Japan's Expanding Security Commitments

The 2+2 Solidifies Security Cooperation between Japan and the U.S.

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 29, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

On July 28, the secretaries and ministers for foreign affairs and defense of both Japan and the United States issued a joint statement following the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in Tokyo. Their statement focused on enhancing the interoperability of Japan and U.S. forces, including a new command system in each country’s defense organization, procurement of defense equipment and upgrading the countries’ discussion of extended deterrence. This cooperation is intended to counter recent demonstrations of military strength by China, Russia, and North Korea.

With the National Defense Strategy in 2022, Japan decided to establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to unify the commands of the three Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in order to reinforce its military readiness. The Diet finally passed a bill in May to set up the headquarters in the Ministry of Defense by the end of FY 2024.

Along with these internal actions in Japan, the 2+2 joint statement notes the U.S. intention to reconstitute the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters. The statement thus implemented the joint statement of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the U.S. President Joe Biden from April of this year, which announced that both countries would upgrade their command and control frameworks for greater interoperability.

Both countries are consolidating their commands in order to address the evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and to plan for contingencies regarding Taiwan. The USFJ has been under jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. To better integrate operations and strengthen interoperability and planning between Japan and the U.S., the U.S. will give the USFJ greater autonomy.

While the principle of interoperability assumes the equivalence of both forces, there is a concern in Japan that the JSDF will be a junior partner to the USFJ given the JSDF dependence on the USFJ for information, capabilities, and decision making. Some hope that the commander of the USJF will have the rank of General to balance the titles of both commanders.

The 2+2 also agreed to cooperate more in manufacturing defense equipment. Quoting the joint statement, “the Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).”

At their summit meeting in April, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden agreed to convene a forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). The 2+2 confirmed this decision and encouraged efforts in both the public and private sectors to improve missile technology, as well as supply chain resilience and repair of ships and aircrafts.

In 2023, the Japanese government eased restrictions on exports of defense equipment to the U.S. by revising the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Because Japanese manufacturers have been producing defense equipment under a U.S. license, exports of this equipment to the U.S. would be allowed. The 2+2 agreed that Japanese manufacturers would export to the U.S. about 3 billion yen’s worth of Patriot missiles.

A highlight of the 2+2 meetings was an upgrading of the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to the minister level. Both governments have conducted EDD at a senior official level since 2010. Both countries now recognize a need to enhance cooperation on deterrence, given the current military environment.

The first minister-level EDD was held at the 2+2. The joint statement described concerns with “North Korea’s continued destabilizing behavior and sustained pursuit of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, China’s accelerating and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and Russia’s undermining of arms control and the global nonproliferation regime.” Their concerns grew out of a 2023 DOD report on China’s military capability. That report indicated that China could acquire over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.

However, EDD means that Japan will rely further on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Some Japanese newspapers noted that the Kishida administration has sent contradictory signals. As the chairman of the G7 Hiroshima Summit 2023, Kishida promoted a world without nuclear weapons. Yet the elevation of EDD might, according to a nuclear disarmament expert quoted in the Tokyo Shimbun, give North Korea a justification for its nuclear weapons arsenal.

The biggest reason for Japan and the U.S. to enhance their security cooperation is the growing power of China in the Indo-Pacific region. “The Ministers concurred that the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy seeks to reshape that international order for its own benefit at the expense of others,” said the 2+2 joint statement. China’s behavior is regarded as a serious concern to the alliance and the international community. The two governments reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands under the Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Japan, meanwhile, keeps on trying to maintain a diplomatic channel with China. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wan Yi in Laos behind the backdrop of ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The two countries intend to strengthen their “strategically reciprocal relationship.” However, the meeting yielded no concrete results.

The 2+2 meeting reflected the fact that both Japan and the U.S. must solidify their security cooperation given the volatility of leadership in both countries. President Joe Biden has announced his withdrawal from the presidential election in November. If Republican Donald Trump is reelected it is uncertain if he would maintain the bilateral relationship. He has argued that U.S. allies, including Japan, have not paid their fair share of defense costs, relying instead on U.S. support.

As for Japan, Kishida’s unpopularity augurs poorly for his continuation as prime minister after the Liberal Democratic Party elections in September. Recent secrets and corruption scandals in the Defense Ministry and JSDF combine with Yasukuni Shrine visits by JSDF officers and the undisclosed sexual violence by U.S. servicemen undermine trust between the two militaries as well as the Japanese public. Officials in both countries, thus, hope the 2+2 statement will institutionalize existing bilateral agreements and encourage greater accountability.

Just what is Japan's postwar?

EDITORIAL: Opposition must push Diet debate in postwar landmark year

The Asahi Shimbun, February 18, 2015


The ongoing debate in the Diet inevitably turns our attention to the significance of Japan’s 70 post-World War II years.

In his policy speech on Feb. 12, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called for efforts to revitalize the economy, fix the social security system and rebuild education. He told the nation, “Let us together embark on the most drastic reforms since the end of World War II.”

What does the prime minister’s use of the qualifier “since the end of World War II” here signify? Given Abe’s track record of repeatedly calling for a “departure from the postwar regime” and his unmistakable interest in rewriting the Constitution, we believe his reforms are not so much about reviving the economy and fixing other urgent problems. Rather, it is only natural to assume that the ultimate goal of Abe’s reforms is to transform the very nature of our country that has been shaped over the last 70 years.

But is such a transformation right for Japan? At budget committee meetings and other sessions in the coming days, opposition parties must keep questioning the prime minister to find out what he really wants to do, and engage him in further debate.

Abe is already trying to fundamentally change Japan’s diplomatic and security policies in the name of “proactive pacifism.” His Cabinet has approved Japan’s right to participate in collective self-defense, adopted a new development cooperation charter to extend economic assistance to foreign militaries and eased the nation’s traditional arms exports ban. These are the “three arrows” with which the Abe administration has armed itself to pursue its new policies.

During a recent Diet debate, Katsuya Okada, president of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan, objected to expanding the overseas activities of the Self-Defense Forces. He told Abe, “The danger of proactive pacifism lies in the fact that it pursues two separate goals simultaneously--Japan’s self-defense and world peace--as if they were one and the same.”

But Abe dismissed Okada’s argument out of hand. “You are mistaken,” he shot back. “Proactive peace diplomacy is what proactive pacifism is all about.”

As one example of a situation where Japan’s exercise of its right to collective self-defense may be anticipated, Abe cited SDF minesweeping operations in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. This is an issue on which Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party does not see eye to eye with its junior coalition partner, Komeito.

Minesweeping constitutes an exercise of armed force if conducted before a truce accord is in place. Is the legislature going to allow this? Komeito has been in discussions with the LDP, but Komeito must make its position clear in the Diet.

Where domestic issues are concerned, the rapidly growing income disparity is starting to change the fabric of society.

Kazuo Shii, chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, blamed Abe’s economic policy for “only causing the growing income disparity, nothing more.”

Abe retorted, “You cannot tell whether the disparity is really growing.” But who can truly believe and say that there is no inequality under Japan’s current taxation and employment systems?

Under Japan’s parliamentary Cabinet system, the Cabinet is formed by the majority camp in the Diet, which renders it difficult for opposition parties to make the government change its bills and policies.

Still, it is an important role of opposition parties to expose problems and flaws in government bills through debate to enable the public to form informed opinions. And it is definitely not what the prime minister disdainfully refers to as “argumentative nitpicking.”

In this landmark year when “postwar” as a concept could start changing, both the ruling and opposition camps bear a heavy responsibility in the Diet.

Didn't Japan drive off this bridge once before?

NSC Secretariat pushes for use of collective self-defense in cases of economic threat

Mainichi Shimbun, 2/4/15


The secretariat of the National Security Council is drafting a proposal to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense in cases of economic threats - even when there are no military threats - to Japanese citizens, the Mainichi Shimbun learned Feb. 3.

The proposal has drawn fire from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's junior coalition partner, Komeito, for its potential to stretch the definition of "threat" and expand the scope of Self-Defense Force (SDF) operations.

The National Security Secretariat's draft proposal allows for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense if a situation is determined to be likely to cause economic damage to Japanese citizens, even if there is no expected military threat. It would expand the range of force indicated in a Cabinet decision passed in July 2014, and give the SDF the go-ahead to participate in minesweeping missions during wartime in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Komeito, however, is set to oppose broadening the scope of Japan's right to collective self-defense.

According to the July 2014 Cabinet decision, Japan's use of force is permitted only when "Japan's existence is threatened and there are clear dangers to its people's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness being fundamentally overturned." Existing laws, however, are based on the premise of individual self-defense, and permit the SDF to use force only when an attack has occurred, or if Japan is in an armed attack situation and in imminent danger. An armed attack situation in which an attack on Japan is predicted, meanwhile, does not grant Japan the right to use force under current legislation.

The National Security Secretariat aims for legislative amendments that would allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense if, for example, due to military attacks on another country, Japan is unable to import oil and suffers economic losses, putting Japanese citizens' assets in danger. Some suggest using the term "survival risk situation" to refer to such cases with relatively low levels of danger.

The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, however, indicated during Diet deliberations that the condition for the use of force by the SDF as established by the Cabinet decision is the level of probability that war would reach Japan. The latest proposal could infinitely stretch the definition of "danger,"and that possibility has provoked strong objections from Komeito, which argues that a new interpretation could be characterized as violating the Constitution and is inconceivable.

With some in the LDP also wary of making such a step, the proposal is unlikely to pass.

Senior ruling party officials had heretofore negotiated revision of security legislation behind closed doors, but the prime minister's office urged them to conduct talks publicly in order to speed things up so that draft bills can be submitted after nationwide local elections this spring. One senior party official said that no agreement was reached in behind-closed-doors negotiations, while a government source admitted that the government was searching for common ground that the LDP and Komeito could share to get the security-related bills off the ground.

The administration is also hoping that by setting the bar high initially in ruling party deliberations over the right to collective self-defense - an issue that has much of the Japanese public worried - the ruling party can later claim to that same public that it had reined in its aspirations regarding the use of force.

Ruling party deliberations on security legislation will begin between the LDP and Komeito on Feb. 13.

Election Win Gives Abe More Time for Change

By William Brooks, APP Senior Fellow

and Mindy Kotler, APP Director

Japan voted for stability in the December 14th Lower House elections. The election was not about change. In contrast, the election for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was about winning time for change. The election brought him time to continue his promised policy changes such as constitutional revision. Without the snap election, Abe would have had only two more years of a guaranteed Lower House majority. Now, barring any political setbacks, he has four or until 2018.

Whereas Japan’s voters are uncomfortable with change, the Abe Administration is focused on a number of substantial ones. The prime minister wants to revise the constitution, not just Japan’s no-war clause Article 9 but also the clauses on human rights, civil liberties, and the Emperor’s divinity. He wants to enhance Japan’s military posture and extend the right of collective self-defense. And he wants an economic overhaul in Japan that includes opening markets, loosening labor regulations, altering agricultural practices, returning to nuclear power, and empowering women.

The Lower House election did not give Abe a mandate. Opposition forces made some gains and he still needs his coalition partner the Komeito, which is less enamored of his plans. Abe will have to work hard to convince the public to accept each aspect of his agenda. This will take time and this he now has.

No Mandate, Just TINA
The LDP’s December 14th win was not a “mandate” to steamroll their agenda through the Diet. The party remains strapped to a sometime reluctant coalition partner, the Komeito, to achieve a two-thirds super-majority. Compromises will continue to be necessary and negotiated.

Voter disinterest, as demonstrated by a record low turnout of 53%--down 6.6 points from 2012—was not simply a factor of bad weather. Only 10 years ago voter turnout was nearly 70%. Japan’s media summarized the mood of the electorate as “TINA”, meaning “There is no alternative.”

An Asahi Shimbun poll the day after the election supported this view.  More than seven out of ten respondents said the LDP won big because of the opposition’s “lack of appeal.” Only 11% attributed the ruling coalition’s lopsided victory to the voters’ positive evaluation of Abe’s policies. Almost 80% said none of the opposition parties are capable of governing the nation. However, about 60% said the ruling coalition captured too many seats. According to the survey, 53% of respondents expressed “concern” about the premier’s future policies and only 31% had “expectations of success.

The opposition, despite its nonstop attacks on the “failure” of Abenomics, was unable to unseat the feeling that there was no replacement to Abe’s policies. It was easy for Abe and the LDP to exploit this resistance to change. Although Japanese opinion polls showed that voters did not feel the economy improved—reinforced by negative GDP numbers—most were uncomfortable with new alternatives. They were willing to give Abe more time to make Abenomics work

The disorganized opposition was also a factor. Not enough candidates were fielded to put up a significant fight. And the party platforms were less specific than those of the LDP. The voters were so disenchanted with the major opposition party the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that its leader lost his seat and the party’s leadership.

Yes, the ruling coalition won, but the LDP lost four seats and the Komeito picked up four. Thus, the two parties’ numerical strength is the same as before the election. Interestingly, the Party for the Next Generations, often a proxy voice for the Abe agenda lost big, going from 20 seats to only two. The DPJ picked up 11 seats to end with 73, keeping it the major opposition party. The real opposition winner was the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which captured the anti-LDP vote by more than doubling its seats in the Lower House, rising from eight to 21. The JCP comes across in Japan as the last socialist force standing, a pacifist protector of the Constitution from change, and an advocate of a basically unarmed Japan.

Amending the Constitution
Abe’s main goal for extending his tenure four years is to give himself enough time to amend or rewrite Japan’s Constitution. The two-thirds majority that the ruling coalition now holds in the Lower House allows it to override any bill rejected by the Upper House. But in order to amend the Constitution, as Abe plans, it will take two-thirds in the Upper House as well, which the coalition does not have.

The next Upper House election is in the summer of 2016. Unless the LDP suffers a crushing defeat in the Upper House in this election, it is possible that Abe will preside over a long-term administration until the term of office of Lower House members expires in 2018.

Despite the pro-LDP vote in the Lower House elections, there is a division between the electorate and the elected in their support for amending the Constitution. At its heart is changing Article 9 and allowing for collective self-defense. A Mainichi Shimbun poll before the election found only 35% of the public favoring Japan’s use of the right of collective defense and 51% opposed. Even among Abe supporters in the poll, only 57% were in favor of collective self-defense and 31% opposed.

In contrast, another Mainichi Shimbun survey of those returned to the Diet found that 83% favored amending the Constitution. This totaled 390 of all those elected, exceeding two-thirds (317 members) required for the Lower House to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Asked whether they think Article 9 of the Constitution should be amended, 57% (267 members) answered yes.

In the Asahi Shimbun mentioned above, only 3% felt that the Abe Administration should focus on amending the Constitution. Respondents felt social security and the economy should be of primary concern.

Neighbors” Reaction
China and South Korea have reacted predictably to the election. The see the LDP’s win as an endorsement of the “rightward policies that deny past history.” Those countries believe Abe’s commitment to amend Japan’s pacifist Constitution as creating even more conflict with them. Abe laid the groundwork for repairing damaged ties with China, and it seems likely he will continue to do so. A visit to Yasukuni or a fishing boat collision could produce set back.

Ties with South Korea are at rock bottom. It will take a lot of patient diplomacy on both sides to inch the relationship forward. The media war between the two countries over the Comfort Women issue has yet to abate. Abe will have to distance himself from such mud-slinging and accusation, and take the high road toward a future-oriented relationship that would be in Japan’s national interests.

There are domestic advantages to hostile neighbors. It can encourage further political support for stability and unity. Coupled with doubt about the reliability of allies, an uncertain security environment helps justify the range of defense changes and enhancements advocated by the Abe Administration.

Alliance Deepening; Okinawa Worsening
On the Alliance, relations with the U.S. under Abe have continued to improve over the past two years. Spring should see the completion of a new set of defense cooperation guidelines that will further deepen ties. The Okinawa base issue, however, could become a thorn in the relationship if Abe is not careful.

The loss of Okinawa seats was the LDP’s and Abe’s biggest calamity in the otherwise smooth election. The prefecture is now dominated by anti-base activists, starting with the governor, who vows to block the relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko Point, where a runway is to be built. In this hostile political environment, Abe will have to somehow build new channels of support and expand economic packages to the prefecture. Passage of casino gambling legislation made get an added push. Henoko will not be built by bulldozing the project over local protests. Yet blocking the Futenma relocation only delays its closing. Neither is a satisfactory solution.

Year Ahead
The LDP faces another election: the national unified local elections in April. To sweep these local assemblies, the LDP will have to soft-sell unpopular policies such as support for TPP and restarting nuclear power stations. Prime Minister Abe will have to tread lightly on controversial decisions until those elections are over. An early decision on TPP, for example, could reverberate wide across the farming prefectures that are against the agreement and at the base of the LDP.

There are also warnings of complacency and over-reach of, Kantei, the prime minister's office. Komeito is wary that Kantei may act arbitrarily. After signing the coalition agreement with Abe on December 15th, party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi stressed that, “We agreed not to become arrogant and to manage the administration steadily.” At his news conference on December 15th, Abe himself said: “We will lose the people’s support instantly if we become arrogant with the majority we enjoy and lose our humility.”

Until May, Abe will be cautious in both initiating and implementing domestic policies. He will continue his photogenic multi-national trips to shore up international support for Japan’s peaceful development and to emphasize his world leadership. At home, Abe will be patient. He will wait until he has solid domestic political backing, which he currently does not have. In all, he is buying time.

Edited 12/20/14

Myths About Japan's Resistance to Collective Self-Defense

Hyuga - DDH 16 - Hyuga class helicopter destroyer

Reexamining "Myths" About Japan's Collective Self-Defense Change -- What critics (and the Japanese public) do understand about Japan's constitutional reinterpretation

By APP Member Bryce Wakefield, assistant professor of Japanese politics and international relations at Leiden University and Craig Martin, associate professor of law at Washburn University. The views expressed in this article are their own. 
First posted on Japan Focus, September 8, 2014


In a recent article in the Diplomat, Michael Green and Jeffrey Hornung claimed that critics of the Abe government’s “reinterpretation” of Japan’s constitution, to end the ban on the use of force for the purposes of collective self-defense, were “basing their opposition on myths about the change.” This allegation that resistance to the “reinterpretation” of Article 9 is based on nothing but “myths” is increasingly heard, and so it is worth examining their arguments, and the so-called myths that they purport to dismiss.

Green and Hornung argued that the changes to be made through the “reinterpretation” were actually slight and that the immediate implications were far less problematic than alleged. There is a grain of truth to this as it relates to imminent strategic consequences, but it also misses the essential point. Yes, at least in the short term, changes to the roles and the missions of the nation’s Self Defense Forces resulting from “reinterpretation” will probably be modest; and yes, the changes will not likely lead to militarism, regional adventurism, or various other scenarios that the article examines and dismisses. But this focus on the intended policy shifts misses the far more significant issues raised both by the unconstitutional nature of the move and the possible longer-term and profound systemic ramifications of the “reinterpretation.”

It is precisely because the immediate strategic implications of the Abe Cabinet’s announcement will probably be relatively modest that the implications for constitutional practice in Japan should be the focus of the debate. Perhaps the changing strategic environment in Asia will require Japan to consider relaxing some of the constraints imposed by Article 9. However, so fundamental a change to the nation’s constitution should only come after broad debate and pursuant to formal amendment procedures as provided for in the constitution. As explained below, the so-called “reinterpretation” process has in fact weakened constitutionalism, the rule of law, and fundamental principles of democracy in Japan, an argument that Green and Hornung, and many other defenders of the “reinterpretation”, never seriously address. In short, the harm is to the Constitution, and so focus on strategy is no answer.

Let us re-examine some of the “myths” that Green and Hornung so quickly dismiss.

“Abe is gutting the spirit of Japan’s peace constitution”

Green and Hornung maintain that Abe’s announcement is not undermining the spirit of Article 9, because in reality it is not really changing the official interpretation at all. They claim that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), a department within the Ministry of Justice that gives advice to the government and the Diet on the constitutionality of laws, has always acknowledged that Japan has a right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but that “collective self-defense was deemed inappropriate because it did not meet the CLB’s definition of ‘minimal’ defense” necessary for the defense of Japan. What has changed now, according to Green and Hornung, is that because of the evolution of the strategic environment, collective self-defense should be understood as being within the “minimal necessary use of force” required for the defense of Japan itself. Thus, they argue, the shift in the “reinterpretation” is not inconsistent with the original CLB position, and is thus not really a new interpretation of Article 9.

This is both misleading in what it does argue, and entirely disregards more fundamental arguments about the harm that will be caused to Article 9. To begin with problems inherent in the narrow point they make, it is simply incorrect to say that the recognition of a right to collective self-defense would not constitute a fundamental change in the meaning of Article 9. Their claim appears to confuse the distinction between individual self-defense (ISD) and collective self-defense (CSD), as those concepts are understood in international law. ISD, of course, is the use of force in defense of the state in response to an armed attack on that state. ISD has been understood to be permitted by Article 9 since Japan reemerged as a sovereign state in the early 1950s, following the postwar Allied Occupation. CSD, on the other hand, is the use of force by one state in defense ofsome other state in response to an armed attack on that other state, for example the American use of force against Iraq in defense of Kuwait in 1991. Green and Hornung’s argument that Japan may use force to assist other countries in order to better ensure Japan’s own security conflates these two concepts. The use of force by Japan in a true exercise of CSD would, by definition, not be for the defense of Japan, even if at some stage in the future such an action might improve Japan’s strategic or defensive situation.

It is true that the CLB has acknowledged that Japan, like all nations, has the right to use force in the exercise of CSD as a matter of international law; but it has also stated, on more than one occasion, that it is prohibited as a matter of constitutional law. According to the bureau’s earlier statements, Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, makes the exercise of that international law right “impermissible under the constitution.” All that is permitted is the minimum force necessary to defend against an armed attack on Japan itself – an exercise of ISD. By eliminating the requirement that there be a direct attack on Japan as a pre-condition for Japan to lawfully use force in self-defense, the Abe Cabinet has therefore made a clear break with, and is in direct opposition to, prior and consistent understandings of the constitution.

A related argument that is often heard is that there has been a pattern of “reinterpretations” by government in the past with respect to defense posture and capabilities, and thus this “reinterpretation” is not unusual. As The Economist puts it, this was a “usual if rather shabby” process of constitutional change. But this too is entirely inaccurate. It is true that there have been incremental changes to Japan’s defense posture, but there has been a consistent understanding that such decisions on force adjustments fall within constitutional boundaries, precisely because they take into account the restraint embodied by the long standing interpretation that force may be used only for the direct defense of Japan. The government has never suggested that these defense posture adjustments constituted a “reinterpretation”, nor have they ever been understood to “reinterpret” Article 9. Government “reinterpretation” has simply never been recognized as a legitimate method of circumventing the legitimate amendment procedures and revising the longstanding interpretations of the constitution.

The difference in nature between past defense posture adjustments and the current “reinterpretation” becomes clearer upon a closer examination of those past shifts. The government has sought to reduce the restrictions on the deployment and use the military since the 1980s, and particularly after the Gulf War. However, many of these restrictions (such as the post-war ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF, rescinded in 1993) were established between the 1950s and the mid-1970s as political measures designed to deflate protest on the political left and to reassure the Japanese public sceptical after the war about military solutions to international problems. At the time they were conceived and often afterwards, the government was careful to note that such restrictions were not required by the constitution. Thus, the later dismantling of those restrictions, such as legislation eliminating the ban on overseas deployment of the SDF for involvement in UN peace keeping operations (PKO), did not constitute a “reinterpretation” of Article 9. The deployment of the SDF for PKO activity does not constitute a use of force under international law and did not implicate Article 9. Similarly, relatively recent overseas missions, such as anti-piracy operations, while they appear to political analysts as a type of CSD, in fact constitute no such thing, because they do not involve the use of force—a concept in international law that relates to relations between state actors. On the other hand, the deployment of the SDF to assist in the belligerent occupation of Iraq in 2003 may indeed have constituted a use of force, as the Nagoya High Court so held in a judgment in 2008—but that would be a violation of the Constitution, not an example of its “reinterpretation”.

Abe’s attempt at “reinterpretation”, shabby though it may be, is therefore far from usual. This point is often lost on historians, political scientists, and analysts interested in Japan’s defense policy, who focus less on the legal ramifications of change and more on the strategic or political implications. It is lost as well on some peace advocates and left-wing politicians in Japan, who have never fully accepted the 1954 interpretation that recognized the right to exercise ISD, or the legitimacy of an SDF as constituting the minimal “war potential” necessary for the defense of Japan. Seen from their perspectives, the current “reinterpretation” may seem to be simply a continuation of an incrementally more assertive (and possibly unconstitutional) defense policy. But from the perspective of the government’s own position on Article 9, this “reinterpretation” is unprecedented.

Green and Hornung also suggest that the current interpretation and understanding of Article 9 was itself based on a “reinterpretation”, and that, therefore, “if Abe’s decision was reached undemocratically, then the earlier interpretation being upheld by his opponents must be considered undemocratic as well.” But this too is misplaced. The CLB played an important role in developing the initial interpretation, it is true – but that was at the very outset of establishing the interpretation of a new constitution. While there was robust debate in the Diet as to what precisely Article 9 meant and exactly what it restricted, the government issued no clear and consistent opinion until the interpretation in 1954. That interpretation, as it related to the very limited right to use force for purposes of ISD, was reinforced by the Supreme Court, the branch of government with the constitutionally mandated authority to interpret the constitution, in the famous Sunagawa case in 1959. It has been further reinforced by more than six decades of consistent Diet testimony and policy precedent. Indeed, in 1991 there was enormous pressure upon Japan to contribute forces to the coalition engaging in collective self-defense in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and there was an acute sense that failure to do so would jeopardize Japan’s alliance with the U.S., but the CLB advised the Kaifu government that Article 9 prohibited any such move. The government, in compliance with that understanding of Article 9, therefore refused to participate in the military operations, and the no-use of force provision of Article 9 successfully operated to constrain government policy. There is no basis for arguing that the manner in which the original interpretation was established, shortly after the Constitution was promulgated and prior to any judicial consideration or serious policy development, is in any way similar to the “reinterpretation” by Cabinet fiat now at issue after six decades of entrenchment. It cannot be considered a serious comparison.

These rather technical arguments about the past CLB interpretation in any event miss the other ways in which the “reinterpretation” will potentially gut Article 9. In addition to now declaring that Article 9 no longer prohibits the use of force for purposes of CSD, key actors in the government and an “Advisory Panel” that Abe set up to “reconstruct the legal basis” for national security have suggested that Japan can and should use force in collective security operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Article 42 of the Charter. If that were to become the accepted interpretation of Article 9, which, it should be recalled, states in part that Japan “forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force for the settling of international disputes”, then Article 9 will in fact no longer renounce any sovereign right relating to the making of war and the use of force, despite its explicit language to the contrary. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by states, with three exceptions – or to put it another way, three sovereign rights – the use of force for ISD and CSD, and collective security measures authorized by the Security Council. Under the “reinterpretation” recommended by the panel, Japan would be permitted to engage in all three, and so Article 9 would not limit Japan from doing anything that international law does not already forbid. It is difficult to see that such a move would not be gutting the pacifist spirit and intent of Article 9.

“The decision starts a slippery slope for revising the constitution and removing Article 9”

The next “myth” that Green, Hornung and others take aim at is the so-called slippery slope argument. Abe’s defenders argue that there is no such slippery slope, and this move cannot be taken as leading to further erosion of Article 9. In emphasizing the modesty of Abe’s “reinterpretation”, they point to the fact that the prime minister has stated that the constitution would continue to prohibit collective security measures authorized by the UN Security Council. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that this limitation is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the text of the Cabinet Resolution, the larger point is that the process of reinterpretation destroys any sense of durable and meaningful constitutional constraints, which undermines not only Article 9, but indeed the entire constitutional structure. So the Cabinet Resolution places various conditions upon the exercise of CSD, upon which defenders of the process place great store. But given the precedent this process has established, these limits too are only binding, if one can call it that, until the next Cabinet resolution. These are not constitutional provisions or principles, but mere whims of the Cabinet of the day. If they can supplant a constitutional provision today, a much broader and more insidious Cabinet Resolution may do so tomorrow. Thus, the prospect of the process comprising the beginning of a slippery slope cannot be dismissed as mere myth. This process of “reinterpretation” by cabinet fiat makes a mockery of the entire notion of a constitution comprising the highest law of the land, which serves to bind future generations to consistent principles and values, and imposes meaningful constraints on the exercise of government power.

The slippery slope argument is further strengthened by considerations of motive. It is hard to dismiss the violence that the Cabinet Resolution does to the constitution as “merely” the product of a government with an overzealous defense agenda prioritizing narrow policy goals over respect for constitutional provisions. Rather, undermining the constitution appears to be a central goal of key actors within the government. Abe has actually suggested that the idea that constitutions are intended to limit government power is “old-fashioned.” In the recent negotiations with Komeito over the exact language of the Cabinet Resolution, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted the resolution to have fewer limitations. Meanwhile, LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru has noted that the government should “start with a limited scope” in its interpretation of CSD so that it can “widen later.” The Abe Cabinet’s “reinterpretation” leaves precisely that possibility intact by at once eliminating the constitutional prohibition on CSD, but also adding ambiguous limitations and conditions, so that any decision on expanding the roles of the SDF will be merely political, not legal. Moreover, it has established the precedent that any provision of the constitution—not just Article 9—is subject to arbitrary government “reinterpretation.” Scholars have also argued that this is just one step towards more wholesale amendment down the road—that by twisting the meaning of the constitution, Abe is trying to ensure that it will be easier to claim later that the actual language of its provisions no longer reflect reality, and must therefore be formally amended. Whether or not that is the case, with reinterpretation acting as a de factomechanism for change, arguments about actual amendment would be moot.

“The decision was made undemocratically without transparency”

In arguing that it is merely a “myth” that the “reinterpretation” was made undemocratically and without transparency, Green and Hornung emphasize that cabinet discussions on CSD, “were reported upon daily by Japan’s media, enabling voters to be fully aware of the discussions.” But that does not address whether the prime minister or the cabinet properly subjected the process to transparent and democratic scrutiny. Yes, there was media attention. Indeed, few issues rile the media in Japan like government action on security policy. But on its own, media coverage of government statements on CSD does not imply transparency or adherence to democratic principles.

In fact, in his push for “reinterpretation”, Abe has pointedly attempted to circumvent any real public or political debate (transparency), and even more seriously, circumvented the constitutionally mandated amendment procedure, which in and of itself constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law (democratic principles). This begins with the circumvention of the amendment procedure. Article 96 of the Constitution provides for precisely how the Constitution is to be amended. Amendments must be initiated by the Diet, approved by two thirds of each house of the Diet, and then approved by a majority of votes in a general referendum. Comparative research has shown that Japan’s amendment process is less difficult than that of a number of other constitutional democracies, including the U.S. Indeed, the LDP did in fact begin laying the foundation for formal amendment in the years following 9/11. But when Abe’s attempts to mobilize support for amending Article 9 ran into stiff headwinds, he attacked the amendment procedure itself, seeking to make the constitutional amendment process little more difficult for the Diet than the revision of common statutes. When that effort failed, due in large measure to the backlash from lawyers and constitutional scholars, he chose to circumvent the amendment procedure altogether, moving to “reinterpret” Article 9. To dress up this wholly illegitimate process, he resurrected his extra-constitutional “Advisory Panel” of so-called experts, with a mandate to examine how Article 9 should be reinterpreted in light of the changing security environment.

The Advisory Panel, which included very few lawyers and only one constitutional law scholar, engaged in little constitutional analysis. Rather, it developed a result-oriented argument, reasoning that because Japan needs to do more to ensure its security, Article 9 must therefore mean that Japan can do more to defend itself and others. On the basis of this Report, the Abe Cabinet developed its resolution that constitutes the “reinterpretation” of Article 9. There was no prior debate on the content of this resolution in the Diet, no vote in the Diet, no referendum, not even consultation with either the Diet or the public. As already discussed above, it was an executive fiat by the Cabinet that purported to change the meaning of a fundamental principle of the constitution, in a manner that was not only inconsistent with the long-established and entrenched interpretation of Article 9, but that was irreconcilable with the explicit language of the provision. As further evidence of the departure from democratic principles, Abe made a political appointment of the new Director of the CLB, presumably to ensure that the CLB would in due course provide a supportive interpretation of the Resolution and laws passed to implement it. This political appointment of someone external to the CLB and the Ministry of Justice was contrary to deeply entrenched convention, and provoked criticism from past CLB directors. The entire process not only usurped the superior constitutional claims of both the Supreme Court and the Diet to constitutional interpretation, but was likely designed to make any future contrary interpretation by the Supreme Court that much more difficult and politically risky.

This process of “reinterpretation” was not only a violation of the constitutional amendment procedure, but it makes a mockery of the idea that the constitution can constrain the exercise of government power. It flies in the face of the notions essential to the rule of law: that all law must be passed and amended through democratic process, and that government is both subject to the law, and must exercise its authority as defined by and in accordance with the law. Pundits argue that the Diet will still have its say when it comes time to pass legislation implementing the new interpretation. But to suggest that this post hoc debate will justify the prior unconstitutional “reinterpretation” is to reveal a perverse understanding of deliberative democracy and the respective roles of the legislature and the executive in a parliamentary system, especially one where the formalseparation of powers is so clearly defined in its constitution. And to suggest that all these ills were cured by the fact that there was robust discussion in the media is just absurd.

Using belligerence to forget

On April 8th,  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter gave a speech to CSIS outlining American military capabilities and plans in the Indo-Pacific region. [TRANSCRIPT] He emphasized that "U.S. interests in the region are enduring, and so also will be our political and economic presence." Five times "enduring" was mentioned in the speech.

He justified American presence in the region as a responsibility accompanied by values worth defending:

I'm more accustomed to listening to people question why the U.S. spends more on defense than the next 16 largest militaries in the world combined. This statistic is true and won't change much in coming years. It's also worth noting that most of the rest of the money that the world spends on defense is spent by countries that are allies and friends of the United States. These levels of defense spending are a reflection of the amount of responsibility that the U.S. and its friends and allies share for providing peace and security.

It was not, however, until nearly the last question in the Qs&As that he said something substantive about Japan. Australian National University Professor Rikki Kersten asked "how important is it for Japan to embrace collective self-defense for the American rebalancing to work effectively" [53.09 in the video above].

He responded that it would be very constructive for Japan to open the way to exercising its right to collective self-defense. "Japan's increasing awareness of their own abilities, their own capabilities and their increasing freeing of themselves from the strictures they imposed upon themselves some decades ago...is a constructive thing. They're doing that with respect to arms exports, with respect to the kinds of activities that they are willing to engage in internationally," he said, adding that "I think that's a good thing."

But then he added something unexpected. He implied that the militarily stronger Japan would supersede regional hesitations about trusting Japan. And this is the strategy that the U.S. is encouraging Japan to pursue.

It's part of the U.S.-assisted, if I may be so bold, process of healing and putting history behind in that part of the world. It gives Japan the opportunity to play a role that it can, which is a very constructive one around the world in security affairs. They are already involved in counter-piracy activities,  maritime domain awareness, and so forth. These are areas where the world has a need, and if Japan can be a part of fulfilling that need,  that is good for everyone.

This answer startled many. What exactly is the Defense Department doing to help Japan address its history of aggression and unhealed wounds? And how is this expected to encourage Japan's neighbors to welcome the country's more overt military presence? And does this mean that the United States will be signing on to Prime Minister Abe's constitutional change campaign?

Later: As reported by Kyodo in the Japan Times, April 9th.