WHAT’S NEXT FOR JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY AND U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS? PERSPECTIVES FROM THE DIET. 5/4, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, Member of the House of Representatives, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Chairperson, Research Commission on the Tax System; Former Minister of Defense; Fumitake Fujita, Member of the House of Representatives, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Secretary-General, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Asei Ito, Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo; Moderator, Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, Associate Professor, University of Oxford.
IS AMERICA WINNING OR LOSING IN IRAN? 5/4, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jon Finer, Former Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Co-Host, The Long Game Podcast; Victoria Coates, Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Middle East and North African Affairs, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Vice President, Davis Institute for National Security, The Heritage Foundation; Moderator: Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, MEI.
ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MEGA CHOKEPOINTS: JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RESET. 5/4, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Keiro Kitagami, Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Liberal Democratic Party; Keitaro Ohno, Chief Secretary, Promotion of Economic Security Headquarters, Liberal Democratic Party, Former State Minister of Economic Security; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies; Akihisa Shiozaki, Director General, Headquarters for Intelligence Strategy, Liberal Democratic Party; Moderator: Mireya Solís, Director, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies.
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If surviving Trump meeting was goal: Takaichi leaves DC a winner
By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s high-stakes meeting with President Donald Trump began with a warm embrace and opening remarks that established a favorable mood.
Takaichi declared that “Donald” is the only person who can achieve peace and prosperity throughout the world, and that she intends to reach out to other countries to support his efforts. Trump congratulated Takaichi for her historic electoral victory, called her a “powerful woman,” and thanked her for all she has done.
But despite the positive atmosphere, this summit revealed the risks of Japan’s policy of clinging to the United States while allowing its relations with China to deteriorate. Because of Japan’s assessment of the Chinese security threat, Takaichi seeks to lock-in Japan’s alliance with the United States by flattering Trump and appeasing as much as possible his demands on defense and economic issues.
When Takaichi originally requested a summit with Trump, her aim was to get reassurance from Trump before his scheduled trip to China (which has now been postponed). Last November, Takaichi’s imprudent remarks about how a Taiwan crisis could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” that might warrant a Japanese military response, triggered a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Her statements wiped away the improvement in ties with China that had been achieved under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi’s immediate predecessor.
Rather than defending Takaichi as Japan-China tensions escalated, Trump reportedly told her in a phone call that she should tone things down because he wanted to avoid a conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. Trump’s cool response prompted Takaichi to seek assurances from Trump that he would not make deals with Xi Jinping that might undermine Japan’s interests. She also wanted to deepen bilateral cooperation to strengthen economic resilience in response to Chinese coercion.
The U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, however, complicated Takaichi’s original game plan and entrapped Japan in a severe dilemma.
On the one hand, Trump wants Japan “to step up” to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz by deploying naval vessels. From Trump’s perspective, Japan should take on this mission because Japan is more dependent on energy supplies passing through the strait than any other country. Given her landslide electoral victory in February, Takaichi ironically does not have the excuse of domestic political constraints to deny Trump’s request. Furthermore, Japan’s acute fear of China makes it hard for Takaichi to say “no” to Trump.
On the other hand, Takaichi faces strong domestic pressures not to comply with Trump. 82 percent of the Japanese public oppose the U.S. attack against Iran, and most Japanese strategic experts — including those who have stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance — believe that Trump’s war against Iran is an illegal and illegitimate strategic blunder. Japan’s legal and constitutional obstacles for deploying naval ships to a war zone are extremely high.
Furthermore, Iran has indicated that states that send naval ships to the area would be considered to have joined the American and Israeli side in this war and would be seen as hostile. Iran has, however, shown a willingness to allow oil tankers headed for countries that are not involved in the conflict and friendly toward Iran to pass through the strait. It is therefore in Japan’s energy security interests not to deploy naval ships into the area.
Although a joint press conference is usually held after U.S.-Japan summits, for some reason no Takaichi-Trump press briefing took place after their meeting. Instead, Takaichi held a solo press conference with the Japanese media on Thursday. She revealed that there was a discussion of the importance of ensuring the safety of the Strait of Hormuz and that she explained in detail what Japan can and cannot do within its legal constraints.
By refraining from mentioning at all any bilateral differences, she seemed to want to avoid giving the impression that there was any friction between her and Trump. And by not holding a joint press conference, both leaders perhaps sought to prevent the media from probing any discord between the U.S. and Japan.
So what should Takaichi do after this U.S.-Japan summit?
First, she should work energetically with other countries to facilitate an early termination of the Iran war. With the negative impact on gas prices and the strong American public opposition to the war, Trump should welcome such an effort because he wants a good off-ramp well before the November mid-term elections so that he can proclaim victory and mission accomplished.
More challenging will be convincing Iran to end the conflict. Not only does Iran want to avenge the killing of its top leaders and the death and destruction caused by Israel and the United States, it also wants solid international guarantees that it will not be attacked again and that its sovereignty will be protected. Among the G-7 countries, Japan maintains the best relations with Iran. Therefore, Takaichi should use this asset to promote serious diplomacy to explore viable ways to end this war.
Second, Takaichi should engage in proactive diplomacy to stabilize and improve relations with China. Although improving Japan’s own defense capabilities and deepening its ties with like-minded countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are important to counter China and to hedge against the uncertainty of the U.S. security commitment, they are no substitute for direct diplomacy with China to stabilize the regional security environment. An emphasis on military deterrence to the neglect of diplomacy will only fuel an arms race that will favor China given the asymmetry in material capabilities and China’s geographic advantages.
As a first step, the Japanese government should publicly clarify its basic stance regarding the Taiwan issue rather than simply repeating that there has been no change in policy. In addition to reaffirming the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan-China normalization communique, Japan should state that it does not support the independence of Taiwan and that it supports any resolution of the Taiwan issue that is peaceful and achieved without coercion and accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
This is necessary to reassure Beijing that Tokyo is not surreptitiously seeking the independence of Taiwan or the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.
In addition, with an eye on the next Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled in China in November 2026, Tokyo should expeditiously initiate discussions with Beijing on a broad range of issues. Rather than sticking to its current passive approach of simply leaving the door open for dialogue, Takaichi should dispatch to Beijing an influential political leader who is trusted by China to restart bilateral discussions. The agenda could include maintaining and strengthening a “rules-based” order, restraining the weaponization of economic interdependence, promoting stability and security of critical supply chains, cooperating more to address climate change, and enhancing confidence-building and crisis prevention measures.
Takaichi has touted that “Japan is back.” By engaging the above two diplomatic challenges, she can establish herself as one of the world’s most important leaders and upgrade Japan’s international status and influence.
Escaping from Trump’s Request to Dispatch Troops By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun You can find his blog, J Update here. March 23, 2026 The White House might have turned into a haunted house for Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Luckily, she managed to leave without infuriating the resident, U.S. President Donald Trump. She explained the legal requirements that limit Japan’s ability to send troops to the Strait of Hormuz. This work left no time for Takaichi to rebuild a common strategy with the U.S. and against China. After all was said and done, the summit meeting produced no obvious progress.
Pushing the Legal Constraints Forward The greatest challenge for Takaichi in the meeting with Trump was how to deal with his demand for U.S. allies to help protect ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Trump had previously called on countries, including Japan, to send warships to keep the strait open.
Takaichi deliberated with her diplomatic staff on how to respond to Trump at the meeting. Their conclusion was that Japan could not send its Self-Defense Force to the Strait. They considered three options: 1) a determination that events in the Strait present a “survival threatening situation” in which Japan can deploy its armed forces to assist the U.S. forces in the region; 2) a determination that Iran’s activities in the strait were a “significant influence situation,” in which case Japan could provide logistic support; and 3) a determination that activities in the strait warranted “maritime security operations” under Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, in which Japanese forces take necessary action to protect life and property.
None of these theories work for action in the Strait, however. The situation in Iran does not threaten Japan’s survival, at least not so far. Japan cannot provide logistical support (on the basis of a significant influence situation) in any area where actual battle is ongoing. Maritime security operations extend only to Japanese vessels. Takaichi and her staff realized that, with the limits on their use, she could do little to satisfy Trump.
After her meeting with Trump, Takaichi explained to the press that she had told him what Japan “can and cannot do” in the Middle East. What she could do was to join with the U.S. in refusing to tolerate Iran’s nuclear development, blame Iran for its de facto blockade of the Strait, and promote a joint Japan-U.S. project for oil reserves. What she could not do was to send troops to the Strait. Asahi Shimbunreported that she cited Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as the constraint on dispatching self-defense forces.
Two hours before the White House meeting, European leaders together with Takaichi issued a joint statement expressing their willingness to make “appropriate efforts” to ensure safe passage through the Strait. The statement ensured that Takaichi was not seen as acting alone but rather as a member of a group of U.S. allies although their rationales differed. The Europeans take the position that the conflict in the Strait is not their war while legal requirements preclude Japan from participating in the conflict.
Takaichi returned to Japan with homework: how to define “appropriate efforts.” The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimutsu Motegi, suggested sending self-defense forces for mine sweeping in the Strait after a ceasefire. Obviously, Takaichi will need to find a reason to explain to the opposition parties in the Diet why Japan would take on this chore.
The China Issue Is Left Behind For Japan, the summit meeting was originally set to discuss China. Takaichi made a careless comment last November on a “Taiwan contingency,” which exacerbated Japan-China tensions. As Trump scheduled his visit to Beijing in April, Takaichi had to talk with Trump beforehand to encourage him to keep the U.S. engaged in security activities in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is afraid that Trump would lose interest in Asia if he were to reach a deal with Xi Jinping. In the event, the Trump-Xi meeting was postponed, as Trump continued to grapple with the war.
At the White House, Takaichi and Trump reconfirmed that they would closely consult with each other on with issues relating to China, based on the time-honored concept of a “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOIP).” Takaichi said that Japan would always be open to China, and Trump replied that he would be “speaking Japan’s praises” when he visits Beijing. But nobody knows when that will be.
It is notable that the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community took Takaichi’s Taiwan comment seriously. “Her comments represent a significant shift for a sitting Japanese prime minister,” the document said. Takaichi does not seem to have been successful in impressing on the president that her position on the Taiwan contingency is the same as that of her predecessor prime ministers.
Takaichi and Trump did reach three economic agreements. A joint announcement on bilateral investment included a commitment by the Japanese to construct small module reactors in Tennessee and Alabama and natural gas generation facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas. These proposals constituted the second wave of Japan’s promised investments that were part of the Japan-U.S. agreement in July 2025, related to Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs on Japanese products.
The agreement for certain Japanese investments must have been the biggest souvenir of Takaichi’s trip to the U.S., regardless of whether Trump was satisfied with it or not. Japan announced the first wave of investments in February, which included the manufacture of industrial synthetic diamonds, construction of the U.S. crude oil export infrastructure, and natural gas generation. Takaichi tried to demonstrate Japan’s willingness to implement the July 22 agreement. The two waves represent about 20 percent of the promised $550 billion investment.
Charming, Flattering, and Ignoring Takaichi presented her unique style of her diplomacy during the trip. Video footage of Takaichi’s arrival at the White House entrance was repeatedly broadcast in Japan. She approached Trump, who was standing at the entrance, and hugged him with her arms embracing his shoulder and waist. It was closer to tackling than hugging. Although she might have been trying to charm Trump, a former Japanese diplomat described it as “embarrassing.” One would have to search long and hard to find any evidence of another world leader hugging Trump.
At the beginning of summit meeting, Takaichi praised Trump as a distinguished leader. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” said Takaichi. In view of the U.S. military operations to replace the Venezuelan leader and to launch a surprise attack on Iran, most Japanese recognized her remarks on Trump-as-peacemaker as explicit flattery.
Japanese leaders have sometimes used “haragei (腹芸),” a performance dealing with issues not based on words or actions but on guts, in its relations with the U.S. Former prime minister Eisaku Sato was renowned for his haragei, as seen in his negotiations for the return of the U.S.-occupied Okinawa and in the textile deal. But Takaichi has yet to reach his skill level: the audience in Japan could easily perceive that she just did not want to piss Trump off.
Asked by the press why the U.S. did not give Japan advance notice of the first attack on Iran, Trump reached back 85 years, five years before he was born. “Who knows better about surprise than Japan, OK? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” Trump answered. Takaichi – who understands the English language just fine – waited for the interpreter’s translation and made no verbal reply. She ignored Trump’s irrelevant joke; a surprise attack would not be announced to the target.
Takaichi has not had much diplomatic or international negotiation experience over trade deals before becoming prime minister. It is not easy for the leader of a country to conduct negotiations with national interests at stake by acting like a girl in love with a strong man.
On March 19, 2026, the White House held a dinner honoring Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The menu was carrot ginger velouté, Maine lobster au gratin with corn puree and asparagus, and strawberry and vanilla cream gateau.
Only one celebrity attended. This was Japanese golf legend Mr. Hideki Matsuyama, Otherwise attendees were CEOs of major American companies, senior government officials, and two full-time lobbyists who are Trump loyalists. Only three Japanese CEOs of American operations were at the dinner: Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and Toyota. Masayoshi Son, SoftBank Group CEO and founder, was the only corporate head leading from Japan.
Notably, there was not one State, Defense or Commerce official tasked with or expert in Japan or the Indo-Pacific. There were no American second tier officials to match with their Japanese counterparts who were present at the dinner.
Scholars, think tankers, and nonprofit executives expert on Japan who "manage" the relationship were also not present. It is very unusual to have such a dinner without attendees familiar with Japanese politics, economy, culture, and history.
Takaichi cleverly used a male interpreter to project power to Trump. He heard a strong male voice in "her" comments. The President had a woman interpreter, whose high-pitched voice subtly diminished him to the Japanese. She was, however, likely to have made Trump more understandable to Takaichi.
Another notable feature of the dinner, and indeed the visit ,is that Trump never once said the Prime Minister's name. "Takaichi" was just too much to say for the President.
Full guest list for White House dinner for the Japanese prime minister
1 The President of the United States Donald Trump
2 Her Excellency TAKAICHI Sanae, Prime Minister of Japan
3 Mr. Andrew Abboud, Las Vegas Sands Corp. Vice President of Government Affairs
4 Dr. Miriam Adelson, spouse of the late Sheldon Adelson, founder Las Vegas Sands Corp
5 Mr. AKAHORI Takeshi, Senior Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
6 His Excellency AKAZAWA Ryosei, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
7 Mr. Jim Allen, chairman of Hard Rock International
8 Mr. Cristiano Amon, CEO and president, Qualcomm
9 Mr. ARAI Masayoshi, Director-General, Trade Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
10 Mr. ARIMA Yutaka, Director-General, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11 The Honorable Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury
12 The Honorable James Blair, White House, Deputy Chief of Staff for Legislative, Political and Public Affairs
13 The Honorable Pam Bondi, Attorney General
14 Mr. Greg Brockman and Mrs. Anna Brockman, OpenAI co-founder.
15 The Honorable Doug Burgum, Secretary of the Interior
16 The Honorable Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Secretary of Labor
17 The Honorable Sean Duffy, Secretary of Transportation
18 Mr. Larry Fink, BlackRock CEO;
19 The Honorable George Glass, Ambassador of the United States to Japan and Mrs. Amy Glass
20 Mr. David Goeckeler, Sandisk CEO;
21 The Honorable Jamieson Greer, United States Trade Representative
22 The Honorable Bill Hagerty, United States Senator from Tennessee and Mrs. Christine Hagerty
23 Mr. HAYASHI Makoto, Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister
24 The Honorable Pete Hegseth, Secretary of War
25 Mr. ICHIKAWA Keiichi, National Security Advisor
26 Mr. IIDA Yuji, Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister
27 Mr. IIJIMA Isao [飯島勲], Special Advisor to the Cabinet, noted Japanese political fixer
28 Mr. Takajiro Ishikawa, President & CEO of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America
29 Mr. KANO Koji, Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs
30 Dr. Alex Karp, CEO of Palantir
31 Mr. Arvind Krishna, IBM CEO
32 Mr. KUMAGAI Naoki, Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
33 The Honorable Kelly Loeffler, Administrator of the Small Business Administration
34 Mr. Palmer Luckey, founder of Anduril
35 The Honorable Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Commerce
36 Mr. MATANO Motosada, Director-General, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
37 Mr. Hideki Matsuyama, Japanese golf pro, first Asian to win the Masters
38 The Honorable Linda McMahon, Secretary of Education
Redrawing America’s Security Bargains in Northeast Asia
by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member.
First Published February 11, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.
The stability of Northeast Asia has long rested on two strategic bargains with South Korea and Japan, forged out of the Korean War and formalized in security treaties. South Korea was compelled to accept the de facto division of the country in exchange for a treaty commitment, manifested in continuous U.S. ground forces, to defend against any North Korean threat of attack. With Japan, the bargain was different. The security pact provided a broad U.S. security umbrella, allowing Japan to focus on its economic recovery. In exchange, Japan provided bases and infrastructure that allowed U.S. air, naval, and marine infantry forces to project power regionally and globally. Both bargains depended on extended deterrence, or the credible threat that the United States would use force, including nuclear weapons if necessary, to protect its allies. That commitment also reduced incentives for South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals.
U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies Donald Trump’s White House believes in a very different version of these security bargains. This was laid out in two documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), issued in late November, and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), issued in late January.
Taken collectively, the Trump administration’s policymakers envision a situation in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific where South Korea has the principal, if not almost sole, responsibility for defense against a potential North Korean attack. U.S. forces are repurposed and perhaps redeployed with a regional mission, mainly aimed at China, with potential use in situations such as a Taiwan contingency. Both South Korea and Japan are pushed, in turn, to not only spend much more but also to focus their spending on building capacities to defend the First Island Chain rather than their own territories.
As this writer noted in an earlier commentary, the NSS contained no mention of the U.S. defense of Korea and Japan, nor of extended deterrence commitments. Instead, Washington says it “must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”
Strikingly, the NSS did not reference the Korean Peninsula broadly and did not reaffirm the long-standing goal of North Korean denuclearization. There was also no mention of the new strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, despite Russia’s potential to vastly improve North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program. The document also dilutes the potential China threat, focusing primarily on economic terms.
The NDS largely follows that framework but offers at least some limited discussion of the security environment in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s military buildup is less of a direct threat in the NDS’s language than a rising power that needs to be balanced by the United States and its allies. The goal is one of an offshore counterweight, one more appropriate to the reduced global role envisioned by the Trump administration. The document also acknowledges that North Korea poses “a direct military threat” to South Korea and Japan and that the former must stay vigilant against the threat of invasion. While there is a nod to North Korea’s nuclear capability, there is no mention of the role of the nearly 30,000 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.
Instead, the NDS states South Korea “is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.” What that support may be is not spelled out, but both the NSS and NDS hint that this may include the removal of U.S. ground and air forces, or at least their redeployment elsewhere. “This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” according to the NDS. Extended deterrence is totally absent, or even the clear commitment made in the security treaty to fully defend South Korea.
The Colby Speech Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby presented the implications of these policy statements more explicitly during recent visits to South Korea and Japan in late January. Colby stated the central purpose of U.S. national security policy in the Western Pacific as the search for a “stable balance of power” with China. To that end, Colby told an audience of elite Korean policymakers:
“We are focused on building a military posture in the Western Pacific that ensures that aggression along the first island chain is infeasible, that escalation unattractive, and war is indeed irrational. This includes a resilient, distributed, and modernized force posture” across the region.
Colby praised South Korea’s defense spending, calling the country a “model ally.” But in what may be considered a stunning omission for any senior U.S. defense official visiting Seoul, there was not a single word devoted to North Korea, its nuclear and missile buildup, its military axis with Moscow, or the United States’ seventy-three-year-long commitment to defend against it.
This was not lost on the audience. “In an 18-minute address, Colby mentioned China seven times but did not refer to North Korea even once,” the major daily Chosun Ilbowrote in its account. Colby, whom the South Korean media credited as leading the drafting of the NDS, which was issued just before his arrival, “made these points during meetings with senior South Korean government officials.”
The Pursuit of a Trump-Kim Summit The White House directed Colby to omit North Korea from his public comments as part of an effort to convince North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to meet President Trump again, a source within the administration told this writer on condition of anonymity. Talk of a meeting, perhaps tied to Trump’s planned visit to China in April, has been widely circulating. “The White House is opening a line of communication to Kim,” the source said.
“Considering how the Trump administration has sent mixed signals on this from day one, it is not really that surprising,” says Clint Work, a Research Fellow at the National Defense University. “I read it similarly, as an effort to tamp down language so as to try and open an avenue to, at the very least, talk with Pyongyang,” Work told the author.
South Korean officials offered little in the way of public reaction to Colby’s message. One reason for this is that President Trump threatened higher tariffs on South Korea the same day that the message was delivered, ostensibly because the National Assembly is slow-walking approval of a trade deal made last year. The timing was so coincidental that it sparked speculation that the tariff move was meant to reinforce Colby’s defense message, but sources within the Trump administration deny that intent.
For its part, the Lee Jae Myung administration may see a U.S. retreat serving its own goals of greater defense autonomy and engagement with North Korea. The South Korean president recently called on the country to rid itself of a “submissive mentality” of being dependent on others. A less engaged United States may accelerate the timetable for South Korean forces to assume operational control on the peninsula, create space for South Korea to enrich nuclear fuel, and incentivize new kinds of defense partnerships, such as in nuclear submarine technology. Support for nuclear armament remains high across South Korea as well.
South Korean policymakers have long resisted the idea that U.S. forces in the country should have any role other than defending against North Korea, or be reduced. But there is more willingness, says Work, to acknowledge and grapple with the idea that U.S. forces may need the “strategic flexibility” to deploy outside the peninsula.
South Korea-based researchers articulated the long-standing counterpoints to such flexibility in a recent paper published at one of the nation’s foremost think tanks, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “South Korean administrations have resisted any changes to U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether in terms of total size or operational focus,” argue Peter Lee and Esther Dunay. “This is due to the ongoing North Korean military and nuclear threat, fears of a potential entanglement in any Taiwan Strait conflict, and longstanding fears of alliance abandonment.”
On the surface, the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan remain intact and manageable. But beneath that appearance of solidarity, the Trump administration’s attempts to redraw the security bargains that have underlain stability and peace in Northeast Asia are creating growing tension and uncertainty.
“We’re burning a lot of bridges,” the administration source told this writer. “We’re stressing the relationships with our allies.”
NEXT STEPS FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE: DETERRENCE, CYBERSECURITY, AND INDO-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPS. 1/12, 10:00-11:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Kei Koga, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore; Satoru Mori, Senior Fellow, The Nakasone Peace Institute & Professor, Keio University; Motohiro Tsuchiya, Professor and Vice President for Global Engagement, Keio University.
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JAPAN'S CHINA-FOCUSED GRAND STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-STRAIT DETERRENCE. 1/12, 12:15-1:30pm, IN PERSON ONLY "brown bag lunch." Sponsor: Stimson. Speaker: Dr. Giulio Pugliese, Director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute in Florence and an incoming Assistant Professor in Asian Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa later this year. To attend contact: Dr. Andrew Oros, Japan Program Director, Stimson, aoros@stimson.org.
JAPAN’S ROLE IN NAVIGATING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL UNCERTAINTY. 11/17, 2:00-6:00pm (JST), Midnight-4:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Speakers: Kenichiro Sasae, President, JIIA; Naoko Eto, Senior Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics; Jacob Happymon, Director, Council on Strategic and Defense Studies, India; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Nguyen Minh Vu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; Naoko Shimazu, Professor, University of Tokyo, and more.
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TRUMP AND MBS: WHAT’S IN STORE FOR U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS? 11/17, 10:00-10:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program, Carnegie; Michael Ratney, Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern History of the Gulf Cooperation Countries, Princeton University.
THE GOOD NEWS ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS GLOBALLY. 11/17, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Live. Speakers: Lyric Thompson, Founder and CEO, Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.
SUPPORTING SURVIVORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE. 11/17, Noon-1:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics, Columbia University. Speakers: Grace Achan, Board Member, Global Survivors Fund, Co-founder, Women’s Advocacy Network; Esther Dingemans, Executive Director, Global Survivors Fund; Ajna Jusić, President, Forgotten Children of War; Khrystyna Kit, Head of JurFem Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association. Moderator: Rachel Vogelstein, Associate Professor of Professional Practice, Director, IGP Women’s Initiative, Director of Human Rights, Gender, and Equity Concentration, Columbia SIPA.
THE US AND CHINA: COMPETITION, COEXISTENCE, OR COLLISION? 11/17, 5:30-6:30pm (CST), 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Leslie Vinjamuri, President & CEO, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.
SHIFTING SECURITY LANDSCAPE: U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS. 11/17, 6:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society, New York. Speakers: Ken Jimbo, Professor, International Relations, Keio University, Managing Director of Programs, International House of Japan; Sheila A. Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
FORMER PRIME MINISTERS IN JAPANESE POLITICS: POWER, INFLUENCE AND THE ROLE OF INFORMAL POLITICS. 11/17, 6:45pm (GMT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society, London. Speakers: Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Karin Narita, Research Associate in Japanese Politics and International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Caroline Rose, Emeritus Professor of Sino-Japanese Relations, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds.
THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW ERA. 6/23, 2:00-3:30pm (JST), 1:00am (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: Nikkei Global Events, The Asia Group. Speakers: Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who oversaw Asia policy during the Biden presidency; former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, involved in Asia diplomacy in the first Trump administration; and former National Security Advisor Takeo Akiba, who long guided Japan's diplomacy.
THE NEXT DECADE: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF US-ROK NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 6/23-24 (KST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Atlantic Council; Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. Speakers Include: Matt Bowen, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, University of Columbia School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA); Scott Campbell, President, Howard Baker Forum; Sungyeol Choi, Associate Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Seoul National University; Bumjin Chung, Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University.
ENERGY SECURITY AND THE ISRAEL-IRAN WAR. 6/23, 9:00-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Clayton Seigle, Senior Fellow and James R. Schlesinger Chair in Energy and Geopolitics, Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Adi Imsirovic, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Raad Alkadiri, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program.
US ATTACKS IRAN: ISRAEL IRAN CONFLICT UPDATE. 6/23, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: General Joseph L. Votel, US Army, Retired, Distinguished Military Fellow, Middle East Institute; Daniel Benaim, Associate Fellow, Middle East Institute; Colby Connelly, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute.
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY REFORM IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC. 6/23, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: WTO. Speakers: Aaditya Mattoo, Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank; Alessandro Barattieri, Senior Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank.
OPERATION MIDNIGHT HAMMER: U.S. STRIKES AGAINST IRAN'S NUCLEAR SITES. 6/23, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish, Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, Julian & Jenny Josephson; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Amikam Norkin, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; John Hannah, Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow, JINSA.
CENTRAL ASIAN FIGHTERS AND GLOBAL JIHAD. 6/23, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL .Sponsor: Center for the National Interest. Speakers: Dr. Gavin Helf, Adjunct Professor, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University; Dr. Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow for South Asia, Stimson Center; Dr. Noah Tucker, Senior Research Consultant, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs. USING LABOUR MIGRATION TO SUPPORT EUROPE’S GREEN TRANSITION. 6/23, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Center for Global Development; Fragmen. Speakers: Gemma Hyslop, Director, Fragomen; Nina Vafaee, Global Mobility Immigration Manager, RWE.
THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS ON GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAINS. 6/23, 10:00–11:30 am (SGT), 10:00–11:30 pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Speaker: Professor Archanun Kohpaiboon, Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University.
TOWARD IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE. 6/2, 9:30-10:30am (JST) 6/1 8:30-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Sasakawa. Speakers: Admiral Tomohisa Takei, fmr. Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa; General Koji Yamazaki, fmr. Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa; General Sadamasa Oue, fmr. Commander, Air Material Command, Japan Air Self-Defense Force / Senior Fellow, Sasakawa.
CHINA IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER ASSAD. 4/28, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Jesse Marks, Senior Advocate, Middle East, Refugees International; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Director, China Program, Stimson Center; Tingyi Wang, Research Fellow, Member, Research Committee, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy; Aaron Glasserman, Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI, Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania.
OUTLOOK FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM JAPANESE LEGISLATORS. 4/28, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, LDP Member, House of Representatives, fmr. Minister of Defense; Shinjiro Koizumi, LDP Member, House of Representatives, fmr. Minister of the Environment.
MULTIPOLARITY, CIVILIZATIONS AND UNIVERSALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. 4/28, 2:00-3:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: New York University School of Law. Speaker: Malcolm Jorgensen, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law.
CUTTING DEEP ABROAD AND AT HOME: SLASHING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CAUSES WORLDWIDE HARM. 4/28, 1:00-2:00pm (PDT), 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for American Progress. Speakers: Jeremy Konyndyk, President, Refugees International; Jordan Schermerhorn, Researcher, former USAID Program Analyst; Chloe Schwenke, Teaching Professor, Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy.
ARCTIC WOMEN LEADERSHIP ADDRESSING CLIMATE, GEOPOLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC TRADITION: LOCAL FEDERAL, AND INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES. 3/31, Noon-1:30PM (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: George Washington University. Speakers: Rebecca Alty, Mayor of Yellowknife, NWT, Canada; Carina Sammeli, Chair of the Municipal Board, Luleå municipality, Sweden; Meghan Tapqaq, Former member of the Nome Common Council, Staff Attorney, Kawerak; Jackie Schaeffer, Director of Climate Initiatives, Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium; Mary Peltola, Former member of the U.S. Congress and Alaska State Legislature.
INNOVATION TIES AND US-JAPAN ADVANCED TECH WORKFORCE INVESTMENTS. 3/31, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Bharati B. Belwalkar, Senior Industrial and Organizational Researcher, American Institutes for Research; Jeffrey Dressler, Partner, Head, Global Government Affairs, Softbank; Michi Kaifu, CEO, ENOTECH Consulting; Brandon Possin, CEO, Merito Network.
A FRACTURED LIBERATION: KOREA UNDER US OCCUPATION. 3/31, 4:00–5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author Kornel Chang, Associate Professor of History and Chair of the History Department, Rutgers University-Newark: Eric Arnesen, the Teamsters Professor of History in the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, The George Washington University; Christian F. Ostermann, Founding Director of the History and Public Policy Program (HAPP). PURCHASE BOOK
VIEW FROM TREASURY: THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. 3/31, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: GWU Elliott School of International Affairs. Speaker: Professor Jay Shambaugh, fmr. Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs.
A “NEW GOLDEN AGE” IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS? 3/31, 6:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP). Speakers: Dr. Ken Jimbo, Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Mr. Christopher B. Johnstone Partner and Chair, Defense & National Security Practice, The Asia Group.
JAPAN'S ZELENSKYY SHOCK. 3/31, 4:00-5:00pm (PDT) 7:00-8:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Speakers: Ulrike Schaede, Professor of Japanese Business, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy; Yuji Idomoto, Postdoctoral Scholar, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy.
“The most important thing to note from his [Trump's] comments is that the United States is no longer committed to defending Japan, South Korea or Taiwan,” said Robert Dujarric, co-director of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies at Temple University’s Tokyo campus [and APP member]. -- South China Morning Post, 3/10/25
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun You can find his blog, J Update here. March 10, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
On Thursday, March 6, U.S. President Donald Trump complained to reporters in the Oval Office that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was imbalanced and unfair. His remarks followed his accusation that European countries were "ripping off" the United States in trade while failing to pay enough for their own national security.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba responded by stressing that that treaty requires Japan to maintain bases in Japan for the U.S. military. Trump’s “America-first” attitude is now shaking the relationship between the U.S. and its top ally in the Indo-Pacific.
To the White House reporters, Trump insisted that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was not reciprocal. “I love Japan. We have a great relationship with Japan, but we have an interesting deal with Japan that we have to protect them, but they don’t have to protect us,” he said. “They make a fortune with us economically,” said Trump, who then asked who had made that deal.
The answer to his question is: U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. On September 8, 1951, they signed the Security Treaty after the San Francisco Peace Treaty ceremony. The Peace Treaty ended the legal state of war between Japan and the Allied Powers and their military occupation of Japan. The Security Treaty addressed U.S.-Japan security arrangements going forward.
The Japan that signed these Treaties was and remains governed by a constitution that came into effect in 1947. Article 9 of the constitution renounces “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” This has been interpreted as prohibiting the exercise of collective self-defense. Japan thus recognizes the Security Treaty as obligating the U.S. to defend Japan. This has been the mutual understanding of both countries since 1951. Trump is probably unaware of this history and expressed his skepticism in the context of an economic transaction.
“Each party recognized that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes,” says Article 5 of Japan-US Security Treaty.
Furthermore, under Article 6 of the Treaty, “[f]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”
Ishiba replied to Trump’s complaint during discussions with the budget committee of the Upper House: “Japan does not have an obligation to protect America. That’s true. But Japan has a duty to offer America the bases in Japan, which no other country owes. It is not necessarily the relationship in which the U.S. unilaterally protects Japan and Japan is unilaterally protected by the US,” Ishida explained, referring to Article 6.
Trump had raised the same argument in his first term. Japanese officials believe Trump will use this assertion as a card to play in bilateral negotiations over economic issues, including trade and tariffs. “I am confident that the U.S. will live up to its obligation in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty using every kind of capability, including nuclear,” said Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi.
Ishiba is a realist. Maybe he senses that Trump is serious about abandoning American security obligations in Asia as he is now doing in Europe. Ishiba has been advocating revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty before Trump entered his second term. In his essay for the Hudson Institute in 2024, Ishiba wrote: “The time is ripe to change this ‘asymmetrical bilateral treaty.” Although he said he wants “to raise the Japan-US alliance to the level of the US-UK alliance,” the rapid evolution of Trump’s America First security strategy suggests that Japan would be better off with a “separate” arrangement rather than one that is equivalent to whatever the relationship is between the UK and the US.
Trump has been questioning the U.S. relationship with Japan. He has accused Japan of devaluing the yen against the dollar. “I’ve called President Xi; I’ve called the leaders of Japan to say you can’t continue to reduce and break down your currency. You can’t do it, because it’s unfair to us,” Trump told reporters, including China as another offender. Trump insisted that the easiest way to solve the currency valuation problem (if there is a problem) would be through tariffs.
After the U.S. President’s comment, the yen briefly climbed from 150 yen per dollar to 148 yen. “We are not adopting a policy to weaken the (Japanese) currency. If you recall our foreign exchange market interventions in recent years, you can understand what I mean,” the Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, said in a press conference.
It is undeniable, however, that the Japanese government is getting nervous about Trump’s aggressive announcement on tariffs. The U.S. president keeps raising his demands on trade policy, including a 25% tariff on foreign steel and aluminum, additional tariffs on cars and the introduction of “reciprocal” tariffs. And he is vocal in demanding defense spending increases.
The former Governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, who led the Bank to adopt an ultra-low interest policy, emphasized the need to fix the “misunderstanding” of the U.S. President. "The BOJ is not intentionally guiding the yen lower with monetary policy. If there's any misunderstanding on that point, it needs to be addressed," Kuroda said in a TV program.
It is uncertain whether the U.S. President is aware of the history of the Security Treaty – which imposes requirements for Japan that continue to this day – or of the responses to his comments from Japanese officials. And it is uncertain whether Trump’s interests are solely for economic reasons or as part of a larger geo-political realignment.
