October Election No Mandate for Abe

By William Brooks, SAIS, Johns Hopkins Fellow and APP Senior Fellow

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) walked away with an easy win in the October 22 general election. The LDP, with its coalition partner the Komeito, attained a two-thirds majority (313) in the House of Representatives (Lower House). This “landslide victory,” however, should not be interpreted as a mandate for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe – who is now likely to stay in power until 2021. He is unlikely to implement the most controversial part of his policy agenda, that of amending Article 9 of Japan’s peace Constitution. Public and media opinion are not necessarily on his side, and the LDP arguably won because the opposition was poorly organized and unprepared.

Abe’s Calling Snap Election Had Little to Do with Policy

Prime Minister Abe cited the North Korean threat, which he deemed a “national crisis,” and demographic issues as his reasons for dissolving the Lower House and calling a snap election. In reality, his motive was purely political. Policy debates played a minor role in the election campaign. Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso even joked after the election that the LDP won “thanks to North Korea,” no doubt knowing that such was not the case.

Abe used the election to shore up his base within the LDP. It had eroded due to plummeting approval rates brought on by two personal money scandals and his party’s ignominious loss in the July Tokyo assembly election. The Kochikai faction in the LDP was getting set to run former Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in the party head election next year to prevent Abe from winning another three years as president and thus prime minister.

Abe also worried about the new opposition party led by Tokyo governor Yuriko Koike and her Party of Hope [PH] (the “Koike boom”). He was keenly aware that if the general election came a year later as scheduled, opposition parties could by then form a possibly undefeatable united front. An election took advantage of a still weak, fragmented, and ill-prepared opposition.

“Balkanization” of Opposition Forces
Democratic Party (DP) head Seiji Maehara’s sudden dissolution of his party, ostensibly to create a larger opposition party by joining the Party of Hope, failed. Koike, in a major tactical mistake, refused to accept the DP’s liberal wing. As a result, the progressives quickly organized the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) to run candidates in the election. Other DP members unwilling to join either side formed an unaffiliated group led by former Foreign Minister and DPJ president Katsuya Okada.

The collapsing DP in short split the opposition camp into conservative and liberal groups that ended up fighting each other in the election. Such confusion may have convinced voters to stay home, since the turnout rate in the election was only 55.6%, the second lowest in postwar history (the lowest being in the last Lower House election in 2014).

The LDP’s win still seems odd because the pre-election polls showed Abe’s lack of popularity, and a majority of the public not favoring him staying on as prime minister after the election. Reports of the LDP candidates campaigning across the country found no outpouring of support for Abe, as well. And yet, the LDP won handily. Why? The poor turnout as potentially anti-LDP voters stayed home must be linked also to the opposition camp’s disarray.

The conservative Party of Hope led by Koike, who did not run for a Diet seat, fizzled. It backed 235 candidates (trying to achieve a majority or 233 seats) but won only 50 seats. It turned out also that the popularity of Koike was primarily a Tokyo phenomenon. But even Koike’s choice to head PH, Masaru Wakasa, lost his seat in Tokyo’s District 10.

The liberal CDPJ, backed by Rengo, the labor union federation, outpaced PH to take 55 seats, emerging as the largest opposition party in the Lower House. The CDPJ, which campaigned on a platform of protecting the Constitution from revision and scrapping all nuclear power, not only captured the liberal vote (perhaps the last gasp of that dying movement), it also drained centrist votes from the Komeito, which lost in Kanagawa, ending up with 34 seats. The biggest loser in the election, though, was the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which lost half its seats. Apparently, the protest votes that used to go to the JCP went to the CDPJ this time.

LDP Wins by Standing Still

The LDP won 284 seats in the election, but this is the same number it had before the election. In fact, the LDP has not attracted more votes in any election since 2005. The party’s absolute ratio of votes (ratio of votes to the total number of voters; not the turnout rate) in the latest election was 25.2%, about the same level as in 2009, when it lost to the DPJ. The party’s strength has been in the 22-25% range since 2005, when then Prime Minister Koizumi successfully attracted millions of unaffiliated voters to bring the ratio to 32% (and win 296 seats for the LDP).

Polls regularly show that between 40-50% of voters are unaffiliated (mutohasou) and able to swing elections, as in 2005 and 2009, when they did decide to vote. Strong issues in the campaign can mobilize them, but the low turnout in this election showed that a large number of unaffiliated voters were disinterested and stayed home.

Another way of looking at the election is the tally of votes in the proportional representation blocs, in which people vote for a party not a candidate. The CDPJ won about 11.07 million votes, and the PH won 9.66 million votes – a combined total of 20.73 million votes. The total of votes won by the LDP in the proportional representation blocs was 18.52 million votes, or about 2 million votes less than that of the two opposition parties combined. The conclusion reached is that the LDP owes much of its victory to the split in the opposition camp.

The results also show that the three way battles in most districts among the LDP, CDPJ, and PH favored the LDP. In 226 of the 289 single-seat districts, a single ruling coalition candidate took on multiple candidates from the opposition camp. The ruling coalition candidates won 183 of the 226 districts or more than 80%. A united front candidate from the opposition camp would likely have changed the results significantly.

Abe Has No Mandate for Constitutional Reform
Assuming that he will serve as Prime Minister until 2021, Abe now plans to move decidedly toward amending the Constitution, based on his own ideas and on proposals that the LDP is now preparing. For example, Abe would like a clause added to Article 9 to specify the legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces.

He is counting on his popularity to recover, and indeed a Yomiuri poll released on October 25 showed the Abe Cabinet’s support rate is up 11 points to 52% from only two weeks earlier. But an Asahi poll on the same day has the support rate only up four points from a week earlier to 42%, with the non-support rate down a point to 39%. Moreover, asked about Abe’s desire to amend Article 9, 45% were negative and only 36 were positive. At best, the nation is split on amending the Constitution in the way that the LDP may want, and if that wariness continues, a future referendum to approve the Diet’s changes could fail.

In the Diet, although most LDP members are eager to amend the Constitution, the Komeito, which gives the ruling coalition the two-thirds majority needed to pass Constitutional changes, remains reluctant to tamper with Article 9. Komeito has the capability to put the brakes to Abe’s drive to reshape the Constitution.

The media is also skeptical. Editorials after the election, liberal and conservative alike, rejected that Abe had a mandate. The editorials were wary of Abe and the LDP having too much power in the Diet now and admonished the Prime Minister to “implement politics humbly” and take a cautious approach. They encouraged the administration and the LDP to “listen to the people’s voice” and to build a consensus with the opposition on contentious issues.

The LDP win is attributed to the “missteps of the opposition.” The voters and the press are concerned that he will be “high-handed” on constitutional revision or other issues with his Diet super majority. Yet, the election made Abe appear the more the canny politician than the reckless crusader. He knows will have to proceed cautiously with as monumental a task as changing Japan’s revered Constitution. After all Abe is a conservative in a country that does not like change.

Bill Brooks and Kent Calder, SAIS, Johns Hopkins, Washington, DC, October 25, 2017

Election Discussion

Election Win Gives Abe More Time for Change

By William Brooks, APP Senior Fellow

and Mindy Kotler, APP Director

Japan voted for stability in the December 14th Lower House elections. The election was not about change. In contrast, the election for Prime Minister Abe Shinzo was about winning time for change. The election brought him time to continue his promised policy changes such as constitutional revision. Without the snap election, Abe would have had only two more years of a guaranteed Lower House majority. Now, barring any political setbacks, he has four or until 2018.

Whereas Japan’s voters are uncomfortable with change, the Abe Administration is focused on a number of substantial ones. The prime minister wants to revise the constitution, not just Japan’s no-war clause Article 9 but also the clauses on human rights, civil liberties, and the Emperor’s divinity. He wants to enhance Japan’s military posture and extend the right of collective self-defense. And he wants an economic overhaul in Japan that includes opening markets, loosening labor regulations, altering agricultural practices, returning to nuclear power, and empowering women.

The Lower House election did not give Abe a mandate. Opposition forces made some gains and he still needs his coalition partner the Komeito, which is less enamored of his plans. Abe will have to work hard to convince the public to accept each aspect of his agenda. This will take time and this he now has.

No Mandate, Just TINA
The LDP’s December 14th win was not a “mandate” to steamroll their agenda through the Diet. The party remains strapped to a sometime reluctant coalition partner, the Komeito, to achieve a two-thirds super-majority. Compromises will continue to be necessary and negotiated.

Voter disinterest, as demonstrated by a record low turnout of 53%--down 6.6 points from 2012—was not simply a factor of bad weather. Only 10 years ago voter turnout was nearly 70%. Japan’s media summarized the mood of the electorate as “TINA”, meaning “There is no alternative.”

An Asahi Shimbun poll the day after the election supported this view.  More than seven out of ten respondents said the LDP won big because of the opposition’s “lack of appeal.” Only 11% attributed the ruling coalition’s lopsided victory to the voters’ positive evaluation of Abe’s policies. Almost 80% said none of the opposition parties are capable of governing the nation. However, about 60% said the ruling coalition captured too many seats. According to the survey, 53% of respondents expressed “concern” about the premier’s future policies and only 31% had “expectations of success.

The opposition, despite its nonstop attacks on the “failure” of Abenomics, was unable to unseat the feeling that there was no replacement to Abe’s policies. It was easy for Abe and the LDP to exploit this resistance to change. Although Japanese opinion polls showed that voters did not feel the economy improved—reinforced by negative GDP numbers—most were uncomfortable with new alternatives. They were willing to give Abe more time to make Abenomics work

The disorganized opposition was also a factor. Not enough candidates were fielded to put up a significant fight. And the party platforms were less specific than those of the LDP. The voters were so disenchanted with the major opposition party the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that its leader lost his seat and the party’s leadership.

Yes, the ruling coalition won, but the LDP lost four seats and the Komeito picked up four. Thus, the two parties’ numerical strength is the same as before the election. Interestingly, the Party for the Next Generations, often a proxy voice for the Abe agenda lost big, going from 20 seats to only two. The DPJ picked up 11 seats to end with 73, keeping it the major opposition party. The real opposition winner was the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which captured the anti-LDP vote by more than doubling its seats in the Lower House, rising from eight to 21. The JCP comes across in Japan as the last socialist force standing, a pacifist protector of the Constitution from change, and an advocate of a basically unarmed Japan.

Amending the Constitution
Abe’s main goal for extending his tenure four years is to give himself enough time to amend or rewrite Japan’s Constitution. The two-thirds majority that the ruling coalition now holds in the Lower House allows it to override any bill rejected by the Upper House. But in order to amend the Constitution, as Abe plans, it will take two-thirds in the Upper House as well, which the coalition does not have.

The next Upper House election is in the summer of 2016. Unless the LDP suffers a crushing defeat in the Upper House in this election, it is possible that Abe will preside over a long-term administration until the term of office of Lower House members expires in 2018.

Despite the pro-LDP vote in the Lower House elections, there is a division between the electorate and the elected in their support for amending the Constitution. At its heart is changing Article 9 and allowing for collective self-defense. A Mainichi Shimbun poll before the election found only 35% of the public favoring Japan’s use of the right of collective defense and 51% opposed. Even among Abe supporters in the poll, only 57% were in favor of collective self-defense and 31% opposed.

In contrast, another Mainichi Shimbun survey of those returned to the Diet found that 83% favored amending the Constitution. This totaled 390 of all those elected, exceeding two-thirds (317 members) required for the Lower House to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Asked whether they think Article 9 of the Constitution should be amended, 57% (267 members) answered yes.

In the Asahi Shimbun mentioned above, only 3% felt that the Abe Administration should focus on amending the Constitution. Respondents felt social security and the economy should be of primary concern.

Neighbors” Reaction
China and South Korea have reacted predictably to the election. The see the LDP’s win as an endorsement of the “rightward policies that deny past history.” Those countries believe Abe’s commitment to amend Japan’s pacifist Constitution as creating even more conflict with them. Abe laid the groundwork for repairing damaged ties with China, and it seems likely he will continue to do so. A visit to Yasukuni or a fishing boat collision could produce set back.

Ties with South Korea are at rock bottom. It will take a lot of patient diplomacy on both sides to inch the relationship forward. The media war between the two countries over the Comfort Women issue has yet to abate. Abe will have to distance himself from such mud-slinging and accusation, and take the high road toward a future-oriented relationship that would be in Japan’s national interests.

There are domestic advantages to hostile neighbors. It can encourage further political support for stability and unity. Coupled with doubt about the reliability of allies, an uncertain security environment helps justify the range of defense changes and enhancements advocated by the Abe Administration.

Alliance Deepening; Okinawa Worsening
On the Alliance, relations with the U.S. under Abe have continued to improve over the past two years. Spring should see the completion of a new set of defense cooperation guidelines that will further deepen ties. The Okinawa base issue, however, could become a thorn in the relationship if Abe is not careful.

The loss of Okinawa seats was the LDP’s and Abe’s biggest calamity in the otherwise smooth election. The prefecture is now dominated by anti-base activists, starting with the governor, who vows to block the relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko Point, where a runway is to be built. In this hostile political environment, Abe will have to somehow build new channels of support and expand economic packages to the prefecture. Passage of casino gambling legislation made get an added push. Henoko will not be built by bulldozing the project over local protests. Yet blocking the Futenma relocation only delays its closing. Neither is a satisfactory solution.

Year Ahead
The LDP faces another election: the national unified local elections in April. To sweep these local assemblies, the LDP will have to soft-sell unpopular policies such as support for TPP and restarting nuclear power stations. Prime Minister Abe will have to tread lightly on controversial decisions until those elections are over. An early decision on TPP, for example, could reverberate wide across the farming prefectures that are against the agreement and at the base of the LDP.

There are also warnings of complacency and over-reach of, Kantei, the prime minister's office. Komeito is wary that Kantei may act arbitrarily. After signing the coalition agreement with Abe on December 15th, party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi stressed that, “We agreed not to become arrogant and to manage the administration steadily.” At his news conference on December 15th, Abe himself said: “We will lose the people’s support instantly if we become arrogant with the majority we enjoy and lose our humility.”

Until May, Abe will be cautious in both initiating and implementing domestic policies. He will continue his photogenic multi-national trips to shore up international support for Japan’s peaceful development and to emphasize his world leadership. At home, Abe will be patient. He will wait until he has solid domestic political backing, which he currently does not have. In all, he is buying time.

Edited 12/20/14

Japan's Unwanted Election

Japan’s Unwanted Election first appeared in Asia Policy Point's Asia Policy Calendar sent to members on December 8, 20014. By Dr. William Brooks, APP Senior Fellow and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins, SAIS.

Prime Minister Abe’s decision to dissolve the Lower House and hold a snap election in mid-December was personal. It was a calculated move to shore up his weakening political base within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). If he can provide his party with a substantial win, he can guarantee his remaining Japan’s prime minister for a full six years. Abe believes he needs that much time to complete his reform agenda, which includes revising the Constitution.

The call for elections stunned members in Abe’s own party. The opposition parties were caught off guard and have had to scramble to cobble together slates of unified candidates. The ruling LDP, initially reluctant and fearing a major loss of seats, has been reassured by polls that suggest their landslide victory.

Although Japan is officially now in a recession, the election will not be a referendum on Abe’s economic policies. Nor will it be a judgment on controversial issues such as collective self-defense or nuclear energy. Both have been carefully avoided as campaign issues.

Instead, the election will be about stability. Voters appear just afraid enough of inexperienced government management to keep the LDP. They are just indifferent enough to who is in charge to continue to vote for the LDP and its coalition partner the Komeito. The result will be for the LDP to keep a comfortable majority in Lower House.

Waste of Time and Money
"Why?" was immediate reaction to Abe’s surprise call for an election. The public saw little or no justification for a snap election. Abe, himself, was not sure. He changed rationales frequently.

At first. Abe cited the need for a referendum on his decision to delay for a year and a half a consumption tax hike to 10%. Yet, there was no opposition to this. Later, he said it was about “Abenomics.” With the economy entering a recession, this did not make sense. Big business leaders have been critical, calling the election a “waste of time and money” (Keidanren). One business magazine complained, “No matter how you look at it, there is no justification.”

In November, the Japanese economy slipped officially into recession. Growth rates had been negative for three quarters since October-December 2013. The January-March quarter saw consumers rush to buy expensive goods before a consumption tax hiked from 5% to 8%. Slow income growth in Japan is a key factor, with prices rising faster than wages.

Consumers continue to avoid buying big-ticket items, like autos, computers, and electrical appliances. The weak yen (now around 120 to the dollar) has helped some exporters, but has made imports more expensive, including food and daily necessities. It has hurt small companies which rely on imported materials. Big companies, benefiting from a rising stock market, are flush with cash, but not investing at home.

Power struggle masked as an election
Abe was reportedly surprised by the GDP showing minus growth. The Finance Ministry had assured him before he first raised the consumption tax that growth would resume in the fall. Startled, Abe responded by postponing the second planned tax hike.

Some powerful figures in his party opposed and challenged his move. With Abe’s popularity plummeting, linked initially to scandals in which two cabinet ministers resigned, talk has begun about his replacement. To reassert control, Abe felts that dissolving the Lower House for a snap election would reestablish his dominance. Thus, the election is a power struggle masked by a “referendum” on the success of his economic policies.

Local chapters of the LDP are unhappy with the surprise election. Local assembly members have to face unified local elections next spring and expect to have their hands full preparing for those races. A snap election requires enormous energy from the LDP’s local support bases, often run by elderly staffers. They fear that they will be too weary to prepare for the spring elections. Reports suggest that many are not overly cooperative with the national election. If this is true, the vote-gathering machine of the LDP in the regions may not be operating at full speed for the December election.

Referendum on Failed Policies
If the election is a referendum on a “failed” economic policy, what is the electorate to do? They cannot vote for the LDP because of satisfaction with the state of the economy – most polls show up to an 80% dissatisfaction rate.  They cannot easily vote for the opposition parties, particularly the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that they had thrown out of office in 2012 because of its policy failures. The DPJ is offering nothing new in its 2014 campaign manifesto. 

The opposition is good at caustic criticisms of Abe policies, accusing him of holding a snap election to mask his failure to grow the economy. Yet, with little to offer as solutions there is no incentive for voters even to cast protest votes against the LDP. Despite their critical views on Abe’s policies, most people are not upset enough to step out of the mainstream. In fact, many of the undecided voters – up to 50% in some polls – frustrated or indifferent -- just may decide to stay home on Dec. 14. If it is still snowing heavily in the mountainous regions, as it does in early December, many definitely will stay home.

The latest polls show the electorate’s dilemma well. The Kyodo poll for November is typical of most opinion surveys. It found that the Abe Cabinet’s disapproval rate (47.3%) now outpaces the approval rate (43.6%). Despite such public dissatisfaction, 28% of the respondents said they would vote for the LDP in the proportional representation segment, while only 10.3% indicated they would vote for the largest opposition party, the DPJ. But 41.2% were still undecided.

Significantly, 84.2% of the public said that they do not feel that the economy has improved under Abe, and 35.1% saw the economy as the important campaign issue. If such is the public’s view, it would seem safe to conclude that LDP will not do well in the election, but such may not be the case, even if there is a large turnout, including the undecided voters.

Other media surveys, such as the Asahi Shimbun, predict that the election outcome will give the LDP and its coalition partner 300 seats or more. The Mainichi in the latest survey gives the coalition even more seats, which could give it a two-thirds majority in the Lower House. Only one survey, a district-by-district tally by one weekly magazine predicted that the LDP could lose over 60 seats (it now has 295) and thus its majority by sinking below the 238 line. The LDP has ruled 266 seats for the coalition as the targeted goal.

Why the discrepancy? The weekly expects the opposition parties to do much better than expected, thanks largely to cooperation to run unified candidates. Running candidates against each other only split the vote for the opposition, giving the win to the LDP candidate. The weekly also expects the number of LDP votes will drop, as well. This combination could result in many wins for the opposition candidates in districts where the LDP won in the previous two elections.

More of the same thing?
It is an open question whether the opposition picks up seats or the LDP again wins big. There are a high proportion of unaffiliated and undecided voters. The Prime Minister has taken care to remove as much controversy from the campaign as possible to focus on the mere issue of stability. Collective self-defense (CSD), membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and even restarting of nuclear power plants are strangely absent from the campaign literature and speech-making.

Tough decisions by Abe on TPP and legislation on CSD will not come until next year. Moreover, the voters see Japan’s relations with the U.S. as relatively good, sour ties with China slowly improving, and Abe’s efforts on the North Korea abduction cases a noble effort. As for poor relations with South Korea, most Japanese blame Seoul. 

In an unwanted election, in which the only issue is the economy, and the only cards seem to be held by the ruling parties, voters lining up on December 14, though disgruntled, may feel they have little choice but to stick to more of the same thing. Be prepared for the election results to reinforce another long reign of the LDP. And one that will further embolden Mr. Abe.

Caroline Kennedy: a Perfect Choice as Ambassador to Japan

By William Brooks, APP Senior Fellow, Adjunct Professor, SAIS Johns Hopkins
This essay first appeared in the Monday, September 30th edition of the Asia Policy Calendar.

Forget any brickbats in the media: Caroline Kennedy is a wonderful choice to be the new U.S. ambassador to Japan.

Japan, like Britain, has become a key ally and friend of the United States; and Tokyo has become like London a leading cosmopolitan city. It is a logical place for a U.S. President to award a distinguished ambassadorial post to a close supporter and confidante. Unlike her grandfather, Joseph P. Kennedy, the U.S. Ambassador in London during The Blitz (1940), she will enjoy the trust of the President.

Ambassador Caroline Kennedy can be expected to bring traditional diplomacy to Japan. Until now, this highly social and elegant form of statesmanship seemed more appropriate for European capitals than for Asian ones. The famous Kennedy name and the new ambassador’s personal credentials will be a tremendous boost for this kind of American-style public diplomacy. Moreover, the new ambassador will have the ear of the President, as well as the Secretary of State – extremely important for a Japan that often has seemed off the radar for Washington policymakers.

The new ambassador’s priorities will obviously include developing close personal relations with Japan’s movers and shakers in the political, government, educational and cultural sectors, as well as nurturing the already friendly ties between the two peoples. She can build on the good work that her predecessor Ambassador John Roos began under the Operation Tomodachi initiative.

In recent years, the Japanese and American societies seem to be growing somewhat distant from each other, not surprising perhaps in an environment in which pressing global issues crowd out the diplomatic and security agendas for East Asia, and given the already short attention span of the media. Indeed, the growing lack of American media interest in Japan can be charted by the scarcity of news articles and journalism, the dwindling number of Japanese students in the U.S. and vice versa, and even the waning presence of Japanese business representatives in the U.S.

The new Ambassador must not only find suitable sparring partners with important opinion leaders, but also expand efforts of the previous ambassador, also initially seen as an “amateur” to diplomacy and things Japanese, to deepen and broaden ties from the grass-roots level up. Despite being a fast read, the new ambassador will most likely need some time to learn the essentials about dealing with Japan and its bilateral issues, but she will have on hand an expert staff of diplomats and advisers who can guide her through her first months in office.

She will need to reach out quickly to the Japanese public through speeches, op-eds, and the usual array of meetings, receptions, and soirees with Tokyo’s elite. She should also get out and see the country, meeting average Japanese at every opportunity and taking advantage of Japan’s great natural beauty and the many cultural heritages sites. A climb up Mt. Fuji, just declared a World Heritage site, would be a golden opportunity.

Just about every American ambassador who has come to Tokyo sooner or later seems to encounter their own version of baptism by fire: a crisis that tests their management abilities to the core. How an ambassador resolves each crisis can shape the relationship. The famous photo of Ambassador Mike Mansfield bowing deeply in apology to Japanese leaders after a U.S. submarine had fatally collided with a Japanese fishing boat in Tokyo Bay earned the respect of many Japanese.

Ambassador Walter Mondale worked hard to bring to closure a period of great national outrage in Japan over the gang rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa by setting in motion a mechanism to reduce the U.S. military footprint in that prefecture. Ambassador Tom Foley masterfully dealt with the tragic collision near Hawaii of a U.S. submarine and a Japanese training ship filled with students. Ambassador Howard Baker faced the horror of 9-11 and then the war on terror just after arriving at his new post in Tokyo. Ambassador Jon Roos played a critical role in U.S. efforts to console Japan and mobilize assistance after the triple earthquake disaster struck northern Japan on March 11, 2011.

Not that Ambassador Kennedy will encounter a crisis of like proportions on her watch, but the region is a dangerous place. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are a direct threat to Japan and American security interests. China’s risky game of military brinksmanship in the waters off the disputed Senkaku Islands make that area a potential flashpoint should an incident or accident occur.

Ambassador Kennedy will be well served by a team of experts and advisers already in place in the U.S. Embassy, and she will be kept well informed of moods and trends in Japan by media watchers in the press section. Some key issues seem now well underway toward resolution, such as Japan as part of a TPP agreement. Others, such as the resolution of U.S. basing in Okinawa, remain open and contentious. These will demand concerted efforts in Washington and Tokyo, and some imagination.

Most important, the Ambassador will have to ensure that democracy flourishes in Japan as the security environment worsens. Unlike her grandfather in embattled Britain, she cannot dismiss democracy as impractical or capitulation as inevitable. She promises to be an ardent defender of human rights, individual liberties, tolerance, and women’s empowerment. A fresh look by the new ambassador and her team at the current state of U.S.-Japan relations that goes beyond the usual defense and security perimeters may be just what is needed.

September 23, 2013

Will history again trip up Prime Minister Shinzo Abe?

At Chidorigaifuchi

Issues of history have dominated the past few weeks of Japan's international relations. For Japan's leaders, they are defending the nation's honor, for all others Tokyo's inability to squarely confront its past undermines trust and distracts from the economy.

APP Senior Fellow William Brooks, who is an Adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, addresses the domestic repercussions of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's focus on "correcting" the misperceptions of history in the essay below that first appeared in the Asahi Asia Japan Watch on May 7, 2013.

Dr. Brooks echoes The Economist's May 18th Cover Story "It's Japan." The editors are unsure if Abe is the economic modernizer, the internationalist, or the radical nationalist. The Prime Minister's emphasis on "backward-facing patriotism as a model for modern strength" and constitutional reform is troubling. Or as The Economist notes:

At best, all this could prove a distraction at a time when some structural-reform initiatives already appear to be running into the sands. At worst, it could endanger all reform by eroding the government’s popularity, at the same time increasing tensions with Japan’s neighbours. Far from having banished the ghosts of his past, as some of his advisers claim, the prime minister is in danger of summoning them up again.

More pointedly, The Economist's editors conclude: 

Mr Abe is right to want to awaken Japan. After the upper-house elections, he will have a real chance to do so. The way to restore Japan is to focus on reinvigorating the economy, not to end up in a needless war with China.

~~~~~~

With the landslide victory of the Liberal Democratic Party in December, its president, Shinzo Abe, returned for the second time as prime minister, aiming to fix Japan’s perpetually ailing economy through dramatic policy measures, dubbed “Abenomics,” which were cheered by the markets and welcomed by the public.

As Abe’s popularity soared in the polls to a 70 percent or higher approval rating, it seemed the momentum would give his ruling party an easy win in the Upper House election in July. Abe also defied trade-protectionist sentiment even in his own party and wowed international opinion by making a bold decision for Japan to join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations that would open the economy to what will become a huge free-trade bloc in the world.

Abe was lauded in Washington, too, by his promise of a strong national security agenda that would enhance Japan’s alliance with the United States. Washington hoped that finally, Japan had a strong leader that it needs to bring the country back on track, return stability to politics and restore Japan’s status as a “tier-one” level member in the global community.

But at the same time, the return of Abe to power has been accompanied by growing controversy due to his nationalistic agenda and revisionist views toward history.

His plan to drastically revise the Constitution, including the war-renouncing Article 9, has set off domestic alarms, even with the LDP’s coalition partner, the New Komeito. He also has upset Asian neighbors by questioning Japan’s wartime legacy and breaking his own taboo by letting Cabinet members visit Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined.

Abe left office in 2007 in a cloud over his handling of the war-guilt issue. Will history ultimately trip up Abe’s second try as prime minister?

Abe's Right-Turn Agenda Detours To Yasukuni
While the Japanese public welcomed the new prime minister, Abe was seen overseas in quite a different light. The Western media were especially critical. The Economist of Britain on Jan. 5, 2013, called Abe an “arch-nationalist” and predicted that his “appointment of a scarily right-wing cabinet bodes ill for the region.” The magazine noted “thirteen [members] support Nippon Kaigi, a nationalist think-tank that advocates a return to ‘traditional values’ and rejects Japan’s ‘apology diplomacy’ for its wartime misdeeds.”

Similar warnings about Abe’s nationalist roots appeared in major U.S. dailies, as well. This sparked a series of rebuttals in op-eds and commentaries from scholars and think-tanks seeing Abe instead as a pragmatic leader who had learned from his unsuccessful first term.

Such concerns seemed borne out when Abe soon began to make comments that were seen in the Western media as “exposing his true nationalist colors.” Abe talked of revising the statements of wartime apologies made by earlier administrations and, in a Diet reply, he questioned the definition of “aggression” to describe Japan’s wartime actions in Asia.

Although he and his Cabinet spokesman sought to assuage irate Korean and Chinese reactions by later assurances that past apologies would always be honored, the damage had been done.

Things did not stop there, however. Abe in his previous turn as prime minister was careful to avoid visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 Class-A war criminals are enshrined. He was painfully aware of the trouble with China and Korea caused by the visits to Yasukuni of his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, and he desired above all to repair ties with those countries.

This time, however, Abe broke his old rule by allowing three of his Cabinet members, including Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, himself a former prime minister, to pay homage at Yasukuni during its April spring festival. Angry reactions swept across Korea and China, and scheduled high-level meetings were either postponed or canceled. Major Japanese dailies and the Western press slammed Abe. He may have miscalculated Korean and Chinese reactions, for it was clear from the start of his administration that he wanted to repair relations strained by territorial disputes. Although Abe himself did not visit the shrine, only sending a donation of a sacred plant, his allowing his deputy to pay homage at the shrine was to Asian eyes the equivalent of sending a proxy.

The impact of the Yasukuni visits has gone far beyond Asia. Abe was chastised for allegedly revealing his nationalist colors by editorials in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Financial Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and other major Western dailies. The Financial Times stressed, “Yasukuni ... is irredeemably associated with the nationalist cult of emperor worship.” The New York Times charged: “Visits to Yasukuni … are often seen as proof that Japan remains unrepentant for its brutal wartime march across Asia.”

The Japanese government’s position, which under ordinary circumstances would be reasonable and understandable, is that how Japan mourns its war dead is not something that other countries can give orders on.

Such a stance may still resonate among U.S. officials, for it harks back to the Yasukuni visits of Koizumi during his tenure in office (2001-2006). Koizumi was careful always to state that his intention was to pay homage to the war dead, not to war criminals. But his actions, though certainly not personally linked to nationalism, roiled China and South Korea and wrecked relations with those countries.

Those who defend official visits to Yasukuni as no more than paying respect for the war dead are denying the reality that the shrine long ago has become hopelessly politicized as a symbol of Japan’s militarist past. The Showa emperor himself stopped going to the shrine decades ago when he found that war criminals had been enshrined there. Still, most Japanese these days are probably neutral about the shrine, seeing Yasukuni as just a place to go to pray for the war dead, perhaps their own relatives. They do not think they are praying for the war criminals enshrined there.

Neutralizing Yasukuni
There has been much talk over the years of separating the souls of the war criminals from Yasukuni and enshrining them elsewhere. Other suggestions have included establishing a secular war memorial where even a U.S. president could lay a wreath. Such talk has not led to any action, though one could persuasively argue that the 14 Class-A war criminals do not belong at Yasukuni anyway: They were never killed on the battlefield but were executed for sending millions to die in battle.

As Abe’s miscalculation shows, though, Yasukuni remains a potential lightning rod for trouble if officials believe that visiting there is just an act of respect for the war dead.

Yasukuni Adds To U.S. Security Concerns In The Region
When Yasukuni flared up again in April, Washington officials were likely more upset about the timing of the dispute than with the visits to the shrine by Cabinet ministers. Washington has become increasingly concerned about escalating tensions between Japan and China over the Senkakus, islands both countries claim. China’s maritime surveillance ships repeatedly intrude into Japanese waters near the isles, and earlier this year, a Chinese warship, locking its radar on a Japan Coast Guard vessel, was ready to fire.

Conflict could have ensued. Moreover, the isles have taken on an even more strategic significance when Beijing recently announced that the Senkakus were part of China’s “core interests,” ranking them with Tibet and Taiwan.

Adding nationalism to territorial and historical issues makes an extremely volatile mixture, and U.S. officials worry that in the case of China and the Senkakus, a military clash is not out of the question. In that case, the United States might be dragged into an unnecessary war.

America’s pivot to Asia is largely centered on protecting its maritime security interests in the region. In that connection, Washington would like Japan and China to find diplomatic ways to return relations to a more cooperative mode, putting the territorial issue on the back burner and toning down the historical rhetoric.

Japan's rocky relations with South Korea further complicate U.S. regional strategy. Washington expects trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and South Korea in dealing with North Korea’s dangerous nuclear and missile programs.

Officials are disappointed, too, that bilateral strategic cooperation between Japan and South Korea, such as planned agreements for intelligence and materiel sharing, have been sidelined by the territorial row in 2012 and made even more remote by the tiff over history.

Moreover, the United States and Japan at this point cannot leverage cooperation from China in pressuring North Korea to reconsider its nuclear ambitions. As Japan becomes more isolated, another casualty is the loss of access to close consultations between Beijing and Seoul over the North Korea problem--a matter of direct national security interest for Tokyo.

Comfort Women Issue Could Roil U.S. Again
The comfort women issue--sex slaves used by the Japanese military in World War II--has the potential to flare up again, not only with Asian countries but also with the United States, if Abe makes good his oft-stated intention to review the 1993 Kono Statement, which admitted military involvement in the recruitment of women, mostly Koreans, to service Japanese soldiers at the war front.

A similar review of the 1995 Murayama Statement of apology for Japan’s wartime acts has also been suggested.

The comfort women issue became a bone of contention between the United States and Japan when Abe was prime minister for the first time. Congress was upset when the Abe government began to deny military involvement in that wartime system, and subsequently passed a resolution critical of Japan’s responses to date.

Americans view the comfort women’s plight as a humanitarian issue and expect Japan to do the right thing. Should the Abe administration, in its review of the Kono Statement, take the tack of again denying coercion and military involvement in this prostitution corps, it will find that the United States has joined the chorus of international criticism, too. Relations that started out so well early in the year could quickly cool. Such a scenario need not happen, though. Abe, who says he has learned from his mistakes in his first time in office, should apply that wisdom by turning over historical issues to historians to discuss and taking politics out of the act.

Japan's TPP decision

Not everyone is happy

On Saturday, April 20th, the 11 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries -- which include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, and Vietnam -- approved Japan to join the TPP negotiations upon completion of current members’ respective domestic processes.

On Wednesday, April 24th, during the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan's annual Washington visit, the USTR announced that the Obama Administration has notified Congress of its intent to include Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade talks. This notification triggers a 90-day consultation period with Congress and the public on U.S. negotiating objectives with respect to Japan.

Here is an April 8, 2013, Congressional Research Service report on  Japan's Possible Entry Into the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Its Implications.

APP Senior Fellow William L. Brooks wrote the following analysis for APP's April 22nd Asia Policy Calendar, which is sent weekly to its members.

Abe’s Risky Decision on TPP to Pay Off?

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s go-for-broke decision to have Japan join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, despite strong opposition in his own Liberal Democratic Party, seems to be paying off. Japan will now join full-fledged talks most likely in July. The hope is of being able to influence rule-setting to Japan’s advantage by the time that negotiations among the 12 member nations wind up late this year.

The support rate for the Abe cabinet in the polls continues to rise, with the Nikkei’s April survey giving it a heady 76%, a seven point jump from March. Kyodo’s poll gave the Abe cabinet a 71.1% approval rating. On TPP, a solid 62.1% of the public approve Japan’s participation in the Kyodo poll. Nikkei’s survey found 47% in favor of joining TPP, with only 30% opposed.

After deciding to join the TPP, Prime Minister Abe set up under his lead a TPP headquarters of 100 senior officials with relevant expertise. They are to prepare the government’s strategy and specific positions when Japan formally joins TPP rule-setting negotiations in July, as well as build domestic support for the effort. Though the public remains unsure as to whether TPP will really create new wealth in the Japanese economy, it is willing to go along with Abe’s bold decision on TPP because of strong expectations that Abenomics to end the long economic slump.

Experts seem to support such optimism. A steady stream of pro-TPP books and magazine articles has hit the market in recent months. Such opinion agrees that although some parts of the agricultural sector may suffer under TPP – requiring government countermeasures and reforms to be introduced quickly – other parts may grow, countering a long-term trend of decline. Moreover, the manufacturing and services sectors are likely to reap the bulk of the benefits, adding jobs and growth to the economy.

With Japan now welcomed by the U.S. and all 11 TPP participants, the debate in Japan has turned to what impact a TPP agreement might have on the economy at the macro and micro levels and what to do about it. In a Nikkei interview on April 12, Itochu Corporation Chairman Eizo Kobayashi championed TPP by stressing that joining it will not only make Japanese exports more competitive in member-nation markets, it will also usher in a wave of direct investments in the Japanese market. He pointed out that the share of the labor force engaged in manufacturing had dropped over the years from a peak of 25% to 16%. If foreign investment significantly increased in Japan’s domestic production base, it would boost domestic and external demand for the products and lead to much-needed job creation and a recovery of the labor force.

Even popular magazines, like the weekly Shukan Shincho, are starting to come around to the logic that the massive free-trade agreement that is TPP will produce benefits to Japan’s national interests that far outweigh the negative side. Even the now highly-protected rice market, the popular weekly argues, will survive liberalization. The premium grade strains such as koshihikari will be able to hold their own domestically. The best Japonica rice grown in the U.S. and now selling for about $20 or more for five kilograms is about the same as the retail price of premium grades in Japan. Adding shipping and distribution costs, U.S. premium rice will be an expensive commodity in Japan. Lesser U.S. grades, again adding shipping and distribution costs, will likely sell for about the same price as comparable strains in Japan. Lesser grades of domestic rice admittedly will not be able to compete with cheap imports, particularly from China or Southeast Asia. But users of such rice, such as the family restaurants and beef-bowl franchises, are already importing a significant amount.

In the U.S., at present, only approximately 300,000 tons of Japonica rice are produced and consumed almost all domestically, the Shincho report continues. Even if all of that was exported to Japan, it would only amount to 3-4% of the annual 8 million tons of domestic rice sold in Japan. Moreover, Japanese consumers are remarkably fussy about the rice they serve at the dinner table, preferring short-grain “sticky rice” instead of medium to long-grained strains, which are produced cheaply and abundantly around the world. Short-grained rice remains in short supply. The magazine concludes that there is no immediate threat to the market for high-quality domestic rice in Japan.

On the other hand, Japanese vegetable and fruit growers, who receive neither government subsidies nor protection, see TPP as an ideal means for exporting high-quality fresh products to the world, according to a Nikkei report on March 31. Thus, the image of all Japanese farmers as being weak and uncompetitive has been exacerbated by the anti-TPP forces. Agricultural reforms aiming at modernizing the farm sector can help it survive the challenges of liberalization that will soon come. Of course, some products, such as sugar, may be wiped out once the 328% tariff on imported sugar is removed. This is a politically sensitive issue since most of the sugar cane grown in Japan is the sole cash crop of small islands near Okinawa. A government rescue package for those inhabitants seems likely.

There is a tendency to see TPP negotiations as focused mainly on trade in goods, but trade in services is also a key component. In 2010, for example, international transactions in financial and other services reached approximately 20% of global trade. Japan is no exception to that trend, so joining TPP will allow it to join another bandwagon for the country’s economic future, the liberalization of services markets among TPP members.

April 22, 2013

Abe’s Bold Decision on TPP Wins Public Approval

On March 15, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formally announced that Japan would join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. He had promised as much to President Barack Obama at their February summit. This bold decision, which many critics thought would be delayed by internal political feuding—the kind that blocked earlier attempts by Abe’s DPJ predecessors Naoto Kan and Yasuhiko Noda—is not without political risk.

Abe successfully argued to his party and coalition partners that joining the TPP can open the door to 3.2 trillion yen in much needed GDP growth. With Japan’s entry, the TPP comprises 12 nations, accounting for 40% of world GDP, making it the largest regional trading bloc. TPP is also seen as a means for Japan to reduce its economic dependency on the China market. Abe stressed that joining now was “so that the world’s third largest economy can take the lead in rule-making” before TPP talks wrap up late this year. Otherwise, he believes that Japan would be left behind and internationally disadvantaged.

Abe received grudging acceptance from anti-TPP elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) by saying that he would protect Japan’s agriculture sector and public health insurance system during negotiations. In theory, TPP members had agreed beforehand to abolish all tariffs without exception. The expectation is that his government will make Japan’s interests reflected in the final set of rules, as well as to gain exemptions from zero-tariffs for certain politically-sensitive agricultural products such as rice and sugar.

With about half of the LDP lawmakers in the Diet opposing TPP, Abe’s strategy is a gamble. All could backfire on him if negotiations with the U.S., which include the knotty side issues of auto trade and government-backed insurance, fail. In particular, if Japan cannot obtain the minimal exceptions on “sacred” agricultural areas it seeks, the party expects it to pull out of the talks. This would be a political disaster and would cost Abe his premiership. On the other hand, if Japan is seen in the U.S. – read the Congress – as receiving special exemptions on key items, the backlash could even jeopardize the passage of the TPP treaty.

Before his statement, the ruling LDP's panel on the TPP passed a resolution that:

-- seeks the premier's crucial decision based on a century-long nation-building plan.
-- urges maintaining tariffs on certain farm products, with rice and others in mind, as well as protection of Japan's universal health insurance system.
-- suggests Japanese negotiators should withdraw from talks if national interests are threatened.
-- notes concerns that Japan will not benefit from growth in the Asia-Pacific region if it does not take part in TPP talks.
-- calls for close communication between the government and the LDP once Japan joins the TPP talks.

Abe is operating with both party and constituent restraints. He is counting on other TPP members, including the U.S., to seek to retain vestiges of its protected trading areas in order to sell the resulting treaty to domestic constituencies and legislative bodies. Abe seems convinced that the TPP goal of 100% zero-based tariffs will have to be eased to reflect domestic political realities. He may be right; it would seem that the U.S. Congress in the end would try to keep protective tariffs on such sensitive products as sugar.

Public Gives Abe High Marks 

The general public appears to support Abe’s gamble. , In the latest opinion surveys released by three major dailies on March 18: the Asahi poll found 71% of the public giving the Prime Minister high marks for his decision to join TPP talks, and 53% would approve Japan actually joining the free trade agreement; a poll by the Yomiuri found 60% of the public supporting entry into the TPP talks, and one by the Mainichi placed such support at a lofty 63%.

Moreover, the popularity of the Abe Cabinet remains strong. The Asahi found the cabinet support rate up three points from the February survey to 63% -- a record high for it in that newspaper. The Yomiuri poll put the cabinet approval rate at a heady 72%, up slightly, and the rate soared 7 points in the Mainichi survey to 70%. For the Japanese people, already pleased with Abe’s brash economic-stimulus policies, dubbed “Abenomics”, the Prime Minister at this juncture can do no wrong.

In response to the public’s positive reaction, the LDP has turned surprisingly supportive of Abe’s TPP strategy. The party members are apparently satisfied that it will do little or no harm to lawmakers running in the Upper House this July. After all, the results of the TPP talks will not be known until around October. Abe in a meeting at LDP headquarters on March 16 asked local party officials gathered from all over the country to “place your trust in me” on TPP matters, and they seemed to agree.

The party will campaign for the July election on a platform that includes measures to bolster the agricultural sector, which is in serious decline. Party Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba added at the LDP’s plenary meeting that the party will seriously debate what to do next to rescue the farm sector and safeguard its base in the nation’s economy. Already, party officials are making the rounds of rural areas likely to be affected by TPP liberalization, to convince them that their interests will not be sacrificed.

Junjiro Koizumi, the son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who took his father’s place in the Diet, even entered the lion’s den. He visited a small island near Okinawa where the only cash crop for the 1,300 inhabitants is sugar cane. This constituency is “absolutely opposed to TPP.” The move was good publicity, producing a photo in a major magazine.

China Syndrome 

As with all of Abe’s strategies affecting external relations, there is a security aspect that even anti-TPP diehards in the LDP have had to acknowledge: the China factor. The media has already picked up this issue, with some analysts seeing Japan’s decision to enter TPP talks as a clear message to China. They say that Japan is now linked more closely to the U.S. in both security and economic terms.

The Senkaku row with China and other regional factors has drawn Japan and the U.S. closer, while the free-trade agreement can bring many other advantages, including access to cheap shale gas. And as the regional bloc grows, China will find itself increasingly left out in the cold – encircled strategically and isolated economically. The analysts note that South Korea is already showing signs of interest in joining TPP, as well, adding to the regional pool.

TPP, in the words of one analyst (Nikkei, March 17), is “a tool that has enhanced the U.S.’s political influence” in the region. There is no doubt in this analyst’s view that for China, the U.S.-Japan condominium has become a potential “major threat” to its interests. China fears that as TPP membership grows, it will see the new trade rules become the new global standard that it will eventually have to accept. Japan seems to playing this China card for all that its worth.

Prime Minister Abe said he “has been tasked” with realizing the promise of TPP’s benefits to Japan. He has also pledged to do his “best to protect Japan's agriculture and food" as it represents Japan’s tradition and culture. For now, he has the support of his party and the electorate as he tries to stitch together Japan’s various definitions of national and economic security.

By William Brooks,
APP Senior Fellow and Adjunct Professor SAIS 

Mixed views in Washington of Abe’s rebooted administration

By William L. Brooks, APP Senior Fellow, Adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He retired from the U.S. State Department in September 2009 after a 35-year career as a diplomat and research analyst. This article first appeared in the January 8, 2013 online Asahi Shimbun Asia & Japan Watch.


The return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party in the Dec. 16 Lower House election after three years of Democratic Party of Japan rule was more a voter repudiation of the DPJ's failed policies than an endorsement of the LDP's policy agenda.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back in office for a second time, knows that if his party is to win the next election for the Upper House in July, he must regain the still-skeptical public's trust by quick and effective displays of policy energy.


Shinzo Abe at the Diet on Dec. 26 (Asahi Shimbun file photo)

To do so, he has scoped out an ambitious agenda covering both domestic and diplomatic policy fronts, including repairing strained relations with China and South Korea, and reclaiming a robust alliance with the United States.

Washington appreciates such momentum, and hopes that political stability has finally returned to Japan. But there is keen awareness that Abe's Achilles' heel remains his controversial revisionist views on Japan's war history, which could come back to haunt him if not kept in check.

Abe's top priority now will be to revive the ailing Japanese economy by overcoming the country's long-standing deflation. He has promised a bold monetary policy that includes setting an inflation target, implementing qualitative fiscal stimulation measures in the public sector, and devising a growth strategy that encourages private investment.

He also intends to accelerate the reconstruction of areas in northern Japan devastated by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, many of which remain desolate wastelands.

Having promised in the election campaign to "restore a reliable Japan-U.S. alliance," Abe intends to visit Washington as soon as possible for a summit meeting with President Barack Obama. He will seek to build a "relationship of trust" with the president, while reconfirming his administration's deep commitment to the bilateral alliance as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. In outlining his policy agenda, Abe will focus on such trouble spots as North Korea and China, and express his commitment to resolve a long-festering issue in Okinawa, the controversial relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to another part of the prefecture.

It is a tradition for a newly elected Japanese leader to make an obligatory journey early on to Washington, but this one has a particularly large significance to Abe.

The bilateral relationship was greatly strained during the three years of DPJ rule, particularly during Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's nine months in office starting in September 2009, and the LDP now wants to reclaim what it believes is its rightful place as the long-standing manager of the alliance. During his first term in office, Obama witnessed growing political instability in Japan, with Cabinets falling, prime ministers changing every year, and policy gridlock in the Diet. There is likely to be skepticism in Washington that the LDP's election and Abe's return to power is not more of the same.

It would indeed help boost bilateral ties if Abe can bring with him progress on commitments that the DPJ before him could not keep, such as the long-delayed decision on whether Japan will join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade pact. But at this juncture, Abe's initial encounter with Obama seems likely to be mainly statements of formal intentions rather than announcements of breakthroughs in pending issues.

Still, Abe's strategies for jump-starting the stalled economy, strengthening ties with the United States, and repairing deteriorating ties with China, South Korea and Russia will impress Washington. He also will please the Pentagon with his plans to enhance Japan's security posture in the region with an "integrated defense strategy" for the unified buildup of defense capabilities of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on long-range contingency scenarios.

Moreover, Abe has surrounded himself with a solid Cabinet filled with experienced policy experts, and he will tap the expertise of the bureaucracy and academia as needed. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in particular will assist Abe on the industrial policy front. His foreign and defense ministers both have experience in Okinawa policy and can be expected to lend their hands to resolving serious U.S. base issues with that prefecture.

Because the next election--this time for the Upper House--is to be held in July, Abe has little time to convince Japan's fickle electorate that his ambitious agenda, starting with bold fiscal and monetary measures to stimulate the economy, will be effective.

Noda the Captain of the DPJ’s Titanic: Will Washington be another iceberg?

Longevity among Japanese governments seems to be the exception and not the rule. And Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s cabinet is no exception. Key bills before the Diet flounder due to internal divisions in and defections from his own Democratic Party of Japan, a rupture in coalition partner the People’s New Party, and stonewalling by the opposition camp, which controls the House of Councilors. He is unable to achieve any of his policy agenda and appears to have lost the confidence of the Japanese people. It is in this atmosphere he is to visit Washington April 30-May 2nd.

Pollsters predicting the DPJ will lose its majority in the House of Representatives should there be an early election later this year. The public’s disenchantment with the DPJ has reached a critical point. The most recent Yomiuri poll (April 12) found that support for the Noda Cabinet has plummeted seven points from March to 28%, its lowest rate yet since coming into office last fall.

Traditionally, governments whose popularity has slipped below the 30% line do not last long. Non-support for the cabinet jumped seven points to 59%, its highest level. Other poll results for April, such as Asahi’s (April 16), were similar.

Among supporters, 49% gave the reason as the Noda Cabinet “being better than its predecessors” – hardly a positive statement since the previous Hatoyama and Kan administrations were highly unpopular and self-destructed when support rates reached the 17-19% range. In contrast, the main reason for the public not supporting Noda was the indicting, “Nothing can be expected of its policy measures” (36%), followed by “a lack of leadership” (23%).

Noda, although eloquent in the Diet, has never developed communications lines to the electorate—a fault of his two predecessors, as well. In the Yomiuri poll, 85% of the Japanese public felt that the Prime Minister was “not providing sufficient explanations about his policies and ideas.” The Noda’s fiscally conservative DPJ government has not focused on stimulating Japan’s sluggish economy and reinvigorating the business sector. It has expended almost all of its energy on reducing the national debt that is now 200% of GNP by hiking the consumption tax. This effort does not sit well with the public, let alone members of the DPJ who have already bolted the party in protest. Noda himself has admitted that he is “staking my political life” on early passage of the consumption tax hike bill, so a failure to do so, which is becoming increasingly likely, could lead to his political downfall.

The Diet remains hopelessly gridlocked with the opposition blocking DPJ legislation in the Upper House it controls. Noda has floated the idea with his counterpart in the LDP of a “grand coalition” that would tackle key legislation of national interest, but LDP President Tanigaki has rejected the suggestion. The LDP wants to force a Diet dissolution for a snap election that it believes it can win.

Apparently ready to give up on the DPJ, a majority (52%) in the Yomiuri poll expect that Noda would dissolve the House of Representative for a snap election later this year. And in that election, only 16% of the electorate said they would vote for Noda’s Democratic Party of Japan. But despite Tanigaki’s dream of returning his party to power, there is no renewed public ardor for the Liberal Democratic Party—the former ruling party turned leading opposition party.

The public’s negative image of the party that led to its overwhelming election defeat in 2009 has not improved. Only 20% of the electorate saying they would vote for the LDP in the next election. A significant 39% of the electorate said they were undecided, but their choices in the end may not go to either major party, for the tendency of swing voters—as seen in the last election for the Upper House in 2010—is to favor new small parties with attractive leaders and programs, of which there are plenty.

The dilemma both major parties face in an upcoming election can be seen in recent Jiji Press polls. Jiji conducts its polls by the more accurate face-to-face interviews, not random digital dialing (RDD) by phone, like other news companies. Jiji’s effective response rate is about 10% on average higher than RDD polls. In the polls for January through March 2012, the DPJ’s support rate dropped from 11.6% to 10.1% and then to 9.2%. It leveled off at 9.5% in April. But the LDP’s support rate also dropped from 13.3% to 12.3% and then to11.7% in March -- the lowest ever for that party. It picked up 1.7 points in April but is still at only 13.4%. In recent polls, those Japanese who said they support no party reached an amazing 70%; the highest level on record.

The time seems to be ripe for a “third force” to emerge and woo voters with attractive leaders and programs. The media have focused much attention recently on Osaka Mayor Toru Hashimoto’s new party (Osaka Ishin no Kai). He intends to run a significant number of candidates in the next national election and could pick up many seats.

A well-known pollster, in a district by district analysis for the April 12 issue of the weekly Shukan Bunshun, has predicted that if a snap election for the Lower House is held this summer, the DPJ would lose its majority, ending up with approximately 144 seats. The chamber has 480 seats and 241 are needed for a majority. The LDP, too, would win approximately 209 seats, according to the simulation, far under a majority. However, two popular small, conservative parties, the Ishin no Kai and Your Party, with strong agendas would together garner 76 seats.

In the end, this all belabors the point as to why Prime Minister Noda will soon visit Washington. He has no legislative victories to bring and even less on resolving the Futenma dilemma. The number one issue for the Obama Administration, Japan joining the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, is unlikely. The one significant achievement of the Noda Government, the official apology to the American POWs of Japan, is heralded by neither the government.

Indeed, Noda faces such rightwing opposition that he took to the floor of the Diet last month and noted that the wartime Comfort Women were not “coerced” victims of sex trafficking. This very same statement by one of his predecessors, Shinzo Abe, created an international outcry against Japan undermining his trip to Washington. It now appears that many of the same dynamics of unpopularity and conservative myopia are again at play with Noda’s Washington visit.

Dr. William L. Brooks
Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
April 16, 2012

More Futenma Analysis

APP's Senior Fellow William Brooks has published in December Cracks in the Alliance? Futenma Log: Base Relocation Negotiations 2009-2010 on the current status of Futenma negotiations. It is issued by Johns Hopkins University SAIS Reischauer Center as a sequel to his highly regarded monograph The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa, which reviews the first two agreements to close and relocate the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station.

Dr. Brooks details how the first two Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) governments—those of Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto—committed to implementing previous bilateral US-Japan understandings, but in the end were unable to make significant progress. He makes three major points: (1) Hatoyama made serious tactical mistakes, that seriously complicate future resolution of the Futenma problem; (2) Forceful Japanese leadership is required for resolution of the Futenma problem, which Kan did not provide, despite a more positive attitude than Hatoyama; and (3) Feasible routes for resolution of the Futenma problem, consistent with original US-Japan understandings, still remain, but will likely involve a package agreement redefining some key elements of the 2006 understandings, that could take some time to negotiate.

He notes:

The contradiction of asking for an immediate closing of a base, whose function in a contingency is regarded as critical, and at the same time saying that it cannot be relocated in Okinawa, while knowing full well from recent efforts that such an option is impossible, can mean two things. One is that the level of emotions among Okinawans since the Hatoyama “betrayal” is so high it has overridden logic and pragmatism. But it also means that Futenma has become a political cause – a tool for political activists who want to see all Marines or all U.S. bases out of Okinawa. Either way, Okinawa loses. The status quo – or worse – is likely to remain for a long, long while. 

Like it or not, the strategic reality is that Okinawa has become even more crucial a center for the forward deployment of U.S. forces in East Asia as China becomes more militarily active in the region. Stable basing is a requirement for the U.S. forces in Japan, and Okinawa provides far more than its share of prime land for that purpose. The 2006 Roadmap Agreement promised to lighten Okinawa’s security burden by closing six facilities and shifting some of the U.S Marine presence to Guam, but it has not been implemented due to local resistance. There are no incentives thus for the U.S. to offer more concessions when the earlier ones have been spurned.

Noda Slip-Sliding Away

Every prime minister–LDP or DPJ–who has come into office after Junichiro Koizumi ended his more than five year tenure on a high note in 2006 has inevitably faced a monthly slide in the opinion polls. This decline in popularity continues until, as Yukio Hatoyama in mid-2010 found himself, support drops into the single-digits. The result is that the PM soon resigns. Will Prime Minister Yasuhiko Noda, facing a similar erosion of public confidence, soon suffer the same fate?

Noda enjoyed a heady 65% support rate in Yomiuri’s opinion poll when he was picked to replace Naoto Kan as prime minister last August 31. Other polls were similar. But since then, his Cabinet’s popularity in the monthly tallies has continued to slip, and now, with the latest Asahi poll taken on December 10-11, it has dropped to a mere 31%, entering a historical danger zone for Japanese prime ministers. The non-support rate at 43% is now far greater than the support rate, with other commercial polls having similar results.

Of course, each prime minister has stumbled and fallen on his own accord. But part of the reason for the public’s tendency to quickly want to dispose of its leaders is a generic dislike of politics in Japan, as revealed in a recent Yomiuri poll (Yomiuri, 11/25/2011, p.9). The face-to-face opinion survey showed strong public dissatisfaction with the current state of impasse in Japanese politics and a general sense of powerlessness to do anything about it. Both the ruling and the opposition parties have earned public scorn and distrust, the poll shows. Asked to evaluate recent Japanese politics, 76% of the public said it was getting wors. Even among DPJ supporters, 54% said it was getting worse. Among independent voters, who can make or break parties during elections, 83% sensed a worsening of politics.

Respondents, when asked to pick multiple reasons for their unhappiness with politics, most frequently cited “A failure to see things through the people’s eyes” (45%), followed by “Decision making is too slow” (43%), “Not setting a future course for Japan” (33%), and “Spending time in political disputes” (30%). Evaluating the current lawmakers, 50% cited their “lack of decision-making capability,” “lack of leadership” (41%), and “lack of a sense of mission” (30%).

Prime Minister Noda started strong, but has made some major mistakes .First, was his way of choosing his own cabinet. One of his biggest mistakes last fall was to give priority to balancing various groups in the party in post appointments instead of to an individual’s qualifications. He seemed more intent on keeping party bosses happy, but ended up with a lineup of mostly amateurs, some of whom proceeded to get into trouble. First to go was his METI Minister for offensive statements about earthquake victims in northeast Japan.

And now, Defense Minister Yasuo Ichikawa has come under fire for expressing ignorance about the 1995 Okinawa rape incident that led to the decision to relocate Futenma Air Station. His attitude has infuriated Okinawans, the opposition camp passed a censure motion against him in the Upper House. But Noda has decided to keep him on in the cabinet, as well as another cabinet member, National Public Safety Commission Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, who is linked to a controversial business scheme. Noda reportedly is unwilling or unable to fire them because both are cohorts of the still powerful former party president Ichiro Ozawa, whom Noda is loathe to upset.

The rupture with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima has further complicated the process of relocating Futenma. In addition, Noda’s ability to pass any legislation in the Diet is now compromised. The LDP-led opposition camp wants to force him during the upcoming regular Diet session that starts in January to dissolve the Diet for a snap election that it believes it can win, returning a LDP coalition to power. This scenario is more wishful thinking than real as no election can be called until there is a redistricting to address the unconstitutional voter disparity problems identified by Japan's Supreme Court.

Visiting LDP party head, Nobuteru Ishihara boldly told a Washington audience on December 12 before rushing off to meet Administration officials that “The LDP is also pressuring the DPJ to hold a general election, as any consumption tax increase is a clear violation of the party’s campaign promises, and a change in its publicly-declared policies. For these reasons, the political world will reach its first critical stage in March, at the end of the Japanese fiscal year.”

He noted that “the most recent opinion poll shows that 64% of the public believes that if the DPJ now turns its back on its campaign promise and submits a bill in the Diet to increase the consumption tax, then it should first call for a new general election and present a revised campaign pledge that includes a consumption tax increase.”

Noda may try to block that by reshuffling his cabinet prior to the Diet opening, removing the offensive two ministers. But his support rate is likely to continue to slip-slide away. The pending issues – TPP, Futenma, tax reform, and pension reform – are all controversial. The spring Diet session could see a replay of scenarios that it has seemingly orchestrated since 2006.

William Brooks
APP Senior Fellow
December 12, 2011