UN General Debate Asian and Significant Speeches

Backgrounders on the race to become the 10th Secretary General of the United Nations General Assembly

• [Re]Group
• Foreign Policy
• Security Council Report

81st UN General Assembly Debate Asian and Other Significant Speeches [subject to change]
Full Videos and Transcripts

9/22-Tuesday
His Excellency Donald TRUMP, President of the United States of America
Son Excellence Emmanuel MACRON, President of the French Republic
His Excellency Khurelsukh UKHNAA, President of Mongolia
His Excellency LEE Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea
His Excellency David Ranibok Adeang President of the Republic of Naoero [Nauru]
His Excellency To LAM, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Viet Nam and President of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
His Excellency Tshering TOBGAY, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Bhutan
His Excellency Andy BURNHAM, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Her Excellency TAKAICHI Sanae, Prime Minister of Japan

9/23 – Wednesday

His Excellency Masoud PEZESHKIAN, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
His Excellency José RAMOS-HORTA, President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
 His Excellency Volodymyr ZELENSKYY, President of Ukraine
President

9/24-Thursday
His Excellency Mahmoud ABBAS, President of the State of Palestine
His Excellency Benjamin NETANYAHU, Prime Minister of the State of Israel
His Excellency Anutin CHARNVIRAKUL, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the Kingdom of Thailand

His Excellency Ratu Naiqama Tawakecolati Lalabalavu, President of Fiji

His Excellency Tarique RAHMAN, Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
His Excellency Balndra SHAH, Prime Minister of Nepal
His Excellency Anthony ALBANESE, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia

9/25-Friday
His Excellency Muhammad SHEHBAZ SHARIF, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

His Taneti MAAMAU, President of Kiribati

Her Excellency Hilda HEINE, President of the Marshall Islands
His Excellency Mathew Cooper WALE, Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands
His Excellency James MARARAPE, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea
His Excellency Feleti TEO, Prime Minister of Tuvalu

Her Excellency Mulipola Anarosa Ale MOLINOO, Deputy Prime Minister of Samoa

9/26-Saturday
His Excellency HAN Zheng, Vice President of the People's Republic of China

His Excellency Aren Palik, Vice President OF Micronesia (Federated States of)
His Excellency Thongsavanh PHOMVIHANE, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic
His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia
His Excellency Sergey LAVROV, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Her Excellency Maria Theresa P. LAZARO, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdul Mateen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam 
His Excellency Vivian BALAKRISHNAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Singapore
His Excellency MOHAMAD Hasan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia
His Excellency SUGIONO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
His Excellency Subrahmanyam JAISHANKAR, Minister of External Affairs of India
The Honorable Anita ANAND, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada [Prime Minister Mark Carney attends but will not speak]

9/28-Monday
His Excellency Vijitha HERATH, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism of Sri Lanka
His Excellency KIM Son Gyong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Korea

Her Excellency Victoria Louise Hallum, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New Zealand

Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, Permanent Presentative to the United Nations, Ambassador of Myanmar 
His Excellency Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vanuatu

Takaichi's Mercantilism

Japan's PM Takaichi Heads to Europe

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 15, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi participates in her first Group of Seven (G7) summit in Evian, France from June 15 to 17. The meeting is the last stop for her; in the past few days, she has visited the United Kingdom and Italy. Her top diplomatic priority is securing Japan’s supply chain amid a volatile world order. Although Takaichi says she stands for a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage,” her diplomacy is in fact heavily dominated by her own interests.
 
The first stop on her trip to Europe was London from June 13-14. In a meeting with United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Takaichi shared her concern over export restrictions on critical minerals and urged bilateral cooperation on economic security, including strengthening supply chains.
 
Securing supply chains has been a core tenet of Takaichi’s diplomacy. In her individual meetings with the leaders of Vietnam, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines in May, Takaichi drew attention to the maintenance of supply chains while criticizing China for its export controls over critical minerals. Aspiring to strengthen her position on international economic security, Takaichi hoped to make up for her irregular comment on the Taiwan contingency last November, which deeply undermined Japan’s relations with China.
 
Takaichi and Starmer also confirmed acceleration of the development of next-generation fighter aircraft under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the UK and Italy. This is supposedly the main reason that Takaichi chose to visit London and Rome before the G7 summit.
 
Takaichi has sought to expand Japan’s international trade in defense equipment, expecting it to contribute to her economic growth strategy. She promoted trade in or joint development of destroyers with the Philippines and Australia. GCAP is in the same context. She once said that “Strategic investments that enhance resilience against potential crises are the core focus of the Takaichi Cabinet’s growth strategy.”
 
This approach reverses Japan’s longstanding reluctance to trade in military equipment.  “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons,” former prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa said when he was foreign minister in 1976. Takaichi now argues that times have changed and that trade with other countries in defense equipment would contribute to the growth of the Japanese economy.
 
While Takaichi was travelling in Europe, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. and Iran had reached a deal for ending the war. Takaichi posted on X that she would welcome the agreement as a key step toward a settlement and hoped for free and safe traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi must be wishing for the normalization of international trade. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” Takaichi said to Trump in her visit to the White House in March.
 
The Takaichi administration introduced a subsidy for gasoline as soon as the war in Iran started. To maintain public support for her cabinet, she formulated a supplemental budget to continue this subsidy earlier this month. A subsidy does not cure all ills, however. Opposition lawmakers have questioned Takaichi about oil import shortages that limit production of various goods that are indispensable for manufacturing and that cause prolonged price inflation.
 
That is why she is focusing her diplomatic efforts on securing the supply chain. It is expected that she would propose a joint stockpiling plan for critical minerals at the G7 summit meeting. Takaichi hopes to take the initiative to build a system in which like-minded countries can collaborate to strengthen supply chains. Her proposal would be a countermeasure to China’s coercive trade policy on critical minerals.
 
It is still unclear whether Takaichi’s initiative to secure the supply chain accelerates Plan B of Japan’s diplomacy, which is to move Japan away from excessive dependence upon the United States. It is true that Japan has been seeking alternatives in trade opportunities after Trump imposed additional tariffs in June 2025. The Iran war has proven that Japan cannot secure oil from the Middle East by relying on U.S. dominance in international security. Yet Japan’s national security is still fundamentally based its alliance with the U.S., as seen in efforts to grow the defense budget by current and former administrations.
 
Takaichi has yet to find an exit from Japan’s current diplomatic difficulties: the uncertainty of the Trump administration and the persistent diplomatic pressure from China. Although Takaichi stands by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which was invented by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to expand Japan’s role in the region, it no longer holds much sway. In the current war-based world order, the creation of a democratic bloc of countries may not guarantee stability or prosperity. The FOIP policy may appeal to Japan’s conservative base, but Takaichi does not have a viable grand strategy to give Japan a greater role on the international stage.
 
Turning our eyes to domestic politics, Takaichi faces scandals of her own. Her secretary is thought to be involved in a defamatory social media campaign strategy in the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party last October. Although she has denied any misdeeds in her campaign, the opposition parties have demanded that the secretary testify before a Diet committee. Although it may not violate any law, a defamatory strategy could damage Takaichi politically because she depends on support from SNS users.

Her approval rating has suffered a gradual decline according to polls of news organizations because of the defamation scandal or the shortage of naphtha. As former prime ministers have done, Takaichi hopes to achieve diplomatic gains that will change the direction of domestic headwinds. However, it is unlikely that she can attain success in her visit to Europe to a degree that would lead to a resurgence in public support. 

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 23, 2026

2025 NETWORK READINESS INDEX (NRI). 3/23, 9:00-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Portulans Institute. Speakers: Chinasa T. Okolo, PhD, Author of AI Governance in a Global Context; Rafael Escalona Reynoso, CEO and Director, Portulans Institute; Shailja Bang Shah, Head of Research, Portulans Institute; Shri Jaipal, Director of the Economic Research Unit (ERU), Department of Telecommunications, Government of India; Bitange Ndemo, Kenya's Ambassador to Belgium and the European Union; Maria Victoria C. Castro, Assistant Secretary for e-Government Department of Information and Communications Technology, The Philippines; Anna Mysyshyn, Founder, Institute of Innovative Governance, Ukraine.

CROSS-STRAIT CROSSROADS: PATHWAYS FOR AMERICA’S TAIWAN POLICY. 3/23, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis, Defense Priorities; Bonnie S. Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program, The German Marshall Fund of the United States; David Sacks, Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Matthew Turpin, Senior Advisor, Palantir Technologies, Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution; Moderators: Ryan Hass, Director, John L. Thornton China Center, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies; Jude Blanchette, Distinguished Tang Chair in China Research; Director, RAND China Research Center – RAND.

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM TRUMP’S BEIJING VISIT. 3/23, 10:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Kurt M. Campbell, Chairman and Co-Founder, The Asia Group, Former Deputy Secretary, United States Department of State (2024-2025); Moderator: Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council.

TAIWAN’S SPACE AMBITIONS AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.–TAIWAN COOPERATION. 3/23, 10:30-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Jong-Shinn Wu, Director General, Taiwan Space Agency; Chirag Parikh, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Aerospace Security Project; Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department. 

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF UPHEAVAL. 3/23, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Tyson Barker, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Amanda Thorpe, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council. 

WAR AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ASSESSING THE NEXT PHASE. 3/23, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Lieutenant General Sam Mundy, USMC (Ret.), Distinguished Military Fellow, Middle East Institute; Colby Connelly, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute; Moderator: Kenneth M. Pollack, Vice President for Policy, Middle East Institute. 

BOOK TALK: CARBON HUNTERS: REFLECTIONS AND FORECASTS OF CLIMATE MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY. 3/23, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Speaker: author, Richard Sandor, CEO, Environmental Financial Institutes, Aaron Director Lecture in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School, Moderator: Joseph E. Aldy. PURCHASE BOOK

TAIWAN'S SHIFTING GLOBAL LANDSCAPE: SECURITY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND IMPLICATIONS. 3/23, 1:00-3:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (IIPS). Speakers: Ian Easton, Associate Professor, U.S. Naval War College; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council; Patrick Nevins, Deputy Staff Director, House Armed Services Committee; Gregory Brown, Executive Director, Alliance Futures Initiative; Iku Tsujihiro, Research Associate, Hudson Institute; Japhet Quitzon, CSIS.

GEOPOLITICAL RISKS AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERAL ORDER. 3/23, 6:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP). Speakers: Dr. Lukas Haynes, Visiting Scholar, Ralph Bunche Institute at CUNY; Hon. Mallory Stewart, CEO, The Council on Strategic Risks; Amb. Susan Elliott, President and CEO, NCAFP. 

South Korea's Continued Political Polarization

Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy successes
in the shadow of political polarisation

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 18, 2026 on the East Asia Forum.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung came into power in an early unscheduled election in June 2025, under perhaps some of the most trying circumstances to face a South Korean leader in the past decade.

The election followed a failed attempt to declare martial law by then-president Yoon Suk-yeol, followed by his impeachment, deepening a political divide that spilled out into the streets of the capital and beyond. The new leader was immediately faced with a trade war from the United States, South Korea’s security ally led by President Donald Trump, that threatened to upend the economy. At the same time, Lee had to shape a policy to balance relations with China and Japan alongside a belligerent and well-armed North Korea, closely tied to Russia and its war in Ukraine.

Yet Lee has exceeded the expectations of many observers of South Korea’s turbulent politics. The leader of the progressive Democratic Party has proven himself to be not only a consummate pragmatist, as some predicted, but even more surprisingly a deft diplomat as well.

In January 2026, Lee managed a highly successful summit in Beijing, followed shortly by a surprisingly warm and positive trip to Japan hosted by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. All along, he avoided getting drawn into the sharpening confrontation between Japan and China.

In the year ahead these diplomatic gains may be overshadowed by the continuing — even sharpening — lines of political polarisation domestically. There is a double divide in South Korean politics. On one level, it exists between the ruling progressives and the conservative opposition People Power Party. Both camps themselves are also split between ideological extremism and more centrist elements.

The South Korean right is increasingly at odds with itself, pitting the hardline followers of former president Yoon, who have adopted the rhetoric and imagery of Trump’s Make America Great Again movement, against the conservatives who crucially broke with Yoon’s martial law bid. On the left, the Lee administration is dominated for now by advocates of pragmatism, not only in the realm of foreign policy but also in fostering the support of chaebols. There are though, more ideological leftists within its ranks and in the membership of the party’s National Assembly bloc.

Those divides are tested by Lee’s increasingly aggressive pursuit to prosecute the leaders and supporters of Yoon’s insurrection, not only through the courts but also via his attempts to regulate conspiracy-driven social media. In the name of defending democracy, the administration has also targeted the Unification Church and other right-wing evangelical movements.

Former US ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens noted that Lee’s actions on these fronts, alongside the perception of his party as being ‘dangerously soft on North Korea’, have led him to be ‘viewed with deep distrust by many [South] Koreans’.

This deepening polarisation will begin to impact not only domestic stability but also the conduct of foreign policy. This is already evident in the difficult job of balancing relations with China, favoured by many on the left but denounced on the right, with increasing unease among progressives over American unilateralism and isolationism.

Lee made significant concessions on trade and investment issues in talks with the Trump administration to preserve the security alliance, though he can claim to have won a better bargain than Japan on both fronts. South Korean negotiators pushed the timetable for the long-sought transfer of wartime operational control of armed forces and made a deal to construct nuclear-powered submarines that could lead to a revision of restrictions on nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing. But even within the Lee administration, there is unhappiness over a shift in the focus of US military presence towards contingencies for confrontation with China.

‘Traditional leftist orientations on major domestic and foreign policy issues are colliding with very different geopolitical and geo-economic drivers that Lee has to accommodate’, argues Chung Min Lee. The South Korean right also faces significant challenges, remaining ‘shell shocked and in near-total disarray’ with no ‘viable party leadership and agenda’.

The looming question that may push these divisions to the forefront, not least within the Lee administration itself, is how to respond to North Korea’s growing confidence in its power. Progressive advocates of engagement, led by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok, are pushing for more attempts to woo Pyongyang, even towards de facto acceptance of its nuclear status.

But this outreach is frustrated by North Korea’s dismissal of their legitimacy. The administration seeks to use improved ties to China to open dialogue with the North Korean regime but Pyongyang seems to prefer relying on its new alliance with Russia and waiting to see what Trump may offer them. Even if Trump’s Beijing visit in April 2026 were able to help foster inter-Korean relations, there is no guarantee that North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will have a dialogue with Seoul.

Policy choices that were deferred will come to the fore in 2026 and bring the double divide of South Korean politics into play. Lee ‘will be walking on a tightrope’ — evidence so far suggests he may be up to the task, but time will tell.

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 12, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly is considering dissolution of the Lower House at the beginning of the ordinary session of the Diet, now scheduled to convene on January 23. A snap election would follow in early or mid-February. Her motivation is to restore the power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before her cabinet’s approval rating falls. If she does so, she will face criticism for bringing about a period of political vacancy and leaving behind the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill.
 
“I asked my ministers to execute policies included in the supplementary budget as early as possible. It is important to let the people realize the benefit of measures taken by my Cabinet to curb price inflation. I am focused on those immediate issues,” Takaichi said  in her new year’s press conference on January 5. This answer to a question from press was widely interpreted as a firm refusal to call an early snap election.
 
Four days later, late on the night of January 9, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Takaichi was thinking of an early snap election. According to Yomiuri, the Lower House election would be on February 8 or 15, if the House were dissolved on the first day of ordinary session, January 23. Mainichi Shimbun published a similar account early in the morning of January 10, and other media outlets followed on January 11.
 
It is well established that the prime minister has the power to dissolve the Lower House.  This authority derives from the cabinet’s duty to advise and approve the Emperor’s actions in matters of state. These actions include dissolving the Lower House. Once the Lower House is dissolved, Japan’s Constitution requires that a general election take place within 40 days. The period from dissolution to election has diminished in recent snap elections. The last Lower House election was in October 2024. Some argue that calling a snap election in a short period may be an abuse of power.
 
The rationale for an early snap election is Takaichi’s relatively high popularity. She has maintained a 60 to 70 percent approval rating in the polls since she took office last October. Some lawmakers in the LDP expect that the party will secure a large enough victory to give the LDP a simple majority in the Lower House. They also expect that the high approval rating will decline as discussions in the ordinary Diet session continue.
 
Even with a majority in the Lower House, Takaichi’s government, including the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority in the Upper House. If the LDP wins a majority in a Lower House snap election, Takaichi will still need to ask opposition parties for support to pass bills in the Upper House. It is possible that an endorsement by the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) of the FY2026 budget bill, which is to be discussed in the coming ordinary session, has encouraged Takaichi to contemplate an early election.
 
To have an early and successful snap election, Takaichi must counter criticisms of her decision. She argues that a majority will ensure action to support her priorities. The highest one on her list is support for people suffering from price inflation, for which she has adopted the slogan of “responsible and proactive public finances.” Although she delivered a certain amount of economic stimulus in the supplemental budget last year, anti-inflation measures are only at a halfway point.
 
If the snap election occurs, no discussion of the FY2026 budget bill can take place until new Lower House members are elected, the Lower House elects a prime minister (presumably Takaichi) again, and the newly elected prime minister delivers a policy speech to the Diet. The budget bill is unlikely to pass the Diet before the end of March.  Without a finished budget bill, the government will have to develop a provisional budget for FY2026 beginning in April.
 
A snap election creates political vacancy, though she said wants to deal with price inflation. There is no reason or cause for dissolution,” the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, said. Noda also indicated that the regular convocation of the ordinary session could invite some discussions that Takaichi does not want to face. There is speculation that Takaichi is afraid of questioning in the Diet about her relationship with the former Unification Church. Weekly Bunshun has reported that the Church had hoped that she would become the LDP president.
 
The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, has expressed his concern that an early election would delay implementation of the economic policies embedded in the FY2026 budget bill. “A dissolution will leave the economy behind,” he said. Although he had agreed with Takaichi last December to support passage of the FY2026 budget bill by the end of March, Tamaki said that he would now reconsider that agreement. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, was terser: when questioned about an early election in light of the urgent issues in economy and foreign affairs, he said, “Why now?”
 
The LDP and the JIP have not reached any agreement on electoral cooperation in the single-seat districts of the Lower House. If JIP suffers a significant defeat in the snap election, particularly in those districts, JIP may reconsider the merits of its coalition with the LDP. The DPP may also rethink its approach to the Takaichi administration if the party loses seats in the Lower House election and finds the coalition to be unbeneficial. A victory by the LDP thus could undermine its coalition framework.
 
Takaichi’s policies have not achieved outstanding results. The Japanese yen has continued to depreciate and fell to 158 yen to the dollar after news broke of a possible snap election. The fall was interpreted as reflecting a concern that Takaichi’s “proactive” fiscal policy would further destabilize the government’s delicate financial balance. The political vacancy resulting from a snap election will delay delivery of an economic stimulus package.
 
On the international front, ever since Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, China has been boosting its pressure on Japan. China most recently announced that it would impose greater restrictions on exports of dual-use goods to Japan. Although China ruled out regulation of private trade, The Wall Street Journal has reported that China has begun choking supply of rare-earths. Takaichi has not taken either effective countermeasures or other steps to mend the relationship with China.
 
Takaichi has stressed that her upcoming March visit to the United States is one of her diplomatic achievements. But President Donald Trump is focusing elsewhere, such as pursuing his America First agenda in Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Iran. The Japan-China relationship is out of his sight. Trump also wants to have a successful, grand summit with China’s Xi Jinping in April. A snap election will give voters in Japan a chance to evaluate Takaichi’s diplomatic work. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 12, 2026

NEXT STEPS FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: DETERRENCE, CYBERSECURITY, AND INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPS. 1/12, 10:00-11:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Kei Koga, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore; Satoru Mori, Senior Fellow, The Nakasone Peace Institute & Professor, Keio University; Motohiro Tsuchiya, Professor and Vice President for Global Engagement, Keio University. 

BOOK TALK: TO DARE MIGHTY THINGS: US DEFENSE STRATEGY SINCE THE REVOLUTION. 1/12, 10:00-11:15am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: author Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Director, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director, Africa Security Initiative; Robert Kagan, Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; General David Petraeus (ret.), Partner and Chairman, KKR Global Institute, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Former Commander, U.S. Central Command, Former Commander, International Security Assistance Force. Moderator: Melanie W. Sisson, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology.  PURCHASE BOOK

IRAN AT A CROSSROADS: PROTESTS, REPRESSION, AND THE RISK OF U.S. MILITARY ESCALATION. 1/12, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy. Speakers: Vali Nasr, Majid Khadduri, Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Ellie Geranmayeh, Senior Policy Fellow; Deputy Head, Middle East and North Africa Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations; Mohammad Ali Shabani, Editor, Amwaj.media; Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy. 

TRUMP’S VENEZUELA STRATEGY. 1/12, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Live. Speakers: Matthew Kroenig, Columnist, Foreign Policy; Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

JAPAN'S CHINA-FOCUSED GRAND STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-STRAIT DETERRENCE. 1/12, 12:15-1:30pm, IN PERSON ONLY "brown bag lunch." Sponsor: Stimson. Speaker: Dr. Giulio Pugliese, Director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute in Florence and an incoming Assistant Professor in Asian Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa later this year. To attend contact: Dr. Andrew Oros, Japan Program Director, Stimson, aoros@stimson.org.

SECURING AMERICA’S COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE: A STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR US LEADERSHIP. 1/12, 1:00-2:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Olivia Trusty, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission; Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for the Economics of the Internet, Hudson Institute. 

TURKEY, SYRIA, AND ISRAEL: WHAT’S NEXT IN THE REGION? 1/12, 1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Council for a Secure America (CSA). Speaker: Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Ph.D., J.D., Professor at SUNY Maritime College.

STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP: A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH REPS. RICH MCCORMICK AND AMI BERA. 1/12, 1:30-2:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Representative Rich McCormick (R-GA), U.S. House of Representatives; Representative Ami Bera (D-CA), U.S. House of Representatives.

REPORT LAUNCH: ISLAMIC FINANCE AND CLIMATE AGENDA. 1/12, 8:30-11:00pm (EST), 9:30am-Noon (MYT), HYBRID. Sponsor: World Bank. Speaker: TBA.

Takaichi’s 2026

Foreign Affairs, Coalition Building, and a Snap Election Headline Takaichi’s 2026

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 5, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi entered the new year learning of the United States’ raid on Venezuela. Takaichi issued an anodyne comment, hoping for sustainable democracy in that country. Trump’s action may be a sign for Takaichi that 2026 will be diplomatically busy, even while her political focus should be on reinforcing the leading coalition and calling for a snap election.
 
It was in the evening of January 3, Tokyo time, when news broke of the U.S. attack on Caracas and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Having no opportunity to speak to the press on the day, Takaichi posted on X that the government of Japan was insisting on the importance of restoring democracy in Venezuela. The Japanese government “will promote diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela and to stabilize the situation there, in close cooperation with neighboring countries and taking the utmost measures to secure the safety of Japanese citizens,” Takaichi said.
 
Although Takaichi had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump only the day before, she gave the reporters no hint about whether they had talked about Venezuela. “Having reconfirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S., we agreed on coordinating for my visit to the U.S. this spring,” Takaichi said in a press briefing after the call.
 
For Takaichi, who naively complicated bilateral relations with China by the observation that Japan could use force if the Taiwan contingency occurs, it would be the U.S. that she can rely on to reestablish diplomatic normality with China, without any apology or regret about her comment. As Trump agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Beijing in April, it is a diplomatic requirement for her to meet with Trump before his meeting with Xi.
 
Japan has opposed a unilateral change in the international status quo by force since criticizing China’s conduct toward Taiwan and its aggression in the South China Sea. No argument is heard in Japan that the U.S. raid on Venezuela was not a unilateral change of the status quo by force. “I am concerned that it would send a dangerous message that this American military operation could be regarded as a unilateral change in the status quo,” former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera said.
 
Professor Kazuhiro Maeshima of Sophia University indicated that Japan will need to balance its security against critical comments about U.S. action in Venezuela. “In case China invades Taiwan, it will not be easy to say ‘stop changing the status quo,’ ” after the U.S. action in Venezuela, Maeshima said. Indeed, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea after the U.S. sent military forces into Venezuela. An event in South America can thus affect security in Northeast Asia.
 
Takaichi’s domestic agenda is no less crucial than the increasing complications in foreign affairs. Takaichi’s priority in 2026 is to stabilize her administration. In the first half of this year, Takaichi must survive the ordinary session of the Diet, which will convene on January 23. She has obtained support for the FY2026 main budget bill, which must pass the Diet by the end of March, from the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). On other legislation, though, the leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), must find votes from other opposition party members.
 
The LDP and JIP tabled action on a bill that would reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the ordinary session. The two parties did, however, agree to proceed in the ordinary session with a bill that would impose greater restrictions on real estate investments and sales by foreigners and that would establish the Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). To find a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, the LDP-JIP coalition must garner votes from the opposition parties.
 
The DPP is willing to support the LDP more broadly than in previous sessions, after the LDP agreed at the end of last year to the DPP’s policy to raise the threshold for imposing income tax to 1.78 million yen of annual income. But, the DPP has not decided to participate in the leading coalition. The DPP is worried that the LDP may field candidates against DPP candidates in single-seat districts of the Lower House in the next election. Further, by not joining the coalition, the DPP may exercise discretion in deciding whether to support bills sponsored by the LDP.
 
Because the LDP currently has no margin for error in passing bills in the House of Representatives, it is important to watch whether Takaichi will call a snap election of the House. The prime minister of Japan is regarded as having the power to dissolve the Lower House at any time of her choosing. Every prime minister hopes to call a snap election to reinforce the political basis of his or her administration.
 
To do so, Takaichi must resolve at least three practical issues. First, there are two conflicting factors. On the one hand, she will need the approval of the LDP’s coalition partner. The LDP and JIP so far have no agreement to cooperate in elections. JIP has overwhelming strength in single-seat districts in Osaka. If the parties do not agree to cooperate, they will compete in those districts. On the other hand, a decision against running candidates in districts with JIP lawmakers will frustrate the LDP’s local organizations. Takaichi will have to weigh the risks whether to cooperate or to compete.
 
Second, Takaichi must find a cause to run on. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House in 2014, asking voters to approve his decision to postpone a consumption tax hike. Fumio Kishida in 2021 and Shigeru Ishiba in 2024 sought approval of their new premierships. To hold a snap election, Takaichi must clarify what she will ask voters in the election.
 
Third and most important, is whether a snap election will reinforce or erode Takaichi’s currently high approval rating. Public opinion for prime ministers tends to go down as time passes after inauguration. If Takaichi calls a snap election, she will want her administration to keep its fresh image.
 
Perhaps the earliest possible time to dissolve the Lower House is in April, right after it passes the FY2026 budget bill. The voters will evaluate Takaichi’s budget achievement and the success (or lack thereof) in her visit to the U.S. now planned for March. Another chance to dissolve the Lower House is at the end of the ordinary session in June after the Diet has passed conservative bills such as legalizing the use of maiden names for wives, rather than allowing for separate surnames.
 
If Takaichi feels she cannot call an election during the ordinary session of the Diet, she may still do so at the extraordinary session in the fall at which she will submit a supplementary budget bill. Notwithstanding her high approval rating in the polls, it is unclear if Takaichi can win a snap election. The state of the economy and international affairs cannot be foretold but will certainly affect the election and the Takaichi administration’s longevity.

Takaichi's China Test

Above is Sanae Takaichi when she was running for LDP president in 2021, holding forth at a rally of Tibetan, Uighur, Hong Kong and Taiwan independence activists inside LDP headquarters. Credit to Michael Cucek, Temple University, Japan

Japan Faces China’s Wolf Warriors

By Takuya Nishimura

Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point

Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun

You can find his blog, J Update here

November 25, 2025

A careless reference to a “Taiwan contingency” by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi drew a vocal official retort from China. As Beijing plays its “wolf warrior diplomacy” gambit against Japan, Tokyo has not responded with any effective countermeasures. Japanese foreign policy officials predict that the bilateral disputes will not be settled any time soon and that the negative consequences to Japan of such a failure are growing. It may also be true that China is using Takaichi’s comment as an excuse to broadcast its longstanding views on the place of Taiwan in China’s sphere of influence.

On November 7 at the Diet discussion, Takaichi said that a Chinese blockade around Taiwan deploying warships with the use of force would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. In such a condition, Japan could invoke its right to collective self-defense to justify activating its self-defense forces with a country with a close relationship with Japan. The “country” in this context is presumably the United States – although U.S. President Donald Trump has yet to demonstrate the closeness of this relationship.

 Before delivering her comment, Takaichi had had a middle-of-the-night (or early morning) meeting at 3 a.m. to discuss a possible “Taiwan contingency” with her staff. Although Takaichi told her staff after the Diet discussion that she might have gone too far, it is likely that her comment on Taiwan was what she meant as she had consulted with her diplomatic advisers. She has refused to retract her words.

China sees Taiwan as one of its core interests. As a result, Beijing would and did respond aggressively to Takaichi. Whether her remark was merely careless or whether it was an affirmative line in the sand mattered not to China. The Chinese Consul General to Osaka, Xue Jian, posted on social media a comment suggesting the beheading of the “filthy heard” of the Japanese leader. Beijing also issued recommendations to its citizens, including college students, not to travel to Japan. China demanded that the Takaichi administration retract the statement.

Moreover, China decided to treat Takaichi’s comment as a form of military intimidation. The People’s Liberation Army Daily regarded Takaichi’s observation as interference in China’s internal affairs and an infringement on China’s sovereignty. “Any external interference forces will be crushed to ashes,” the paper announced. Four China Coast Guard vessels entered territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands on November 16.

China continues to apply diplomatic pressure on Japan. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, sent a letter to UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, on November 21, stating that Japan had issued a threat of force against China for the first time. China froze again its imports of Japanese seafood by imposing stricter inspections of Japanese cargo. Until this decision, Japan had since May been able to export goods to China with few restrictions.

Other ostensibly private sector actions followed. Some Chinese airlines stopped flights to Japan. Chinese travel agencies cancelled reservations to hotels in Japan. These measures have begun to have an impact on the Japanese economy. The worst decision for Japan was China’s embargo of exports of rare earth minerals an action that Japan had experienced in 2010. Rare earth minerals are crucial for the production of cars and smart phones.

These measures represent China’s confrontational policy in foreign relations, which is called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” named after a 2015 Chinese film. Changing from traditional diplomacy avoiding controversy, China actively seeks its utmost interest by aggressively taking advantage of any diplomatic resources including economic sanctions or military pressure.

Japan’s position has been that Takaichi’s comment did not cross the line that her predecessors had drawn. The Prime Minister tried to explain this view by sending the Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masaaki Kanai, to Beijing on November 18. China had none of it.

After Kanai’s meeting, Chinese media broadcast a scene with the the Foreign Ministry’s Director General Liu Jinsong looking down contemptuously on Kanai. Liu had his hands in his trousers’ pockets while Kanai looked to be bowing to Liu. Kanai was obviously not ready for the press.

Although hawkish groups in Japan have called on the government to declare the Consul General to Osaka a persona non grata and send him home, the previous four examples of Japan’s expulsion of foreign diplomats are based on crimes or a highly serious deterioration in bilateral relations. It is questionable whether the expulsion can be applied to the posting on SNS of a Chinese diplomat who is critical of the Japanese government.

The Takaichi administration has miscalculated in its diplomatic relations with China. She mostly had no idea that her comment would cause China to respond so stridently. “I’m not going to discuss a specific issue in this venue anymore,” Takaichi said before the budget committee of the Lower House. But a prime minister cannot be responsible for Japan’s sovereign people without discussing specific issues in the Diet.

Takaichi made her comment on Taiwan just a week after her meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea. She and her staff did not recognize the significance of China’s decision to meet with the new hawkish leader of Japan despite concerns of the Chinese (as well as other nations) about her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and comments supporting revisionist history. Tokyo was not considerate and Takaichi’s surprise statement caused Xi to lose face with the Chinese public.

The first response of Trump to the contretemps was not to Takaichi’s advantage. When asked about it in an interview with Fox News on November 11, Trump observed that “a lot of our allies are not friends either.” Adding, he said “Our allies took advantage of our trade more than China did.” Japan had little advance knowledge of this change of U.S. policy from the Biden administration toward its allies or China. Trump takes a softer approach to China while eschewing close relationships with traditional allies.

A second and possibly more troubling event was Xi’s call to Trump in the morning of Monday, November 24. Xi’s purpose was to discuss Taiwan, specifically that Taiwan’s return to China is central to the post-World War II international order. At least one U.S. press report has linked Xi’s call to Takaichi’s statement, but there appear to be no reports that Xi mentioned Japan or Takaichi by name. It may be fair to say that China’s disproportionate response to Takaichi reflects a felt need that existed well before she came on the scene to promote its influence over Taiwan.

Trump called Takaichi that evening. Although she did not reveal the substances of their conversation about the Japan-China row over Taiwan, Takaichi told the press that she was briefed on the Trump-Xi call and Trump said she should call him whenever she wanted. The time lag between Trumps calls with China and Japan, however, appears to undermine her efforts to shape a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”

Takaichi, as the first female premier of Japan, hopes to be the Margaret Thatcher of Japan. The conservative “Iron Lady” was a hardliner against the Soviet Union. But Japanese observers expect that Takaichi will more likely follow one of two recent and different models: Liz Truss of the UK or Giorgia Meloni of Italy. Truss’s tenure was brief: she stepped down shortly after her installation when the markets looked unfavorably on her tax cut policy that lacked reliable, alternative fiscal resources. Meloni has been more successful. She has adjusted her conservative agenda to account for the realities of domestic and international politics.

Thus far, Takaichi has been able to keep her relationship with U.S. President Trump on an even keel. Maintaining a dialogue with China is more difficult. Her active spending for an economic stimulus has met with skepticism from the market, which now shows a triple low of stocks, bonds, and the Japanese yen a reminder for Japan about the U.K.’s Truss Shock in 2022.

It is true that Takaichi has high approval rate in current polls, despite concerns on relations with China stemming from her own speech. However, the honeymoon period for theTakaichi administration is getting close to an end. If China’s measures start impacting Japan’s economy or security, the one-month-old Takaichi administration may similarly find itself in a Truss situation with questions about its survival.