Takaichi's Agenda Stumbles

Takaichi Caught Between a Staff Scandal and U.S. Pressure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 12, 2026

Although Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is trying to focus on the economy during the Diet’s fall session, two unexpected issues, one domestic, the other international, have upset her agenda. Irritated about Takaichi’s handling of a scandal concerning the Agriculture minister, opposition parties have slowed the procedures for considering bills. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paralyzed Takaichi’s diplomacy with the U.S. despite her unwavering support for President Donald Trump. The prime minister now faces the hardest time since she took the seat a year ago.

In her October 5 policy speech, Takaichi introduced an old Chinese expression called Keisei-saimin [経世済民], which could be interpreted as “Good governance saves the people.” This saying became the etymology of “economy [経済]” in Japan. The faction led by former premier Noboru Takeshita, Keisei-kai [経世会], was named after this phrase. By using the idiom, Takaichi hoped to show her determination to decrease the consumption tax and tackle price inflation.

It was remarkable for Takaichi to refer to the political principle of the former Takeshita faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because it had been a political enemy of the former Abe faction, or Seiwa-kai [清和会], with which Takaichi herself had once been affiliated. Takaichi has begun to distance herself from Abe in other ways as well.  

In Diet discussions, she has distinguished her economic policy from past reflation policy. Reflation had been a fundamental element of Abenomics. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s demand that Japan stop the reflation has taken precedence. Thus, while keeping with such Abe-oriented diplomatic policies as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Takaichi is departing from other of Abe’s political stances.

Opposition parties are still skeptical about Takaichi’s economic policy. Komeito and the Democratic Party for the People have requested in Diet discussion a greater distribution of public benefits rather than a consumption tax cut to deal with price inflation. Takaichi has insisted that a consumption tax cut is the best policy in terms of sufficiency and swiftness. However, she has not yet answered the question of how she has found or will find fiscal resources for the tax cut. She has said only, “Don’t worry.”

Although Takaichi had expected to discuss economic policies in the Diet, opposition leaders did not allow it by asking why Takaichi had appointed Kazuo Yana as the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in her September cabinet reshuffling. Yana had boasted in May that, earlier in the year, he, as an individual Diet member, had cut the national government’s budget for road construction in two municipalities in his electoral district – in retaliation for their mayors’ support of Yana’s rival in the February Lower House election. Admitting his remarks were inappropriate, Yana retracted the comment, inviting further criticism about eating his words.

While a lawmaker can check the policies of ministries, influencing a specific policy may be incompatible with his obligations as a representative of all the people. Yana’s interference in national budget work to take revenge against the mayors was the opposite of that. Yana’s comment ignited a traditional skepticism of pork barrel shenanigans by LDP politicians through shadowy relationships with the ministries.

In response to a request that she dismiss Yana, Takaichi insisted on keeping him in his position, arguing that the budget had in fact been appropriately distributed to local governments. Although the prime minister usually replaces a cabinet member who becomes embroiled in scandal, Takaichi chose the opposite course. [Yana resigned Wednesday, October 14.]

Not only the opposition parties but also members of the LDP question her decision to retain Yana. LDP Executive Acting Secretary General, Koichi Hagiuda, criticized Yana’s speech as arrogant and intolerable. Opposition parties are united in sponsoring a censure motion in both chambers of the Diet. The opposition parties have a tough road ahead in the Lower House since the LDP has a majority, but they may have a chance to pass the censure motion with a majority in the Upper House. The opposition parties have also decided to refuse to discuss bills related to Yana in the Upper House. With this atmosphere it is uncertain whether Takaichi can get a consumption tax cut through the Diet.

Further pressure on Takaichi has come from the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio who announced sanctions on the ICC. “We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate,” Rubio said in a statement. The sanctions are highly unpopular in Japan ever since the ICC’s Japanese president was targeted with personal sanctions in August.

Takaichi left a short comment on her social media account, expressing a “deep concern” on the sanctions decision of the U.S. Japan also joined the joint statement of foreign ministers of European countries and Canada which regretted and strongly disagreed with U.S. sanctions. Takaichi endorsed the statement but has taken no further action at the leaders’ level so far.

By now, Takaichi is one of the few world leaders who wholeheartedly support Trump. In her meeting with him in October 2025, Takaichi praised Trump as the only leader who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. She even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Through such unstinting loyalty, Takaichi has put herself in a position in which her criticism of any Trump policy would not make sense.

The Diet begins discussion of economic measures at the Committee on the Budget in the Lower House this week. If Yana remains in place, Takaichi will be asked about her responsibility for naming him agriculture minister in which position he can control the budget for farmers or the price of rice. On the diplomatic side, the Trump administration seems to be aligning the U.S. with Russia in the war in Ukraine. Such a commonality of interests might lead to other coordinated actions, such as opposition to the ICC. Whether Takaichi can find a way to break through and preserve Japan’s independence deserves scrutiny.

Consumption Tax Cut is Back at the Forefront

The Extraordinary Session of the Diet Begins

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 5, 2026

An extraordinary session of the Diet was convoked on October 5 with closure scheduled for December 12. The top priority for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a consumption tax cut that would begin in April 2027. However, Takaichi faces the headwind of a scandal inside her administration and reservations about her diplomatic skills.
 
Ordinarily, such a Diet session in the fall is to discuss a supplemental budget for the Japanese economy or for dealing with an unexpected event such as a natural disaster. However, Takaichi has no plans so far to submit a supplemental budget bill. Indeed, she previously declared that she would not propose any supplemental budget and would integrate all the budget items into an annual budget that begins every April. Forgoing a supplemental budget should improve the efficiency of private business activities by improving the predictability of government spending.
 
Hence a consumption tax cut is the focus of this session. The Takaichi Cabinet made an official decision on the tax cut in mid-September: it will seek to reduce the consumption tax rate on food from eight percent to one percent for two years starting next April. The government will also establish a new system to subsidize job-hunting efforts by low-income families, instead of a refundable tax credit.
 
The leading coalition, the LDP and its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, forcing the two parties to seek some help from opposition parties. LDP and JIP expect Komeito, which left the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in September, to vote yes on the consumption tax cut bill.
 
However, the situation among the opposition parties is extremely complicated. The CRA lawmakers who had joined the party from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) have since established a new party, the Democratic Reform Association (DRA). The DRA and Komeito then have organized a parliamentary group in the Lower House. Although the CDPJ and Komeito have not launched a similar project in the Upper House and continue to work separately there, it is up to Komeito whether to take a position closer to the CDPJ or to the LDP on the consumption tax cut proposal.
 
In addition to enacting the consumption tax cut, the LDP/JIP coalition hopes to reduce the number of Diet seats. The JIP has been calling on the LDP to implement their agreement made in October 2025 to reduce the number of seats in the Lower House by ten percent. The two parties failed to pass such a bill in either the extraordinary session of last fall or the special session earlier this year. Several members of the LDP are skeptical of JIP’s hard push for seat reduction.
 
The seat reduction proposal has led to an unusual unification of the opposition parties because all 45 seats to be eliminated are in proportional districts of the Lower House and thus work against small parties. If the LDP and JIP decide to ignore opposition complaints and take advantage of their super majority in the Lower House to pass the seat reduction, Komeito may oppose the consumption tax cut bill in retaliation. A multi-partisan group of lawmakers, including some from the LDP, submitted their opinion to the council for election reform, which argued that the 45-seat reduction would be baseless.
 
Controlling the procedure in the Diet will be crucial for Takaichi, who is reluctant to join the Diet’s discussion of the bills. The newly appointed Chairman of the LDP Council on Diet Affairs, Hideki Murai, supports Takaichi’s hesitancy and may negotiate to reduce her appearances before the Committee on Budget. But if Murai fails, the opposition parties will be further emboldened to oppose the leading coalition.
 
The Committee on the Budget has been a venue for discussing political scandals. Weekly magazines have reported that, before taking the position as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana threatened some municipalities in his electoral district with cuts to their road construction budgets. The mayors of those cities supported another candidate in the last election in February. Yana’s possible involvement can be interpreted as blackmailing political opponents.
 
Yana is one of the lawmakers who received kickbacks from a former Abe faction in the LDP. His punishment was exclusion from a leadership position in the LDP for six months. Nevertheless, Takaichi allowed him to return to the leadership group by appointing him as minister in her cabinet reshuffle in September. She must have thought the kickback scandal was over. However, in an Asahi Shimbun poll, 68 percent considered it a problem that Takaichi had begun to appoint lawmakers embroiled in the funding scandal to ministerial positions. Mishandling of the Yana scandal may affect Takaichi’s approval rating.

Takaichi’s limited diplomatic skills have also raised concerns. A member of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa was arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of a robbery from and the murder of a Japanese woman. The government of Japan has expressed its extreme regret to the U.S. However, Takaichi has not taken the matter up with U.S. President Donald Trump. Takaichi once said (in what she must now recognize as a grave mistake) that Trump was the only person who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. If she remains wedded to this view, she will show her irresolution about protecting Japanese citizens, and her public image will deteriorate.
 
Takaichi still has not improved bilateral relations with China that resulted from her careless speech on the Taiwan contingency in the Diet last November. Some lawmakers are trying to normalize Japan-China relations. This is not within Takaichi’s repertoire. Her missteps in diplomacy will give challengers a window to consolidate their opposition to her reelection as the LDP president in the fall of 2027.

History, the hardest easy problem for Japan to resolve

How China Uses Wartime History Against Japan

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published October 7, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Beyond all the pageantry, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a strategic goal for his Washington visit – to undermine the American relationship with Japan. Xi succeeded, perhaps beyond his expectations.

Japanese policy makers saw this coming. They arranged a brief meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly between Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Donald Trump ahead of Xi’s arrival.

The meeting was empty of content but seemed reassuring. But the next day, Trump welcomed Xi by fondly recalling “the greatness that we had together fighting in World War Two” without mentioning the postwar alliance with Japan.

Xi followed the next day at the official banquet, making clear who was their common enemy. “Over 80 years ago, the Chinese and American people stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors,” Xi said, deliberately obscuring the fact that wartime China was led by the Nationalists, not their Communist foes. The official statements issued by both governments echoed the language of their status as wartime allies.

“Clearly, Beijing would like to drive a wedge between Trump and Takaichi,” respected scholar Mike Mochizuki told Toyo Keizai, “but Takaichi clings to Donald while Donald does not return the favor by calling her Sanae.”

This Chinese use of the wartime past is part of a broader campaign to increase diplomatic pressure on Japan and the Takaichi administration over the Prime Minister’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency and to push the Chinese characterization of Japan’s defense buildup as a renewal of Japanese wartime “militarism”.

Trump, thrilled by his role as a host to Xi, either ignored the Chinese strategic intent, or simply failed to understand the trap he had stepped into.

“Trump’s failure to grasp that the United States had allied with a different China and fought a different Japan will only invite more Chinese coercion,” commented Mireya Solis, the senior Japan expert at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington.

The Chinese wedge strategy may not be entirely effective. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains anchored in security establishments whose bonds have “deepened enough to prevent a U.S.-Japan estrangement even under Trump,” notes Mochizuki, affiliated with the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

But Japanese officials are clearly rattled. The Prime Minister’s office felt compelled to tell the Yomiuri Shimbun that during a short phone call between Takaichi and Trump after the Xi visit, the American president reassured her that he had not sided with the Chinese leader in his criticism of Japan and urged him to hold talks with the Japanese Premier. “I’d be surprised if Trump spoke in detail about Japan with Xi,” a recently retired senior State Department official told this writer.

China’s war on Takaichi

China’s criticism of Japan intensified in response to Takaichi’s victory in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election last October. Even before her remarks on a possible use of Japanese military forces in a Taiwan crisis, the Chinese were warning about the dangers of her administration as a triumph of the ‘new conservatives’ who favor defense buildup and cultivate close ties to pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Takaichi’s unapologetic views on the war were well known in Beijing. She made a splash in the Diet early in her career, in 1994, challenging then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi for his bold statements acknowledging the war as an act of aggression. Later Murayama issued his statement on the 50th anniversary of the war apologizing for Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression.”

For Takaichi, this was unacceptable. “You can’t just apologize on my behalf without my consent,” she said in the Diet exchange, making it clear that she viewed the war as “legally justifiable.” In a later interview, she pledged to revise the Murayama statement, saying that Japan “fought wars for self-preservation and self-defense.”

When Takaichi met Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Korea in late October, shortly after she took power, the Chinese leader pointedly challenged these views.

“We should widely promote the spirit of the Murayama Statement,” he reportedly told her, “which reflected on the history of aggression and apologized to victimized countries.”

In that sense, Takaichi herself has created the opportunity for China to use the wartime past to try to isolate and pressure Japan.

“Takaichi shares (former Prime Minister) Abe’s revisionist views of history but lacks Abe’s pragmatic and prudent judgement,” says Japan scholar Mochizuki. “So it is not surprising that China has linked Taiwan, Japanese imperialism, and Japan’s defense buildup together to criticize what they see as Japan’s neomilitarism.”

The Chinese use of the wartime past continued with the late September visit of former Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi linked the moment to the anniversary of the Tokyo war crimes trials.

"If Japan does not learn lessons from history and challenges the postwar 'Peace Constitution,' tries to revive its history of aggression and resurrect war criminals, it will not even be able to face the world, let alone move toward the future, and it will have no future," Wang said.

Behind this war talk, the Wang Yi talks with Iwaya are an effort to reach out to forces within Japan that believe Takaichi’s anti-China stance, and her overreliance on the relationship with the unreliable Trump, are a mistake. Iwaya, along with former Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, is among those clearly opposed to the Prime Minister’s policies toward China. Even more intriguing is the recent interview in Shincho by special advisor Imai Takaya calling on Takaichi to change her language on Taiwan and take a strategic view that does “not rely on the US for everything.”

The upcoming APEC summit meeting in China may provide a window to repair relations. But it will require Japan to act, a Japan that is increasingly isolated by China.

China’s use of the wartime past is nothing new

However the current maneuvers play out, it is important to recognize that the Chinese use of the wartime past is hardly new. In a comparative study of the formation of wartime historical memory that we conducted at Stanford University, our research detailed how the Chinese Communist Party shifted in the last few decades to construct a patriotic narrative to replace one that focused on the struggle against their Nationalist enemies.

In this patriotic narrative, the war serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it allows the current Chinese leadership to assume the role of a great power that helped found the United Nations and was part of a global “anti-fascist” struggle. And it emphasizes the struggle of a unified Chinese people against the Japanese invader, claiming to have been victors in that war.

“There is a growing sense in China that its suffering and its contribution to the overall victory in World War II haven’t been sufficiently appreciated,” historian Rana Mitter, the author of several important books on the war and Chinese memory, told The Wire China in a 2020 interview. “World War II has enabled the state to say, look, this is when China was able to stand up for itself and fight back against invasion.”

In recent years, “history is used by China, including war history and the history of the United Nations, to make the case for Chinese global leadership since 1945,” Harvard Kennedy School historian Mitter told a recent seminar in Europe. The message is that in the current turbulence of the world order, China can play the role it played in 1945 in creating that order.

Beyond the claim to global leadership, the Chinese have not hesitated to use the wartime memories to target Japan.

Last September, the Chinese hosted a huge commemoration of the 80th anniversary, featuring a military parade attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Xi chose this moment to again emphasize the war against Japan and the creation of a “national united front against Japanese aggression established at the initiative of the Communist Party of China.”

Paired with the celebration, the Chinese film industry premiered two slickly produced blockbuster films, both of which were aimed not only at the Chinese audience but also distributed globally, including on streaming services like Netflix. “Dead to Rights” was yet another account of the Nanjing Massacre, done relatively artfully. But “731,” an account of the infamous secretive Japanese biological and chemical warfare unit that performed ghastly experiments on Chinese and foreign prisoners, was directly aimed at Japan. The depiction of Japanese as evil barbarians, and the failure of the United States to prosecute these war crimes, was garishly depicted.

This clash surfaced at the United Nations in what seems like an obscure issue – the existence of a clause in the UN charter which refers to “enemy states,” namely Japan and Germany, allowing the Allied powers from World War II to take action against those former Axis powers without prior Security Council approval. It was designed as a temporary safeguard against the resurgence of militarism but is widely recognized as obsolete and without effect. The General Assembly voted twice to remove the clause but it requires an amendment of the Charter that China and Russia can block.

Prime Minister Takaichi called on the UN to remove this clause. After her address to the General Assembly, China’s deputy ambassador to the UN, Sun Lei, defended its existence, pointing to “proof that Japan’s re-militarization has become a real threat to regional and global peace and stability.”

These history wars are decades long, and they shift in response to the needs of foreign policy, in both Beijing and Tokyo. China has played the history card, again, and it remains to be seen how Japan will respond. For Japan, the U.S. under Trump is increasingly an unreliable actor. But however this plays out, the past will never really be forgotten.

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Asia Policy Events, Monday March 2, 2026

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THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MYANMAR’S ELECTIONS. 2/2, 9:00-11:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Morgan Michaels, Research Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence, IISS; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chulalongkorn UniversitySteve Ross, Senior Fellow, Stimson; Min Zin, Executive Director, ISP-Myanmar; Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Moe Thuzar, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Myanmar Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS); Moderator: Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Myanmar Project; Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson. 

THAILAND’S 2026 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDUM: WHAT TO EXPECT. 2/2, 10:00-11:30am (SGT), 2/1, 9:00-10:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISWAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Mathis Lohatepanont, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; Thanisara Ruangdej (GG), CEO and Co-founder, WeVis.

WHAT FUTURE AFTER THE WAR? OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE’S SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND PROSPERITY. 2/2, 9:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Anatolii Amelin, Executive Director, Ukrainian Institute of the Future; Max Bergmann, Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Hans Braunfisch, Founder, Pravo Ventures; Serhii Haidaichuk, Founder, CEO Club Ukraine; John E. Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Mykola Murskyj, Program Director, Razom for Ukraine; Senator Rob Portman, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Practice of Public Policy, AEI; Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI; Ambassador Olga Stefanishyna, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States; Angela Stent, Senior Fellow, AEI.

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF US DEMOCRACY. 2/2, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Marie Gottschalk, Edmund J. Kahn Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; G. Elliott Morris, data journalist and author of the Strength in Numbers Substack; Elora Mukherjee, Jerome L. Greene Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Ilan Wurman, Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Moderator: Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Herbert H. Lehman Professor of Government and Director of IGP American Democracy Initiative, Columbia SIPA. 

BOOK TALK: RETRENCH, DEFEND, COMPETE: A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA. 2/2, Noon-1:00pm (EST). Sponsor: Quincy Institute (QI). Speakers: author Charles Glaser, Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program; Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Michael D. Swaine, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Program, QI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4cbcAbg

JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. 2/2, Noon-1:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Speaker: Ryo Sakai, 35th Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and International Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School. For inquiries, please contact Mr. Kenji Nagayoshi, knagayoshi@spfusa.org.

IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM STEYER. 2/2, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics (LSE). Speakers: Tom Steyer, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Chair, Galvanize, Founder, NextGen America, Investor, Climate Advocate; President and Vice Chancellor, Larry Kramer, London School of Economics, Former President, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Former Dean, Stanford Law School; Susana Mourato, Professor of Environmental Economics, Vice President and Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research), Department of Geography and Environment; Jonathan Pershing, Dean of the Global School of Sustainability, Professor in Practice, The Global School of Sustainability at LSE; Lord Stern, IG Patel Chair of Economics and Government, Chairman, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Department of Economics, The Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics (LSE). 

TARIFFS, TECH & TRUST: NAVIGATING THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S.–JAPAN TRADE TIES. 2/2, 5:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Washington, DC. Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director & Director for Political-Security Affairs, ASPI; William Chou, PhD, Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Yuka Hayashi, Vice President, Japan Practice, The Asia Group; Moderator: Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, ASPI. LIVESTREAMING HERE.

JAPAN'S TARIFF NEGOTIATOR

Ryosei AKAZAWA [赤澤 亮正]

 We are not considering sacrificing Japan's agriculture, 

forestry and fisheries industries for the sake of automobiles. 

Ryosei AKAZAWA (赤澤 亮正), 64
MINISTER IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION
7 terms in House of Representatives (Tottori 2). LDP

Also under current government his portfolios are:
Minister in charge of New Capitalism
Minister in charge of Wage Increase
Minister in charge of Startups
Minister in charge of Social Security Reform
Minister in charge of Infectious Disease Crisis Management
Minister in charge of the Preparation of Establishing the Disaster Management Agency
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy
 
He is in charge of establishing a Disaster Prevention Agency, which is a pet project of Prime Minister Ishiba.
 
Past Positions: State Minister in charge of Financial Services Agency (2nd Kishida Cabinet (2nd Reshuffled))
Parliamentary Secretary for Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2nd Abe Cabinet)
 
University of Tokyo (1984)
Upon graduation joined the Ministry of Transportation (today’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism)
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, MBA (1991)

Returned to Ministry after Cornell. Among his early assignments was to oversee the Sasakawa organization-funded Nippon Foundation. (The Sasakawa organization manages motorboat racing (gambling) in Japan, is closely involved in the shipbuilding and harbor management industries in Japan, and funds many philanthropic groups. Its founder, Ryōichi Sasakawa [笹川 良], a Class-A war criminal, was involved in all manner of illicit activities during and after the war.)

Retired from government in 2005.
 
One of “Koizumi’s Children/Assassins” who won election to the Lower House for the first time in the 2005 “postal reform election”
One of the 20 nominators for Ishiba in 2024 LDP presidential election
Although he was a lawmaker supported by Junichiro Koizumi, he became an ally of Ishiba and was elected from the same prefecture, Tottori
Often referred to as an “Ishiba Mania.” His continued support of Ishiba alienated him from mainstream politicians like Abe, Suga, and Kishida

Served as secretary general of Ishiba's campaign in the 2024 LDP presidential election

While at the Ministry of Transportation, Akazawa managed the government’s disaster responses of the crash of Japan Air Lines Flight 123 (1985) and of the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake (1995). This work made him an expert on and advocate for disaster management policies. He is now in charge of establishes a Disaster Prevention Agency.
 
It is reported that he learned American-style negotiation skills while at Cornell University’s business school. At the Ministry of Transport in 1994, he was Assistant Director, International Aviation Division, Supervision Department, Civil Aviation Bureau in charge of Japan-U.S. aviation negotiations.
 
In the 2005 election, then Prime Minister Koizumi dropped some lawmakers against his postal reform from the LDP slate and fielded “snipers” to their districts as official LDP candidates. Akazawa was one of those new lawmakers who defeated the anti-Koizumi candidates. As a lawmaker from a rural community, Akazawa shared decentralization policies with Ishiba for years and became a close ally in Ishiba faction, named Suigetsu-kai.
 
Akazawa is considered the cabinet minister most trusted by Prime Minister Ishiba. Although Akazawa has limited experience with trade negotiations, it is reasonable to assume for Ishiba to pick the Minister in charge of Economic Revitalization, because Toshimitsu Motegi, dubbed as “tough negotiator” by Trump, held the same position in the negotiations over Japan-U.S. Trade Agreement in 2019. Akazawa’s success in tariff negotiations depends on how well the Ministries for Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) support him.

Family
Akazawa's birth name was Mori. His father was a university professor who encouraged him to pursue public service. When he started the University of Tokyo, he was adopted by his maternal grandparents. His maternal grandfather, Masamichi Akazawa [赤沢正道], was a politician and chairman of the construction company Akazawa Gumi [赤沢組] likely founded in 1915 by his great grandfather, Kohei Akazawa, a samurai from the Tokushima Domain who became an engineer and construction worker.

Akazawa’s wife: Chiaki Akazawa, born in Hokkaido. They met while he was working for Hokkaido Prefectural Government between 1996 and 1998, dispatched from the Ministry of Transport. Akazawa son; Ryota Akazawa, 24 years old. He was known as the leader of the cheering squad in Yonago Higashi High School in Tottori. Both Chiaki and Ryota were involved in the 2024 election campaign 

On his personal website, he prominently features his grandfather Masamichi Akazawa, former Minister of Home Affairs (today’s Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications) in the third Ikeda cabinet (1964) and the first reshuffled cabinet of the second Sato cabinet (1967). Akazawa says he wants to emulate his grandfather's principled way of life.

Conservative Nationalist Parliamentary League: Yasukuni, Association for Protecting National Interests in TPP Negotiations. Unification Church ties.

 
Social Media
Official Page: https://www.ryosei-akazawa.com/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/akazawa.ryosei/
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/akazawa_ryosei/
Twitter: https://x.com/ryosei_akazawa
 
Book
Preparation Acts for Terrorism: How to Confront the Imminent Threat – 38 Key Debates in the National Diet [テロ等準備罪：目の前にある危機にいかに立ち向かうか 国会38の論点] by Ryosei Akazawa, Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Liberal Democratic Party, Member of House of Representative, Good Books, Tokyo. November 15, 2017, 280 pages.
Book description:
     The passage of the 2017 legislation on the Punishment of the Preparation of Acts of Terrorism and Other Organized Crimes faced backlash from opposition parties and the media, primarily from the perspectives of privacy and human rights protection. According to the author, “the crux of this legislation is to strike an optimal balance between countering the threats of terrorism and organized crime and protecting privacy and human rights.” This book outlines Japan’s vulnerability to terrorism and organized crime prior to the legislation, and argues that, despite media criticism, the law remains restrained in key areas of enforcement compared to international standards.

The facts presented in this report were collected entirely from open sources.
We endeavor to keep the information we provide you up to date and correct.
However, as with any research, we make no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, about its completeness, accuracy, reliability, or suitability.
Your comments, suggestions, and corrections are welcome.

Meeting Trump Sometime

FM Iwaya with Secretary Rubio

Foreign Minister Iwaya’s Effort to Arrange a Summit Meeting

 
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 20, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

2/2/25 UPDATE: PM Ishiba will meet with President Trump on Friday, February 7, 2025.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi IWAYA  is in Washington, DC to attend the inauguration ceremony of the 47^th President of the United States, Donald Trump. Iwaya met with the foreign policy staff of the incoming Trump administration, including Marco Rubio, the new Secretary of State. Japan hopes to maintain the Biden administration’s diplomatic framework of Indo-Pacific multilateral cooperation.
 
As soon as he arrived Washington, Iwaya met with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong. Both ministers shared their belief that it is important for Japan and Australia to play a leading role in realizing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Iwaya also met with Indian Foreign Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (whose son heads an outpost of the Indian think tank, ORF, in Washington). Australia and India are the members of a quadrilateral security framework with Japan and the U.S., called the QUAD.
 
On his way to Washington, Iwaya stopped in three Asian countries for ministerial meetings—South Korea, the Philippines, and Palau. In the Republic of Korea, Iwaya and Korean Foreign Minister, Cho Tae-yul reconfirmed the importance of cooperation between both countries, as well as their trilateral relationship with the U.S. The meeting of the two ministers also commemorated the 60^th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.
 
While Iwaya’s visit came at a time of great political volatility in South Korea with President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment, Iwaya observed in his press conference that Korea is working to stabilize its policymaking under the constitution and laws.
 
In Manila, Iwaya gave the Philippine Foreign Minister Japan’s support for maritime security. The support will come through Official Security Assistance (OSA), a new Japanese government program to bolster the security of developing countries in the Pacific. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba referred to the OSA in his visit to Malaysia and Indonesia earlier in January.
 
Iwaya also had a short conversation with Taiwanese Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung when they sat together at the inauguration ceremony for Palau’s President Surangel S. Whipps, Jr.
 
This series of diplomatic overtures to Asia-Pacific countries before Trump takes office signals Japan’s willingness to take the lead in formulating a cooperative security framework in the Indo-Pacific region. At his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken earlier this month in Tokyo, Iwaya made a point of promoting cooperation among like-minded countries as seen in Japan-U.S.- ROK, Japan-U.S.-Philippines, and the QUAD.
 
Although their governments hold different views on the acquisition of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel, Iwaya and Blinken reaffirmed the importance of Japan-U.S. economic relations. After issuing a presidential order to block the acquisition, the Biden administration extended the deadline for Nippon Steel to abandon the takeover by June 18th. “The United States-Japan alliance is deeper and stronger than any single, one economic transaction or business transaction,” said the departing U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Rahm Emanuel.

Having shored up diplomatic relationships with Japan’s key partners in the Indo-Pacific, Iwaya arrived in the U.S. with the mission to fix the date of a meeting between Ishiba and Trump. Although Ishiba tried to arrange a meeting with the President-elect as soon as Trump won the presidency in November, Trump did not grant the request. Indeed, Trump compounded the snub by meeting earlier with the wife of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Ishiba rival, Akie Abe, and the leader of the communication business Softbank, Masayoshi Son (Son and Iwaya have been close friends since they were high school students).
 
According to Nikkei, the government of Japan has been negotiating with the Trump team for a summit meeting in early February. The leaders are expected to discuss the security and economic issues between the two countries. Several media outlets predict that Trump will raise harder requests than the Biden administration did, including demands that Japan bear greater financial responsibility for its security costs and that it enter into a trade deal preferable to the U.S.
 
The Ishiba administration does not seem to have a deliberate strategy to deal with the “unpredictable” Trump 2.0. If Trump seeks to deal directly with Chinese leader Xi Jinping or North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Japan will have to revise its long-held view that in facing China or North Korea it will be backed by the U.S. and other allies. Japan is trying to improve bilateral relations with China, but there is no predictable future.

Kishida's audience with Biden

No Big Deal, but Small Progress

By Takuya Nishimura, Chief Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
January 23, 2023

The headlines of newspapers covering Prime Minister Kishida’s meeting with President Biden on January 13th mainly focused on enhancement of the deterrence capability of the Japan-US alliance, but the outcome of the meeting lacked substantial deals. During the meeting, Kishida appealed for U.S. support of Japan’s security buildup. Biden had no reason to be unhappy with Japan’s positive stance on the security in East Asian region. However, the Joint Statement issued after the meeting was mainly filled with the predictable words. While the agreement leaned toward military measures against actual or potential threats, diplomatic solutions received little attention, which has caused public uneasiness in Japan. It is too early to say that bolstering the alliance has achieved broad consensus in Japan.

Both leaders celebrated the bilateral relationship noting that it had “never been closer.” Kishida told Biden that the Japanese government had renewed major security documents and would expand the security budget in coming five years. Biden praised Japan’s effort, saying “We are modernizing our military alliance.”

While the joint statement stressed that the bilateral cooperation was unprecedented, rooted in the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and a peaceful and prosperous world, there was no significant news in it. The two leaders “reaffirmed” that the alliance remains the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Biden “reiterated” the unwavering commitment of US to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and “reaffirmed” the application of the article to the Senkaku Islands. These are reconfirmations of the agreements of former leaders of both nations.

Biden commended Japan’s security reinforcement through the new National Security Strategy and the new National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program, which actually are the renewals of earlier documents. One of the selling points of the new NSS is the capability to strike enemy bases, that is described as “counterstrike” capability in the joint statement. But it does not necessarily mean preemptive attack. Kishida has been insisting that the capability to strike back against an attacker would not violate Japan’s traditional security principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Japan’s expansion of its security budget, which Biden called an “historic increase,” is still a matter of planning. Kishida failed to include it in last month’s budget, however.

Both leaders had the reasons for making the outcome dramatic. Kishida needs to persuade the Japanese people that the US is firmly committed to the security of East Asia, where Chinese advances have been growing as seen in the missile launch at Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Biden answered Kishida’s request by saying: “Let me be crystal clear: The United States is fully, thoroughly, completely committed to the alliance.” Biden needs to assure the US people that the Japanese are ready to make enough effort to defend themselves.

Japan’s new NSS and defense budget may be the preferable tools for his Kishida’s domestic politics. However, their political boost has not been seen. In addition, Biden's controversy involving classified documents precluded a joint press conference with Kishida. Meanwhile, there remains certain unpopularity in Japan about Kishida’s handling of important policies, including tackling infectious diseases and inflation. Some even argue that Group 7 summit meeting this May may result in an exit for Kishida administration.

Japan welcomes end of Trump era

But has its doubts over Joe Biden-led US

By Jeff Kingston, Temple University Japan, APP Member

First appeared in South China Morning Post, Nov 18,2020

President-elect Joe Biden’s administration has a lot to prove but inherits a relatively strong US-Japan relationship. He will also find Japan is ready to move beyond US President Donald Trump’s “America first” transactional approach to diplomacy. One can imagine Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s quiet fist pump when he learned of Trump’s defeat.

Tokyo hopes Biden will revive US multilateral engagement and provide greater coherence in Washington’s diplomacy but fears Biden might be soft on China. Following his congratulatory conversation with Biden, Suga sought to dampen such doubts by singling out his reassurance that the US-Japan mutual security treaty covers the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Even so, scepticism lingers that Biden will seek rapprochement with China to the detriment of Japan, a concern former president Bill Clinton ignited a quarter-century ago when he visited China and bypassed Japan.

This underscores how symbolism matters in diplomacy and has implications for Biden’s choice of the next ambassador. Japan favours candidates who have strong political connections to the White House and know little about the nation because they are easier to manage.

Biden can send a different message, though. The United States has had a Chinese-American ambassador to China in Gary Locke, a Korean-American ambassador to South Korea in Sung Kim and an Indian-American ambassador to India in Rich Verma but so far no Japanese-American ambassador to Japan.

It is time to rectify this situation and Glen Fukushima, fluent in Japanese with extensive Japan-related public and private sector experience, is eminently qualified.

Trump shredded the US image with his browbeating of allies and fawning over despots, an improvised diplomacy of blunders and disrespect. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe nurtured a relatively good personal relationship with Trump, but on matters of importance, that goodwill did not seem to have much impact on the president’s actions.

For example, Trump ran roughshod over Japan by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal, put sanctions on Japanese exports to the US, instigated a trade war with China that inflicted collateral damage on Japan and threatened to defund the World Health Organisation amid a global pandemic.

He did all this while repudiating multilateralism overall, the mainstay of Tokyo’s diplomacy.

He also played hardball on Japan’s financial support for hosting US military bases, calling for quadrupling the annual subsidy to US$8 billion.

Tokyo slow-walked those negotiations, probably hoping US voters would solve that problem. Biden will probably not take such a hard line but is also unlikely to offer Okinawans a reprieve from the controversial Henoko base construction project they rejected in a 2019 referendum.

To some extent, the Japanese government favoured Trump, mostly because he took a hard line with China and explicitly promised the US would militarily defend the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This went beyond his predecessors’ reassurances that the US would respond according to Article 5 of the security treaty, which does not actually spell out how America would respond.

Trump also earned kudos for raising the abductee issue with Kim Jong-un, but Tokyo worried that his grandstanding diplomacy might lead to a deal on intercontinental ballistic missiles that left some of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal intact. Like many of his gambits, though, fanfare did not produce results.

Much has changed in the US since the Obama-Biden first term when there was an emphasis on engaging China and treating it as a strategic partner.

In 2012, then-president Barack Obama soured on engagement and announced the pivot to Asia, although not much happened in reality. Relations further soured under Trump, and some are convinced the US and China are locked into a cold-war rivalry.

While this might be a misleading comparison, it is clear Beijing’s regional ambitions are seen as threats to an Asian Pax Americana.

A war is being waged on trade, intellectual property and tech, and containing China is one of the few issues receiving bipartisan support in the US. Even if Biden knows there are benefits to hitting the reset button on Sino-US relations, this is virtually impossible.

Statements on the campaign trail are often not a reliable barometer, but Biden denounced President Xi Jinping, lambasted Beijing’s massive lock-up of Uygurs as genocidal and pledged to uphold support for democracy in Hong Kong. This is not exactly music to the Communist Party’s ears.

Biden appears to support the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision championed by Japan but is less inclined than the Trump administration to nudge the Quad security grouping towards a Nato-like institutionalisation. On trade, he might end Trump’s counterproductive tariffs, but tensions will persist.

After Trump pulled out of the TPP, Abe revived the multilateral pact now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The US is unlikely to join that or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, where China is the dominant player.

Japanese leaders have misgivings about Biden over trade as they believe Democrats pander to organised labour. They hope Biden will re-engage in Asia’s multilateral processes and revive its battered networks of influence, but the deep hole Trump dug at home will necessitate an inward focus that cautions against hopes of strong and sustained US leadership.

Tokyo wants Uncle Sam engaged as much as possible but worries the US is a declining power. It is thus hedging by expanding its regional security relations and boosting its autonomous capacity as a counter to China’s regional hegemonic ambitions.