Showing posts with label Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economy. Show all posts

Sunday, July 12, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 13, 2026

BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY: SAMURAI AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM. 7/13, Noon (JST), 7/12, 11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr. Rosina Buckland, Asahi Shimbun Curator: Japanese Collections, The British Museum.

CHINA AND THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES. 7/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Mary Lovely, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Claire Reade, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wei Liang, Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. 

NATO SUMMIT DEBRIEF: WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER ANKARA? 7/13, 10:45-11:30am (CDT), 11:45am-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: General Christopher G. Cavoli, 20th Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 19th Commander, United States European Command; Julianne Smith, Former US Permanent Representative to NATO; Leslie Vinjamuri, President and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

THE FIRST TARGET AUDIENCES: THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE FOUNDERS. 7/13, Noon-1:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Public Diplomacy Council of America. Speakers: Martha Bayles, Author, Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America's Image Abroad (2014); Caitlin Schindler, Author, The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition (2018); Eric Weiner, Author, Ben & Me (2024).

A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR BERNIE MORENO AND CHAIRMAN JOHN MOOLENAAR ON CONNECTED CARS. 7/13, 4:15-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman, Select Committee on China; Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-OH); Moderator: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, AEI.

Sunday, June 14, 2026

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

D
espite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Friday, May 22, 2026

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026
Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 

While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Saturday, May 2, 2026

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 27, 2026

📚Books of the Week📖



The Broken China Dream: 
How Reform Revived Totalitarianism
By Minxin Pei, Professor of Government, 
Claremont McKenna College
PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

When China embarked on its transformative journey of modernization in 1979, many believed the country’s turn toward capitalism would put its totalitarian past to rest and mark the birth of a democratic, open society. Instead, China reverted to a neo-totalitarian state, one backed by one of the fastest-growing, most formidable economies on earth. Pei explains why the reforms of the post-Mao era have been reversed on nearly every front.



Goliath's Curse: The History and Future 
of Societal Collapse
By Luke Kemp, Research Associate, Centre for the 
Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge
PURCHASE BOOK 9/23/2025

Kemp traces the emergence of “Goliaths”: large societies built on a collection of fragile hierarchies that collapse time after time across the world. Drawing on historical databases and the latest discoveries in archaeology and anthropology, he uncovers that more democratic societies tend to be more resilient. In our modern, global Goliath, a collapse is likely to be long-lasting and more dire than ever before. Collapse may be invisible until after it has occurred and has often had a more positive outcome for the general population than for the 1%.



Israel on Trial: Examining the History, 
the Evidence, and the Law
By Roy K. Altman, U.S. District Judge for 
the Southern District of Florida
PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Judge Altman applies courtroom-tested standards—burden of proof, corroboration, chain of custody— to examine claims of colonialism, apartheid, and genocide with dispassionate precision. In an era shaped by viral slogans and curated outrage, Judge Altman offers a disciplined method for discerning truth from propaganda and what it means to demand proof.


*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*
Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement
They are simply new and interesting.

Reviving Nuclear Power in Japan

Japan Depends on Nuclear Power


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 27, 2026


The military attack on Iran by the United States and Israel and the ensuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have had a major impact on Japan’s economy. A shortage of naphtha, which must be shipped through the Strait, has limited Japan’s manufacture of medical equipment, and it is unclear how long the governmental subsidy on gasoline will last. While Sanae Takaichi’s government has said that Japan has enough oil reserves for the time being, the government is accelerating the resumption of nuclear power generation.
 
Energy has traditionally been the weakest point in Japan’s national security strategy. Japan has said that it attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 to secure oil in Southeast Asia without U.S. interference. As fuel for power generation shifted from coal to oil in the post-war era, Japan increasingly relied on oil imports from the Middle East. Currently, over 95 percent of imported oil comes from the Middle East, and most of it passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
 
An alternative to oil is nuclear power. Through 2010, Japan had built 54 reactors for nuclear power generation that supplied about 30 percent of all electric power in Japan. In 2011, however, the Great East Japan Earthquake severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant when protective structures failed, leading to several deaths and mass evacuations. The event seriously undermined Japan’s energy strategy. The government began to set strict limits for power companies to operate nuclear reactors or construct new ones. 
 
Japan nevertheless took the course of resuming transmission at as many of the existing reactors as possible to secure stable and powerful electricity. The government did not take an alternative course developing renewable energy as European countries had done after the accident in Chernobyl 40 years ago this month.
 
The restart two weeks ago of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is an epoch-making event for energy supply in Japan. Reactor 6 at the plant began its commercial operation on April 16, 2026, for the first time since it paused operations in March 2012. The plant is known as one of the biggest nuclear power plants in the world with seven reactors that have the capacity for 8,212 megawatts of power.
 
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant is owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which was responsible for the inadequate defenses of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to the 2011 earthquake and for the ensuing deaths and evacuations.  Restarting the plant has been controversial. Although two reactors out of seven passed the examination by the Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) in 2017, the NRA issued an order to prohibit their operation in 2021 because of failure to take anti-terrorist measures.
 
The NRA lifted the prohibition order in 2023, and in December 2025, the governor of Niigata, Hideyo Hanazumi, approved resumption of the plant’s operation. TEPCO restarted Reactor 6 in January 2026 but paused the operation at least twice due to an unexpected alarm from a control rod and a leak of electricity on the land surface. Those malfunctions delayed commercial operation of Reactor 6, damaging TEPCO’s credibility. Reactor 7 is expected to start up again in 2029.
 
Even with the restart of Reactor 6, there is no place for nuclear waste to go. Japan has no final disposal site. Mutsu city, Aomori, has an interim storage facility to keep used nuclear fuel until it can be transferred to a nuclear recycling factory, which is planned to be finished in Rokkasho village, Aomori.
 
Although the interim facility in Mutsu was expected to accept 60 metric tons of used nuclear fuel from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in FY2026, the Governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, announced that he would not approve any new transfers of used nuclear fuel to the Mutsu facility in FY2026. Miyashita believed it was unpredictable whether the recycling factory in Rokkasho could pass an examination by the NRA. Japan thus has not established a credible recycling system for used nuclear fuel.
 
The government of Japan, meanwhile, is looking for a site to build a final disposal facility somewhere in the country. The government decided in 2000 that nuclear waste from nuclear power plants should be buried underground, a method known as geological disposal, but the government has not decided on a site.
 
To decide on a location, the government must take three steps: a survey of technical literature, a preliminary investigation, and a detailed investigation. The government will grant a two-billion-yen subsidy to a municipality that accepts the literature survey. Another seven billion yen is provided for a preliminary investigation.
 
The government has identified three possible sites: Suttsu Town and Kamoenai Village in Hokkaido, and Genkai Town in Saga. Ogasawara Village, Tokyo, has emerged as a fourth candidate, and the government on April 21 decided to have a literature survey which will take about two years. Although the three earlier candidates voluntarily stepped forward to accept the survey, Ogasawara has left the decision of accepting the survey to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). It made the first example to conduct a literature survey with initiative of the national government.
 
METI expects to survey Minamitorishima Island (Marcus Island) in the administrative area of Ogasawara village. Marcus Island is a tiny saucer-like coral atoll with a raised outer rim of between 5 and 9 m (16 and 30 ft) above sea level. It is 2,000 kilometers from mainland Japan.
 
The chief of Ogasawara village, Masaaki Shibuya, has reserved his decision on whether to go forward with a preliminary investigation after the literature survey is finished. There is no one among other three front runners that has decided to proceed to a preliminary investigation. METI is still far from deciding the location for final disposal site, which is needed for operating nuclear power plants in Japan.
 
It is obvious that the effort to build a whole new nuclear power generation system, including a disposal locale for nuclear waste, will not ameliorate the current concerns about energy supply. Construction will take many years. Nevertheless, the government of Japan does not want to stop focusing on nuclear power generation, fearing that it will lose its status as a major economic power in the world.

Sunday, April 26, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 27, 2026

AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS: CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW REGIONAL MECHANISM FOR PRINCIPLED SECURITY. 4/27, 10:00am-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speakers: TBD.  Lunch will be served.

POWER, RELIGION, AND IDEOLOGY IN NORTH KOREA. 4/27, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jonathan Cheng, China Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal; Jung H. Pak, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Moderator: Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies. PURCHASE BOOK

TRUMP, TAKAICHI AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF DETERRENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 4/27, Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speakers: Kenneth Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Moderator: Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government, Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.

BOOK TALK: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM REVIVED TOTALITARIAN RULE IN CHINA. 4/27, 5:00-6:30pm (BST), Noon-1:30pm (EDT) VIRTUAL. Sponsor: School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Speaker: author Minxin Pei, Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College, Editor of China Leadership Monitor. PURCHASE BOOK

THE FUTURE OF THE GULF: COMMERCE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER OPERATION EPIC FURY. 4/27, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Jared Cohen, President, Global Affairs, Goldman Sachs and Co-Head, Goldman Sachs Global Institute; Moderator: Mike Gallagher, Distinguished Fellow.

Sunday, April 19, 2026

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖


Cold War Comrades: An Emotional History 
of the Sino-North Korean Alliance
By Gregg A. Brazinsky, Professor of History and International Affairs, 
George Washington University
PURCHASE BOOK 1/8/2026

Brazinsky argues that neither the PRC nor the DPRK would have survived as socialist states without the ideal of Sino-North Korean friendship. Chinese and North Korean leaders encouraged mutual empathy and sentimental attachments between their citizens and then used these emotions to strengthen popular commitment to socialist state building. He explains why the unique relationship that Beijing and Pyongyang forged during the Korean War remained important throughout the Cold War and how it continues to influence the international relations of East Asia today.



Narrowing Sea: Fukuoka, Pusan, and the Rise 
and Fall of an Imperial Region
By Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor of History, 
Yale University
PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

Shepherd examines the shared histories of Pusan and Fukuoka over the eight decades from Japan's forced opening of Korea's ports in 1876 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. Wars, colonization, and capitalist industrialization forged intimate connections between the two, knitting together an imperial region that transcended its maritime boundaries. She challenges traditional views of empire and urban growth and shows how local networks, migration, and capital flows shaped the region's exploitative and uneven geographies.

Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: 
Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War
By Sean Wiswesser, Former Senior Operations Officer,
Central Intelligence Agency
PURCHASE BOOK 4/21/2026

Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. He breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights.


Japanese Rebels: Non-Conformists in a Conformist Society
By David McNeill, Former Correspondent, The Independent 
and The Economist
&
Stephen McClure, Freelance Journalist, Former Asia Bureau Chief, Billboard
PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Japan is often seen through the lens of an unusually resilient stereotype that it is a nation of risk-averse conformists. McNeill and McClure deconstruct that stereotype by showing that there have always been Japanese people who have rejected the status quo, challenged injustice, and fought for personal freedom. 


*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*
Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement
They are simply new and interesting.

Sunday, November 2, 2025

Prime Minister Takaichi’s First Policy Speech


Ambitions Lacking Details



By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy PointYou can find his blog, J Update here
November 1, 2025

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered her first policy speech to the extraordinary Diet session on October 24. She emphasized that her administration would make the Japanese economy and Japan itself stronger. However, it was not at all clear how she would do so or how Japan will fare under her leadership. One thing that was clear was her commitment to follow the policies of the former Shinzo Abe administration, which she greatly admires.

“I will strive to build a robust economy, turning people’s unease and apprehension over their current lives and the future into hope and foster a Japan that is stronger and more prosperous,” Takaichi said. She was adamant that she would restore Japanese diplomacy so that it “flourishes on the world’s center stage” – a term coined by Abe when he advocated for an active role for Japan in the world.

One question remains: What exactly is a strong economy? A “responsible and proactive public finances” is Takaichi’s main concept. She calls for bold governmental spending, which, she says, will raise incomes, transform people’s mindsets regarding consumption, and boost tax revenues without raising tax rates as business earnings increase. She aims to curb the growth of Japan’s outstanding debt so as not to exceed the rate of economic growth and lower Japan’s ratio of outstanding government debt to GDP.

This concept does not differ in any significant way from the “economic virtuous cycle” that former administrations had hoped to achieve. However, neither Abe nor other prime ministers were able to grow real wages. As these administrations poured money into the market by issuing government bonds, wages could not catch up with price hikes. While Takaichi and her allies have great nostalgia for Abenomics, that policy was a remedy for deflation, not for inflation from which the Japanese public is now suffering.

When she talks about responsibility for economic policies, Takaichi must show fiscal resources that will give effect to her policies. She promised in her policy speech that her administration would pass a bill in the current session of the Diet to remove the provisional gasoline tax rate. But she did not propose how she would find the fiscal resources to make up for lost revenue.

Takaichi listed several policies her administration would pursue, including subsidies for the wages of workers in medical services and nursing care facilities, for local communities to support small and mid-size entrepreneurs, and for payments to high schools for school lunches. But she never explained how she would pay for them. It is notable that, during her campaign for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Takaichi did not rule out issuing government bonds to fund her economic policies.

Takaichi also introduced the concept of “crisis management investment.” She defines it as strategic investments “to address various risks and social issues, including economic security, food security, energy security, health and medical security, and measures to enhance national resilience” with coordination between the private sector and the government. Another goal is to advance Japan as “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” To implement this economic agenda, she proposed establishing a “Council for Japan’s Growth Strategy.”

LDP governments have long used disaster management to justify expenditures for infrastructure construction. Mirroring the views of her immediate predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi stressed the need to prepare for the Nankai Trough Great Earthquake and to continue reconstruction following the great earthquakes in northeast Japan in 2011 and Noto Peninsula in 2024.

Takaichi’s respect for Abe comes through in her diplomatic policies. A “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOAP)” is at the center of her foreign policy. Abe proposed FOAP in 2016 to counter Chinese advances in the region. Takaichi appointed Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official, Keiichi Ichikawa, to be the new Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat. Ichikawa originated the idea of FOAP in MOFA. 

Takaichi also declared that she would take “front-loaded measures” to increase the defense budget to two percent of GDP within FY2025. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida assumed that income tax, corporate tax, and tobacco tax revenues would fund the two percent commitment. Takaichi has yet to adopt that view, and she has not indicated how she would pay for the increase in the defense budget.

As a practical matter, the most important agenda item for the Takaichi administration is how to ensure the survival of her current minority government. Yet, she did not meaningfully address the priority policy of her coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) – a reduction in the number of Diet seats. This reduction was the “absolute condition” for the JIP to enter a coalition with the LDP. In her speech, Takaichi did not mention any reduction at all, instead referring to the policy as social security reform. But it is nothing more to her than a topic to “discuss quickly.” 

Takaichi also omitted any mention of campaign financing reform, namely the prohibition of donations from companies and organizations. The LDP’s resistance to reform was the greatest reason Komeito left the coalition with the LDP. Indeed, far from pursuing reform, Takaichi appointed lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal, to positions in her government and on the LDP board. Her indifference to political reform may engender some criticism.

Thursday, May 15, 2025

Japan is not the UK of the East

The Impact of Tariffs on Japan’s Economy


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 12, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point


As U.S. President Donald Trump enters bilateral tariff negotiations with several countries, his tariffs have already begun to negatively affect Japan’s economy. Some business sectors had already realized profit and growth losses from the slowdown of Japan’s economy. The Shigeru Ishiba administration believes that, as a close ally of the United States, it can negotiate some exceptions to the punishing tariffs. This is far from certain.
 
The Bank of Japan has revised its estimate of the growth of Japan’s economy in FY2025. “Japan’s economic growth is likely to moderate, as trade and other policies in each jurisdiction [other countries] lead to a slowdown in overseas economies and to a decline in domestic corporate profits and other factors,” says the bank’s Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices in April. The outlook identifies Japan’s evolving trade situation and developments in import prices as risks to economic activity.
 
Toyota Motor Corporation published its FY2025 consolidated financial results on May 8. According to its estimation, net income from April 2025 to March 2026 will decline by 3.1 trillion yen ($21 billion), or 34.9 percent. Toyota has already taken into account declines of 180 billion yen in April and May 2025 that have resulted from Trump’s tariff policy, as well as an annual 745 billion yen reduction caused by the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates.
 
Nippon Steel estimates its net income between April 2025 and March 2026 will be 200 billion yen, a 42.9 percent decline from the previous fiscal year. “The U.S. administration’s tariff policy is becoming increasingly uncertain day by day and is beginning to have a major impact on the global economy. As a result, the trend toward favoring domestic production is accelerating, and it is expected to have a significant impact on the domestic and overseas steel industry, including an indirect impact,” according to Nippon Steel’s consolidated financial results for FY2024.
 
The Trump administration imposed a 25 percent tariff on foreign steel and aluminum in March. In April, it imposed another 25 percent tariff on imported cars. The Shigeru Ishiba administration quickly sought to negotiate reductions in these tariffs. Japan’s top negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, announced that the talks were focused on the expansion of bilateral trade, non-tariff barriers, and economic security.
 
While Japan has been spending time trying to set the agenda, the United Kingdom reached a deal with the U.S. to reduce tariffs on UK products. The tariff on 100,000 UK cars will be reduced from 27.5 percent to 10 percent, and steel and aluminum imports will be tariff-free. On Monday, May 12, the U.S. agreed with China to cut the 145 percent tariff on Chinese goods to 30 percent for 90 days.
 
The Trump administration clearly is seeking deals with countries, regardless of whether they are allies or foes. Japan was stunned by the indifference of Trump administration to their alliance and shared values of democracy and free markets, as seen in the U.S. intent to exclude the new tariffs on automobiles, steel, and aluminum from negotiations with Japan.
 
Trump’s tariffs caused the Japanese yen to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. The appreciation will itself raise the cost of Japan’s goods sold in the U.S., although the precise change in the exchange rate has varied. The yen rose from 155 yen per dollar at the time of Trump’s inauguration in January to a high of 140 yen in April. As of the close of business Monday, May 12, in the U.S., the rate was approximately 148 yen to the dollar.
 
Despite pressure from the Trump Administration to ease monetary policy, the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board made no change to the current federal funds rate of 4¼ to 4½ percent at its May meeting, which concluded on May 7.  As long as U.S. monetary policy does not reduce the interest gap between the U.S. and Japan, there should be little impact on the yen. 
 
However, the announcement of even a 90-day deal between the U.S. and China devalued the yen. At the close of the market on Friday, the Japanese yen was at approximately 145 yen to the dollar. At the U.S. close on Monday, it was approximately 148 yen to the dollar. 
 
A cheap yen hikes the price of imported goods in Japan. According to the Monthly Labour Survey in March by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the real wage of workers in Japan has dropped for three consecutive months. Workers’ wages have still not caught up with price inflation.
 
To minimize the negative impact of Trump’s tariffs in the coming Upper House election, the Ishiba administration plans to deliver an economic stimulus package. However, the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party are reluctant to include a consumption tax cut or a cash distribution in the party’s campaign platform.
 
If Japan falls behind other countries in finishing bilateral tariff deals, the Ishiba administration will be unable to reverse the downward trend in its approval rating. The latest poll of NHK showed a 33 percent approval rating, down 2 percentage points from the previous month. The Trump administration's tough line toward Japan is having a negative effect on Japanese politics.

Thursday, October 5, 2023

Kishida's Political Calculations

Kishida’s Economic Measures Have Political Motivations

By Takuya Nishimura
, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 1, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

Suffering from consistently low public support for his administration, Prime Minister Kishida ordered September 25th the preparation of a package of economic measures to relieve inflation and wage growth. Kishida will submit a supplemental budget bill to an extraordinary session of the Diet later this month. He has even referred to a possibility of tax reduction. This announcement has invited speculation about a snap election by the end of this year.

The planned economic measures consist of five pillars: protection from inflation, sustainable wage growth, promotion of domestic investment, overcoming demographic decline, and infrastructure to enhance safety and security. Sustainable wage growth typically receives the most paid attention.

Kishida may also attempt to reform the pension and health insurance system. Embedded in the system is the so-called “wall of ¥1.3 million.” That is, a worker who earns ¥1.3 million or more annually is no longer included with another worker’s – i.e., the spouse’s -- “dependent family.” The worker who has breached the wall must pay for pension and health insurance of his/her own.

In a family, the wall affects the lower-earning spouse. If a woman--and women typically earn less than men in Japan--is part of the dependent family of her husband, her pension and health insurance is covered by her husband. If her yearly income is less than ¥1.3 million, the payment for her pension and health insurance is paid by the company she works for. Her husband also can accept ¥380 thousands of reduction from his income tax for supporting his dependent family. But once the wife’s income exceeds ¥1.3 million, she and her husband no longer enjoy these benefits. In some cases, then, the wife is better off being her husband’s dependent family without any job than being an independent worker who has to pay for her own pension and health insurance.

Kishida supports only a temporary fix, either ¥500 thousand subsidy for each worker or a two-year moratorium on enforcement of the ¥1.3 million wall. The current system was established in 1986, when women were only beginning to gain financial and independence, and the government sought to support women unable to take that step. In the thirty-seven years since then, job prospects for women have improved. Fundamental system reform is needed, rather than one-time stop-gap measures.

Temporary relief is also the plan for other pillars. To address inflation, the subsidy for gasoline, electricity or gas, set expire at the end of this year may continue into next year. To raise workers’ wage, the government plans a tax cut for employers who have increased wages. To increase business investment the government may provide some support for semi-conductor industries.


Where does the money come from? Article 29 of Public Finance Act allows supplemental appropriations only when an urgent need arises after the yearly budget has been wrapped up. Inflation relief and wage growth may be urgent, demographic decline and infrastructure safety are not.

Furthermore, there is a fundamental question about the necessity of economic measures now, when Japan’s economy is not in a serious slump. According to the estimate of Cabinet Office, GDP gap in the second quarter of this year marked +0.4%, which meant total demand surpassed total supply for the first time in these fifteen quarters. Bank of Japan sees that “Japan’s economy is likely to continue recovering moderately.”

Nevertheless, Kishida insists on delivering stimulus measures, including tax reduction. “Now, we have to properly return the increased tax revenue, which is our achievement of growth, to the people,” Kishida said in his press conference. This statement caused speculation about a snap election within this year, because tax cuts typically garner higher popularity for incumbents.

The supplementary budget will be submitted to the next Diet session starting on October 20th. “I’m focusing on economic issues that cannot be delayed,” said Kishida, when asked about the possibility of snap election. As long as a snap election is a possibility, the opposition parties are unlikely to debate the supplementary measures aggressively. For Kishida, economic measures are merely tools to control politics.

Sunday, November 6, 2022

Monday Asia Events November 7, 2022

PREPARING FOR NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND A PACT FOR THE FUTURE: THE ROAD TO THE 2024 SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE. 11/7, NOON (EST),  6:00PM (CEST), IN PERSON AND ZOOM. Sponsors: Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Stimson Center. Speakers: Richard Ponzio – Director for Global Governance, Justice & Security Program at the Stimson Center and author of the report “Road to 2023. Our Common Agenda and the Pact for the Future”; Discussants: Ann Linde – Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden; Adam Day – Co-Lead to the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism and Head of the United Nations University Geneva Office; Jo Leinen – FEPS Senior Fellow, Former Member of the European Parliament, and Chair of Key Committees of the European Parliament. 

ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS. 11/7, 3:00-4:15pm (EST), IN-PERSON AND WEBCAST. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jun Kazeki, Executive Advisor, GRIPS Alliance; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Mihoko Matsubara, Chief Cybersecurity Strategist, NTT Corporation; James L. Schoff, Senior Director, U.S.-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA; Moderator: Mireya Solís, Director, Center for East Asia Policy Studies Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies.

PRC CYBERATTACKS ON TAIWAN: WHAT THE U.S. SHOULD LEARN FROM THEM. 11/7, 5:00-6:00pm (EST), IN-PERSON. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speaker: Gillian Hand, IWP National Security Affairs M.A. Candidate ('22).

DIGITALLY TRANSFORMING JAPAN: A CONVERSATION WITH FORMER DIGITAL MINISTER KAREN MAKISHIMA. 11/7, 5:00–6:15pm (EST), WEBINAR. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speaker: Karen Makishima, House of Representatives, Japan, Kanagawa 17th district; Kenji E. Kushida, Senior Fellow, Japan Studies, Carnegie’s Asia Program; Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Professor of Sociology, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

THE TAO OF ALIBABA AND LESSONS FOR BROADER U.S.–CHINA BUSINESS RELATIONS. 11/7, 5:30-6:30pm (PST), WEBINAR. Sponsor: Asia Society. Speakers: Author Brian Wong, Alibaba Executive, Former Special Assistant to Jack Ma, The Tao of Alibaba: Inside the Chinese Digital Giant That is Changing the World; Moderator: Frank Lavin, CEO and Founder, Export Now.
PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3h0ebWS

Friday, August 5, 2022

Japan's New Capitalism

Prioritize Equality of Opportunity with Predistribution

by Steven K. Vogel, UC Berkeley and APP Member

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 27, 2022

Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has vowed to shift Japan toward a “new capitalism” that will deliver growth with redistribution. The administration’s plan announced in June combines a wide variety of measures, from boosting wages to increasing investments in science and technology – yet some critics charge that it offers more hopeful proclamations than promising substance.

The prime minister is right to strive to reform Japanese capitalism to achieve both growth and equity. But how should he do that? If the government really wants to address inequality at its roots, it should prioritize growth with “predistribution” over redistribution. The term may be obscure, but the concept is rather simple. Redistribution accepts the market allocation of profits as given and tries to moderate inequalities after the fact with policies such welfare spending or progressive taxation. Predistribution, in contrast, seeks to affect who benefits from economic activity in the first place through public investment and market governance reforms.

The British Labour Party leader Ed Miliband heralded “predistribution” in his new agenda in 2012, presenting it as a way to create a fairer economy without huge increases in government spending. In more recent years, scholars have refined predistribution analysis to evaluate the sources of economic inequality and to devise remedies. Some of the leading scholars in this area, such as Thomas Piketty and others associated with the World Inequality Lab, have increasingly emphasized the predistribution roots of inequality.

Predistribution and redistribution policies can blur in practice, but the distinction remains useful in evaluating Japan’s past performance and its future prospects. In fact, Japan delivered growth with equity through most of the postwar era via what could be interpreted as a successful predistribution strategy. It achieved a relatively equitable income distribution not through a big welfare state but rather through “predistribution” factors such as corporate practices, labor relations, and societal norms. And now that Japan confronts higher inequality and lower growth, it should prioritize predistribution solutions to these new challenges.

The predistribution-redistribution distinction engages the timeless debate over equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome. Predistribution seeks to eliminate inequalities of opportunity rather than to compensate people for them. Yet advocates of predistribution insist that equality of opportunity must be substantive, not merely formal. That is, predistribution should enhance human capabilities and give workers and entrepreneurs greater ability to compete in the marketplace. It does not take away resources from one group and give them to another, but strives for a more equitable distribution of returns in the first place. It does not seek to override markets but to make them work better.

Now libertarians would surely object to this line of argument. They would insist that the government should not intervene in the free operation of the market. But there is no free market. All markets are embedded in government regulations, business practices, and social norms. All real-world markets reflect balances of power, such as employers versus workers or producers versus consumers. So devising and refining market rules is not an alien intervention into a pristine free market, but rather a prerequisite to properly functioning markets. Think of it this way. If workers are being paid too little for their labor and consumers are paying too much for their products, then should we sit by idly or change the rules of the marketplace to addresses these injustices?

From the other side, egalitarians might argue that we should seek equal outcomes by any means possible, and that would mean going all in with redistribution. Yet the advocates of predistribution do not oppose redistribution so much as they contend that predistribution should come first. Shouldn’t we try to eliminate unequal opportunities first, before we start compensating people for them? Then redistribution policies could fill in where predistribution policies fall short in producing a fair and equitable market society.

So how does all of this grand theory apply to Japan past and present? We can reinterpret Japan’s postwar success in achieving growth with equity via the lens of predistribution. The government invested in transport and communications infrastructure that supported economic growth and mobility, and it provided high-quality universal education and health care that sustained both growth and equity. Japan’s large corporations practiced a stakeholder model of governance, with channels for labor incorporation at the plant and office level and job security and benefits for core workers. Japan’s postwar system harbored some major structural inequities, of course, such as large firms versus small, urban regions versus rural, and male workers versus female. Yet it nonetheless delivered a combination of growth with equity that was the envy of the world.

Some of Japan’s vaunted strengths have partially eroded since the 1990s. The education system has become less equal as those with resources have gamed the system to advantage their children. The employment system has become less stable and more unequal as the share of nonregular workers has increased. The predistribution lens offers a framework for setting priorities for reforms. The predistribution approach would prioritize public investment in education, training, research and development, and startup funding. It would also favor family policies, including pre-school education, and maternity, paternity, and elder care leave. These policies are redistributive and predistributive at the same time because they support children while also enabling parents to enhance their skills and to participate in the labor market. My own mentor, the late Harold Wilensky, studied the economic and social performance of 20 rich democracies, including Japan, over a 60-year span. He found, not surprisingly, that some government policies favored growth over equity while others favored equity over growth. But he stressed that the most enlightened policies, such as these family policies, managed to achieve both goals at the same time.

With respect to market reforms, the government should immediately hike the minimum wage. This will boost growth and equity by putting money into the hands of those most likely to spend and by raising the income of those earning the least. The government should reduce the gap in pay, security, and benefits between permanent and non-regular workers by vigorously enforcing equal pay for equal work. And it should promote work-life balance policies that will contribute to higher productivity, such as fewer working hours, more flexible schedules, and remote work options. Japan has made some real progress in these areas in recent years, but it could go much further. With respect to corporate governance, the government should continue to promote greater diversity and accountability, which will enhance both equity and productivity. But it should resist reforms that will raise corporate returns at the expense of workers and other stakeholders.

None of this suggests that Japan does not need redistribution as well. For example, the government could enhance both growth and equity by raising corporate taxes while reducing consumption taxes. Consumption taxes are regressive, and they slow growth by reducing demand.

For many years, economic analysts have assumed there is a tradeoff between growth and equity. Japan disproved this in the postwar era by achieving high growth with equity. And Japan, the United States, and many other advanced economies have doubly disproved this thesis in recent years by demonstrating that inequality can become a drag on growth.

The United States is much further down that road than Japan, so Japan should heed this as a valuable warning. In fact, the U.S. economy could rightly be viewed as one of upward predistribution. That is, the market rules – from labor regulations to corporate governance practices – are structured to maximize returns for the wealthy and the powerful at the expense of everyone else. Viewed through the lens of predistribution, current-day Japan is underperforming the Japan of the postwar era but it remains much less unequal than the United States. With greater attention to predistribution reforms, it can do much better.