Unification Church Again

Japanese Court Orders Dissolution of the Unification Church

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 31, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

On March 25, the Tokyo District Court issued an order to dissolve the religious corporation, Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU), broadly known as former Unification Church (UC). The Court found that the UC had damaged its believers and their families through requirements for expensive donations. The Federation plans to appeal. The broader social issue, which goes beyond the district court’s ruling, is how to draw a line between religious groups and politics.
 
The UC was established in the Republic of Korea in 1954 and was incorporated in Japan in 1964. It changed its name to the current one in 2015. In several instances in the 1980s and 1990s, UC believers reportedly suffered from the expensive purchase of purported “spiritual” goods, such as porcelain vases or Korean ginseng.
 
The government, however, ignored these scams until the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2022. The shooter, Tetsuya Yamagami, whose mother had donated over 100 million yen to the UC, plunging her family into poverty, explained that his motivation for the assassination was the close relationship between the UC and Abe.
 
Acknowledging accumulated damages on the believers, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology requested from the court a dissolution order to the FFWPU in October 2023. The Ministry argued that there had been at least 32 civil cases in which courts in Japan had ordered the Federation to compensate its believers’ from the financial harm caused by sales of putative religious objects and from compulsory donations.
 
Tokyo District Court found that the damages in those 32 cases between 1980 and 2009 amounted to 1,784 million yen on 168 believers, and recognized other 985 million yen of damages on 179 believers after 2009 when the federation issued a declaration of compliance. Based on those illegal activities, Tokyo District Court ordered dissolution of the FFWPU.
 
The Court based its order of dissolution on Article 81 of the Religious Corporation Act, which authorizes a court to dissolve a religious corporation when it commits an illegal activity obviously against the public welfare. The activity against the public welfare in this case was the FFWPU’s donation requirement, which rendered believers insolvent and unable to maintain a reasonable lifestyle.
 
There are two earlier dissolution cases that may be instructive. In 1995, in a fortunately rare case, a court ordered that Aum Shinrikyo be dissolved for its sarin attack on the Tokyo subway. In 2002, in a case like that of the FFWPU, a court ordered the dissolution of the Myokakuji Temple for fraud in seeking donations for their baseless spiritual powers. Both cases, however, were based on criminal law. The order against the FFWPU case is the first one based on violations of the civil code.
 
The FFWPU immediately announced its intention to appeal. “The civil court judgements, which are listed as grounds for dissolution, are cases of 32 years ago in average. All damages for the court judgements have already been paid and each of the cases has already been settled,” said the president of FFWPU, Tomihiro Tanaka, in his press conference at Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan.
 
Stripping the FFWPU of its status as a religious corporation does not prevent it from practicing its religion. Tanaka, however, contends that the court decision would interfere with the FFWPU’s freedom of religion under Article 20 of the Japanese constitution.  The FFWPU’s legal director, Norishige Kondo, has also noted that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Japan has adopted, confirms the rights of religious groups.
 
However, Article 18-3 of the covenant states that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
The Deputy Chief Defense Attorney of Lawyers Across Japan for the Victims of the Unification Church, Masaki Kito, has asserted that the believers’ donations to the Federation disturbed their own constitutional rights: rights to their own property and a basic right to their life. According to Kito, the FFWPU also violated the believers’ freedom of marriage in the UC’s mass weddings.   
 
The appeals court faces a complicated task in reconciling the various rights asserted.  If the court affirms the decision of the district court, the process of dissolution will begin. Tokyo District Court estimates that the Federation possessed 1,136 million yen of assets at the time of March 2022. Once dissolution process starts, those assets will be liquidated and the FFWPU will no longer receive tax relief for religious corporation.
 
The nature of the FFWPU’s involvement in political activities over the years is not entirely clear. The former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, grandfather of Shinzo Abe, was one of the backers of the political branch of the UC, the International Federation for Victory over Communication. The founder of UC, Sun Myung Moon, urged his followers to support the Seiwa-kai, one of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions once led by Shinzo Abe and his father Shintaro Abe. Tanaka has stated, however, that each believer may vote for a candidate in each electoral district that best reflects their family values. Acceptable candidates are not limited to members of the LDP.
 
On the other side, the lawyers for the victims have emphasized that the FFWPU is under the strict control of the religion’s headquarters in South Korea and has a strong influence on Japanese politics, especially in the time of the Shinzo Abe administration. The lawyers have called for legislation to regulate foreign lobbyists or spies and to preserve the assets of the FFWPU to ensure the compensation of the victims as ordered by the district court and before the federation sends funds to South Korea or another foreign country.
 
Stressing that the LDP had cut off its relationship with the FFWPU, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba warned LDP lawmakers against any ties to the FFWPU. Ishiba observed that penalties for receipt of donations or other support from the Federation were possible. Whether the party can campaign without the FFWPU will be closely watched in the Upper House election this summer.
 
N.B.: The Unification Church [Family Federation for World Peace and Unification International], is also involved in U.S. politics through its ownership the conservative Washington Times and funding of conservative organizations such as CPAC. The family is currently in a legal dispute over the late-Reverand Moon’s assets

Mongolia: Proponent of Peace in Northeast Asia

Mongolia: Potential Mediator between the Koreas and Proponent of Peace in Northeast Asia
By: David L. Caprara, Katharine H.S. Moon and Paul Park

Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Dr. Moon and Mr. Park are APP members.

Opinion | January 2015

2014 was a relatively friendless year for the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). It publicly lost its best friend and patron, China, to its erstwhile nemesis, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), when Presidents Park Geun-hye and Xi Jinping celebrated their growing friendship at the July summit in Seoul. Recently, retired PLA General Wang Hongguang wrote in the Chinese language site of Global Times, which is closely linked to the Chinese Communist Party, that China tired of cleaning up North Korea’s “mess” and would not step in to “save” North Korea if it collapses or starts a war.[1] And there is a vigorous debate in Beijing on whether the DPRK should be treated on a “normal” basis with China’s interests as the sole guide and purpose or be treated as a special case needing China’s indulgence and protection.[2] Since the Sony hack of November, North Korea has been under tighter scrutiny, both real and virtual, by Seoul, Beijing and Washington, accompanied by tighter sanctions in the new year. Bludgeoned by global condemnation of its atrocious human rights record, Pyongyang’s pariah status has intensified. Only Russia has been warming up to North Korea out of its own economic and political self-interest.

Is there any sizable country with good intentions for the region that is not giving up or beating up on North Korea? Is there any country Pyongyang likes and possibly even trusts? Mongolia stands out as the sole candidate, and it is friendly with both the East and the West.

Since the 2000s, Mongolia has played an increasingly constructive and steady role in in its bilateral ties with the DPRK and in its promotion of peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia. President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, who visited Pyongyang in 2013, was the first head of state to reach out to the DPRK since Kim Jung Un assumed power and helped author the “Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asia Security,” which held its first meeting in June, 2014. It is a unique forum that combines official (track one) and unofficial academic/think tank/NGO (track two) participants, on a variety of important regional issues. The goals are to decrease distrust among nations and increase cooperation and peace. Both the DPRK and the ROK (Republic of Korea or South Korea) were represented at the inaugural meeting, as were the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and some European nations.

The UB Dialogue, as a consultative mechanism, has the potential to bring together policymakers, international organizations such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and civil society entities and facilitate a range of initiatives related to economic cooperation; military transparency; environmental issues; non-traditional security threats; regional stability, cultural and educational exchange among the participants, including the two Koreas. These are official agenda items and goals of the UB Dialogue. With the Six-Party Talks nearly defunct and inter-Korean relations unable to address regional issues that affect the peninsula, Mongolia may be able to serve as a “Geneva or Helsinki of the East” as some observers have suggested.

Mongolia’s expanding global presence
Mongolia is uniquely positioned as the only country in Northeast Asia that enjoys good relations not only with North Korea but also South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan.

Mongolia’ relations with the United States, Canada, and Western Europe have steadily improved and deepened since the late 1980s. In recent decades, both Democratic and Republication administrations in Washington have enjoyed mutually warm and collaborative relations with Mongolia. President George W. Bush was the first sitting U.S. president to visit the country in 2005; he thanked the Mongolians for sending troops to join U.S.-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and for supporting anti-terrorism initiatives. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also visited in the same year. In 2007, President Nambaryn Enkhbayar visited Washington to co-sign the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact with President Bush. The next (and current) leader, President Elbegdorj, met U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House in 2011, as did the first civilian Minister of Defense, L. Bold. Vice President Joe Biden included Mongolia on a three-country Asia visit in August, 2011; China and Japan were the other two. A year later, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton took her turn in Ulaanbaatar. The most recent visit by top-level U.S. officials to Mongolia was by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in April 2014.

Mongolia’s pursuit of the “third neighbor” policy allows the country to develop cooperative relations with the United States, Western Europe, ASEAN nations and others partly as “an air pocket” from its economic and security reliance on Beijing and Moscow. The softer side of this diplomatic push has been demonstrated by Ulaanbaatar’s membership in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its previous chairmanship of the Community on Democracies.”[3]

Western experts on Mongolia applaud the way the country has developed a unique “peacekeeping niche” that facilitates participation in UN peacekeeping activities, international anti-terrorism measures, and humanitarian actions. For its small population of about three million, Mongolia takes on a heavy load of peacekeeping activities, ranking 26th on the UN’s list of contributing nations.[4]

Since 2003, Mongolia annually hosts the “Khaan Quest” peacekeeping exercises for the purpose of tactical advancement and capacity building for its Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) and for the improvement of regional confidence building. Although the United States and NATO play prominent roles, the Quest has attracted more diverse participants over the years so that by 2012, the number of interested parties expanded to include representatives from China and India as well as an array of developing nations such as Vietnam and Cambodia. These exercises are acknowledged as gatherings devoted to strengthening international cooperation and interoperability on peacekeeping initiatives around the world.[5]

On the economic side, Mongolia has been diversifying its external relations, with the maintenance of sovereignty and the related desire to reduce its overwhelming dependence on China as important goals. Expansion of economic relations is driven in part by a desire to participate in and benefit from global standards investment funds, and market access is a national priority. In that context, Mongolia’s relations with the West have been constructive and collaborative. For example, in 2013, the United States Trade Representative Michael Froman and Mongolia's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Luvsanvandan Bold, signed the Agreement on Transparency in Matters Related to International Trade and Investment between the United States of America and Mongolia. The Agreement commits the parties to provide opportunities for public comment on proposed laws and regulations and to publish final laws and regulations in Mongolian and English in order to facilitate access, openness, fairness, and procedural coherence in international trade and investment between Mongolia and other countries. “Additional commitments address the application of disciplines on bribery and corruption.” This type of administrative and legal modernization and the incorporation of measures to prevent and correct corruption are exemplary measures that could be helpful to the DPRK and other countries that are unfamiliar with or lagging in appropriate frameworks for doing business with diverse international actors.

Maintaining sovereignty between giants
China and Russia have vied for influence over Mongolia for many decades, from the time when Mongolia was in the Soviet sphere in influence to the present. Although 89 percent of foreign trade in 2013 was with China and Russia provides about 75 percent of Mongolia’s gasoline and diesel fuel and much of its electricity, Ulaanbaatar is assertively broadening and deepening its economic interests with the two big neighbors, especially greater transportation access and cheaper costs (vital to the landlocked nation), participation in the development of the New Silk Road corridor, and the construction of a Russian oil and gas pipeline through Mongolia that reaches China. All three countries have mutual interests and investments in developing Mongolia’s well-endowed mining industry.

But being sandwiched between two giants means Mongolia has to be prudent in preserving its sovereignty and independence, and Ulaanbaatar has done so in practical ways, balancing the two large powers’ interests with its own. The 2010 National Security Concept’s “One-Third Clause” sets a clear limit on the proportion of foreign direct investment from any one country: one-third. Legislation limits (foreign) state-owned companies from gaining control of strategic assets. And as numerous bilateral security and military cooperation agreements link Mongolia with China and Russia, UB has strategically and legally created elbow room for its autonomy. The government’s National Security and Foreign Policy Concepts outline a specific policy of not allowing foreign troops the use of its territory. Such preservationist measures to maintain sovereignty and independence in economic and security terms would be welcome examples to a North Korea which zealously prioritizes national sovereignty.