Takaichi's Agenda Stumbles

Takaichi Caught Between a Staff Scandal and U.S. Pressure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 12, 2026

Although Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is trying to focus on the economy during the Diet’s fall session, two unexpected issues, one domestic, the other international, have upset her agenda. Irritated about Takaichi’s handling of a scandal concerning the Agriculture minister, opposition parties have slowed the procedures for considering bills. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paralyzed Takaichi’s diplomacy with the U.S. despite her unwavering support for President Donald Trump. The prime minister now faces the hardest time since she took the seat a year ago.

In her October 5 policy speech, Takaichi introduced an old Chinese expression called Keisei-saimin [経世済民], which could be interpreted as “Good governance saves the people.” This saying became the etymology of “economy [経済]” in Japan. The faction led by former premier Noboru Takeshita, Keisei-kai [経世会], was named after this phrase. By using the idiom, Takaichi hoped to show her determination to decrease the consumption tax and tackle price inflation.

It was remarkable for Takaichi to refer to the political principle of the former Takeshita faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because it had been a political enemy of the former Abe faction, or Seiwa-kai [清和会], with which Takaichi herself had once been affiliated. Takaichi has begun to distance herself from Abe in other ways as well.  

In Diet discussions, she has distinguished her economic policy from past reflation policy. Reflation had been a fundamental element of Abenomics. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s demand that Japan stop the reflation has taken precedence. Thus, while keeping with such Abe-oriented diplomatic policies as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Takaichi is departing from other of Abe’s political stances.

Opposition parties are still skeptical about Takaichi’s economic policy. Komeito and the Democratic Party for the People have requested in Diet discussion a greater distribution of public benefits rather than a consumption tax cut to deal with price inflation. Takaichi has insisted that a consumption tax cut is the best policy in terms of sufficiency and swiftness. However, she has not yet answered the question of how she has found or will find fiscal resources for the tax cut. She has said only, “Don’t worry.”

Although Takaichi had expected to discuss economic policies in the Diet, opposition leaders did not allow it by asking why Takaichi had appointed Kazuo Yana as the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in her September cabinet reshuffling. Yana had boasted in May that, earlier in the year, he, as an individual Diet member, had cut the national government’s budget for road construction in two municipalities in his electoral district – in retaliation for their mayors’ support of Yana’s rival in the February Lower House election. Admitting his remarks were inappropriate, Yana retracted the comment, inviting further criticism about eating his words.

While a lawmaker can check the policies of ministries, influencing a specific policy may be incompatible with his obligations as a representative of all the people. Yana’s interference in national budget work to take revenge against the mayors was the opposite of that. Yana’s comment ignited a traditional skepticism of pork barrel shenanigans by LDP politicians through shadowy relationships with the ministries.

In response to a request that she dismiss Yana, Takaichi insisted on keeping him in his position, arguing that the budget had in fact been appropriately distributed to local governments. Although the prime minister usually replaces a cabinet member who becomes embroiled in scandal, Takaichi chose the opposite course. [Yana resigned Wednesday, October 14.]

Not only the opposition parties but also members of the LDP question her decision to retain Yana. LDP Executive Acting Secretary General, Koichi Hagiuda, criticized Yana’s speech as arrogant and intolerable. Opposition parties are united in sponsoring a censure motion in both chambers of the Diet. The opposition parties have a tough road ahead in the Lower House since the LDP has a majority, but they may have a chance to pass the censure motion with a majority in the Upper House. The opposition parties have also decided to refuse to discuss bills related to Yana in the Upper House. With this atmosphere it is uncertain whether Takaichi can get a consumption tax cut through the Diet.

Further pressure on Takaichi has come from the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio who announced sanctions on the ICC. “We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate,” Rubio said in a statement. The sanctions are highly unpopular in Japan ever since the ICC’s Japanese president was targeted with personal sanctions in August.

Takaichi left a short comment on her social media account, expressing a “deep concern” on the sanctions decision of the U.S. Japan also joined the joint statement of foreign ministers of European countries and Canada which regretted and strongly disagreed with U.S. sanctions. Takaichi endorsed the statement but has taken no further action at the leaders’ level so far.

By now, Takaichi is one of the few world leaders who wholeheartedly support Trump. In her meeting with him in October 2025, Takaichi praised Trump as the only leader who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. She even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Through such unstinting loyalty, Takaichi has put herself in a position in which her criticism of any Trump policy would not make sense.

The Diet begins discussion of economic measures at the Committee on the Budget in the Lower House this week. If Yana remains in place, Takaichi will be asked about her responsibility for naming him agriculture minister in which position he can control the budget for farmers or the price of rice. On the diplomatic side, the Trump administration seems to be aligning the U.S. with Russia in the war in Ukraine. Such a commonality of interests might lead to other coordinated actions, such as opposition to the ICC. Whether Takaichi can find a way to break through and preserve Japan’s independence deserves scrutiny.

Takaichi Administration Shuffle

Takaichi Makes Minor Changes to Her Team

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 21, 2026

On September 16 and 17, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reshuffled the board members of her party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and her cabinet. As expected, she did not make major changes, nor did she replace core members. Her focus was to strengthen her political base ahead of her bid for reelection in next fall’s LDP presidential election. However, some opposition to her reelection has emerged, which may cause her concern.

The prime minister, or the president of the leading party, often has good reason to reshuffle his or her staff. When the leader finds that the administration is slowing down, particularly in the wake of a major political scandal, a reshuffling may be a measure to regain public support. When the leading party has lawmakers who expect to be ministers, the prime minister may ease that frustration by reshuffling the cabinet to appoint them to unoccupied positions.

Takaichi had no major reason to change her staff now because she has maintained a relatively high approval rating. But the LDP established a rule in 2022 that board members (except the president) may serve only one-year terms. They may be reappointed twice for a total of three consecutive terms. Changes to the LDP board always linked to reshuffling of cabinet ministers. Takaichi appointed LDP board members in October 2025. That is why she needed to make some changes in her team.

The lineup of the Takaichi administration has three categories: close allies, supporters to rely on and potential rivals. Minister of Finance Satsuki Katayama and Minister on Economic Security Kimi Onoda are Takaichi’s close allies because they were two of the 20 nominators for Takaichi in the 2025 LDP presidential election. Takaichi decided to keep them in the same positions, unaffected by the reshuffle.

LDP vice-president Taro Aso is Takaichi’s most important supporter and guardian. Because Aso’s grip on the LDP is essential, Takaichi reappointed Aso as vice president and named Aso’s brother-in-law, Shun-ichi Suzuki, LDP Secretary General. The Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, Takayuki Kobayashi, also stayed because Aso expects Kobayashi to be a future leader. Kobayashi has been a rival of Takaichi – he ran for the LDP presidency last fall -- but Takaichi supposedly accepted Aso’s recommendation to reappoint Kobayashi to the council chairman’s slot.

Former members of the Abe faction might also be labeled as supporters of Takaichi since they share conservative political principles. Several lawmakers in the former Abe faction were punished when the kickback fund scandal emerged in 2024 and were then purged from positions as ministers or members of the LDP board. Takaichi has now brought them back into the fold.  

Three former Abe faction leaders -- Koichi Hagiuda (deputy SG), Yasutoshi Nishimura (election chief), and Hirokazu Matsuno (organization chief) – retained the positions that Takaichi had given them after she took office. Additionally, she appointed two other lawmakers involved in the scandal, Yoshihiro Seki (education), and Kazuo Yana (agriculture), to the cabinet for the first time after the scandal. Takaichi seems now to have pardoned many leaders of the now-defunct Abe faction.

Two key cabinet members, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimitsu Motegi, and the Minister of Defense, Shinjiro Koizumi, both ran in the LDP presidential election last fall and would be recognized as Takaichi’s rivals. It may sound strange for Takaichi to keep them in her cabinet. But it is not easy for a cabinet minister to run for the party presidency to replace the incumbent prime minister because every minister needs to approve the prime minister’s policies. To take different policy positions, the minister needs to reject signing on cabinet decision, which is likely to cause a dismissal. Thus, Takaichi’s reappointment of Motegi and Kozumi keeps them on the sidelines.

This rationale did not apply across the board. The Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Yoshimasa Hayashi, was another candidate in last fall’s presidential election, and thus a potential rival of Takaichi. Takaichi replaced Hayashi. Her decision indicates that she recognizes him as a serious obstruction to her reelection.

As the minister in charge of local governments, Hayashi was able to visit cities and towns all around Japan for a year to build good relationships. His travels might have laid the local groundwork for local support in the next LDP presidential election. Hayashi had been a leader in Kochikai, an LDP faction that has been dissolved, which represented LDP liberalism in contrast to more hawkish groups in the party.

Excluding Hayashi from her team is part of Takaichi’s reelection strategy: the exclusion will isolate Hayashi in the LDP, which is otherwise united under her leadership. However, this reshuffling revealed one of her weaknesses. That would be Diet affairs.

Takaichi replaced the LDP Chairman on Diet Affairs, Hiroshi Kajiyama, with Hideki Murai because of her differences with Kajiyama over this year’s budget process. During the discussions over the fiscal year 2026 budget bill in the last session of the Diet, Kajiyama’s handling of Diet procedure frustrated Takaichi since she was forced to answer questions from opposition parties. Murai, the new Chairman, has argued that the prime minister need only appear a few times before the Diet.

Takaichi’s preferences were more telling in the Upper House. The LDP Upper House Secretary General, Jun-ichi Ishii, stepped down against his will. Having strong connections with the opposition parties, Ishii managed negotiations with opposition parties in the last session of the Diet. The LDP was unable to collect a majority vote in the Upper House and failed to pass a budget bill by the end of March. Ishii has expressed his concern with Takaichi’s unrealistically short scheduling for passing bills regardless of opposition parties’ protest. Takaichi did not like to be advised by Ishii.

Moreover, Ishii had established a new group in the Upper House LDP in April, which became the anti-Takaichi group in the party. If this movement in the Upper House LDP attracts lawmakers who have distanced themselves from Takaichi, like Hayashi for example, it will be a formidable challenge to Takaichi in next year’s LDP presidential election. The LDP election is next year. This would be a nightmare for Takaichi, who has not built an unshakable political base within the LDP.

Japan’s House of Representatives Dissolved

Now What?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba dissolved the House of Representatives (Lower House) on October 9. All the seats were immediately open for election. The general election campaign begins on October 15, and voting takes place on October 27.
 
With the negative impact of the slush fund scandal, it is predicted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will lose seats. However, the opposition parties have not established an effective framework for cooperation that would outmaneuver the LDP’s leading coalition. The LDP defines its victory in this election as securing a simple majority of 233 seats with its coalition partner, Komeito.
 
Prime Minister Ishiba has long questioned the power of a prime minister to unilaterally dissolve the Lower House. He wrote in his blog in June about importance of learning from the wisdom of predecessors in the House, quoting the words of former Speaker of House of Representatives, Shigeru Hori, that criticized the arbitrary dissolution in 1978.
 
Nevertheless, Ishiba dissolved the House only eight days after he was elected as prime minister. He explained that he thought a new prime minister should be judged by voters as soon as possible. The opposition parties criticized Ishiba for his shortcut, which ignored the custom of pre-election policy discussions in the Diet.
 
The biggest issue in the election is political reform, stemming from the slush fund scandal that led Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, to step down. The LDP decided to exclude members who had received heavy penalties in the scandal from its slate of candidates in the coming general election. Cutting candidates from the slate necessarily will make it harder for the LDP to retain power.
 
Back in April, the LDP found that 85 of its members had failed to report kickback funds from their factions. Of these, 55 planned to run in next general election. Six of the 55 then dropped out. On October 9, the LDP removed 12 of the remaining 49 from the slate. The 12 members had received major penalties in the scandal.
 
The party included in its slate 34 members with minor penalties in the slush fund scandal. The official endorsement of a party is a great advantage in a race for a Lower House seat. A candidate with an official endorsement from his or her party can receive financial support from the party, broadcast his/her opinions through the public TV and radio program, and distribute more flyers than an independent candidate can.
 
The 34 members have, however, lost one benefit: they may not receive “double nominations.” A double nomination means that an LDP member who loses in a single-seat constituency may still run as one of several proportional representatives. LDP members not implicated in the scandal may still receive double nominations. Several members felt that the exclusion from double nominations was too heavy a sanction. To sooth those ruffled feathers, Ishiba excluded himself and other four major positions in LDP board – Secretary General and Chairs of the General Council, Policy Research Council and Election Strategy Committee – from double nominations.
 
The 12 members removed from the LDP slate and the 34 members ineligible for a double nomination are all candidates in single-seat constituencies. Three other members involved in the scandal are candidates for proportional representatives, and they declined to be included in the LDP slate. One of the three is running in a single-seat constituency as an independent candidate, and another will seek election to the House of Councillors next year.
 
Despite Ishiba’s cutting back the slate, there is a trick that may help the LDP. Even after the election, it is not unusual for a party to include victorious candidates as additional members of its slate. Ishiba did not rule out the possibility of adding independent winners to the LDP slate. If the LDP does so, it likely would include some independent winners who originally were excluded from the slate due to the scandal.
 
The opposition parties do not consider the decisions of the LDP to pare down the slate and bar double nominations as meaningful penalties for the members involved in the scandal. “Most of them would be on the slate. It cannot be understood by the people,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) Yoshihiko Noda to Nikkei Shimbun. The head of the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), Nobuyuki Baba, said that the LDP members should testify before the Political Ethics Council in the Diet. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) demanded the resignations of those LDP lawmakers.
 
According to the counting of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), LDP fielded 342 candidates (266 for single-seat constituencies and 76 for proportional representatives excluding the double nomination). Komeito has 50 (11 and 39). LDP did not field any candidate in a district where Komeito has its own.
 
The number of candidates of the opposition parties are as follows; CDP: 237 (207 and 30), Ishin: 164 (163 and 1), JCP: 236 (213 and 23), Democratic Party for the People: 42 (41 and 1), Reiwa Shinsengumi: 35 (19 and 16), Social Democratic Party: 17 (10 and 7), and Sanseito: 95 (85 and 10).
 
Most of the JCP’s candidates will compete with CDP or Ishin candidates. It is likely that the votes against LDP will be divided among some opposition parties, but the parties are not working together to defeat LDP candidates. Although Noda hoped to lead negotiations to establish a cooperative framework among the opposition parties, time has run out with the LDP strategy of an early call of a snap election.
 
LDP held 256 seats in the House of Representatives before the general election was proclaimed, and Komeito held 32. The coalition of these two parties thus controlled 288 seats – 55 seats above the simple majority of 233. If this coalition loses 56 seats or more in the election, they will lose the majority. In this event, the coalition will have to add unaffiliated, independent voters or find additional coalition partners. So far, no opposition party has shown any interest in joining the coalition with the LDP and Komeito.
 
The possibility of LDP and Komeito losing the administration is widely estimated as low because the approval rating for the LDP rose after Ishiba replaced Kishida and because the opposition parties have not formed a united front against the leading coalition. This possibility is not zero, however: LDP candidates who had been involved in the slush fund scandal will face very difficult campaigns, even if they are included in the LDP slate. No one can deny a possibility of political turmoil following the election.
 
Explaining the Election System for the House of Representatives
Dissolution of the House of Representatives is made under the name of the Emperor. Article 7 of the Constitution of Japan states that dissolution is one of the acts in matters of state by the Emperor. However, the Emperor does not have political power, and the acts in matters of state are exercised with the advice and approval of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is led by the Prime Minister. So, the provision has been interpreted as vesting Prime Minister with the power to dissolve the House of Representatives at any time.
 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of the House of Representatives within 40 days from the date of dissolution under Article 54 of the Constitution. The general election in 2024 will be held 18 days after the dissolution.
 
The House of Representatives has 465 seats. 289 seats are from single-seat constituencies in all over Japan. The remaining 176 seats are from eleven blocks with several representatives that are allocated to parties on pro rata based on the number of votes.
 
Each voter has two votes in election; one is for writing a name of a candidate in a single-seat constituency, and the other is for writing the name of a party (and not an individual candidate) for proportional representatives.
 
In each single-seat constituency the system is first-past-the-post: whoever receives the most votes wins the seat. The winning proportional representatives are selected from the slate of each party, according to the number of seats allocated to them. Each party makes a list of candidates in order of priority. If a party wins 10 seats in a block of proportional representatives, the candidates from number 1 to 10 on the list will take the seats.
 
What makes this system complicated is that one candidate can be nominated for both kinds of seats. A candidate with a double nomination can take a seat as a proportional representative, even if he/she loses the single-seat constituency.
 
Moreover, a party can nominate multiple candidates in the same position on the list of proportional representatives. It is usual that, say, ten or twenty candidates who also are candidates in single-seat constituencies are nominated in the number one position. As between the candidates in this position, the candidate with the smallest margin of defeat in the single-seat constituency takes priority. If candidate A lost by 5 percentage points to his or her opponent, and candidate B lost by 10 percent, A is superior to B when seats are allocated to proportional representatives.

Kishida's Survival Gamble

Taro Aso Will his administration survival? By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun You can find his blog, J Update here. January 21, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point The Special Investigation Division of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office has mostly wrapped up its investigation into the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) slush fund scandal. They indicted some Abe faction lawmakers and the accounting managers of the Abe, Nikai, and Kishida factions. To restore public confidence in politics, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced the dissolution of his faction. Although the Abe and Nikai faction also agreed to be dissolved, the remaining three LDP factions--Aso, Motegi and Moriyama—have not. Kishida’s abrupt and unilateral decision threatens to bring about a sharp rift in the LDP. The Asahi Shimbun has reported that the public prosecutors indicted two lawmakers in the Abe faction, Yasutada Ono and Yaichi Tanigawa, on charges of violating the Political Funds Control Act. The two are specifically alleged to have failed to report funds from the faction that were derived from the sales of tickets for fundraising parties. On January 7, prosecutors had already arrested a lawmaker, Yoshitaka Ikeda. Ono was indicted in house and has denied any involvement in illegal activities. Tanigawa received a summary indictment and admitted the charge against him. Both men have left the LDP and Tanigawa has submitted his resignation from the Lower House. The accounting managers of three factions allegedly failed to report the funds relating to their faction’s fundraising parties, including the return of some proceeds of the fundraisers to the lawmakers. Amounts not reported include ¥1.3 billion for the Abe faction, ¥380 million for the Nikai faction and ¥30 million for the Kishida faction. Strangely, leading lawmakers in the Abe faction, including the “Five Guys,” were not indicted. Prosecutors interviewed them about the management of their money, but apparently did not find sufficient evidence of their participation in reporting violations. The leaders explained that the head of the faction, either former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe or former Speaker of House of Representatives, Hiroyuki Hosoda controlled the unreported funds. Coincidentally, both men are deceased. Abe ended the “kickback” practice, but his successors in the LDP reversed the decision after he died in July 2022. The leaders of the Abe faction and the accounting manager said in their interviews with the prosecutors that the accounting manager decides whether the funds would be reported or not. Prosecutors failed to ask who was responsible for the decision to resume kickbacks. Another question: What is the difference between the lawmakers who were arrested or indicted and the ones who were not? Asahi and other news media have reported that the charging threshold was ¥30 million. Ono, Tanigawa and Ikeda are suspected or charged with failing to report ¥40 to ¥50 million of funds, while the Abe faction failed to report less than ¥30 million. It is true that the Abe faction’s unreported amount is lower than in the cases of the Japan Dental Federation in 2004, in which the Heisei Study Group, currently the Motegi faction, received ¥100 million, or of the office of Ichiro Ozawa, which failed to report ¥2.1 billion in 2010. However, the Abe faction has run its kickback system for nearly two decades. Ordinary people will have a hard time understanding the decision not to indict Abe faction leaders. Predictably, the approval rating of Kishida’s Cabinet did not show any upsurge (Asahi: from 23% to 23%, Yomiuri: from 25% to 24%) after the indictments were announced. Kishida had at first underplayed the reporting failures, but he changed his tune after Asahi reported the prosecutors’ plan to indict not only people with the Abe and Nikai factions, but also some with Kishida faction. He abruptly announced the dissolution of his faction to show his commitment to party reform and to limit further damage to his administration’s public standing. Kishida did not consult with other factions before announcing the dissolution of his faction. The announcement came as a surprise, if not a shock, to the LDP. Following Kishida’s announcement, the Abe and Nikai factions, both of which handled greater amounts of slush funds than the Kishida faction, called urgent assemblies and declared the dissolution of their factions. Although Kishida did not demand that other factions also dissolve, his decision effectively destroyed the two other major factions. The other three factions are in a difficult position. They are not alleged to have failed to report political funds, but they are the subject of guilt by association. The factions have stressed the positive aspects of factions as policy study groups. The leader of the Aso faction and the vice-president of LDP, Taro Aso, told Kishida that he would not dissolve his faction. This faction, as well as the Motegi and Miroyama factions will decide how to respond formally to Kishida’s action after the Political Reform Headquarters of LDP issues its interim report later this month. The structure of the Kishida administration, supported by Aso and Motegi factions, may well collapse, if Kishida does not establish an appropriate rule for the activities of factions. Some in the LDP have discussed making any faction a genuine study group, and ending their roles in the distribution of political funds, support of member campaigns, and recommendation of members for cabinet or party leadership positions. The LDP may be divided between pro- and anti-faction groups if Aso and Motegi insist on retaining theirs. Kishida’s approval rating has declined for several months. Party leaders could replace Kishida, ensuring his failure in the next general election. Kishida has, however, gambled his administration’s survival on the public’s understanding of his party’s arcane factions without explaining the purpose their fundraising.

Kishida Continues with Unintended Errors

PM Kishida Fails in Preventing Scandal

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 5, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point 

Only five days after a Parliamentary Vice-Minister resigned after his illicit relationship with a woman became public, a State Minister stepped down due to his involvement in an illegal local election campaign. Although Prime Minister Fumio Kishida admitted his responsibility for the original appointments, he nevertheless failed to appoint the right people. As scandals accumulate, Kishida has responded to each of them in the same way. He is, losing credibility, and the accreting misadventures are slowly damaging his administration.

The State Minister of Justice, Mito Kakizawa, resigned on October 31st, admitting his involvement in an illegal election campaign in April for a mayoral candidate in Tokyo’s Koto Ward, Yayoi Kimura. Kimura appeared in an advertising video on YouTube with the subtitle “Vote for Yayoi Kimura.” The Public Offices Election Law prohibits paid election advertisements on the Internet. Accused of a violation in the local assembly, Kimura stepped down as mayor in late October.

In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, Kakizawa acknowledged that he had advised Kimura to make that ad, because it would be “effective.” But a State Minister of Justice should know well about the illegality of the campaign ad. Kakizawa resigned five days after Kimura stepped down.

Since then, the Yomiuri Shimbun has reported that Kakizawa is suspected of giving money to an assembly member of Koto Ward in exchange for support for Kimura in the campaign in April. The Special Investigation Department of Tokyo Public Prosecutors’ Office has been interviewing assembly members about the alleged bribe. A similar incident involving Katsuyuki Kawai in Hiroshima, led to his arrest in 2020 and imprisonment in 2021.

This is serious stuff for Kishida, who had just replaced his Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Education and Post-Disaster Reconstruction after a reported extramarital affair. “I take my responsibility as the appointer seriously. I'll do my best to regain citizens' trust,” Kishida said in the discussion at the Committee on Budget in the House of Councillors on October 31st.

When Kishida reshuffled the State Ministers and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers in September and was criticized for not appointing any women, he argued that the selections were based on a concept of the “appropriate person to the appropriate position.” When asked whether the appointment of Kakizawa was “appropriate,” Kishida did not answer the question but said that he would do his best to regain credibility.

Since Kishida took office in 2021, his administration has endured several ministerial and staff resignations. In 2022, a “resignation domino” trend began: consecutive resignations of four Ministers: Minister for Economic Revitalization Daishiro Yamagiwa with a suspected relationship with the former Unification Church; Minister of Justice Yasuhiro Hanashi with a gaffe on the death penalty; Minister for Internal Affairs Minoru Terada with a scandal on payments for political activities; and Minister for Reconstruction Kenya Akiba with a money scandal.

Reporters have been asking how this could have happened. Kishida’s response has been the same. “I recognize my responsibility for appointing him. That is why I will take responsibility for promoting a bunch of issues forward,” Kishida said when Yamagiwa resigned.

This pattern is the same in other cases. A scandal happens, Kishida urges the suspected person to explain, the person resigns, and Kishida replaces the person and concedes his own responsibility for the appointment. But he never imposes any penalty on himself, and says only that he will continue to do his best This pattern has generated a steady decline in his approval rating

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe handled scandals in a similar way with the motto “responsible but carry on.” When Minister for Economic Revitalization Akira Amari resigned in 2016, Abe said, “responsibility for the appointment belongs to me, and I deeply apologize to the nation.” Abe, however, did not take any specific measures to prevent scandals, other than to replace the offending minister.

Nevertheless, Abe successfully maintained his administration because he enjoyed a relatively high public approval rating. He also received support from the lawmakers in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), because he was the leader of the biggest faction and brought victory to the LDP in the elections in both Houses. Kishida does not have these advantages. Moreover, Kishida’s repeated Cabinet reshufflings – two within two years – have made matters worse for him. Although he believes that the reshufflings create political momentum, they increase the chances of unwise appointments.

If Kishida is to avoid scandals and resignations, he needs better background information about potential appointees. But his State Ministers and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers are selected solely from lists forwarded by various factions in the LDP. It is doubtful that Kishida had good staff work.

Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi upheld a principle of “One Cabinet, One Minister,” which meant that each minister should remain as long as possible. If a Minister is changed in the short term, he or she will not accumulate enough knowledge on policies. Koizumi introduced the same principle in his Cabinet to keep the grip on the bureaucracy. Kishida has many things to learn from past Prime Ministers.

Nothing New

Kishida Preserves His Administration

By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
September 18, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

You can find his blog, J Update here.

On September 13th, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reshuffled his Cabinet for the second time since coming to power in October 2021. Although personnel changes are ordinarily made to tackle difficult issues, Kishida focused on the balance of power in his administration. He reappointed most key Cabinet ministers and leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida must have thought that he had to preserve the LDP’s positions in the administration in order to garner their support in the presidential election next year.

The main point of the reshuffle was not about the Cabinet, but the LDP Board. The key structure of the board was maintained. Vice-President Taro Aso, Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi and Chairman of Policy Research Council Koichi Hagiuda from the Abe group were retained remained in the same positions. The new Chairman of the General Council Hiroshi Moriyama leads the smallest faction.

According to the news reports, Kishida once wanted to replace Motegi, who did not conceal his ambition to succeed him. But considering that his faction is only the fourth largest in the LDP, Kishida was afraid that the Motegi group could further distance itself from his administration, if Motegi left the board. Kishida finally decided to let Motegi stay in his current position.

To deter Motegi’s plan to run in the next presidential election, Kishida picked Yuko Obuchi, a daughter of late, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, for one of the four pillars on the LDP Board, the Chair of Election Strategy Committee. It gives her a chance to sell herself as another possible candidate for president in the Motegi group. Obuchi has strong support from her father’s close colleagues: Keizo’s successor Yoshiro Mori, who still has a considerable influence in the Abe group, and Mikio Aoki, who had not been a supporter of Motegi in the Motegi group.

The Yomiuri Shimbun and other newspapers reported that Kishida considered bringing Hagiuda into the cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, hoping for a closer relationship with the largest Abe group. Hagiuda has been criticized, however, for his close relationship with Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (formerly the Unification Church, FFWPU). The relationship of FFWPU with a number of LDP lawmakers has caused low popularity of Kishida administration. Kishida and his staff finally gave up on the idea.

These decisions show that the main reason for the reshuffling and renewing LDP board members was to establish a firm basis of the administration to ensure victory in the presidential election next year. Kishida naming five women to ministerial positions, equaling the record of largest number of women in a cabinet, also reflects Kishida’s desire to increase public support for his reelection.

Some points in the reshuffling are hard to understand. Japan is the chair country of Group of Seven meeting later this fall, but Kishida chose to replace Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs with Yoko Kamikawa. Kamikawa is known as the former Minister of Justice who signed death penalty orders for thirteen prisoners of Aum Shinrikyo in 2018. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa are affiliated with the Kishida group.

Since Kamikawa has little experience as a diplomat, Kishida said that he would lead diplomacy himself. Hayashi’s recent denouncement of Russian aggression in Ukraine and his remarks on the reconstruction of Ukraine might have presented a challenge to the prime minister.

If Kishida wants to raise his support, why didn’t he replace the ministers who faced public unpopularity? Minister in Charge of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi accused the Ministry of Internal Affair of fabricating her remarks in documents over impartiality in the Broadcasting Law. But no evidence supported the attack. It is obvious that she will be targeted by the opposition parties in the Diet discussion.

Elsewhere, the Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono, has apologized publicly for several critical mistakes in registering people to the new healthcare system connected to My Number Card. Cabinet reshuffling was a good opportunity for a fresh restart for healthcare reform led by a new Minister for Digital Transformation, but Kishida missed it.

Blunt political considerations may explain why Takaichi and Kono survived the recent reshuffling. Both were contenders against Kishida in the 2021 LDP presidential election. Takaichi is one of the possible leaders in the conservative group, and Kono can be a candidate for the future prime minister in Aso group. Kishida possibly took the influence of the conservative and Aso groups into consideration.

Given the deference accorded two problematic ministers, it is ironic that Kishida replaced the Minister for Children Affairs and the Minister of Defense, both of whom are in charge of issues Kishida focuses on, in order to bring some element of newness to the cabinet.

Two meanings can be seen in picking Yoshitaka Shindo, an ultraconservative lawmaker whose grandfather was the supreme commander of Japan Imperial Army in the Battle of Iwo Jima and the head of a conservative group called 'League of Lawmakers Taking Action for Protecting Japan’s Territory.' One is a message to the conservative group in LDP that Kishida is taking good care of the conservative issues, including promoting constitutional amendment. But if Kishida is so serious about amending the Constitution, Shindo should stay in the LDP and manage the issue in the Diet. Another approach should be to separate Shindo from Motegi. Shindo has been a firm supporter of Motegi in his group. People will see how Motegi’s leadership in his group will be affected by the latest reshuffling.

In spite of all the above elements on the revived administration, Kishida claimed that his goal was not solely to preserve the political life of his administration. His focus was policy. Kishida said in his press conference on the 13th that he would focus on three issues: economy, society, and diplomacy and security.

While Kishida stresses salary increases for workers, inflation increasingly damages the household economy. The Kishida administration will submit a supplementary budget in the middle of next month. But budgetary resources for his key policies such as raising the birth rate or expanding defense capability have yet to be identified.

With her money scandal unexplained, Obuchi may cause further damage to the LDP. No end is in sight for the War in Ukraine or for disputes with China on the discharge of processed radioactive water in Fukushima. It is doubtful that a vulnerable administration that stands on a delicate balance of power in the leading party can handle all the critical issues inside and outside of Japan.

As long as support for the Kishida administration remains low, Kishida may not declare a snap election of House of Representatives. But there still is a speculation that passing the supplemental budget in this fall session of the Diet will trigger a snap election, because victory in the general election will support Kishida’s reelection in the LDP presidential election. All the calculations are made for preserving the life of this administration.

The Japanese prime minister’s end game

Abe’s cabinet changes reflect tension between pragmatism and ideology

AsiaTimes, September 15, 2019

By Daniel Sneider, a Stanford lecturer and APP member, is associate editor of the Washington-based Nelson Report, which first published this article.


The naming of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new cabinet has launched what are supposed to be the final two years of his already historically long administration.

The new cabinet and the opening statement by Abe reflect the schizophrenic nature of his administration, for there are really two Abes.

There is the outer Abe or, perhaps more precisely, the pragmatic Abe, whose focus has been on reviving Japan as a dynamic power with a more assertive claim to leadership in the region and globally. In that version, the priorities are economic growth and effective management of relations with the US and with China and the rest of Asia.

Then there is the inner Abe, the ideological Abe, who still feels the pull of history: unfinished tasks of ending the postwar era, as viewed through the lens of the Japanese revisionist conservatives. That Abe asserts the priority of finally revising, and in effect repudiating, the anti-war provisions of the constitution adopted under the weight of American military occupation. The current focus on the dispute with South Korea over wartime history issues reflects, to some degree, that outlook as well.

Both Abes were on view last week, and the debate was reflected in the array of commentary in the major Japanese media.

The Bolton question
But before getting to that, there is the unintended overlap with the new Abe cabinet of John Bolton’s ouster from the White House. Ironically, the cabinet change coincided also with a shakeup in the Japanese counterpart to Bolton – the replacement of the well-respected former Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi with the intelligence boss of the National Police Agency, Shigeru Kitamura, as well as an elevation of Abe’s close aide, former Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry bureaucrat Takaya Imai.

Bolton’s departure was seen by some in the Japanese media as a bit of a blow to Abe’s ability to manage relations with the mercurial Donald Trump, coming at a sensitive moment when there are attempts to finalize a trade deal and talk of another summit with North Korea. Bolton was widely seen as being “pro-Japanese” and, perhaps more importantly, as a voice within the White House opposing the kind of limited bargain with North Korea that would leave intact the missiles and warheads that directly threaten Japan.

“From Abe’s perspective,” a veteran Japanese journalist told me, “Bolton was the stabilizer of Trump’s volatility and, above all, the thermostat of simmering love between Trump and Kim Jong Un – plus the cold-eyed critic against [South Korean President] Moon Jae-in’s fantasy of the unified peninsula.

“In addition, Bolton was important to Abe in the sense that there was relatively reliable communication channel kept between Yachi and Bolton,” the journalist added. “Now both are gone. Once again the Abe administration is back into an uncharted territory of Trump’s impulse game with allies. Neither [Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo nor [NSC Asia director Matt] Pottinger can be any match to Bolton as a consistent counterpart, even if he was a neocon jerk.”

For some observers, however, this would overstate the importance of Bolton.

“The Abe-Trump relationship stood on its own two feet, so Bolton’s departure likely has little impact on the bilateral relationship overall,” veteran Japan hand Brad Glosserman, deputy director of the Center for Rule Making Strategies at Tokyo’s Tama University, told me. “For all the alignment of views between Bolton and Abe, there is little indication that Bolton moved US policy in ways that benefitted Japan. The president is the decision maker and there is little sign that DJT acted on any particular issue because Bolton pressed his view upon him.”

That view can be found widely within the Prime Minister’s office and the National Security Secretariat – there is some degree of confidence that Abe can successfully manage the challenges ahead, beginning with the trade negotiations, followed by the prospect of another North Korea negotiation and finally upcoming tense talks on defense cost sharing. But behind that confidence lies the belief that Japan mainly has to play for time, to do what they can to keep the wolf of Trump’s neo-isolationism at bay and survive the coming election year.

The new cabinet and constitutional revision
The unveiling last week of the new Abe cabinet reflected the two sides of the Prime Minister.

On the one hand, there was a clear genuflection toward the revisionist right. The prime minister declared at his press conference that constitutional change was his priority and he called on the opposition to yield to demands to open parliamentary debate on this, the necessary step towards a national referendum. “As we stand at the start of the new Reiwa Era,” Abe said, referring to the ascension of the new Emperor, “we are on the cusp of creating a new Japan…and on the horizon is the challenge of constitutional revision.”

The cabinet is filled with Abe loyalists ready to do his bidding, and is peppered with leaders of the revisionist rightwing Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) who are well known advocates of constitutional revision. Among them are new education minister, Koichi Hagiuda; Seiichi Eto, who is a key figure in Nippon Kaigi; Sanae Takaichi, who was reappointed as minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, where she has led the charge to purge the television broadcasting networks; and, not least, former education minister Hakubun Shimomura, who now has a senior post in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) where he has been a leading voice on promoting constitutional revision.

The main media backer of this focus for Abe is, of course, the Fox News-like daily newspaper Sankei Shimbun and its affiliated television network, Fuji Television. “We cannot afford to put off constitutional revision any further,” Sankei editorialized on September 12. “Whether Japan can enjoy peace and prosperity in the future is called into question.”

The problem for Abe and the right is two-fold. First, the changes in interpretation of the constitution made by the Abe administration in 2015 have already made it possible for Japan to carry out any imaginable security role, without the need for a formal amendment.

More importantly, despite the right’s having pounded away on this issue for decades, and particularly during Abe’s rule, the Japanese public does not support changing the anti-war clause of the constitution. People understand very well that, however it may be worded, a change in Article 9 has huge symbolic meaning. While polls showed a bump in popularity from the cabinet reshuffle – a normal event in Japan – they also showed that only 38.8 percent supported Abe’s constitutional obsession, while 47.1 percent were opposed.

The opposition parties, with the exception of the Osaka-based Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), are united in refusing even to open a parliamentary debate on this. Without that, it will be almost impossible for Abe to move ahead. And while the LDP remains dominant, recent elections in which the left and centrist opposition parties managed to stand together may only encourage this stance. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and the Democratic Party for the People joined with the two leftist parties, the Communists and Social Democrats, to easily re-elect the governor of Iwate last Sunday, following a victory in late August in Saitama over a more formidable LDP candidate.

The lack of a political environment to push the rightwing agenda was clearly on the mind of the more mainstream conservative daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, which called on Abe to pay more attention to a possible downturn in the Japanese economy and to reform of the heavily burdened social welfare system. The national sales tax, the consumption tax, will go up 2 percent on October 1, to 10 percent which is considered necessary for securing the social security system. But it may also trigger a recessionary downturn in consumer spending. With the US-China trade war already creating a drag on the Japanese economy, “the re-reshuffled cabinet should first focus on economic policy,” the Yomiuri opined on September 12.

Given the uncertainties of US-Japan relations and the unstable security situation in the region, the conservative daily wrote, it is important for Abe to “create an environment for discussion” of the constitution first.

While Abe made his gestures to the ideological side, he also gave key positions to LDP leaders who have been essential to carrying out his pragmatic foreign policy. The move of economy minister Toshimitsu Motegi over to the foreign ministry, where he will continue to run the trade negotiations with the US, is key, as is the shift of Foreign Minister Taro Kono over to the defense ministry. Motegi, who is seen as one of the more competent and capable figures in the party and who enjoys a close relationship with Abe, will also have the responsibility for trying to ease the tensions with South Korea.

All this suggests that the pragmatic Abe will likely prevail over the ideological one.

“Abe still harbors those conservative ambitions but the mechanics of an amendment remain quite complex, the ruling coalition is split and the public is ambivalent about amendment under Abe,” comments Glosserman. “Amendment requires a benign external environment as well. If the economy takes a dive, if there is a big international crisis, especially in the region, political energies will be redirected. And if there is a regional security crisis, and Japan steps up without constitutional change, it would undercut the perceived urgency of amendment. And then there are the Olympics.”

Know your Abe Administration - Directory for Sale

Shinzo Abe

Do you know who's who in Abe's 4th Cabinet, 2nd reshuffle?

Directory of the Abe Administration

Shinzo ABE  created a new Cabinet on November 1, 2017 after his party's landslide victory in the general election held October 22, 2017. This was the fourth time since he was elected Japan’s prime minister for the second time on December 26, 2012. Abe is the first prime minister to launch a fourth Cabinet since October 1952, when then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida did so.

On October 2, 2018 he reshuffled this Cabinet for the second time. Since then there have been a few resignations and changes.

On Sunday, July 21, 2019, Japan held its Upper House elections. Abe had hoped that his LDP/Komeito coalition would gain two-thirds of the Upper House seats so that he could proceed with his professed plan of revising Japan's postwar Constitution. Although, he still holds a majority of the seats, he did not achieve his goal.

To examine how Abe may again reshuffle or reconstitute his Cabinet--as expected in September 2019--we present you with a directory and analysis of the 80-plus members of his Administration or greater Cabinet. It is designed to be a reference by both ministry and last name.

There is biographical information, legacy highlights, professional history, electoral district data, party and faction affiliations for each official identified. The descriptions also contain links to online primary sources, where available, including Cabinet members’ personal homepages and blogs, their official Diet pages, and their official social media accounts. We also note the incomes of the top ten wealthiest Cabinet members.

This report also identifies each member’s known affiliations with eight prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups. Japan’s parliamentary leagues are non-government-managed, semi-permanent groups of Diet members sharing an interest or holding a particular ideological stance.

The 107-page report includes 10 pages of charts, tables, and graphs to help you visualize the extent and depth of the ideology of Abe’s Cabinet.

This 107-page report is free to Asia Policy Point members and congressional staffers. EMAIL US HERE.

👉For all others we ask ONLY for a $25 DONATION: CLICK HERE TO ORDER YOUR COPY.

New Cabinet State Ministers and Affiliations

Vice Ministers

On October 2, 2018, Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe reshuffled his Cabinet. Of the 25 State Ministers in his Fifth Cabinet, six (24%) were reappointed from the previous Cabinet and 19 (76%) are new. Tsukasa AKIMOTO previously a State Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, was re-appointed as the State Minister of the Environment. 

Most the State Ministers are conservative nationalists. The usual metric is memberships or affiliations with various Diet Leagues, especially the Diet Members’ League for the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership [Shinto League] (also can be translated as Shinto Political Alliance Diet Member’s Roundtable; 神道政治連盟国会議員懇談会-Shintou seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai) and the Diet Members’ Gathering (League) for the Japan Conference, [Nippon Kaigi] (also can be translated as Diet Representative ‘Japan Conference’ Roundtable;日本会議国会議員懇談会- Nippon kaigi kokkai giin kondankai). 

Both organizations advocate revising the constitution to return Shinto as the state religion and the Emperor to political power. They oppose the current Constitution support of individual rights, women's rights, and freedom of speech. They advocate a moral education and respect for Japan's past, while rejecting any Japanese involvement in war crimes.

Nineteen (76%) State Ministers are members of the Shinto League, while sixteen (64%) are affiliated with Nippon Kaigi. 

Four State Ministers are members of neither League. Emiko TAKAGAI, State Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare is the only LDP member affiliated with neither.

The other three are from the Komeito Party: Masayoshi HAMADA, State Minister for Reconstruction; Tomoko UKISHIMA, State Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology; Yoshinori OGUCHI, State Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare. Komeito Party is associated with the Buddhist religious group, Sokka Gakkai. The party has been a coalition partner with the LDP since 1999. There is one member of the U.S. Congress who is a Sokka Gakkai member. 

October 18th was the Autumn Festival at Yasukuni Shrine. Although all the Cabinet Ministers refrained from visiting, we determined from public postings that eight State Ministers (32%) visited. Yasukuni is a Shinto Shrine (a form of animism) located in central Tokyo established in 1869 to anchor the new, modernizing Japanese state to a religion and an ideology. It “militarized” the religion. This Shrine is associated with the discredited “state Shinto” created to justify the Emperor-centric, military state. Many war criminals are enshrined there. Thus, visiting the Shrine is a controversial for politicians and bureaucrats. 

Although Abe appointed only two female State Ministers in his previous Cabinet, this time he increased the number to five female State Ministers (20%): Yukari SATO, State Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Toshiko ABE, State Minister for Foreign Affairs; Emiko TAKAGAI, State Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Yoshihiko ISOZAKI, State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.

★ New cabinet member
❇︎ Position as State Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in Abe’s 4th Cabinet

Position	First Name	Last Name	Shinto League	Nippon Kaigi	Yasukuni Visit (10/18)
State Minister for Reconstruction	Keiichiro	TACHIBANA★	✔
State Minister for Reconstruction	Masayoshi	HAMADA
State Minister of Cabinet Office	Akira	SATO★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Cabinet Office	Ryosei	TANAKA	✔	✔
State Minister of Cabinet Office	Kazuyuki	NAKANE	✔		✔
State Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications	Junji	SUZUKI★		✔
State Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; State Minister of Cabinet Office	Yukari	SATO★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Justice	Hiroshi	HIRAGUCHI★	✔	✔
State Minister for Foreign Affairs	Toshiko	ABE★	✔
State Minister for Foreign Affairs	Masahisa	SATO		✔
State Minister of Finance	Kenichiro	UENO	✔	✔
State Minister of Finance	Keisuke	SUZUKI★	✔
State Minister of education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology	Keiko	NAGAOKA★	✔	✔
State Minister of education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology; State Minister of Cabinet Office	Tomoko	UKISHIMA★
State Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare	Yoshinori	OGUCHI★
State Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare	Emiko	TAKAGAI★
State Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Yasuhiro	OZATO★	✔	✔
State Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	Shuichi	TAKATORI★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry	Yoshihiro	SEKI★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; State Minister of Cabinet Office	Yoshihiko	ISOZAKI★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism	Takashi	OTSUKA★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; State Minister of Cabinet Office; State Minister for Reconstruction	Ichiro	TSUKADA★	✔	✔	✔
State Minister of the Environment	Minoru	KIUCHI★	✔	✔
State Minister of the Environment; State Minister of Cabinet Office	Tsukasa	AKIMOTO❇︎	✔	✔
State Minister of Defense; State Minister of Cabinet Office	Kenji	HARADA★	✔

The Ministers of Abe's Fifth Cabinet

On October 2, 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reshuffled his Cabinet. Of the 19 Cabinet Ministers in his Fifth Cabinet, eight (42.1%) were re-appointed from the previous Cabinet and eleven (57.8%) are new. 

This Cabinet is measurably more conservative than his previous ones. The usual metric is memberships or affiliations with various Diet Leagues, especially the Diet Members’ League for the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership [Shinto League] (also can be translated as Shinto Political Alliance Diet Member’s Roundtable; 神道政治連盟国会議員懇談会-Shintou seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai) and the Diet Members’ Gathering (League) for the Japan Conference, [Nippon Kaigi] (also can be translated as Diet Representative ‘Japan Conference’ Roundtable;日本会議国会議員懇談会- Nippon kaigi kokkai giin kondankai). 

Both organizations advocate revising the constitution to return Shinto as the state religion and the Emperor to political power. They oppose the current Constitution support of individual rights, women's rights, and freedom of speech. They advocate a moral education and respect for Japan's past, while rejecting any Japanese involvement in war crimes.

Only one Minister is a member of neither League: Keiichi ISHII, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. He is from the Komeito Party that is associated with the Buddhist religious group, Sokka Gakkai. The party has been a coalition partner with the LDP since 1999. There is one member of the U.S. Congress who is a Sokka Gakkai member.

Taro KONO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Masatoshi ISHIDA, Minister for International Affair and Communications; Yoshiaki HARADA, Minister of the Environment; and Takuya HIRAI, Minister for Information Technology Policy, although members of the Shinto League, are not members of the Nippon Kaigi.

There is only one female minister: Satsuki KATAYAMA, Minister of State for Regional Revitalization. In Abe's previous Cabinet (4th) there were four female ministers and in his 3rd, two.

★ New cabinet member
❇︎ Past affiliation with Shinto League, but not in recent years

Position	First Name	Last Name	Shinto League	Nippon Kaigi
Prime Minister	Shinzo	ABE	✔	✔
Minister of Finance	Taro	ASO	✔	✔
Minister for Internal Affair and Communications	Masatoshi	ISHIDA ★	✔
Minister of Justice	Takashi	YAMASHITA★	✔	✔
Minister for Foreign Affairs	Taro	KONO	✔
Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology	Masahiko	SHIBAYAMA ★	✔	✔
Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare	Takumi	NEMOTO	✔ ❇︎	✔
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries	Takamori	YOSHIKAWA ★	✔	✔
Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry	Hiroshige	SEKO	✔	✔
Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism	Keiichi	ISHII
Minister of the Environment	Yoshiaki	HARADA ★	✔
Minister of Defense	Takeshi	IWAYA ★	✔	✔
Chief Cabinet Secretary	Yoshihide	SUGA	✔	✔
Minister for Reconstruction	Hiromichi	WATANABE ★	✔	✔
Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission	Junzo	YAMAMOTO ★	✔	✔
Minister for Promoting Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens	Mitsuhiro	MIYAKOSHI ★	✔	✔
Minister in charge of Information Technology Policy	Takuya	HIRAI ★	✔
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy	Toshimitsu	MOTEGI	✔	✔
Minister of State for Regional Revitalization	Satsuki	KATAYAMA ★	✔	✔
Minister in charge of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic	Yoshitaka	KATAYAMA ★	✔	✔

Know your Abe Cabinet

Do you know who's who in Abe's 4th Cabinet?

Shinzo ABE  reshuffled his Cabinet on November 1, 2017. This was the fourth time since he was elected Japan’s prime minster for the second time in December 2012. Abe is the first prime minister to launch a fourth Cabinet since October 1952, when then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida did so.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) landslide victory in the general election held October 22, 2017 gave Abe the confidence and stability to present a new cabinet barely three months after his last redo. The average support rate of the 4th Cabinet has been 43 percent and non-support 41 percent. The LDP’s support rate during this period averaged 40 percent.

September 7th was the start of the official campaign for president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 63, is expected to win more rank-and-file party member votes than his opponent former LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba in the September 20^th election. 

To examine how Abe may organize his next government and again reshuffle his Cabinet, we present you with a directory and analysis of the members of his Administration or greater cabinet. It is designed to be a reference by both ministry and last name.

There is biographical information, professional history, electoral district data, party and faction affiliations for each official identified. The descriptions also contain links to online primary sources, where available, including cabinet members’ personal homepages and blogs, their official Diet pages, and their official social media accounts.

This report also identifies each member’s known affiliations with eight prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups. Japan’s parliamentary leagues are non-government-managed, semi-permanent groups of Diet members sharing an interest or holding a particular ideological stance.

The current 4^th Cabinet after some minor changes this year due to scandal is his most conservative. There are nine pages of charts, tables, and graphs to help you visualize the extent and depth of the ideology of Abe’s cabinet members.

This 90-page report is free to Asia Policy Point members and congressional staffers. 

All others we ask for $20 from non-members. CLICK HERE TO ORDER YOUR COPY.

What's China's View On Abe’s Latest Cabinet Reshuffle?

Compared to the past, China has been relatively restrained in its criticism of Abe.

By Pengqiao Lu, was a research assistant at Asia Policy Point, he holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University. His research focuses on security and economic governance in East Asia and Cross-strait relations. He has worked at multiple think tanks in Washington, DC. You can follow him on Twitter: @plu91

The Diplomat, August 17, 2017

On August 3, Japanese Prime Minister Abe reshuffled his cabinet. The shake-up came at a time when the prime minister was embroiled in scandals, his political protégé was under great pressure due to gaffes and missteps, and the ruling LDP was crushed in the Tokyo metropolitan assembly election. Chinese media and scholars riveted by the shake-up have attempted to make assessments and speculation about its impact. Overall, while recognizing some positive signs, most Chinese commentators are pessimistic about the prospect of the Cabinet and a comprehensive Sino-Japan détente if Abe does not overhaul his domestic and foreign policy.

A Not-so-fresh Cabinet Signals the End of Abe Dominance
One view is that this reshuffle is a wholesale shake-up. A CRI online article tracked previous reshuffles: September 3, 2014, six out of 18 ministers were retained by Abe; October 7, 2015, 9 out of 19; and August 3, 2016, 8 out of 19; notably this time, only 5 were retained. The article hence described this Cabinet shake-up as the “largest political reshuffle since Abe took office.”Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Stability is another major feature stressed by Chinese commentaries. As China Central Television put it, “for a regime with plunging approvals, another failed Cabinet revamp could be fatal to it; therefore, the key word for the new Cabinet is stability.”

According to Chinese observers, Abe tries to reach that goal in three ways. First, purging cabinet members that — using a Xinhua article’s words — “fail to handle troubles effectively and leave a negative impression on the public.” Xinhua referred to then-Minister of Education Matsuno Hirokazu, then-Minister of State for the Promotion of Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy in Japan Yamamoto Kozo, and then-Minister of Justice Kaneda Katsutoshi. Second, opting for political veterans over fresh faces in appointing ministers. Safe hands noticed by Chinese observers include the new Defense Minister Onodera Itsunori, new Justice Minister Kamikawa Yoko, new Education Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa, and Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Motegi Toshimitsu. Finally, retaining the core Cabinet members. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Aso Taro and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide as Abe’s “right-hand man” stay on.

Gao Hong, deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, commented that “Abe purged some of his ‘dumb friends,’ and picked some moderate and balanced new cabinet members, which will to some extent mollify Japanese public’s discontent.”

Moreover, Chinese analysts noted Abe’s emphasis on the factional balance in this Cabinet reshuffle. Li Ruoyu, a researcher with the Institute of Japanese Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, wrote that “compared to previous Abe Cabinets, the new cabinet features less Abe’s personal preferences and more balancing among LDP’s factions. Diet members, such as Kono Taro and Noda Seiko, that have been keeping some distance from Abe, or even are potential challengers to Abe within the party, all assume ministerial posts in the Cabinet.”

Meanwhile, according to Meng Xiaoxu, an Associate Professor at the China University of International Relations, “for the 19 cabinet members, the number of ministers from the Kishida faction increased to 4, matching the largest faction in the LDP, the Hosoda faction. And Kishida Fumio himself was appointed the critical post of the Chairman of LDP Policy Research Council, a move to balance relations between factions. Appointing dissident Noda Seido also represents Abe’s compromise. Moreover, avoiding filling key posts with Abe’s confidants could also quell intra-party dissatisfaction, reduce internal threats, and stabilize the political situation.”

Since his return to premiership in December 2012, Abe has maintained seemingly invincible political dominance. On the grounds that this Cabinet reshuffle is so cautiously managed and “not-so-Abe”, Chinese analysts assert that such dominance has come to an end, or at least has been crippled. Lian Degui, Professor at the Shanghai International Studies University, observed that “Abe’s status has been shaken. Voters’ discontent is mainly targeted at Abe. Even a Cabinet reshuffle could not reverse the trend of Abe’s shrinking influence.”

Will the Reshuffle be Abe’s Lifesaver?
Barring major policies adjustments, most Chinese analysts are considerably pessimistic about the long-term effects of the cabinet revamp in terms of rescuing the Prime Minister’s political outlook. From their perspective, the current predicament stems from himself: his arrogant ruling style, and more importantly, his rightist policies.

Wang Shaopu, director of the Japan Study Center with the Shanghai Jiaotong University, wrote that “the reshuffle might have short-term effects but cannot ensure stability in the long run. The troubles of the Abe Cabinet were caused by Cabinet members such as Inada Tomomi, but were rooted in Abe… The root is Abe’s insistence on the national policies that are against the trend of the world. Currently there is few sign that Abe will fundamentally adjust those national policies. In this case, it is hard to imagine that Abe cabinet will get out of the mess because of the changes of several cabinet members.” Consequently, he predicted that “in the foreseeable future, Japan will operate under a government with low supporting rates and political infighting will hence intensify.”

Chinese observers used more space to speculate the effects of this reshuffle on the Sino-Japan relations.

The appointment of Kono Taro, the son of the famous China-friendly politician Kono Yohei, as the foreign minister, the increasing influence of dovish Kishida faction within the Cabinet and the LDP leadership, and the retention of other China hands (namely, Vice-President of the LDP Komura Masahiko and LDP Secretary General Nikai Toshihiro) all caught Chinese analysts’ eyes. Some observers gave Abe credit for those arrangements and therefore expressed some optimism about the prospect of improving Sino-Japanese ties.

Gao Hong, for example, commented that “Overall, this Cabinet reshuffle and LDP’s personnel changes do not overtly provoke China. Nikai Toshihiro stays as the General Secretary and Kono Taro is appointed as the New Foreign Minister. Both leave some space for the stabilization and improvement of bilateral relations.”

Lu Zhongwei, the former president of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), also commented on the combination of a hawkish Itsunori Onodera and a dovish Kono “might suggest that Japan’s China diplomacy will make slight adjustments.”

Zhang Jingwei, Senior Researcher at the Charhar Institute, believed that “the appointment of a China hand Kono Taro as the Foreign Minister will have some positive effects on cracking the history disputes among China, Japan, and South Korea.”

Lian Degui was even more optimistic, claiming that the strong presence of doves in the leadership will push the new Cabinet’s Asia policy “moving toward moderation” and “is bound to be of some help for improving Sino-Japan ties.”

However, Chinese analysts also cautioned against expectations of an overhaul in Abe’s China policy and a comprehensive Sino-Japan détente for three reasons.

First, the doves’ influence in the Cabinet will be constrained as Abe is the ultimate decision-maker. Li Ruoyu, for example, wrote that “whether Abe’s appointment of Kono Taro as the Foreign Minister signals an all-around transition in Japan’s foreign policy? Not necessarily. Even if we assume Kono Taro completely follows his father’s foreign policy, it is certain that an independent foreign policy under the Foreign Minister is impossible… Kono could only take limited initiatives under the premise of implementing Abe’s foreign policy approach.”

Lu Yaodong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences viewed Abe’s appointment of Kono more as a move to stabilize LDP factions and earn their support, and to make preparations for submitting the Diet a draft new Constitution.

A Global Times editorial mocked: “Abe is a born hawk; even if he stuck several doves’ feathers in his wings, his eyes, his mouth and his voice couldn’t hide his hawkish gene.”

Second, Abe shows no sign of fundamentally shifting his Asia policy. Arguing that “the nation’s rightward trend has not changed,” Lu Zhongwei thought that “Abe see that as the historical mission of the LDP and the political standard for picking officials to make sure the new Cabinet continue to push Japan moving forward along this path.” Meanwhile, he also believed that “[Abe’s] thinking of leaning on the U.S. and confronting China has not changed.” In a word, “this move seems new, yet old in essence, entailing not many adjustments to the ever-existing political mindset and governance style over the past five years,” he wrote.

Finally, the structural contradictions have decided the limits of Sino-Japan détente. Zhang Jingwei predicted that “even if Abe steps down, no matter who succeeds, Sino-Japan relations still face structural conundrums. The geopolitical situation in the Northeastern Asia shifts as the power pendulum sways. Deep down, the historical impasse and contemporary contradictions are not caused by Abe himself, but rather a reality of many interweaving factors.” Similarly, a CRI online article warned that “the structural contradictions will not disappear with Cabinet reshuffle or administration change.”

An Opportunity for Sino-Japan Ties?
The examination of Chinese views toward Abe’s latest Cabinet reshuffle indicates that in contrast to their harsh rhetoric in the past, Chinese sources are relatively restrained in their criticism against Abe. Judging from their commentaries, this is because of a strong dovish presence in the Cabinet and LDP leadership that could potentially check Abe’s rightward impulses. And many Chinese analysts interpret such presence itself as Abe’s signal to show his willingness to improve Sino-Japan ties.

Unfortunately, their analyses also reveal their ingrained mistrust of Abe. They seriously doubt he would make any fundamental shift in his China policy. Meanwhile, when compared to 2006, when Koizumi’s step-down ignited optimist feelings that Sino-Japan ties would quickly rebound, many Chinese observers now seem to believe that the structural contradictions are so deep that even if Abe cabinet could not last, a comprehensive Sino-Japan détente would still be unrealistic. On these grounds, they contend that the warming of ties would be tactical and limited.

Nonetheless, as long as steps toward détente are steady, a little bit sluggishness does not matter. One critical reason for the chilliness in these years’ Sino-Japan exchanges is that there are fractures in the foundation of the relationship. If those fractures could be carefully healed, a Sino-Japan springtime will come, sooner or later.