Prime Minister of Japan’s Schedule October 27-November 2, 2014

Monday, October 27, 2014

AM
12:00 At private residence (no visitors)

08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
09:30 Depart from private residence
09:46 Arrive at office

10:13 Meet with Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare Shiozaki Yasuhisa, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Nishimura Yasuhiko, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Furuya Kazuyuki, and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s Director-General of Health Service Bureau Shinmura Kazuya
10:52 End meeting with Mr. Shiozaki, Mr. Nishimura, Mr. Furuya, and Mr. Shinmura
10:53 Meet with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Saiki Akitaka
11:27 End meeting with Mr. Saiki

PM
12:02 Meet with Secretary-General of Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union [日韓議員連盟 : Nikkan Giin Renmei] Kawamura Takeo
12:19 End meeting with Mr. Kawamura
03:56 Meet with South Korean resident Ambassador to Japan Yoo Heung-soo
04:11 End meeting with Mr. Yoo
04:13 Receive courtesy call from Speaker of National Assembly of South Korea Chung Ui-hwa. Mr. Yoo also attends
04:41 Courtesy call ends
04:42 Speak with Minister of State for Disaster Management Yamatani Eriko
04:56 Finish speaking with Ms. Yamatani
05:00 Depart from office
05:01 Arrive at Diet
05:02 Enter LDP President’s Room
05:03 LDP Officers Meeting
05:18 Meeting ends
05:19 Meet with LDP Vice-President Komura Masahiko, Secretary-General Tanigaki Sadakazu, and Chairman of Election Strategy Committee Motegi Toshimitsu
05:41 End meeting with Mr. Komura, Mr. Tanigaki, and Mr. Motegi
05:42 Leave LDP President’s Room
05:43 Depart from Diet
05:45 Arrive at office
05:46 Meet with Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Shimomura Hakubun
06:14 End meeting with Mr. Shimomura
06:19 Director of Cabinet Intelligence Kitamura Shigeru, Director of National Security Council (NSC) Yachi Shotaro, and Director of Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center Shimohira Koji enter
06:28 Mr. Yachi and Mr. Shimohira leave
06:42 Mr. Kitamura leaves
06:50 Depart from office
06:54 Arrive at Hotel Okura in Toranomon, Tokyo. Attend Memorial Reception for Murase Jiro in banquet hall Heian Room, deliver address
07:15 Depart from hotel
07:21 Arrive at Chinese restaurant Fureika in Higashi-Azabu, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with female reporters
09:55 Depart from restaurant
10:09 Arrive at private residence

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

AM
12:00 At private residence (no visitors)
07:45 Depart from private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo
07:59 Arrive at office
08:08 Cabinet Meeting begins
08:17 Cabinet Meeting ends
08:20 Ministerial Meeting on Response to Ebola Virus Disease
08:28 Meeting ends
08:31 Meet with Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Nishi Masanori
08:57 End meeting with Mr. Nishi
10:13 Meet with former Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) researcher Edward Luttwak
10:58 End meeting with Mr. Luttwak
11:07 Speak with Director of Cabinet Intelligence Kitamura Shigeru
11:12 Finish speaking with Mr. Kitamura
11:13 Meet with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu
11:31 End meeting with Mr. Kato
11:32 Speak with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister Kimura Taro and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’s Director-General of Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau Uemura Tsukasa
11:41 Finish speaking with Mr. Kimura and Mr. Uemura
11:49 Lunch with Chairperson of LDP General Council Nikai Toshihiro and political commentator Morita Minoru

PM
12:44 Finish lunch
12:52 Depart from office
12:53 Arrive at Diet
12:55 Enter Lower House Speaker’s Reception Room
01:00 Leave room and enter Lower House Plenary Meeting Hall
01:02 Lower House Plenary Session convenes
03:35 Lower House Plenary Session adjourns
03:36 Leave meeting hall
03:37 Enter LDP Secretary-General’s Room
03:38 Endorse candidate for Fukuoka City’s gubernatorial election. Commemorative photo session
03:42 Photo session ends
03:43 Depart from room
03:44 Depart from Diet
03:46 Arrive at office
04:00 Filming video message for National Convention of Japan Commercial Broadcasters Association
04:10 Finish filming
04:43 Receive courtesy call from Speaker of House of Peoples’ Representatives of Ethiopia Abadula Gemeda
05:03 Courtesy call ends
05:22 Receive proposal letter from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Advisory Council
05:33 Finish receiving proposal
05:34 Education Rebuilding Implementation Council meeting
06:00 Meeting ends
06:01 Meet with Director of NSC Yachi Shotaro, MOFA’s Vice-Minister Saiki Akitaka, Administrative Vice-Minister Sugiyama Shinsuke, and Director-General of European Affairs Bureau Hayashi Hajime
06:38 End meeting with Mr. Yachi, Mr. Saiki, Mr. Sugiyama, and Mr. Hayashi
06:43 Depart from office
06:44 Arrive at official residence. Dinner meeting with Chairman of LDP Diet Affairs Committee Sato Tsutomu, Chairman of New Komeito Diet Affairs Committee Oguchi Yoshinori, and colleagues. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu also attend
08:10 Mr. Sato, Mr. Oguchi, and Mr. Kato leave
08:43 Mr. Suga leaves

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

AM
12:00 At official residence (no visitors)
08:00 At official residence (no morning visitors)
08:46 Depart from official residence
08:56 Arrive at Imperial Palace. Reception event with wife Akie for King of the Netherlands Willem-Alexander and his wife the Queen
09:40 Depart from Imperial Palace
09:54 Arrive at Tsukiji Honwanji Temple in Tsukiji, Tokyo. Condolence call for former resident Ambassador to Thailand, the late Okazaki Hisahiko
10:00 Depart from temple
10:09 Arrive at office
10:46 Director of Cabinet Intelligence Kitamura Shigeru and Councillor of Cabinet Secretariat Kitamura Hirofumi enter
11:12 Councillor Kitamura leaves
11:16 Director Kitamura leaves
11:37 Speak with Director of NSC Yachi Shotaro
11:40 Finish speaking with Mr. Yachi
11:41 Meet with Minister in charge of Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy in Japan Ishiba Shigeru, Special Advisor to Minister of State for Special Missions (Ishiba Shigeru) Ito Tatsuya, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sugita Kazuhiro, and Acting Senior Chief Secretary of Headquarters for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economies Yamasaki Shiro

PM
12:05 End meeting with Mr. Ishiba, Mr. Ito, Mr. Sugita, and Mr. Yamasaki
12:06 Depart from office
12:07 Arrive at Lower House 1st Diet Members’ Meeting Hall. Dental examination at dentist’s office within hall
12:20 Depart from meeting hall
12:23 Arrive at LDP Party Headquarters. Lunch meeting with Special Advisor to President of the LDP Hagiuda Koichi and LDP Upper House member Yamamoto Ichita
01:04 Depart from LDP Party Headquarters
01:07 Arrive at office
01:20 Meet with CEO of US corporation BlackRock Laurence Fink, President of Your Party Asao Keiichiro, and Your Party Upper House member Inoue Yoshiyuki
01:58 End meeting with Mr. Fink, Mr. Asao, and Mr. Inoue
02:04 Meet with Chairman of Germany’s ruling parties Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) Group Volker Kauder
02:32 End meeting with Mr. Kauder
03:31 Meet with Cabinet Advisor Munakata Norio
03:46 End meeting with Mr. Munakata
03:47 Meet with LDP Secretary-General Tanigaki Sadakazu
04:40 End meeting with Mr. Tanigaki
04:45 Meet with Minister in charge of TPP Amari Akira and Deputy Chief Negotiator of Government Headquarters for TPP Oe Hiroshi
05:13 End meeting with Mr. Amari and Mr. Oe
05:17 Headquarters for Healthcare and Medical Strategy Promotion meeting
05:53 Meeting ends
06:35 Depart from office
06:41 Arrive at Imperial Palace. Attend Imperial Banquet Reception for King and Queen of the Netherlands with wife Akie
10:02 Depart from Imperial Palace
10:15 Arrive at private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo

Thursday, October 30, 2014

AM
12:00 At private residence (no visitors)
07:21 Depart from private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo
07:34 Arrive at office
07:35 Meet with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu
08:47 End meeting with Mr. Kato
08:49 Depart from office

08:50 Arrive at Diet
08:52 Enter Lower House 1st Committee Members’ Room
08:53 Speak with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Aso Taro
08:54 Finish speaking with Mr. Aso
08:55 Speak with LDP Lower House member Kawamura Takeo
08:56 Finish speaking with Mr. Kawamura
08:59 Lower House Budget Committee convenes

PM
12:00 Lower House Budget Committee recess
12:01 Leave Lower House 1st Committee Members’ Room
12:03 Depart from Diet
12:05 Arrive at office
12:54 Depart from office
12:55 Arrive at Diet
12:57 Enter Lower House 1st Committee Members’ Room
01:00 Lower House Budget Committee reconvenes
05:02 Lower House Budget Committee adjourns
05:03 Leave room
05:05 Depart from Diet
05:07 Arrive at office

The Dutch King & Queen

05:10 Meet with President of American think tank Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Richard Haass. Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Sugiyama Shinsuke and Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanehara Nobukatsu also attend
05:33 End meeting with Mr. Haass
05:58 Depart from office
06:05 Arrive at Akasaka Palace (State Guest House) in Moto-Akasaka, Tokyo
06:30 Reception for King of the Netherlands Willem-Alexander and his wife the Queen at Akasaka Palace
06:32 Conference with King and Queen in Hall of the Sunrise
07:02 Conference ends
07:03 Dinner meeting hosted by Prime Minister Abe and his wife in Kacho Hall
08:16 Dinner meeting ends
08:20 See off King and Queen of the Netherlands
08:23 Depart from Akasaka Palace
08:27 Arrive at official residence
08:29 Meet with MOFA’s Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Ihara Junichi. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio, Minister in charge of the Abduction Issue Yamatani Eriko, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Saiki Akitaka, and Secretary-General of Headquarters for the Abduction Issue Ishikawa Shoichiro also attend
09:19 End meeting with Mr. Ihara
09:20 Interview open to all media: When asked about “the content of the report from Bureau Director Ihara” Mr. Abe answers “Without obsessing over the results of the immediately previous investigation of North Korea, he has indicated to Japan a plan to use a new angle and pursue a more thorough investigation.”
09:23 Interview ends

Friday, October 31, 2014

AM
12:00 At official residence (no visitors)
07:54 Depart from official residence
07:55 Arrive at office
08:01 Cabinet Meeting begins
08:14 Cabinet Meeting ends
08:40 Meet with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Katsunobu
09:19 End meeting with Mr. Kato
09:37 Depart from office
09:38 Arrive at Diet
09:40 Enter Lower House 1st Committee Members’ Room. Attend Lower House Special Committee on Regional Vitalization meeting
11:57 Meeting adjourns. Leave room
11:59 Depart from Diet

PM
12:04 Arrive at Imperial Hotel in Uchisaiwai-cho, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Aso Taro, President of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Hirano Nobuyuki, President of Mitsui Sumitomo Banking Corporation Kunibe Takeshi, and President of Mizuho Financial Group Sato Yasuhiro at French restaurant Les Saisons within hotel
12:50 Depart from hotel
12:58 Arrive at office
01:26 Meet with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Saiki Akitaka
01:53 End meeting with Mr. Saiki
02:07 Meet with Minister of Finance Aso Taro, Ministry of Finance’s Vice-Minister Kagawa Shunsuke, Director-General of Budget Bureau Tanaka Kazuho, and Director-General of Tax Bureau Sato Shinichi
03:05 End meeting with Mr. Aso, Mr. Kagawa, Mr. Tanaka, and Mr. Sato
03:06 Speak with Director of Cabinet Intelligence Kitamura Shigeru
03:15 Finish speaking with Mr. Kitamura
03:16 Meet with Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Amari Akira, Cabinet Office’s Vice-Minister Matsuyama Kenji, and Director-Generals for Policies on

Cohesive Society Maekawa Mamoru, Habuka Shigeki, and Tawa Hiroshi
03:46 End meeting with Mr. Amari, Mr. Matsuyama, Mr. Maekawa, Mr. Habuka, and Mr. Tawa
03:48 Depart from office
03:52 Arrive at Hotel Okura in Toranomon, Tokyo
04:14 Attend concert sponsored by King of the Netherlands Willem-Alexander and his

wife the Queen in banquet hall Akebono Room within hotel
05:15 Concert ends
05:37 Attend return reception hosted by King and Queen of the Netherlands in banquet hall Heian Room within hotel
06:04 Reception ends
06:09 Attend inaugural celebratory reception for Japan-US Intellectual Exchange Joint Research Program [日米知的交流・共同研究プログラム：Nichibei Chiteki Koryu Kyodokenkyu Puroguramu] hosted by Japan Center for Economic Research and Japan Institute of International Affairs in banquet hall Ascot Hall within hotel annex, deliver address
06:36 Reception ends
06:37 Depart from hotel
06:45 Arrive at Imperial Hotel. Attend Akahige Award Reception hosted by Japa

Medical Association in banquet hall Peacock within hotel, deliver address
06:54 Depart from hotel
07:07 Arrive at Ark Mori Building in Akasaka, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with President of Kyodo News Service Fukuyama Masaki, colleagues, and news people in Ark Hills Club within building
09:22 Depart from Ark Mori Building
09:40 Arrive at private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo

Saturday, November 1, 2014

AM
12:00 At private residence (no visitors)
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
11:52 Depart from private residence

PM
12:15 Arrive at hotel Grand Hyatt Tokyo in Roppongi, Tokyo. Work out at NAGOMI Spa and Fitness within hotel
03:24 Depart from hotel
03:45 Arrive at private residence
06:36 Depart from private residence
06:50 Arrive at restaurant L’art Et Mikuni in Kitanomaru Park, Tokyo. Dinner with Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture Kuroiwa Yuji, TV personality Kataoka Tsurutaro, and others
09:38 Depart from restuarant
09:52 Arrive at private residence

Sunday, November 2, 2014

AM
12:00 At private residence (no visitors)
10:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
At private residence throughout the morning (no visitors)

PM
12:34 Depart from private residence
12:46 Arrive at office
12:48 Speak with Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Ohta Akihiro
12:58 Finish speaking with Mr. Ohta
01:21 Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill
01:55 Drill ends
02:30 Depart from office
02:42 Arrive at private residence


Provisional Translation by: Erin M. Jones

Myths About Japan's Resistance to Collective Self-Defense

Hyuga - DDH 16 - Hyuga class helicopter destroyer

Reexamining "Myths" About Japan's Collective Self-Defense Change -- What critics (and the Japanese public) do understand about Japan's constitutional reinterpretation

By APP Member Bryce Wakefield, assistant professor of Japanese politics and international relations at Leiden University and Craig Martin, associate professor of law at Washburn University. The views expressed in this article are their own. 
First posted on Japan Focus, September 8, 2014


In a recent article in the Diplomat, Michael Green and Jeffrey Hornung claimed that critics of the Abe government’s “reinterpretation” of Japan’s constitution, to end the ban on the use of force for the purposes of collective self-defense, were “basing their opposition on myths about the change.” This allegation that resistance to the “reinterpretation” of Article 9 is based on nothing but “myths” is increasingly heard, and so it is worth examining their arguments, and the so-called myths that they purport to dismiss.

Green and Hornung argued that the changes to be made through the “reinterpretation” were actually slight and that the immediate implications were far less problematic than alleged. There is a grain of truth to this as it relates to imminent strategic consequences, but it also misses the essential point. Yes, at least in the short term, changes to the roles and the missions of the nation’s Self Defense Forces resulting from “reinterpretation” will probably be modest; and yes, the changes will not likely lead to militarism, regional adventurism, or various other scenarios that the article examines and dismisses. But this focus on the intended policy shifts misses the far more significant issues raised both by the unconstitutional nature of the move and the possible longer-term and profound systemic ramifications of the “reinterpretation.”

It is precisely because the immediate strategic implications of the Abe Cabinet’s announcement will probably be relatively modest that the implications for constitutional practice in Japan should be the focus of the debate. Perhaps the changing strategic environment in Asia will require Japan to consider relaxing some of the constraints imposed by Article 9. However, so fundamental a change to the nation’s constitution should only come after broad debate and pursuant to formal amendment procedures as provided for in the constitution. As explained below, the so-called “reinterpretation” process has in fact weakened constitutionalism, the rule of law, and fundamental principles of democracy in Japan, an argument that Green and Hornung, and many other defenders of the “reinterpretation”, never seriously address. In short, the harm is to the Constitution, and so focus on strategy is no answer.

Let us re-examine some of the “myths” that Green and Hornung so quickly dismiss.

“Abe is gutting the spirit of Japan’s peace constitution”

Green and Hornung maintain that Abe’s announcement is not undermining the spirit of Article 9, because in reality it is not really changing the official interpretation at all. They claim that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), a department within the Ministry of Justice that gives advice to the government and the Diet on the constitutionality of laws, has always acknowledged that Japan has a right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but that “collective self-defense was deemed inappropriate because it did not meet the CLB’s definition of ‘minimal’ defense” necessary for the defense of Japan. What has changed now, according to Green and Hornung, is that because of the evolution of the strategic environment, collective self-defense should be understood as being within the “minimal necessary use of force” required for the defense of Japan itself. Thus, they argue, the shift in the “reinterpretation” is not inconsistent with the original CLB position, and is thus not really a new interpretation of Article 9.

This is both misleading in what it does argue, and entirely disregards more fundamental arguments about the harm that will be caused to Article 9. To begin with problems inherent in the narrow point they make, it is simply incorrect to say that the recognition of a right to collective self-defense would not constitute a fundamental change in the meaning of Article 9. Their claim appears to confuse the distinction between individual self-defense (ISD) and collective self-defense (CSD), as those concepts are understood in international law. ISD, of course, is the use of force in defense of the state in response to an armed attack on that state. ISD has been understood to be permitted by Article 9 since Japan reemerged as a sovereign state in the early 1950s, following the postwar Allied Occupation. CSD, on the other hand, is the use of force by one state in defense ofsome other state in response to an armed attack on that other state, for example the American use of force against Iraq in defense of Kuwait in 1991. Green and Hornung’s argument that Japan may use force to assist other countries in order to better ensure Japan’s own security conflates these two concepts. The use of force by Japan in a true exercise of CSD would, by definition, not be for the defense of Japan, even if at some stage in the future such an action might improve Japan’s strategic or defensive situation.

It is true that the CLB has acknowledged that Japan, like all nations, has the right to use force in the exercise of CSD as a matter of international law; but it has also stated, on more than one occasion, that it is prohibited as a matter of constitutional law. According to the bureau’s earlier statements, Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, makes the exercise of that international law right “impermissible under the constitution.” All that is permitted is the minimum force necessary to defend against an armed attack on Japan itself – an exercise of ISD. By eliminating the requirement that there be a direct attack on Japan as a pre-condition for Japan to lawfully use force in self-defense, the Abe Cabinet has therefore made a clear break with, and is in direct opposition to, prior and consistent understandings of the constitution.

A related argument that is often heard is that there has been a pattern of “reinterpretations” by government in the past with respect to defense posture and capabilities, and thus this “reinterpretation” is not unusual. As The Economist puts it, this was a “usual if rather shabby” process of constitutional change. But this too is entirely inaccurate. It is true that there have been incremental changes to Japan’s defense posture, but there has been a consistent understanding that such decisions on force adjustments fall within constitutional boundaries, precisely because they take into account the restraint embodied by the long standing interpretation that force may be used only for the direct defense of Japan. The government has never suggested that these defense posture adjustments constituted a “reinterpretation”, nor have they ever been understood to “reinterpret” Article 9. Government “reinterpretation” has simply never been recognized as a legitimate method of circumventing the legitimate amendment procedures and revising the longstanding interpretations of the constitution.

The difference in nature between past defense posture adjustments and the current “reinterpretation” becomes clearer upon a closer examination of those past shifts. The government has sought to reduce the restrictions on the deployment and use the military since the 1980s, and particularly after the Gulf War. However, many of these restrictions (such as the post-war ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF, rescinded in 1993) were established between the 1950s and the mid-1970s as political measures designed to deflate protest on the political left and to reassure the Japanese public sceptical after the war about military solutions to international problems. At the time they were conceived and often afterwards, the government was careful to note that such restrictions were not required by the constitution. Thus, the later dismantling of those restrictions, such as legislation eliminating the ban on overseas deployment of the SDF for involvement in UN peace keeping operations (PKO), did not constitute a “reinterpretation” of Article 9. The deployment of the SDF for PKO activity does not constitute a use of force under international law and did not implicate Article 9. Similarly, relatively recent overseas missions, such as anti-piracy operations, while they appear to political analysts as a type of CSD, in fact constitute no such thing, because they do not involve the use of force—a concept in international law that relates to relations between state actors. On the other hand, the deployment of the SDF to assist in the belligerent occupation of Iraq in 2003 may indeed have constituted a use of force, as the Nagoya High Court so held in a judgment in 2008—but that would be a violation of the Constitution, not an example of its “reinterpretation”.

Abe’s attempt at “reinterpretation”, shabby though it may be, is therefore far from usual. This point is often lost on historians, political scientists, and analysts interested in Japan’s defense policy, who focus less on the legal ramifications of change and more on the strategic or political implications. It is lost as well on some peace advocates and left-wing politicians in Japan, who have never fully accepted the 1954 interpretation that recognized the right to exercise ISD, or the legitimacy of an SDF as constituting the minimal “war potential” necessary for the defense of Japan. Seen from their perspectives, the current “reinterpretation” may seem to be simply a continuation of an incrementally more assertive (and possibly unconstitutional) defense policy. But from the perspective of the government’s own position on Article 9, this “reinterpretation” is unprecedented.

Green and Hornung also suggest that the current interpretation and understanding of Article 9 was itself based on a “reinterpretation”, and that, therefore, “if Abe’s decision was reached undemocratically, then the earlier interpretation being upheld by his opponents must be considered undemocratic as well.” But this too is misplaced. The CLB played an important role in developing the initial interpretation, it is true – but that was at the very outset of establishing the interpretation of a new constitution. While there was robust debate in the Diet as to what precisely Article 9 meant and exactly what it restricted, the government issued no clear and consistent opinion until the interpretation in 1954. That interpretation, as it related to the very limited right to use force for purposes of ISD, was reinforced by the Supreme Court, the branch of government with the constitutionally mandated authority to interpret the constitution, in the famous Sunagawa case in 1959. It has been further reinforced by more than six decades of consistent Diet testimony and policy precedent. Indeed, in 1991 there was enormous pressure upon Japan to contribute forces to the coalition engaging in collective self-defense in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and there was an acute sense that failure to do so would jeopardize Japan’s alliance with the U.S., but the CLB advised the Kaifu government that Article 9 prohibited any such move. The government, in compliance with that understanding of Article 9, therefore refused to participate in the military operations, and the no-use of force provision of Article 9 successfully operated to constrain government policy. There is no basis for arguing that the manner in which the original interpretation was established, shortly after the Constitution was promulgated and prior to any judicial consideration or serious policy development, is in any way similar to the “reinterpretation” by Cabinet fiat now at issue after six decades of entrenchment. It cannot be considered a serious comparison.

These rather technical arguments about the past CLB interpretation in any event miss the other ways in which the “reinterpretation” will potentially gut Article 9. In addition to now declaring that Article 9 no longer prohibits the use of force for purposes of CSD, key actors in the government and an “Advisory Panel” that Abe set up to “reconstruct the legal basis” for national security have suggested that Japan can and should use force in collective security operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Article 42 of the Charter. If that were to become the accepted interpretation of Article 9, which, it should be recalled, states in part that Japan “forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force for the settling of international disputes”, then Article 9 will in fact no longer renounce any sovereign right relating to the making of war and the use of force, despite its explicit language to the contrary. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by states, with three exceptions – or to put it another way, three sovereign rights – the use of force for ISD and CSD, and collective security measures authorized by the Security Council. Under the “reinterpretation” recommended by the panel, Japan would be permitted to engage in all three, and so Article 9 would not limit Japan from doing anything that international law does not already forbid. It is difficult to see that such a move would not be gutting the pacifist spirit and intent of Article 9.

“The decision starts a slippery slope for revising the constitution and removing Article 9”

The next “myth” that Green, Hornung and others take aim at is the so-called slippery slope argument. Abe’s defenders argue that there is no such slippery slope, and this move cannot be taken as leading to further erosion of Article 9. In emphasizing the modesty of Abe’s “reinterpretation”, they point to the fact that the prime minister has stated that the constitution would continue to prohibit collective security measures authorized by the UN Security Council. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that this limitation is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the text of the Cabinet Resolution, the larger point is that the process of reinterpretation destroys any sense of durable and meaningful constitutional constraints, which undermines not only Article 9, but indeed the entire constitutional structure. So the Cabinet Resolution places various conditions upon the exercise of CSD, upon which defenders of the process place great store. But given the precedent this process has established, these limits too are only binding, if one can call it that, until the next Cabinet resolution. These are not constitutional provisions or principles, but mere whims of the Cabinet of the day. If they can supplant a constitutional provision today, a much broader and more insidious Cabinet Resolution may do so tomorrow. Thus, the prospect of the process comprising the beginning of a slippery slope cannot be dismissed as mere myth. This process of “reinterpretation” by cabinet fiat makes a mockery of the entire notion of a constitution comprising the highest law of the land, which serves to bind future generations to consistent principles and values, and imposes meaningful constraints on the exercise of government power.

The slippery slope argument is further strengthened by considerations of motive. It is hard to dismiss the violence that the Cabinet Resolution does to the constitution as “merely” the product of a government with an overzealous defense agenda prioritizing narrow policy goals over respect for constitutional provisions. Rather, undermining the constitution appears to be a central goal of key actors within the government. Abe has actually suggested that the idea that constitutions are intended to limit government power is “old-fashioned.” In the recent negotiations with Komeito over the exact language of the Cabinet Resolution, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted the resolution to have fewer limitations. Meanwhile, LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru has noted that the government should “start with a limited scope” in its interpretation of CSD so that it can “widen later.” The Abe Cabinet’s “reinterpretation” leaves precisely that possibility intact by at once eliminating the constitutional prohibition on CSD, but also adding ambiguous limitations and conditions, so that any decision on expanding the roles of the SDF will be merely political, not legal. Moreover, it has established the precedent that any provision of the constitution—not just Article 9—is subject to arbitrary government “reinterpretation.” Scholars have also argued that this is just one step towards more wholesale amendment down the road—that by twisting the meaning of the constitution, Abe is trying to ensure that it will be easier to claim later that the actual language of its provisions no longer reflect reality, and must therefore be formally amended. Whether or not that is the case, with reinterpretation acting as a de factomechanism for change, arguments about actual amendment would be moot.

“The decision was made undemocratically without transparency”

In arguing that it is merely a “myth” that the “reinterpretation” was made undemocratically and without transparency, Green and Hornung emphasize that cabinet discussions on CSD, “were reported upon daily by Japan’s media, enabling voters to be fully aware of the discussions.” But that does not address whether the prime minister or the cabinet properly subjected the process to transparent and democratic scrutiny. Yes, there was media attention. Indeed, few issues rile the media in Japan like government action on security policy. But on its own, media coverage of government statements on CSD does not imply transparency or adherence to democratic principles.

In fact, in his push for “reinterpretation”, Abe has pointedly attempted to circumvent any real public or political debate (transparency), and even more seriously, circumvented the constitutionally mandated amendment procedure, which in and of itself constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law (democratic principles). This begins with the circumvention of the amendment procedure. Article 96 of the Constitution provides for precisely how the Constitution is to be amended. Amendments must be initiated by the Diet, approved by two thirds of each house of the Diet, and then approved by a majority of votes in a general referendum. Comparative research has shown that Japan’s amendment process is less difficult than that of a number of other constitutional democracies, including the U.S. Indeed, the LDP did in fact begin laying the foundation for formal amendment in the years following 9/11. But when Abe’s attempts to mobilize support for amending Article 9 ran into stiff headwinds, he attacked the amendment procedure itself, seeking to make the constitutional amendment process little more difficult for the Diet than the revision of common statutes. When that effort failed, due in large measure to the backlash from lawyers and constitutional scholars, he chose to circumvent the amendment procedure altogether, moving to “reinterpret” Article 9. To dress up this wholly illegitimate process, he resurrected his extra-constitutional “Advisory Panel” of so-called experts, with a mandate to examine how Article 9 should be reinterpreted in light of the changing security environment.

The Advisory Panel, which included very few lawyers and only one constitutional law scholar, engaged in little constitutional analysis. Rather, it developed a result-oriented argument, reasoning that because Japan needs to do more to ensure its security, Article 9 must therefore mean that Japan can do more to defend itself and others. On the basis of this Report, the Abe Cabinet developed its resolution that constitutes the “reinterpretation” of Article 9. There was no prior debate on the content of this resolution in the Diet, no vote in the Diet, no referendum, not even consultation with either the Diet or the public. As already discussed above, it was an executive fiat by the Cabinet that purported to change the meaning of a fundamental principle of the constitution, in a manner that was not only inconsistent with the long-established and entrenched interpretation of Article 9, but that was irreconcilable with the explicit language of the provision. As further evidence of the departure from democratic principles, Abe made a political appointment of the new Director of the CLB, presumably to ensure that the CLB would in due course provide a supportive interpretation of the Resolution and laws passed to implement it. This political appointment of someone external to the CLB and the Ministry of Justice was contrary to deeply entrenched convention, and provoked criticism from past CLB directors. The entire process not only usurped the superior constitutional claims of both the Supreme Court and the Diet to constitutional interpretation, but was likely designed to make any future contrary interpretation by the Supreme Court that much more difficult and politically risky.

This process of “reinterpretation” was not only a violation of the constitutional amendment procedure, but it makes a mockery of the idea that the constitution can constrain the exercise of government power. It flies in the face of the notions essential to the rule of law: that all law must be passed and amended through democratic process, and that government is both subject to the law, and must exercise its authority as defined by and in accordance with the law. Pundits argue that the Diet will still have its say when it comes time to pass legislation implementing the new interpretation. But to suggest that this post hoc debate will justify the prior unconstitutional “reinterpretation” is to reveal a perverse understanding of deliberative democracy and the respective roles of the legislature and the executive in a parliamentary system, especially one where the formalseparation of powers is so clearly defined in its constitution. And to suggest that all these ills were cured by the fact that there was robust discussion in the media is just absurd.