Takaichi Diet Lesson

Takaichi Realizes the Power of the Upper House

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 29, 2026
 
A power play over Japan’s FY2026 budget bill resulted in a defeat for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi by the opposition parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced on March 30 that it has given up its attempt to pass the budget bill before the end of March. The Cabinet was forced to submit to the Diet an interim budget bill to authorize spending for the beginning of FY2026. Despite this setback, Takaichi continues to be highly popular in recent polls.
 
Looking back at the past few months, Takaichi exercised her constitutional power and dissolved the Lower House on January 23. The House held a general election on February 8. Her decision was fundamentally surprising because the timing of the snap election put at risk passage of the annual budget bill, which must occur before the beginning of the next fiscal year on April 1. Takaichi nevertheless initiated the snap election to reinforce her political support before her approval rating fell.
 
The LDP’s sweeping victory in the election went beyond her expectation. Takaichi and her staff in Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) came to believe that they were invincible, able to make impossible possible. Takaichi called on the Diet to pass the budget bill before the fiscal year began. The LDP in the Lower House obliged; it passed the budget bill with only 59 hours of discussion, ignoring the established but unspoken agreement between the parties to discuss a budget bill for at least 80 hours.
 
This hard push by the leading party stirred anger in the opposition parties in the Upper House which still outnumber the LDP. The opposition held captive a few bills relating to the FY2026 budget. Two of them were the high school tuition bill and the free school lunch bill which were to take effect in April. These bills also needed to pass the Diet by the end of March.
 
The Committee on Education, Culture and Science in the Upper House was to discuss the bills. The chair of this committee is a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the biggest opposition party. The chairman delayed discussion of the bills at the request of the opposition parties who first wanted to thoroughly examine the qualifications of the Minister of Education, Yohei Matsumoto [松本 洋平], who had a history of extramarital affairs. The opposition parties threatened the LDP that they would scrap the two bills if the parties did not have enough time to discuss the budget bill in the Upper House.
 
The leading parties and opposition parties struck a deal in late March. The leading parties would give up on meeting the March 31 deadline for the FY2026 budget bill, allowing time in the Upper House for discussion for the bill in early April. In the meantime, there would be an interim budget bill for 11 days, by which time the Diet is expected to pass the budget. The opposition parties agreed to pass the related bills, including the high school tuition and school lunch bills by the end of March. Although media reports did not go into detail, the LDP leaders told Takaichi about the deal on March 23. But Takaishi still insisted on passage of the budget bill by the end of March.
 
Takaichi must have known of the LDP’s weakness in the Upper House and of the deal between the parties to pass the bills. In fact, the FY2026 budget bill includes an economic stimulus package. Any delay in the budget bill will frustrate voters who expected assistance in this time of price inflation. Takaichi and her staff mistakenly thought that the opposition parties, afraid of public annoyance, would not be so persistent in opposing the budget bill.
 
She and her staff miscalculated the anger of the opposition parties in the Upper House. An extraordinarily abbreviated discussion on the budget bill brought to the fore a fundamental concern about the existence of the chamber, which has been dubbed “a carbon copy of the Lower House.” Regardless of their positions as either leading or in opposition, the parties in the Upper House felt challenged about their raison d’etre.
 
As a matter of fact, the Upper House sometimes has played a crucial role in the history of the Japanese government. The Ryutaro Hashimoto administration fell to a minority government in the Upper House after a defeat in the 1998 election. On the advice of his mentor, former premier Noboru Takeshita, Hashimoto stepped down as prime minister even though he maintained a majority in the Lower House.
 
In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believed that the LDP’s majority in the Lower House could overcome its minority position in the Upper House. The result was terrible. A cabinet reshuffling caught some ministers in scandals related to the mismanagement of political funds. When the Upper House blocked an anti-terrorism bill, Abe’s chronic disease returned, he could not attend a plenary sitting in the Diet, and he decided to resign.
 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan left office in 2011 because a bill to authorize government bonds to fund reconstruction after the East Japan Great Earthquake earlier that year could not pass the Upper House. He asked the LDP, which had a majority in the house, to pass the bill in return for his resignation. These episodes illustrate that the Upper House has the power to destroy an administration.
 
Despite her mismanagement of the budget bill, Takaichi remains highly popular in two polls. Nikkei Shimbun reported a 72 percent approval rating of Takaichi’s Cabinet. She also maintained a high rating in the Mainichi Shimbun poll with 58 percent approval. Although there is skepticism about her attitude to the Diet, a substantial share of respondents preferred her performance in her summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Her style of relying on popular opinion is still working and may continue for some time.

The Decoupling of the Abe Faction

JAPAN POINT ⚫️ 日本ポイント

research on contemporary Japan
Vol. VII, No. 3, December 18, 2023

by Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow
retired chief editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun


On Thursday, December 14, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida replaced four Cabinet Ministers affiliated with the faction founded by Shinzo Abe (Seiwa-kai) in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This faction is suspected of having distributed secret slush funds to its members. On the same day, two LDP board members also submitted their resignations to Kishida, reportedly in frustration with Kishida singling out the Abe faction in connection with the growing political funds scandal.

A deep rift is appearing within the ruling LDP. At his Thursday press conference, Kishida did not explain how he, as LDP president, would take responsibility for the expanding scandal. “I will deal with this issue, becoming a fireball, at the frontline of the LDP for restoring the people’s credibility,” Kishida just said. Even after removing the Abe faction Cabinet ministers, the Kishida administration is in jeopardy.

The Prime Minister also emphasized that he will promote party reform while watching closely the Tokyo Prosecutor’s investigation. The direction of the reforms will be based on who is ultimately arrested or indicted. Kishida suggested that there may be a discussion on amending the Political Funds Control Act or reconsidering the roles of factions in LDP politics. He concluded that he cannot afford to think about a snap election or a Cabinet reshuffle until after the budget bill for FY 2024 passes the Diet in March.

Kishida replaced Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno with the recently former Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshimasa Hayashi, who serves as the titular head of the Kishida faction. Matsuno reportedly received over ¥10 million of secret money from the sales of fundraising party tickets. The Asahi Shimbun reported that Kishida first offered the post to former Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada, but he declined.

Ken Saito, a former Minister of Justice, succeeded Yasutoshi Nishimura, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. Kishida also replaced the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communication, Junji Suzuki, with former Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto as well the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Ichiro Miyashita, with former Minister of State for Regional Revitalization Tetsushi Sakamoto. Matsuno, Nishimura, Suzuki and Miyashita are reportedly all implicated in the slush funds scandal.

[Backgrounds of the new Cabinet Members will be the subject of the next Japan Point]

The Chairman of the LDP’s Policy Research Council, Koichi Hagiuda, and the Chairman of the LDP Diet Affairs, Tsuyoshi Takagi, handed in their resignations on Thursday. Although Kishida had not said unequivocally that they would be replaced, these two leaders of the Abe faction nevertheless walked out. Some in the Abe faction interpreted their departures as a protest against Kishida’s focus only on the Abe faction’s wrongdoing. The Kishida and Nikai factions are also said to have distributed secret flush funds to their faction members.

One of the members of the Abe faction, State Minister of Defense Hiroyuki Miyazawa revealed on Wednesday that he had been instructed by the faction not to record money received in the political funds report and to not say anything about it. The Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo Public Prosecutor's Office will conduct further interviews with Abe faction members.

In the press conference at the closing of Diet session on Thursday, Kishida said that he regretted the doubts that had arisen about the LDP’s use of political funds. He promised reforms to restore the party’s credibility, but did not identify any specific measures. “I will make it clear based on the facts which will be confirmed later,” is all that Kishida said about the reforms. This could mean that if the criminal investigation is focused solely on the Abe faction, Kishida would have a basis for removing the Abe faction from the LDP.

This was a very unusual comment by the top LDP leader. LDP leaders have in past said that “When a scandal is revealed, the politician is responsible for explaining it for him/herself.” This time, no one in the Abe faction said anything about the scandal and has said only that the investigation is ongoing. Nevertheless, Kishida has ousted only members of the Abe faction, as if only the Abe faction violated the law. LDP members no doubtless will regard Kishida’s comments as hostile to the Abe faction.

Excluding the Abe faction does not mean that all the problems in the Kishida administration have been solved. Other factions including Kishida’s own are responsible for LDP secret money scandals as well. If someone in the LDP is eventually arrested, Kishida, as the party’s president, will not be able to escape responsibility.

It is likely that ethics in politics will be one of the hottest topics in the Diet session beginning January of next year. The Constitutional Democratic Party has established an investigation team to look into fundraising parties in preparation for debates over amendments to the Political Funds Control Act. The CDP has argued that the LDP should hand its administration over to the opposition.

What the other parties are most afraid of is an abrupt counterattack by Kishida: dissolution of the House of Representatives and a new general election. However, the Kishida administration now lacks the political power to do so. The latest Jiji poll showed that the approval rating for the Kishida Cabinet has dropped as low as 17.1 percent.“ Kishida can never have a snap election,” said the President of Komeito, Natuso Yamaguchi, in a radio interview, “because he has no cause to do it without any effort to restore public credibility on the politics.”

Other poll results on the Cabinet’s approval rating are: 16% (-5) of approval rate for the Kishida Cabinet and 17% (-7) for the LDP in Mainichi Shimbun; 22.3% (-6.0) and 26.0%(-8.1) in the Kyodo News; 23% (-2) and 23% (-4) in the Asahi Shimbun; 25%(+1) and 28% (±0) in the Yomiuri Shimbun; 26% (-4) and 30% (-4) in the Nikkei Shimbun. In the Yomiuri poll, the most popular pick for next the prime minister was Shigeru Ishiba (20%) followed by Shinjiro Koizumi (17%), and Taro Kono (12%).



Kishida may hope for a snap election before the LDP presidential election next fall.The last chance for him to dissolve the House would be sometime between the passage of the FY 2024 budget bill in March and the end of the ordinary session of the Diet in the middle of June, if the session is not extended. Although the best timing for him would be just after his state visit to United States , which is expected in April, there is no guarantee that his approval rating will improve by then or after.


OBSERVATION FROM WASHINGTON
A Scare for Japan Managers

by APP Washington

Prime Minister Kishida has done a bit of house cleaning, even though it was forced by the Tokyo Prosecutor’s Office. The result is likely to lessen the influence of the conservative nationalists in Japan’s government. The ministers and party officials removed were among Japan’s most conservative, history denier politicians. These are also the men with whom Washington’s Japan managers had or were cultivating closer ties.

It was Prime Minister Abe and his supporters who had the government commit millions of on-and off-budget funds to public relations. The primary focus of these efforts has been to scrub clean Japan’s wartime history and re-fantasize Japanese culture, all to advance a military alliance. The Abe government coordinated with private Japanese foundations to expand support of Washington think tanks, congressional programs, and Japanese-American cultural organizations. They also encouraged the efforts by Japanese nationalist organizations such Happy Science, Worldmate (Handa), and the Unification Church to build relationships with American rightwing groups such as the American Conservative Union’s CPAC as a way to access Trump and MAGA politicians.

The demise of the conservative nationalist Abe faction and the sidelining of its supporters suggest that the era of easy funding for Washington institutions involved with Japan-focused research and cultural activities is coming to an end. The removal of the conservative nationalists from the Japanese administration may also signal a shift away from defense budget increases and increasing alignment with the U.S. on security policies. The “Alliance” may become less a subject of support and study. This all presupposes that the coming changes are as ideological as they are political.

Japan's Ambiguous Prime Minister

Kishida In The Danger Zone

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 26, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

Despite new policies to help families, the approval rating of the Fumio Kishida Cabinet has plunged into a dangerous level below 30%. The polls show people’s frustration with Kishida’s ambiguous attitude toward repairing the economy. With his low popularity, Kishida is not likely to call a snap election to re-boot his administration. Some lawmakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are beginning to consider replacements of the prime minister, who is also their party president. However, Kishida enjoys the luck of having no obvious successor.

The polls taken in the third weekend of November marked record low approval ratings for the Kishida Cabinet. Among three major newspapers: 25% approved Kishida Cabinet in Asahi Shimbun’s poll and 65% disapproved; Yomiuri Shimbun’s poll showed 24% approval and 62% disapproval; and Mainichi Shimbun’s found 21% approval and 74% disapproval. These approval ratings were the lowest not only since Kishida took office in October 2021, but since the LDP retook the administration from Democratic Party of Japan in 2012.

The main reason for the abrupt decline is Kishida’s economic policies. His administration announced a new economic stimulus plan earlier this month, including tax cuts for all taxpayers and their families and an allowance for low-income families. In the three polls above, less than 30% were positive about the tax cut and more than 60% were opposed.

Taxpayers are supposed to welcome any tax cut, which will return money to their wallets. But in this case the Japanese do not, because Kishida earlier had announced a tax increase for the defense budget. Recognizing widespread skepticism about the proposed tax cut, Kishida decided not to start the tax increase until FY 2024. But the tax increase eventually will take effect, and expectations for the tax cut have not risen.

Doubts about the future of the tax cut seemed to be confirmed when Minister of Finance Shun-ichi Suzuki revealed that the government’s budget surplus, which was supposed to cover the tax cut, has been spent already. A tax cut thus would require an additional issuance of government bonds. Given this situation, the issue becomes what is the purpose of the tax cut. The answer is for Kishida to win elections, not only the next general election of House of Representatives but also his own reelection as LDP president next fall (and thus remain prime minister).

Kishida’s other policies suffer from similar ambiguities and contradicitions. At the beginning of this year, Kishida proposed “different-dimensioned” measures to reverse the country’s declining birthrate. His cabinet approved a Children’s Future Strategic Plan in June. But in the fall, his focus shifted to ending deflation with the refrain “It’s the economy, economy and economy,” and he promoted policies for wage hikes and investment.

In the Diet discussion on the supplementary defense budget, the head of Constitutional Democratic Party, Kenta Izumi, argued that the delivery of economic measures were too late to help the people. Commodity price hikes have been damaging the people’s ordinary life. In response, the Kishida administration reluctantly began to consider the “trigger clause.” which would provide tax relief when gasoline prices rise steeply.

Kishida must be disappointed with the result of the polls, which were conducted soon after a series of mid-November diplomatic events in San Francisco. In the meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden, Kishida reconfirmed the close cooperation with Biden on the situation in Israel and Palestine and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Kishida also agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping on holding a High-level Economic Dialogue for cooperation on green-economy and medical-care issues. But those efforts did not move the public opinion dial.

It can be said that any potential gains in popularity as the result of diplomacy were offset by successive scandals in the Kishida administration. Just before Kishida flew to San Francisco, State Minister of Finance Kenji Kanda stepped down under suspicion of late tax payments by his businesses. Given Kanda’s role as tax collector, the delay was nothing but an insult to taxpayers.

Kanda was the fourth minister in a month to resign after a scandal. Each time, Kishida offered a rote response: admitting his responsibility as the appointor of ministers and expressing his determination to continue his job. The consecutive scandals, dubbed as “resignation domino,” revealed Kishida’s weakness in adequately vetting the personnel working for him.

Looking at the administration’s slump, at least one LDP member is considering entry in the post-Kishida race. Minister in charge of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi launched the “Power of Japan” Study Group with some fellow conservatives. Although Takaichi expects support from the Abe faction, the faction has already expressed its support for Kishida’s reelection. One of the five leaders of the Abe faction, Hiroshige Seko, has criticized her action as “questionable” for a Minister in the Kishida Cabinet.

Among the names raised in the polls, former Minister of Environment Shinjiro Koizumi and Minister for Digital Transformation Taro Kono are popular as post-Kishida figures. They share an interest in the introduction of a rideshare system in Japan to address the shortage of taxi drivers. Former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has joined their efforts. Although all three lawmakers represent districts in the Kanagawa Prefecture, they have not been able to turn ride sharing into a campaign issue.

There is speculation in the LDP that the current situation of Kishida administration resembles that of Taro Aso administration in late 2000s. After facing a major economic crisis with Lehman Shock, Aso’s approval rating fell as low as 25% in December 2008, and it kept on declining below 20%. Although the remaining term of the lawmakers in House of Representatives was less than a year, Aso did not dare call a snap election with such a low rating. Aso soon lost the general election in August 2009 and handed the government over to the DPJ.

It is notable that Aso maintained his administration for nine months after his approval rating had fallen to 25%. The polls showed that Aso was less popular than the opposition leader at the time, Ichiro Ozawa. Nevertheless, the lack of a prominent alternative leader in the LDP saved Aso from being replaced as LDP president and thus as prime minister.

Kishida has no prominent opposition leader challenging him. Takaichi has no hope of receiving meaningful support from the Abe faction. Supporters of Koizumi and Kono have not organized their campaign teams. Former Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba is popular in the polls, but he is a lone wolf in the LDP.

The major LDP factions still support Kishida, and thus his political standing continues. Moreover, the current money scandals among these factions may make them passive in a presidential race. Kishida maintains his unpopular administration through a strange balance of power in Japanese politics.

An unhappy state

A Controversial State Funeral

By Takuya Nishimura, Chief Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun 

October 1, 2022

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun

Sharp antagonisms marked the state requiem for Japan’s late right-leaning former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Not attending were Japan’s Emperor and Empress, the main opposition leaders, or any of the G-7’s top leaders. Across Japan, protesters against spending tax money for the ceremony chanted “No state funeral. In his condolence speech, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida praised Abe, quoting a sentence in English, “Courage is doing what is right.” The national ceremony did resolve these feelings and  unexpectedly revealed deep divisions within the nation.

In 1947, the State Funeral Order that determined the Rites for an Imperial Funeral was abolished. Thus, today, there is no legal basis for holding a state funeral. The only exception was the one in 1967 for Japan’s former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida. It too prompted a public discussion on the pros and cons of holding a state funeral. The result was a consensus urging the government to promote further debate for future state funerals. The rest of the funerals of former prime ministers, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Eisaku Sato or Supreme Order Yasuhiro Nakasone, were held as public ones, although the government paid for them.

Kishida raised four reasons to have the state funeral for Abe: (1) the longest period as a premier; (2) distinguished achievements in restoration from Great East Japan Earthquake, revitalization of Japanese economy, or strategic diplomacy based on Japan-US relationship; (3) broad condolences from overseas; and (4) showing firm opposition against undemocratic violence during the national election. But there are contradictions with each.

In terms of the length of the term, however, Eisaku Sato held office the longest at the time among post-war prime ministers. The restoration policy of the great earthquake originated from the previous Democratic administration. The current growth of the Japanese economy has not surpassed that in the 1960s, 70s or 80s. The most Americanized prime minister may be Nakasone, who called the Japanese archipelago an "unsinkable carrier." And frankly, the volume of foreign condolences or violence in an election campaign should not determine who is worthy a state funeral.

Kishida insisted that his decision was legally correct, quoting Cabinet Office Establishment Law. Article 4 of the law determines the businesses of the office and Section 3-33 of the article refers to “official works related to the rituals of the nation or the Cabinet.” That is it. There is no evidence that “the rituals” include legally baseless state funerals. The law is nothing more than determining the jobs of the Cabinet Office and has no power to decide what the national rituals are. It may not be Kishida, but his cabinet staff who distortedly interpreted the law.

A state funeral of a national leader should appeal to uniting the nation or legitimacy of power transition. However, Abe’s state funeral did not display unity, but fostered division. The leaders of the main opposition parties refused to join the event. They were frustrated with the process of having the funeral without consulting with the Diet. 

Retributive sentiment of the assassin, Tetsuya Yamagami, revealed Abe’s close relationship with the Unification Church, which has been known for its coercive activities of “spiritual sales.” News reports found that Abe distributed the voters of the Unification Church to some candidates of the Liberal Democratic Party in past national elections. Most protesters on the streets realized that Abe would not fit for a state funeral, because of his inappropriate relationship with such an antisocial organization.

Kishida could not anticipate the state funeral of Queen Elizabeth II of Britain before Abe’s. A number of the heads of state gathered in London to show their deepest condolences. The guests included US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, and even the Emperor of Japan, all of whom did not attend Abe’s state funeral. Although the British people formed miles-long queues for mourning the deceased national mother, the Japanese people only made long lines offering flowers as well as demonstrations against the state funeral. The contrast between the UK and Japan may have hurt the sentiment of nationalists in Japan.

Probably worried about his declining support rate, Kishida ignored law and tradition to use Abe’s funeral to publicize his diplomatic strengths. He explained that the funeral would be a good opportunity to meet with world leaders. Kishida reconfirmed Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific by meeting with US Vice President Kamala Harris and accepting condolences from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. However, no actual foreign policy advances were realized among these short greetings of condolence diplomacy. For addressing the world order threatened by Russian aggression in Ukraine or the unilateral advances of China in the Pacific region, annual General Debates of the United Nations General Assembly the preceding week in New York may have been a more meaningful opportunity.

ABE RUNNING AWAY

Abe without makeup

Japan’s Longest-Serving PM, Shinzo Abe, Quits in Bid to ‘Escape’ Potential Prosecution

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his second time at bat lasted longer than anyone before him but he leaves office unable to stomach the job with the public unable to stomach him.

BY Jake Adelstein, Daily Beast, Aug. 28, 2020.

Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, decided to resign Friday ostensibly because of his health, but also because he fears the unpleasant and unhealthy conditions of a Japanese prison.

At a press conference, he cited his painful stomach condition ulcerative colitis as the reason for stepping down, but he leaves at a time when his ratings are plummeting and he is under at least one criminal investigation, with the public clamoring for the reopening of other cas

Abe is not resigning; he is escaping. 

He is under investigation by the Japanese prosecutors for violations of election laws, similar to those his former handpicked justice minister is now being tried for in the lower courts of Tokyo. Testimony in that case may implicate Abe in the political scandal as well.

Abe’s efforts to shield himself from investigation by Japan’s authorities have fallen apart.

A high-ranking member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), of which Abe also serves as president, told The Daily Beast on conditions of anonymity, “If Abe had been able to stack the prosecutor’s office with his choice—he’d still be clinging to power. His choice for the next head of the National Police Agency, Itaru Nakamura, was sidelined this month and Abe fears being arrested by either the prosecutors or the police. Resignation now allows him to escape a lot of scrutiny.” Nakamura was the high-ranking police chief that ended the rape investigation of Abe’s unofficial biographer.

A source in the Ministry of Justice told The Daily Beast, “It’s a done deal. Abe resigns taking ‘social punishment’ and several criminal investigations into his conduct are going to be closed.” Former special prosecutor Nobuo Gohara says, “It doesn’t seem like a coincidence that he resigns the same week a criminal trial has started in which Abe’s involvement will become a central issue.”

The Tweet of Defeat
This year, Abe’s approval ratings sank as low as 27 percent in opinion polls. You’ll see many things cited in the Japanese press in the coming days about what caused Abe’s grip on power and popular support to fail. There have certainly been many gaffes this year. He ignored the growing threat of the novel coronavirus due to his obsessive desire to hold the Olympic Games, which meant that Tokyo had to appear safe. His plan to distribute two face masks to every household, when masks were in short supply, was an expensive disaster. The masks were too small, dirty, and they were slow to be delivered. They were ridiculed as “Abe No Mask,” which sounds much like “Abenomics” when said in Japanese. Abenomics was the PM’s much-touted fiscal policy that involved the imaginary “arrows” of monetary easing and financial reforms, but the overhaul never came and the policy was a total failure.

Abe claimed that Japan’s “if you don’t test, you don’t know” coronavirus policy had worked fantastically, until it failed and the infection rates began shooting up again. This was accelerated by his obstinate push for the implementation of a weirdly named promotional campaign,“Go to Travel,” which ended up translating for many people to “Go to Quarantine” as the pandemic resurged.

What has derailed his popularity isn’t his poor handling of the coronavirus pandemic, but an ill-timed attempt to consolidate his power in the midst of it. #SayonaraAbe (in Japanese) was trending on Twitter months ago.

The end of the Abe era began with a single tweet that started his downward spiral in May. There is some irony in a prime minister who invested so much energy controlling Japan’s mainstream media being taken down by social media.

On the evening of May 9,  there was a tweet by a 35-year-old female office worker that sparked an inferno of public dissent. The resulting tweetstorm was fueled by Japan’s usually apolitical celebrities and former prosecutors. Even LDP members expressed dissent.

The content of the tweet seems rather prosaic. “I protest the proposed changes in the Public Prosecutor Office Laws.” There were 8 million tweets with the hashtag “I protest the proposed revision of the Public Prosecutors Office Law,” by May 14. 

Here’s the backstory. 

Abe has slowly exerted his control over government agencies, public broadcaster NHK, and even the media. In 2014, he created a Cabinet Personnel Bureau that gave the cabinet control over the appointment of hundreds of top-level bureaucrats. Ambitious government workers paid attention, and have since worked hard not to offend him and gain favor. He has incentivized them to cover up scandals without being directly asked. He has wined and dined the press to curry favor, and bullied them relentlessly when displeased. Japan’s press-freedom ranking was No. 22 when he took office; it now ranks 66th. 

At the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Abe and the ruling LDP lobbied for changes in the constitution that would give the cabinet absolute authority in an emergency. The attempt failed but even conservative magazine PRESIDENT called it in an opportunistic and despicable grab for power. When he tried to put the public prosecutor’s office under his thumb this summer, he was going too far.

Fatally Wounded 

The move against the prosecutors began on Jan. 31, when the Abe cabinet decided to delay the retirement of Japan’s second most powerful prosecutor, Hiromu Kurokawa. Kurokawa was reportedly very close to Abe and cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga. The press referred to him as “the guardian deity of the Abe cabinet.”  

The majority of prosecutors are required by law to retire at 63; Kurokawa was allowed to stay on. Abe claimed this was not a problem because his cabinet had “reinterpreted the law” to make it possible. The opposition, legal scholars, and the public vehemently disagreed.

The administration stood its ground but later proposed an amendment to the Public Prosecutor Laws. This was seen as a retroactive attempt to justify keeping Kurokawa in office, and clearing the way for replacing the top prosecutor in Japan. 

Former Prosecutor-General Kunihiro Matsuo and other ex-prosecutors wrote a protest letter to the Ministry of Justice stating explicitly that they believed the revisions were an attempt by the Abe administration to have prosecutors act in accordance with their will. The letter quoted John Locke: “Wherever law ends, tyranny begins.” 

Abe defended the bill in parliament, “There will be no instances of [prosecutorial] personnel affairs being determined arbitrarily,” he said. Only 16 percent of the public believed him.

Typically, Abe would ramrod the bill into law anyway, as he has done with other unpopular legislation. 

By May 18, his approval ratings had plummeted to 34 percent. The same day, the LDP agreed to temporarily table the legislation. 

That evening, more than 600 lawyers submitted legal briefs to the Tokyo prosecutors office accusing Abe of misusing public funds to hold cherry blossom viewing parties for his constituents, a scandal that became known as “Cherryblossom-gate.” 

Bad luck followed Abe’s bad decisions. The weekly magazine Bunshun reported that Kurokawa had routinely played mahjong with reporters, gambling on the games in clear contravention of Japanese law. Kurokawa was given an admonishment and allowed to resign. 

After nearly a decade in power, Abe has become haughty, declaring in parliament last year “I am the nation.” He has been winning for a long time, but no one’s luck lasts forever. The legislative attempt to subvert the prosecutors may have been, to paraphrase the title of an epic war film, a bill too far. It was later abandoned entirely. 

Already on Trial? 

The current investigation of “Cherryblossom-gate” is not the only problem facing Abe. 

He is being dragged into the high-profile trial of a close friend and supporter. This June, Katsuyuki Kawai, 57, a House of Representative member and his wife, Anri Kawai, 46, a member of the House of Councilors, were indicted on suspicion of handing out millions of yen in cash to politicians and supporters in Hiroshima Prefecture. This was allegedly in return for their efforts to secure votes in the Upper House elections held in July 2019. Abe appointed Katsuyuki minister of justice in September 2019; Katsuyuki resigned on Oct. 31. 

Their trial began this week.

The LDP headquarters provided nearly $1.5 million (150 million yen) or more in campaign funds to Anri Kawai, and some of that money may have been used in bribing local politicians to help round up votes. If Abe himself, as president of the LDP, approved the whopping funding for Anri, he will move into the spotlight.

Former Special Prosecutor Nobuo Gohara told The Daily Beast, “It seems clear from the opening statements by the prosecutors in the case of Kawai, that they will show Prime Minister Abe’s involvement in this case. For a former minister of justice, hand-picked by Abe to be involved in bribing other politicians—outrageous. Even if Abe can avoid criminal responsibility, he has a moral responsibility in the matter.”

Gohara sees Abe’s inability to stomach his position as part of the stress of not knowing when or if he will be implicated in the current trial. 

There is a third fire burning under Abe’s feet, one known as the Moritomo-gakuen case. In 2017, it became clear that government land valued at nearly $8 million had been sold to a right-wing school operator for $1 million, reportedly at the urging of the prime minister and his wife, Akie. The school was going to be named Abe Elementary. When the scandal came to light, bureaucrats in the ministry of finance altered and destroyed documents to cover up Abe’s involvement. One government official, Toshio Akagi, refused to play along and killed himself in protest in March 2018. He left behind incriminating documents that his widow revealed this year. Over 70 percent of the Japanese public now wants a reopening of the investigation into the Morikake case. 

He didn’t learn

Abe virtually vanished for a month this summer, avoiding all press conferences and parliamentary discussions. He can now avoid discussing the scandals surrounding him very easily. He has seemingly timed his publicized visits to the hospital this week in a way to make sure that questions about his involvement in corruption cases were not asked. By visiting Keio Hospital on Aug. 24, the day before the Kawai trial, attention was shifted from his role in the case, to whether or not he was going to be able to continue as prime minister. 

Abe’s great escape is not as dramatic as the flight of former Nissan Chairman Carlos Ghosn, but it’s a valiant effort. 

Abe was Japan’s longest reigning prime minister in its constitutional history, but never has so little been accomplished in such a long period of time. If he leaves any legacy at all, it is a number of bills passed into law that were so unpopular they now lie like landmines and may blow up Japan’s brittle democracy someday. Those laws include: a draconian conspiracy law that seems right out of the sci-fi film Minority Report; a repressive and Orwellian state secrets law that will muffle the press and whistleblowers; and the Peace Preservation Act, which allows ostensibly pacifist Japan to wage war.

This was his second term in office after a disastrous stint from 2006 to 2007. He was able to resurface due to the support of the right-wing Shinto cult Nippon Kaigi, which will continue to yield great power in parliament long after Abe. 

They say those who don’t remember history are doomed to repeat it. Perhaps the root of Abe’s folly is that he is a well-known historical revisionist, the grandson of a war criminal, who has never been able to admit to the atrocities committed by Japan in World War II; many of his political appointees and allies admired Hitler. He’s been so busy trying to deny the past that it seems Abe can’t even learn from his own history. His life is a re-run.

He leaves office much the same way he did when he stepped down in 2007: unable to handle the job while mired in scandals involving his cronies; unpopular, considered incompetent, and irrelevant. 

He will not be missed. 

Monday in Washington, April 8, 2019

SSANSE PROJECT: SYMPOSIUM ON RUSSIA AND CHINA'S POLITICAL INTERFERENCE ACTIVITIES IN NATO SMALL STATES. 4/8, 9:00am-Noon. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Neringa Bladaitė, University of Vilnius; Anne-Marie Brady, Wilson Center, University of Canterbury; Donald J. Jensen, Center for European Policy Analysis; Ryan Knight, GTU; Martin Hála, Charles University; Margarita Šešelgytė, University of Vilnius; Khamza Sharifzoda, GTU; Mark Stokes, 2049 Project; Alan Tidwell, GTU; Baldur Thorhallson, University of Iceland; Moderator: Abe Denmark, Asia Program, Wilson Center.

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS VERSUS SLOW VIOLENCE: THINKING ABOUT THE IMPACTS OF THE XE PIAN XE NAMNOY HYDROPOWER DAM IN SOUTHERN LAOS. 4/8, Noon-1:30pm, Lunch. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Ian G. Baird, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Brian Eyler, Director, South East Asia Program, Stimson Center.

THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA. 4/8, 12:15-1:15pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics. Speaker: Ethan Burger, Washington-based International Legal Consultant and Educator, and Adjunct Professor, Institute of World Politics.

AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION. 4/8, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs; Lily Wojtowicz, Research Associate, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs; Denis Volkov, Head of Applied Research, Levada Center; Stepan Goncharov, Senior Research Fellow, Levada Center; Jeffrey Mankoff, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS.

click to order

CHINA'S INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP. 4/8, 4:00-5:15pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Bi-khim Hsiao, Legislator, Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan); Michael Mazza, Visiting Fellow, Foreign & Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute; Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council.

COLD WAR DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. 4/8, 4:00-5:30pm. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author Jennifer Miller, Assistant Professor of History, Dartmouth College; Moderator: Christian F. Ostermann, Director, History and Public Policy Program; Cold War International History Project; North Korea Documentation Project; Nucleaclr Proliferation International History Project, Wilson Center.

Monday in Washington, April 9, 2018

RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER 20 YEARS. 4/9, 9:30-11:00am. Sponsor: Wilson Center (WWC). Speakers: Marina Agaltsova, Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Attorney at Law, Human Rights Center; Maria Issaeva, Threefold Legal Advisers, Moscow; Member, Executive board, European Society of International Law; author Lauri Mälksoo, Fellow, Professor of International Law, University of Tartu, Estonia.  https://amzn.to/2GJeu1s

THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE: CONFESSIONS OF A NUCLEAR WAR PLANNER. 4/9, 11:30-2:30pm. Sponsors: Partnerships for International Strategies in Asia (PISA), Leadership, Ethics, and Practice Initiative, Elliott School, GWU; Nuclear Security Working Group. Author: Daniel Ellsberg.

EXPLORES CHINA’S LEADERSHIP GOALS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS. 4/9, Noon. Sponsor: Public Diplomacy Alumni Association. Speakers: Christopher Walker, Vice President for Studies and Analysis, National Endowment for Democracy; Robert Daly, Director, Kissinger Institute, Wilson Center. Fee.

ITALY’S THREAT TO THE EURO. 4/9, 2:30-4:30pm. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Alberto Alesina, Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University; Michele Boldrin, Hoyt Distinguished Professor in Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis; Erik Jones, Director, European and Eurasian Studies, Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University; Desmond Lachman, Resident Fellow, AEI. Moderator: Stan Veuger, Resident Scholar, AEI.

DON'T COPY THAT FLOPPY! CHINESE THEFT OF U.S. MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES. 4/9, 3:30-4:30pm. Sponsor: Organization of Asian Studies, Elliott School, GWU. Speakers include: Terry Dunlap, CEO, ReFirm Labs; Bill Gertz, National Security Columnist, Washington Times, Senior Editor, Washington Free Beacon; Dr. Stephen Bryen, Founder, Defense Technology Security Administration.

WHAT'S NEXT IN THE MIDDLE EAST? PUBLIC OPINION AND THE CRISIS OF LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND THE UNITED STATES. 4/9, 5:00-7:00pm, Dinner. Sponsors: Elliott School, GWU; OneVoice Movement. Speakers: Dahlia Scheindlin, Policy Fellow, MITVIM Institute; Obada Shtayeh, Regional Director, OneVoice Movement; Nathan Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Director, Institute for Middle East Studies, Elliott School, GWU. Moderator: Ned Lazarus, Visiting Professor of International Affairs, Elliott School, GWU.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF WORK. 4/9, 5:30-7:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Institute for International Economic Policy, Elliott School, GWU. Speaker: Martin Fleming, Chief Economist, Vice President, Business Performance Services, IBM.

Monday in Washington, October 2, 2017

CHINA’S ECONOMY AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS.10/2, 9:30-10:30am. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Michael Pettis, a nonresident senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program based in Beijing; Douglas H. Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie.

PUBLIC OPINION ON "AMERICA FIRST". 10/2, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsors: Chicago Council on Global Affairs; Wilson Center. Speakers: Ambassador Ivo Daalder, President, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, former US Permanent Representative to NATO; Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center; Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs; The Honorable Mike Gallagher, United States Representative from Wisconsin's 8th District; Moderator: Karen DeYoung, Associate Editor, Washington Post.

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN TURBULENT TIMES: MITIGATING ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES. 10/2, 10:30am-Noon. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). Speakers: Kevin Rudd, President, ASPI; Shivshankar Menon, Distinguished Fellow, ASPI; Pham Quang Vinh, Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United States.

RESISTING WAR: HOW COMMUNITIES PROTECT THEMSELVES. 10/2, 3:30-4:30pm. Sponsor: Applied Conflict Transformation Center, U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). Speakers: Oliver Kaplan, Senior Fellow, USIP, Assistant Professor, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver; Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Senior Associate for the Andes, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA); Moderator: Carla Koppell, Vice President, Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP.

DEBATING COUNTER-FACTUALS: WAS THE RISE OF ISIS INEVITABLE? 10/2, 6:00-7:30pm. Sponsor: IISS-Americas. Speakers: Hal Brands, Professor, Global Affairs, SAIS, John Hopkins; Peter Feaver, Professor, Political Science and Public Policy; Duke University; Dana Allin, Senior Fellow, US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Affairs, IISS.

Japan's Unwanted Election

Japan’s Unwanted Election first appeared in Asia Policy Point's Asia Policy Calendar sent to members on December 8, 20014. By Dr. William Brooks, APP Senior Fellow and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins, SAIS.

Prime Minister Abe’s decision to dissolve the Lower House and hold a snap election in mid-December was personal. It was a calculated move to shore up his weakening political base within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). If he can provide his party with a substantial win, he can guarantee his remaining Japan’s prime minister for a full six years. Abe believes he needs that much time to complete his reform agenda, which includes revising the Constitution.

The call for elections stunned members in Abe’s own party. The opposition parties were caught off guard and have had to scramble to cobble together slates of unified candidates. The ruling LDP, initially reluctant and fearing a major loss of seats, has been reassured by polls that suggest their landslide victory.

Although Japan is officially now in a recession, the election will not be a referendum on Abe’s economic policies. Nor will it be a judgment on controversial issues such as collective self-defense or nuclear energy. Both have been carefully avoided as campaign issues.

Instead, the election will be about stability. Voters appear just afraid enough of inexperienced government management to keep the LDP. They are just indifferent enough to who is in charge to continue to vote for the LDP and its coalition partner the Komeito. The result will be for the LDP to keep a comfortable majority in Lower House.

Waste of Time and Money
"Why?" was immediate reaction to Abe’s surprise call for an election. The public saw little or no justification for a snap election. Abe, himself, was not sure. He changed rationales frequently.

At first. Abe cited the need for a referendum on his decision to delay for a year and a half a consumption tax hike to 10%. Yet, there was no opposition to this. Later, he said it was about “Abenomics.” With the economy entering a recession, this did not make sense. Big business leaders have been critical, calling the election a “waste of time and money” (Keidanren). One business magazine complained, “No matter how you look at it, there is no justification.”

In November, the Japanese economy slipped officially into recession. Growth rates had been negative for three quarters since October-December 2013. The January-March quarter saw consumers rush to buy expensive goods before a consumption tax hiked from 5% to 8%. Slow income growth in Japan is a key factor, with prices rising faster than wages.

Consumers continue to avoid buying big-ticket items, like autos, computers, and electrical appliances. The weak yen (now around 120 to the dollar) has helped some exporters, but has made imports more expensive, including food and daily necessities. It has hurt small companies which rely on imported materials. Big companies, benefiting from a rising stock market, are flush with cash, but not investing at home.

Power struggle masked as an election
Abe was reportedly surprised by the GDP showing minus growth. The Finance Ministry had assured him before he first raised the consumption tax that growth would resume in the fall. Startled, Abe responded by postponing the second planned tax hike.

Some powerful figures in his party opposed and challenged his move. With Abe’s popularity plummeting, linked initially to scandals in which two cabinet ministers resigned, talk has begun about his replacement. To reassert control, Abe felts that dissolving the Lower House for a snap election would reestablish his dominance. Thus, the election is a power struggle masked by a “referendum” on the success of his economic policies.

Local chapters of the LDP are unhappy with the surprise election. Local assembly members have to face unified local elections next spring and expect to have their hands full preparing for those races. A snap election requires enormous energy from the LDP’s local support bases, often run by elderly staffers. They fear that they will be too weary to prepare for the spring elections. Reports suggest that many are not overly cooperative with the national election. If this is true, the vote-gathering machine of the LDP in the regions may not be operating at full speed for the December election.

Referendum on Failed Policies
If the election is a referendum on a “failed” economic policy, what is the electorate to do? They cannot vote for the LDP because of satisfaction with the state of the economy – most polls show up to an 80% dissatisfaction rate.  They cannot easily vote for the opposition parties, particularly the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) that they had thrown out of office in 2012 because of its policy failures. The DPJ is offering nothing new in its 2014 campaign manifesto. 

The opposition is good at caustic criticisms of Abe policies, accusing him of holding a snap election to mask his failure to grow the economy. Yet, with little to offer as solutions there is no incentive for voters even to cast protest votes against the LDP. Despite their critical views on Abe’s policies, most people are not upset enough to step out of the mainstream. In fact, many of the undecided voters – up to 50% in some polls – frustrated or indifferent -- just may decide to stay home on Dec. 14. If it is still snowing heavily in the mountainous regions, as it does in early December, many definitely will stay home.

The latest polls show the electorate’s dilemma well. The Kyodo poll for November is typical of most opinion surveys. It found that the Abe Cabinet’s disapproval rate (47.3%) now outpaces the approval rate (43.6%). Despite such public dissatisfaction, 28% of the respondents said they would vote for the LDP in the proportional representation segment, while only 10.3% indicated they would vote for the largest opposition party, the DPJ. But 41.2% were still undecided.

Significantly, 84.2% of the public said that they do not feel that the economy has improved under Abe, and 35.1% saw the economy as the important campaign issue. If such is the public’s view, it would seem safe to conclude that LDP will not do well in the election, but such may not be the case, even if there is a large turnout, including the undecided voters.

Other media surveys, such as the Asahi Shimbun, predict that the election outcome will give the LDP and its coalition partner 300 seats or more. The Mainichi in the latest survey gives the coalition even more seats, which could give it a two-thirds majority in the Lower House. Only one survey, a district-by-district tally by one weekly magazine predicted that the LDP could lose over 60 seats (it now has 295) and thus its majority by sinking below the 238 line. The LDP has ruled 266 seats for the coalition as the targeted goal.

Why the discrepancy? The weekly expects the opposition parties to do much better than expected, thanks largely to cooperation to run unified candidates. Running candidates against each other only split the vote for the opposition, giving the win to the LDP candidate. The weekly also expects the number of LDP votes will drop, as well. This combination could result in many wins for the opposition candidates in districts where the LDP won in the previous two elections.

More of the same thing?
It is an open question whether the opposition picks up seats or the LDP again wins big. There are a high proportion of unaffiliated and undecided voters. The Prime Minister has taken care to remove as much controversy from the campaign as possible to focus on the mere issue of stability. Collective self-defense (CSD), membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and even restarting of nuclear power plants are strangely absent from the campaign literature and speech-making.

Tough decisions by Abe on TPP and legislation on CSD will not come until next year. Moreover, the voters see Japan’s relations with the U.S. as relatively good, sour ties with China slowly improving, and Abe’s efforts on the North Korea abduction cases a noble effort. As for poor relations with South Korea, most Japanese blame Seoul. 

In an unwanted election, in which the only issue is the economy, and the only cards seem to be held by the ruling parties, voters lining up on December 14, though disgruntled, may feel they have little choice but to stick to more of the same thing. Be prepared for the election results to reinforce another long reign of the LDP. And one that will further embolden Mr. Abe.

Asia in Washington in August

Ordinarily August is the Silly Season, meaning it is a slow news month. Unfortunately it was canceled this year in favor of war, pestilence, genocide, ignorance, and just plain pig-headedness.

8/14 - International Comfort Women Day
8/15 - 1945. Japan Surrenders
8/18 - Pope Francis performs Mass in Seoul

8/19 - UN World Humanitarian Day

IRAQ: WHAT IS HAPPENING? 8/14, 12:15-1:45pm. Sponsor: New America Foundation. Speakers: Col. Derek Harvey (Ret.), Professor, University of South Florida, and Former Senior Analyst for Iraq for General David H. Petraeus; Denise Natali, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, and author, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq; Steve Levine, Future Tense Fellow, New America Foundation, and Author, The Oil and the Glory, The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea; and Douglas A. Ollivant, Senior National Security Fellow, International Security Program, New America Foundation, and Former NSC Director for Iraq.

HAS SOUTH KOREA SQUANDERED ITS DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND? 8/18, 12:30-2:00pm. Sponsor: CSIS, Korea Chair. Speaker: Elizabeth Hervey Stephen, Associate Professor of Demography, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

HISTORY IMPEDES FUTURE PROGRESS IN NORTHEAST ASIA. 8/19, 2:00-5:30pm. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Ret.), Chairman, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and former Director, National Intelligence; Ahn Ho-Young, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States; Lee Sung-yoon, Professor, Fletcher School , Tufts University; Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Associate, East Asia Program, Stimson; Victor Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, CSIS, and former Director for Asian Affairs, National Security Council; Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage; Evans Revere, Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group, and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; and Walter Lohman, Director, Asian Studies Program, Heritage. 

BEYOND THE QUAGMIRE: THE FUTURE OF MONGOLIA’S UNITED STATES AND JAPAN PARTNERSHIPS. 8/20, Noon-1:30pm. Sponsor: East West Center Washington. Speaker: Mr. Mendee Jargalsaikhan, Visiting Fellow, East-West Center in Washington, Doctoral Candidate, University of British Columbia.

SILICON GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CONSTRAINTS: THE RISE OF CHINA'S AND INDIA’S SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES. 8/27, 9:00-10:30am. Sponsor: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Speakers: David M. Hart (moderator), Director, Center for Science and Technology Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University; Douglas Fuller, Professor, Department of Business Administration, Zhejiang University’s School of Management; Robert D. Atkinson, President, ITIF; Jimmy Goodrich, Director of Global Policy, Information Technology Industry Council; and Brian Toohey, President & Chief Executive Officer, Semiconductor Industry Association.

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ON USING LAW TO EMPOWER WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SYSTEMS. 8/27, 10:00-11:30pm. Sponsors: Women In International Security, Women's Action for New Directions, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Speakers: Julie L. Arostegui, Toolkit Author and Director, Women, Peace and Security Policy, Women's Action for New Directions; Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Executive Director and Co-Founder, International Civil Society Action Network; Susan Stigant, Senior Program Officer, Rule of Law, US Institute of Peace; Susan Markham, Senior Gender Coordinator, USAID; and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, President, Women in International Security. 

PUBLIC OPINION AND WAR. 8/28, 2:00-4:00pm. Sponsor: Cato Institute. Speakers: Adam Berinsky, professor of political science, MIT; John Mueller, professor of political science, Ohio State University and senior fellow, Cato; Jason Reifler, senior lecturer, University of Exeter; Trevor Thrall, associate professor of public and international affairs, George Mason University; and Justin Logan, director of foreign policy studies, Cato.

All quiet on Abe

Signatories of November 4, 2012 The Facts Ad

Shinzo Abe and the media: Self-censorship

Richard Katz, editor of the Oriental Economist and APP member, published the article below in OE's June 2013 issue (June 7, 2013)

The Japanese media is famous for finding fault with Prime Ministers within a couple months of their taking office. But Shinzo Abe “has been getting an incredible free pass for six months,” said one stunned American political scientist. The media had similarly acted as a cheering squad for Yukio Hatoyama in his first couple months—until his own fecklessness doomed him. In the initial honeymoon, the editor of one journal called the editor of another to complain about an article that, while accurate, made Hatoyama look bad. “Japan needs Hatoyama to succeed to reinforce ‘regime change,’ so we should support him.”

Today, editors and reporters are acting as if Abe’s success is somehow Japan’s last chance to revive. Meanwhile, Abe has carefully cultivated the media, reportedly having dinner with the President of almost every major media organization. Abe and Yomiuri publisher Tsuneo Watanabe reportedly meet frequently. (Click HERE and search for “Prime Minister of Japan’s Schedule” “PMJS” in tags)

The dog that didn’t bark
The media stance is sometimes seen in the news that they fail to report. The most egregious case has occurred around Abe’s comments on whether Japan’s actions during World War II and earlier deserve the label “aggression” used in the 1995 apology by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. Proclaiming in the Diet that this was an issue for academic historians, it was, in fact, a refusal to reaffirm the Murayama statement.

Abe had promised himself not to let such issues arise before the July Upper House elections, but sometimes he just can’t help himself. The problem is that his beloved grandfather, Noboru Kishi, was directly involved as economic overlord of Manchukuo and a Minister in Hideki Tojo’s cabinet. Abe cannot admit to himself that his hero committed aggression. This is a problem that Abe shares with many other LDP leaders who are descendants of World War II-era leaders.

LDP Policy Affairs Council chair Sanae Takaichi went beyond Abe’s evasions, forthrightly claiming that, “It was understood at that time [before and during the war] that our nation had to fight resolutely in self-defense for its own survival.” Other ministers and party leaders have been forced to resign for far less damaging comments.

With the exception of a few outlets like Asahi, most of the media simply offered brief reports on Abe’s and Takaichi’s words. They provided little analysis and failed to explain the damage these comments did to Japan’s interests overseas, including cooperation with Seoul regarding North Korea. Abe’s views focus Asian attention on Japan’s past acts rather than China’s present ones. The US State Department summoned a senior official from the Japanese Embassy to express its distress.

Kyodo did a very good analysis, but few newspapers printed it. Jiji Press reported as if it were fact a statement from Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga that the Koreans had "misunderstood" Abe’s words. Think tanks whose leaders tend to be supportive of Abe, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, have tried to convey to Abe in private the impact he has had.

How many ordinary Japanese know that the man who campaigned on restoring US-Japan ties has been losing Washington’s confidence?

Suga tried to put an end to the whole issue by having Abe say that, “I never denied that Japan committed aggression.” Yet, Abe refuses to affirm it either. Nonetheless, the Yomiuri, which one journalist said is “acting like a government newspaper,” reported that Suga had successfully laid the issue to rest. Within Japan perhaps—especially since Toru Hashimoto has diverted attention via his notorious comments on “comfort women.” But not in the nations whose cooperation Japan needs.

Abe, Tamogami, and the “comfort women” ad
Nor has the daily press and TV investigated why so many of Abe’s aides and associates hold revisionist views. Consider Education Minister Hakubun Shimomura, the man in charge of Abe’s desire to make the education curriculum “more patriotic.”

In 2012, Shimomura said that Abe “should declare that the Nanking Massacre did not take place and the issue of comfort women does not exist. He should fully negate the Tokyo Trials historical viewpoint, and should also visit Yasukuni Shrine.” The interview was with Toshio Motoya, a real estate magnate and Abe associate whose magazine in 2008 awarded first prize to a notorious essay by Toshio Tamogami [Was Japan an Aggressor Nation? 2008], who was appointed [Japan] Air [Self Defense] Force Chief of Staff during Abe’s first term.

Tamogami claimed that, “Japan was ensnared in a trap that was very carefully laid by the United States in order to draw Japan into a war.” Though Tamogami was forced to resign, Mindy Kotler of the Washington-based Asia Policy Point, has discovered on Tamogami’s website that Abe appeared publicly at least six times at events sponsored by Tamogami’s Nippon Ganbare organization.*

Abe himself signed a November 4, 2012 advertisement in the New Jersey Star-Ledger denying the Japanese government and military’s role in forcing women into prostitution during World War II. So, did LDP Policy Chief Takaichi. Rather than justify the sex slavery, as Hashimoto did, Abe simply denies it. Abe heads the list of signers from the Liberal Democratic Party. According to Kotler, the signers include ten members of Abe’s current cabinet.** The ad was sponsored by the rightwing “Committee For Historical Facts” [Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact].

Why the media protects Abe 
Why does so much of the media protect Abe? The reason seems to be that Abe gives the impression of being the strong leader that many Japanese feel is needed to get Japan out of its economic morass and to stand up to China and South Korea.

People admire Abe’s leadership capacity and personality far more than his individual policies. For example, in a May 28 poll in Sankei, 72% approved of Abe’s personal character and 67% approved of his leadership qualities. Both are significantly above the 54% who approved of Abe’s stimulus measures, the 47% who approved of his security policies, and the 32% who approved of amending Article 96 of the Constitution. Considering that 75% disapproved of Hashimoto’s comments on comfort women, what would happen to Abe’s approval rate if the press delved deeply into Abe’s views?

People yearn for a reason to hope and don’t want any news about Abe that could dampen their hopes. According to an important leader in Japanese journalism, editors and reporters are not merely unwilling to defy the feelings of their viewers and readers. Many of them share those feelings.

Asia Policy Point adds:
*7 (possibly 8 as one has disappeared from the website since ) 

Watch the Videos: 

November 24, 2012, http://youtu.be/3L9rn92WurI?t=41m21s;

June 30, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vu98IK4wyuk;
May 11, 2011, http://youtu.be/61SIP9GdvEI?t=23m36s; 

September 21, 2010, http://youtu.be/nCfWX2--jtw?t=6m59s; 

June 9, 2010, http://youtu.be/FRWSE3ppZjs?t=6m33s; 

February 17, 2010, http://youtu.be/bY0jzrI3k0c?t=7m27s; 

February 2, 2010, http://youtu.be/xSMMjYcCl_U?t=15m37s

**See photo heading this article of "assentors/signatories". Separated out below is the list of Abe Cabinet members who signed "The Facts" ad in the November 4, 2012 New Jersey Start Ledger, which was two days before the US national elections and less than a week after Hurricane Sandy devastated parts of New Jersey.

Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister
Seiichi Eto, Special Advisor to Prime Minister on National Issues
Keiji Furuya, Minister in Charge of Abduction Issue and Nation’s Infrastructure Resilience
Tomomi Inada, Minister of State for Regulatory Reform
Yoshitaka Ito, Parliamentary Secretary of Finance
Shigeo Kitamura, Parliamentary Secretary of Cabinet Office
Hiroshige Seko, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
Hakubun Shimomura, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology
Yoshitake Shindo, Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications
Hiroyuki Yoshiie, Parliamentary Secretary of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

Monday in Washington

ONE MILLION BONES. 6/8-10. National Mall. Large-scale social arts practice, combining education, hands-on art making, and public installation to raise awareness of ongoing genocides and mass atrocities in places like Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Burma. 1,000,000 handcrafted bones placed on the Mall to serve as a collaborative site of conscience to honor victims and survivors and as a visual petition against ongoing conflicts and a call for action.

SCALING UP: CHINESE RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND. 6/10, 9:00-11:00am. Sponsor: Wilson Center, China Environmental Forum. Speakers: Hu Tao, Senior Associate, International Financial Flows and Environment Project, World Resources Institute (WRI); Yingzhen Zhao, Research Assistant, International Financial Flows and Environment Project, WRI; Todd Foley, Senior Vice President, Policy and Government Relations, American Council On Renewable Energy.

IS JAPAN "BACK"?: AN ASSESSMENT OF ABENOMICS. 6/10, Noon-1:00pm. Sponsor: Japan America Society of Washington. Speaker: Matthew P. Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy, CSIS.

THE PRESIDENT'S STEM CALL TO ACTION - A JOINT IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSE TO PCAST'S 'ENGAGE TO EXCEL' REPORT. 6/10, 1:30pm. Sponsor: The Business-Higher Education Forum, National STEM Undergraduate Partnership. Speakers: Navy Secretary Ray Mabus; Thomas Kalil, White House Deputy Director for Technology and Innovation; Reginald Brothers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research; Susan Singer, Director, Division of Undergraduate Education, National Science Foundation.

IRAN AT A CROSSROADS: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 6/10, 2:00pm. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). Speakers: Dennis Ross, Co-chairman, JINSA Iran Task Force; Eric Edelman, Co-chairman, JINSA Iran Task Force; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Mortimer Zuckerman, Editor-in-chief of U.S. News and World Report, Publisher, New York Daily News; Michael Makovsky, CEO, JINSA.

EXPLORING ECONOMIC POLICY PERCEPTIONS. 6/10, 3:00-5:00pm. Sponsor: U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC), Chamber Foundation. Speakers: Bruce Stokes, Director, Global Economic Program, Pew Research Global Attitudes Project; John Lipsky, former G20 Sherpa, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF; Kalpana Kochhar, Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy Department, IMF; Nuno Mota Pinto, Alternative Director for Portugal, World Bank; Gary Litman, Vice President, International Strategic Initiatives, USCC; John Sullivan, Managing Director, Center for International Private Enterprise; Joel Rogers, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute, United Kingdom, Academic Drector, YouGov; Aniket Shah, Investec Asset Management, South Africa.

TYRANNY OF CONSENSUS. 6/10, 5:00-6:30pm. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speaker: Janne Nolan, Author, Senior Fellow, Association for Diplomatic Studies.

DRONES AND THE FUTURE OF COUNTERTERRORISM IN PAKISTAN. 6/10, 5:00-6:30pm. Sponsor: Carnegie Endowment (CEIP). Speakers: Samina Ahmed, Senior Asia Adviser, International Crisis Group, Islamabad, Pakistan; Frederic Grare, Director, Senior Associate, South Asia Program, CEIP.