Asia Policy Events, Week of August 16, 2026

Asia Policy Point is on summer recess, like the U.S. Congress until August 31. We will, however, post some events weekly for our readers and members. If you want to receive these directly to your mailbox, you have to become a "member" of APP. An individual, nonshareable membership is only $105/year and includes our occasional papers of on Japanese politics and access to our office while visiting Washington. SIGN UP HERE.

Week of August 16, 2026

8/3~16 - Beidaihe Annual Summer Chinese leadership meetings, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, PRC. The list of invitees to the annual gathering, as reported by state media, suggests that China’s leaders are placing a heavy emphasis on science, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
8/10-14 - Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby visits Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia. First official trip to Southeast Asia as Under Secretary of War for Policy. MANILA SPEECH, PRESS CONFERENCE.
8/12 - South Korea's Supreme Court confirms a decision requiring Japan's Nippon Steel to compensate the relatives of a Korean national who endured forced labor under Japan's occupation at its Kamaishi Steelworks. 
8/13 - Russian President Vladimir Putin makes his first visit to one of four Russian-held western Pacific islands (Iturup, known in Japan as Etorofu) seized after WWII that Japan calls its Northern Territories.
8/14 – Memorial Day for Japanese Forces’ Comfort Women Victims, South Korea.
8/14 – 1991. South Korean comfort woman victim Kim Hak-sun became the first to give public testimony about her experience.

8/15 - 1945. Imperial Japan accepts the Potsdam Declaration and ceases combat operations. Shūsen-kinenbi (Memorial Day for the End of the War in Japan). National Memorial Service for the War Dead at the Nippon Budokan hall in Tokyo with the Emperor and prime minister. 
     As expected, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi did not make her usual visit Yasukuni Shrine and sent an offering instead. However, Upon arriving at Nippon Budokan hall to attend her first war memorial ceremony since taking office last year, Takaichi turned toward the Yasukuni Shrine across the road and bowed twice, clapped twice and bowed once in an apparent act of Shinto worship from a distance. She did visit the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery for War Dead down the street from the Yasukuni Shrine. Her Memorial statement also made no mention of "remorse." [APP wrote about Prime Minister Ishiba's reinsertion of "remorse" in the annual memorial statement after its removal by Prime Minister Abe.] Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, Minoru Kiuchi, economic and fiscal policy minister, Kimi Onoda, economic security minister, and Hitoshi Kikawada, in charge of issues related to Okinawa and the Northern Territories did visit the Shrine. Senior LDP officials -- Secretary General Suzuki, Haruko Arimura, head of its General Council, and Yasutoshi Nishimura, head of its Election Strategy Committee -- went to the Shrine as well. On the same day, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung emphasized in his remarks for Liberation Day "that Korea-Japan cooperation is more important than ever, The light of the new Korea-Japan relationship that we will create is To those who are still enduring pain in the shadows of history It must be able to be a source of warmth." 

8/15 -  USS George Washington departs the Pacific and expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East leaving the Western Pacific without an American aircraft carrier. Next day Trump orders the scaling back of the upcoming U.S.-South Korea exercises.
15 – Annual Far Eastern Prisoners of War (FEPOW) Day in Taiwan hosted by Taiwan POW Camps Memorial Society. 
8/15-16 - Panda Fest DC 2026, Washington, DC, outdoor Asian food festival with experiential activities, tastings, and market fairs.
8/17 - 1926. Centenary of the birth of late Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. Xi to speak at commemoration.
8/17 – Independence Day, National Holiday, Indonesia.
8/17-27 - 26th Annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with the U.S. and South Korea held in South Korea. On the 16th, Trumps tells Hegseth to scale them back!!
8/19 – 1945. Several dozen British, Dutch, and American senior officers including Lieutenant Generals Jonathan Wainwright and A.E. Percival located by the OSS at the Hsian POW camp, 150 miles north of Mukden (today's Shenyang, China).
8/20-21 - Religious Freedom in Asia: Representation, Restrictions and Rights hosted by the Asia Centre Bangkok.
8/21 – 1945. Japanese authorities decide to set up the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) for the benefit of Allied occupation troops modeled on the military government’s long-established Comfort Women system.

8/22-23 - Freedom 250 Grand Prix street circuit: NTT INDYCAR SERIES. First-ever automotive race around the National Mall and the historic streets of Washington, DC. Veterans of the NTT trade wars will be amused that Japan's NTT is now encircling the National Mall. 
8/23 - Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong gives an annual address to mark the independence of the city-state. 
8/23-27 - World Water Week.

KEIRIN: JAPAN'S WARRIORS ON BICYCLES. 8/17, 6:45pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society-UK. Speakers: Joe Truman, British Track Cyclist; author, Justin McCurry, Japan and Korea correspondent, The Guardian, War on Wheels: Inside Keirin and Japan’s Cycling Subculture; Moderator: Jim McCafferty, Director, Reynolds Technology. PURCHASE BOOK. NB: Keirin is a major off-budget source of funding (managed by METI) for Japan’s electronics industry.

BEYOND PYONGYANG: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZATION, AND INEQUALITY IN NORTH KOREA. 8/17, 8:00-9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson, 38 North. Speakers: Martyn Williams, Senior Fellow, 38 North Program; Iliana Ragnone, Research Analyst & Managing Editor, 38 North Program; Moderator: Jenny Town, Director, 38 North Program.

THE HORMUZ IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY POLICYMAKING: JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA. 8/18, 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. Speakers: TERAZAWA, Tatsuya, Chairman and CEO, IEEJ, Japan; Jae-Seung Lee, Professor, Jean Monnet Chair in College & Graduate School of International Studies (CIS & GSIS), Korea University; Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program.

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S GENERATIONAL SHIFT: FOREIGN POLICY FUTURES. 8/18, 9:00-10:35am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Speakers include: Dante Schulz, Project Manager for Political and Security Affairs, NBR; Rohan Mukherjee, Assistant Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; Rajni Gamage, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore; Md. Tanvir Habib, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka; Moderator: Christopher Clary, Associate Professor of Political Science, University at Albany.

THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ CLOSURE: WHAT HAPPENS TO TRADE AND SHIPPING? 8/19, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). Speakers: Simon J. Evenett, Professor of Geopolitics and Strategy, IMD Business School, Founder of St Gallen Endowment for Prosperity through Trade, University of St Gallen Switzerland; Dorota Lost-Siemińska, Director Legal Affairs and External Relations, International Maritime Organization (IMO); Moderator: Cecilia Malmström , Nonresident Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics (PIIE).

GOLDEN DOME: EARLY ASSESSMENT AND OPEN QUESTIONS. 8/19, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: David Mosher, Director of National Security Analysis - Congressional Budget Office; Steve Fetter, Professor, School of Public Policy - University of Maryland; Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Director - Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director - Africa Security Initiative, Moderator: Melanie W. Sisson, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology.

PRESS CONFERENCE: JAPAN'S SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD. 8/19, 11:00-Noon (JST), 8/18, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Ken Jimbo, Research Institute for Advanced Innovation and GeoStrategy (RAIS); Tomoyuki Furutani, (RAIS).

DIGITAL TAIWAN LECTURE SERIES – TAIWAN’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE 2026 LOCAL ELECTIONS. 8/19, 4:00-5:00pm (TST), 4:00-5:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Dr. Ching-Hsin Yu, Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; Moderator: Yi-Chieh Chen, Research Fellow, ISDP’s Stockholm Taiwan Center.

CAN THE UNITED STATES RETAIN ITS SCIENTIFIC TALENT? 8/20, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Speakers: Adriana Bankston, Consultant & Advisor; Scientific Research Policy; Advocacy & Government Relations; Donna Ginthe, Roy A. Roberts & Regents Distinguished Professor of Economics Director, Institute for Policy & Social Research, University of Kansas; Shalin Jyotishi, Founder and Director, Future of Work and Innovation Economy Initiative; Moderator: Trelysa Long, Policy Analyst, ITIF.

DOES AUKUS STRENGTHEN AUSTRALIA’S SECURITY? 8/20 6:00-7:15pm (AEST), 4:00-5:15am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Lowy Institute. Speakers: Sam Roggeveen, Program Director Lowy Institute’s International Security Program; Jennifer Parker, Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, Adjunct Fellow in Naval Studies at the University of Western Australia; Mihai Sora, Director of Research at the Lowy Institute. Fee 

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 9, 2026

INSIDE JAPAN’S HIGH-STAKES SNAP ELECTION. 2/9, 8:00-9:00AM (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Speakers: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS; Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, University of Oxford; Charles McClean, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Japan Chair, CSIS, Assistant Professor, Yale University; Moderator: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS.

BOOK TALK: RUNAWAY CAPITALISM. 2/9, Noon-1:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: American University School of International Service. Speakers: author, James Mittelman, Distinguished Research Professor and University Professor Emeritus, American University; Maria De Jesus, Professor, School of International Service, American University; Patricia Aufderheide, University Professor of Communication Studies, School of Communication, American University, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Media & Social Impact; Clarence Lusane, Professor, Howard University; Director, International Affairs Program; Julie Radomski, Global China Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Boston University Global Development Policy Center; Yang Zhang, Professor, School of International Service, American University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4qR3l4n

BOOK TALK: CANCELING RUSSIA: THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WESTERN HAWKS. 2/9, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov, Professor of Russian and International Politics, San Francisco State University; Anatol Lieven, Director, Eurasia Program, Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History, Quincy Institute.

DECODING TRUMP’S CHINA POLICY. 2/9, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE (FP). Speakers: Kurt Campbell, Former U.S. deputy secretary of state and current chairman and co‑founder of The Asia Group; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in chief of Foreign Policy and host of FP LIVE. 

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 12, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly is considering dissolution of the Lower House at the beginning of the ordinary session of the Diet, now scheduled to convene on January 23. A snap election would follow in early or mid-February. Her motivation is to restore the power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before her cabinet’s approval rating falls. If she does so, she will face criticism for bringing about a period of political vacancy and leaving behind the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill.
 
“I asked my ministers to execute policies included in the supplementary budget as early as possible. It is important to let the people realize the benefit of measures taken by my Cabinet to curb price inflation. I am focused on those immediate issues,” Takaichi said  in her new year’s press conference on January 5. This answer to a question from press was widely interpreted as a firm refusal to call an early snap election.
 
Four days later, late on the night of January 9, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Takaichi was thinking of an early snap election. According to Yomiuri, the Lower House election would be on February 8 or 15, if the House were dissolved on the first day of ordinary session, January 23. Mainichi Shimbun published a similar account early in the morning of January 10, and other media outlets followed on January 11.
 
It is well established that the prime minister has the power to dissolve the Lower House.  This authority derives from the cabinet’s duty to advise and approve the Emperor’s actions in matters of state. These actions include dissolving the Lower House. Once the Lower House is dissolved, Japan’s Constitution requires that a general election take place within 40 days. The period from dissolution to election has diminished in recent snap elections. The last Lower House election was in October 2024. Some argue that calling a snap election in a short period may be an abuse of power.
 
The rationale for an early snap election is Takaichi’s relatively high popularity. She has maintained a 60 to 70 percent approval rating in the polls since she took office last October. Some lawmakers in the LDP expect that the party will secure a large enough victory to give the LDP a simple majority in the Lower House. They also expect that the high approval rating will decline as discussions in the ordinary Diet session continue.
 
Even with a majority in the Lower House, Takaichi’s government, including the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority in the Upper House. If the LDP wins a majority in a Lower House snap election, Takaichi will still need to ask opposition parties for support to pass bills in the Upper House. It is possible that an endorsement by the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) of the FY2026 budget bill, which is to be discussed in the coming ordinary session, has encouraged Takaichi to contemplate an early election.
 
To have an early and successful snap election, Takaichi must counter criticisms of her decision. She argues that a majority will ensure action to support her priorities. The highest one on her list is support for people suffering from price inflation, for which she has adopted the slogan of “responsible and proactive public finances.” Although she delivered a certain amount of economic stimulus in the supplemental budget last year, anti-inflation measures are only at a halfway point.
 
If the snap election occurs, no discussion of the FY2026 budget bill can take place until new Lower House members are elected, the Lower House elects a prime minister (presumably Takaichi) again, and the newly elected prime minister delivers a policy speech to the Diet. The budget bill is unlikely to pass the Diet before the end of March.  Without a finished budget bill, the government will have to develop a provisional budget for FY2026 beginning in April.
 
A snap election creates political vacancy, though she said wants to deal with price inflation. There is no reason or cause for dissolution,” the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, said. Noda also indicated that the regular convocation of the ordinary session could invite some discussions that Takaichi does not want to face. There is speculation that Takaichi is afraid of questioning in the Diet about her relationship with the former Unification Church. Weekly Bunshun has reported that the Church had hoped that she would become the LDP president.
 
The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, has expressed his concern that an early election would delay implementation of the economic policies embedded in the FY2026 budget bill. “A dissolution will leave the economy behind,” he said. Although he had agreed with Takaichi last December to support passage of the FY2026 budget bill by the end of March, Tamaki said that he would now reconsider that agreement. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, was terser: when questioned about an early election in light of the urgent issues in economy and foreign affairs, he said, “Why now?”
 
The LDP and the JIP have not reached any agreement on electoral cooperation in the single-seat districts of the Lower House. If JIP suffers a significant defeat in the snap election, particularly in those districts, JIP may reconsider the merits of its coalition with the LDP. The DPP may also rethink its approach to the Takaichi administration if the party loses seats in the Lower House election and finds the coalition to be unbeneficial. A victory by the LDP thus could undermine its coalition framework.
 
Takaichi’s policies have not achieved outstanding results. The Japanese yen has continued to depreciate and fell to 158 yen to the dollar after news broke of a possible snap election. The fall was interpreted as reflecting a concern that Takaichi’s “proactive” fiscal policy would further destabilize the government’s delicate financial balance. The political vacancy resulting from a snap election will delay delivery of an economic stimulus package.
 
On the international front, ever since Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, China has been boosting its pressure on Japan. China most recently announced that it would impose greater restrictions on exports of dual-use goods to Japan. Although China ruled out regulation of private trade, The Wall Street Journal has reported that China has begun choking supply of rare-earths. Takaichi has not taken either effective countermeasures or other steps to mend the relationship with China.
 
Takaichi has stressed that her upcoming March visit to the United States is one of her diplomatic achievements. But President Donald Trump is focusing elsewhere, such as pursuing his America First agenda in Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Iran. The Japan-China relationship is out of his sight. Trump also wants to have a successful, grand summit with China’s Xi Jinping in April. A snap election will give voters in Japan a chance to evaluate Takaichi’s diplomatic work. 

Takaichi’s 2026

Foreign Affairs, Coalition Building, and a Snap Election Headline Takaichi’s 2026

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 5, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi entered the new year learning of the United States’ raid on Venezuela. Takaichi issued an anodyne comment, hoping for sustainable democracy in that country. Trump’s action may be a sign for Takaichi that 2026 will be diplomatically busy, even while her political focus should be on reinforcing the leading coalition and calling for a snap election.
 
It was in the evening of January 3, Tokyo time, when news broke of the U.S. attack on Caracas and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Having no opportunity to speak to the press on the day, Takaichi posted on X that the government of Japan was insisting on the importance of restoring democracy in Venezuela. The Japanese government “will promote diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela and to stabilize the situation there, in close cooperation with neighboring countries and taking the utmost measures to secure the safety of Japanese citizens,” Takaichi said.
 
Although Takaichi had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump only the day before, she gave the reporters no hint about whether they had talked about Venezuela. “Having reconfirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S., we agreed on coordinating for my visit to the U.S. this spring,” Takaichi said in a press briefing after the call.
 
For Takaichi, who naively complicated bilateral relations with China by the observation that Japan could use force if the Taiwan contingency occurs, it would be the U.S. that she can rely on to reestablish diplomatic normality with China, without any apology or regret about her comment. As Trump agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Beijing in April, it is a diplomatic requirement for her to meet with Trump before his meeting with Xi.
 
Japan has opposed a unilateral change in the international status quo by force since criticizing China’s conduct toward Taiwan and its aggression in the South China Sea. No argument is heard in Japan that the U.S. raid on Venezuela was not a unilateral change of the status quo by force. “I am concerned that it would send a dangerous message that this American military operation could be regarded as a unilateral change in the status quo,” former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera said.
 
Professor Kazuhiro Maeshima of Sophia University indicated that Japan will need to balance its security against critical comments about U.S. action in Venezuela. “In case China invades Taiwan, it will not be easy to say ‘stop changing the status quo,’ ” after the U.S. action in Venezuela, Maeshima said. Indeed, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea after the U.S. sent military forces into Venezuela. An event in South America can thus affect security in Northeast Asia.
 
Takaichi’s domestic agenda is no less crucial than the increasing complications in foreign affairs. Takaichi’s priority in 2026 is to stabilize her administration. In the first half of this year, Takaichi must survive the ordinary session of the Diet, which will convene on January 23. She has obtained support for the FY2026 main budget bill, which must pass the Diet by the end of March, from the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). On other legislation, though, the leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), must find votes from other opposition party members.
 
The LDP and JIP tabled action on a bill that would reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the ordinary session. The two parties did, however, agree to proceed in the ordinary session with a bill that would impose greater restrictions on real estate investments and sales by foreigners and that would establish the Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). To find a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, the LDP-JIP coalition must garner votes from the opposition parties.
 
The DPP is willing to support the LDP more broadly than in previous sessions, after the LDP agreed at the end of last year to the DPP’s policy to raise the threshold for imposing income tax to 1.78 million yen of annual income. But, the DPP has not decided to participate in the leading coalition. The DPP is worried that the LDP may field candidates against DPP candidates in single-seat districts of the Lower House in the next election. Further, by not joining the coalition, the DPP may exercise discretion in deciding whether to support bills sponsored by the LDP.
 
Because the LDP currently has no margin for error in passing bills in the House of Representatives, it is important to watch whether Takaichi will call a snap election of the House. The prime minister of Japan is regarded as having the power to dissolve the Lower House at any time of her choosing. Every prime minister hopes to call a snap election to reinforce the political basis of his or her administration.
 
To do so, Takaichi must resolve at least three practical issues. First, there are two conflicting factors. On the one hand, she will need the approval of the LDP’s coalition partner. The LDP and JIP so far have no agreement to cooperate in elections. JIP has overwhelming strength in single-seat districts in Osaka. If the parties do not agree to cooperate, they will compete in those districts. On the other hand, a decision against running candidates in districts with JIP lawmakers will frustrate the LDP’s local organizations. Takaichi will have to weigh the risks whether to cooperate or to compete.
 
Second, Takaichi must find a cause to run on. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House in 2014, asking voters to approve his decision to postpone a consumption tax hike. Fumio Kishida in 2021 and Shigeru Ishiba in 2024 sought approval of their new premierships. To hold a snap election, Takaichi must clarify what she will ask voters in the election.
 
Third and most important, is whether a snap election will reinforce or erode Takaichi’s currently high approval rating. Public opinion for prime ministers tends to go down as time passes after inauguration. If Takaichi calls a snap election, she will want her administration to keep its fresh image.
 
Perhaps the earliest possible time to dissolve the Lower House is in April, right after it passes the FY2026 budget bill. The voters will evaluate Takaichi’s budget achievement and the success (or lack thereof) in her visit to the U.S. now planned for March. Another chance to dissolve the Lower House is at the end of the ordinary session in June after the Diet has passed conservative bills such as legalizing the use of maiden names for wives, rather than allowing for separate surnames.
 
If Takaichi feels she cannot call an election during the ordinary session of the Diet, she may still do so at the extraordinary session in the fall at which she will submit a supplementary budget bill. Notwithstanding her high approval rating in the polls, it is unclear if Takaichi can win a snap election. The state of the economy and international affairs cannot be foretold but will certainly affect the election and the Takaichi administration’s longevity.

The LDP Presidential Campaign Begins

The LDP Enters the Policy Discussion Phase of its Presidential Election

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 22, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) kicked off its presidential election campaign on September 22. Five lawmakers officially submitted their candidacies to the party on the 22nd with only a 15 minute window to file. The deadline for entries has now passed. All five were losers in the last election a year ago.
 
Having lost the majority in both Houses of the Diet under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the presidential election should be about how to regain power through reforming the party. Yet the candidates are not talking much about reform.  They are instead focusing on their economic policies for households or maneuvers to attract support from the opposition parties.
 
One of the biggest reasons for the defeats in the 2024 Lower House election and the 2025 Upper House election was the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. It revealed LDP’s mismanagement of political funds without transparency. The opposition parties called for stricter regulation of donations from companies and organizations, which have been the financial lifeline for the LDP.  After receiving protests from LDP lawmakers, Ishiba did not reach a consensus with the opposition on the issue. Ishiba announced his resignation as the LDP president on September 7.
 
The LDP set the presidential election for October 4 and opened the starting gate for campaigns on September 22. Five people have entered the race. They are: former Minister on Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Minister on Economic Security Sanae Takaichi, and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Each has his or her own platform.
 
Kobayashi is running on three key issues. First, he supports a temporary income tax cut with a fixed rate. The tax cut would provide greater benefits to high-income taxpayers than to low-income ones. Kobayashi would offset the cut with surplus tax revenue in the current year. Second, reflecting his hawkish perspective, Kobayashi supports an increase in the defense budget to more than 2 percent of GDP. Finally, he advocates greater regulation of foreign intervention in communications in Japan.
 
Announcing his candidacy immediately after Ishiba’s announcement, Motegi promises that he will pursue economic growth policies that will increase the annual income of each worker by 10 percent within three years. While other candidates prioritize policy talks with the opposition parties, Motegi aims to assemble a coalition to secure a majority in the Diet.
 
Hayashi would continue the policies of the Ishiba administration in the hope of attracting the votes of Ishiba and his allies. Setting a target of one percent growth in real wages each year, Hayashi would establish a Japanese version of “universal credit,” a social security payment which the United Kingdom has introduced. In addition, to reform the party, he would create a digital platform for real-time communications with the public. He would also amend the party constitution.
 
In her campaign speech at the LDP headquarters, Takaichi emphasized her conservative agenda. This includes greater regulation of foreigners in Japan, limiting the line of succession to the imperial throne to male offspring in the male line, and amendments to Japan’s Constitution. Unusually, however, she would pursue economic policies that include positions held by the opposition parties. These include a refundable tax credit system, a gasoline tax cut, and an increase in the income threshold for tax liability.
 
Finally, Koizumi has actually distanced himself from his platform a year ago. Party “reform” is no longer at the center of his campaign. He has also withdrawn his support for a different surname system and the deregulation of worker dismissals. Instead, Koizumi promises a one-million-yen increase in the annual average wage by FY2030 and domestic investment up to 135 trillion yen. These economic policies were already part of the Ishiba administration’s agenda.
 
Remarkably, none of the five candidates has offered a plan that would settle the dispute over regulation of (or prohibitions on) donations from companies and organizations. The opposition parties have proposed new regulations on and even the abolition of this kind of fundraising. If the LDP insists on this traditional form of fundraising, the party will retain its negative image as an old-line party.
 
In the polls by news organizations, Takaichi has the greatest popularity among general voters. However, among LDP supporters, Koizumi has the greatest support, and only LDP members will vote in the election. There is no certainty that the party election results will be consistent with the popularity of the candidates among the public voters.
 
Five is the largest number of candidates in the history of LDP presidential elections except for the 2024 election, which had nine. Since a candidate can win only with a majority vote, it is almost certain that the election will go to a run-off. Negotiations over policies among the candidates may determine the winner; there is no way to predict which of the five will emerge victoriously.

LDP Rematch

Consolation Match for the Five LDP Presidency Candidates

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 15, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

A week after Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation, the campaign for the next president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began. It has turned into a race with five entrants – all of whom lost in the last election a year ago. The race is likely to be about which candidate can “change” the ailing party’s culture through political funding reform and can manage Diet affairs without a majority in either chamber.
 
Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, resigned last September, in the face of public criticism of the kickback fund scandal by some factions in the LDP. Ishiba succeeded Kishida in the expectation that he would reform a party that relied heavily on donations from companies and business organizations. Ishiba was caught in the middle of a party struggle over whether to ban those donations.
 
Ishiba had promised last December that he would have a legislative solution to reform political donations by the end of March, but he did not deliver. Instead, he continued to discuss reforms with the opposition parties, some of which demanded the total abolition of donations from companies and organizations.
 
In the Lower House election last October, the LDP lost its majority. Responsibility for the loss fell largely on Kishida since the election took place shortly after Ishiba assumed the PM position. Ishiba could not, however, avoid responsibility when the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House election last July. “I could not meet the expectation for change,” Ishiba said in his resignation press conference.
 

The LDP called a presidential election on October 4. Candidates must file entry forms on September 22, when the party will officially open the election. Five candidates are reportedly willing to run for the president.
 
Former Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi was the first to step forward. In his press conference to announce his candidacy, Motegi emphasized his economic policy that would increase take-home pay for many Japanese. This policy resonates with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). Motegi also mentioned the possibility of building a leading coalition with the DPP or the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) that would hold a majority in the Diet.
 
Motegi is running with the support of former colleagues in his now defunct faction, many of whom were leading the anti-Ishiba movement in the LDP after the Upper House election. He also met one-on-one with former prime minister Taro Aso, who openly opposed Ishiba. Polls have shown, however, that many Japanese did not believe that Ishiba should have resigned. This polling data may force Motegi to explain his differences with Ishiba. Motegi will have to develop a plan for party reform.
 
Other candidates try to catch up Motegi. Former Minister on Economic Security, Takayuki Kobayashi, announced his candidacy on September 16. As a candidate in the age of 50, representing young generation, Kobayashi upheld policies for young generation, including income tax cut. His team is headed by former Minister of Defense, Yasukazu Hamada, who is elected from Chiba, the same prefecture as Kobayashi.
 
Two ministers in Ishiba Cabinet showed apparent interest in the election on the same day. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi, revealed that he had told his candidacy to his supporters in his hometown, Yokosuka. Although official announcement will be later this week, it is surprising that Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead Koizumi’s team, instead of running for the president.
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi, also told his intention to run for the president in his regular press conference. As a core member of Ishiba Cabinet, Hayashi insisted on succeeding policies of Ishiba administration. Supporters for Hayashi consist of lawmakers with former Kishiba faction, supposedly with backing of Kishida himself. He is expected to have another press conference to publicize his policies.
 
Former Minister on Economic Security, Sanae Takaichi, is expected to officially announce her bid for the president later this week. She mainly receives supports from the conservative lawmakers who were frustrated with Ishiba administration. Reiterating a phrase of “rebuild backbone of the party,” Takaichi hopes to restore the cause of conservatives, which gained momentum in the time of former prime minister Shinzo Abe.
 
Takaichi and Koizumi currently dominate. In the election last November, Takaichi finished second and Koizumi third. Both enjoyed broad public support in and did not rely on a specific faction. Takaichi has a firm base of support among conservatives. Koizumi has the support of former premier Yoshihide Suga and younger party members.
 
But neither one is likely to win in the first round. To win in the first round, a candidate must garner at least 296 votes: a majority of all 590 votes: 295 for lawmakers and 295 for local party members. In any subsequent run-off election local party members have only 47 votes. The successful candidate must win at least 171 votes out of 342.
 
If the run-off pits Takaichi against Koizumi, conservative votes, including those who have supported Kobayashi, will go for Takaichi. Koizumi does not have a similar natural group of supporters. Instead, he must appeal to Ishida’s supporters. This is a tall order because Koizumi had urged Ishiba to step down. With this history, support from some of Ishiba’s allies may be hard to get. Koizumi does have the advantage of a close relationship with the leader of Ishin, Hirofumi Yoshimura. Takaichi expects cooperation from conservative parties, such as Sanseito.

Motegi and Hayashi both rely on the power of former factions. Motegi cannot count on support from Ishiba, and Hayashi expects Ishiba’s support since he was the deputy in the prime minister’s office. But the presidential election last year proved that factions, including the Aso faction, will not suffice as voting units. The LDP factions represented outmoded politics. 
 
The opposition parties have accused the LDP of creating a political vacancy in the election process. Encouraged by public opinion polls showing that the replacement of Ishiba will not raise the LDP’s credibility, the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, degraded this LDP presidential election as “a consolation match” of the previous election a year ago.

Inevitable transition

Ishiba Announces He Is Stepping Down

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 8, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Acknowledging his responsibility for the serious defeat in the Upper House elections in July, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation on September 7. Although he sought a way to stay in office after the election, backed by public opinion that he did not have to leave, the anti-Ishiba movement in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) overwhelmed Ishiba’s continuity plan. The LDP presidential election, which is likely to name the next prime minister, will be held on October 4.

Ishiba announced his resignation at an abrupt press conference on Sunday evening. “I’ve been saying that I would not insist on my position, I would make a decision at a proper time, and I am responsible for the result of the election. Now is the proper time to open my position to a successor, because we could conclude tariff negotiations with the United States,” Ishiba said.

With the defeat in the Upper House elections on July 20, the leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito fell into minority positions in both Chambers of the Diet. Ishiba sought advice on how to continue the government from three former prime ministers, Taro Aso, Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, three days after the election. Although Ishiba denied that the meetings covered his possible resignation, it was reported that the three former premiers did not unequivocally support Ishiba staying in office.

Achievements in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and the expansion of rice production gave the Ishiba Cabinet a bump in its approval rating in August. In the polls, people considered the LDP’s defeat to be more a function of the LDP slush fund scandal than of Ishiba’s mishandling of the election campaign. Nevertheless, anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP called for Ishiba’s resignation and an early presidential election to replace him.

The LDP decided to conduct a count on September 8 of how many lawmakers and local branches would demand an early election. Ishiba made up his mind to step down a day before this showdown. “If we proceed to the process for an early presidential election, it will cause a division of our party. That was not what I want,” Ishiba explained about his decision. The LDP cancelled the count.

A day before the announcement, Ishiba had met with Suga and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. After 30 minutes, Suga left, and Koizumi had a one-on-one meeting with Ishiba for 90 minutes. It was reported that Suga and Koizumi urged Ishiba to resign to avoid a division of the party. Now isolated, Ishiba decided to resign.

The argument of Suga and Koizumi that Ishiba would avoid disruption of the LDP by resigning did not in fact make good sense because the LDP has already been divided. Anti-Ishiba groups, notably the former Abe faction, have been frustrated with Ishiba’s leadership from the beginning. There has been a rivalry between Ishiba and former prime minister Shinzo Abe ever since Ishiba had rejected Abe’s offer to be his minister in charge of security legislation in 2014. This position oversaw the radical reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.

Ishiba’s and Abe’s antagonism stemmed from a political war in the 1970s between Kakuei Tanaka, Ishiba’s political mentor, and Takeo Fukuda, a founder of the Seiwa Policy Group which was the official name of the former Abe faction. Looking back further, the LDP originally was the result of a merger in 1955 of the conservative Democratic Party of Japan and the relatively dovish Liberal Party. From the beginning, no leader has been found in the LDP who could reconcile the fundamental difference between those two parties: the historical revisionists pushing for an immediate constitutional amendment and the moderates advocating domestic decentralization.

As prime minister, Ishiba was unusually adept at handling competing policies. Although he could not deliver an official statement on August 15 to recognize the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba included, in his address at the memorial ceremony, the word “remorse” in reference to Japan’s invasion of neighboring countries. Abe, in contrast, refrained from expressing “remorse” in his annual addresses.

On another issue, however, campaign contributions from companies and organizations, Ishiba was unable to abolish them after protests from anti-Ishiba powers in the LDP. Ishiba regretted that he could not deliver the kind of political reform sought by the public.

After Ishiba’s resignation, the LDP decided to hold a presidential election on October 4 to elect a successor. The election will be held in “full spec version,” in which lawmakers and general party members have equivalent votes. In the full-spec version, each of 295 Diet members of LDP has one vote, and hundreds of thousands of votes by general LDP members are proportionally divided into 295 votes.

There is a speculation that the two leading contenders are Koizumi and former Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi. Both have yet to announce their candidacies. Former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, who has allied himself with Aso’s faction. A young conservative, Takayuki Kobayashi, is another possible entrant in the race. Electioneering begins on September 22.

One significant difference between the October 4 election and previous LDP presidential elections is that the winner will not necessarily be elected prime minister in the Diet. The LDP and its junior coalition partner Komeito do not have a majority vote in either Chamber. That is, the opposition parties can elect their own prime minister if they can agree to back a single candidate.

But the opposition parties are too fragmented to do so. One possible consensus candidate is the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan Yoshihiko Noda. Yet some opposition lawmakers may vote for an LDP candidate rather than for an opposition candidate from another party. For there to be smooth negotiations with the opposition parties to name a prime minister or to pass a budget bill, the next LDP president will be required to have an ability to talk convincingly and work closely with the opposition parties.

The No Change Change

Ishiba Government Loses Majority in Both Houses

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s July 20 Upper House elections resulted in a significant defeat for the coalition government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The coalition of the LDP and Komeito lost its majority in the Upper House, as it did last October in the Lower House. Although Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced that he would stay in his position, his government will be in an extremely unstable condition that could break down in short order.
 
In the Upper House election, 125 members (including a supplement for one vacancy in Tokyo district) out of all 248 seats were elected. The rest of 123 members do not have an election this year. Among those 125, the LDP saw its seats reduced from 52 before the election to 39 after, while Komeito also lost six seats, from 14 to eight. The coalition secured only 47 seats in the election. The LDP and Komeito hold 75 seats without election this year. Thus, the total sum of their seats in the Upper House is 122, which is short of a simple majority by three seats.
 
The biggest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), had no change from its pre-election status. The CDPJ had 22 seats up for election and won 22 seats in the election. The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) added just two seats, from five to seven. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) made a significant surge from four seats to 17, while the new populist party, Sanseito, expanded from one seat to 14.
 
It has been said that the LDP has its supporters, 60 percent of whom always vote for the party in every election. The other 40 percent are indecisive and go back and forth between the LDP and other parties. It is likely that those swing voters, disappointed with the lack of LDP leadership in the Diet, went for the DPP or Sanseito this time; there is speculation that most of these voters were conservatives.
 
The advance of Sanseito resembles the far-right movements in some European countries. Creating the slogan “The Japanese First,” the party received public support for its xenophobic agenda, such as blocking foreign workers and foreign investments. However, Sanseito is not yet a leading force in the national politics in Japan. Fiery and controversial anti-immigrant speeches of its leader and candidates have isolated the party from the others.
 
The LDP’s campaign strategy fared poorly. The party promised cash payments for children and low-income families to offset consumer price inflation. However, many voters viewed the handouts as temporary and less effective than lowering the consumption tax rate, a cut promoted by the opposition parties. Additionally, the LDP lost credibility with voters by failing to enact legislation dealing with political donations from companies, to introduce separate surname legislation, and to conclude tariff negotiations with the United States.
 
The opposition parties also reached a wider range of voters than the LDP did. The DPP’s slogan, “The summer of increasing take-home pay,” had broad appeal, as if the party could give all voters more cash in their pockets by the end of the summer. By contrast, the LDP presented long-term and conceptual policies, such as “1 million yen of additional salary in 2030” or a future target of “1,000 trillion yen of Japan’s GDP.”
 
The LDP also lagged in social media. At the beginning of the campaign season, immigration was not a major issue. But through advertisements and posts on social networking services, Sanseito turned anti-immigration measures into the top priority for many voters during the final week of the election campaign. The LDP could not reverse the trend, continuing to rely on traditional town meetings and chants of candidates’ names from campaign cars.
 
Prime Minister Ishiba, as the president of the LDP, declared that he would stay on as premier. “I will take responsibility as the leader of largest party (in the Diet),” Ishiba said in his press conference on July 21. There is no precedent since the establishment of the LDP in 1955 for a leading party or coalition to run the government without a majority in both Houses.
 
Although the Lower House has decisive power to choose the government, even an Upper House election can have a significant impact, as seen in the collapse of the Ryutaro Hashimoto Cabinet in 1998 and the first Shinzo Abe Cabinet in 2007.
 
Ishiba has chosen to stay because he believes that he can buck tradition and govern without the traditional majorities. Despite losing a majority of the seats in the Lower House last fall, he saw through the Lower House’s approval of the FY2025 annual budget by the end of March this year. He also headed off submission of a no-confidence resolution against Ishiba Cabinet by the opposition parties. It shows that Ishiba has remarkable political dexterity.
 
It is unlikely that the opposition parties, from the leftist Japan Communist Party to the far-right Sanseito, can form their own coalition and defeat the Ishiba administration. Another reason for Ishiba’s confidence in his staying power is the absence of any rival in his party so far.
 
Two days before the Upper House election, Sanae Takaichi, the finalist in the most recent LDP presidential election in 2024, expressed her willingness to run in the next presidential election. However, LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama has discouraged such moves, saying that it is not the time for a leadership struggle within the LDP. Other contenders in the last presidential election have not challenged Ishiba, nor are they able to do so.
 
It is likely that Ishiba will enter discussions with opposition parties on a policy-by-policy basis as he has done since losing the Lower House majority. He expects good opportunities to add opposition parties to his coalition and bolster his administration. However, the Ishiba administration will always be vulnerable to the collective efforts of opposition powers as well as to an upsurge of anti-Ishiba sentiment within the LDP.

Monday Asia Policy Events, July 21, 2025

INDIA IN THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER: IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN AND BEYOND. 7/21, 2:30-4:00pm (SGT), 2:30-4:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS); Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS). Speakers: Choi Shing Kwok, Director and Chief Executive Officer, Yusof Ishak Institute; Dr. Samir Saran, President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, India; Iqbal Singh Sevea, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. 

INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: A RESET. 7/21, 8:30am-2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Peter A. Barnes, Of Counsel, Caplin & Drysdale; Daniel Bunn, President, Tax Foundation; Nathaniel Carden, Partner, International Tax; Tax Controversy and Litigation, Skadden; Ron Estes, US House of Representatives (Kansas); Michael J. Graetz, Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University; Mindy Herzfeld, Professor of Practice, University of Florida; Michael Knoll, Theodore K. Warner Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Adam N. Michel, Director, Tax Policy Studies, Cato Institute; William Morris, Global Tax Policy Leader, PwC US; Michael Plowgian, Principal, KPMG; Kyle Pomerleau, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Julie A. Roin, Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Karl Russo, National Economics and Statistics Leader, PwC; Luisa Scarcella, Global Policy Lead, International Chamber of Commerce; Brad Schneider, US House of Representatives (Illinois). 

STRENGTHENING CYBER PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 7/21, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security. Speakers: Dr. Duyeon Kim, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security; Mihoko Matsubara, Chief Cybersecurity Strategist, NTT Corporation; Dr. Teng Wei-Chung, Professor and Chairman, Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology; Dr. Sherwin Ona, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Developmental Studies, De La Salle University; Moderator: Vivek Chilukuri, Senior Fellow and Program Director, Technology and National Security Program, Center for a New American Security. 

TOKYO AS A WINDOW FOR GLOBAL JAPAN: A CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR YURIKO KOIKE. 7/21, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Yuriko Koike, Governor, Tokyo; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair. 

REPORT ROLLOUT: MESH SENSING FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE. 7/21, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Missile Defense Project, CSIS. Speakers: Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department, CSIS; Masao Dahlgren, Fellow, Missile Defense Project, CSIS.

POLICY INNOVATION FROM TOKYO TO THE WORLD. 7/21, 3:00-4:30pm, IN PERSON ONLY, 555 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Room 426, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS. Speaker: Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike. 

CORONAVIRUS AND NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REGIME RESPONSES AND FUTURE INSTABILITY SCENARIOS. 7/21, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Speakers: Robert Collins, Author, Coronavirus and North Korean Human Rights; Col. David Maxwell, Board Member, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); Jaewoo Park, Journalist, Radio Free Asia (RFA); Moderator: Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 

THE JAPANESE HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS. 7/22, 10:00-11:00am (JST), 7/21, 9:00-10:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Speaker: Michael Cucek, Faculty Advisor for Asian Studies and an Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan Campus. 

PRESS CONFERENCE: KIM IJUNG, KOREAN RESIDENTS UNION IN JAPAN (MINDAN). 7/22, 11:00am-Noon (JST), 7/21, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speakers: Kim Ijung, President, Central Head Office, Korean Residents Union, Japan

Japan's 2025 Upper House Elections II

Upsurge of a New Populist Party in the Election Campaign

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 14, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

As Japan’s Upper House election campaigns enter their last week, policies toward foreigners in Japan have become prominent. Most parties, whether they are part of the current coalition or not, support the immigration of foreign workers to fill labor shortages.,

However, one small populist party, Sanseito [参政党, lit. 'Political Participation Party'; translated as the Party of Do it Yourself!! in English] appears to have attracted substantial support (largely at the expense of the LDP and Komeito) by arguing that the Japanese should operate the country by themselves and reduce their dependence upon foreign workers. This issue has now taken on considerable importance.

Sanseito was established in 2020 as an alternative to current traditional parties by reaching out to potential supporters via the Internet and social media. In 2022, the party’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, became the first party member to win election to the Upper House. In the Lower House election in 2024, the party garnered three more seats. Sanseito has about 150 seats in local assemblies, including the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, in which the party won three seats in June.

Sanseito has adopted “The Japanese First” as its catch phrase in the Upper House election campaign, much like the terms “America First” or “Make America Great Again” used by U.S. President Donald Trump. The party is clearly right wing. In a July 3 press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Sanseito’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, listed four foreign parties that Sanseito felt closest to: the most conservative part of the Republican Party in the U.S., Alternative for Deutschland in Germany, the National Rally in France, and Reform U.K. in Britain.

Sanseito’s founding principle is anti-globalism. “There is globalism behind the scenes in our current economic stagnation, in which multinational companies collect money through deregulation, accelerating poverty and ruining the middle class,” Kamiya said in a debate of eight party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2.

Sanseito’s party platform for the Upper House election includes regulations that would prohibit excessive entry of foreign workers and the purchase of real property by foreigners. Calling Sanseito by its nickname, the “Party of Do It Yourself,” Kamiya believes that Japan can rebuild without foreign workers by taking advantage of such technologies as artificial intelligence and robotics, even if Japan has a smaller population in the future.

These policies prove a xenophobic aspect of Sanseito. “Japan has no anti-espionage law and no strict punishment for foreigners’ crimes or false advantages (in taxation or welfare),” Kamiya said at the JNPC debate. That statement ignited a controversy on policies for foreigners. As a matter of fact, Japan has Special Secret Protection Act and Economic Security Promotion Act. Crimes by foreigners in 2024 declined by half from 2005. Newspapers published editorials that opposed exclusion of foreigners.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has supported foreign workers as a solution to labor shortages in Japan. To address complaints about advantages for foreign workers, the LDP proposes to end illegal immigration into Japan. Opposition parties have been critical of the deteriorating situation of foreign workers. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, for example, stresses the need to build “a multi-cultural coexisting society.” The Democratic Party for the People (DPP), however, agrees with Sanseito on a prohibition on foreign ownership of real property.

Sanseito could be a threat to the LDP. In a poll by Kyodo News in late June, Sanseito took the second position behind the LDP with an 8.1 percent approval rating in proportional districts in the Upper House election. There is a speculation that Sanseito will win ten or more seats.

Sanseito has staked out ultra-conservative positions on other issues unrelated to immigration. The party interprets the Emperor as “sacred and inviolable” in their draft of new constitution of Japan, using the term in pre-war Constitution of the Empire of Japan. Sanseito would also redefine the Self-defense Force as a military force.

It is likely that Sanseito has won over some LDP conservative supporters. Kamiya judges that some disappointed LDP supporters shifted to the DPP, and then they came to Sanseito, frustrated with the liberal DPP.

Given this surge of support for right-wing causes, the LDP is under serious pressure in the prefectural districts. In some traditionally conservative districts, the LDP is in a close race with opposition parties.

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba had anticipated gains in popular support for the LDP with the conclusion of tariff negotiations with the U.S. before the campaign season opened on July 3. That did not happen. Aggravating the situation was a July 7 letter from Trump threatening a 25 percent tariff rate starting on August 1. “It’s a battle of our national interest. We won’t be taken advantage of,” Ishiba said in a campaign rally on July 9, using unusually aggressive language for a prime minister.

It seems to be the time for the LDP to face the negative aspects of their past policies. Importing foreign labor and prioritizing car manufacturers over other industries have too heavily focused on a “growth-oriented” economy. The LDP put aside some problems caused by these policies such as the impact of labor imports on people’s life or the damage on agriculture from trade deals with the U.S. or other countries. As a result, they made a room for a populist party to step in.

Japan's Upper House Elections I

Parties Campaign on Three Policy Differences


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 7, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s Upper House election season opened on July 3 with the vote to take place on July 20. This election is overwhelmingly about two issues: support of families suffering from price inflation and international relations, specifically with the United States. In addition, the management of political funds by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be front and center for many voters.

Protection against price inflation has largely taken the form of a debate over the consumption tax. Voters are divided over possible measures to reduce price inflation – so the parties have focused on this issue. In an NHK poll in May, 38 percent of respondants favored a consumption tax cut, while just two percent fewer, 36 percent, supported the current consumption tax rate. Eighteen percent wanted to abolish the consumption tax altogether.

Several opposition parties would reduce or eliminate the tax. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) proposes a zero percent consumption tax on food, which is their top priority. The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, insists that the government can eliminate this part of the consumption tax without an impact on government finances that would compel the issuance of new government bonds.

In a debate featuring party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2, Prime Minister Ishiba (the president of the LDP) asked Noda what financial resources would offset the consumption tax cut. Noda pointed to two areas: the surplus in the governmental funds that are reserved for special policy purposes and the foreign exchange fund special account. Noda also said that other, unspecified tax measures could be revised.

The CDPJ has estimated that eliminating the consumption tax on food would reduce tax revenues by five trillion yen a year. Noda said in February that his party had found a 7.8 trillion-yen surplus in governmental funds. He also argued that much more of the government’s profits in foreign exchange could be included in the government’s general account. And he asserted that the special purpose tax on wage increase would increase the government’s revenues by 0.7 trillion yen. In the CDPJ’s view, all these resources would make a consumption tax cut on food feasible.

Taking a different approach, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) calls for halving consumption tax rate (from ten percent to five percent) on all goods on a time-limited basis. The cut would continue until the growth in workers’ wages exceeds consumer price inflation. But the party has not identified as specific budgetary resource for this tax reduction as what the CDPJ listed.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) favors another route: reducing the consumption tax rate on all goods to five percent before taking it to zero. But the party has not announced when the consumption tax will be repealed. Reiwa Shinsengumi, a small party with liberal policies, says that the government can offset these rate cuts by raising other tax rates and issuing government bonds.

The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) does not look to the consumption tax rate to protect against the effects of inflation but rather focuses on reducing premium for social insurance.

In lieu of any changes to tax rates, the LDP and Komeito propose to distribute twenty thousand yen to everyone and an additional twenty thousand yen for each child or a low-income family. The parties dismiss consumption tax rate reductions as unviable. To that point, in the debate at the JNPC, the chief representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, asked Noda about what would happen when the government resumes the current consumption tax rate, which in a sense becomes a tax increase. Noda did not provide a clear answer.

Turning to international relations, the opposition parties are critical of Ishiba’s management of foreign affairs. Just a few days before the start of election campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his frustration with the bilateral tariff negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. “Dear Mr. Japan, here’s the story: You’re going to pay a 25 percent on your cars,” said Trump. He also complained about the small amount of Japan’s imports of American rice, particularly given the rice shortage in the Japanese market.

In a mixed message yesterday, July 7, Trump sent a letter to Ishiba, saying that a 25 percent tariff on all Japanese goods would apply on August 1 unless the countries reach an agreement before then. Trump had previously set a deadline of July 9 for the conclusion of tariff negotiations, so his letter extends the negotiating timeline. Interestingly, the deadline is ten days after the election.

In the JNPC debate, Noda asked Ishiba how he planned to resolve these negotiations. Ishiba did not specify a way forward but stressed that Japan’s unique position as the biggest national investor and biggest job creator in the U.S. “The success of Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel means that they can deliver good products with their technology and U.S. Steel’s labor force. I think our position with the U.S. is more about investment than tariffs,” Ishiba said. When Noda recommended another summit talk with Trump as soon as possible, Ishiba simply repeated that he would protect the national interests of Japan.

The Trump administration has demanded that Japan increase its defense budget to cover the costs of expanding its military and of hosting the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. At the JNPC debate, the Chairwoman of the Japan Communist Party, Tomoko Tamura, observed that a swollen military budget would not be compatible with social security policies. When Ishiba rejected Tamura’s argument for failing to recognize Japan’s security situation, Tamura accused Ishiba of ignoring suffering families.

On another foreign policy note, the debate covered Trump’s recent reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump compared those events to the recent U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities as tactics that ended a war. (In the case of Iran, a ceasefire would count as an ending.) Ishiba refrained from criticizing Trump. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, rejected the comparison.

The greatest single reason for the LDP’s major defeat in the Lower House election last October was the party’s mismanagement of political funds. That weakness remains. Ishiba failed to reach a consensus with the opposition parties on the regulation of donations from companies and organizations during the ordinary session of the Diet. The issue surely will weigh in the voters’ decision later this month.

The opposition parties have different views on the question of political donations. The Japan Innovation Party urges a total ban on corporate and organizational donations, while the CDPJ would allow donations from some organizations. The DPP fundamentally opposes any ban on donations. As seen in their mistake of fielding multiple candidates in single-seat districts such as Nara, Shiga or Fukui, the fragmentation of the opposition parties may help the LDP.