Japan and South Korea Grow Closer

The Trump effect on Japan–South Korea relations

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 12, 2026 at the East Asian Forum.

The August 2023 Japan–South Korea–US trilateral summit at Camp David provided powerful impetus for Tokyo and Seoul to restore warm ties, an undertaking initiated by former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol.

The momentum in Japan–South Korea relations has continued, surviving changes in leadership in all three countries. Even the potentially disastrous pairing of a conservative nationalist government in Tokyo and a progressive administration in Seoul has not slowed the pace of the bilateral partnership’s deepening.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung sit at two ends of the political spectrum, but their May 2026 meeting in Lee’s hometown of Andong on 18-19 May, was marked by a spirit of warmth. Even Lee’s critics, who feared that his long-held harsh views on the legacy of Japanese colonial rule would reverse progress, were pleased.

Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo was ‘quite impressed with how [Lee] handled South Korea–Japan relations after taking office’, noting that the meeting in Andong ‘went very well’ — a view shared by senior South Korean officials in off-the-record discussions.

This success can be credited to Japan and Korea’s shared challenges of hedging against both China and an unpredictable United States, with US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and military interventions sending shocks across both economies. Lee’s decision to avoid past sources of contention like wartime history issues with Japan can be read as a calculated effort to use closer ties with Tokyo to insulate South Korea from growing chaos in an unpredictable security environment.

The most powerful factor in this is the prospect of US withdrawal from global leadership under Trump 2.0. Another South Korean senior official noted off the record that South Korea and Japan have ‘shared anxieties about Washington’ and that ‘it is not about China’.

Senior South Korean officials are discussing the need for closer security ties with Japan in response to US retreat, including potentially finessing the territorial disputes by signing a non-aggression pact and moving towards a mutual defence treaty. While this would go beyond what most South Koreans would tolerate — and much less in Japan — its mere consideration is a remarkable sign of the impact of Trump-driven uncertainty.

This tightening is taking place without active US involvement at the highest level. While trilateral meetings are still being held among senior officials and statements are being issued with common views on regional and global security issues like North Korea, this is the product of institutional inertia created by former US president Joe Biden’s administration. There is no evidence of a connection between those official pronouncements and the White House and Trump has never expressed any interest in trilateral cooperation, nor is he eager to follow in Biden’s footsteps.

Despite the factors impelling closer ties, there are serious concerns in Seoul and Tokyo that the rhetoric of bilateral partnership has not been sufficiently reflected in concrete actions.

The most cited example of this is the potential admittance of South Korea to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which could forge closer trade and investment alliances and counter US mercantilism. While Seoul has expressed its interest in joining, it has yet to formally apply. Domestic politics remain a constraint, reflected in the ongoing restrictions on the purchase of Japanese seafood due to the Fukushima nuclear accident and its aftermath.

A similar dynamic is visible in the arena of defence cooperation. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro visited Seoul in June 2026 and reaffirmed tightening defence ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. But he was unable to get Seoul to sign off on a long-sought military logistics pact which would institutionalise joint operations. Lee told reporters earlier in June that public sentiment on history issues were the obstacle to signing what would otherwise be a logical agreement.

Beyond immediate issues, two policy areas — China and North Korea — could also drive the neighbours apart.

Lee has been careful to maintain good ties with Beijing, both in the economic realm and in potentially seeking China’s help in dealing with North Korea. The divergence between Lee’s policy towards China and the hostile state of Japan–China relations was noted at the Andong meeting.

Both governments share a commitment to the eventual denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. But Lee seems ready to back a possible Trump summit with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un which could offer de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Japan has always been fearful that this outcome could lead to a separation of the Korean peninsula from US extended deterrence commitments and leave Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The relationship also remains marred by the lingering issues of wartime history and justice that have been carefully put aside but not resolved. Compensation cases against Japanese companies for wartime workers in Japanese mines and factories continue to make their way through South Korean courts. Takaichi has carefully avoided doing anything to inflame Seoul, but it would only take a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine — something she did regularly for several decades — to relight the fires of South Korean patriotism.

For now, the path to improved ties looks open, thanks in large part to Trump and to a lesser extent to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the question of how long it will remain so is far less certain.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 13, 2026

BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY: SAMURAI AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM. 7/13, Noon (JST), 7/12, 11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr. Rosina Buckland, Asahi Shimbun Curator: Japanese Collections, The British Museum.

CHINA AND THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES. 7/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Mary Lovely, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Claire Reade, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wei Liang, Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. 

NATO SUMMIT DEBRIEF: WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER ANKARA? 7/13, 10:45-11:30am (CDT), 11:45am-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: General Christopher G. Cavoli, 20th Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 19th Commander, United States European Command; Julianne Smith, Former US Permanent Representative to NATO; Leslie Vinjamuri, President and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

THE FIRST TARGET AUDIENCES: THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE FOUNDERS. 7/13, Noon-1:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Public Diplomacy Council of America. Speakers: Martha Bayles, Author, Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America's Image Abroad (2014); Caitlin Schindler, Author, The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition (2018); Eric Weiner, Author, Ben & Me (2024).

A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR BERNIE MORENO AND CHAIRMAN JOHN MOOLENAAR ON CONNECTED CARS. 7/13, 4:15-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman, Select Committee on China; Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-OH); Moderator: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, AEI.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 6, 2026

Asia Policy Point is not publishing a newsletter this week, Congress is in recess, and President Trump will attend the NATO Summit the 7th and 8th in Turkey. Apart from NATO's 32 members, Ukraine will attend along with four of NATO's Indo-Pacific partner states -- Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand -- as well as Middle East partners Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. On the 8th, the IMF will release an update of its World Economic Outlook.

JAPAN’S AI START-UP ECOSYSTEM AND TRENDS IN VENTURE INVESTMENT. 7/6, Noon-1:00pm (BST), 7:00-8:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speakers: James Riney, Founding Partner and CEO, Coral Capital; Jesper Koll, Expert Director, Monex Group and Japan Catalyst Fund; Bill Emmott, Visiting Fellow, Tokyo College, University of Tokyo.

A NEW ERA FOR OLD ALLIANCES: CHINA-NORTH KOREA AND US-SOUTH KOREA TIES IN 2026. 7/6, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea (NCNK). Speaker: Dr. Chung-in Moon, Former Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs and National Security to South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

PRESERVATION AS CONTINUITY: PROTECTING JAPANESE BUILT CULTURAL HERITAGE. 7/6, 6:45pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speaker: Andrea Carlson, Founder, Kominka Collective.

CRITICAL MINERALS AND THE FUTURE OF KOREAN INDUSTRY. 7/7, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Center (KIPEC). Speaker: Meredith Schwartz, Associate Fellow, Critical Minerals Security Program, CSIS.

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

China Strategy Isolates Japan

 Takaichi Goes It Alone at the G7

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 21, 2026
 
At this month’s annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit Meeting in Evian-les-Bains, France, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made it clear that she had a quite different concern on international issues than the other leaders did. The summit is traditionally a forum to reconfirm unity of the group to lead the world. Such was the case this year when the group reviewed progress to end the war in Iran. Takaichi, however, emphasized the vulnerability of industrial supply chains and competition with China’s trade strategy. Her tack gained no enthusiastic supporters among the G7 as an explicit supply chain policy would strain rather than ease international tensions.
 
It was obvious at the outset that the Iran war would dominate the discussions. Just before the leaders’ meeting began, the United States and Iran reached an apparent 60-day ceasefire (although not nearly a permanent solution). The memorandum of understanding (MOU) obligates Iran to use its best efforts to ensure safe passage of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days. (In fact, Iran has now closed the Strait.) To Iran’s benefit, the MOU also includes – again for a 60-day period – termination of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, plans (but no financial commitments) for a $300 billion reconstruction program, waivers of U.S. sanctions crude oil exports from Iran, and the return of frozen assets to Iran.
 
On the nuclear issue, Iran “reaffirmed” that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons; that is, Iran confirmed an earlier commitment. Iran and the U.S. also committed to develop a mechanism to dispose of Iran’s “stockpiled enriched material,” which could mean on-site down-blending, but the MOU does not rule out other disposition methods such as removal. The MOU allows – for the 60 days it is in effect – Iran to maintain its nuclear program and without any new sanctions from the U.S. The MOU does not mention missiles. By many accounts, the MOU considered a victory for Iran.
 
The G7 countries welcomed the deal as an attempt to normalize international relations and the oil trade. A leaders’ statement stressed that the deal was “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump,” noting efforts by France and the United Kingdom to resume maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The G7 chairman, French President Emmanuel Macron, described the summit as “a moment of unity, of quality discussion, and of genuine cooperation of the leaders.”
 
Upon receiving the news of the U.S.-Iran agreement, Takaichi welcomed it as a major step toward settling the situation in the Middle East. She emphasized the importance of implementing the agreement. But she did not offer any commitment by Japan to the reconstruction of Iran, including mine-sweeping in the strait. “Nothing has been determined for dispatching the Self-Defense Force,” Takaichi stated in a press conference. As readers know, the Constitution of Japan strictly limits sending troops to a battlefield.
 
On the sidelines of the summit, Takaichi had a five-minute conversation with Trump. In his press conference afterward, Trump limited his warmth to Japan by characterizing Takaichi as his “biggest fan.” Otherwise, Trump said, “I’ll be honest, Japan was not willing to get involved during the war.” There was no report that Takaichi affirmed her compliment of Trump in her visit to the White House in March, which was that “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world.”
 
Instead, Takaichi tried to pursue Japan’s interest by connecting the war in Iran with pressure on China. She put economic security at the center of Japan’s views in the G7 rather than joining with the other members in focusing on ending the war in Iran or post-war reconstruction. Although she proposed building a system of oil reserves for developing countries, Takaichi’s clear goal was to gain support for stockpiling critical minerals and lessening dependence on China. The G7 issued a declaration on supply chains for critical minerals, but it went only as far as to say that the group “will work together with partners to reduce critical dependencies and ensure that attempts or threats to weaponize economic dependencies fail.”
 
China immediately responded to that statement. “It’s leader’s latest G7 remarks on China were particularly obtrusive, exposing that its attempt to rally allies and stir up confrontation wins no support and is bound to fail,” said China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian. Lin said that Takaichi’s posture against China was a “glaring self-contradiction” and an instance of “Japan’s hypocrisy.” Despite her stated willingness to talk, Takaichi has made no serious effort to resume bilateral leaders’ talks and normalize economic relationship with China. Takaichi’s G7 diplomacy seems to have only exacerbated tensions with China.
 
It has not helped Takaichi that other G7 countries, suffering from Trump’s tariff policies, have approached China about trade deals that might restore their economic performance to the pre-U.S. tariff levels (or beyond). Macron visited China last December, calling for efforts to promote multinationalism with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing last January and agreed with Xi on advancing a strategic partnership between the two countries. Carney described relations with China as “more predictable” than those with the Trump administration.
 
Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Xi in Beijing also in January. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China in February. And Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to China in July 2024.
 
Even worse, from Takaichi’s perspective, Trump himself visited China in May, agreeing with Xi on building a relationship of strategic stability between the two countries. Takaichi is the only G7 leader who has not made a visit to China. All that she has been able to do was to visit the White House before Trump visited China. Japan finds itself uniquely isolated in its adversarial China policy. It is time for Takaichi to emulate her G7 colleagues and improve bilateral relations with China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 29, 2026

U.S. BASING POSTURE IN THE WAKE OF EPIC FURY. 6/29, 10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: General Frank McKenzie, Jr. (ret.), Hertog Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Moderator: Jonathan Ruhe, Fellow for American Strategy, JINSA.

BRIDGING NORDIC DUAL-USE INNOVATION AND TAIWAN’S DEFENSE ECOSYSTEM. 6/29, 11:00am-Noon (CEST), 5:00-6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Bryce C. Barros, Defense Innovation and Dual-use Technology Strategist; Martin Längkvist, Senior Lecturer in Computer Science, AI, Robotics, and Cybersecurity Center (ARC), Örebro University, Sweden.

USMCA JOINT REVIEW: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 6/29, 9:00-10:20am, (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for China-America Studies. Speakers: Diego de Leon Segovia, Director, APCO; David Collins, Professor of International Economic Law, The City Law School; Wenting He, Postdoctoral Scholar, China Institute, University of Alberta; Enrique Dussel Peters, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Moderator: Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow, Institute for China-America Studies.

THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE LIVE PODCAST: WHAT IS NORTH KOREA LEARNING FROM RUSSIA'S WAR IN UKRAINE? 6/29, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, Korea Chair; Kateryna Bondar, Senior Fellow, Wadhwani AI Center; Bruce Klingner, Senior Fellow, The Mansfield Foundation. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 22, 2026

SHADOW OF CATASTROPHE AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. 6/22, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Speakers: Colin Kahl, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford; Janice Stein, Founding Director, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Chief, Norwegian Intelligence School. Moderator: Ulrich Kuehn, Head of Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, University of Hamburg.

PHILIPPINES ASEAN CHAIRSHIP 2026: ADVANCING REGIONAL RESILIENCE AND U.S.-ASEAN COLLABORATION. 6/22, 3:00-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: US-ASEAN Center; Embassy of the Philippines; US-Philippines Society. Speakers include: Jose Manuel G. Romualdez, Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States; Hunt VanderToll, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Hans Siriban, Economic Minister and Consul, Philippine Embassy to the U.S.; Heather Variava, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

STABILITY MULTIPLIERS: FOOD AND CLIMATE SECURITY IN A FRACTURED WORLD. 6/22, 6:00-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks; Strategic Climate Risks Initiative; Ditchley Foundation; Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University. Speakers: TBA; Moderator: Erin Sikorsky, Director, Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks.

WOMEN ARTISTS IN ACTION: VISUALIZING THE 1970S WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. 6/22, 6:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Workshop. Speaker: Kanako Tajima, PhD Candidate, Columbia University. 

TAIWAN’S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND THE FUTURE OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS. 6/22, 6:30-8:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Speakers: Tom Chih-Chiang Lee, Director-General, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office; Shihoko Goto, Vice President of Programs and Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Chris Estep is a Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Aaron Stein, President, FPRI; Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI.

Expanding Japan's Imperial Family

The Diet’s Unanimous Opinion on Maintaining the Imperial Family

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 8, 2026 Updated June 15, 2026

The Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both chambers of the Diet agreed to a draft of a “unanimous opinion” [立法府の総意] of the legislative branch to secure members of the Imperial Family. The draft proposes expansion of the family in two ways, adopting expert recommendations from 2021. First, female members of the family would be allowed to remain in the family after marriage. Second, male members of branches of the Imperial Family that were excised in 1947 could be adopted and thus re-enter the family.
 
The acting chair on this issue, Speaker of the Lower House Eisuke Mori, hopes to make these changes through amendments to the Imperial House Law by the end of the current session of the Diet on July 17. 
 
The Imperial House currently has 16 members, only three of whom are male and eligible to succeed to the throne. Members of the public, members of the Diet, and the imperial family itself are concerned that the family may dwindle. There is a near-term issue about lightening the responsibilities of each family member. The duties of the imperial family to participate in the life of the nation – such as participating in ceremonies of national events or official visits of foreign heads of state – are in fact extensive and occasionally burdensome. Spreading out these responsibilities by expanding the imperial family would be helpful to all.
 
Allowing married female members to remain in the family has the overwhelming support of all the parties. Article 12 of the Imperial House Law provides that a female loses her status as a family member when she marries. If female members could remain in the family, they could share the roles of the Imperial Family. The draft accordingly would allow all female members to stay after marriage. The draft also includes transitional measures to respect the will of female members who have been living their lives based on current law – i.e., not all female members may wish to stay in the family.
 
Whether the husband and children of a female member remaining in the family should also have the status of members of the Imperial Family has been a controversial point. While some lawmakers with Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) support such inclusion, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) oppose it. If the husband and children do not have the imperial status, possible questions are “Do they have the right of freedom of religion or political activities?” or “Can they spend the governmental funds for the Imperial Families?
 
The draft does not take a position on the status of husband and children and merely recommends adding a supplementary provision to the revised Imperial House Law that hopes to resolve the issue sometime in the future.
 
More divisive in the draft is a process for the Imperial Family to adopt a male from a branch of the former Imperial Family that had been excised in 1947. That former Imperial Family share the same ancestor of over 600 years ago with current Imperial Family. Article 9 of the Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits Imperial House members from adopting children to prevent members from disrupting the imperial lineage.
 
While the LDP and JIP approve of the adoption proposal, as do some conservative opposition parties, some CRA members have protested it. For them, an adoption without consent may violate the constitutional provision that prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Even some conservative scholars are skeptical about the idea of adoption.
 
Considering the CRA’s objections, the draft includes conditions on adoption. There would be a minimum age for adoption, which is supposed to be fifteen. The draft also demands a decision on who in the Imperial Family can adopt a child. Most importantly, an adopted child would not be eligible to succeed to the throne. With these conditions, the CRA accepted adoption. The draft also recommends the Diet to resolve that this rule for adoption should be subjected to ongoing reviews.
 
Complicating things, the Speaker Mori announced his own view in his press conference that male offspring of adopted children should have eligibility to succeed to the throne. That represented a conservative standpoint which insists on making paternal succession certain rather than the legitimacy of lineage concerning adoption. Some opposition parties firmly oppose Mori’s idea. Mori later explained that he was referring to an interpretation of the current law, and not binding future discussions.
 
The draft would not affect other Imperial Family rules. The draft unequivocally reconfirms the current order of succession to the throne. The first successor of Emperor Naruhito is Crown Prince Akishino, followed by his son, Prince Hisahito. Maintenance of the current order was a requirement of the experts’ report in 2021. That report separated discussion about provisions to enlarge the Imperial House from the line of succession.
 
The speakers distributed the draft to the parties on June 8 and concluded the draft as “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” with approval of seven parties out of all thirteen on June 10. The Emperor Abdication Special Law of 2017 demands such unanimity. The opinion was submitted to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Takaichi Cabinet is expected to submit a bill of revised Imperial House Law to current session of the Diet.

It is noteworthy that the Emperor Naruhito commented on securing Imperial Family members right after the Speakers wrapped up the unanimous opinion. “I hope it to be understood by the people,” he said in his press conference before leaving Japan to visit Europe on June 11. Although reserving judgement on the opinion, he clearly wants the process to be democratic and reflecting the views of the Japanese people. The emperor began his remarks by noting that the fundamental principle of the imperial family is "to share the joys and sorrows of the people."

 It is still unclear, however, whether the unanimous opinion will receive the full support of the people. Polls by news organizations find that the concept of the adoption of male members of former Imperial Family branches faces a certain amount of opposition. A substantial percentage of those polled support the right of female members to remain the in family after marriage.
 
There is a popular expectation that Aiko, the daughter of Naruhito, will succeed to the throne. The “unanimous opinion” would rule out this possibility. Takaichi revealed her opposition to a female emperor during a discussion in the Diet last March. “The time has not come for discussing it. It may destabilize imperial succession,” said Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister. This is a view more representative of Japan’s conservatives who believe that succession should be only along the male line than of its citizens.

Cruciatus in cruce

 

U.S. Senator Bob Packwood, 93, died on June 6 in California. A relatively liberal Republican senator representing Oregon, he was forced to resign the Senate in 1995 because he accepted a bribe from Mitsubishi Electric Corp (MEC). Although the Justice Department declined to prosecute him, the details of the case combined with multiple accusations of sexual misconduct with female staff to have his fellow Senators to demand his resignation. It is possible that the harassment claims were cover for the more serious charges of bribery. However, his obituaries only mention the "sex scandal."

The lobbyist who worked on Senator Packwood for MEC and many other Japanese companies was Steven Saunders (Saunders & Co. one of the more notorious lobbyists for Japan) . He died last year at 78 in Alexandria, VA. MEC was the focus of congressional inquiry and a Harvard Business School case study on its aggressive and eventually successful effort to co-opt the patent and put out of business Fusion Systems that was then-owned by the rowing legend Don Spero (who is still alive,1964 Olympian and 1966 world champion).

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 15, 2026

Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology launch of a new report, Strengthening the Front Line: Transforming the Japan Self-Defense Force for 

Twenty-First-Century Deterrence

with David Byrd and Bryan Clark

AFTER THE WAR: REORIENTING GULF ECONOMIC STRATEGY. 6/15, 4:00-5:15pm (GMT+3), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Frédéric Schneider, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Mohammed Al-Hashemi, Economic Expert; Sultan Barakat, Professor at the College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Moderator: Logan John Robert Cochrane, Associate Professor, College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University.

NAVIGATING LOCAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN EUROPE. 6/15, 3:00-4:00pm (CEST), 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Speakers: Tomasz Kamiński, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Paul Costello, Senior Program Manager, GMF Cities; Mareike Ohlberg, Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, GMF.

NEW ADVOCATES AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS. 6/15, 4:00-5:00pm (BST), 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: Binaifer Nowrojee, President, Open Society Foundations; Moderator: Marc Weller, Director, Global Governance and Security Centre, Chatham House.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM. 6/15, 1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers Include: Azeka Abramoff, Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation; Barbara M. Angus, Consultant, Ernst & Young (Washington, DC); Pat Brown, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers; George Callas, Founder, Callas Strategy Group; Nate Carden, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Todd Castagno, Head of Global Valuation, Accounting & Tax (GVAT), Morgan Stanley; Alan Cole, Senior Economist, Tax Foundation; Ronald A. Dabrowski, Principal, KPMG; Tijana J. Dvornic, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Lilian V. Faulhaber, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Mindy Herzfeld, Professor of Practice, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Brian Jenn, Partner, McDermott, Will, & Schulte.

VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE IN CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT COSTA. 6/15, 7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speakers: Mike Pence, 48th Vice President of the United States; Robert Costa, Chief Washington Analyst, CBS. FEE