Showing posts with label APP in Print. Show all posts
Showing posts with label APP in Print. Show all posts

Saturday, September 8, 2018

Know your Abe Cabinet

Do you know who's who in Abe's 4th Cabinet?


Shinzo ABE  reshuffled his Cabinet on November 1, 2017. This was the fourth time since he was elected Japan’s prime minster for the second time in December 2012. Abe is the first prime minister to launch a fourth Cabinet since October 1952, when then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida did so.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) landslide victory in the general election held October 22, 2017 gave Abe the confidence and stability to present a new cabinet barely three months after his last redo. The average support rate of the 4th Cabinet has been 43 percent and non-support 41 percent. The LDP’s support rate during this period averaged 40 percent.

September 7th was the start of the official campaign for president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 63, is expected to win more rank-and-file party member votes than his opponent former LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba in the September 20th election. 

To examine how Abe may organize his next government and again reshuffle his Cabinet, we present you with a directory and analysis of the members of his Administration or greater cabinet. It is designed to be a reference by both ministry and last name.

There is biographical information, professional history, electoral district data, party and faction affiliations for each official identified. The descriptions also contain links to online primary sources, where available, including cabinet members’ personal homepages and blogs, their official Diet pages, and their official social media accounts.

This report also identifies each member’s known affiliations with eight prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups. Japan’s parliamentary leagues are non-government-managed, semi-permanent groups of Diet members sharing an interest or holding a particular ideological stance.

The current 4th Cabinet after some minor changes this year due to scandal is his most conservative. There are nine pages of charts, tables, and graphs to help you visualize the extent and depth of the ideology of Abe’s cabinet members.

This 90-page report is free to Asia Policy Point members and congressional staffers. 

All others we ask for $20 from non-members. CLICK HERE TO ORDER YOUR COPY.

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Know your Abe Administration: A Guide

THE ABE ADMINISTRATION: ITS TOP 100 MEMBERS
On January 24, 2017, Asia Policy Point issued its 91-page directory of biographical and background information on all top 100 members of the current Abe Administration: 20 Cabinet Ministers and top appointed government officials. Seventy-four are Dietmembers and 26 are non-politicians such as academics and bureaucrats.
The officials are organized by government ministry and by last name. All known social media accounts are included. Automatic Google Translate can be very helpful in looking at these Japanese-language resources.
Each member’s known affiliations with 20 prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues, caucuses, and issue groups are also identified. 
Included is a chapter describing these groups followed by a chapter of charts and graphs for you to visualize the strength and depth of these ideological memberships in the Abe Administration.
For perspective, a Japanese conservative nationalist is different from an American conservative in a number of critical ways. A Japanese conservative nationalist advocates big government; defends social welfare; is wary of individual rights and freedoms; believes in a central government headed by the Emperor under the Shinto religion; aspires to Japan’s independent defense, and rejects that Imperial Japan committed war crimes or started WWII.

Sunday, November 16, 2014

Comfort Women issue in the Sunday New York Times

Sunday Review | OPINION
The Comfort Women and Japan’s War on Truth
By MINDY KOTLER, APP Director


Robert G. Fresson

WASHINGTON — In 1942, a lieutenant paymaster in Japan’s Imperial Navy named Yasuhiro Nakasone was stationed at Balikpapan on the island of Borneo, assigned to oversee the construction of an airfield. But he found that sexual misconduct, gambling and fighting were so prevalent among his men that the work was stalled.

Lieutenant Nakasone’s solution was to organize a military brothel, or “comfort station.” The young officer’s success in procuring four Indonesian women “mitigated the mood” of his troops so well that he was commended in a naval report.

Lieutenant Nakasone’s decision to provide comfort women to his troops was replicated by thousands of Imperial Japanese Army and Navy officers across the Indo-Pacific both before and during World War II, as a matter of policy. From Nauru to Vietnam, from Burma to Timor, women were treated as the first reward of conquest.

We know of Lieutenant Nakasone’s role in setting up a comfort station thanks to his 1978 memoir, “Commander of 3,000 Men at Age 23.” At that time, such accounts were relatively commonplace and uncontroversial — and no obstacle to a political career. From 1982 to 1987, Mr. Nakasone was the prime minister of Japan.

Today, however, the Japanese military’s involvement in comfort stations is bitterly contested. The government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is engaged in an all-out effort to portray the historical record as a tissue of lies designed to discredit the nation. Mr. Abe’s administration denies that imperial Japan ran a system of human trafficking and coerced prostitution, implying that comfort women were simply camp-following prostitutes.

The latest move came at the end of October when, with no intended irony, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party appointed Mr. Nakasone’s own son, former Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone, to chair a commission established to “consider concrete measures to restore Japan’s honor with regard to the comfort women issue.”

The official narrative in Japan is fast becoming detached from reality, as it seeks to cast the Japanese people — rather than the comfort women of the Asia-Pacific theater — as the victims of this story. The Abe administration sees this historical revision as integral to restoring Japan’s imperial wartime honor and modern-day national pride. But the broader effect of the campaign has been to cause Japan to back away from international efforts against human rights abuses and to weaken its desire to be seen as a responsible partner in prosecuting possible war crimes.

A key objective of Mr. Abe’s government has been to dilute the 1993 Kono Statement, named for Japan’s chief cabinet secretary at the time, Yohei Kono. This was widely understood as the Japanese government’s formal apology for the wartime network of brothels and front-line encampments that provided sex for the military and its contractors. The statement was particularly welcomed in South Korea, which was annexed by Japan from 1910 to 1945 and was the source of a majority of the trafficked comfort women.

Imperial Japan’s military authorities believed sex was good for morale, and military administration helped control sexually transmitted diseases. Both the army and navy trafficked women, provided medical inspections, established fees and built facilities. Nobutaka Shikanai, later chairman of the Fujisankei Communications Group, learned in his Imperial Army accountancy class how to manage comfort stations, including how to determine the actuarial “durability or perishability of the women procured.”

Japan’s current government has made no secret of its distaste for the Kono Statement. During Mr. Abe’s first administration, in 2007, the cabinet undermined the Kono Statement with two declarations: that there was no documentary evidence of coercion in the acquisition of women for the military’s comfort stations, and that the statement was not binding government policy.

Shortly before he became prime minister for the second time, in 2012, Mr. Abe (together with, among others, four future cabinet members) signed an advertisement in a New Jersey newspaper protesting a memorial to the comfort women erected in the town of Palisades Park, N.J., where there is a large Korean population. The ad argued that comfort women were simply part of the licensed prostitution system of the day.

In June this year, the government published a review of the Kono Statement. This found that Korean diplomats were involved in drafting the statement, that it relied on the unverified testimonies of 16 Korean former comfort women, and that no documents then available showed that abductions had been committed by Japanese officials.

Then, in August, a prominent liberal newspaper, The Asahi Shimbun, admitted that a series of stories it wrote over 20 years ago on comfort women contained errors. Reporters had relied upon testimony by a labor recruiter, Seiji Yoshida, who claimed to have rounded up Korean women on Jeju Island for military brothels overseas.

The scholarly community had long determined that Mr. Yoshida’s claims were fictitious, but Mr. Abe seized on this retraction by The Asahi to denounce the “baseless, slanderous claims” of sexual slavery, in an attempt to negate the entire voluminous and compelling history of comfort women. In October, Mr. Abe directed his government to “step up a strategic campaign of international opinion so that Japan can receive a fair appraisal based on matters of objective fact.”

Two weeks later, Japan’s ambassador for human rights, Kuni Sato, was sent to New York to ask a former United Nations special rapporteur on violence against women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, to reconsider her 1996 report on the comfort women — an authoritative account of how, during World War II, imperial Japan forced women and girls into sexual slavery. Ms. Coomaraswamy refused, observing that one retraction did not overturn her findings, which were based on ample documents and myriad testimonies of victims throughout Japanese-occupied territories.

There were many ways in which women and girls throughout the Indo-Pacific became entangled in the comfort system, and the victims came from virtually every settlement, plantation and territory occupied by imperial Japan’s military. The accounts of rape and pillage leading to subjugation are strikingly similar whether they are told by Andaman Islanders or Singaporeans, Filipino peasants or Borneo tribespeople. In some cases, young men, including interned Dutch boys, were also seized to satisfy the proclivities of Japanese soldiers.

Japanese soldiers raped an American nurse at Bataan General Hospital 2 in the Philippine Islands; other prisoners of war acted to protect her by shaving her head and dressing her as a man. Interned Dutch mothers traded their bodies in a church at a convent on Java to feed their children. British and Australian women who were shipwrecked off Sumatra after the makeshift hospital ship Vyner Brooke was bombed were given the choice between a brothel or starving in a P.O.W. camp. Ms. Coomaraswamy noted in her 1996 report that “the consistency of the accounts of women from quite different parts of Southeast Asia of the manner in which they were recruited and the clear involvement of the military and government at different levels is indisputable.”

For its own political reasons, the Abe administration studiously ignores this wider historical record, and focuses instead on disputing Japan’s treatment of its colonial Korean women. Thus rebuffed by Ms. Coomaraswamy, the chief cabinet secretary, Yoshihide Suga, vowed to continue advocating in international bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Council, for Japan’s case, which is to seek to remove the designation of comfort women as sex slaves.

The grave truth about the Abe administration’s denialist obsession is that it has led Japan not only to question Ms. Coomaraswamy’s report, but also to challenge the United Nations’ reporting on more recent and unrelated war crimes, and to dismiss the testimony of their victims. In March, Japan became the only Group of 7 country to withhold support from a United Nations investigation into possible war crimes in Sri Lanka, when it abstained from voting to authorize the inquiry. (Canada is not a member of the Human Rights Council but issued a statement backing the probe.) During an official visit, the parliamentary vice minister for foreign affairs, Seiji Kihara, told Sri Lanka’s president, “We are not ready to accept biased reports prepared by international bodies.”

Rape and sex trafficking in wartime remain problems worldwide. If we hope to ever reduce these abuses, the efforts of the Abe administration to deny history cannot go unchallenged. The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council — all of whom had nationals entrapped in imperial Japan’s comfort women system — must make clear their objection to the Abe government’s perverse denial of the historical record of human trafficking and sexual servitude.

The United States, in particular, has a responsibility to remind Japan, its ally, that human rights and women’s rights are pillars of American foreign policy. If we do not speak out, we will be complicit not only in Japanese denialism, but also in undermining today’s international efforts to end war crimes involving sexual violence.

NB: The print version in the Sunday New York Times is slightly shorter than the online version featured above.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

The Abe Administration-What you need to know

ABE ADMINISTRATION 2012-14 - A PROFILE

Abe Shinzo began his second term as Prime Minister of Japan on December 26, 2012. His Cabinet – one of the most stable in recent years – is expected to be reshuffled on September 3, 2014. In anticipation of the changes, APP has prepared a report with a detailed 94-page overview of Abe’s 2012-2014 Cabinet personnel. It contains profiles of the 97-member Abe Administration, which includes the 19 top Ministers of the immediate Cabinet (including prime minister), as well as Senior Vice Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Cabinet Secretaries, and Special Advisors. 
 
This report also lists the members’ affiliations with 18 prominent conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues or caucuses (giin renmei, 議員連盟) and issues groups. These are followed by pages of tables and graphs illustrating the extensive membership of the Abe Cabinet in these groups.

It is our contention that in September Abe Shinzo will have to continue to forgo traditional criteria for appointed office, such as faction affiliation and seniority, in favor of ideological similarity. It is, therefore, crucial to have a knowledge of the ideologicalparliamentary leagues, their memberships, and operation.


Wednesday, March 31, 2010

APP members in print

Political Change in Japan Affects US-Japan Security Relations, Regional Diplomacy, Interview with Professor Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University, by Barbara Wanner, US Asia Pacific Council, Washington Report, Vol 2, March 2010.
     "I was taken aback when former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said earlier this year that we were all caught by surprise by the DPJ’s unwillingness to readily implement the force realignment package.1 He may have been caught by surprise, but I think many of us who follow Japanese politics pointed out that the DPJ’s victory amounted to a structural change in governance."

Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation by Donald K. Emmerson, Stanford University, RSIS Working Paper, No. 193, March 19, 2010, 36pgs.
      The United States belongs to various organizations and networks that encompass countries on both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The East Asia Summit (EAS) is not among them. Should the US try to join? This paper answers that question with a qualified yes: Despite formidable difficulties affecting President Obama’s schedule of foreign travel, his administration should try to “ease” the US into the Summit, initially as a guest of the host country. Eventually, pending a review of the EAS’s prior performance and future prospects, the administration may wish to upgrade that status to membership.

The 2010 QDR and Asia: Messages for the Region by Michael A. McDevitt, CNA, Asia Pacific Bulletin, East West Center, No. 53, March 11, 2010, 2 pgs.
     “In sum, the QDR message for Asia should be considered a good one for nations worried that the United States is intent on retreating from the region. The message is clear; the US still embraces its stabilizing role and is intent on ensuring it fields the military capability to do so for the foreseeable future.”

Politics of Well-Known Japanese “Secrets” Risk American Nuclear Umbrella by Bruce Klingner, Heritage Foundation, March 24, 2010.
     "By exposing the contradictory and hypocritical nature of Japan’s nuclear posture, the task force report may raise questions over the nature of Washington’s extended deterrence guarantee (“nuclear umbrella”) for the defense of Japan and South Korea. For decades Tokyo has embraced three non-nuclear principles that prohibit the manufacture, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Tokyo has also depicted itself as a uniquely qualified advocate for a nuclear-free world, since it is the only nation to have suffered the effects of atomic weapons."

Featured Print by SB Colado

Monday, March 22, 2010

DPJ is not anti-American

Former POW rejects idea that DPJ is anti-American

By LESTER TENNEY
Special to The Japan Times
Dr. Tenney, a survivor of the Bataan Death March is a member of Asia Policy Point

CARLSBAD, Calif. — As a survivor of Imperial Japan's infamous prisoner-of-war camps, forced labor at a Mitsui coal mine in Fukuoka and the horrors of the Bataan Death March in the Philippines, I know anti-Americanism when I see it. Some say the ruling Democratic Party of Japan is anti-American. I know that it is not.
...

Japan over the past 15 years has spent more than $14 million to invite 1,200 former POWs and their families from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to visit Japan as well as to support archival research on POWs held by Japan. I told Diet members and journalists that by being excluded from the initiative, we American former POWs felt abused once again.

I recalled the words of the Japanese commandant at our first POW camp, who bellowed that Americans were "lower than dogs" and that Japanese "would never be friends" with them. The DPJ members with whom I talked were all embarrassed to learn this and promised to do what they could to correct this slight to Americans — now Japan's closest ally.
...

The DPJ members I know are working hard to restore trust between the U.S. and Japan damaged by a long failure of Japan to acknowledge its past. There is no doubt that recognizing the plight of American POWs represents the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.

###

Picture: The picture above is of the burial detail at Camp O'Donnell, the first POW camp for the survivors of the Bataan Death March and where Dr. Tenney was told he was lower than a dog. Until recently, AP identified the picture as simply one of the March. This was recently corrected by AP, although many POW memoirs, such as Samuel B. Moody's Reprieve From Hell (New York: Pageant Press, 1961) identify the picture correctly. Mr. Moody ended the war at Narumi POW Camp where he was a forced laborer for Nippon Sharyo, the rail car maker.

Monday, March 1, 2010

APP Members in Print

Recent issues of the online foreign policy journal YaleGlobal have featured pieces by Asia Policy Point members.

To Deal With New Challenges, Should NATO Go Global? Before taking global responsibility, NATO needs to get its own house in order, by
Dr. Richard Weitz (Hudson Institute), YaleGlobal , 26 February 2010.
If NATO improves coordination among the dozens of countries and international institutions engaged in Afghanistan, then the Alliance might profitably consider performing the same role in other global hotspots. If it fails in Afghanistan, then NATO should properly concentrate on getting its own house in order before venturing out of its area any time soon.
Will Japan Emerge from its Shell? – Part I Climate change is a good platform for Japan’s greater global intercourse by
Dr. Edward J. Lincoln (New York University) YaleGlobal , 3 February 2010
Japanese must decide for themselves whether they want to come farther out from their shell. A society so insular that it cannot embrace a substantial inflow of immigrants to offset its declining population, however, might not step up to the international role that the world expects.
Will Japan Emerge from its Shell? – Part II The new government finds charting a new course not so easy by Mr. Daniel Sneider (Stanford University), YaleGlobal , 5 February 2010
Whether any real lessons have been learned in Tokyo or Washington remains to be seen [from months of reevaluating their relationship]. But perhaps the turn in Sino-US relations has reminded people in Tokyo and Washington that there remains a strategic purpose to the alliance.