Asia Policy Events Monday February 16, 2026

Today is a national holiday in the United States - President's Day.
Birth date of Kim Jong Il - National Holiday in North Korea.
Lunar New Year Eve.

BANGLADESH’S PIVOTAL ELECTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION. 2/16, 4:00-5:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Crisis Group. Speakers: Thomas Kean, Senior Consultant, Crisis Group; Sara Hossain, Lawyer and Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh; Mubashar Hasan, Adjunct Researcher, Western Sydney University; Margarite Clarey, Senior Advocacy and Communications Officer, Crisis Group. 

ADJUSTING TO A SLOW-MOVING CRISIS: AGEING AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN JAPAN. 2/16, 6:00-7:30pm (JST), 4:00-5:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: French Research Institute on Japan at the Maison Franco‑Japonaise (IFRJ‑MFJ). Speaker: Brieuc Monfort, Associate Professor, Sophia University (Tokyo) & Research Fellow, European Institute of Sophia University; Moderator: Malo Mofakhami, Sorbonne Paris Nord Univ., IFRJ-MFJ, French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN: WHY DOES CHANGE LAG BEHIND? 2/16, 6:45pm (GMT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society, London. Speaker: Sanae Fujita, Fellow, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.

Burning a lot of bridges

Redrawing America’s Security Bargains in Northeast Asia

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published February 11, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

The stability of Northeast Asia has long rested on two strategic bargains with South Korea and Japan, forged out of the Korean War and formalized in security treaties. South Korea was compelled to accept the de facto division of the country in exchange for a treaty commitment, manifested in continuous U.S. ground forces, to defend against any North Korean threat of attack. With Japan, the bargain was different. The security pact provided a broad U.S. security umbrella, allowing Japan to focus on its economic recovery. In exchange, Japan provided bases and infrastructure that allowed U.S. air, naval, and marine infantry forces to project power regionally and globally. Both bargains depended on extended deterrence, or the credible threat that the United States would use force, including nuclear weapons if necessary, to protect its allies. That commitment also reduced incentives for South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies
Donald Trump’s White House believes in a very different version of these security bargains. This was laid out in two documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), issued in late November, and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), issued in late January.

Taken collectively, the Trump administration’s policymakers envision a situation in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific where South Korea has the principal, if not almost sole, responsibility for defense against a potential North Korean attack. U.S. forces are repurposed and perhaps redeployed with a regional mission, mainly aimed at China, with potential use in situations such as a Taiwan contingency. Both South Korea and Japan are pushed, in turn, to not only spend much more but also to focus their spending on building capacities to defend the First Island Chain rather than their own territories.

As this writer noted in an earlier commentary, the NSS contained no mention of the U.S. defense of Korea and Japan, nor of extended deterrence commitments. Instead, Washington says it “must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”

Strikingly, the NSS did not reference the Korean Peninsula broadly and did not reaffirm the long-standing goal of North Korean denuclearization. There was also no mention of the new strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, despite Russia’s potential to vastly improve North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program. The document also dilutes the potential China threat, focusing primarily on economic terms.

The NDS largely follows that framework but offers at least some limited discussion of the security environment in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s military buildup is less of a direct threat in the NDS’s language than a rising power that needs to be balanced by the United States and its allies. The goal is one of an offshore counterweight, one more appropriate to the reduced global role envisioned by the Trump administration. The document also acknowledges that North Korea poses “a direct military threat” to South Korea and Japan and that the former must stay vigilant against the threat of invasion. While there is a nod to North Korea’s nuclear capability, there is no mention of the role of the nearly 30,000 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.

Instead, the NDS states South Korea “is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.” What that support may be is not spelled out, but both the NSS and NDS hint that this may include the removal of U.S. ground and air forces, or at least their redeployment elsewhere. “This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” according to the NDS. Extended deterrence is totally absent, or even the clear commitment made in the security treaty to fully defend South Korea.

The Colby Speech
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby presented the implications of these policy statements more explicitly during recent visits to South Korea and Japan in late January. Colby stated the central purpose of U.S. national security policy in the Western Pacific as the search for a “stable balance of power” with China. To that end, Colby told an audience of elite Korean policymakers:

“We are focused on building a military posture in the Western Pacific that ensures that aggression along the first island chain is infeasible, that escalation unattractive, and war is indeed irrational. This includes a resilient, distributed, and modernized force posture” across the region.

Colby praised South Korea’s defense spending, calling the country a “model ally.” But in what may be considered a stunning omission for any senior U.S. defense official visiting Seoul, there was not a single word devoted to North Korea, its nuclear and missile buildup, its military axis with Moscow, or the United States’ seventy-three-year-long commitment to defend against it.

This was not lost on the audience. “In an 18-minute address, Colby mentioned China seven times but did not refer to North Korea even once,” the major daily Chosun Ilbo wrote in its account. Colby, whom the South Korean media credited as leading the drafting of the NDS, which was issued just before his arrival, “made these points during meetings with senior South Korean government officials.”

The Pursuit of a Trump-Kim Summit
The White House directed Colby to omit North Korea from his public comments as part of an effort to convince North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to meet President Trump again, a source within the administration told this writer on condition of anonymity. Talk of a meeting, perhaps tied to Trump’s planned visit to China in April, has been widely circulating. “The White House is opening a line of communication to Kim,” the source said.

“Considering how the Trump administration has sent mixed signals on this from day one, it is not really that surprising,” says Clint Work, a Research Fellow at the National Defense University. “I read it similarly, as an effort to tamp down language so as to try and open an avenue to, at the very least, talk with Pyongyang,” Work told the author.

South Korean officials offered little in the way of public reaction to Colby’s message. One reason for this is that President Trump threatened higher tariffs on South Korea the same day that the message was delivered, ostensibly because the National Assembly is slow-walking approval of a trade deal made last year. The timing was so coincidental that it sparked speculation that the tariff move was meant to reinforce Colby’s defense message, but sources within the Trump administration deny that intent.

For its part, the Lee Jae Myung administration may see a U.S. retreat serving its own goals of greater defense autonomy and engagement with North Korea. The South Korean president recently called on the country to rid itself of a “submissive mentality” of being dependent on others. A less engaged United States may accelerate the timetable for South Korean forces to assume operational control on the peninsula, create space for South Korea to enrich nuclear fuel, and incentivize new kinds of defense partnerships, such as in nuclear submarine technology. Support for nuclear armament remains high across South Korea as well.

South Korean policymakers have long resisted the idea that U.S. forces in the country should have any role other than defending against North Korea, or be reduced. But there is more willingness, says Work, to acknowledge and grapple with the idea that U.S. forces may need the “strategic flexibility” to deploy outside the peninsula.

South Korea-based researchers articulated the long-standing counterpoints to such flexibility in a recent paper published at one of the nation’s foremost think tanks, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “South Korean administrations have resisted any changes to U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether in terms of total size or operational focus,” argue Peter Lee and Esther Dunay. “This is due to the ongoing North Korean military and nuclear threat, fears of a potential entanglement in any Taiwan Strait conflict, and longstanding fears of alliance abandonment.”

On the surface, the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan remain intact and manageable. But beneath that appearance of solidarity, the Trump administration’s attempts to redraw the security bargains that have underlain stability and peace in Northeast Asia are creating growing tension and uncertainty.

“We’re burning a lot of bridges,” the administration source told this writer. “We’re stressing the relationships with our allies.”

The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 9, 2026

INSIDE JAPAN’S HIGH-STAKES SNAP ELECTION. 2/9, 8:00-9:00AM (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Speakers: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS; Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, University of Oxford; Charles McClean, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Japan Chair, CSIS, Assistant Professor, Yale University; Moderator: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS.

BOOK TALK: RUNAWAY CAPITALISM. 2/9, Noon-1:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: American University School of International Service. Speakers: author, James Mittelman, Distinguished Research Professor and University Professor Emeritus, American University; Maria De Jesus, Professor, School of International Service, American University; Patricia Aufderheide, University Professor of Communication Studies, School of Communication, American University, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Media & Social Impact; Clarence Lusane, Professor, Howard University; Director, International Affairs Program; Julie Radomski, Global China Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Boston University Global Development Policy Center; Yang Zhang, Professor, School of International Service, American University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4qR3l4n

BOOK TALK: CANCELING RUSSIA: THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WESTERN HAWKS. 2/9, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov, Professor of Russian and International Politics, San Francisco State University; Anatol Lieven, Director, Eurasia Program, Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History, Quincy Institute.

DECODING TRUMP’S CHINA POLICY. 2/9, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE (FP). Speakers: Kurt Campbell, Former U.S. deputy secretary of state and current chairman and co‑founder of The Asia Group; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in chief of Foreign Policy and host of FP LIVE. 

Policy? What Policy?

Vigorous Policy Discussion Missing in the Campaign

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 2, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s February 8th call for a snap election in the House of Representatives has dealt a blow to the campaigns of those parties that did yet have a fully built policy platform to present to voters. The only recourse for these campaigns has been to contest details about the consumption tax cut or about minor defense and foreign policies. Parties with populist agendas are exploiting public concern about the swelling number of foreign visitors. The campaigns are already in the second half.

The central feature of this campaign season is not policy debate, however, but the prospect that Japan may endorse its first female prime minister – and perhaps by a wide margin. News organizations have conducted several polls to predict the possibility that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) may achieve a simple majority in the Lower House, obviating the need for a coalition partner.

A poll by the Asahi Shimbun (telephone and online survey of approximately 370,000 people between January 31 and February 1) indicated a significant surge of support for the LDP that would take it from its current 196 seats to between 270 and 280. The media’s treatment of the campaign as a horse race – a phenomenon well known in other countries – has superseded meaningful discussion of policies that will determine Japan’s near-term future.

Management of Public Finances
The LDP has presented a campaign platform with five planks: 1) a strong economy, 2) the local community as the engine of Japan’s economy, 3) responsible defense and diplomacy strategies to strengthen the international order, 4) financial security for every generation and responsibility for future generations, and 5) a new constitution compatible with contemporary Japan. Of these, Takaichi has focused on the economy and defense policy.

The catchword for the Takaichi campaign is “responsible and proactive public finances.” What does “responsible” or “proactive” mean? Observers suppose that “responsible” means a national budget not dependent on the issuance of governmental bonds and that “proactive” means investments for the future. Takaichi thus promises that her administration will manage public finances without an excessive issuance of Japanese government bonds (JGBs).

But even during her so-far brief period as prime minister, Takaishi has favored more JGBs. Her FY2025 supplemental budget from last December totaled ¥18.4 trillion last December. The principal source of funding (63% to be precise) was the issuance of ¥11.4 trillion in JGBs. The FY2026 budget bill will set a spending record of ¥122.3 trillion, funded in part by the issuance of ¥29.5 trillion in JGBs, but it has not been discussed in the Diet yet as a result of Takaichi’s dissolution of the Lower House.

The LDP platform explains that “responsible and proactive public finances” means “producing a positive cycle in which further investment is possible through the sustainability of public finances, powerful economic growth and an increase in tax revenue.” The LDP aims to improve the balance of governmental debt against Japan’s GDP. Takaichi claims that she will begin fundamental reform of public finances by ending the annual tradition of a supplemental budget.

However, the prime minister has not proven her capacity to communicate smoothly with the markets. Reflecting investors’ fundamental concerns about Takaichi’s budget deficit, the market for long-term bonds has been declining ever since she took office last October. The rate on 10-year JGBs has steeply risen 60 basis points from 1.6 percent in late October to 2.2 percent in late January 2026. When she referred to exporters’ prosperity with yen’s depreciation, Japanese yen suddenly dropped against dollar early February. So far, there is little to suggest that Takaichi can implement her budget proposal “with the confidence of the markets.”

The opposition parties have not built a counterargument to Takaichi’s public financing plan. They have instead focused on such granular issues as whether a consumption tax cut should cover all consumption or be limited to foods, and whether the cut should be permanent or limited to two years. While most parties have not produced a plan to offset the decrease in revenues from a consumption tax cut, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposes to establish a governmental fund to cover the tax cut. Takaichi has not identified any fiscal resource to substitute for a consumption tax cut.

Diplomacy at the Center of the World
“We will resume our diplomatic standing at the center of the world by restoring the power of the economy and our defense systems,” says the LDP platform. It is not clear that in the last 80 years Japan has ever stood at the center of the world or shaped it in any significant way. The best guess is that Takaichi wants to revive former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s policy that Japan “flourish at the center of the world.”

There is nothing new in the content of her foreign policies. The LDP platform calls for strengthening relations with allied countries and the global south through shared values based on a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This policy incorporates the concepts of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. The platform cites as an example the Abe administration’s solution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea.

The LDP platform also stresses constructive and stable relations with China, but Takaichi has already worsened the relationship with her careless comment in November on the Taiwan contingency. Since then, the Japanese economy has suffered. China has taken counter actions, including advising its citizens not to travel to Japan and banning exports of dual use items to Japan. The Chinese have also indicated that they may restrict exports of rare earth minerals.

On other national security issues Takaichi has discussed defense spending in the context of active public investment in economic growth. The LDP platform proposes revisions to three national security documents and the removal of regulations covering exports of defense equipment. Takaichi also hopes to revise the three anti-nuclear principles that now prohibit Japan from possessing, producing, or introducing nuclear weapons.

The CRA has pointed out that the LDP’s hawkish coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), is behind these national security planks, and the CRA emphasizes its support for an exclusively defense-oriented policy. But the party is still explaining why it turned away from the traditional position of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, which opposed Abe’s 2015 security legislation to maximize Japan’s exercise of its right to collective self-defense.

Populistic Agenda for Foreigners
Some parties embrace xenophobic policies that would regulate foreigners, as if to say that Japan is suffering from a foreign invasion. But wide-ranging restrictions on foreigners are not feasible because the Japanese economy depends heavily on foreign workers and travelers. As a result, any new restrictions on foreigners would replicate traditional measures for travelers and immigrants.

The LDP would impose stricter controls on immigrants, a tax on foreign citizens, and a prohibition on real estate acquisitions by foreign investors. JIP and Sanseito are proposing an anti-spy act although such legislation could violate the privacy of Japanese citizens. Pressured by these two right-wing parties, Takaichi has said that she will protect privacy by strengthening governmental oversight of the legislation by establishing a new organization equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Japan’s economy is in fact highly dependent on foreign citizens. The Japanese government introduced a new system for foreign workers to make up for the shortage of Japanese labor brought about by Japan’s low birth rate. Foreign staff run most convenience stores in Tokyo. Foreign travelers and their heavy luggage regularly crowd trains in urban areas. These phenomena do not require xenophobic measures, but rather proper information for foreign visitors on how to abide by customs in Japanese society.

The CRA argues that it will establish an environment in which the Japanese and foreigners can live comfortably and with mutual respect. Although, as a practical matter, there are not many things that the Japanese government can do to reduce foreign presence, parties that say they will do something about it, like using the rallying cry, “the Japanese first,” are attracting voters. And voters supporting these attitudes are likely to help propel the LDP and its allied parties to garner a super majority of over 261 seats in the Lower House guaranteeing Takaichi’s premiership.

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 2, 2026

THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MYANMAR’S ELECTIONS. 2/2, 9:00-11:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Morgan Michaels, Research Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence, IISS; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chulalongkorn UniversitySteve Ross, Senior Fellow, Stimson; Min Zin, Executive Director, ISP-Myanmar; Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Moe Thuzar, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Myanmar Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS); Moderator: Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Myanmar Project; Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson. 

THAILAND’S 2026 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDUM: WHAT TO EXPECT. 2/2, 10:00-11:30am (SGT), 2/1, 9:00-10:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISWAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Mathis Lohatepanont, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; Thanisara Ruangdej (GG), CEO and Co-founder, WeVis.

WHAT FUTURE AFTER THE WAR? OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE’S SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND PROSPERITY. 2/2, 9:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Anatolii Amelin, Executive Director, Ukrainian Institute of the Future; Max Bergmann, Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Hans Braunfisch, Founder, Pravo Ventures; Serhii Haidaichuk, Founder, CEO Club Ukraine; John E. Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Mykola Murskyj, Program Director, Razom for Ukraine; Senator Rob Portman, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Practice of Public Policy, AEI; Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI; Ambassador Olga Stefanishyna, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States; Angela Stent, Senior Fellow, AEI.

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF US DEMOCRACY. 2/2, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Marie Gottschalk, Edmund J. Kahn Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; G. Elliott Morris, data journalist and author of the Strength in Numbers Substack; Elora Mukherjee, Jerome L. Greene Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Ilan Wurman, Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Moderator: Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Herbert H. Lehman Professor of Government and Director of IGP American Democracy Initiative, Columbia SIPA. 

BOOK TALK: RETRENCH, DEFEND, COMPETE: A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA. 2/2, Noon-1:00pm (EST). Sponsor: Quincy Institute (QI). Speakers: author Charles Glaser, Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program; Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Michael D. Swaine, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Program, QI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4cbcAbg

JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. 2/2, Noon-1:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Speaker: Ryo Sakai, 35th Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and International Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School. For inquiries, please contact Mr. Kenji Nagayoshi, knagayoshi@spfusa.org.

IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM STEYER. 2/2, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics (LSE). Speakers: Tom Steyer, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Chair, Galvanize, Founder, NextGen America, Investor, Climate Advocate; President and Vice Chancellor, Larry Kramer, London School of Economics, Former President, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Former Dean, Stanford Law School; Susana Mourato, Professor of Environmental Economics, Vice President and Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research), Department of Geography and Environment; Jonathan Pershing, Dean of the Global School of Sustainability, Professor in Practice, The Global School of Sustainability at LSE; Lord Stern, IG Patel Chair of Economics and Government, Chairman, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Department of Economics, The Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics (LSE). 

TARIFFS, TECH & TRUST: NAVIGATING THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S.–JAPAN TRADE TIES. 2/2, 5:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Washington, DC. Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director & Director for Political-Security Affairs, ASPI; William Chou, PhD, Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Yuka Hayashi, Vice President, Japan Practice, The Asia Group; Moderator: Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, ASPI. LIVESTREAMING HERE.