LDP's September 27 Presidential Election

Unusual Developments in the LDP’s Presidential Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 2, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

As the campaign season for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enters its initial stages, an unprecedentedly substantial number of candidates – twelve – emerged. Some of them have secured the support of the 20 lawmakers necessary for nomination, while others are still searching. However, it is unclear whether the LDP can demonstrate that it has turned away from its old-style politics that have included obscure political funds and a balance of power among factions. 
 
The day after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said that he would not pursue another term, he encouraged the Ministers in his Cabinet not to hesitate to run in the LDP presidential election. “There must be someone who will consider running in the presidential election. I hope you can make fair discussions as far as it does not disturb your work,” Kishida told them in a Cabinet Meeting on August 15.
 
Kishida’s comment ignited the race. Some ministers immediately expressed their desire to run. “I hope I can make use of my experiences as minister someday,” said Digital Minister Taro Kono. Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa expressed determination to take action for her candidacy with deliberation. Even Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito stepped forward, revealing that some of his colleagues expect him to run.
 
Those moves accelerated the decisions of other possible candidates. The next day, Kono met with the boss of his faction, Taro Aso, to request his endorsement. Aso received a similar request from LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi. Aso approved Kono’s candidacy and told Motegi that he would not have the support of the faction as a whole.
 
Others announced their candidacies within the following days. In addition to Kono, former Minister for Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former Defense Minister and LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi all said that they would run.
 
Former Minister of Environment Shinjiro Koizumi and Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi followed. As did former Minister for Women’s Empowerment Seiko Noda, former Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare Katsunobu Kato, and conservative lawmaker Shigeharu Aoyama.
Among those 12, Kobayashi, Ishiba and Kono held press conferences before the end of August. Hayashi, Motegi, Koizumi, Takaichi and Kato will hold theirs in early September. Those eight lawmakers are reportedly confident that they have secured the endorsement of 20 LDP members in the Diet, as required in the LDP presidential election rules. Noda, Aoyama, Kamikawa, and Saito have not yet collected.
 
Under the rules of presidential election, each LDP lawmaker has one vote for a total of 367 votes. Local party members also may vote, but, regardless of the number of local voters, their votes are aggregated to create a pool of votes that are equivalent to 367 of the lawmaker votes. The pool votes are then allocated among the candidates on pro rata basis.
 
Election to the presidency requires a simple majority of the total votes of lawmakers and local, which will be 734, in the first round. If there is no victor in that round, the party will hold a runoff between the two top candidates. While the Diet members still have total 367 votes in the second round, the votes of local party members are reduced to 47, representing each prefectural branch of the party. Each of 47 local votes will go to a candidate who was number one in the prefecture in the first round.
 
A candidate’s prospects can vary considerably between the first and later round. A popular candidate has advantage in the first round because the local votes carry significant weight. But in the later rounds, coalitions among the groups or factions matters can control a majority of the votes because the local member vote is significantly reduced. 
 
When the campaign officially starts on September 12, some of the 12 possible candidates may have dropped out of the race. Not all the candidates will have 20 endorsements. Even among those who do so far, supporters may shift their endorsements from one candidate to another by September 12.
 
If a candidate drops out, his or her supporters will move to other candidates, changing structure of the race. Some candidates will have a first-round advantage and will aggressively seek victory then. Others, however, will shoot for the second round, leading to elaborate arrangements among different groups. That is, the strategy for the second round will be based on factional politics.
 
The biggest topic of discussion so far is Koizumi’s entry into the race. As a young and hopeful lawmaker, whose father is former – and popular – prime minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi, Shinjiro Koizumi has changed the trend of the polls and overtaken Ishiba among the responders who would support the LDP, not necessarily the members of the LDP.
 
In the poll of Asahi Shimbun late August, Koizumi held 28 percent among the LDP supporters, leaving Ishiba (23 percent) behind. Former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, who had been the guardian of an earlier trilateral coalition of Ishiba, Koziumi and Kono, announced that he would support Koizumi this time.
 
Since local LDP leaders tend to be older, there is a speculation that the veteran Ishiba has the advantage over the young and unexperienced Koizumi in the local members’ voting on September 27.
 
For the candidates who lack broad popular support, how to survive the first round is a great concern. While they campaign among the local party members as much as they can, they and their supporters must consider how to vote in the second round if they are not one of the top two vote getters.
 
Negotiations for the runoff are ongoing behind the scenes right now. Typically, in an LDP presidential election, some leaders who support different candidates in the first round will seek to form a coalition to take united action in the second-round runoff.
 
Possible candidates for LDP presidential election

Name	Age	Cabinet Minister of	LDP Board	Former Job	University
ISHIBA, Shigeru	67	Defense, Agriculture, Local Revitalization	Secretary General,	Mitsui Bank	Keio
KONO, Taro	61	Digital, MOFA, Defense, Administrative Reform	Public Affairs	Fuji Xerox	Georgetown
KOIZUMI, Shinjiro	43	Environment		Father’s Secretary	Kanto Gakuin
KOBAYASHI, Takayuki	49	Economic Security		MOF	Tokyo
MOTEGI, Toshimitsu	68	MOFA, METI, Economic Revitalization	SG, Election Strategy	McKinsey	Tokyo
HAYASHI, Yoshimasa	63	CCS, MOFA, Defense, Education, Agriculture		Mitsui & Co., Secretary	Tokyo
TAKAICHI, Sanae	63	Economic Security, Internal Affairs	Policy Research	Newscaster	Kobe
KATO, Katsunobu	68	MHLW, CCS, Childbirth	General Council	MOF	Tokyo
KAMIKAWA, Yoko	71	MOFA, Justice, Childbirth		Mitsubishi Research	Tokyo
NODA, Seiko	63	Internal Affairs, Women’s Empowerment, Postal	General Council	Imperial Hotel	Sophia
SAITO, Ken	65	METI, Justice, Agriculture		METI	Tokyo
AOYAMA, Shigeharu	72			Kyodo News	Waseda

(Incumbent is underscored)
 
CDP Race with Old Faces
The leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), will hold its leader’s election on September 23. A former head of the party Yukio Edano and former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda have announced their bids. The incumbent head, Kenta Izumi, plans to run for a second term. He is still collecting endorsements in the party.
 
Although Edano and Noda have secured 20 endorsements (the same threshold as the LDP’s), Izumi still struggles to gather enough. There is little chance for any new face to emerge. A freshwoman, Harumi Yoshida, and some others hope to run, but have little confidence that they can secure 20 endorsements.
  
Noda has said that the election should not be a race of the old faces – yet he has sought and received the support of the veteran kingmaker Ichiro Ozawa. Edano meanwhile is backed by the biggest faction in the CDP, called Sanctuary.
 
In their press conferences for their candidacies, Edano and Noda made clear their intent to take administration back from the LDP. But the way forward is not clear. They try to approach the Democratic Party for the People and Japan. But the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) still rejects cooperation with the CDP. A coalition with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is not a realistic choice, but Edano and Noda have not denied cooperation with the JCP in some districts.
 
Behind the race between the two veteran leaders, CDP members are frustrated that the party has not achieved an obvious boost in the polls because of the LDP’s slush fund scandal.   
 
The greatest concern for the CDP is not attracting the public attention away from the LDP.
 
Possible candidates for CDP leader’s election

Name	Age	Cabinet Position	Party Board	Former Job	University
EDANO, Yukio	60	CCS, METI, Administrative Reform	Head	Lawyer	Tohoku
NODA, Yoshihiko	67	Prime Minister, MOF	Head (DPJ)	Chiba Prefectural Assembly	Waseda
IZUMI, Kenta	50		Head	Secretary	Ritsumeikan
YOSHIDA, Harumi	52			Secretary	Rikkyo
MABUCHI, Sumio	64	MLIT	Diet Affairs	General, Co.	Yokohama National
EDA, Kenji	68		SG (Your Party)	METI	Tokyo

(Incumbent is underscored)

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Kishida Stands Down

How new will the next Japanese PM be?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 21, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

On August 14, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced at his press conference that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election this coming September. His campaign would have been for a second term as president of the LDP. The new party leader elected on September 27 will become the next prime minister of Japan by virtue of the LDP’s voting power in the Diet. 

An extraordinary session of the Diet is expected next month after the LDP election in order to vote on the next prime minister. The date has not yet been selected. When it is, this will mark the end of the current highly unusual political situation in which a wildly unpopular prime minister has overstayed his tenure.

In his press conference, Kishida emphasized the need for change in the LDP. “It is necessary for the LDP to show its change before the nation. The first step for it, which is very easy for the people to understand, is that I am going to stand down. I will not run for coming presidential election,” said Kishida. His diplomatic work had ended the day before after a telephone call with the prime minister of Mongolia.

In aftermath of the LDP slush fund scandal, Kishida lost public confidence when he failed to explain how and why the kickback system of ticket sales for fundraising parties was created and operated. His inability to regain public support led to miserable defeats in the April by-elections of the House of Representatives. These losses generated serious concerns among LDP lawmakers about the coming elections of both houses of the Diet.

Kishida alienated himself from other LDP lawmakers by dissolving his faction, the Kochi-kai, and then by appearing before the Political Ethics Council of the Diet to describe his own involvement in the slush fund scandal while urging other LDP lawmakers to take responsibility. The lawmakers were frustrated with Kishida and demanded his resignation. Under these circumstances, Kishida could not keep his administration going.

Kishida confessed, as the LDP president, he felt responsible when details of the slush fund scandal first began to emerge. This created expectations that he would step down over the summer. And he has.

The race to succeed Kishida will be short and fast. Former LDP Secretary General and former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba announced his candidacy, if he would be able to secure necessary nominators, as soon as Kishida ended his press conference. The current Secretary General, Toshimitsu Motegi, has not hidden his ambition either. Within hours of Kishida’s announcement, Motegi had a one-on-one meeting with LDP Vice President Taro Aso.

The race likely will be between those two men. Two former prime ministers, Aso and Yoshihide Suga, who hope to maintain behind-the-scenes leadership, may influence the race. Aso would prefer Motegi in order to control the next administration. Ishiba would be the better vehicle for Suga. But it is unclear whether Ishiba will want or need Suga’s support.

Other possible contenders include Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi, Digital Minister Taro Kono, and former Minister for Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi. However, each of them is still struggling to marshal support in the LDP. Kono’s faction boss, Aso, has yet to endorse him. Takaichi has not expanded her wing of the LDP beyond ultra conservatives. And Kobayashi has not built a significant youth movement.

One of the biggest obstacles for the lesser contenders is LDP election law. Article 10 of the Rules for Election of President of the LDP states that “only those members nominated by at least 20 Party Diet members shall be accepted as candidates.” Collecting 20 supporters is not easy, because those supporters will be isolated if their candidate loses in the presidential election. Twenty supporters have to be ready for exclusion from cabinet posts and party leadership positions, if they fail. The 20-person requirement means that four or five candidates would be the maximum number. 

So long as the 20 party-member requirement remains in place, factional politics will be the order of the day. The supporters of the winner become mainstream in the next administration and act as a quasi-faction. To maintain collective power in politics, LDP lawmakers take collective action. The meeting between two leaders of the former Kochi-kai, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi and former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, on the same day of Kishida’s announcement demonstrated that they would maintain their factions.

Both the former Abe and Nikai factions are too fragmented after the slush fund scandal to unite in the presidential election. Some members are no longer affiliated with the LDP. It is possible that the LDP will field new candidates against their former members in the next election. That is what former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi did in the postal reform election in 2005 against his political enemies. An old-time kingmaker, Shin Kanemaru, once said that factional breakdown was “dispersed horse manure in a river stream (maguso-no-kawa-nagare).”

Although young LDP lawmakers have expressed concerns about factional politics, the LDP has no choice. The opposition parties criticize the LDP’s routine replacement of a leader in order to escape responsibility for any failure, in this case the slush fund scandal. The opposition also derides the LDP’s factional politics as old-fashioned.

Yet, it is undeniable that the LDP remains the choice of voters in Japan. The opposition parties have not presented a clear alternative to the LDP. They have never agreed on basic policies such as constitutional amendments or nuclear power generation. It is necessary for them to propose which parties will construct a new administration and who will be the prime minister. The leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, needs to discuss its idea for a new administration in its September 23 presidential election—four days prior to the LDP’s presidential election.

The Sado Gold Mine Decision

General Masaharu Homma
"Beast of Bataan"
Sado Island was family fiefdom

Is Compromise Over History Possible?

First published on the Korea Economic Institute website, August 14, 2024

BY Daniel Sneider, APP Member, is a Lecturer of International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University and a Non-Resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

The transformation of relations between South Korea and Japan during the past two-plus years is one of the signal accomplishments of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. However, there remain doubts over the durability of this achievement. A troubling question remains whether the historical past of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea will again roil relations. The ongoing division between the two countries over colonial and wartime history, alongside Korean demands for historical justice, is again on display in recent weeks.

Background and Controversy Surrounding the Sado Gold Mine

On July 27, the World Heritage Committee of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) formally granted the prized World Heritage Site status to the gold mines located on Japan’s Sado Island. Submitted to UNESCO in 2015, Japan had included the mines on a list of sites that supported its industrial revolution. The Sado gold mines were developed during the Tokugawa era and played an important role in Japan’s modernization. Although the mines are no longer operational, they have been preserved as a historical site for tourists.

The controversy surrounding Japan’s application centers on the wartime history of the mines and the use of Korean workers to carry out dangerous mining operations. The South Korean government and civic activists opposed the granting of World Heritage status to the gold mines. Koreans, along with numerous Western and Japanese historians, insist that many of the workers were brought to the mines against their will, either through coercion or deception. The objections to the granting of World Heritage status rested on compelling Japan to acknowledge the role of Korean forced labor at the site itself and in its official accounts.

The Sado decision reflected a compromise by Japan that was supported by the South Korean government and reached through diplomatic negotiations. It included an agreement by Japan to present the role of Korean workers and their harsh working conditions, as well as hold an annual ceremony to pay respect to them. An exhibit at a museum near the site was created to provide information on the more than 1,500 Korean laborers who worked there, including the fact that they faced more dangerous conditions than their Japanese counterparts and other harsh measures.

However, it avoided using the term “forced labor,” which the Japanese government has always opposed. Within Korea, this compromise has been assailed, particularly by the opposition Democratic Party and Korean media commentary. The Yoon government has been accused of deliberately and misleadingly claiming that Japan had agreed to fully accept this history.

“The Japanese government had never acknowledged the concept of forced labor,” former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo told this writer in an email exchange. Even in the case of Battleship Island (discussed below), it tried to find language that avoided the term. “This time, it seemed the negotiations did not squarely address this issue.”

Nonetheless, Ambassador Shin believes that the compromise was justified. “My hunch is that the Korean government strove to put more emphasis on the real teaching of history to the visitors to the site than arguments on the wording,” the former diplomat, who remains active on relations with Japan, said. “We need to assess the outcome as a product of diplomatic compromise, given the big gap between the two sides on their historical views.”

Japan Fails to Fill Out the History

At the time of the 2015 application, the Japanese government, then led by the late Abe Shinzo, denied the forced nature of Korean labor and discrimination against Koreans at the sites. But UNESCO insisted that Japan clearly admit that “a large number of Koreans and others…were brought against their will and forced to work under harsh conditions in the 1940s at some of the sites.”

The coal mine operated on Japan’s Hashima Island, popularly known as Battleship Island, was granted World Heritage status in 2015, but only after Japan agreed to include the “full history” that would “allow an understanding that there were a large number of Koreans and others who were brought against their will and forced to work under harsh conditions in the 1940s at some of the sites.” Even then, a follow-up monitoring team found in 2021 that the information center failed to do this.

In the case of the Sado Mine, historians have documented that at least 1,519 Koreans were forced to work from 1939 until the end of World War II. The initial application filed by the local government, which sought the status to promote tourism to the island, made no mention of the wartime era. It confined itself to the history of the mines during the Tokugawa and Meiji era (until 1912), seeking to avoid this controversy.

The Korean government opposed this application, as did UNESCO experts. UNESCO’s International Council on Monuments and Sites requested that the Japanese applicants deal with the wartime period, and a supplemental document was submitted to respond to this issue. The document offers a description of three phases of labor “recruitment” that implies the Korean workers voluntarily agreed to work at the mines until 1944, when labor “requisition” was compulsory. The Japanese official document also asserts that there was no discrimination between Korean and Japanese workers and that the Koreans were paid wages.

The descriptions of the phases of “recruitment” in the document are “misleading,” Dr. Nikolai Johnsen, a British scholar at the University of London who has researched and written extensively on this history, told this writer. The workers were signed up by agents supported by the colonial government “who compelled large groups of men from impoverished Korean villages to take up dangerous work in Japan under false pretenses.” During the second phase, which began in 1942, the colonial regime directly selected the workers, and opposition “often had dire consequences” in the form of “forced mobilization,” the scholar said.

Further, Johnsen explained that “claiming this system was non-discriminatory is simply historical denialism.” Wages and working conditions were far from equal, and much of the wages were never paid, held in accounts by Mitsubishi but never released.

The Japanese account also uses the term “workers from the Korean Peninsula,” a formulation that treats Koreans as subjects of the Japanese Empire and refuses to recognize them as foreign forced laborers. “Recognition of the true character of this history would greatly elevate the universal value of the Sado mines as a UNESCO World Heritage site,” Johnsen wrote in a paper published two years ago. “They cannot be suppressed for the sake of instilling pride in future Japanese generations to the neglect of the victims.”

Lingering Disputes and the Shadow of History

This is not an issue confined to the question of World Heritage status. Suits filed in Korea by Korean workers and their descendants against Japanese companies who used forced labor – and in the case of these mines, Mitsubishi Materials – were a central part of the downturn in Korea-Japan relations in 2018. The successful rulings in favor of the workers, who demanded compensation for unpaid wages, remain an issue despite the Yoon administration’s decision last year to resolve the problem by using a Korean-funded foundation to settle the demands.

That is quite distinct from the way Mitsubishi Materials dealt with a suit filed by Chinese forced laborers that was settled in Chinese courts in 2016 with compensation payments and an apology from the company. The company also offered similar apologies [sic, there was only one apology] to American POWs used as forced labor in their mines during the war. The contrast with Japan’s approach to Korea remains problematic, to say the least.

As noted, the Yoon administration’s drive to improve relations with Tokyo is a signal accomplishment. From the standpoint of geopolitics, the most notable consequence of this improvement has been the deepening of trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan. However, both trilateral ties and improved bilateral relations with Japan remain vulnerable not only to a change in political leadership but also to the lingering and potentially explosive effects of unaddressed historical grievances.

Japan's Expanding Security Commitments

The 2+2 Solidifies Security Cooperation between Japan and the U.S.

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 29, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

On July 28, the secretaries and ministers for foreign affairs and defense of both Japan and the United States issued a joint statement following the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in Tokyo. Their statement focused on enhancing the interoperability of Japan and U.S. forces, including a new command system in each country’s defense organization, procurement of defense equipment and upgrading the countries’ discussion of extended deterrence. This cooperation is intended to counter recent demonstrations of military strength by China, Russia, and North Korea.

With the National Defense Strategy in 2022, Japan decided to establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to unify the commands of the three Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in order to reinforce its military readiness. The Diet finally passed a bill in May to set up the headquarters in the Ministry of Defense by the end of FY 2024.

Along with these internal actions in Japan, the 2+2 joint statement notes the U.S. intention to reconstitute the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters. The statement thus implemented the joint statement of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the U.S. President Joe Biden from April of this year, which announced that both countries would upgrade their command and control frameworks for greater interoperability.

Both countries are consolidating their commands in order to address the evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and to plan for contingencies regarding Taiwan. The USFJ has been under jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. To better integrate operations and strengthen interoperability and planning between Japan and the U.S., the U.S. will give the USFJ greater autonomy.

While the principle of interoperability assumes the equivalence of both forces, there is a concern in Japan that the JSDF will be a junior partner to the USFJ given the JSDF dependence on the USFJ for information, capabilities, and decision making. Some hope that the commander of the USJF will have the rank of General to balance the titles of both commanders.

The 2+2 also agreed to cooperate more in manufacturing defense equipment. Quoting the joint statement, “the Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).”

At their summit meeting in April, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden agreed to convene a forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). The 2+2 confirmed this decision and encouraged efforts in both the public and private sectors to improve missile technology, as well as supply chain resilience and repair of ships and aircrafts.

In 2023, the Japanese government eased restrictions on exports of defense equipment to the U.S. by revising the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Because Japanese manufacturers have been producing defense equipment under a U.S. license, exports of this equipment to the U.S. would be allowed. The 2+2 agreed that Japanese manufacturers would export to the U.S. about 3 billion yen’s worth of Patriot missiles.

A highlight of the 2+2 meetings was an upgrading of the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to the minister level. Both governments have conducted EDD at a senior official level since 2010. Both countries now recognize a need to enhance cooperation on deterrence, given the current military environment.

The first minister-level EDD was held at the 2+2. The joint statement described concerns with “North Korea’s continued destabilizing behavior and sustained pursuit of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, China’s accelerating and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and Russia’s undermining of arms control and the global nonproliferation regime.” Their concerns grew out of a 2023 DOD report on China’s military capability. That report indicated that China could acquire over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.

However, EDD means that Japan will rely further on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Some Japanese newspapers noted that the Kishida administration has sent contradictory signals. As the chairman of the G7 Hiroshima Summit 2023, Kishida promoted a world without nuclear weapons. Yet the elevation of EDD might, according to a nuclear disarmament expert quoted in the Tokyo Shimbun, give North Korea a justification for its nuclear weapons arsenal.

The biggest reason for Japan and the U.S. to enhance their security cooperation is the growing power of China in the Indo-Pacific region. “The Ministers concurred that the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy seeks to reshape that international order for its own benefit at the expense of others,” said the 2+2 joint statement. China’s behavior is regarded as a serious concern to the alliance and the international community. The two governments reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands under the Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Japan, meanwhile, keeps on trying to maintain a diplomatic channel with China. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wan Yi in Laos behind the backdrop of ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The two countries intend to strengthen their “strategically reciprocal relationship.” However, the meeting yielded no concrete results.

The 2+2 meeting reflected the fact that both Japan and the U.S. must solidify their security cooperation given the volatility of leadership in both countries. President Joe Biden has announced his withdrawal from the presidential election in November. If Republican Donald Trump is reelected it is uncertain if he would maintain the bilateral relationship. He has argued that U.S. allies, including Japan, have not paid their fair share of defense costs, relying instead on U.S. support.

As for Japan, Kishida’s unpopularity augurs poorly for his continuation as prime minister after the Liberal Democratic Party elections in September. Recent secrets and corruption scandals in the Defense Ministry and JSDF combine with Yasukuni Shrine visits by JSDF officers and the undisclosed sexual violence by U.S. servicemen undermine trust between the two militaries as well as the Japanese public. Officials in both countries, thus, hope the 2+2 statement will institutionalize existing bilateral agreements and encourage greater accountability.

Monday Asia Events July 29, 2024

AEROSPACE NATION: GEN JAMES C. SLIFE, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE. 7/29, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speakers: Gen James C. Slife, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. 

ON THE BRINK: ISRAEL AND HEZBOLLAH. 7/29, 11:00am (EDT), ZOOM. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: IDF Major General (ret.) Yaakov Amidror; Israel's former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister IDF Major General (ret.) Amikam Norkin; Former Commander of the Israeli Air Force, Blaise Misztal (Vice President for Policy, JINSA). 

FORGING STRONGER CONNECTIONS: LEVERAGING MILITARY DIPLOMACY AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 7/29, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: East-West Center in Washington. Speakers: BG (ret.) Rory Copinger-Symes, Royal Marines, United Kingdom; Lt. Col. (ret.) Andre Rivier, Foreign Area Officer, United States Army.

STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS: GLOBAL REGULATION AND LITIGATION. 7/29, 12:30-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Mark Cohen, Research Fellow, UC-Berkeley Haas Business School, fmr. Senior Intellectual Property Attaché, U.S. Embassy in Beijing; David Long, Founder, Managing Director, Essential Patents LLC; Eric Stasik, Founder, Managing Director, Avvika; Richard Vary, Partner, Bird and Bird..

STRENGTHENING AIR AND SPACE POWER: A CONVERSATION WITH UNDERSECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE MELISSA DALTON. 7/29, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speaker: Melissa Dalton, Undersecretary of the Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense. 

Japan's Defense Ministry on the Eve of an Enhanced Alliance

Unprecedented Mass Discipline in Japan’s Defense Ministry

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 22, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Ministry of Defense announced on July 12 an unprecedented discipline of 218 members of the ministry and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The charges covered unauthorized access to and misuse of highly sensitive information, falsification of records of exercise allowances, and harassment. Structural problems in the ministry and the SDF enabled the misconduct and cannot be immediately corrected.

The charges based on the mishandling of sensitive information were based on evidence that some unqualified crews in the Maritime Self-defense Force (MSDF) could access “specially designated secrets.” The information included the location of ships as displayed on the monitoring screen in the bridge or in the combat information center on board destroyers and other ships. Some unqualified members had not only accessed the information but handled it.

The Specially Designated Secrets Protection Act, enacted in 2014, identified certain information in diplomacy, security, espionage activities and terrorism as specially designated secrets. Although the legislation was criticized as a possible infringement on freedom of press, it was not the press, but the SDF that breached the law on a large scale.

The charges relating to record falsification involved diving exercises as training for rescuing crew of sunk submarines. Divers received monetary awards based on the time and depth of their dives. But the officers falsified these measurements to provide larger allowances to the divers.

After news of the scandal broke last November, the ministry announced the arrest of four MSDF members on charges of forgery of official documents this month. Although the ministry said that the amount of the payments based on false records of allowance was 43 million yen, it increased that number to 53 million yen a week later. The ministry has been criticized for its delay in disclosing this information.

The ministry also revealed that some MSDF members did not pay for meals in its facilities. Twenty-two members were punished. The nonpayments amounted to 1.6 million yen.

Finally, the ministry punished three officers in the civilian section of the ministry for harassment of their subordinances. The harassment took the form of emails asserting that the staff had been doing their jobs in a way that was hard to understand or claiming that they were immature. Some of the staff suffered mental breakdowns as a result.

MSDF Chief of Staff Ryo Sakai took responsibility for the failed oversight of the individuals involved and stepped down. Other Chiefs of Staff for the Joint Staff, Ground SDF and Air SDF were reprimanded. The Minister of Defense, Minoru Kihara, and the administrative vice-minister offered to return a part of their salaries. “Every case I announced today is a betrayal against the people and something that should have never happened,” said Kihara in his press conference.

Defense of Japan, the ministry’s annual white paper, which was published on the same day as the crimes were announced, ironically noted the importance of protecting secret information. Citing examples of leaks of specially designated secrets in 2022 and 2023, the white paper indicated that measures to prevent leaks were not working well. The misuse of sensitive information by members of the MSDF occurred before the ministry established new measures.

The Specially Designated Secrets Protection Act 2014 is one of the most controversial pieces of legislation of the Shinzo Abe administration. In this, it joins laws on the right of collective self-defense and the then-new crime of conspiracy. At the time, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wanted to confirm by statute the protection of sensitive secrets in order to share important information with allies such as the United States. Abe intended the legislation to blunt criticism that his administration violated freedom of the press or the right of privacy. Abe and his successors spent time and energy on battles with their political opponents at the expense of training personnel who would administer the law.

Most members who mishandled specially designated secrets or who falsely recorded allowances did it because their predecessors had done the same thing. It is a feature of Japanese culture that a crime will be tolerated if someone had done it before.

My personal view is that in comparing Japan and the U.S. one need to understand that there is a fundamental difference in education. If education is a process to raise worthy citizens for society, an ideal adult for Japan is someone who can act as others do and keep opinions to oneself. In the U.S., an adult is someone who can clearly and persuasively argue for one’s own opinion. The MSDF members, or everyone in Japan, have been educated to do as their predecessors did. International observers have a hard time understanding this.

The Asahi Shimbun previously revealed that Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which is now building submarines for the MSDF, is suspected of paying for gifts and dinners for MSDF members. In light of the SDF Ethics Act, which prohibits JSDF members from using their positions for private gain, the decline of morality in the MSDF is unconcealable.

Both Houses of the Diet are taking action. The Liberal Democratic Party and the Constitutional Democratic Party of each House have agreed to hold a committee meeting on the issue during the recess. The opposition parties will charge that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida delayed the ministry’s announcement to conceal a scandal inconvenient for the administration. In sum, this Defense Ministry scandal is another black mark against the Kishida administration.

Monday Asia Events July 22, 2024

RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES - IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION. 7/22, 5:30am (EDT), 6:30pm (JST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Konstantin von Eggert, MBE, Russian affairs analyst, Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster.

SCHRIEVER SPACEPOWER SERIES: MAJ GEN TIMOTHY J. SEJBA, COMMANDER, SPACE TRAINING AND READINESS COMMAND. 7/22, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute. Speaker: Maj. Gen. Timothy J. Sejba, Commander, Space Training and Readiness Command, United States Space Force.

CHINA’S THIRD PLENUM: A PLAN FOR RENEWED REFORM? 7/22, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS; Bonny Lin, Director, China Power Project, Senior Fellow, Asian Security, CSIS; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Daniel H. Rosen, Co-Founder, Rhodium Group; Lingling Wei, Chief China Correspondent, Wall Street Journal.

WHAT WE LEARNED FROM THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION. 7/22, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Elaine Kamarck, Founding Director, Center for Effective Public Management, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; E.J. Dionne, Jr., W. Averell Harriman Chair, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Henry Olsen, Senior Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center; A.B. Stoddard, Columnist, The Bulwark.

UNPACKING IRAN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: DRIVERS AND IMPLICATIONS. 7/22, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Holly Dagres, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Arash Ghafouri, CEO, Stasis Consulting; Alex Vatanka, Director of Iran Program, Middle East Institute; Nazee Moinian, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute. 

SHIFTING THE TRADE PARADIGM: CAN WE DO BETTER FOR GLOBAL CITIZENS (AND DEMOCRACY)? 7/22, 11:00-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Speakers: Katherine Tai, United States Trade Representative; Prof.Simon Johnson, MIT, CEPR Fellow. 

BUILDING A STRATEGY TO COUNTER HONG KONG’S ROLE IN SANCTIONS EVASION. 7/22, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Olivia Enos, Senior Fellow; Samuel Bickett, Lawyer and Head, US-Hong Kong Policy Roundtable; Sunny Cheung, Associate Fellow for China, Jamestown Foundation.

PREPARING FOR A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA: NEXT GENERATION LEADERSHIP. 7/22, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Endowment for Democracy. Speakers Include: NED, ROK Ministry of Unification, Human Asia, and the “next generation of North Korean leaders.”.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE U.S.-U.K. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE AGE OF TRUMP, FARAGE, AND BREXIT. 7/22, 6:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heritage. Speakers: Matthew Goodwin, Professor, Politics and International Relations, University of Kent; Andrew Hale, Jay Van Andel Senior Policy Analyst, Trade Policy.

No Conclusion on Stable Imperial Succession

Empress Suiko (推古天皇) (554 – 15 April 628)

Still skittish on female succession

 
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Diet failed to act on stable imperial succession by the end of the ordinary session of this year. Although the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the House of Councillors looked for a way to increase the members of the Imperial House, the parties could not reach an agreement.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was late in wrapping up their internal opinions, due to the slush fund scandal and its consequences. Looking at the opinions submitted by the parties, it is not easy to find a consensus between the conservatives and the other sectors of the Diet.

The Imperial House of Japan has 17 members, 12 of whom are female. They share official duties such as attending public events or visiting foreign countries. According to the Imperial House Law, only male members may succeed to the throne. Female members leave the House when they marry. Currently, Prince Hisahito of Akishino, a son of Crown Price Fumihito, is the youngest in the line of succession.

A supplementary resolution in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication in 2017 required the Diet to achieve “a full consensus of the legislative branch” for measures to stabilize imperial succession. The resolution also directed the government of Japan to consider allowing for a female-headed Imperial family.

In March 2021, former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga assembled an expert panel to examine succession issues. That December, the panel submitted the Prime Minister, now Fumio Kishida, a report that proposed two options to deal with the declining number of members in the Imperial House. Neither, however, addressed female succession.

One was to allow female members of the imperial household to retain their royal status regardless of marriage. Members of the Imperial House take on various obligations of the Imperial family such as attending cultural, academic, or sporting events, visiting areas devastated by natural disasters, and visiting foreign countries. As female members leave the House, those obligations are taken by fewer members. If female members stay in the house, the House would be sustainable.

A second was to allow males from former branches of the imperial family to regain their imperial status through adoption. Two years after the end of World War II, fifty-one people from eleven houses left the Imperial House. The second option would return their male descendants to the Imperial House.

Kishida submitted the report to both Houses of the Diet for further discussion in January 2022.

Each party first reviewed the report internally. Komeito approved both options as reasonable. The Japan Innovation Party, leaning conservative, also approved both options as realistic. Both parties are comfortable that the options do not include female succession. The conservatives hope to maintain the rule of paternal succession.

The Constitutional Democratic Party asked for further discussion of the first option because the report excluded the husband and children of female House members from royal status. The CDP also requested information on who among the male members of the former branches would consider rejoining the Imperial House through adoption.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) would allow a female emperor, or an emperor descended matrilineally from the Imperial Family. While the JCP hopes to pave the way to a female emperor, conservative lawmakers oppose that idea.

The last party that submitted its opinion was the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP approved both options in mid-April.

Concerning the requirement of “a full consensus of the legislative branch” in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication, both Houses sought an overall agreement at several meetings in May. At the first meeting, with the speaker and president of the Houses and representatives of parties in attendance, each party expressed its own opinion. The LDP added that a son of an adopted male member should be qualified as a successor. No consensus emerged.

In late May, both chairs of the Houses and each party held separate meetings with each party. There was no plenary meeting. The LDP is committed to exclusively male succession. The CDP and the JCP are willing to expand the line of succession to female members of the Imperial House and to male members in matrilineal lines.

Back in 2005, the Junichiro Koizumi administration convened an expert panel that submitted a report recommended that the possibility of a female or matrilineal emperor be easily understood by the people, be based on traditional values and ensure a stable succession system. However, after Prince Hisahito was born in 2006, the LDP turned against the idea of a female or matrilineal emperor.

A Kyodo News poll last April revealed that 90 percent of those polled supported the idea of a reigning empress. However, the current experts’ panel recommended that, considering the age and marital status of Prince Hisahito, the discussion over the imperial succession take place in the future. In short, the LDP and current experts oppose the concept of a female emperor, while the CDP and former experts for Koizumi administration embrace it.

To the extent that the Diet is now dealing with the Imperial Family, it is focused on how to reduce the family’s official duties. But once lawmakers begin to discuss who should share the duties of the Imperial Family, the question of succession is unavoidable.

Monday Asia Events July 15, 2024

NATO AND NORTHEAST ASIA: AN EXPANDING PARTNERSHIP. 7/15, 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Masafumi Ishii, fmr. South Korean Ambassador to NATO; Hyoung Zhin Kim, fmr. Diplomat, ROK; Danny Russel, ASPI Vice President.

 
2024 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF TRADE AND TRADE POLICY - SEMINAR 1: GENDER-SEGMENTED LABOR MARKETS AND TRADE SHOCKS. 7/15, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: United States International Trade Commission. Speakers: Raymond Robertson, Texas A&M University; Carlos Góes, PhD Candidate, USCD Economics; Gladys Lopez Acevedo, Lead Economist, Global Lead, Poverty and Equity Global Practice, World Bank.

HOW ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES ARE RESHAPING MANUFACTURING. 7/15, 10:00am-NOON (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: John Hazen White, Jr., Executive Chairman, Taco Family of Companies, Trustee, Brookings; Bruce Lawler, Managing Director, MIT Machine Intelligence for Manufacturing and Operations, General Manager Digital, Re:Build Manufacturing; Helena Fu, Director, Office of Critical and Emerging Technologies, U.S. Department of Energy; Heather Evans, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manufacturing Industry & Analysis, International Trade Administration; Berardino Baratta, CEO, MxD.   

AEROSPACE NATION: LT GEN ANDREW J. GEBARA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION. 7/15, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speaker: Lt Gen Andrew J. Gebara, Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.

BOOK EVENT: DETERRENCE, DIPLOMACY AND THE RISK OF CONFLICT OVER TAIWAN BY BILL EMMOTT. 7/15, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), 3:00-4:00pm (BST), HYBRID. Sponsor: IISS. Speakers: author Bill Emmott, Chairman of the IISS Trustees, independent writer and consultant; Professor Phillips P. O’Brien, Professor of Strategic Studies, Head of the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4buPQiI

AI TRANSFORMATION AT THE DOD: A CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF DIGITAL AND AI OFFICER, DR. RADHA PLUMB. 7/15, 1:30-2:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speaker: Radha Plumb, Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer, Department of Defense.

Tokyo's Elections

Resentment against Existing Parties Shown in Tokyo Elections

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 8, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The incumbent governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike, secured her third term in the gubernatorial election on July 7. A contender supported by the opposition parties in national politics, Renho, came third behind an independent candidate, Shinji Ishimaru. The result, including by-elections for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, showed a fundamental resentment against existing political parties -- casting a shadow on the future of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

In her campaign Koike promised to update her policies, including support for families with children, and emphasized disaster management. She named her campaign policies “Tokyo Great Reform 3.0.”

Koike did not accept official support from the LDP and Komeito for her campaign. Still, both parties voluntarily promoted her. According to an exit poll of NHK, 60 percent of LDP supporters and 80 percent of Komeito supporters voted for Koike. They are undeniably the driving force behind Koike’s victory.

She successfully distanced herself from the LDP, which has been unpopular in the current election season. The party’s unpopularity dates to the by-elections for the House of Representatives in April and is the result of the slush fund scandal. Although Koike was formerly an LDP lawmaker, she separated from the LDP as the governor of Tokyo, leading her Tokyoites First Party. That stance made LDP’s “stealth support” for Koike easier.

Renho meanwhile failed to set her agenda within the structure of confrontation between the leading and opposition parties in national politics. When she announced her candidacy in May, Renho emphasized her bid against Koike as “anti-LDP, non-Koike.” But Koike eluded Renho’s campaign strategy, by refusing any help from the LDP on the campaign trail. Renho ironically lost her momentum by accepting support from the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP).

The true anti-LDP candidate turned out to be Ishimaru. As a former mayor of Aki-Takata City, Hiroshima, Ishimaru ran his campaign through social networking. In his speeches on the street, he asked his audience to upload his campaign materials to the Internet, instead appealing his own policies for Tokyo. In YouTube videos, he continued to denounce existing politics.

Unfortunately for Koike, she did not receive a true majority of the vote; the sum of votes for Renho and Ishimaru exceeded what Koike obtained. There were frequent disturbances during Koike’s speeches. It is undeniable that Koike was regarded by voters as one of the leaders of the old politics.

It was a comfortable outcome for the LDP, none the less. Since the complete defeat in all three by-elections of the House of Representatives in April, Koike’s win was the first major victory of a candidate supported by the LDP. Party leaders are not feeling it, though. “Koike’s victory is not our party’s victory. Criticisms still remain and we need to promote party reforms,” LDP Deputy Secretary General, Tomomi Inada, told NHK News.

The LDP’s pessimism is based on the result of the by-elections for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly that were held the same day. Although the LDP ran candidates in eight of nine districts, it won in only two. The party representation was reduced by three seats in the election, facing criticisms of its management of political funds as shown in the slush fund scandal in the Diet.

In the Hachioji district, an independent candidate defeated the LDP candidate by a great margin. Hachioji is the district where one of the leaders of the Abe faction, Koichi Hagiuda, has been keeping his seat in the House of Representatives. Although party leaders, including Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi and a popular candidate as the next prime minister Shigeru Ishiba, campaigned for the LDP candidate, their appearances did not soften the negative impact on the party.

In the Koto district, which overlaps with the Tokyo 15 district in the House of Representatives -- where the LDP lost in a by-election in April -- the LDP candidate lost to an independent. In the other four districts, the LDP lost by slight margins to the CDP, the Tokyoites First Party or an independent. Strangely enough, the LDP won by a big margin in the Itabashi district, which is in the grip of another leader of the Abe faction, Hakubun Shimomura, who is among the most conservative.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida did not stand on the stage of any campaigns in the Tokyo gubernatorial election or the by-elections of the assembly. It was obvious that Kishida would have received harsh criticism of his handling of the slush fund scandal from the audience. The result of the elections in Tokyo will work against Kishida’s reelection this fall.

Renho’s defeat cast doubt on the value of the CDP’s cooperation with the JCP.   Running Renho for Tokyo governor was a decision of the CDP with expectation that, in the party’s following winds from the major victories in the by-elections in April, she could sail to victory.

The CDP may reconsider its strategy for the next general election of the House of Representatives. The result of elections in Tokyo may also affect the selection of the next CDP leader in September.

The unexpected success of Ishimaru may affect the campaign strategies of the existing parties. Ishimaru proved that a campaign relying on SNS could overcome the biggest opposition party. He boasted that running against Prime Minister Kishida in his district in Hiroshima of the House of Representatives would be an option for him in the next election. His message against the politics of existing parties struck a chord with certain voters.

Frustration with current politics is reflected in the number of candidates. Fifty-six candidates ran for the one seat of governor, marking a new record. The public poster boards in the streets did not have room for all the candidates.

Tokyo gubernatorial election in 2024 was not completely an event for selecting the next governor of Tokyo. Some candidates did not intend to work as governor, but to collect money by selling an opportunity for voters to express their disappointment with the process or to earn more page views in SNS. The existing parties have begun to consider new legislation to regulate election campaigns. The biggest loser might be democracy in Japan.

Monday Asia Events July 8, 2024

NATIONAL CONSERVATISM CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, DC. 7/8-9, HYBRID. Sponsor: Edmund Burke Foundation. Speakers Include: Rt Hon Suella Braverman, KC MP, Secretary of State, Home Department and Member of Parliament for Fareham; Elbridge Colby, Co-founder, Principal, The Marathon Initiative; Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Senior United States Senator, Missouri; Ram Madhav, President of the India Foundation (IF); David P. Goldman, Deputy Editor, Asia Times. 

DAY ONE FOR THE NEW UK GOVERNMENT. 7/8, 1:00-2:15pm (BST), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Lord Simon McDonald, former Permanent Under Secretary, Head of Diplomatic Service, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Creon Butler, Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme; Dr Tim Benton, Director, Environment and Society Centre; Sunder Katwala, Director, British Future; Olivia O’Sullivan, Director, UK in the World Programme. 

REVISITING THE LEGACY OF SHINZO ABE. 7/8, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Kunihiko Miyake, Senior Advisor, Canon Institute for Global Studies; Tobias Harris, Founder, Principal, Japan Foresight LLC; Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson Center. 

CRIMEA: WHERE RUSSIA'S WAR BEGAN AND WHERE UKRAINE WILL WIN. 7/8, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jamestown Foundation. Speakers: Peter Mattis, President, Jamestown Foundation; Dr. Taras Kuzio, professor, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy, associate research fellow, Henry Jackson Society; Amb. Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council, director, National Endowment for Democracy, Visiting Professor, Warsaw University. 

PIVOTAL STATES: IS A DEEPER ALLIANCE WITH SAUDI ARABIA WORTH IT? 7/8, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Kim Ghattas, Contributing Editor, Financial Times, author, Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East; Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Ambassador Dennis Ross, Counselor, William Davidson Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

MARITIME SECURITY AND NEXT-GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES: A PLATFORM FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND ITS ASIA-PACIFIC PARTNERS. 7/8, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Benedetta Berti, Head of Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary-General, NATO; Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation; Peter Rough, Senior Fellow and Director, Center on Europe and Eurasia; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson. 

BOOK TALK: ACCIDENTAL DIPLOMATS AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THE COLD WAR. 7/8, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Berkeley Center, Georgetown University. Speakers: Judd Birdsall, assistant professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University; author Philip Dow, head, Black Forest Academy, Kandern, Germany. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3WcdQ5z 

POLICY BRIEF LAUNCH EVENT: SECURING LEBANON TO PREVENT A LARGER HEZBOLLAH-ISRAEL WAR AND WIDER ESCALATION. 7/8, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Paul Salem, Vice President for International Engagement, MEI; Amb. Ed Gabriel, President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon, Former US Ambassador to Morocco; Patricia Karam, Senior Advisor, American Task Force on Lebanon; Fadi Nicholas Nassar, US-Lebanon Fellow, MEI; Amb. David Hale, Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, Former US Ambassador to Lebanon.

IS IT ME OR THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM? CHANGING CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD INEQUALITY: A BIG DATA CHINA EVENT. 7/8, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Rozelle, Co-Director, Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions; Martin Whyte, John Zwaanstra Professor, International Studies and Sociology, Emeritus, Harvard University; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Ilaria Mazzocco, Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Elizabeth Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University; Jessica C. Teets, Professor of Political Science, Middlebury College; Qin Gao, Professor of Social Policy and Social Work, Director, China Center for Social Policy, Columbia University. 

THE MORNING AFTER: ANALYSING THE RESULTS OF THE FRENCH ELECTION. 7/8, 2:30-3:30am (EDT), 8:30-9:30am (CEST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Speakers: Célia Belin, Head, ECFR Paris; Ulrike Franke, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR; Camille Lons, Deputy Head, ECFR Paris. 

LAUNCH OF WOMEN LEAD: WOMEN LEADING EFFECTIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE. 7/8, 2:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Jennifer Klein, Assistant to the President, Director, White House Gender Policy Council; Dr. Geeta Rao Gupta, Ambassador-at-large, Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues, Department of State. 

Monday Asia Events July 1, 2024

WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE EU? 7/1, 9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Léonie Allard, Visiting Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Charles Lichfield, Deputy Director, C. Boyden Gray Senior Fellow, GeoEconomics Center, Atlantic Council; Olga Khakova, Deputy Director, European Energy Security, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Rachel Rizzo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Transfor Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council.

BRETTON WOODS AT 80: EVOLVING FOR THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY. 7/1, 1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Axel van Trotsenburg; Senior Managing Director, World Bank; Atish Rex Ghosh, Deputy Director, Strategic, Policy, and Review Department, IMF; Alexia Latortue, Assistant Secretary, International Trade and Development, US Department of the Treasury; Creon Butler. Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme, Chatham House.

BOOK TALK: CONFLICT: THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE FROM 1945 TO UKRAINE. 7/1, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: McCain Institute. Speaker: author Gen. (Ret.) David Petraeus, Partner, KKR, Chairman, KKR Global Institute, Board Member, McCain Institute. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4c56tm

WILL BIDEN’S SAUDI SECURITY PACT SPARK A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE? 7/1, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: Thomas Countryman, former United States Assistant Secretary of State, International Security and Nonproliferation; Ariel Petrovics, Non-Resident Fellow, Quincy Institute, Assistant Research Scholar, University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy; Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Brookings Institution.

OUR POLYCRISIS SUMMER. 7/1, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Kate Mackenzie, independent writer, researcher, consultant, Paris Agreement goals, fellow, Centre for Policy Development; Tim Sahay, co-editor, Polycrisis at Phenomenal World, co-director, Net Zero Industrial Policy Lab, Johns Hopkins University; David Wallace-Wells, writer, New York Times Opinion, columnist, New York Times Magazine; Noah Gordon, Acting Co-Director, Sustainability, Climate, and Geopolitics Program, Fellow, Europe Program.

EXECUTING DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS IN A CONTESTED MARITIME ENVIRONMENT. 7/1, 4:00-5:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Dmitry Filipoff, Associate Research Analyst, Operational Warfighting Division, Center for Naval Analyses; Director, Online Content, Center for International Maritime Security; Barbara Anderson, Director, Strategy and Performance Management, Herren Associates; RADM Tony Lengerich, USN (ret.), VP Naval Programs, Thales Defense & Security, Inc.

BOOK TALK: CHINA AND TAIWAN: WILL IT COME TO CONFLICT? 7/1, 6:30-8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society-Center on US-China Relations. Speakers: author Matt Pottinger, Visiting Fellow, Hoover; Amb. Winston Lord, U.S. Ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989; Jianying Zha, writer and journalist; Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies, CFR. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3XGrnUf

Japan's Ordinary Diet Session Ends

A bad term for Kishida

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 23, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

On June 23, Japan’s ordinary Diet session for this year ended. From the beginning, the session was preoccupied with the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) slush fund scandal.  Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s administration barely survived persistent inquiries from the opposition parties about the LDP’s secret expenditures of political funds.  By now, Kishida is exhausted after his efforts to protect his party and isolated from nearly everyone in the party. His reelection as LDP president this fall is uncertain at best.

The slush fund scandal came to public attention last November when a professor, Hiroshi Kamiwaki, found that some lawmakers had reported actual expenditures more than their fundraising. This difference lay in the fact that lawmakers, most of whom were affiliated with the Abe faction, had failed to report income from the sales of tickets for fundraising parties. The Special Investigation Division of the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office began to investigate them and their factions.

Before the Diet’s ordinary session was convened in January, Kishida tried to protect his Cabinet by firing four Ministers of the Abe faction. But it was too little too late to mitigate the impact of the slush fund scandal. It emerged that the secret “kickback” of party ticket sales was a regular method of distributing political funds in the Abe faction. In January, the Public Prosecutor’s Office indicted three lawmakers in that faction and a number of accounting managers in the Abe and Nikai factions.

Considering public resentment of the LDP, Kishida suddenly announced that he would dissolve his own faction, Kochi-kai. He did not consult with his closest allies, LDP Vice-president Taro Aso or Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi. When the leaders of the Abe faction were reluctant to appear before the Political Ethics Council of both Houses to address the scandal, Kishida abruptly decided to urge the leaders of Abe faction to attend the Council meetings.

Those two unilateral decisions -- dissolving Kochi-kai and appearing before the Councils – put considerable distance between Kishida and other party leaders. The leaders regarded Kishida’s decisions as a form of populism.

The LDP eventually determined that 82 lawmakers had failed to report kickbacks and punished 39. The 39 included Ryu Shionoya, the chair of the Abe faction, and Hiroshige Seko, the top leader of the Upper House lawmakers in the faction. Both left the party. Other leaders, including some from the Nikai faction, were suspended from party membership or party leadership posts. These lawmakers felt they were being made scapegoats for the Kishida administration.

In handling the scandal, Kishida could never explain to the public why the scandal had happened. Some believe that the kickback system in the Abe faction began when former prime minister Yoshiro Mori was the faction leader. But Kishida did not ask Mori for details, thus casting doubt on Kishida’s seriousness about the issue. Kishida’s seeming indifference to public sentiment against politicians’ mismanagement of political funds to avoid taxation caused a steady decline in the approval ratings of his administration.

In the second half of the ordinary session, Kishida focused on a bill to amend the Political Funds Control Act. Although the bill passed the Diet at the end of the session, it included three important loopholes.

First, at the insistence of Komeito, the LDP lowered the threshold for disclosing the identities of party ticket purchasers from 200 thousand yen to 50 thousand yen. But the LDP did not revise the bill to set a limit on the number of fundraising parties each year.

Second, the bill requires certain disclosures about policy activity funds, the money that is distributed from a party to its leaders without mandate of reporting. But there is a time lag: disclosures are required only 10 years after the distribution of funds. Moreover, the crime of failing to properly report political funds will legally become invalid after five years. It is possible that an incorrect report cannot be punished when it is disclosed ten years after, because it already is invalid.

Third, the law requires every lawmaker to certify his or her political funds report. Yet if the certification is wrong, the legislation allows a lawmaker to blame his or her accounting manager.

Caught in the middle between the LDP, which has sought as loose regulation as possible and the opposition parties, sometimes including Komeito, which have called for stricter standards on political funds, Kishida made compromises with both sides. The decision to lower threshold for the disclosure of party ticket purchasers left behind leaders of the LDP including Aso and Motegi.

Kishida’s unilateral handling of politics during the session has taken its toll. In the leaders’ debate in the last week of the session, in which the opposition leaders demanded that Kishida dissolve the House of Representatives and hold a general election, Kishida firmly rejected a snap election at the end of the session.

Although the opposition parties proposed a no-confidence resolution in the prime minister, the ruling party rejected it with majority of votes. Arguments remain, however, that Kishida is not a fit party leader in the coming presidential election. Kuniyoshi Azuma, a member of the Lower House affiliated with the Motegi faction, explicitly questioned Kishida’s campaign. “Kishida should be circumspect in referring to his reelection and have more self-restraint,” said Azuma at a meeting in Asahikawa City, Hokkaido.

Party leaders now hold clandestine meetings to discuss the timing of a snap election. Summer elections would give the LDP a miserable defeat because of the extremely low approval rating for the Kishida Cabinet and the LDP. They have concluded that it would be best for a snap election to be held this fall after September’s selection of a new LDP president.