South Korea's Autonomous Defense

South Korea Is Building for the Alliance and for Itself 

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 20, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

The United States and South Korea describe the latter’s defense buildup with the same enthusiasm but mean two different things. American officials call it “alliance modernization,” while South Korean officials increasingly call it “autonomous defense.” Neither side has much incentive to dwell on the difference, but it is getting harder to avoid.

As the Donald Trump administration tells it, South Korea is increasing defense spending and equipment procurement within the context of a redesigned U.S. strategy to restructure the roles of both U.S. and South Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

Modernization is the “administration’s shorthand for pushing U.S. allies to adapt to a changing regional security environment and shoulder more of the defense burden,” Brookings Institution’s Andrew Yeo observed last fall. Writing for the latest edition of KEI’s Korea Policy, Korea National Defense University’s In Hyo Seol described modernization as “a redistribution of roles on a foundation of converging military interests.” 

This framework is a more comfortable one for those concerned about friction between the United States and South Korea. Differences over specific issues, such as the timeline for returning wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean armed forces, can be more easily managed if both Washington and Seoul share the same goal of alliance modernization.

Autonomous Defense

But the reality is more complicated. South Koreans increasingly place their defense buildup and its key components within a different, though not entirely contradictory, policy framework called “autonomous defense.”

Autonomous defense traces its roots to the fear of abandonment in the 1970s, when then President Richard Nixon withdrew 20,000 troops from the peninsula during the Vietnam War. More recently, defense autonomy for South Korea means greater self-reliance, indigenous weapons procurement sustained by arms exports, and ultimately limiting the reliance on U.S. forces as a deterrent to North Korea. 

South Korean policymakers have long grappled with a persistent tension in defense policy between a desire for more autonomy and the reality of the operational indispensability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. “The goal of autonomy policy is to hold our own while being alliance compatible,” a senior South Korean official told the author on a recent visit to Seoul. In other words, South Korea hopes to shift the alliance’s internal balance of power, reduce technological dependency on U.S. defense systems, and build sufficient indigenous capability to make Seoul a more equal partner.

On the surface, the Trump administration’s goals of shifting a greater share of defense burdens to its allies and encouraging a more regional approach to security would seem to be compatible with South Korea’s preferences. But Washington has been clear about the limits: allies are expected to spend more, not to build alternatives.

The OPCON transfer initiative, for example, was initially targeted in 2012 but has since been replaced by a conditions-based threshold with no fixed timeline. The conditions range from South Korea’s own capability, both in equipment and command, to lead combined forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and most nebulous of all, the existence of a regional security environment that would be compatible with the transfer.

In 2019, the allies determined that South Korea met a minimum baseline capability and interoperability with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Further progress slowed until recently, when the Trump and Lee Jae Myung administrations agreed that a second stage, full operational capability, would be verified this year. Seoul seems likely to establish 2028 as a new target year for OPCON transfer to occur by. 

That push has been met, however, with resistance from the U.S. military, led by USFK Commander Xavier Brunson, who suggested earlier this year that this timeline was too optimistic. The U.S. Senate has backed that up by proposing tighter conditions for OPCON transfer. 

Arms Production and Exports

Similar tensions lurk not far below the surface when it comes to South Korea’s indigenous arms production and its successful export drive across Europe and Asia. Sales of armored vehicles, artillery, jet aircraft, and missile defense systems have transformed the country into a global leader of arms sales. Earlier this month, President Lee attended a NATO forum and suggested such weapons sales could underpin an evolution of South Korea-NATO ties. But senior Trump administration officials have seemingly pushed back on the notion that allies could or should replace reliance on American weapons.

“The simple fact of the matter is that no alternative country or countries can compete with the U.S. defense industrial base, either in quantity or quality,” Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby asserted on social media last week. The United States “makes the best equipment, and we make it at a scale that no plausible competitor can match,” Colby continued. Access to the U.S. defense industrial base “is a privilege, not a right.”

Thus, even in its most ambitious formulation, South Korea’s autonomous defense still involves maintaining the U.S. extended deterrence commitment in the face of threats from North Korea. Some sort of U.S. military presence makes that political commitment concrete.

“The withdrawal of USFK is not something we want to see,” a senior Lee administration official told this writer. “But if it becomes a reality for us, and we have to fend for ourselves, we need to block the threat of nuclear weapons.”

The most obvious way to do so—and the one that has attracted the most attention in American policy circles—is a South Korean nuclear weapons program. Alternatively, policymakers in Seoul are interrogating whether rapid changes in defense technology might create a reliable form of conventional deterrence. The first option is still beyond the pale, while the second is still a ways down the road.

“We are learning the lessons of the Ukraine and Iran wars,” the senior official explained, notably laser weapons and AI-powered defense systems that can “potentially intercept hundreds of missiles at one time.” 

For now, neither the United States nor South Korea has an interest in forcing the question. But indigenous production, export markets, command authority, and the first sketches of a conventional answer to nuclear coercion add up to more than burden-sharing.

Japan and South Korea Grow Closer

The Trump effect on Japan–South Korea relations

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 12, 2026 at the East Asian Forum.

The August 2023 Japan–South Korea–US trilateral summit at Camp David provided powerful impetus for Tokyo and Seoul to restore warm ties, an undertaking initiated by former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol.

The momentum in Japan–South Korea relations has continued, surviving changes in leadership in all three countries. Even the potentially disastrous pairing of a conservative nationalist government in Tokyo and a progressive administration in Seoul has not slowed the pace of the bilateral partnership’s deepening.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung sit at two ends of the political spectrum, but their May 2026 meeting in Lee’s hometown of Andong on 18-19 May, was marked by a spirit of warmth. Even Lee’s critics, who feared that his long-held harsh views on the legacy of Japanese colonial rule would reverse progress, were pleased.

Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo was ‘quite impressed with how [Lee] handled South Korea–Japan relations after taking office’, noting that the meeting in Andong ‘went very well’ — a view shared by senior South Korean officials in off-the-record discussions.

This success can be credited to Japan and Korea’s shared challenges of hedging against both China and an unpredictable United States, with US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and military interventions sending shocks across both economies. Lee’s decision to avoid past sources of contention like wartime history issues with Japan can be read as a calculated effort to use closer ties with Tokyo to insulate South Korea from growing chaos in an unpredictable security environment.

The most powerful factor in this is the prospect of US withdrawal from global leadership under Trump 2.0. Another South Korean senior official noted off the record that South Korea and Japan have ‘shared anxieties about Washington’ and that ‘it is not about China’.

Senior South Korean officials are discussing the need for closer security ties with Japan in response to US retreat, including potentially finessing the territorial disputes by signing a non-aggression pact and moving towards a mutual defence treaty. While this would go beyond what most South Koreans would tolerate — and much less in Japan — its mere consideration is a remarkable sign of the impact of Trump-driven uncertainty.

This tightening is taking place without active US involvement at the highest level. While trilateral meetings are still being held among senior officials and statements are being issued with common views on regional and global security issues like North Korea, this is the product of institutional inertia created by former US president Joe Biden’s administration. There is no evidence of a connection between those official pronouncements and the White House and Trump has never expressed any interest in trilateral cooperation, nor is he eager to follow in Biden’s footsteps.

Despite the factors impelling closer ties, there are serious concerns in Seoul and Tokyo that the rhetoric of bilateral partnership has not been sufficiently reflected in concrete actions.

The most cited example of this is the potential admittance of South Korea to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which could forge closer trade and investment alliances and counter US mercantilism. While Seoul has expressed its interest in joining, it has yet to formally apply. Domestic politics remain a constraint, reflected in the ongoing restrictions on the purchase of Japanese seafood due to the Fukushima nuclear accident and its aftermath.

A similar dynamic is visible in the arena of defence cooperation. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro visited Seoul in June 2026 and reaffirmed tightening defence ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. But he was unable to get Seoul to sign off on a long-sought military logistics pact which would institutionalise joint operations. Lee told reporters earlier in June that public sentiment on history issues were the obstacle to signing what would otherwise be a logical agreement.

Beyond immediate issues, two policy areas — China and North Korea — could also drive the neighbours apart.

Lee has been careful to maintain good ties with Beijing, both in the economic realm and in potentially seeking China’s help in dealing with North Korea. The divergence between Lee’s policy towards China and the hostile state of Japan–China relations was noted at the Andong meeting.

Both governments share a commitment to the eventual denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. But Lee seems ready to back a possible Trump summit with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un which could offer de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Japan has always been fearful that this outcome could lead to a separation of the Korean peninsula from US extended deterrence commitments and leave Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The relationship also remains marred by the lingering issues of wartime history and justice that have been carefully put aside but not resolved. Compensation cases against Japanese companies for wartime workers in Japanese mines and factories continue to make their way through South Korean courts. Takaichi has carefully avoided doing anything to inflame Seoul, but it would only take a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine — something she did regularly for several decades — to relight the fires of South Korean patriotism.

For now, the path to improved ties looks open, thanks in large part to Trump and to a lesser extent to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the question of how long it will remain so is far less certain.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.