. That December, the panel submitted the Prime Minister, now Fumio Kishida, a report that proposed two options to deal with the declining number of members in the Imperial House. Neither, however, addressed female succession.
One was to allow female members of the imperial household to retain their royal status regardless of marriage. Members of the Imperial House take on various obligations of the Imperial family such as attending cultural, academic, or sporting events, visiting areas devastated by natural disasters, and visiting foreign countries. As female members leave the House, those obligations are taken by fewer members. If female members stay in the house, the House would be sustainable.
A second was to allow males from former branches of the imperial family to regain their imperial status through adoption. Two years after the end of World War II, fifty-one people from eleven houses left the Imperial House. The second option would return their male descendants to the Imperial House.
Kishida submitted the report to both Houses of the Diet for further discussion in January 2022.
Each party first reviewed the report internally. Komeito approved both options as reasonable. The Japan Innovation Party, leaning conservative, also approved both options as realistic. Both parties are comfortable that the options do not include female succession. The conservatives hope to maintain the rule of paternal succession.
The Constitutional Democratic Party asked for further discussion of the first option because the report excluded the husband and children of female House members from royal status. The CDP also requested information on who among the male members of the former branches would consider rejoining the Imperial House through adoption.
The Japan Communist Party (JCP) would allow a female emperor, or an emperor descended matrilineally from the Imperial Family. While the JCP hopes to pave the way to a female emperor, conservative lawmakers oppose that idea.
The last party that submitted its opinion was the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP approved both options in mid-April.
Concerning the requirement of “a full consensus of the legislative branch” in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication, both Houses sought an overall agreement at several meetings in May. At the first meeting, with the speaker and president of the Houses and representatives of parties in attendance, each party expressed its own opinion. The LDP added that a son of an adopted male member should be qualified as a successor. No consensus emerged.
In late May, both chairs of the Houses and each party held separate meetings with each party. There was no plenary meeting. The LDP is committed to exclusively male succession. The CDP and the JCP are willing to expand the line of succession to female members of the Imperial House and to male members in matrilineal lines.
Back in 2005, the Junichiro Koizumi administration convened an expert panel that submitted a report recommended that the possibility of a female or matrilineal emperor be easily understood by the people, be based on traditional values and ensure a stable succession system. However, after Prince Hisahito was born in 2006, the LDP turned against the idea of a female or matrilineal emperor.
A Kyodo News poll last April revealed that 90 percent of those polled supported the idea of a reigning empress. However, the current experts’ panel recommended that, considering the age and marital status of Prince Hisahito, the discussion over the imperial succession take place in the future. In short, the LDP and current experts oppose the concept of a female emperor, while the CDP and former experts for Koizumi administration embrace it.
To the extent that the Diet is now dealing with the Imperial Family, it is focused on how to reduce the family’s official duties. But once lawmakers begin to discuss who should share the duties of the Imperial Family, the question of succession is unavoidable.
Sunday, July 7, 2024
Monday Asia Events July 8, 2024
DAY ONE FOR THE NEW UK GOVERNMENT. 7/8, 1:00-2:15pm (BST), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Lord Simon McDonald, former Permanent Under Secretary, Head of Diplomatic Service, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Creon Butler, Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme; Dr Tim Benton, Director, Environment and Society Centre; Sunder Katwala, Director, British Future; Olivia O’Sullivan, Director, UK in the World Programme.
REVISITING THE LEGACY OF SHINZO ABE. 7/8, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Kunihiko Miyake, Senior Advisor, Canon Institute for Global Studies; Tobias Harris, Founder, Principal, Japan Foresight LLC; Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson Center.
CRIMEA: WHERE RUSSIA'S WAR BEGAN AND WHERE UKRAINE WILL WIN. 7/8, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jamestown Foundation. Speakers: Peter Mattis, President, Jamestown Foundation; Dr. Taras Kuzio, professor, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, associate research fellow, Henry Jackson Society; Amb. Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council, director, National Endowment for Democracy, Visiting Professor, Warsaw University.
REVISITING THE LEGACY OF SHINZO ABE. 7/8, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Kunihiko Miyake, Senior Advisor, Canon Institute for Global Studies; Tobias Harris, Founder, Principal, Japan Foresight LLC; Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson Center.
CRIMEA: WHERE RUSSIA'S WAR BEGAN AND WHERE UKRAINE WILL WIN. 7/8, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jamestown Foundation. Speakers: Peter Mattis, President, Jamestown Foundation; Dr. Taras Kuzio, professor, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, associate research fellow, Henry Jackson Society; Amb. Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council, director, National Endowment for Democracy, Visiting Professor, Warsaw University.
PIVOTAL STATES: IS A DEEPER ALLIANCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA WORTH IT? 7/8, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Kim Ghattas, Contributing Editor, Financial Times, author, Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East; Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Ambassador Dennis Ross, Counselor, William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
MARITIME SECURITY AND NEXT-GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES: A PLATFORM FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND ITS ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERS. 7/8, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO; Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation; Peter Rough, Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Europe and Eurasia; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson.
BOOK TALK: ACCIDENTAL DIPLOMATS AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THE COLD WAR. 7/8, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Berkeley Center, Georgetown University. Speakers: Judd Birdsall, assistant professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University; author Philip Dow, head, Black Forest Academy, Kandern, Germany. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3WcdQ5z
POLICY BRIEF LAUNCH EVENT: SECURING LEBANON TO PREVENT A LARGER HEZBOLLAH-ISRAEL WAR AND WIDER ESCALATION. 7/8, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Paul Salem, Vice President for International Engagement, MEI; Amb. Ed Gabriel, President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon, Former US Ambassador to Morocco; Patricia Karam, Senior Advisor, American Task Force on Lebanon; Fadi Nicholas Nassar, US-Lebanon Fellow, MEI; Amb. David Hale, Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, Former US Ambassador to Lebanon.IS IT ME OR THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM? CHANGING CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD INEQUALITY: A BIG DATA CHINA EVENT. 7/8, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Rozelle, Co-Director, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions; Martin Whyte, John Zwaanstra Professor, International Studies and Sociology, Emeritus, Harvard University; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Ilaria Mazzocco, Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Elizabeth Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University; Jessica C. Teets, Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College; Qin Gao, Professor of Social Policy and Social Work, Director, China Center for Social Policy, Columbia University.
THE MORNING AFTER: ANALYSING THE RESULTS OF THE FRENCH ELECTION. 7/8, 2:30-3:30am (EDT), 8:30-9:30am (CEST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Speakers: Célia Belin, Head, ECFR Paris; Ulrike Franke, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; Camille Lons, Deputy Head, ECFR Paris.
LAUNCH OF WOMEN LEAD: WOMEN LEADING EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE. 7/8, 2:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Jennifer Klein, Assistant to the President, Director, White House Gender Policy Council; Dr. Geeta Rao Gupta, Ambassador-at-large, Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues, Department of State.
Sunday, July 21, 2019
Know your Abe Administration - Directory for Sale
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| Shinzo Abe |
Directory of the Abe Administration
Shinzo ABE created a new Cabinet on November 1, 2017 after his party's landslide victory in the general election held October 22, 2017. This was the fourth time since he was elected Japan’s prime minister for the second time on December 26, 2012. Abe is the first prime minister to launch a fourth Cabinet since October 1952, when then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida did so.
On Sunday, July 21, 2019, Japan held its Upper House elections. Abe had hoped that his LDP/Komeito coalition would gain two-thirds of the Upper House seats so that he could proceed with his professed plan of revising Japan's postwar Constitution. Although, he still holds a majority of the seats, he did not achieve his goal.
To examine how Abe may again reshuffle or reconstitute his Cabinet--as expected in September 2019--we present you with a directory and analysis of the 80-plus members of his Administration or greater Cabinet. It is designed to be a reference by both ministry and last name.
There is biographical information, legacy highlights, professional history, electoral district data, party and faction affiliations for each official identified. The descriptions also contain links to online primary sources, where available, including Cabinet members’ personal homepages and blogs, their official Diet pages, and their official social media accounts. We also note the incomes of the top ten wealthiest Cabinet members.
This report also identifies each member’s known affiliations with eight prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups. Japan’s parliamentary leagues are non-government-managed, semi-permanent groups of Diet members sharing an interest or holding a particular ideological stance.
The 107-page report includes 10 pages of charts, tables, and graphs to help you visualize the extent and depth of the ideology of Abe’s Cabinet.
This 107-page report is free to Asia Policy Point members and congressional staffers. EMAIL US HERE.
👉For all others we ask ONLY for a $25 DONATION: CLICK HERE TO ORDER YOUR COPY.
Saturday, March 16, 2019
Religion in Japanese Politics
Ask your average Japanese if he or she is religious, they will say no. Observe how they live their day and note the organizations they join, and your answer is different. Religious organizations and beliefs have considerable influence on Japanese politics. This is especially true of conservative nationalist groups that seek the restoration of an Emperor-focused government and society. On March 5, 2019, at Harvard University, Associate Professor of Asian Religions, North Carolina State University Levi McLaughlin discussed this topic. His presentation is only accessible via the audio above. He is the author of Soka Gakkai’s Human Revolution: The Rise of a Mimetic Nation in Modern Japan. He will speak on Friday, April 12th from 12:30-2:00pm at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.
Sunday, November 4, 2018
The Ministers of Abe's Fifth Cabinet
On October 2, 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reshuffled his Cabinet. Of the 19 Cabinet Ministers in his Fifth Cabinet, eight (42.1%) were re-appointed from the previous Cabinet and eleven (57.8%) are new.
This Cabinet is measurably more conservative than his previous ones. The usual metric is memberships or affiliations with various Diet Leagues, especially the Diet Members’ League for the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership [Shinto League] (also can be translated as Shinto Political Alliance Diet Member’s Roundtable; 神道政治連盟国会議員懇談会-Shintou seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai) and the Diet Members’ Gathering (League) for the Japan Conference, [Nippon Kaigi] (also can be translated as Diet Representative ‘Japan Conference’ Roundtable;日本会議国会議員懇談会- Nippon kaigi kokkai giin kondankai).
Both organizations advocate revising the constitution to return Shinto as the state religion and the Emperor to political power. They oppose the current Constitution support of individual rights, women's rights, and freedom of speech. They advocate a moral education and respect for Japan's past, while rejecting any Japanese involvement in war crimes.
Only one Minister is a member of neither League: Keiichi ISHII, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. He is from the Komeito Party that is associated with the Buddhist religious group, Sokka Gakkai. The party has been a coalition partner with the LDP since 1999. There is one member of the U.S. Congress who is a Sokka Gakkai member.
Only one Minister is a member of neither League: Keiichi ISHII, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. He is from the Komeito Party that is associated with the Buddhist religious group, Sokka Gakkai. The party has been a coalition partner with the LDP since 1999. There is one member of the U.S. Congress who is a Sokka Gakkai member.
Taro KONO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Masatoshi ISHIDA, Minister for International Affair and Communications; Yoshiaki HARADA, Minister of the Environment; and Takuya HIRAI, Minister for Information Technology Policy, although members of the Shinto League, are not members of the Nippon Kaigi.
There is only one female minister: Satsuki
KATAYAMA, Minister of State for Regional Revitalization. In Abe's previous Cabinet (4th) there were four female ministers and in his 3rd, two.
★ New cabinet member
❇︎ Past affiliation with Shinto League, but not in recent years
| Position | First Name | Last Name | Shinto League | Nippon Kaigi |
| Prime Minister | Shinzo | ABE | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister of Finance | Taro | ASO | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister for Internal Affair and Communications | Masatoshi | ISHIDA ★ | ✔ | |
| Minister of Justice | Takashi | YAMASHITA★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister for Foreign Affairs | Taro | KONO | ✔ | |
| Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology | Masahiko | SHIBAYAMA ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare | Takumi | NEMOTO | ✔ ❇︎ | ✔ |
| Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries | Takamori | YOSHIKAWA ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry | Hiroshige | SEKO | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism | Keiichi | ISHII | ||
| Minister of the Environment | Yoshiaki | HARADA ★ | ✔ | |
| Minister of Defense | Takeshi | IWAYA ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Chief Cabinet Secretary | Yoshihide | SUGA | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister for Reconstruction | Hiromichi | WATANABE ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission | Junzo | YAMAMOTO ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister for Promoting Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens | Mitsuhiro | MIYAKOSHI ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister in charge of Information Technology Policy | Takuya | HIRAI ★ | ✔ | |
| Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy | Toshimitsu | MOTEGI | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister of State for Regional Revitalization | Satsuki | KATAYAMA ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
| Minister in charge of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic | Yoshitaka | KATAYAMA ★ | ✔ | ✔ |
Sunday, October 22, 2017
Identifying the ‘liberal’ in Japanese politics
By PHILIP BRASOR
Japan Times, October 21, 2017
The current group of conservative public figures in the United States wants to return to an age when certain middle-class values were ascendant, without acknowledging that many of those values were realized because President Franklin Roosevelt implemented progressive social policies and trade unions had real power. They maligned Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders for his avowed socialist platform during the 2016 presidential campaign, but much of that platform constituted the status quo in the 1950s. Later, Ronald Reagan dismantled the government structures that made the era prosperous.
There’s a similar nostalgia at work in today’s Japanese general election. On the one hand, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to rewrite the Constitution in a bid to re-create the “beautiful Japan” he thinks existed before the country lost World War II, without recognizing that some of the qualities he admires led Japan to destruction.
On the other side of the ideological divide, some left-leaning politicians have feelings for the immediate postwar era, when the hard-won freedom of conscience was considered a precious right. And then there’s Yukio Edano, the former Democratic Party leader who just formed the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan as a tribute to relatively iconoclastic leaders who held sway in the early 1990s, like Takako Doi, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — which had held power continually since its creation in 1955 — was losing its relevancy.
As Sophia University professor Koichi Nakano wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed, today’s election was originally seen as a two-way race between different right-wing flavors — Abe’s nostalgic LDP on the one hand and former LDP stalwart Yuriko Koike’s more media-savvy conservatism on the other. Edano’s party supposedly fills the liberal vacuum created by the collapse of the Democratic Party, whose members were not consistently liberal across its ranks anyway. In fact, many members were as conservative as Abe, which is why it was so easy for them to jump ship to Koike’s Party of Hope, especially when Koike purged it of any liberal influence.
This situation set off a conversation in the media as to what Japanese liberalism is. According to manga artist and conservative firebrand Yoshinori Kobayashi, only “stupid people” in Japan believe left-wingers are synonymous with liberals. Despite his own longing for prewar Japanese ideals, Kobayashi admires liberals for their dedication to “freedom,” which he thinks is the main philosophical pillar of liberalism. In an Oct. 7 blog post he admits to identifying more with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) — which he sees as being liberal, meaning centrist, and not “leftwing” — more than he does with the LDP or its doctrinaire brothers-in-arms Nippon Ishin no Kai. The JCP has abandoned many left-wing positions for a more practical stance.
“The JCP is changing all the time,” Kobayashi writes. “It no longer insists on abolishing the Emperor system or the Self-Defense Forces.” More significantly, the JCP is against neoliberalism and the free trade Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Kobayashi also opposes. “JCP’s policies are based on a nationalism that overlaps with conservatism,” he says, “while the LDP and Ishin support globalism and only call themselves conservatives.”
Kobayashi may be confusing liberalism with libertarianism, which, according to freelance journalist Tetsuo Jimbo, has no traction in Japan. In a discussion with veteran political operative Norihiko Narita on Jimbo’s website, Videonews.com, Jimbo says he thinks the late LDP Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa once represented the “liberal” wing of the party, though Narita makes the point that Miyazawa eventually became the standard bearer for what the media called the “new right” in Japan. Until the ’90s, the main opposition was the Japan Socialist Party, which was against the U.S.-Japan military alliance and advocated for a strict interpretation of the postwar Constitution.
Ironically, the LDP maintained power for so long because of policies that were socialist in nature. It carried out income redistribution through public works projects, which stimulated the economy until the asset-inflated bubble burst at the dawn of the ’90s. Opposition parties took advantage of the LDP’s weakness in the general election of 1993, which Narita says resembles the upcoming election in that a great deal of political retrenchment took place. The idea was to create a real two-party system, but what happened is that, due to election reform that designated one person from each party running for a constituency seat, the LDP’s traditional “faction” structure fell apart, resulting in greater power for whoever is the leader of the ruling party.
Since then, “opposition parties have become even weaker,” says Narita, “which means the media has had to act as the opposition party.” However, the press has been effectively cowed by the Abe administration. “Their fangs have been removed,” Narita says, and now there is no clear liberal force in Japanese public life.
Because there is no equivalent term in Japanese, the English word “liberal” is used. An Oct. 8 Asahi Shimbun article attempted to parse the meaning of the word and found that even Japanese dictionaries define it differently. Since both the LDP and Koike demonstrate libertarian impulses, some people are confused, and Edano has muddled matters even more by calling himself a “liberal conservative.”
If there’s anything that ideologically distinguishes ruling party conservatives, it is the idea of “individual rights,” which both Abe and Koike seem to abhor, since they equate individualism with selfishness. Pundit Takeshi Nakajimasaid in the Asahi that the LDP’s conservatism is inherently “paternalistic,” and as Narita told the Mainichi Shimbun, “50 percent of the population is opposed to changing the Constitution,” which, as it stands, guarantees the rights of individuals.
A person who defends the postwar Constitution may be the best way to identify a Japanese liberal.
Japan Times, October 21, 2017
The current group of conservative public figures in the United States wants to return to an age when certain middle-class values were ascendant, without acknowledging that many of those values were realized because President Franklin Roosevelt implemented progressive social policies and trade unions had real power. They maligned Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders for his avowed socialist platform during the 2016 presidential campaign, but much of that platform constituted the status quo in the 1950s. Later, Ronald Reagan dismantled the government structures that made the era prosperous.
There’s a similar nostalgia at work in today’s Japanese general election. On the one hand, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to rewrite the Constitution in a bid to re-create the “beautiful Japan” he thinks existed before the country lost World War II, without recognizing that some of the qualities he admires led Japan to destruction.
On the other side of the ideological divide, some left-leaning politicians have feelings for the immediate postwar era, when the hard-won freedom of conscience was considered a precious right. And then there’s Yukio Edano, the former Democratic Party leader who just formed the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan as a tribute to relatively iconoclastic leaders who held sway in the early 1990s, like Takako Doi, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) — which had held power continually since its creation in 1955 — was losing its relevancy.
As Sophia University professor Koichi Nakano wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed, today’s election was originally seen as a two-way race between different right-wing flavors — Abe’s nostalgic LDP on the one hand and former LDP stalwart Yuriko Koike’s more media-savvy conservatism on the other. Edano’s party supposedly fills the liberal vacuum created by the collapse of the Democratic Party, whose members were not consistently liberal across its ranks anyway. In fact, many members were as conservative as Abe, which is why it was so easy for them to jump ship to Koike’s Party of Hope, especially when Koike purged it of any liberal influence.
This situation set off a conversation in the media as to what Japanese liberalism is. According to manga artist and conservative firebrand Yoshinori Kobayashi, only “stupid people” in Japan believe left-wingers are synonymous with liberals. Despite his own longing for prewar Japanese ideals, Kobayashi admires liberals for their dedication to “freedom,” which he thinks is the main philosophical pillar of liberalism. In an Oct. 7 blog post he admits to identifying more with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) — which he sees as being liberal, meaning centrist, and not “leftwing” — more than he does with the LDP or its doctrinaire brothers-in-arms Nippon Ishin no Kai. The JCP has abandoned many left-wing positions for a more practical stance.
“The JCP is changing all the time,” Kobayashi writes. “It no longer insists on abolishing the Emperor system or the Self-Defense Forces.” More significantly, the JCP is against neoliberalism and the free trade Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Kobayashi also opposes. “JCP’s policies are based on a nationalism that overlaps with conservatism,” he says, “while the LDP and Ishin support globalism and only call themselves conservatives.”
Kobayashi may be confusing liberalism with libertarianism, which, according to freelance journalist Tetsuo Jimbo, has no traction in Japan. In a discussion with veteran political operative Norihiko Narita on Jimbo’s website, Videonews.com, Jimbo says he thinks the late LDP Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa once represented the “liberal” wing of the party, though Narita makes the point that Miyazawa eventually became the standard bearer for what the media called the “new right” in Japan. Until the ’90s, the main opposition was the Japan Socialist Party, which was against the U.S.-Japan military alliance and advocated for a strict interpretation of the postwar Constitution.
Ironically, the LDP maintained power for so long because of policies that were socialist in nature. It carried out income redistribution through public works projects, which stimulated the economy until the asset-inflated bubble burst at the dawn of the ’90s. Opposition parties took advantage of the LDP’s weakness in the general election of 1993, which Narita says resembles the upcoming election in that a great deal of political retrenchment took place. The idea was to create a real two-party system, but what happened is that, due to election reform that designated one person from each party running for a constituency seat, the LDP’s traditional “faction” structure fell apart, resulting in greater power for whoever is the leader of the ruling party.
Since then, “opposition parties have become even weaker,” says Narita, “which means the media has had to act as the opposition party.” However, the press has been effectively cowed by the Abe administration. “Their fangs have been removed,” Narita says, and now there is no clear liberal force in Japanese public life.
Because there is no equivalent term in Japanese, the English word “liberal” is used. An Oct. 8 Asahi Shimbun article attempted to parse the meaning of the word and found that even Japanese dictionaries define it differently. Since both the LDP and Koike demonstrate libertarian impulses, some people are confused, and Edano has muddled matters even more by calling himself a “liberal conservative.”
If there’s anything that ideologically distinguishes ruling party conservatives, it is the idea of “individual rights,” which both Abe and Koike seem to abhor, since they equate individualism with selfishness. Pundit Takeshi Nakajimasaid in the Asahi that the LDP’s conservatism is inherently “paternalistic,” and as Narita told the Mainichi Shimbun, “50 percent of the population is opposed to changing the Constitution,” which, as it stands, guarantees the rights of individuals.
A person who defends the postwar Constitution may be the best way to identify a Japanese liberal.
Monday, August 28, 2017
Koike tests possibilities and perils of populism in Japan
BY Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan and APP Member
JAPAN TIMES, AUG 26, 2017
The horrendous images beamed around the world from Charlottesville, Virginia, serve as a poignant reminder that white-supremacist populism is a toxic force in the United States. President Donald Trump’s repugnant response, coming out on the wrong side of history on both Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, inflamed passions and reminded everyone that he is unfit to be president.
The Brexit vote, Trump’s election and French President Emmanuel Macron’s thumping victory are symptomatic of the age of anger we live in. Populism is about claiming to represent the “real people” and targeting the establishment, corruption and immorality. Populists feed on social discontent and promise to clean up a bankrupt system that is rigged for the favored few while the interests of the “real people” are neglected. They invoke culture wars and promise to revive and protect traditional values and community ties that have been sundered by a self-seeking elite. They promise a better life and trade in disappointment and nationalist grandstanding.
Populists have astutely exploited unease about job security and rising inequality, stoking resentment against the broken promises of globalization made by the political and business establishment.
So why no populist revolt after Japan’s economic bubble collapsed in 1990 or the 2008 “Lehman shock”? Perhaps this is because Japanese politics is influenced by a culture that esteems self-effacement, proper conduct and harmony. This is to say that a bumptious and meretricious candidate like Donald Trump is unthinkable.
Populism feeds on significant disparities in wealth, power and cultural values between the governing elite and “the people” and harps on a shared feeling of exclusion — slim pickings here as income disparities are relatively modest and social cohesion is strong.
Anti-immigrant activism is also quite limited because there are not many in Japan. Non-Japanese legally resident in the country total about 2.23 million, with an additional 200,000 foreign trainees and 240,000 foreign students. Japan’s welcome mat for asylum seekers is minuscule, with the government accepting just 28 refugees from a total of 10,901 applicants in 2016, so there is not much to grandstand against.
Zaitokukai, a right-wing fringe organization, has been at the forefront of xenophobic agitation, targeting Japan’s Zainichi community of ethnic Koreans who came to Japan in the prewar era, mostly under duress, and remained after Japan’s 1945 defeat. But its hatemongering confronted much larger counter-demonstrations, and in the 2016 Tokyo elections the group’s founder ran and won 110,000 votes. That’s puny compared to the nearly 3 million votes that clinched Yuriko Koike the governorship, but that’s still a lot of xenophobes.
Populism in Japan is not feeding on resentments stirred by glaring economic disparities, a large immigrant population or significant cultural divisions. Instead, Koike is riding an anti-establishment populist wave like her mentor, Junichiro Koizumi. He became president of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2001 by promising voters that he would destroy the party. He didn’t sugarcoat his agenda, instead embracing the slogan “No pain, no gain,” offering hope of better times down the road, but only if the public would bite the bullet now; voters loved it. He was a populist neoliberal raging against the conservative establishment who convinced people he was on their side against the vested interests, even as his popularity helped the party that represents those interests.
Telegenic and charismatic, Koizumi was the first Japanese prime minster who understood the power of media in the theater of politics. He barked out pithy sound bites, controlling the message by giving the media what they needed on his terms.
Current PM Shinzo Abe is no populist, but he has learned about the threat of populism. Koike emulates Koizumi in the theater of politics, winning public acclaim by promoting transparency and accountability regarding the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and the relocation of the iconic Tsukij fish market. The public lapped up the spectacle provided by hearings that skewered the LDP old guard for sweetheart deals and greenlighting the market’s relocation to a toxic site. It was classic David vs. Goliath — we the people against the powers that be — earning Koike kudos for having the guts to challenge the powerful dinosaurs that call the shots in Japan.
Koike embraces right-wing political positions very similar to Abe’s, so her new party, Nippon First no Kai (Japan First), will struggle to stake out policy positions that make it an appealing alternative to the LDP. Her formula for success has been outing cronyism, promoting transparency and making the establishment look fusty and clueless, admittedly not a big challenge when you can serve up ex-Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara and Yoshiro Mori, head of the Tokyo 2020 organizing committee, as exhibits A and B. In championing transparency and accountability, she has made a name for herself on issues that Abe is vulnerable on given recent scandals, missing documents and his having let Tomomi Inada off the hook for what appears to be a scandalous role in an alleged coverup at the Defense Ministry on her watch.
Koike faces stiff challenges, however, in translating her appeal in Tokyo into a nationwide populist movement. Just ask former Osaka Gov. Toru Hashimoto, who tried and failed.
Problematically, Abe occupies Koike’s ideological comfort zone, so she needs to cannibalize his base to get any traction. It is thus imperative that she presents an alternative policy agenda to highlight their differences and tap into simmering dissatisfaction with the status quo. Pushing for a comprehensive indoor smoking ban in Tokyo and promoting work-life balance to cut down on excessive hours will help, but she needs much more. She could gain considerable support by declaring opposition to nuclear reactor restarts and pledging to phase out nuclear energy.
Success brings heightened scrutiny. Back in 2012, Kazusa Noda, who Koike named as head of Tokyo First in 2016, suggested the current Constitution should be invalidated and that Japan should return to the pre-World War II version. But isn’t that Abe territory?
As Koike’s record comes under closer scrutiny, the media may pop her populist bubble. Indeed, the Asahi and Mainichi are now challenging her pro-transparency image, with the Asahi giving her a grade of ‘F’ for her first year in office due to her “black box” approach to policymaking. They assert that there was no transparency in her signature policy reforms and she is acting just like her predecessors.
Populists thrive on the limelight, but it could prove Koike’s undoing, as France’s Macron now knows all too well. Bet she now wishes she had not made a point of saying how similar they are.
The horrendous images beamed around the world from Charlottesville, Virginia, serve as a poignant reminder that white-supremacist populism is a toxic force in the United States. President Donald Trump’s repugnant response, coming out on the wrong side of history on both Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan, inflamed passions and reminded everyone that he is unfit to be president.
The Brexit vote, Trump’s election and French President Emmanuel Macron’s thumping victory are symptomatic of the age of anger we live in. Populism is about claiming to represent the “real people” and targeting the establishment, corruption and immorality. Populists feed on social discontent and promise to clean up a bankrupt system that is rigged for the favored few while the interests of the “real people” are neglected. They invoke culture wars and promise to revive and protect traditional values and community ties that have been sundered by a self-seeking elite. They promise a better life and trade in disappointment and nationalist grandstanding.
Populists have astutely exploited unease about job security and rising inequality, stoking resentment against the broken promises of globalization made by the political and business establishment.
So why no populist revolt after Japan’s economic bubble collapsed in 1990 or the 2008 “Lehman shock”? Perhaps this is because Japanese politics is influenced by a culture that esteems self-effacement, proper conduct and harmony. This is to say that a bumptious and meretricious candidate like Donald Trump is unthinkable.
Populism feeds on significant disparities in wealth, power and cultural values between the governing elite and “the people” and harps on a shared feeling of exclusion — slim pickings here as income disparities are relatively modest and social cohesion is strong.
Anti-immigrant activism is also quite limited because there are not many in Japan. Non-Japanese legally resident in the country total about 2.23 million, with an additional 200,000 foreign trainees and 240,000 foreign students. Japan’s welcome mat for asylum seekers is minuscule, with the government accepting just 28 refugees from a total of 10,901 applicants in 2016, so there is not much to grandstand against.
Zaitokukai, a right-wing fringe organization, has been at the forefront of xenophobic agitation, targeting Japan’s Zainichi community of ethnic Koreans who came to Japan in the prewar era, mostly under duress, and remained after Japan’s 1945 defeat. But its hatemongering confronted much larger counter-demonstrations, and in the 2016 Tokyo elections the group’s founder ran and won 110,000 votes. That’s puny compared to the nearly 3 million votes that clinched Yuriko Koike the governorship, but that’s still a lot of xenophobes.
Populism in Japan is not feeding on resentments stirred by glaring economic disparities, a large immigrant population or significant cultural divisions. Instead, Koike is riding an anti-establishment populist wave like her mentor, Junichiro Koizumi. He became president of the Liberal Democratic Party in 2001 by promising voters that he would destroy the party. He didn’t sugarcoat his agenda, instead embracing the slogan “No pain, no gain,” offering hope of better times down the road, but only if the public would bite the bullet now; voters loved it. He was a populist neoliberal raging against the conservative establishment who convinced people he was on their side against the vested interests, even as his popularity helped the party that represents those interests.
Telegenic and charismatic, Koizumi was the first Japanese prime minster who understood the power of media in the theater of politics. He barked out pithy sound bites, controlling the message by giving the media what they needed on his terms.
Current PM Shinzo Abe is no populist, but he has learned about the threat of populism. Koike emulates Koizumi in the theater of politics, winning public acclaim by promoting transparency and accountability regarding the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and the relocation of the iconic Tsukij fish market. The public lapped up the spectacle provided by hearings that skewered the LDP old guard for sweetheart deals and greenlighting the market’s relocation to a toxic site. It was classic David vs. Goliath — we the people against the powers that be — earning Koike kudos for having the guts to challenge the powerful dinosaurs that call the shots in Japan.
Koike embraces right-wing political positions very similar to Abe’s, so her new party, Nippon First no Kai (Japan First), will struggle to stake out policy positions that make it an appealing alternative to the LDP. Her formula for success has been outing cronyism, promoting transparency and making the establishment look fusty and clueless, admittedly not a big challenge when you can serve up ex-Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara and Yoshiro Mori, head of the Tokyo 2020 organizing committee, as exhibits A and B. In championing transparency and accountability, she has made a name for herself on issues that Abe is vulnerable on given recent scandals, missing documents and his having let Tomomi Inada off the hook for what appears to be a scandalous role in an alleged coverup at the Defense Ministry on her watch.
Koike faces stiff challenges, however, in translating her appeal in Tokyo into a nationwide populist movement. Just ask former Osaka Gov. Toru Hashimoto, who tried and failed.
Problematically, Abe occupies Koike’s ideological comfort zone, so she needs to cannibalize his base to get any traction. It is thus imperative that she presents an alternative policy agenda to highlight their differences and tap into simmering dissatisfaction with the status quo. Pushing for a comprehensive indoor smoking ban in Tokyo and promoting work-life balance to cut down on excessive hours will help, but she needs much more. She could gain considerable support by declaring opposition to nuclear reactor restarts and pledging to phase out nuclear energy.
Success brings heightened scrutiny. Back in 2012, Kazusa Noda, who Koike named as head of Tokyo First in 2016, suggested the current Constitution should be invalidated and that Japan should return to the pre-World War II version. But isn’t that Abe territory?
As Koike’s record comes under closer scrutiny, the media may pop her populist bubble. Indeed, the Asahi and Mainichi are now challenging her pro-transparency image, with the Asahi giving her a grade of ‘F’ for her first year in office due to her “black box” approach to policymaking. They assert that there was no transparency in her signature policy reforms and she is acting just like her predecessors.
Populists thrive on the limelight, but it could prove Koike’s undoing, as France’s Macron now knows all too well. Bet she now wishes she had not made a point of saying how similar they are.
Saturday, February 18, 2017
Japan is Great
by Nakano Koichi, Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University, Japan Focus, February 1, 2017, Volume 15, Issue 3, Number 4
While it is important to note the eerie similarity of the “Japan is great” boom in the media today with that of the 1930s, as this article does, it also bears emphasizing that this is hardly a uniquely Japanese phenomenon. As the following article indicates, while the self-congratulatory praise of Japan by the Japanese media was temporarily dormant in the postwar period, it energetically re-emerged during the 1990s and since then, has become more and more vociferous. But this increase in praise has not come about merely as a spontaneous reaction to the decline of self-confidence in the aftermath of the collapse of the bubble economy.
The reassertion of national pride and identity by the Japanese has also been actively encouraged as healthy and desirable by the United States. As the Cold War came to an end, Washington pressured Japan to shake off its postwar self-constraints and project its influence and political power (even its military power) in international affairs more forcefully. This was demanded of Japan in order to make it better serve the goals of American foreign policy. (e.g. Michael Green’s “Japan Is Back: Why Tokyo's New Assertiveness Is Good for Washington”).
In the United States itself, it has been pointed out that Ronald Reagan, as president between 1981 and 1989, ushered in a new era of patriotic language, including symbolically, the sign-off phrase “God Bless America” that has been standard presidential rhetoric ever since (See here). In Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Reagan’s counterpart in the 1980s, gave new force to the nationalist cause, which included not only historical revisionism but also rearmament, by couching it in rhetoric of iconoclastic reformism that claims to confront postwar taboos, constraints, and conventions (See here).
To date, the discourses of right-wing leaders of both countries continue to echo one another. your drunk uncle at Thanksgiving’s call to “Make America Great Again” was preceded by Abe Shinzo’s electoral slogan “Take Back Japan.” In his New Year Reflections in 2015, Abe reiterated his determination to “make Japan a country that once again shines on the world’s center stage”; then in 2016 he pledged, “This will be a year in which Japan truly shines on the world’s center stage”; and again in 2017 he reiterated that “we will hoist the flag of Proactive Contribution to Peace even higher and make Japan shine in the center of a worldwide stage”.
It matters greatly that Japan is not just “great” but that it is recognized as such by the world, and by the United States in particular. It remains to be seen whether Abe’s “patriotic” fervor will be deemed sufficiently supportive of US military goals in the eyes of Trump who declared his inauguration a National Day of Patriotic Devotion. Trump would certainly demand from the Japanese no less than Tokyo serving Washington’s interests first and foremost. NK
Essay Here http://apjjf.org/2017/03/Shirona.html
by Shirana Masakazu and Ikeda Teiichi, Translation by Joseph Essertier
Friday, February 3, 2017
The Abe Administration and The Japan Conference
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| click for photo source |
By Mr. Yoshifumi Tawara, Director of Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, Tokyo, Japan
Originally published in Japanese in the Children and Textbooks Japan Network21 News, vol.111 (12/12/2016): 8-9. Translated by APP Senior Fellow William L. Brooks with permission from Textbook 21.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is an ultra-rightwing politician and an historical revisionist. His administration is an ultra-rightwing cabinet. In his third reshuffled cabinet, 16 ministers (80 percent; or 85 percent if Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Ishii of the Komeito is excepted) belong to the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarians' Round-Table Conference (A.K.A. the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League), which is linked to the Nippon Kaigi (Full name: Japan Conference for Revising the Constitution and Assisting the Imperial Throne), Japan's largest rightwing organization.
In addition, a prime ministerial assistant and a deputy chief cabinet secretary, as well as 16 state ministers and 16 parliamentary vice ministers are in the same parliamentarian league. Adding up all of these positions from ministers to deputy chief cabinet secretary, Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League members make up 67.5 percent of the Abe Administration.
Establishment of the Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League
When and how were the Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League started? The Nippon Kaigi was launched on May 30 ,1997, as Japan's largest rightwing organization for the purpose of revising the Constitution and assisting Imperial Rule [Translator's note: Harking back to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association of the 1940s]. It was formed through the integration of two existing groups: the Nihon o mamoru kai (Society for the Protection of Japan), a rightwing organization founded in 1974, and the Nihon o mamoru kokumin kaigi (People's Conference/National Conference to Protect Japan, a religious rightwing organization founded in 1981).
On May 29, the day before the Nippon Kaigi was launched, the nonpartisan Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League was established for the purpose of completely backing and closely cooperating with the Nippon Kaigi.
Although the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League is nonpartisan, 90 percent are from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The members from the LDP form a formidable force in the Diet (around 40 percent of the total of 717 members of both houses of the Diet). The key members of such a powerful rightwing parliamentarian league have been working behind the scenes to push up Shinzo Abe as LDP president and prime minister during his three administrations. Japan's politics is being shaped by the close cooperation between the Nippon Kaigi and its related parliamentarian league.
Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League Control Japanese Politics, Society, Education
The Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarian League is working on three projects: 1) "History, Education, and Family Issues" (chaired by Sanae Takaichi since 2007; others are the same); 2) "Defense, Diplomacy, and Territorial Issues" (chaired by Shinzo Abe); and 3) "Constitution, Imperial Household, and Yasukuni Issues" (chaired by Yoshitada Konoike). The project teams engage in discussions with the Nippon Kaigi through joint meetings of officials and other formats, and they carry out activities that bring requests and proposals of Nippon Kaigi to the government.
In addition, the Nippon Kaigi has held study group sessions bringing in such lecturers as journalist Yoshiko Sakurai, who is a key member of the Nippon Kaigi and lectures on such themes as the Constitution, defense, bases, territorial issues, the Imperial System, and crisis management. Other lecturers include Akira Momochi (professor, Nippon University), Osamu Nishi (professor emeritus, Komazawa University), Kazuhiro Nagao (professor emeritus, Chuo University), Michiko Hasegawa (professor emeritus, Saitama University}, Yasuo Ohara (professor emeritus, Kokugakuin University) , and Shiro Takahashi (professor, Meisei University).The lecturers actively pursued theoretical arguments armed with theoretical backing, as well as unity of purpose.
In addition to such activities, the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarians' League established two project teams, one on the Imperial System (June 2014), chaired by Seiichi Eta) and another on Constitutional Revision (chaired by Keiji Furuya). The two project teams carry out study sessions and policy-making.
The Organization and Movements of the Nippon Kaigi and Its Accomplishments
Nippon Kaigi commands a force of 38,000 members across the country . There is a headquarters for the 47 prefectures and a total of 250 local branches. The Nippon Kaigi has developed a grassroots rightwing movement via the Nippon Kaigi League of Local Assembly Members, consisting of over 1,600 local assembly members, as well as via such organizations as the Nippon Kaigi-affiliated Japan Women's Association and the Japan Youth Conference. Centered on the local assembly leagues and other grassroots organizations, the Nippon Kaigi has promoted a people's movement, elevating itself to a frontline organization on specific topics. As a result, if its period as the Nihon wo Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi is included, the Nippon Kaigi has accomplished results that have greatly influenced Japanese politics, society and education .
The following lists the main achievements:
- Enactment of the Era Name Law
- Realization of government-sponsored celebratory events by the Emperor
- Halting a planned change in the Imperial Household Law that would have allowed women to ascend the Imperial Throne
- Enactment of national flag and anthem legislation
- Expunging passages about "comfort women" from middle school textbooks
- Revision of the Basic Education Law
- Stopping a bill that would have allowed women to choose a name different from their husband's family name
- Stopping a bill to allow foreigners to have the right to participate in regional politics
- Revising the textbook screening system and strengthening the controls on textbooks
- Bringing about the study of morality (dotoku) in schools
- Broadening the movement to pay homage annually on August 15 at Yasukuni Shrine
- Realizing the citation of government views in school textbooks about the widening xenophobia toward the territorial issue, and the choosing of a textbook published by lkuhosha.
Current State of the Constitution-Revision Movement by the Abe Administration and Nippon Kaigi
The Nippon Kaigi, looking toward realizing its long-cherished goal (which is also that of Prime Minister Abe) of revising the Constitution, formed in October 2014 the "People's Association to Create a Constitution for a Beautiful Japan" (Kokumin no Kai). It then put in every effort to build a grassroots movement to revise the Constitution that would bring about a "war-making country." The officers of the Kokumin no Kai are co-head Yoshiko Sakurai (who also heads the Minkan Kenpo Rincho (Private Ad Hoc Council on the Constitution), Tadae Takubo (chairman of the Nippon Kaigi) , Toru Miyoshi (honorary chairman of the Nippon Kaigi) director Yuzo Kabashima, and secretary general Akira Momochi.
Kokumin no Kai is aiming to gather 10 million signatures approving constitutional revision, and it is developing a grassroots movement calling for constitutional revision for the Nippon Kaigi.
The form of Nippon Kaigi activities are the same as when it was the Nihon wo Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, that is to say, "replacing the leftwing movement with a rightwing movement." It does so by covering the country from the regions to the center, by such activities as gathering signatures, pleading for support to the Diet members in each district, obtaining resolutions by local assemblies, sponsoring gatherings in each locality and large rallies in Tokyo, caravans across the country, and placing newspaper ads.
In the House of Councillors’ election in July 2016, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito gained seats, and when the seats not up for reelection are added, reached more than the two-thirds majority needed for amending the Constitution. Prime Minister Abe asserted, “We seem to have built a bridge (to revising the Constitution).” (From the Nippon Kaigi’s official magazine “Nihon no Ibuki (Breath of Japan)”, September 2016 issue)
Thus, the impetus toward constitutional revision is growing rapidly. The Nippon Kaigi, too, seeing this as the ideal chance for changing the Constitution, is strengthening even more its grassroots movement to do so.
With the ruling coalition’s win in the Upper House election, Yuzo Kabashima, the chairman of the Nihon Seinen Kyogikai (Japan Youth Conference), as well as the secretary general of the Nippon Kaigi, wrote the following in a September 30, 2016, “confidential” bulletin, “Japan’s Pride” News:
“With the ruling coalition obtaining the two-thirds majority in the Upper House election that is needed for revising the Constitution, I strongly feel the significant fact is that the world has changed on July 10. We are living in a completely new world.”
“It is close to a miracle that at the same time a situation allowing constitutional reform has emerged in both chambers of the Diet. And the G7 leaders all formally visited Ise Shrine.”
“Since the election was soon after that, it is only natural to think that it was a miracle. I am thankful for this situation having come about, and I would like to carry out our responsibility.”
At that working-level meeting, Kabashima touched on expanding the movement to gather 10 million signatures to support revising the Constitution, as well the movement to persuade local assemblies to adopt position papers seeking constitutional revision. The Nippon Kaigi announced that as of October 31, 2016, local assembly resolutions were passed in 35 prefectures, 56 towns or cities, and that the drive to reach 10 million signatures had reached 7.54 million as of July 31, 2016. It asserts that signatures will reach the 10 million mark by the end of the year. [Editor: it is unknown if this goal was attained.]
For additional details about the Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarians’ League, please refer to my book, “The Whole Story about the Nippon Kaigi – The Actual Situation about that Unknown Giant Organization [Nippon Kaigi no Zenbo – Shirarezaru Kyodai Soshiki no Jittai] published by Kadensha.
“Since the election was soon after that, it is only natural to think that it was a miracle. I am thankful for this situation having come about, and I would like to carry out our responsibility.”
At that working-level meeting, Kabashima touched on expanding the movement to gather 10 million signatures to support revising the Constitution, as well the movement to persuade local assemblies to adopt position papers seeking constitutional revision. The Nippon Kaigi announced that as of October 31, 2016, local assembly resolutions were passed in 35 prefectures, 56 towns or cities, and that the drive to reach 10 million signatures had reached 7.54 million as of July 31, 2016. It asserts that signatures will reach the 10 million mark by the end of the year. [Editor: it is unknown if this goal was attained.]
For additional details about the Nippon Kaigi and the Nippon Kaigi Parliamentarians’ League, please refer to my book, “The Whole Story about the Nippon Kaigi – The Actual Situation about that Unknown Giant Organization [Nippon Kaigi no Zenbo – Shirarezaru Kyodai Soshiki no Jittai] published by Kadensha.
Saturday, January 28, 2017
Know your Abe Administration: A Guide
THE ABE ADMINISTRATION: ITS TOP 100 MEMBERS
On January 24, 2017, Asia Policy Point issued its 91-page directory of biographical and background information on all top 100 members of the current Abe Administration: 20 Cabinet Ministers and top appointed government officials. Seventy-four are Dietmembers and 26 are non-politicians such as academics and bureaucrats.
The officials are organized by government ministry and by last name. All known social media accounts are included. Automatic Google Translate can be very helpful in looking at these Japanese-language resources.
Each member’s known affiliations with 20 prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups are also identified.
Included is a chapter describing these groups followed by a chapter of charts and graphs for you to visualize the strength and depth of these ideological memberships in the Abe Administration.
For perspective, a Japanese conservative nationalist is different from an American conservative in a number of critical ways. A Japanese conservative nationalist advocates big government; defends social welfare; is wary of individual rights and freedoms; believes in a central government headed by the Emperor under the Shinto religion; aspires to Japan’s independent defense, and rejects that Imperial Japan committed war crimes or started WWII.
Saturday, January 21, 2017
The Power of Nippon Kaigi
[says Nikkei's headline, but the article text contradicts this conclusion]
Nikkei Shimbun, October 16, 2016. (in Japanese) Provisional translation for scholarly discussion by Asia Policy Point
Nippon Kaigi [Japan Conference] proposes constitutional revision, visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and the introduction of an education system that better reflects the intrinsic values of Japan to conservative politicians inside the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party and other political parties. It hopes to attract like-minded lawmakers. It calls for support for conservative politicians and backs them. In this way it maintains its influence.
“This gathering became my first step toward a career in politics,” said Defense Minister Tomomi Inada when as LDP policy affairs chief she attended an annual national convention for the commemoration of war dead that the Japan Conference co-hosted with other groups last year at Yasukuni Shrine.
At this year’s event, Yoshitaka Shindo, the minister of internal affairs and communications in the second Abe cabinet, was present and called for support for the Japan Conference’s activities. Inada and Shindo are two of the core members of the group’s bipartisan parliamentary league, Nippon Kaigi Kokkai Giin Kondai Kai (the Japan Conference Diet members’ council).
Participation Is Merely “Adding Names to the Roster”
This parliamentarians’ group convenes a general meeting once a year. At the meeting held in March, over 30 Diet members attended and decided on policies on such matters as how to lobby for holding a national referendum on constitutional revision.
Speculation that the Japan Conference has a greater say in the government’s policymaking is sparked by the fact that many incumbent cabinet ministers belong to the group. Though the roster of the latest membership is not made public, Prime Minister Abe and 15 of 19 cabinet ministers belong, according to a source familiar with the matter.
But [asked about their membership,] the offices of several cabinet ministers replied they “have never attended gatherings of the league.” One office staffer said, “We are not aware that we belong to the group.” Though it has a membership of about 290 politicians, only a handful of them – mainly senior old-guard politicians – are active.
Then how much influence does the Japan Conference actually wield over elections? A person with the Japan Conference says that it acts as a “node” of various conservative forces and consolidates them into a single organism. This becomes the source of its influence.
The Japan Conference maintains its influence by closely working with the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (Shindo Seiji Renmei, or Shinseiren), which comprises religious groups, such as the Association of Shinto Shrines (Jinja Honcho). With the help of the Shinto community, it has been rolling out a campaign to collect 10 million signatures to revise the Constitution.
But the Japan Conference has a membership of about 38,000 people. While Nichiiren (Federation of Japanese Doctors), the political arm of the Japan Medical Association, delivers about 200,000 votes to the LDP every election, the Japan Conference has an extremely small organizational base and is not in the position to field its own candidates. Its activities are mainly funded by membership fees and it cannot afford to make political donations to conservative members.
With the Abe government shifting to a realistic approach, how to maintain the national momentum of conservative movements will become one issue that the Japan Conference needs to tackle down the road.
The key is how the Japan Conference will keep facilitating discussions on constitutional revision. Within the LDP, there has been talk of extending Abe’s time in office as the party’s president. On the surface, it stands to gain if Abe, who it backs, stays in power for a longer period of time, but matters are not as simple as that.
“Rather, we are concerned that there is a developing mood wherein constitutional revision needs not to be done quickly if there is an extension of the length of time the LDP president can remain in office,” said a policymaking committee member in the Japan Conference. There are fears the momentum of its national campaign for constitutional revision may slow.
Another worrisome issue is that its activities are not attracting wide support from the public. Birei Kin, a conservative critic and supporter of the Japan Conference, points out that “the same people always participate in its events” and deplores that its campaigns do not reach many.
The Abduction Issue Potentially Starting a New Fire
Now, the emperor, who is the greatest centripetal force of the Nippon Kaigi, also poses a new challenge for the organization. After the Emperor hinted that he would like to step down while alive, nervousness that the current emperor system (in which the Emperor plays a symbolic role) might change fundamentally is simmering inside the Nippon Kaigi. Although the organization on the surface follows the direction that “we must realize it if that is the Emperor’s will,” among the members opposition and push back are strong. For the Nippon Kaigi, the issue might start a new fire.
In recent years, new members recruited through the Internet, especially among the young, are increasing. That said, the trend of non-partisan groups’ conservatism is the real source of the growing attention paid to the Nippon Kaigi. If in the future the non-partisan groups’ preferences change, the possibility of the Nippon Kaigi losing influence certainly exists.
Saturday, December 17, 2016
Japan Conference from its own perspective
Japan Conference policy official speaks to the group’s objectives, influence upon Abe government
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| Akira Momochi |
Nikkei, October 9, 2016, p. 12
Provisional translation for academic use by APP
Q: What is the objective of the Japan Conference [Nippon Kaigi]?
Momochi: Some people point out that we are trying to revert to the prewar [regime], but that is wrong. It is also [biased] to label “prewar” as “evil.” We campaign for stopping the rejection of the inherent virtues of the Japanese and for restoring their traditions.
Q: What are the characteristics [of the Japan Conference]?
Momochi: There used to be various conservative groups, but they had difficulty tapping into the younger generation. The Japan Conference has local chapters in 47 prefectures. We are rolling out “grassroot conservative campaigns,” such as collecting signatures and petitioning local assemblies, and have produced significant results. Recently, more young people are becoming members.
Q: Is your campaign for constitutional revision spreading across the country?
Momochi: Supporters [for our constitutional revision campaign] have been steadily growing in numbers. The existing Constitution was drafted by the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces during the Occupation, and this fact was concealed back then. We need to revise the Constitution so that it caters to our needs today.
Q: A recent publication points out that the Japan Conference pulls the strings of the Abe government. Is this true?
Momochi: I want to ask those who make this argument the following question: Is there anyone inside the Abe government who thinks they are being manipulated by the Japan Conference? No. We don’t entertain such an impudent idea either. Those who are behind this plot must be developing the idea of overthrowing the Japan Conference, because they fear the growing momentum for constitutional revision. We have a membership of slightly less than 40,000. Other groups are far bigger than us.
Q: But a parliamentarians’ league that supports your organization is joined by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and many other influential politicians.
Momochi: Our parliamentarians’ group indeed has many influential people and incumbent cabinet ministers, but this holds true for other parliamentarians’ leagues. We would appreciate the Abe government’s implementing policies we want, but it is not necessarily aligned with us [on every corner]. That is why we struggle. Constitutional revision is one example. We want the government to hasten efforts, but that is not the case in reality.
Q: The statement issued on the 70th anniversary of the end of war contains the language “remorse” and sparked criticism of Abe from conservative critics.
Momochi: We understand that the criticism comes mainly from pundits who support ideological purity. We roll out “national campaigns,” so we understand Abe’s stance that needs to pay consideration to the reality. We continue to have high hopes on Abe
The Nikkei Shimbun interviewed recently Nihon University Professor Akira Momochi, a member of the Japan Conference’s policymaking committee, on the objective of the organization and its influence on the Abe Government.
Q: What is the objective of the Japan Conference [Nippon Kaigi]?
Momochi: Some people point out that we are trying to revert to the prewar [regime], but that is wrong. It is also [biased] to label “prewar” as “evil.” We campaign for stopping the rejection of the inherent virtues of the Japanese and for restoring their traditions.
Q: What are the characteristics [of the Japan Conference]?
Momochi: There used to be various conservative groups, but they had difficulty tapping into the younger generation. The Japan Conference has local chapters in 47 prefectures. We are rolling out “grassroot conservative campaigns,” such as collecting signatures and petitioning local assemblies, and have produced significant results. Recently, more young people are becoming members.
NB: A group of young American progressives with extensive political experience wrote a manifesto outlining how to oppose the Trump Administration. They modeled their advice on the success of the American Tea Party. Momochi's focus on local politics mirrors this manifesto, called Indivisible: A Practical Guide for Resisting the Trump Agenda: Former congressional staffers reveal best practices for making Congress listen. So much for "unique Japan."
Q: Is your campaign for constitutional revision spreading across the country?
Momochi: Supporters [for our constitutional revision campaign] have been steadily growing in numbers. The existing Constitution was drafted by the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces during the Occupation, and this fact was concealed back then. We need to revise the Constitution so that it caters to our needs today.
Q: A recent publication points out that the Japan Conference pulls the strings of the Abe government. Is this true?
Momochi: I want to ask those who make this argument the following question: Is there anyone inside the Abe government who thinks they are being manipulated by the Japan Conference? No. We don’t entertain such an impudent idea either. Those who are behind this plot must be developing the idea of overthrowing the Japan Conference, because they fear the growing momentum for constitutional revision. We have a membership of slightly less than 40,000. Other groups are far bigger than us.
Q: But a parliamentarians’ league that supports your organization is joined by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and many other influential politicians.
Momochi: Our parliamentarians’ group indeed has many influential people and incumbent cabinet ministers, but this holds true for other parliamentarians’ leagues. We would appreciate the Abe government’s implementing policies we want, but it is not necessarily aligned with us [on every corner]. That is why we struggle. Constitutional revision is one example. We want the government to hasten efforts, but that is not the case in reality.
Q: The statement issued on the 70th anniversary of the end of war contains the language “remorse” and sparked criticism of Abe from conservative critics.
Momochi: We understand that the criticism comes mainly from pundits who support ideological purity. We roll out “national campaigns,” so we understand Abe’s stance that needs to pay consideration to the reality. We continue to have high hopes on Abe
Sunday, November 27, 2016
The think tanks of Donald Trump
Jason Stahl discussing his forthcoming book on conservative think tanks
at the Library of Congress in January 2010
Heritage's Dr. James Carafano is reportedly overseeing the National Security/Foreign Policy transition.
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| click to order |
Aside from the Heritage Foundation, the other think tanks that are said to have some influence on Mr. Trump's thinking are less well-known, less establishment mainstream. Many are funded by the Koch Brothers who opposed Mr. Trump and are pro-free trade. As Politico observed: "The president-elect, in filling out his transition team and administration, has drawn heavily from the vast network of donors and advocacy groups built by the billionaire industrialist brothers, who have sought to reshape American politics in their libertarian image."
The traditional think tank homes of foreign policy professionals appear to have fallen out of favor. This interesting phenomenon will test the theory that think tanks are merely lobbying platforms as opposed to sources for original thinking as funders, especially foreign, will reconsider their investments.
Here are those that are mentioned:
· American Action Forum, https://www.americanactionforum.org/.
· American Civil Rights Union, http://www.theacru.org/mission-statement/.
· American Crossroads, http://www.americancrossroads.org/
· American Enterprise Inst. (AEI), http://www.aei.org/
· American Foreign Policy Council, http://www.afpc.org/
· Americans for Prosperity, http://americansforprosperity.org/national-site
· Americans for Tax Reform, http://www.atr.org/
· Atlas Economic Research Foundation, http://atlasnetwork.org/
· Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/
· Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/.
· Center for International Private Enterprise, http://www.cipe.org/ .
· Center for Public Justice, http://www.cpjustice.org/public/page/content/homepage
· Center for Security Policy, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/
· Center for the National Interest, http://www.cftni.org/
· Charles Koch Institute, https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/
· Competitive Enterprise Institute, http://www.cei.org/
· Concerned Veterans for America, https://cv4a.org/
· Conservative Action Project, http://conservativeactionproject.com/
· Cornwall Alliance, http://cornwallalliance.org/
· Council for National Policy, http://www.cfnp.org/
· Economic Strategy Institute, http://www.econstrat.org/
· Employment Policies Institute, https://www.epionline.org/
· Family Research Council, http://www.frc.org/
· Federalist Society, http://www.fed-soc.org/
· Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), http://www.fpri.org/
· Freedom Works, http://www.freedomworks.org
· Frontiers of Freedom, https://www.ff.org/
· Heartland Institute, http://www.heartland.org/
· Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/
· Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/
· Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/
· Institute for Energy Research, http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/
· Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, http://www.ifpa.org
· Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/
· International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC), http://www.strategycenter.net/
· Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/.
· Manhattan Institute, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
· Mercatus Center (George Mason U), https://www.mercatus.org/
· Project 2049 Institute, http://project2049.net
· Tax Foundation, http://taxfoundation.org/.
· The Foreign Policy Initiative, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/
· The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/
· United States Business and Industry Council, http://americaneconomicalert.org/default.asp
To research see:
· American Action Forum, https://www.americanactionforum.org/.
· American Civil Rights Union, http://www.theacru.org/mission-statement/.
· American Crossroads, http://www.americancrossroads.org/
· American Enterprise Inst. (AEI), http://www.aei.org/
· American Foreign Policy Council, http://www.afpc.org/
· Americans for Prosperity, http://americansforprosperity.org/national-site
· Americans for Tax Reform, http://www.atr.org/
· Atlas Economic Research Foundation, http://atlasnetwork.org/
· Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/
· Center for Immigration Studies, http://cis.org/.
· Center for International Private Enterprise, http://www.cipe.org/ .
· Center for Public Justice, http://www.cpjustice.org/public/page/content/homepage
· Center for Security Policy, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/
· Center for the National Interest, http://www.cftni.org/
· Charles Koch Institute, https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/
· Competitive Enterprise Institute, http://www.cei.org/
· Concerned Veterans for America, https://cv4a.org/
· Conservative Action Project, http://conservativeactionproject.com/
· Cornwall Alliance, http://cornwallalliance.org/
· Council for National Policy, http://www.cfnp.org/
· Economic Strategy Institute, http://www.econstrat.org/
· Employment Policies Institute, https://www.epionline.org/
· Family Research Council, http://www.frc.org/
· Federalist Society, http://www.fed-soc.org/
· Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), http://www.fpri.org/
· Freedom Works, http://www.freedomworks.org
· Frontiers of Freedom, https://www.ff.org/
· Heartland Institute, http://www.heartland.org/
· Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/
· Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/
· Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/
· Institute for Energy Research, http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/
· Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, http://www.ifpa.org
· Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/
· International Assessment and Strategy Center (IASC), http://www.strategycenter.net/
· Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/.
· Manhattan Institute, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
· Mercatus Center (George Mason U), https://www.mercatus.org/
· Project 2049 Institute, http://project2049.net
· Tax Foundation, http://taxfoundation.org/.
· The Foreign Policy Initiative, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/
· The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/
· United States Business and Industry Council, http://americaneconomicalert.org/default.asp
To research see:
Free Trade Think Tank Directory, http://freedomtotrade.org/coalition
How the Tea Party thinks about think tanks, http://atlasnetwork.org/blog/2010/08/think-tank-primer/
Organization that tracks the Tea Party, Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org
How the Tea Party thinks about think tanks, http://atlasnetwork.org/blog/2010/08/think-tank-primer/
Organization that tracks the Tea Party, Think Progress, http://thinkprogress.org
The following two conferences held this year also give insight into who may be have some influence:
Advancing American Security: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy by the Charles Koch Institute (May 2016)
Advancing American Security: The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy by the Charles Koch Institute (May 2016)
The best blog on think tanks, Think Tank Watch, however, finds an interesting anomaly in the sources of Trump inspiration.
Meet Trump's New Favorite Think Tank (July 1, 2016)
Presumed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has a new favorite think tank, and it is not who you think. You may have guessed something like the Heritage Foundation or the Hudson Institute or even the Hoover Institution. Wrong, wrong, and wrong.
Trump's new favorite think tank is the liberal, union-backed think tank Economic Policy Institute (EPI). No folks, we are not making this up. On June 28 Trump gave an economic and trade speech which frequently cited statistics from EPI. In fact, in a footnoted version of the speech, he cited EPI 20 times. There was nary a single citation from a conservative think tank, which he also relies on from time to time.
The only other think tanks mentioned in the citations were the liberal Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and the conservative Tax Foundation, which each had one citation.
EPI, of course, it not too keen on being linked to Donald Trump, and has called his latest take on trade a "scam." After all, EPI bills itself as the first (and the premier) think tank to focus on the economic conditions of low- and middle-income Americans and their families. Being linked to a billionaire is a huge no-no.
From 2010 to 2014, about 57% of EPI funding came from foundation grants, while another 27% came from labor unions. The remainder came from a mix of organizations, corporations, individuals, and others.
The Wall Street Journal recently called EPI "the AFL-CIO's think tank," referring to the largest federation of unions in the United States.
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