Japan Challenges Russia in Antarctic

Sparking Concern in Moscow About West’s Plans

by Paul Goble

First printed in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 27, 2021 -- Volume 18, Issue 119

 

The Japanese government’s National Institute for Polar Research (NIPR) released four reports so far this month (July 2021) outlining Tokyo’s view that Japan should be among the countries allowed to exploit the oil and natural gas resources lying below the surface in Antarctica and to make territorial claims there once the current treaty regime expires or is modified (Nipr.ac.jp cited by Rambler, July 24). That has sparked outrage in Moscow. Russian commentaries have characterized the NIPR proposals as a threat to Russian rights in the Antarctic; as a challenge to the 1959 international accord that governs the activities of countries there; as a new move on the geopolitical chessboard intended to put pressure on Moscow to sign a peace treaty with Tokyo and return the Kurile Islands; and even as a trial balloon to test out analogous plans the United States may try to employ against Russia in the Arctic in the immediate future (Izvestia, Politros.com, iReactor, Ren.tv, July 24; Expert.ru, July 25).
 
The NIPR reports, in fact, do not speak about any immediate Japanese actions but rather appear designed to set the stage for Tokyo’s participation in talks planned to revise the 1959 international accord, which limits the activities of the signatory countries to only scientific research in the Antarctic. That accord is set to expire in 2048; but already, Russia and other countries have been talking about its revision so as to permit exploitation of oil and gas reserves there (see EDM, June 9, 2020, June 24, 2020, January 19, 2021). Japan raised this issue before, in 2012, but its legal position is different; and so its announcement then was largely ignored in Moscow and the West. Tokyo made expansive claims regarding Antarctica in 1939, but the post-World War II settlement forced the Japanese government to give them up in 1951. That has had two consequences. First, it has meant that Japan’s claims to the southern polar region are invariably wrapped up in the issues of the revision of the outcome of that war, something Russian President Vladimir Putin is especially sensitive to (not least because of the Kurile Islands dispute—see EDM, November 27, 2018 and January 24, 2019). And second, it has meant that whenever Japan does make a claim, however far in the future it may be, Moscow-based experts tend to see it as a stalking horse, either to make demands for a return of the Kuriles or as an action taken on behalf of the US against Russia (Svobodnaya Pressa, July 25).
 
Most of the coverage in Moscow over the last few days about the Japanese reports has been dismissive, viewing them as, at most, Japan’s latest effort to pressure Russia to return the Kurile Islands. Moreover, these commentaries collectively suggest that the real competition in the Antarctic is in the seas around it rather than on land, at least for now. But some Russian analysts, like Igor Shatrov of the Strategic Development Council, see what Japan has done as having far broader implications. For Shatrov, it represents a sign that Tokyo increasingly wants to act without regard to the post–World War II settlement and is an indication that Japan is working hand-in-glove with the US to come up with a strategy in the Antarctic in the distant future that the two countries can apply against Russia in the Arctic now. He and others argue Russia must work more closely with China to counter this Japanese-US move (Svobodnaya Pressa, July 25).
 
One who makes this case is Andrei Koshkin of the Russian Economics University, who has argued in the past that anything Japan does is the implementation of US plans and that whatever Tokyo is saying about the Antarctic provides a glimpse into what Washington intends to do in the Arctic. Because that is so, he contends, any manifestation of Japanese interest in Antarctica must be of immediate concern to Moscow. This is not so much because Japan or the US can do anything in the world’s southernmost region now or that Russia could not block them (see EDM, January 19, 2021; Meduza, December 16, 2020; N+1, December 7, 2020; Kommersant, November 26, 2020; Znak, January 28, 2020) but rather because of its implications for what is likely to happen in the Arctic in the near future (Svobodnaya Pressa, October 26, 2020).
 
Of course, a critical difference exists between the Arctic and Antarctic as far as international politics is concerned. A global accord restricts development in the Antarctic until mid-century; and disputes there are primarily about fishing in the seas around the continent rather than over natural resources locked away underground. But the Japanese NITR reports suggest that the differences between policies regarding the areas around the poles are narrowing. As long as the issue in the Antarctic is about fishing, the US has real advantages because many countries, including Japan, want to restrict Russian fishermen there. If the dispute shifts to land, Russia may be able to use the 1959 treaty and exploit the fears of many countries that they will be left out in a scramble for resources beneath the Antarctic ice. That means Moscow must be concerned about any territorial claims there, ally itself with China, and use their common objections to block them, Koshkin says, all while recognizing that the US is developing policies around the South Pole that it intends to use in the North (Svobodnaya Pressa, October 26, 2020).
 
Thus, what might appear to many as a tempest in a Moscow media teapot is anything but. It is a sign of Russian concern about Japan’s new international activism not only in the Antarctic but more generally; and it is a reflection of a broader Russian judgment that whatever the West does in Antarctica is first and foremost not about that continent but about the polar region in the north—an area Vladimir Putin has made central to his plans to project Russian power in order to defend Russian national security.

 

Despite Bilateral Diplomatic Contacts, Russia Hardens Its View of US as the Enemy

Russian coast guard vessels moored in port at the
Kurile island of Shikotan (Source: Reuters)

First published in the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 63, March 31, 2016

By: Pavel Felgenhauer

According to Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, the frequency and intensity of high-level contacts between Russia and the United States “are unprecedented.” US Secretary of State John Kerry has regularly visited Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and with President Vladimir Putin. This flurry of diplomatic activity is proof, according to Ryabkov, that Moscow is an indispensable world power, essential to fixing important global problems; and Washington is being forced to recognize this fact. Russia will be doing its best to further impress on the US its own importance and the need to “treat us [Moscow] as an equal power.” But there are problems: “Illegal sanctions imposed by the West are in force” and “anti-Russian rhetoric is deafening in the election-year debates in America.” Russia’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are frozen: There is no date yet to hold a NATO-Russia Council meeting at the ambassadorial level, because Moscow does not accept NATO’s proposed draft agenda (Izvestia, March 28).

Russia refused to attend the fourth nuclear security summit in Washington this week (March 31–April 1)—the first time a top Russian official has been absent since these summits were initiated by President Barack Obama. The Kremlin and the White House exchanged barbs over “Russian self-isolation” on one side and the “lack of understanding with Washington” on the other. Kerry’s visits and talks did not help dissolve mutual distrust (Kommersant, March 31). The chair of the Duma Foreign Relations Committee, Alexei Pushkov, dismissed US calls for more nuclear disarmament talks and Obama’s demand that Russia fully comply with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Washington accuses Moscow of violating the INF by developing a land-based, long-range, nuclear-capable cruise missile—an accusation the Russian side has adamantly denied. According to Pushkov: “The US must first repair relations with Russia that were destroyed by Obama and only then offer us talks on nuclear weapons” (RIA Novosti, March 31).

The Russian military has recently begun to once again officially use the Cold War phrase “likely enemy” (veroyatniy protivnik) when referring to the US and its allies. Since the collapse of Communism in 1991, the term fell into disuse. But today, Russia and the US are apparently officially enemies again. Last week, speaking at a gathering of top Russian brass in Moscow (the Defense Ministry Collegium), the defense minister, Army-General Sergei Shoigu, announced the deployment of new S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems near Novosibirsk, in the Central Military District. According to Shoigu, new air defense units are being formed, “which will allow, by 2020, to drastically increase the zone of denial of attack by air formations of the likely enemy—we will be able to shoot down cruise missiles flying at low, high and medium altitude” (Mil.ru, March 25).

Shoigu seems to be preparing the Russian military to fight an all-out war with the “likely enemy” on all fronts—on land, sea and air—defending military industrial targets in big cities deep in the Russian hinterland. New threats and military deployments were announced in the East, the Arctic and in the West against NATO, “which is expanding its military potential in Europe, close to Russian borders.” According to Shoigu, “Russia must respond.” New forces are being organized and deployed against NATO in the Western Military District, “including two new army divisions.” Bases are being built and expanded in the Arctic, including on Vrangel Island, located north of Chukotka, in the Arctic Sea (Mil.ru, March 25).

Reinforcements are also being deployed in the Kurile Islands: In 2016, new anti-ship guided missiles “Bal” and “Bastion,” together with new spy drones will be deployed in the South Kurile Kunashir and Iturup islands, also claimed by Japan (see EDM, March 30). Shoigu announced that in April 2016, a special three-month-long naval expedition “by sailors of the Pacific Fleet” will be commenced from the islands of the Greater Kurile Chain (Ridge) to “explore new bases for the Pacific Fleet” (Mil.ru, March 25). According to the chair of the Defense and Security Committee of the Federation Council (upper house of the Russian parliament), Victor Ozerov, “the number of naval ships of the Pacific Fleet that will be deployed in the Kuriles will depend on how constructive relations will be with Japan and other Asia-Pacific nations.” Ozerov called on Japan not to view this future deployment as a threat: “The military-strategic importance [to Russia] of the Kuriles is high; and anyway, not all of the Pacific Fleet will be deployed there” (RIA Novosti, March 25).

It is unclear where the Russian warships are to be stationed in the Kuriles: on Kunashir and Iturup or further north. Today, only Kunashir, Iturup and the most northern Paramushir islands are populated. The Russian military is deployed in the southern Kunashir and Iturup, close to Japan. The rest of the Kurile islands (56 in all) are uninhabited and have no military infrastructure. Since military forces are already deployed in the South Kuriles, there seems no need to send a special naval expedition to seek possible new bases. Possibly the Russian military is planning to militarize the other Kurile islands, as well.

The Russian General Staff considers the Kurile Islands a prime military-strategic asset. The Russian navy has announced it will deploy its newest Borei-class strategic nuclear submarines armed with new Bulava multiple-warhead ballistic missiles to Kamchatka, at the Vilyuchinsk submarine base, where housing and infrastructure have been revamped on orders from the Kremlin. Overall, eight Borei-class subs are planned to be built, and up to five could be based in Kamchatka (TASS, March 4).

At present, the existing Borei-class subs (Yuri Dolgoruky, Vladimir Monomakh and Alexander Nevsky) are undergoing testing in the Barents Sea—close to the Severnaya shipyard, where they were built in Severodvinsk, in the estuary of the Severnaya Dvina, on the White Sea (Izvestia, March 2) When operating in the Pacific, the Borei submarines will go on patrol from Vilyuchinsk into the Russian-controlled, relatively shallow Sea of Okhotsk. From there, they will target the continental United States.

The Sea of Okhotsk is seen as a better safe haven than the northern Barents Sea. The Kurile Island Chain separates the Sea of Okhotsk from the open Pacific Ocean; it is strategically important for the Russian military to build up its naval defenses in the region so as not to allow US and allied anti-submarine assets to penetrate the Okhotsk waters and airspace. As the Borei subs begin arriving in the Pacific, the Kurile Islands could be further militarized—and not only the southern ones facing Japan.

New Momentum in the Russia-China Partnership

Chinese President Xi Jinping
and Russian President Vladimir Putin

More than a temporary marriage of convenience

First published in the Jamesetown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 62 March 30, 2016
By: Stephen Blank, is a Senior Fellow and resident Russia expert at the American Foreign Policy Council.  

Many observers of the Russo-Chinese relationship continue to believe that it is merely a marriage or axis of convenience, which will only last as long as it does not damage its two players’ other rational interests. This attitude clearly embodies the distinctive belief, particularly prevalent in the United States, that all governments—Moscow and Beijing included—are merely calculating Realists with no other motive. However, mounting evidence shows that this view fails to capture the growing closeness of Russian and Chinese positions on many global issues. Moreover, proponents of this perspective fail to see that China continues to make material concessions to Russia to keep it on China’s side, whereas Russia is also willing to take steps damaging to its relations with third parties in order to please China (see EDM, March 16).

Notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping recently urged both governments to strengthen communication and coordination in international security and on regional issues (presumably Korea, Southeast Asia, Japan, the Middle East and Ukraine) to achieve political solutions. He also reiterated that bilateral Sino-Russian cooperation plays a key role in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and in the world more generally (China Daily, Xinhua, March 26). Beyond that, China’s Deputy Prime Minister Zhang Gaoli recently met with Gazprom head Alexander Miller and vowed to improve bilateral energy cooperation (Xinhua, March 22). To mollify Russia, China recently lent Gazprom $2.17 billion; and it appears that further loans to Russian energy companies as well as further Chinese investment in them will be forthcoming, thus representing a tangible manifestation of Chinese support for Russia against the West (see EDM, March 16). Indeed, China has already become the largest consumer of Russian crude oil (RT, March 14).

This cooperation is not only occurring in the energy sphere. China has now made advance payments for Russia’s high-tech S-400 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile system, which it should begin receiving in 2017. While the specific missile that will be sold as part of the S-400 system has not yet been conclusively revealed, if it is the 40N6 model, it will provide China with the capability to cover a range of up to 400 kilometers. That will allow China to strike over all of Taiwan as well as reach targets as far as New Delhi, Calcutta, Hanoi, Seoul and all of North Korea. Armed with 40N6 missiles, Beijing’s S-400 launchers would also be able to fully protect the Yellow Sea and China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. But even a shorter-range missile would represent a significant upgrading of China’s capability for anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations (TASS, March 21; The Diplomat, March 22). This will certainly upset the military balance in the region, which is not necessarily in Moscow’s interest. Yet, Russian defense expert Vasily Kashin, of the Moscow-based Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technology, a think tank closely tied to the defense industrial complex, has simultaneously advocated for still more enhanced military cooperation with China. Furthermore, Kashin has advocated for strong Russo-Chinese industrial cooperation in electronics and mining (Xinhua, March 25).

On a different note, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced plans to continue its major military buildup on the Kurile Islands, the southernmost of which are claimed by Japan. In particular, Moscow is looking to deploy Bal-E and Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missile systems, anti-ship missiles, as well as Eleron-3 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Russia is also considering setting up a naval base on those islands (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, March 25).

It should be clear to any observer that this announcement regarding the further militarization of the Kuriles is a direct insult to Japan and its leader, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The timing of the announcement is particularly damaging to Moscow-Tokyo ties, as Abe is planning to travel to Russia to try and bring about a normalization of bilateral relations based on a transfer of at least two of the Kuriles back to Japan. Evidently, Russia is not prepared to make any meaningful concessions to Japan at the expense of Moscow’s ties to Beijing—Tokyo’s arch-rival in East Asia. And this decision, represents a practical response by Russia to the closer coordination on regional security that Xi has called for. China and Russia’s joint opposition to the US decision to deploy the THAAD missile defense system to South Korea against a North Korean threat provides another notable example (see EDM, March 16). Similarly, with regard to competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, while Russia says it would like to see these issues resolved peacefully and is unlikely to be enthusiastic about Chinese dominance there, its officials have now moved to follow China’s line by calling for the United States to stay out of the region. Indeed, Russian authorities have even declared that US presence in the South China Sea could constitute a threat to Moscow (RIA Novosti, December 8, 2015; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, FBIS SOV, January 7, 2015).

Given all these signs of ever-closer rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing, even at the expense of their other interests, is it really possible—let alone useful—to continue to cling to the belief that the Sino-Russian relationship is merely a temporary marriage of convenience?

Whither Russo-Japanese Relations?

By: Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow and resident Russia expert at the American Foreign Policy Council

First published in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Volume: 12 Issue: 212, November 20, 2015

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin will not be visiting Japan this year or anytime soon (see EDM, October 9) and currently no agenda even exists for any such visit, Tokyo appears so desperate for reconciliation with Moscow that it has agreed to continue discussing the status of the disputed Kurile Islands and overall normalization of relations with Russia. Indeed, Putin invited Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to Moscow instead, and Abe is apparently considering accepting. But if Japan follows this path, it will be venturing into dangerous diplomatic territory. As noted at a conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment, on November 15, several Japanese analysts and policymakers harbor the belief that Russia may be prepared to return at least two of the Kurile Islands. Moreover, they contend that if Japan and Russia are able to come to some kind of agreement on the disputed territories, this could open the way for an overall, if gradual, rapprochement between Russia and the West, which would redound to Japan’s credit (Kyodo News Service, November 15, 16; Japan Times, November 17).

However, Tokyo’s persistent chasing after Moscow probably has not strengthened its cause or reputation. For one thing, it has likely reinforced Russia’s preconceptions that Japan needs Russia more than Russia needs Japan, even though the truth is arguably the exact opposite. But additionally, it has bolstered Russia’s seeming belief that it can bully Japan, insult it with impunity, and still gain its objectives (see EDM, July 31). Illustratively, in mid-September 2015, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told his Japanese counterpart, Fumio Kishida, that normalization was only possible if Japan first recognized the “historical realities” regarding the Kurile Islands (Japan Times, September 22).

Moscow has clearly demonstrated it would not negotiate on the island issue for as long as sanctions on Russia, which were passed by Tokyo and its Western partners in response to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, remain in place. In other words, for Japan to receive any of its islands back, let alone regain sovereignty over them, the price it will probably have to pay would be breaking the West’s united front on sanctions. Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov, who oversees Russia’s Asian policies, said as much several months ago (Interfax, September 2). But that action, if taken, would place a landmine under Japan’s relations with its most important ally—the United States—and the West in general.

Putin has reportedly warned Abe that if he comes to Japan, the Russian leader must have concrete economic results to show for it (Nikkei Asian Review, September 15). And at the Putin-Abe meetings in September 2015, Putin pointedly referred to declining Russo-Japanese trade (Ajw.asahi.com, September 29). However, he also expressed his confidence that both states have a high potential for economic cooperation on a large number of joint projects (Kyodo, September 29). Similarly Sergei Naryshkin, the speaker of the State Duma (lower house of parliament) and a close aide to Putin, has stated that “Japan’s imposition of sanctions on Russia has become an obstacle to bilateral relations” (Kyodo, September 11).

Logically one should have concluded that no realistic prospect for normalizing Russo-Japanese relations exists. The evidence has been wide and varied, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s recent visit to the Kurile Islands; the new Russian plans for a military buildup there (see EDM, October 28); fresh insults directed against Tokyo in the wake of Japanese protests about those actions; the August 2015 Russo-Chinese naval maneuvers, which featured simulated amphibious landings (RT, August 16); as well as President Putin’s prominent presence in Beijing, in September, at the 70th anniversary celebration of the end of World War II, which was marked by a high level of anti-Japanese rhetoric (Xinhua, September 3). Moreover, during August–September 2015, almost every day featured a Japanese or Russian denunciation of the other government’s actions or speeches in regard to the Kurile Islands. Indeed, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs infuriated Tokyo by saying at one point that the Kurile Islands problem does not exist—i.e., that for Russia, there is no problem (Sputnik News, September 4). Neither was this the first time the Russian foreign ministry or other officials have simply denied the existence of the problem. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, a known provocateur, exemplified such inflammatory rhetoric when, in August, he suggested that the Japanese government would be better off committing collective ritual suicide (hari-kiri) rather than continue to complain about Medvedev’s recent visit to the Kurile islands (Kyodo, August 25).

Even if Japan renounces the sanctions it imposed on Russia, it might still not receive the disputed islands back; and if Tokyo does eventually regain the Kuriles, it could well be in the form of a “gift” from Moscow that does not entail the full transfer of sovereignty to Japan. Such an outcome would thus be a poisoned chalice for the East Asian island country. Accordingly, if Japan were to indeed break the sanctions regime on Russia, it is difficult to see how such a step would translate into Tokyo becoming a broker for an East-West rapprochement. Nor would Japan dropping its sanctions be likely to contribute to geopolitically detaching Russia from China. Importantly, Japan would probably not receive anything other than a symbolic acknowledgement of territories whose symbolic value far outweighs their strategic utility for Tokyo. Rather, Tokyo would have isolated itself from its allies and shown Beijing that it can be pushed around simply for the sake of its “status.” 

Put another way, by agreeing to abandon sanctions in exchange for Moscow’s partial or conditional acceptance of Tokyo’s claim to the Kuriles, Japan would inadvertently be signaling to other governments in the region that it does not hold fast to the principle of the territorial inviolability of states. That would be an ominous precedent with regard to its claims to the Senkaku Islands, which are under a Chinese challenge. Ultimately then, the belief that Japan can break its alliance ties in order to gain some symbolic victories or economic opportunities represents not realism but wishful thinking. And in regard to Russia, wishful thinking is never enough.

Russia announces plans to build military base on disputed Kurile Islands

Seventy Years After the End of WWII, the Kuriles Still Roil Russian-Japanese Relations

By: Dr. John C. K. Daly, Jamestown Foundation

First published in the Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 195, October 28, 2015 

On October 22, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia plans to build a military base in the Kurile Islands, annexed by the Soviet Union from Japan at the end of World War II (Zerkalo Nedeli, October 22). Shoigu did not specify what the facility would be. Following Shoigu’s remarks Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said that the government was studying the Russian defense minister’s statements, telling a press conference in Tokyo, “We do not have accurate data, [due to] the form in which the declaration was made, so there will be no further response until after a full examination of this information is made. Our position remains unchanged” (Vzgliad, October 23). Tokyo’s position, since 1945, has been that Russia must return the four southernmost Kurile Islands, a demand that Russia has consistently refused.

The Kurile archipelago straddles the western Pacific Ocean from the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula. The four southernmost of the chain’s 18 islands—Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and the Habomai islets—are called the Southern Kuriles by Russia and the Northern Territories by Japan. The dispute involves the four islands seized by Soviet forces after the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) declared war on Japan, on August 8, 1945.

The declaration came three months to the day after the end of the war in Europe, as Joseph Stalin had promised his Western allies at both the Yalta and subsequent Potsdam conferences that the USSR would enter the Pacific theater against Japan after European military operations ended. The declaration nullified the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, which was to run for five years. By September 1, the Soviet seizure of the Kuriles was complete. Since 1956, Japan has persistently demanded the return of the “Northern Territories,” but both the USSR and, since 1991, the Russian Federation, have refuted Japanese claims.

During the Cold War, the Kuriles assumed increasing strategic importance for the USSR because they block the entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Soviet navy introduced the Yankee-class submarine, armed with 16 SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). At that time, many Western analysts predicted that the USSR would assume a “bastion defense” concept for this and successive ballistic missile submarines. The “bastion defense” concept involves removing ballistic missile submarines from enemy coastlines into Soviet maritime “bastions”—one of which being the Sea of Okhotsk—making it both difficult for enemy maritime forces to penetrate and easier for the Soviet military to defend (Richard L. Haver, “Soviet Navy Perspectives,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1988, p. 236).

Yet, Russia’s interest in retaining the Kuriles is not solely nationalistic and military. On Iturup, near the Kudriavyi volcano, is the world’s richest known deposit of rhenium, a rare earth element used in alloys to create components for missile and supersonic aircraft technology (Interfax, August 10). Moreover, nickel-based rhenium super-alloys are used in combustion chambers, turbine blades and jet engine exhaust nozzles. The Iturup rhenium deposit’s discovery was announced in 1994 (Nature 369, May 5, 1994, pp. 51–52).

Because of this element’s low availability relative to demand, rhenium is among the most expensive of metals; in March in the wake of earthquakes in top producer Chile, prices of refined rhenium pellets, used in heat-resistant alloys by the aircraft industry, were quoted at $4,000–$5,200 per kilogram, up from around $3,600–$5,000 per kg the previous week (Reuters, March 31). In August 2015, Interfax reported that Kurile Island production of rhenium could reach up to 40 tons by the year 2025 (Interfax, August 10).

Other mineralogical deposits in the Kuriles include thousands of tons of titanium and iron ore, along with 1,867 tons of recoverable gold and 9,284 tons of silver. The islands are also surrounded by rich fishing grounds (Pravda, January 26, 2012).

Three months before Shoigu made his announcement of new Kurile Island military facilities, Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev told reporters that the island chain would be included as a territory of priority development (TOR) for Russia, along with two areas in Khabarovsk krai and one in Primorye. Medvedev added that the total funding of the Kurile program was set at $1.1 billion over the next decade, further noting that he planned to visit the Kurile Islands in the future (Vzgliad, July 23). More recently, on October 15, emphasizing Russia’s military interests in the contested archipelago, Russian Eastern Military District spokesman Aleksandr Gordeev announced that advanced Russian Su-35 fighter jets carried out military exercises near the Kurile Islands (TASS, October 15).

The Kurile dispute remains unresolved since World War II and has kept Russia and Japan from signing a formal peace treaty (see EDM, July 31, October 9). Farther afield, Russia’s expansion of its military bases in both the Arctic and Kurile Islands, combined with its intervention in Syria, is causing concern in the West. An official of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), speaking on condition of anonymity, recently told Voice of America, “Russia is increasingly assertive and unpredictable” (Voice of America, October 23). 

Unlike Japan’s diplomatic dispute with South Korea over the Liancourt Rocks or the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, also claimed by China and Taiwan, the Kurile issue is the result of military action, not contested sovereignty claims based on historical maps and documents. As Vladimir Putin’s administration has been increasingly flexing Russia’s military prowess against opponents ranging from NATO to the Islamic State, it would seem that diplomacy remains Japan’s best option, despite a lack of success over seven decades.