Takaichi's Vulnerabilities

Yana’s Scandal Exposes Takaichi’s Weaknesses

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 18, 2026

After hesitating for two weeks, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi replaced her Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana, with Arata Takebe, a former state minister of agriculture. Takaichi’s two-week indecisiveness about Yana’s status revealed her weaknesses in two things: positioning her staff and Diet affairs. Her inability to act quickly stems from her lack of experience as the supreme leader of Japanese politics.

When the weekly magazines Daily Shincho and Weekly Bunshun (online edition) reported on September 30 on Yana’s speech and his pork-barrel (or reverse pork-barrel) politics, Takaichi, surprisingly, did not consider firing him. She said that he would make amends for the scandal by his hard work as minister. But once the magazines published other scandals that could violate other laws, Takaichi decided to move. It took two weeks for Takaichi to understand the seriousness of Yana’s conduct.

Lack of Close Allies
It is likely that Takaichi appointed Yana in the September reshuffle of her cabinet because he was one of her few allies. When Takaichi was the Chairwoman of the LDP Policy Research Council between 2021 and 2022, Yana supported Takaichi in his capacity as a director on agriculture policy. Takaichi respected Yana’s knowledge about agriculture policies. Yana submitted his proposal to be agriculture minister to Takaichi, and Takaichi accepted it.

Usually, a prime minister orders his or her staff to conduct thorough background checks on the people under consideration for ministerial positions. Yana made his troubling speech in May. Other doubts about Yana’s failure to follow election norms, such as a shuttlebus service to campaign rallies and financial awards to the campaign’s telephone solicitors, had arisen earlier during his election campaign in February. Takaichi could have (and should have) known about Yana’s inappropriate conduct before she appointed him as agriculture minister in September. Her failure must have meant that she did not have a staff to advise her on the backgrounds of her ministers.

While Takaichi was thinking about letting Yana stay at his position, LDP lawmakers were hoping for his quick replacement. Yana’s scandal had the feel of pork barrel politics, which LDP lawmakers are attempting to excise. Takaichi failed to realize that the LDP was concerned that Yana’s scandal would ignite broader criticisms of LDP politics.

During the time when the Ministry of Finance is formulating the national budget for the next fiscal year, ordinarily every December, local business leaders visit Tokyo to meet with their local Diet members to request appropriations for roads, bridges, ports, or other business infrastructure. If their request is granted, the local leaders will work for the lawmaker in his or her election campaign.
The lawmaker can ask the ministries how the budget is being allocated but cannot demand specific favors on the budget. However, consultations about the budget will exert pressure on the ministries. If a ministry has a project that requires the lawmaker’s political support, then the bureaucrats in the ministry can formulate a budget advantageous to the lawmaker. This is an interdependence between the politician and the bureaucrat.

Takaichi does not have experience as LDP secretary general, a position that oversees election and Diet affairs. Takaichi simply described Yana’s cynical speech as “unhip” in her discussions with opposition parties in the Diet. But Yana’s reference to the budget incident in his speech as an example of his influence over the budget was a necessary move for a lawmaker who lost in his single-seat district in the last election, even though it was inappropriate in a moral perspective. It must be hard for Takaichi to imagine Yana’s electoral weakness.

Novice in Diet Affairs
Another failure of Takaichi was that she did not decide to replace Yana until opposition parties united to attack Yana and Takaichi in the Diet. Typically, a prime minister replaces a minister mired in scandal on a Friday before it can affect the schedule and media coverage in the coming week. However, Takaichi let the matter linger and did not fire Yana until Wednesday October 14. She had to face harsh criticism from the opposition parties on the scandal and was held accountable for her appointment of Yana.

The highest priority for Takaichi in this Diet session is passing bills to cut the consumption tax on food. The LDP Diet Affairs Committee has had to scurry to schedule the discussion on the tax cut bill. Takaichi’s late decision on Yana jeopardized the schedule. The LDP Diet affairs team had to negotiate with the opposition parties on a new schedule and managed to reach an agreement to begin the discussion on October 20.

With no career in Diet affairs, Takaichi does not understand the delicacy of negotiations over the Diet’s schedule. The Diet has many unwritten rules. All the parties in the Diet share a common interest in a detailed examination of such significant issues as a consumption tax (and its reduction). The Diet often requires the prime minister’s attendance, which may often become a condition of taking the final voting for a bill. But Takaichi whines about the frequency of her appearances, frustrated that they interfere with her busy life of doing her make up, bathing in the early morning, and cooking.

The leading parties are discussing reducing the amount of time a prime minister must spend before the Diet. But it is up to Takaichi to manage the issues that need detailed consultation with the Diet.

Oddly enough, the approval ratings for the Takaichi Cabinet did not show a steep decline, even after she replaced Yana. Asahi Shimbun reported only a one percentage point decline to 50 percent, while Yomiuri Shimbun showed a two-point loss to 57 percent. These results indicate that many the Japanese do not understand Takaichi’s accountability for the appointment of Yana as agriculture minister.

Takaichi's Agenda Stumbles

Takaichi Caught Between a Staff Scandal and U.S. Pressure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 12, 2026

Although Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is trying to focus on the economy during the Diet’s fall session, two unexpected issues, one domestic, the other international, have upset her agenda. Irritated about Takaichi’s handling of a scandal concerning the Agriculture minister, opposition parties have slowed the procedures for considering bills. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paralyzed Takaichi’s diplomacy with the U.S. despite her unwavering support for President Donald Trump. The prime minister now faces the hardest time since she took the seat a year ago.

In her October 5 policy speech, Takaichi introduced an old Chinese expression called Keisei-saimin [経世済民], which could be interpreted as “Good governance saves the people.” This saying became the etymology of “economy [経済]” in Japan. The faction led by former premier Noboru Takeshita, Keisei-kai [経世会], was named after this phrase. By using the idiom, Takaichi hoped to show her determination to decrease the consumption tax and tackle price inflation.

It was remarkable for Takaichi to refer to the political principle of the former Takeshita faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because it had been a political enemy of the former Abe faction, or Seiwa-kai [清和会], with which Takaichi herself had once been affiliated. Takaichi has begun to distance herself from Abe in other ways as well.  

In Diet discussions, she has distinguished her economic policy from past reflation policy. Reflation had been a fundamental element of Abenomics. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s demand that Japan stop the reflation has taken precedence. Thus, while keeping with such Abe-oriented diplomatic policies as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Takaichi is departing from other of Abe’s political stances.

Opposition parties are still skeptical about Takaichi’s economic policy. Komeito and the Democratic Party for the People have requested in Diet discussion a greater distribution of public benefits rather than a consumption tax cut to deal with price inflation. Takaichi has insisted that a consumption tax cut is the best policy in terms of sufficiency and swiftness. However, she has not yet answered the question of how she has found or will find fiscal resources for the tax cut. She has said only, “Don’t worry.”

Although Takaichi had expected to discuss economic policies in the Diet, opposition leaders did not allow it by asking why Takaichi had appointed Kazuo Yana as the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in her September cabinet reshuffling. Yana had boasted in May that, earlier in the year, he, as an individual Diet member, had cut the national government’s budget for road construction in two municipalities in his electoral district – in retaliation for their mayors’ support of Yana’s rival in the February Lower House election. Admitting his remarks were inappropriate, Yana retracted the comment, inviting further criticism about eating his words.

While a lawmaker can check the policies of ministries, influencing a specific policy may be incompatible with his obligations as a representative of all the people. Yana’s interference in national budget work to take revenge against the mayors was the opposite of that. Yana’s comment ignited a traditional skepticism of pork barrel shenanigans by LDP politicians through shadowy relationships with the ministries.

In response to a request that she dismiss Yana, Takaichi insisted on keeping him in his position, arguing that the budget had in fact been appropriately distributed to local governments. Although the prime minister usually replaces a cabinet member who becomes embroiled in scandal, Takaichi chose the opposite course. [Yana resigned Wednesday, October 14.]

Not only the opposition parties but also members of the LDP question her decision to retain Yana. LDP Executive Acting Secretary General, Koichi Hagiuda, criticized Yana’s speech as arrogant and intolerable. Opposition parties are united in sponsoring a censure motion in both chambers of the Diet. The opposition parties have a tough road ahead in the Lower House since the LDP has a majority, but they may have a chance to pass the censure motion with a majority in the Upper House. The opposition parties have also decided to refuse to discuss bills related to Yana in the Upper House. With this atmosphere it is uncertain whether Takaichi can get a consumption tax cut through the Diet.

Further pressure on Takaichi has come from the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio who announced sanctions on the ICC. “We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate,” Rubio said in a statement. The sanctions are highly unpopular in Japan ever since the ICC’s Japanese president was targeted with personal sanctions in August.

Takaichi left a short comment on her social media account, expressing a “deep concern” on the sanctions decision of the U.S. Japan also joined the joint statement of foreign ministers of European countries and Canada which regretted and strongly disagreed with U.S. sanctions. Takaichi endorsed the statement but has taken no further action at the leaders’ level so far.

By now, Takaichi is one of the few world leaders who wholeheartedly support Trump. In her meeting with him in October 2025, Takaichi praised Trump as the only leader who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. She even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Through such unstinting loyalty, Takaichi has put herself in a position in which her criticism of any Trump policy would not make sense.

The Diet begins discussion of economic measures at the Committee on the Budget in the Lower House this week. If Yana remains in place, Takaichi will be asked about her responsibility for naming him agriculture minister in which position he can control the budget for farmers or the price of rice. On the diplomatic side, the Trump administration seems to be aligning the U.S. with Russia in the war in Ukraine. Such a commonality of interests might lead to other coordinated actions, such as opposition to the ICC. Whether Takaichi can find a way to break through and preserve Japan’s independence deserves scrutiny.

Consumption Tax Cut is Back at the Forefront

The Extraordinary Session of the Diet Begins

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 5, 2026

An extraordinary session of the Diet was convoked on October 5 with closure scheduled for December 12. The top priority for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a consumption tax cut that would begin in April 2027. However, Takaichi faces the headwind of a scandal inside her administration and reservations about her diplomatic skills.
 
Ordinarily, such a Diet session in the fall is to discuss a supplemental budget for the Japanese economy or for dealing with an unexpected event such as a natural disaster. However, Takaichi has no plans so far to submit a supplemental budget bill. Indeed, she previously declared that she would not propose any supplemental budget and would integrate all the budget items into an annual budget that begins every April. Forgoing a supplemental budget should improve the efficiency of private business activities by improving the predictability of government spending.
 
Hence a consumption tax cut is the focus of this session. The Takaichi Cabinet made an official decision on the tax cut in mid-September: it will seek to reduce the consumption tax rate on food from eight percent to one percent for two years starting next April. The government will also establish a new system to subsidize job-hunting efforts by low-income families, instead of a refundable tax credit.
 
The leading coalition, the LDP and its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, forcing the two parties to seek some help from opposition parties. LDP and JIP expect Komeito, which left the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in September, to vote yes on the consumption tax cut bill.
 
However, the situation among the opposition parties is extremely complicated. The CRA lawmakers who had joined the party from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) have since established a new party, the Democratic Reform Association (DRA). The DRA and Komeito then have organized a parliamentary group in the Lower House. Although the CDPJ and Komeito have not launched a similar project in the Upper House and continue to work separately there, it is up to Komeito whether to take a position closer to the CDPJ or to the LDP on the consumption tax cut proposal.
 
In addition to enacting the consumption tax cut, the LDP/JIP coalition hopes to reduce the number of Diet seats. The JIP has been calling on the LDP to implement their agreement made in October 2025 to reduce the number of seats in the Lower House by ten percent. The two parties failed to pass such a bill in either the extraordinary session of last fall or the special session earlier this year. Several members of the LDP are skeptical of JIP’s hard push for seat reduction.
 
The seat reduction proposal has led to an unusual unification of the opposition parties because all 45 seats to be eliminated are in proportional districts of the Lower House and thus work against small parties. If the LDP and JIP decide to ignore opposition complaints and take advantage of their super majority in the Lower House to pass the seat reduction, Komeito may oppose the consumption tax cut bill in retaliation. A multi-partisan group of lawmakers, including some from the LDP, submitted their opinion to the council for election reform, which argued that the 45-seat reduction would be baseless.
 
Controlling the procedure in the Diet will be crucial for Takaichi, who is reluctant to join the Diet’s discussion of the bills. The newly appointed Chairman of the LDP Council on Diet Affairs, Hideki Murai, supports Takaichi’s hesitancy and may negotiate to reduce her appearances before the Committee on Budget. But if Murai fails, the opposition parties will be further emboldened to oppose the leading coalition.
 
The Committee on the Budget has been a venue for discussing political scandals. Weekly magazines have reported that, before taking the position as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana threatened some municipalities in his electoral district with cuts to their road construction budgets. The mayors of those cities supported another candidate in the last election in February. Yana’s possible involvement can be interpreted as blackmailing political opponents.
 
Yana is one of the lawmakers who received kickbacks from a former Abe faction in the LDP. His punishment was exclusion from a leadership position in the LDP for six months. Nevertheless, Takaichi allowed him to return to the leadership group by appointing him as minister in her cabinet reshuffle in September. She must have thought the kickback scandal was over. However, in an Asahi Shimbun poll, 68 percent considered it a problem that Takaichi had begun to appoint lawmakers embroiled in the funding scandal to ministerial positions. Mishandling of the Yana scandal may affect Takaichi’s approval rating.

Takaichi’s limited diplomatic skills have also raised concerns. A member of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa was arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of a robbery from and the murder of a Japanese woman. The government of Japan has expressed its extreme regret to the U.S. However, Takaichi has not taken the matter up with U.S. President Donald Trump. Takaichi once said (in what she must now recognize as a grave mistake) that Trump was the only person who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. If she remains wedded to this view, she will show her irresolution about protecting Japanese citizens, and her public image will deteriorate.
 
Takaichi still has not improved bilateral relations with China that resulted from her careless speech on the Taiwan contingency in the Diet last November. Some lawmakers are trying to normalize Japan-China relations. This is not within Takaichi’s repertoire. Her missteps in diplomacy will give challengers a window to consolidate their opposition to her reelection as the LDP president in the fall of 2027.

Japan’s Opposition Cannot Hold Together

Centrist Reform Alliance head Junya Ogawa 

Japan’s Main Opposition Party Fragments

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 7, 2026

Japan’s largest opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), determined to dissolve and separate itself into two groups: the former Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and the former Komeito. Although the party had hoped to be an alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet, the CRA failed to find common ground between ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members on crucial policies, or to invite some members in other parties including the LDP. Fragmentation of the opposition will encourage Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to continue exercising arbitrary power to promote her conservative agenda.
 
Lower House members of the CDPJ and Komeito formed the CRA last January. It was an attempt to counter the LDP in Takaichi’s snap election in February by consolidating the votes of supporters of the CDPJ and Komeito. But the strategy failed because the voters regarded the merger as a maneuver not for confronting Takaichi’s policies but merely for the two parties’ survival. The CRA emerged from the February election with only 49 seats – a 70 percent loss from its pre-election seats of 167.
 
Although the CRA leaders expected the Upper House lawmakers in the CDPJ and Komeito to join immediately after the Lower House election, the Upper House members of the CDPJ hesitated. Members of Komeito, which had left the leading coalition with the LDP in the fall of 2025, were willing to join, but the CDPJ was reluctant because of basic policy differences. The CDPJ has taken liberal stances on security legislation that would include a right of collective self-defense right, construction of nuclear power plants, and building new military base in Okinawa. Komeito has stayed its conservative course on these issues. Neither party expressed much interest in compromise.
 
The CRA set a deadline for the merger at the end of August, to prepare a unified party able to compete in local elections in April 2027. But the local organizations of the CDPJ resisted an integrated campaign with Komeito since it had been an enemy for decades. The leaders of the CRA, CDPJ and Komeito officially agreed to abandon the merger in early September and to separate the party between its ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members.
 
The method of separation is unique and complicated. The former Komeito lawmakers will leave the CRA and return to Komeito. The former CDPJ members will join with the current CDPJ members in the Upper House to establish a new party. However, a single former CDPJ lawmaker will remain in the CRA to maintain its party status.
 
The CRA depended heavily on public funding to support its political activities. The party expects to receive 2.34 billion yen in 2026 and in fact has already accepted half the amount, 1.17 billion yen. If the CRA disappears, the rest of 1.17 billion yen will not be delivered. Hence one lawmaker in the CRA, which will be enough to maintain its eligibility to receive the remaining funds later this year. The leader of CRA, Jun-ya Ogawa, explained that the funding will be used to retire CRA’s debts for the election campaign in February.
 
The new party organized by the former CDPJ and CRA members will succeed to the funds assigned to the CRA shell. Komeito will not receive any of the funds. It is remarkable that the government will pay the funds to a single-member party that will not take any effective political activity. The CRA has in the past accused the LDP of mismanagement of its political funds, but the CRA is now vulnerable to criticism of its control of its own funds.
 
Regardless of former party memberships, it is expected that the lawmakers who leave the CRA will form a parliamentary group in the Lower House. However, those lawmakers still differ on some important policies. Whether and for how long the new parliamentary group can take integrated actions in the Diet remains to be seen.
 
The LDP, which does not have a simple majority in the Upper House, expects Komeito to cooperate on such issues as the consumption tax cut. Takaichi pushed her conservative agenda, including a national statutory prohibition on national flag vandalism, in the last session of the Diet. Takaichi and the LDP are likely to approach Komeito for support on defense budget increase or constitutional amendment. In the meantime, the opposition parties are further fragmented from the far right to the far left.
 
Historically, the CRA has had a much smaller presence in the Diet than other earlier opposition parties. In 1960s, during the Cold War era, the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, occupied 30 percent of the seats in the Lower House. The New Frontier Party, established after of its members left the LDP, won 31 percent of votes in Lower House election in 1996. The Democratic Party of Japan won 26 percent of seats in the election in 2000. By contrast, the CRA had only 10 percent of Lower House seats, and now these seats will be divided. Trouble in the opposition parties thus enhances the power of LDP – without the LDP having to do anything.

The CRA's break up is welcomed by the Takaichi's administration. The unraveling of the opposition, as witnessed in the combined CRA dissolution and the LDP win in the Okinawa gubernatorial election, will solidify Takaichi's rule. If the CRA had found a way to remain unified, it could have presented a meaningful alternative to the LDP and Takaichi's military build-up.

The CRA had received over 10 million votes among the proportional districts in the February election. Although this was only half of those for the LDP, they did represent 18 percent of the overall vote--no small voice in the Diet. The CRA did not consider the power of that political will in their rush to put an end to their union.

The Osaka Capital

JIP Drags Down the Diet

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 26, 2026
 
The Diet finished its special session on July 25, approving the Backup Capital Act by a small margin in the Upper House at the last moment. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was not eager to enact it. It was the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP: Nippon Ishin-no Kai), that was the main supporter. The opposition parties suspected that JIP was pushing it solely for its own narrow interest. JIP’s persistence on the bill led to a confusing few days at the end of the session.
 
The Backup Capital Act is aimed at building an alternative “capital” of Japan to Tokyo, in case Tokyo suffers a major natural disaster. The law should also help decentralize businesses in Japan. A city interested in serving as a backup capital must meet several conditions, including a minimum population size, business concentration, or an agreement on coordination between the prefectural government and the city government. While some cities, such as Sapporo, Nagoya or Fukuoka, might qualify, Osaka is recognized as the leading candidate.
 
In connection with the Backup Capital Act, JIP has put another issue at the top of its reform agenda for the announced purpose of minimizing government expenditures.  This is the Osaka Capital Initiative, which would integrate the Osaka prefectural government with the Osaka city government. The integration would resemble the governmental system of the Tokyo metropolitan area. Appealing to the competitive sentiment of the people of Osaka against Tokyo, JIP sold the policy as making Osaka another capital of Japan.
 
Controlling the seats of the Osaka prefectural governor and the Osaka city mayor, JIP held two referendums on the Osaka Capital Initiative in 2015 and 2020, but the initiative was rejected by a small margin in both referenda. Although residents of the small cities in the Osaka prefecture supported the idea, those in Osaka city did not, because it seemed to have fewer benefits for them.
 
JIP has been looking for a third chance at the initiative. Their tactic is to connect the Osaka Capital Initiative with the Backup Capital Act, though the party leaders publicly explain that those two concepts are different. But the party has also explained that the Osaka Capital Initiative is a precondition for Osaka to be a backup capital and has declared a third referendum in the spring 2027. JIP’s leader and the governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, announced that he would resign as governor next spring and run again for election as his own successor. He plans to hold the election and the third referendum on the same day on the expectation that the initiative can ride his coattails.
 
Hence JIP’s enthusiasm for enacting Backup Capital Act in the special session of the Diet that closed on July 25. To have the “double voting” in Osaka next spring, the Diet had to pass the Act in this session. In a meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on July 7, Yoshimura reconfirmed that the LDP and JIP would enact the Backup Capital Act in this session and that JIP would leave behind its effort to reduce seats in the Diet.
 
No party other than JIP had any interest in a backup capital. When the chairman of a committee in the Lower House, who was from JIP, unilaterally began discussion of the Backup Capital Bill in late June, the opposition parties boycotted all the discussions. The Diet spent a week normalizing its discussions. Even the LDP was reluctant to pass the backup capital bill within the current session.
 
Takaichi came to the rescue of the bill in the final phase of the Diet session with her personal support. Takaichi was indebted to JIP for its support of the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act, which had been on her long-time political agenda. That statute was enacted on July 17. In return, Takaichi extended the term of the Diet session for 8 days and worked to pass the backup capital bill.
 
The opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the unilateral procedure used by the LDP and JIP to pass the bill in the Upper House -- where the two parties do not have a majority. Although the opposition parties demanded further discussion of the bill, the chairman of the committee, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, decided to finish discussion quickly and to take a vote on the bill. However, the chairman accepted a supplemental resolution to the bill that ruled out JIP’s planned double voting on the referendum and governor’s race. With this supplement, the bill was approved by a slight margin, supported by the LDP, JIP, Team Mirai and some independent lawmakers.
 
Yoshimura was not satisfied with the result. Holding votes for the third referendum on the Osaka Capital Initiative and for the Osaka gubernatorial election on the same day next spring is crucial for JIP to gain broad support from the voters. Immediately after the Diet passed Backup Capital Act, Yoshimura reiterated that he still planned to have the double vote next spring. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, accused Yoshimura of a lack of respect for the decisions of the Diet. What happens next spring in Osaka remains to be seen.
 
As seen in his unusually strong push for seat reduction in the House of Representatives, Yoshimura is too focused on his own agenda in Osaka to properly honor the Diet, which, after all, represents the whole interest of the people of Japan. The Osaka Capital Initiative is a typical populist issue to firm up the political base of the party, which is highly concentrated in Osaka. Thus, the Diet spent the last days of the extended session on enhancing JIP’s political fortunes – and those of Takaichi who relies on JIP’s support.

Takaichi’s Legislative Strategy Unites Opposition

Three Reasons for This Diet Session’s Unusual Procedure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2026
 
The Diet decided to extend the term of the current special session for eight days with approval of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Although these leading parties have been trying to pass all the bills submitted by Sanae Takaichi Cabinet before the end of the term set on July 17, the boycott of discussions by the opposition parties made it impossible. The opposition parties accuse Takaichi of mismanaging the Diet. This abnormality was brought about by Takaichi’s arrogant administration of the Diet, JIP’s insistence on its own agenda, and the opposition parties’ unusual unification against leading coalition.
 
Takaichi’s Capriciousness
This is a very unusual session of the Diet. The ordinary session 2026 was convoked on January 23 and ended the same day because Takaichi dissolved the House of Representative to hold a snap election. After the Lower House election on February 8, the Takaichi administration set a special session. Although a special session is ordinarily convoked for a few days to elect a new prime minister, Takaichi set a 150-day term from February 18 to July 17 to discuss the fiscal year 2026 budget and tackle other critical issues. The Diet did not work between January 23 and February 17.
 
During the final weeks in the current session, Takaichi was unwilling to attend the Diet discussion. After opposition parties criticized her for defamation in her LDP presidential campaign last October, Takaichi refused to answer their questions in the Diet. The opposition parties, holding a majority in the Upper House, boycotted the Diet discussion in late June and early July. The leading parties were unable to pass all the bills by July 17, the regular end of the current session.
 
Takaichi prioritized passage of the revised Imperial House Law and the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act in the final phase of the session. The LDP has not been active in extending the Diet session. Every year, lawmakers get back to their hometowns after the ordinary session to meet their supporters, to reinforce their political base, and to prepare for the next election. Extension of the Diet session will reduce their chances to cultivate their voters in the local districts.
 
The LDP nevertheless submitted a motion to the Diet to extend the term of the current special session for the passage of some important bills. The Diet Law provides that an ordinary session can be extended once and an extraordinary or special session twice. The LDP has a majority in the Lower House and not in the Upper House. If the two chambers of the Diet reach different decisions on an extension, the decision of the Lower House controls.
 
The extension of the current session for eight days was thus approved by the votes of   the LDP-JIP majority coalition in the Lower House. The opposition parties blamed the extension on Takaichi’s mismanagement of the Diet schedule. If she had not dissolved the Lower House, and if she had not refused the discussion on her defamation scandal, the parties would have had enough time to discuss all the bills. It was Takaichi who delayed the schedule.
 
JIP’s Insistence on Its Own Agenda
The opposition parties’ boycott of discussion was based on another reason. The leading coalition unilaterally decided to start discussion on the bills for reducing Lower House seats and for introducing a “backup capital” bill. Discussion on a bill usually starts with an overwhelming consensus among the parties. But in this case, the leading parties ignored the protest of the opposition parties. The two bills are strongly supported by JIP.
 
Established in 2012, the JIP had been a determined opposition party, pushing for political reforms. Forming the leading coalition with LDP led by Takaichi in 2025 changed everything. The JIP needed a cause to join the coalition and decided that reduction of Diet seats would be its top priority. JIP leader and the Governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, labeled the issue “political reform 101.” Yoshimura believed that the seat reduction would receive wide public support because it would lead to a reduction in governmental spending for the Diet.
 
Opposition parties had reason to oppose the bill. The bill includes the reduction of forty-five seats in the proportional districts of the Lower House. That reform of the election system would work against small opposition parties which are heavily dependent on proportional districts. It also did not make good sense for the House to reduce its seats at the initiative of the governor of Osaka. Not only the opposition parties but some lawmakers in the LDP were skeptical about the bill. Takaichi finally decided to postpone the seat reduction bill to the next session.
 
JIP still hopes to enact the Backup Capital Act in the extended term of the current session of the Diet. While the law enables local prefectures and cities to have stronger authority for governance as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government currently possesses, most lawmakers believe that the system of backup capital will help the Osaka Capital Initiative, which JIP has been promoting since its establishment.
 
Opposition parties have criticized JIP’s strong push for the bill, arguing that the law only benefits Osaka. They demand a detailed examination of the bill in the Diet, which requires weeks of discussion. Although the leading coalition passed the bill in the Lower House with the approval of Team Mirai, they have still not secured a majority in the Upper House. The leading parties have not yet decided whether to extend the term of the current session again.
 
If the LDP fails to enact the two bills for seat reduction and a backup capital, the JIP may lose its major cause for staying in the leading coalition with the LDP. Although the merits of leading coalition should be greater than leaving it, the JIP is worried about its political power shrinking, as they are growingly dependent on the LDP’s leadership. Voters in future elections may regard JIP as a supplemental group of LDP. It would be a major concern for the LDP whether the JIP stays or goes.
 
Unusual Unification of Opposition Parties
When the leading coalition unilaterally began discussion over the Lower House seat reduction and the Backup Capital Act, the opposition parties took united action to stop the unilateral procedure in the Diet. They requested impartial treatment of the bills by the leaders in both chambers. The possible crucial impact of seat reduction on small opposition parties made that concerted action possible.
 
The action included a wide range of parties. The highly conservative Sanseito and the far-left Japan Communist Party joined the frontline in protesting capricious management of the Diet by leading coalition. Adding to those two parties, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), and Team Mirai demanded that the chairman (from JIP) of a Lower House committee not start discussion on the seat reduction bill. When the chairman declared that discussion had begun, those opposition parties boycotted the committee.
 
Ironically, JIP’s push for a seat reduction bill unified opposition parties from the right to the left. This unification became a threat to the leading parties, causing them to think which other bills would be blocked by the opposition parties.
 
However, the opposition parties are not completely united against the leading parties. The CRA, DPP and Sanseito voted yes to revisions to the Imperial House Law, while JCP and some others opposed it. The National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act passed the Diet with the approval of DPP and Sanseito, but the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, JCP and Reiwa Shinsengumi opposed. The coalition of opposition parties is still limited to some specific bills.

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

Expanding Japan's Imperial Family

The Diet’s Unanimous Opinion on Maintaining the Imperial Family

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 8, 2026 Updated June 15, 2026

The Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both chambers of the Diet agreed to a draft of a “unanimous opinion” [立法府の総意] of the legislative branch to secure members of the Imperial Family. The draft proposes expansion of the family in two ways, adopting expert recommendations from 2021. First, female members of the family would be allowed to remain in the family after marriage. Second, male members of branches of the Imperial Family that were excised in 1947 could be adopted and thus re-enter the family.
 
The acting chair on this issue, Speaker of the Lower House Eisuke Mori, hopes to make these changes through amendments to the Imperial House Law by the end of the current session of the Diet on July 17. 
 
The Imperial House currently has 16 members, only three of whom are male and eligible to succeed to the throne. Members of the public, members of the Diet, and the imperial family itself are concerned that the family may dwindle. There is a near-term issue about lightening the responsibilities of each family member. The duties of the imperial family to participate in the life of the nation – such as participating in ceremonies of national events or official visits of foreign heads of state – are in fact extensive and occasionally burdensome. Spreading out these responsibilities by expanding the imperial family would be helpful to all.
 
Allowing married female members to remain in the family has the overwhelming support of all the parties. Article 12 of the Imperial House Law provides that a female loses her status as a family member when she marries. If female members could remain in the family, they could share the roles of the Imperial Family. The draft accordingly would allow all female members to stay after marriage. The draft also includes transitional measures to respect the will of female members who have been living their lives based on current law – i.e., not all female members may wish to stay in the family.
 
Whether the husband and children of a female member remaining in the family should also have the status of members of the Imperial Family has been a controversial point. While some lawmakers with Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) support such inclusion, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) oppose it. If the husband and children do not have the imperial status, possible questions are “Do they have the right of freedom of religion or political activities?” or “Can they spend the governmental funds for the Imperial Families?
 
The draft does not take a position on the status of husband and children and merely recommends adding a supplementary provision to the revised Imperial House Law that hopes to resolve the issue sometime in the future.
 
More divisive in the draft is a process for the Imperial Family to adopt a male from a branch of the former Imperial Family that had been excised in 1947. That former Imperial Family share the same ancestor of over 600 years ago with current Imperial Family. Article 9 of the Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits Imperial House members from adopting children to prevent members from disrupting the imperial lineage.
 
While the LDP and JIP approve of the adoption proposal, as do some conservative opposition parties, some CRA members have protested it. For them, an adoption without consent may violate the constitutional provision that prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Even some conservative scholars are skeptical about the idea of adoption.
 
Considering the CRA’s objections, the draft includes conditions on adoption. There would be a minimum age for adoption, which is supposed to be fifteen. The draft also demands a decision on who in the Imperial Family can adopt a child. Most importantly, an adopted child would not be eligible to succeed to the throne. With these conditions, the CRA accepted adoption. The draft also recommends the Diet to resolve that this rule for adoption should be subjected to ongoing reviews.
 
Complicating things, the Speaker Mori announced his own view in his press conference that male offspring of adopted children should have eligibility to succeed to the throne. That represented a conservative standpoint which insists on making paternal succession certain rather than the legitimacy of lineage concerning adoption. Some opposition parties firmly oppose Mori’s idea. Mori later explained that he was referring to an interpretation of the current law, and not binding future discussions.
 
The draft would not affect other Imperial Family rules. The draft unequivocally reconfirms the current order of succession to the throne. The first successor of Emperor Naruhito is Crown Prince Akishino, followed by his son, Prince Hisahito. Maintenance of the current order was a requirement of the experts’ report in 2021. That report separated discussion about provisions to enlarge the Imperial House from the line of succession.
 
The speakers distributed the draft to the parties on June 8 and concluded the draft as “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” with approval of seven parties out of all thirteen on June 10. The Emperor Abdication Special Law of 2017 demands such unanimity. The opinion was submitted to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Takaichi Cabinet is expected to submit a bill of revised Imperial House Law to current session of the Diet.

It is noteworthy that the Emperor Naruhito commented on securing Imperial Family members right after the Speakers wrapped up the unanimous opinion. “I hope it to be understood by the people,” he said in his press conference before leaving Japan to visit Europe on June 11. Although reserving judgement on the opinion, he clearly wants the process to be democratic and reflecting the views of the Japanese people. The emperor began his remarks by noting that the fundamental principle of the imperial family is "to share the joys and sorrows of the people."

 It is still unclear, however, whether the unanimous opinion will receive the full support of the people. Polls by news organizations find that the concept of the adoption of male members of former Imperial Family branches faces a certain amount of opposition. A substantial percentage of those polled support the right of female members to remain the in family after marriage.
 
There is a popular expectation that Aiko, the daughter of Naruhito, will succeed to the throne. The “unanimous opinion” would rule out this possibility. Takaichi revealed her opposition to a female emperor during a discussion in the Diet last March. “The time has not come for discussing it. It may destabilize imperial succession,” said Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister. This is a view more representative of Japan’s conservatives who believe that succession should be only along the male line than of its citizens.

Imperial Succession

Diet Discussion on the Imperial Family Resumes

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026

Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15^th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
 
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
 
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
 
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
 
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
 
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12^th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
 
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
 
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
 
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
 
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
 
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
 
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
 
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947.  However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.

Takaichi Diet Lesson

Takaichi Realizes the Power of the Upper House

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 29, 2026
 
A power play over Japan’s FY2026 budget bill resulted in a defeat for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi by the opposition parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced on March 30 that it has given up its attempt to pass the budget bill before the end of March. The Cabinet was forced to submit to the Diet an interim budget bill to authorize spending for the beginning of FY2026. Despite this setback, Takaichi continues to be highly popular in recent polls.
 
Looking back at the past few months, Takaichi exercised her constitutional power and dissolved the Lower House on January 23. The House held a general election on February 8. Her decision was fundamentally surprising because the timing of the snap election put at risk passage of the annual budget bill, which must occur before the beginning of the next fiscal year on April 1. Takaichi nevertheless initiated the snap election to reinforce her political support before her approval rating fell.
 
The LDP’s sweeping victory in the election went beyond her expectation. Takaichi and her staff in Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) came to believe that they were invincible, able to make impossible possible. Takaichi called on the Diet to pass the budget bill before the fiscal year began. The LDP in the Lower House obliged; it passed the budget bill with only 59 hours of discussion, ignoring the established but unspoken agreement between the parties to discuss a budget bill for at least 80 hours.
 
This hard push by the leading party stirred anger in the opposition parties in the Upper House which still outnumber the LDP. The opposition held captive a few bills relating to the FY2026 budget. Two of them were the high school tuition bill and the free school lunch bill which were to take effect in April. These bills also needed to pass the Diet by the end of March.
 
The Committee on Education, Culture and Science in the Upper House was to discuss the bills. The chair of this committee is a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the biggest opposition party. The chairman delayed discussion of the bills at the request of the opposition parties who first wanted to thoroughly examine the qualifications of the Minister of Education, Yohei Matsumoto [松本 洋平], who had a history of extramarital affairs. The opposition parties threatened the LDP that they would scrap the two bills if the parties did not have enough time to discuss the budget bill in the Upper House.
 
The leading parties and opposition parties struck a deal in late March. The leading parties would give up on meeting the March 31 deadline for the FY2026 budget bill, allowing time in the Upper House for discussion for the bill in early April. In the meantime, there would be an interim budget bill for 11 days, by which time the Diet is expected to pass the budget. The opposition parties agreed to pass the related bills, including the high school tuition and school lunch bills by the end of March. Although media reports did not go into detail, the LDP leaders told Takaichi about the deal on March 23. But Takaishi still insisted on passage of the budget bill by the end of March.
 
Takaichi must have known of the LDP’s weakness in the Upper House and of the deal between the parties to pass the bills. In fact, the FY2026 budget bill includes an economic stimulus package. Any delay in the budget bill will frustrate voters who expected assistance in this time of price inflation. Takaichi and her staff mistakenly thought that the opposition parties, afraid of public annoyance, would not be so persistent in opposing the budget bill.
 
She and her staff miscalculated the anger of the opposition parties in the Upper House. An extraordinarily abbreviated discussion on the budget bill brought to the fore a fundamental concern about the existence of the chamber, which has been dubbed “a carbon copy of the Lower House.” Regardless of their positions as either leading or in opposition, the parties in the Upper House felt challenged about their raison d’etre.
 
As a matter of fact, the Upper House sometimes has played a crucial role in the history of the Japanese government. The Ryutaro Hashimoto administration fell to a minority government in the Upper House after a defeat in the 1998 election. On the advice of his mentor, former premier Noboru Takeshita, Hashimoto stepped down as prime minister even though he maintained a majority in the Lower House.
 
In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believed that the LDP’s majority in the Lower House could overcome its minority position in the Upper House. The result was terrible. A cabinet reshuffling caught some ministers in scandals related to the mismanagement of political funds. When the Upper House blocked an anti-terrorism bill, Abe’s chronic disease returned, he could not attend a plenary sitting in the Diet, and he decided to resign.
 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan left office in 2011 because a bill to authorize government bonds to fund reconstruction after the East Japan Great Earthquake earlier that year could not pass the Upper House. He asked the LDP, which had a majority in the house, to pass the bill in return for his resignation. These episodes illustrate that the Upper House has the power to destroy an administration.
 
Despite her mismanagement of the budget bill, Takaichi remains highly popular in two polls. Nikkei Shimbun reported a 72 percent approval rating of Takaichi’s Cabinet. She also maintained a high rating in the Mainichi Shimbun poll with 58 percent approval. Although there is skepticism about her attitude to the Diet, a substantial share of respondents preferred her performance in her summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Her style of relying on popular opinion is still working and may continue for some time.