Imperial Succession Undermined

josei tennō (女性天皇)

Takaichi Excludes Women from Becoming Emperor, Ignoring the Will of the People

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 20, 2026

Prime Minister Takaichi has been aggressively trying to expand the male line of succession to the Imperial Throne, but she is doing so in a way that undermines the constitutional basis of the Imperial Family. On June 10, the House of Representatives of the Diet passed a bill that amends the Imperial House Law (IHL) to permit the adoption of males of former imperial families. The Upper House approved the bill on July 17.  The law gives the male offspring of the adopted male (but not the male himself) a place in the order of succession to the throne of the Emperor. 

Since only some but not all the opposition parties approved the bill, the amendments cannot be said to reflect the unanimous opinion of the legislative branch.

Unanimity is a key constitutional principle for the Imperial Family in Japan. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of the Emperor is derived from the will of the people. The Japanese interpret this article to mean that the will of the people must be unanimous. When former Emperor Akihito abdicated the throne in 2019, the Diet attached a supplemental resolution on unanimity to the special law for the abdication.

That resolution required a discussion in the Diet to obtain a “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” on stable succession to the throne. The resolution contemplated a unanimous opinion that would reverse the declining number of Imperial Family members. This year, the Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both Houses of the Diet held a brief discussion and wrapped up a “unanimous opinion” and handed it to Prime Minister Takaichi on June 10. The opinion allowed female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and permitted the adoption of males of Imperial Family branches that had left the Family in 1947.

After delivery of the unanimous opinion, the Takaichi Cabinet proposed amendments to the Imperial House law to maneuver around the unanimity requirement in the 2019 supplemental resolution. The legislation includes two critical new measures relating to Imperial succession that were not part of the unanimous opinion.

One is to include the offspring of an adopted male in the line of succession to the throne. This amendment would codify Takaichi’s desire to maintain strict patrilinear succession. Not all males in the Imperial Family branches will qualify for adoption: eligible adoptees must be at least fifteen years old and cannot already be married or already have children. In the discussion of this provision in the Diet, members recognized that adoption of male members of the former Imperial Family would offset the current shrinkage in the Imperial Family. The unanimous opinion of the Diet did not include a discussion of the sons of an adopted male.

The second new element in the legislation is not to give the husband and children of female members that remain in in the family the status of Imperial Family members. These children could not in any case join the line of succession because they are in the female line. It is highly unusual for members of a family to be separated by legal status. Nevertheless, the draft recognizes only the mother as a member of the Imperial Family and excludes the father and the children. Again, this provision was not part of the unanimous opinion.

The Takaichi Cabinet submitted a draft of the revised IHL to the Diet on June 30. Takaichi asked the leading parties to make their best efforts to pass the bill in the current session of the Diet. The Committee on Rules and Administration of the Lower House discussed the bill for just three hours on July 10. The House Plenary Sittings passed the bill later that same day.

Notably, the top opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), voted yes on the bill. The party had originally opposed the idea of placing the male offspring of an adopted male in the line of succession. After hearing the explanation by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minoru Kihara, in the committee to the effect that the revised IHL would not affect or bind future succession discussions in the Diet, the CRA changed its vote to yes. Under the bill, future discussions occur only at thirty-year intervals.

In protest of the CRA’s decision, four CRA lawmakers walked out of the Plenary Sittings. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) voted no on the bill, arguing that the bill had become totally different from the unanimous opinion of the legislative branch. Even the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) coalition partner, quibbled with the provision in the bill that limited adoptions of male members to those no younger than fifteen. It can hardly be said that the bill represents the unanimous opinion of the Diet.

On July 17, the Upper House in its Plenary Sittings passed the bill by a vote of 184 to 57 – obviously not a unanimous view.  

Looking at the voting in both chambers, six parties approved – the LDP, JIP, CRA, the Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito. Five opposition parties voted in the negative – the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, the Social Democratic Party, and Okinawa Whirlwind. Team Mirai approved the bill in the Upper House but released its members in the Lower House to vote as they saw fit. Interestingly, the Conservative Party of Japan abstained.

It is still unclear why Takaichi has been so hasty in completing revisions of the IHL in the current session of the Diet. Popular sentiment is against the quick action. In the poll of Asahi Shimbun last month, 71 percent of respondents thought that legislation for adopting males in the male line did not need to be made soon. In a more recent Asahi Shimbun poll, 60 percent of respondents thought that the revised Imperial House Law had not received views of the people, while only 24 percent thought it had. 

The conservative lawmakers obviously hoped to maintain the imperial throne in the male line. It is likely that they wanted to act now while Takaichi enjoyed a high approval rating in the polls. They made it but possibly at the cost of that very approval rating. The same recent Asahi Shimbun poll revealed that the approval rating for the Takaichi Cabinet declined from 60 percent in June to 53 percent in July. The disapproval rose from 27 percent to 35 percent. This finding may reflect popular reaction to the part of Takaichi’s legislation that blocks the possibility of Princess Aiko becoming Empress.

In other results, a poll by Jiji Press found that 39.5 percent approved of placing the sons (and subsequent offspring) of an adopted male in the male line of succession, while 26.9 percent disapproved. 34.0 percent hoped to give Imperial Family status to the husband and children of a female family member who remained in the Imperial Family after marriage. A smaller number, 27.5 percent, did not.

Takaichi depends on conservative lawmakers for her political base. The vice president of the LDP, Taro Aso, is one of the greatest advocates for these revisions of the IHL. His younger sister is Princess Nobuko of Mikasa. Nobuko established a new family and separated from the Mikasa Family just two years ago, in 2025. According to the revised IHL bill, Nobuko could adopt a son whose offspring would be in the line of succession to the throne.

Looking back to Michinaga Fujiwara, who exercised great power in the Imperial Family in the eleventh century, former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is worried that the Aso family might be Fujiwara in Reiwa era. Michinaga left a tanka, a famous verse: “I realize this whole world is mine, only I ignore the eclipse of the moon.” Takaichi needs to keep Aso as her guardian in the LDP.

Noda also asked the government to take seriously the fact that the IHL excluded adoption to avoid disruption of the imperial lineage. Eleven former imperial families that lost royal status in 1947 are 36 to 38 degrees away from reigning Emperor Naruhito. Naruhito and they must reach back some six hundred years to find their common ancestor. 

Takaichi will now be remembered as a prime minister who prized patrilinear succession over the legitimacy of the throne. 

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 8, 2026

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The Future of Japan's Constitution

articles on Constitution

The Leading Coalition Accelerates a Constitutional Amendment

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 1, 2026

The leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) has accelerated its effort to amend the Constitution of Japan to deal with emergencies. The two parties claim that the discussion of proposed amendments is nearly wrapped up. However, some opposition parties expect further discussion. Even LDP lawmakers are divided over whether the Lower House or the Upper House should be the primary forum for debate. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi encourages the discussion, presenting herself as a brave leader grappling with a divisive issue – but with no clear hope of success.
 
An amendment to address emergencies that prevent the Diet from acting have taken at least two forms. One was a rough draft of an amendment that the Lower House Legislation Bureau submitted to the Commission on the Constitution of the House on May 14. The draft primarily would add a clause to the constitution that would, in the event of certain emergencies, allow Diet members to remain in office even after their terms expire. The amendment recognizes four categories of emergency: a major natural disaster, a major spread of infectious disease, social disorder by civil war and an armed attack of foreigners.
 
According to the draft, each of these emergencies can create an “election difficulty situation”: a time in which a national election cannot be held in broad geographic areas for a certain long period. Members of the Lower House have four-year terms, and six years are given to those elected to the Upper House. The draft of the amendment states that these terms will be extended in emergency. An election difficulty situation will be declared in advance by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet.
 
A second type of response to an emergency is also in the draft. It includes a controversial provision to authorize the Cabinet to issue an “emergency ordinance.” “In a special occasion in which it cannot afford to wait for legislation by the Diet,” the draft says, “the Cabinet can enact an emergency ordinance which is equivalent to a law.” Although the draft requires approval of the Diet after the ordinance is declared, there is no time limit on Diet action and thus no time limit on an emergency ordinance.
 
A member of the Lower House commission who represents the LDP, Yoshitaka Shindo, commented to the press that most parties agreed on the extension of terms of lawmakers in emergency and that issue can be said to be “pinned down.” Another commission member from the JIP, Nobuyuki Baba, said that all the talking points on the amendment have now been proposed and discussed. The two parties in the leading coalition hope to proceed to the next step of drafting a provision to initiate an amendment.
 
Opposition parties do not want to rush the process. The Centrist Reform Alliance disagreed with Baba’s notion that the discussion was over and that new measures were necessary to maintain the ordinary functions of the Diet in an emergency. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan already provides that the Cabinet can convoke an emergency session of the Upper House in a national emergency. The opposition parties believe that this existing power to gather the Upper House in an emergency session will ensure that the Diet will function even if the Lower House is empty.
 
Opposition parties are further skeptical about introducing the emergency ordinance. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, argued that the proposal for an emergency ordinance power was dropped in an agreement of five parties, including the LDP and the JIP, in 2024. Moreover, a situation in which the Diet would not work at all was unimaginable if lawmakers’ terms could be extended. The Japan Communist Party has pointed out that there was an imperial emergency ordinance in pre-war Japan that was issued in Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. That power confirmed that the emperor had the highest state power.
 
This concept of imperial authority ended after World War II. Article 41 of the constitution states that the Diet is “the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” If the Cabinet obtains the power to issue ordinances that are equal to a statute passed by the Diet, the relationship between the legislative and executive branch under the constitution will fundamentally be changed. The introduction of the executive branch’s power to declare an emergency ordinance would erode the status of the Diet as the supreme organ of state power.
 
An unignorable fact in the discussion over the constitutional amendment is that the leading coalition does not have even a simple majority in the Upper House. A super majority – a two-thirds vote – in each House of the Diet is necessary for a constitutional amendment to move forward. While the LDP and the JIP have that majority in the Lower House after the LDP’s sweeping victory in the February elections, they do not have even a simple majority in the Upper House.
 
The Upper House is focused on an entirely different constitutional issue. In the meeting of the Upper House Commission on the Constitution on May 20, the main topic of discussion was not the emergency clause but the election system. In Upper House elections, each prefecture has had its own seats. But with the decline of eligible voters, the districts of Tottori and Shimane were integrated into a single district, just as the Tokushima and Kochi were combined, for the 2016 election and thereafter. Members of the Upper House from both sides of the aisle have urged the elimination of such integrated districts
 
The LDP accordingly has proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish integrated prefectural districts. However, the top opposition party in the Upper House, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), does not believe that an amendment is necessary; rather, the Diet can achieve this end simply by amending the election laws. Komeito, as a partner of the CDPJ in the Lower House, supports this view.
 
The LDP and JIP have different priorities regarding a constitutional amendment. The JIP is focused on an emergency clause that would enhance executive power in a time of crisis. The LDP is going in a different direction, prioritizing electoral system reform in the Upper House. The LDP thinks it will be easier to reach a consensus there on election reforms than on the emergency clause amendment. 
 
As a lawmaker in the conservative bloc, PM Takaichi has presented herself as a firm proponent of the theory of constitutional amendments. “The constitution should occasionally be updated to meet contemporary demands,” said Takaichi to a recent meeting of supporters for constitutional amendment. She did not, however, provide any details on which provisions should be amended adding uncertainty to how the debate should proceed.

Imperial Succession

Diet Discussion on the Imperial Family Resumes

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026

Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15^th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
 
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
 
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
 
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
 
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
 
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12^th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
 
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
 
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
 
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
 
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
 
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
 
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
 
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947.  However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.

Protected by the Constitution

Escaping from Trump’s Request to Dispatch Troops

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 23, 2026
 
The White House might have turned into a haunted house for Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Luckily, she managed to leave without infuriating the resident, U.S. President Donald Trump. She explained the legal requirements that limit Japan’s ability to send troops to the Strait of Hormuz. This work left no time for Takaichi to rebuild a common strategy with the U.S. and against China. After all was said and done, the summit meeting produced no obvious progress.
 
Pushing the Legal Constraints Forward
The greatest challenge for Takaichi in the meeting with Trump was how to deal with his demand for U.S. allies to help protect ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Trump had previously called on countries, including Japan, to send warships to keep the strait open.
 
Takaichi deliberated with her diplomatic staff on how to respond to Trump at the meeting. Their conclusion was that Japan could not send its Self-Defense Force to the Strait. They considered three options: 1) a determination that events in the Strait present a “survival threatening situation” in which Japan can deploy its armed forces to assist the U.S. forces in the region; 2) a determination that Iran’s activities in the strait were a “significant influence situation,” in which case Japan could provide logistic support; and 3) a determination that activities in the strait warranted “maritime security operations” under Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, in which Japanese forces  take necessary action to protect life and property.
 
None of these theories work for action in the Strait, however. The situation in Iran does not threaten Japan’s survival, at least not so far. Japan cannot provide logistical support (on the basis of a significant influence situation) in any area where actual battle is ongoing. Maritime security operations extend only to Japanese vessels. Takaichi and her staff realized that, with the limits on their use, she could do little to satisfy Trump.
 
After her meeting with Trump, Takaichi explained to the press that she had told him what Japan “can and cannot do” in the Middle East. What she could do was to join with the U.S. in refusing to tolerate Iran’s nuclear development, blame Iran for its de facto blockade of the Strait, and promote a joint Japan-U.S. project for oil reserves. What she could not do was to send troops to the Strait. Asahi Shimbun reported that she cited Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan as the constraint on dispatching self-defense forces.
 
Two hours before the White House meeting, European leaders together with Takaichi issued a joint statement expressing their willingness to make “appropriate efforts” to ensure safe passage through the Strait. The statement ensured that Takaichi was not seen as acting alone but rather as a member of a group of U.S. allies although their rationales differed. The Europeans take the position that the conflict in the Strait is not their war while legal requirements preclude Japan from participating in the conflict. 
 
Takaichi returned to Japan with homework: how to define “appropriate efforts.” The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimutsu Motegi, suggested sending self-defense forces for mine sweeping in the Strait after a ceasefire. Obviously, Takaichi will need to find a reason to explain to the opposition parties in the Diet why Japan would take on this chore.
 
The China Issue Is Left Behind
For Japan, the summit meeting was originally set to discuss China. Takaichi made a careless comment last November on a “Taiwan contingency,” which exacerbated Japan-China tensions. As Trump scheduled his visit to Beijing in April, Takaichi had to talk with Trump beforehand to encourage him to keep the U.S. engaged in security activities in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan is afraid that Trump would lose interest in Asia if he were to reach a deal with Xi Jinping. In the event, the Trump-Xi meeting was postponed, as Trump continued to grapple with the war.
 
At the White House, Takaichi and Trump reconfirmed that they would closely consult with each other on with issues relating to China, based on the time-honored concept of a “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOIP).” Takaichi said that Japan would always be open to China, and Trump replied that he would be “speaking Japan’s praises” when he visits Beijing. But nobody knows when that will be.
 
It is notable that the Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community took Takaichi’s Taiwan comment seriously. “Her comments represent a significant shift for a sitting Japanese prime minister,” the document said. Takaichi does not seem to have been successful in impressing on the president that her position on the Taiwan contingency is the same as that of her predecessor prime ministers.
 
Takaichi and Trump did reach three economic agreements. A joint announcement on bilateral investment included a commitment by the Japanese to construct small module reactors in Tennessee and Alabama and natural gas generation facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas. These proposals constituted the second wave of Japan’s promised investments that were part of the Japan-U.S. agreement in July 2025, related to Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs on Japanese products.
 
The agreement for certain Japanese investments must have been the biggest souvenir of Takaichi’s trip to the U.S., regardless of whether Trump was satisfied with it or not. Japan announced the first wave of investments in February, which included the manufacture of industrial synthetic diamonds, construction of the U.S. crude oil export infrastructure, and natural gas generation. Takaichi tried to demonstrate Japan’s willingness to implement the July 22 agreement. The two waves represent about 20 percent of the promised $550 billion investment.
 
Charming, Flattering, and Ignoring
Takaichi presented her unique style of her diplomacy during the trip. Video footage of Takaichi’s arrival at the White House entrance was repeatedly broadcast in Japan. She approached Trump, who was standing at the entrance, and hugged him with her arms embracing his shoulder and waist. It was closer to tackling than hugging. Although she might have been trying to charm Trump, a former Japanese diplomat described it as “embarrassing.” One would have to search long and hard to find any evidence of another world leader hugging Trump.
 
At the beginning of summit meeting, Takaichi praised Trump as a distinguished leader. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” said Takaichi. In view of the U.S. military operations to replace the Venezuelan leader and to launch a surprise attack on Iran, most Japanese recognized her remarks on Trump-as-peacemaker as explicit flattery.
 
Japanese leaders have sometimes used “haragei (腹芸),” a performance dealing with issues not based on words or actions but on guts, in its relations with the U.S. Former prime minister Eisaku Sato was renowned for his haragei, as seen in his negotiations for the return of the U.S.-occupied Okinawa and in the textile deal. But Takaichi has yet to reach his skill level: the audience in Japan could easily perceive that she just did not want to piss Trump off.
 
Asked by the press why the U.S. did not give Japan advance notice of the first attack on Iran, Trump reached back 85 years, five years before he was born. “Who knows better about surprise than Japan, OK? Why didn’t you tell me about Pearl Harbor?” Trump answered. Takaichi – who understands the English language just fine – waited for the interpreter’s translation and made no verbal reply. She ignored Trump’s irrelevant joke; a surprise attack would not be announced to the target.
 
Takaichi has not had much diplomatic or international negotiation experience over trade deals before becoming prime minister. It is not easy for the leader of a country to conduct negotiations with national interests at stake by acting like a girl in love with a strong man.

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 23, 2026

THE WORLD OF HARD POWER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON UKRAINE. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (GMT), 7:00-8:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK. 

BNP RETURNS TO POWER: ASSESSING THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BANGLADESH’S ELECTIONS. 2/23, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Razia Sultana, Core Senior Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS); Avinash Paliwal, Reader in International Relations, School of Oriental and African Studies; Farooq Sobhan, Former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, Moderator: Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program, Stimson; Steve Ross, Senior Fellow, Crisis in Rakhine State Project Director, Stimson. 

WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S IEEPA RULING? 2/23, 9:30-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Navin Girishankar, President, Economic Security and Technology Department; Philip Luck, Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business; William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair Emeritus, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business; Angela Ellard, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economic Security and Technology Department. 

CHINA-RUSSIA VIEWS OF THE "DONROE DOCTRINE": HOW MOSCOW AND BEIJING ARE RESPONDING TO TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY. 2/23, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist for China Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA); Lyle J. Goldstein, Director of the China Initiative and Visiting Professor at Brown University’s Watson Institute; Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. 

THE UN WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES: THE FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. 2/23, 10:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Heba Aly, Director, Article 109; Charles Kenny, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development; Sarah E. Mendelson, Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy, Director, Sustainable Futures, Carnegie Mellon University; Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, Global Order and Institutions Program. 

HOW WILL THE SUPREME COURT’S IEEPA RULING IMPACT U.S.-CHINA TECH COMPETITION? 2/23, 11:00-11:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Navin Girishankar, President, Economic Security and Technology Department; Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Sujai Shivakumar, Director and Senior Fellow, Renewing American Innovation; Joseph Majkut, Director, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. 

THE UK CRITICAL MINERALS STRATEGY: BUILDING NATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH GLOBAL POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL COLLABORATION, 2/23, 5:00-6:00pm (GMT), Noon-1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: Chris McDonald MP, UK Minister for Industry. 

BOOK TALK: THE WEST: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author Georgios Varouxakis, Professor of History, Queen Mary University of London; Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program, Quincy Institute. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4tpQIPX

ALLIED NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIPS: ADVANCING U.S.–KOREA–JAPAN COOPERATION. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Global American Business Institute (GABI). Speakers: Nobuo Tanaka, Chair, Steering Committee of Innovation for Cool Earth Forum (ICEF), CEO, Tanaka Global, Inc., Executive Director Emeritus, International Energy Agency (IEA); Joyce Connery, Principal Owner, Connery Strategies, Former Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Moderator: Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Please Contact Mr. Bryan Cheong.

2026 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONFERENCE. 2/23-24. 1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Washington International Trade Association (WITA). Speakers: Matt Blunt, President, American Automotive Policy Council; Jordan Dickinson, Director of Government Relations, Target; Andrea Durkin, Vice President for International Policy, National Association of Manufacturers; Nasim Fussell, Vice President, Trade & International, Business Roundtable; Khalil Gharbieh, Senior Director, Trade Policy, Microsoft; Peter Harrell, Visiting Scholar, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown Law School; William Kimmitt, Under Secretary of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan McHale Vice President, Digital Trade, Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA); Kellie Meiman, Senior Counselor, McLarty Associates; Ambassador Mariana Pacheco, External Consultant, Araujo Ibarra; Greta Peisch, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP; Del Renigar, Vice President, External Affairs, Rio Tinto; Sara Schuman, Managing Director, Beacon Global Strategies; Susan Schwab Strategic Advisor, Mayer Brown LLP; Kelly Ann Shaw, Partner, Akin; Joe Stockunas, President of SEMI Americas, SEMI; Stephen Vaughn, Partner, International Trade, King & Spalding LLP; Brad Wood, Senior Director, Trade and Innovation Policy, National Foreign Trade Council; Maria Zieba, Vice President of Government Affairs, National Pork Producers Council; Ricardo Zúñiga, Strategic Advisor, Dinámica Americas. 

FOUR YEARS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE. 2/23, 3:30-4:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor:

CSIS, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. Speakers: Max Bergmann, Director, Europe,

Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center; Maria Snegovaya, Senior Fellow, Europe,

Russia, and Eurasia Program; Hanna Notte, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Europe,

Russia, and Eurasia Program; Jason Paul "JP" Gresh, Senior Associate (Non-resident),

Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Michael Kimmage, Director, Kennan Institute.

BOOK TALK: GHOST NATION: THE STORY OF TAIWAN AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL. 2/23, 4:00-5:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speaker: author Chris Horton. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4kIPcV0

REPORT RELEASE: RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU: KIM REGIME’S PRECIOUS TREASURED SWORD. 2/23, 4:00-5:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Committee for Human Rights North Korea. Speakers: Report Author Robert Collins; Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, HRNK Board Member and Henry Wendt Chair, American Enterprise Institute (AEI); ROKA LTG (Ret.) Chun In-bum; Dr. George Hutchinson, Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Korean Studies (IJKS); Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 

WE THE PEOPLE: THE US CONSTITUTION IN TODAY'S WORLD. 2/23, 5:30-6:30pm (CST), 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago; Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 

[POSTPONED] THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER. 2/23, 6:30-8:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP). Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Asia Society Policy Institute; Ken Jimbo, Keio University; Susan A. Thornton, Director, NCAFP Forum on Asia Pacific Security.

CONTAINING CHINA WITHOUT CONFRONTATION? THE QUAD'S MARITIME SECURITY PARADOX PLAYS OUT AT SEA. 2/23, 6:45-8:45pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: John F. Bradford, Co-founder of YCAPS and Adjunct Senior Fellow at RSIS.

NUCLEAR THREATS AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 2/23, 7:00-8:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Anna Hood, Associate Professor, University of Auckland; Monique Cormier, Associate Professor, Monash University; Carrie McDougall, Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School; Paul Davis, Adjunct Principal Researcher, RAND; George Perkovich, Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow. 

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY IN 2026: GROWTH WITHOUT MOMENTUM. 2/24, 10:00-11:00am (SGT), 2/23, 2/23 9:00-10:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Dr. Jan Carlo Punongbayan, Visiting Fellow, Philippine Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Moderator: Dr. Jayant Menon, Visiting Senior Fellow, Regional Economic Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 

The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.