Showing posts with label LDP President. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LDP President. Show all posts

Saturday, September 26, 2026

Takaichi Administration Shuffle

Takaichi Makes Minor Changes to Her Team

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 21, 2026


On September 16 and 17, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reshuffled the board members of her party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and her cabinet. As expected, she did not make major changes, nor did she replace core members. Her focus was to strengthen her political base ahead of her bid for reelection in next fall’s LDP presidential election. However, some opposition to her reelection has emerged, which may cause her concern.

The prime minister, or the president of the leading party, often has good reason to reshuffle his or her staff. When the leader finds that the administration is slowing down, particularly in the wake of a major political scandal, a reshuffling may be a measure to regain public support. When the leading party has lawmakers who expect to be ministers, the prime minister may ease that frustration by reshuffling the cabinet to appoint them to unoccupied positions.

Takaichi had no major reason to change her staff now because she has maintained a relatively high approval rating. But the LDP established a rule in 2022 that board members (except the president) may serve only one-year terms. They may be reappointed twice for a total of three consecutive terms. Changes to the LDP board always linked to reshuffling of cabinet ministers. Takaichi appointed LDP board members in October 2025. That is why she needed to make some changes in her team.

The lineup of the Takaichi administration has three categories: close allies, supporters to rely on and potential rivals. Minister of Finance Satsuki Katayama and Minister on Economic Security Kimi Onoda are Takaichi’s close allies because they were two of the 20 nominators for Takaichi in the 2025 LDP presidential election. Takaichi decided to keep them in the same positions, unaffected by the reshuffle.

LDP vice-president Taro Aso is Takaichi’s most important supporter and guardian. Because Aso’s grip on the LDP is essential, Takaichi reappointed Aso as vice president and named Aso’s brother-in-law, Shun-ichi Suzuki, LDP Secretary General. The Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, Takayuki Kobayashi, also stayed because Aso expects Kobayashi to be a future leader. Kobayashi has been a rival of Takaichi – he ran for the LDP presidency last fall -- but Takaichi supposedly accepted Aso’s recommendation to reappoint Kobayashi to the council chairman’s slot.

Former members of the Abe faction might also be labeled as supporters of Takaichi since they share conservative political principles. Several lawmakers in the former Abe faction were punished when the kickback fund scandal emerged in 2024 and were then purged from positions as ministers or members of the LDP board. Takaichi has now brought them back into the fold.  

Three former Abe faction leaders -- Koichi Hagiuda (deputy SG), Yasutoshi Nishimura (election chief), and Hirokazu Matsuno (organization chief) – retained the positions that Takaichi had given them after she took office. Additionally, she appointed two other lawmakers involved in the scandal, Yoshihiro Seki (education), and Kazuo Yana (agriculture), to the cabinet for the first time after the scandal. Takaichi seems now to have pardoned many leaders of the now-defunct Abe faction.

Two key cabinet members, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimitsu Motegi, and the Minister of Defense, Shinjiro Koizumi, both ran in the LDP presidential election last fall and would be recognized as Takaichi’s rivals. It may sound strange for Takaichi to keep them in her cabinet. But it is not easy for a cabinet minister to run for the party presidency to replace the incumbent prime minister because every minister needs to approve the prime minister’s policies. To take different policy positions, the minister needs to reject signing on cabinet decision, which is likely to cause a dismissal. Thus, Takaichi’s reappointment of Motegi and Kozumi keeps them on the sidelines.

This rationale did not apply across the board. The Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Yoshimasa Hayashi, was another candidate in last fall’s presidential election, and thus a potential rival of Takaichi. Takaichi replaced Hayashi. Her decision indicates that she recognizes him as a serious obstruction to her reelection.

As the minister in charge of local governments, Hayashi was able to visit cities and towns all around Japan for a year to build good relationships. His travels might have laid the local groundwork for local support in the next LDP presidential election. Hayashi had been a leader in Kochikai, an LDP faction that has been dissolved, which represented LDP liberalism in contrast to more hawkish groups in the party.

Excluding Hayashi from her team is part of Takaichi’s reelection strategy: the exclusion will isolate Hayashi in the LDP, which is otherwise united under her leadership. However, this reshuffling revealed one of her weaknesses. That would be Diet affairs.

Takaichi replaced the LDP Chairman on Diet Affairs, Hiroshi Kajiyama, with Hideki Murai because of her differences with Kajiyama over this year’s budget process. During the discussions over the fiscal year 2026 budget bill in the last session of the Diet, Kajiyama’s handling of Diet procedure frustrated Takaichi since she was forced to answer questions from opposition parties. Murai, the new Chairman, has argued that the prime minister need only appear a few times before the Diet.

Takaichi’s preferences were more telling in the Upper House. The LDP Upper House Secretary General, Jun-ichi Ishii, stepped down against his will. Having strong connections with the opposition parties, Ishii managed negotiations with opposition parties in the last session of the Diet. The LDP was unable to collect a majority vote in the Upper House and failed to pass a budget bill by the end of March. Ishii has expressed his concern with Takaichi’s unrealistically short scheduling for passing bills regardless of opposition parties’ protest. Takaichi did not like to be advised by Ishii.

Moreover, Ishii had established a new group in the Upper House LDP in April, which became the anti-Takaichi group in the party. If this movement in the Upper House LDP attracts lawmakers who have distanced themselves from Takaichi, like Hayashi for example, it will be a formidable challenge to Takaichi in next year’s LDP presidential election. The LDP election is next year. This would be a nightmare for Takaichi, who has not built an unshakable political base within the LDP.

Monday, October 27, 2025

Japan’s First Woman Prime Minister

 Ms. Sanae Takaichi 

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point

Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 21, 2025

Japan’s Diet elected Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president Ms. Sanae Takaichi the country’s 104th prime minister. Although her success was due to the establishment of a new coalition between the LDP and the conservative nationalist Japan Innovation Party (JIP, 日本維新 の会, Nippon Ishin no Kai; Japan Restoration Association), JIP decided not to send a minister to Takaichi’s Cabinet. JIP will exert its influence indirectly to ensure hawkish policies in the new administration.

Takaichi’s election was not certain after the LDP’s long-time partner Komeito left the leading coalition. The next coalition possibility, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), refrained from forming a coalition with the LDP because even together they could not achieve a simple majority in the Diet. Takaichi then reached out to JIP to form a new coalition. On October 20, after five days of negotiation, the LDP and JIP reached a twelve-point agreement for their coalition.

Komeito’s departure made it easier for the LDP to approach JIP because both parties have closely aligned conservative platforms. Although JIP has previously sought to cooperate formally with the LDP, notably during the Shinzo Abe administration, Komeito blocked JIP from the coalition because of political differences. Komeito kept a liberal position in the coalition. With Komeito’s departure, the LDP was unleashed from Komeito’s rein.

The LDP’s rightward move is embedded in the coalition agreement. Both parties decided to revise the three security documents, approved by the Fumio Kishida administration in 2022, to further increase the defense budget. They plan to allow greater exports of defense equipment by easing export controls in five categories– rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and sea minesweeping. Takaichi expects to explain the impact of these policies to the U.S. President Donald Trump during his visit to Tokyo later this month.

The LDP and JIP are firm advocates for several constitutional amendments. Both parties plan to submit to the Diet by the end of FY2026 a draft amendment that would add an emergency clause to maintain the legislative branch in a contingency. The parties also will discuss amending the pacifism principle in Article 9. They agreed as well to revise the Imperial House Law to encourage imperial succession only by males in the male line.

During the two parties’ policy talks, JIP abruptly shifted its focus from social security reform and the sub-capital initiative to the reduction of Diet seats. The LDP accepted the idea of a 10 percent reduction in Lower House seats in the current session of the Diet. The opposition parties oppose it, arguing that a reduction in Diet seats must have comprehensive approval of parties with representatives in the Lower House.

As for the sub-capital initiative, which would establish an alternative to Tokyo in case the capital suffers from a major disaster, the LDP and JIP aim to enact it in the ordinary session of the Diet in 2026. There is no time limit on discussions between the two parties on elimination of the consumption tax on food for two years. JIP had earlier demanded that this be part of the Diet’s urgent agenda.

JIP’s most controversial decision was to give the LDP a two-year delay on the enactment of a prohibition on contributions from companies and organizations. The two parties’ agreement states that the Diet will affect the ban only by the end of Takaichi’s term as LDP president in September 2027. It is notable that the coalition agreement between the LDP, the Liberal Party and Komeito in 1999 included a commitment to enact the prohibition in the Diet session of that year. In the event, the LDP did not act on it for 26 years. In fact, any provision in the LDP-JIP agreements is nothing more than a target subject to future discussion.

With these policy agreements in place, the two parties were able to elect Takaichi as prime minister. Takaichi won in the Lower House with 237 votes out of 465, or 51% -- enough to avoid a run-off. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, came a distant second with 149 votes. The opposition parties could not unite for an alternative candidate. Takaichi also defeated Noda by 125 votes to 46 in a run-off in the Upper House. These votes made Takaichi the first female prime minister of Japan.

Takaichi started her political career as an independent lawmaker of the House of Representatives in 1993. She participated in establishment of the New Frontier Party in 1994, and joined the LDP in 1996. Affiliation with the Seiwa Policy Group, one of the factions in the LDP, determined her course in politics, which was conservative.

She supported two leaders of Seiwa group who were her mentors: former prime ministers Yoshiro Mori and Shinzo Abe. She supported unpopular prime minister Mori as a “volunteer advisor” in 2000. When Abe ran for LDP president in 2012 against Nobutaka Machimura, who was the head of Seiwa group, Takaichi left the faction to support Abe. Her relationship with Mori and Abe helped her advance politically.

Takaichi is known to have a rivalry with another woman LDP lawmaker, Seiko Noda, whose is relatively liberal. Both won the Lower House election for the first time in 1993. Noda’s first appointment to cabinet minister and first marriage were earlier than Takaichi’s. Abe simultaneously picked Takaichi for LDP policy chief and Noda for chairwoman of LDP General Council to let them compete each other in his second administration starting in 2012. Takaichi appears to have won the competititon.

However, the Japanese people are not very enthusiastic about her premiership. It is true that the main reason behind expectations about Takaichi is that she is a woman – rather than that she has particular political views one way or another. But she was less popular among women than among men in LDP presidential election. She opposes the possibility of a female emperor as well as a separate surname system. She is identified not merely as conservative, but as rightwing.

Her cabinet reflects her political obligations and biases. She appointed Minoru Kihara as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Toshimitsu Motegi as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Shinjiro Koizumi as Minister of Defense. Yoshimasa Hayashi will be Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. Takaichi thus included in her cabinet or on the LDP board all the other four candidates in the LDP presidential election.

For Minister of Finance, Takaichi picked Satsuki Katayama as one of the female cabinet members. Ryosei Akazawa, Japan’s top negotiator in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and a close ally of former premier Shigeru Ishiba, remains Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry; he is expected to continue managing trade negotiations with the U.S. These appointments seem to be an attempt to reintegrate the LDP. But appointment of female ministers was limited to two people instead of the expected five.

While it agreed to a firm coalition with the LDP, JIP did not join the Takaichi Cabinet. It is an unusual decision. A junior partner in a leading coalition typically will have at least one member in the cabinet. In its coalition with the LDP, Komeito sent a minister to the cabinet every year since 1999, except during DPJ government between 2009 and 2012. There is one precedent for JIP’s decision: in 1996, the Social Democratic Party and New Party Sakigake left LDP’s Ryutaro Hashimoto Cabinet but maintained a cooperative relationship with the LDP.

The leader of JIP, Hirofumi Yoshimura, indicated that his party did not have enough experience to join the cabinet. But it is likely that the party has reserved a choice to leave the coalition if the LDP fails to live up to the coalition agreement.

Cooperation outside the cabinet is a weaker form of a coalition government than a traditional one. The cabinet attains its policy goals through cabinet decisions. Each decision is made with the unanimous approval of all the ministers. If a minister refuses to sign onto a cabinet decision, the prime minister can force him or her to leave the cabinet.

JIP’s decision to distance itself from the Takaichi cabinet has two aspects. First, JIP will not be responsible for each decision of the Takaichi Cabinet. Second, without a representative in the cabinet, JIP cannot directly use the cabinet decision-making process to turn its policies into law. JIP is not without influence, though; the LDP will be constantly concerned by policy differences that would cause JIP to leave the coalition.

The coalition agreement does not refer to cooperation in elections. The LDP lawmakers from the Osaka area, where JIP has a stronghold, are worried about cooperation with JIP. How the two parties can cooperate in elections in each district may determine the fortune of their coalition.

Wednesday, October 15, 2025

Uncertainty in Japanese Politics


Komeito Dissolves the Leading Coalition

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 13, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

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Wednesday, October 8, 2025

Takaichi Becomes the First Female LDP President

Can she become prime minister?

By Takuya Nishimura
, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
October 6, 2025

Former Minister of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi won the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on October 4, making her the first female president in the party’s history. As the race turned to be a match between pro- and anti-Ishiba blocs, Takaichi achieved a sweeping victory, assembling conservative votes within the LDP – largely among general party members. The point now is whether she can mitigate division in the party and restore the LDP’s historical majority in both Houses of the Diet.

In the election, Takaichi showed her strength among rank-and-file voters of the party. The first-round score of each candidate was 183 (64 from lawmakers and 119 general party members) for Takaichi, 164 (80 and 84) for Minister of Environment Shinjiro Koizumi, 134 (72 and 62) for Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, 59 (44 and 15) for former Minister of Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, and 49 (34 and 15) for former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi.

Because no candidate achieved a simple majority, the election went to a run-off between Takaichi and Koizumi. Takaichi received 185 votes (149 from lawmakers and 36 from party branches), and Koizumi 156 (145 and 11). Before the election Takaichi seemed popular among the rank-and-file and Koizumi had strength among lawmakers. The election itself showed that Takaichi dominated both groups.

One reason for Takaichi’s victory was a fundamental concern of rank-and-file members who realized that LDP support had eroded everywhere in Japan with the advance of conservative parties such as Sanseito. These parties significantly increased their seats in July’s Upper House election. Trying to regain conservative votes that had left the LDP, the general members hoped to restore the conservative cause of the party by voting for the right-wing Takaichi.

Another critical element in Takaichi’s favor was a maneuver by a heavyweight in the party, former prime minister Taro Aso. He leads only one faction in the LDP, but it was enough. He instructed his allies to vote in the run-off for the candidate who had received the largest number of votes from general party members in the first round. The faction members knew this meant voting for Takaichi because it had become obvious before the election that she was leading Koizumi among general members.

The victory of Takaichi, in short, was based on separate motivations of the rank and file and the Aso faction members in the Diet. The right-leaning sentiment of LDP general members was to defend the party from surges of new conservative movements throughout Japan. Lawmakers represented by Aso hoped to maintain the traditional political arrangement in which factions, once rejected by public voters, again dominate power in the party.

Takaichi was elected to the House of Representatives for the first time as an independent in 1993. She joined the LDP in 1996, after a short affiliation with the later-dissolved New Frontier Party (Shinshin-tou). She became a member of the Seiwakai Policy Study Group, a faction led by Yoshiro Mori, Jun-ichiro Koizumi and eventually by Shinzo Abe. Takaichi eventually became chair of the LDP Policy Research Council, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, and Minister on Economic Security.

Known as a conservative lawmaker close to Abe, Takaichi repeatedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine on its festival days and the August 15 Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead. She has argued forcefully for amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. Takaichi also advocates mobilization of financial policies to inject substantial amounts of government money into the market, i.e., deficit spending. Such spending reflects the economic policies of the Abe administration known as Abenomics. She has also spoken favorably of the need to regulate foreigners in Japan, a position that attracts the xenophobic sentiment of conservative voters.

Takaichi is better known as a promotor of a hawkish agenda than as an advocate for women’s rights – notwithstanding that she is likely to become the first woman prime minister. She opposes separate surnames and instead calls for expanded use of nicknames. She wholeheartedly supports primogeniture, a doctrine under which a male Emperor is succeeded by a male heir in the male line belonging to the imperial lineage. This doctrine rules out the possibility of female emperor.

“I will make this party with the participation of everyone, bringing all generations together,” said Takaichi in her press conference right after the LDP presidential election. Her first assignment as the LDP president is to reunite the party which was divided between members who favored Ishiba and those who opposed him. However, it is likely that figures from anti-Ishiba groups will populate her administration.

The fact that Aso’s endorsement ensured Takaichi’s election means that she will be beholden to him. Press reports indicate that Takaichi is considering picking Shun-ichi Suzuki, a former Minister of Finance, a ranking member of the Aso faction and his brother-in-law, as Secretary General of the LDP. The appointment is probably a show of gratitude to Aso.

To bolster the right wing of her administration, Takaichi reportedly plans to pick Takayuki Kobayashi, one of the candidates in the presidential election, as chair of the LDP Policy Research Council. She will likely also appoint Haruko Arimura for the chairwoman of General Council and Keiji Furuya for the head of Election Committee, both well-known ultra conservative. Her selections for LDP board members are overwhelmingly hawkish.

It is also said that she plans to appoint Minoru Kihara, a former member of the Motegi Faction, as Chief Cabinet Secretary of her Cabinet. Takaichi is said to be considering inclusion of Motegi, Koizumi, and Hayashi, three of her contenders in the presidential election into her cabinet.

The appointments may also represent the restoration of factions that were disbanded in the aftermath of the scandal involving the factions’ illegal management of political funds. She is appointing Koichi Hagiuda, one of the recipients of secret funds from former Abe faction, to LDP Executive Acting Secretary General. Although this slush fund scandal helped cause the LDP’s serious defeats in the national elections in 2024 and 2025, Takaichi has declared that she would distribute important posts in her administration to the lawmakers who had been involved in the scandal. She scarcely mentioned reform of the LDP in her presidential campaign.

Takaichi is likely to be elected the first female prime minister to succeed Shigeru Ishiba in the extraordinary session of the Diet in mid-October. The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito does not have a majority in either House, meaning that Takaichi will have to attract votes from outside these two parties. However, the opposition parties are too divided to settle on a candidate for prime minister from within their own ranks. Even so, Takaichi will have to find a way to work with the opposition if the Takaichi Cabinet is to implement her policies.

Although Takaichi thinks that her administration should be based on the LDP’s traditional partnership with Komeito, this peace-focused party opposes many of Takaichi’s hawkish views. Its Chief Representative, Tetsuo Saito, has indicated that Takaichi must modify four policies to maintain the leading coalition: visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, given their adverse effect on diplomacy; fair treatment of foreigners in Japan; stricter regulation of campaign contributions by companies and organizations; and expansion of the LDP-Komeito coalition.

Takaichi’s victory was a surprise to the opposition parties, and there appear to be differing results. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) has focused on implementation of their economic policy, and the Takaichi administration expects to build a close relationship with them. It was reported that the DPP would be the first target for Takaichi to formulate a new coalition

Other parties may be less successful. The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) has not been able to cooperate with Komeito in single-seat districts in Osaka. Given its hope to amend security legislation in 2015, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) is unlikely to be a coalition partner of the LDP. The CDPJ nevertheless favors a refundable tax credit that is a priority for Takaichi.

In diplomacy, Takaichi’s first test is likely to be U.S. President Donald Trump. He is expected to make a state visit to Tokyo later this October (reportedly 27-29). Frustrated with Trump’s imposition of a 15 percent tariff on Japanese products, Takaichi previously has suggested renegotiating the tariff agreement. Observers on both sides of the Pacific will watch with great interest whether Takaichi can build a personal relationship with Trump that benefits Japan.

Improving, or at least maintaining, relations with neighboring countries are another vital task for Takaichi. Her continuing visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have caused China to accuse Japan of indifference to historical issues. Her political mentor, Abe, undermined Japan’s relationship with the Republic of Korea by encouraging a revisionist history of the former colony. Takaichi’s like-minded historical views may similarly affect Japan’s relationship with Korea, which had improved in the Ishiba administration.

Whether Takaichi can revive the LDP while managing diplomacy toward both Japan’s neighbors and the U.S. is her challenge.

Monday, September 29, 2025

Japan's Succession Battle Pits Moderates Against the Right

—and Korea Is Watching

Originally Published on The Peninsula, September 26, 2025

By Daniel Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, and APP member.

As he heads out the revolving door of Japanese politics, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has two important stops on his agenda. The first will be in Busan, South Korea, for a meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung next week. The two leaders have vowed to solidify the momentum in closer relations and to make these meetings a regular feature of those ties.

Three days later, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will pick a new party leader, with the winner expected to become Japan’s prime minister. Immediately after that hurdle has been cleared, Ishiba is reportedly planning to deliver a long-expected major address, likely in Tokyo, on his version of the lessons of World War II and his vow not to repeat “the devastation of war.”

The outgoing Japanese leader represents the more liberal wing of the LDP and had hoped to cement ties with neighboring Korea and ease tensions with China while seeking more space to pursue an independent foreign policy. But his government was far too weak to take any bold steps. A longtime foe of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Ishiba may now be worried about the candidates for succession from the right, led by former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Sanae Takaichi.

A rare female figure in Japanese politics, Takaichi has embraced the anti-immigrant and hyper-patriotic rhetoric of the small but surprisingly successful Sanseito, which won fourteen seats in the last election for the upper house of the National Diet on a “Japan First” platform that consciously echoed the ideology and agenda of Donald Trump’s MAGA movement.

The prospect of a victory by Takaichi, who is considered a strong contender along with the more moderate Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi, the son of a former prime minister, also rattles close observers of Japan in Korea.

“Takaichi is a disaster for Korea,” said a former Korean ambassador to Japan, who spoke to this writer on background. “We are closely watching the succession process in Japanese politics,” added former Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo. “It is true that we have concerns over the election of a hawkish PM who might derail the restoration process of Korea-Japan relations.”

Ambassador Shin, who remains active in promoting Korea-Japan ties, gives some credit to President Lee for continuing to build on the previous administration’s outreach. “Now the ball is in Japan’s court,” the former diplomat said. Takaichi, if elected, “would change her revisionist attitude toward the past history as President Lee Jae Myung did after his election,” he forecast.

The Battle within the LDP
The vote within the LDP comes little more than a year after Ishiba won an improbable victory in a similar contest following the resignation of then Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. He inherited a party and a government that was widely discredited due to fundraising scandals and rising cost of living. Along with poor LDP election performance across Japan and other domestic issues, Ishiba faced the challenge of the Trump administration and harsh tariffs imposed on Japan.

Ishiba tried to hang onto power, including accepting a disadvantageous deal with the United States on tariffs and investment. But those defeats and signs of growing discontent ultimately forced his resignation.

The lineup of contenders this time is similar to the vote a year ago, though with only five candidates. The initial vote takes place among almost a million party members, given the equivalent of 295 votes, and 295 members of the parliament. If no one has a majority, there is a runoff with the legislative members and 47 votes from prefectural chapters. In that second round, the still-powerful party leaders—all of them former prime ministers—would have more sway.

Among the candidates, Takaichi is joined on the right by former Minister for Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi. On the left, there is the current Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi. In the center are two well-known figures—former Minister for Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi and Agriculture Minister Koizumi, the latter of whom leads in many polls. Whomever becomes party leader must still form a de facto coalition government in order to have a working majority—even informally—which requires forming a pact with the Komeito and at least one of the other opposition parties.

In the initial debates among the candidates, foreign policy has been at best a secondary issue. There has been disproportionately large attention paid to alleged problems with foreign workers and tourists, as well as immigration. But the main focus areas are curbing inflation, restoring the social security system, reducing taxes, and political reform.

The only foreign policy issue to get much attention has been the Trump administration’s tariffs. To the extent that foreign policy is a concern, the consensus among observers in Seoul and Tokyo is that the best choices are the two former foreign ministers, Hayashi and Motegi, both of whom have good reputations on the foreign policy front.

“The best choice for Japan’s diplomacy is undoubtedly Hayashi, who has steadily acted as a moderate as foreign minister,” says a veteran Japanese foreign policy reporter at a major daily newspaper. “He has a good record of dialogue with Beijing as well as with Washington.” In Seoul, “Hayashi and Motegi are favorable choices for us,” says Ambassador Shin. Hayashi is considered a long shot, but he could emerge if there is a stalemate between Takaichi and Koizumi, who faltered the last time around when he was considered an early favorite.

Conservative front-runner Takaichi has tried to soften her image but remains anathema to many inside and outside the party as too extreme and likely to scare away many voters. Possible coalition partners like the Komeito have already made clear that they will not join a government headed by her.

Who is Koizumi?
Koizumi, at age forty-four, is increasingly the odds-on favorite to become Japan’s next prime minister. The last time he ran, a year ago, he displayed the inexperience and lack of confidence that seemed to confirm the view that he is too young for the job. But this time around, he looks more polished and presents himself as the person who can both unify the LDP and broaden its appeal again, especially to younger voters. He is also considered more acceptable to the opposition parties that would have to cooperate to make him prime minister and pass vital legislation.

But there remain considerable questions about his foreign policy views, particularly his approach toward Korea and China. He has been a regular visitor to the Yasukuni Shrine, though only as a politician and cabinet minister, following in the footsteps of his father. He has avoided the question of whether he would visit as prime minister.

“Koizumi has two faces, conservative and realistic,” says the former Korean ambassador to Japan, who spoke on background. “Still, I am not that much worried about his position regarding Korea-Japan relations.” The former envoy points out that Koizumi’s parliamentary district in the Kanagawa area is home to a large population of Korean-Japanese residents.

Koizumi notably embraced the importance of Korea-Japan relations in a press conference announcing his candidacy, apparently eager to dispel the idea that he would turn in a more right-wing direction.

“South Korea is an important neighboring country with which we must cooperate as a partner in addressing various global challenges. The importance of South Korea-Japan relations and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. is growing,” Koizumi recently declared. He pledged continuity with the path taken by the previous two Japanese administrations.

Regardless of who wins the LDP leadership, the path ahead in Japan is likely to be fraught with ongoing political instability until the party wins a new election and regains its majority.

“For the time being, Japanese politics is in chaos and flux, limiting Japan’s international role,” concludes Ambassador Shin. “That is quite detrimental to our interests too.”

Tuesday, September 23, 2025

The LDP Presidential Campaign Begins

The LDP Enters the Policy Discussion Phase of its Presidential Election


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 22, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) kicked off its presidential election campaign on September 22. Five lawmakers officially submitted their candidacies to the party on the 22nd with only a 15 minute window to file. The deadline for entries has now passed. All five were losers in the last election a year ago.
 
Having lost the majority in both Houses of the Diet under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the presidential election should be about how to regain power through reforming the party. Yet the candidates are not talking much about reform.  They are instead focusing on their economic policies for households or maneuvers to attract support from the opposition parties.
 
One of the biggest reasons for the defeats in the 2024 Lower House election and the 2025 Upper House election was the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. It revealed LDP’s mismanagement of political funds without transparency. The opposition parties called for stricter regulation of donations from companies and organizations, which have been the financial lifeline for the LDP.  After receiving protests from LDP lawmakers, Ishiba did not reach a consensus with the opposition on the issue. Ishiba announced his resignation as the LDP president on September 7.
 
The LDP set the presidential election for October 4 and opened the starting gate for campaigns on September 22. Five people have entered the race. They are: former Minister on Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Minister on Economic Security Sanae Takaichi, and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Each has his or her own platform.
 
Kobayashi is running on three key issues. First, he supports a temporary income tax cut with a fixed rate. The tax cut would provide greater benefits to high-income taxpayers than to low-income ones. Kobayashi would offset the cut with surplus tax revenue in the current year. Second, reflecting his hawkish perspective, Kobayashi supports an increase in the defense budget to more than 2 percent of GDP. Finally, he advocates greater regulation of foreign intervention in communications in Japan.
 
Announcing his candidacy immediately after Ishiba’s announcement, Motegi promises that he will pursue economic growth policies that will increase the annual income of each worker by 10 percent within three years. While other candidates prioritize policy talks with the opposition parties, Motegi aims to assemble a coalition to secure a majority in the Diet.
 
Hayashi would continue the policies of the Ishiba administration in the hope of attracting the votes of Ishiba and his allies. Setting a target of one percent growth in real wages each year, Hayashi would establish a Japanese version of “universal credit,” a social security payment which the United Kingdom has introduced. In addition, to reform the party, he would create a digital platform for real-time communications with the public. He would also amend the party constitution.
 
In her campaign speech at the LDP headquarters, Takaichi emphasized her conservative agenda. This includes greater regulation of foreigners in Japan, limiting the line of succession to the imperial throne to male offspring in the male line, and amendments to Japan’s Constitution. Unusually, however, she would pursue economic policies that include positions held by the opposition parties. These include a refundable tax credit system, a gasoline tax cut, and an increase in the income threshold for tax liability.
 
Finally, Koizumi has actually distanced himself from his platform a year ago. Party “reform” is no longer at the center of his campaign. He has also withdrawn his support for a different surname system and the deregulation of worker dismissals. Instead, Koizumi promises a one-million-yen increase in the annual average wage by FY2030 and domestic investment up to 135 trillion yen. These economic policies were already part of the Ishiba administration’s agenda.
 
Remarkably, none of the five candidates has offered a plan that would settle the dispute over regulation of (or prohibitions on) donations from companies and organizations. The opposition parties have proposed new regulations on and even the abolition of this kind of fundraising. If the LDP insists on this traditional form of fundraising, the party will retain its negative image as an old-line party.
 
In the polls by news organizations, Takaichi has the greatest popularity among general voters. However, among LDP supporters, Koizumi has the greatest support, and only LDP members will vote in the election. There is no certainty that the party election results will be consistent with the popularity of the candidates among the public voters.
 
Five is the largest number of candidates in the history of LDP presidential elections except for the 2024 election, which had nine. Since a candidate can win only with a majority vote, it is almost certain that the election will go to a run-off. Negotiations over policies among the candidates may determine the winner; there is no way to predict which of the five will emerge victoriously.