Cruciatus in cruce

 

U.S. Senator Bob Packwood, 93, died on June 6 in California. A relatively liberal Republican senator representing Oregon, he was forced to resign the Senate in 1995 because he accepted a bribe from Mitsubishi Electric Corp (MEC). Although the Justice Department declined to prosecute him, the details of the case combined with multiple accusations of sexual misconduct with female staff to have his fellow Senators to demand his resignation. It is possible that the harassment claims were cover for the more serious charges of bribery. However, his obituaries only mention the "sex scandal."

The lobbyist who worked on Senator Packwood for MEC and many other Japanese companies was Steven Saunders (Saunders & Co. one of the more notorious lobbyists for Japan) . He died last year at 78 in Alexandria, VA. MEC was the focus of congressional inquiry and a Harvard Business School case study on its aggressive and eventually successful effort to co-opt the patent and put out of business Fusion Systems that was then-owned by the rowing legend Don Spero (who is still alive,1964 Olympian and 1966 world champion).

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 15, 2026

AFTER THE WAR: REORIENTING GULF ECONOMIC STRATEGY. 6/15, 4:00-5:15pm (GMT+3), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Frédéric Schneider, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Mohammed Al-Hashemi, Economic Expert; Sultan Barakat, Professor at the College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Moderator: Logan John Robert Cochrane, Associate Professor, College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University.

NAVIGATING LOCAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN EUROPE. 6/15, 3:00-4:00pm (CEST), 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Speakers: Tomasz Kamiński, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Paul Costello, Senior Program Manager, GMF Cities; Mareike Ohlberg, Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, GMF.

NEW ADVOCATES AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS. 6/15, 4:00-5:00pm (BST), 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: Binaifer Nowrojee, President, Open Society Foundations; Moderator: Marc Weller, Director, Global Governance and Security Centre, Chatham House.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM. 6/15, 1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers Include: Azeka Abramoff, Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation; Barbara M. Angus, Consultant, Ernst & Young (Washington, DC); Pat Brown, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers; George Callas, Founder, Callas Strategy Group; Nate Carden, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Todd Castagno, Head of Global Valuation, Accounting & Tax (GVAT), Morgan Stanley; Alan Cole, Senior Economist, Tax Foundation; Ronald A. Dabrowski, Principal, KPMG; Tijana J. Dvornic, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Lilian V. Faulhaber, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Mindy Herzfeld, Professor of Practice, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Brian Jenn, Partner, McDermott, Will, & Schulte.

VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE IN CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT COSTA. 6/15, 7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speakers: Mike Pence, 48th Vice President of the United States; Robert Costa, Chief Washington Analyst, CBS. FEE

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 8, 2026

JAPAN'S CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN BUSINESS OWNERS. 6/8, 1:30-2:30pm (JST), 12:30-1:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Sakura Uchikoshi, Member of the House of Councillors; Kazuki Yuda, Touch Immigration Law Firm.

2026 JAPAN–PHILIPPINES FRIENDSHIP YEAR COMMEMORATIVE SYMPOSIUM. 6/8, 2:30-6:00pm (JST), 1:30-5:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tokyo. Speakers Include: H.E. Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines; H.E. Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Defense, Member of the House of Representatives; Sen. Juan Miguel Fernández Zubiri, Senator, the Republic of the Philippines; Yoshiaki Wada, Member of the House of Representatives, Japan; Maryjun Takahashi; Shun Ohno, Affiliated Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; Ines Yamanouchi Mallari, School President, Philippine Nikkei Jin Kai International School, School President, Mindanao Kokusai Daigaku.

PETRO DIPLOMACY 2026: ENERGY IN CRISIS. 6/8, 9:00am-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Phillip Cornell, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Mason Hamilton, Vice President of Economics and Research, American Petroleum Institute; Ben Cahill, Nonresident Fellow, AGSI; Ambassador William Roebuck, Executive Vice President, AGSI; Sarah Ladislaw, Founding Director, New Energy Industrial Strategy Center, Former Senior Director for Climate and Energy, U.S. National Security Council.

GAZA UPDATE: REALITIES, RISKS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD. 6/8, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jaser Abu Mousa, Senior Fellow, MEI; Natan Sachs, Senior Fellow, MEI; Moderator: Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Senior Fellow, MEI.

THE END OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY?: ERDOĞAN'S ATTEMPTS TO NEUTER THE LAST OPPOSITION PARTY. 6/8, 3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Amb. Eric Edelman, Distinguished Scholar, JINSA, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Svante E. Cornell, Scholar, Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, JINSA; Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy, JINSA. Exclusively for JINSA National Leaders in good standing, program participants, congressional and administration staff, U.S. military, press, and select members of the policy community.

FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND THE FUTURE OF AID IN TURBULENT TIMES. 6/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Development Department, CSIS. Speakers: David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue Committee (IRC); Rabih El Chammay, Head, National Mental Health Programme, Ministry of Health, Lebanon; Roya Rahmani, Director of Global Engagement, World Bank Group; Moderator: Enoh T. Ebong, President, Global Development Department, CSIS.

FROM YORKTOWN TO PHILADELPHIA: GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. 6/8, 6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Hillsdale College [MAGA]. Speaker: Paul A. Rahe, Professor of History, Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair, Western Heritage, Hillsdale College.

KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY. 6/8, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: Xavier Brunson, General Commander UNC/CFC/USFKs, United States Army.

FISCAL POLICY FORUM: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISES. 6/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University, School of Public Policy and Management at Korea Development Institute. Speakers: Tom Ramage, Fellow/Economic Policy Analyst, Korea Economic Institute of America; Tami Overby, Partner, DGA Group Government Relations; Taesuk Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Finance and Social Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI); Younghyun Kim, Director, Budget Communication Cooperation Division, Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Planning and Budget; Moderator: Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.

The Future of Japan's Constitution

articles on Constitution

The Leading Coalition Accelerates a Constitutional Amendment

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 1, 2026

The leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) has accelerated its effort to amend the Constitution of Japan to deal with emergencies. The two parties claim that the discussion of proposed amendments is nearly wrapped up. However, some opposition parties expect further discussion. Even LDP lawmakers are divided over whether the Lower House or the Upper House should be the primary forum for debate. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi encourages the discussion, presenting herself as a brave leader grappling with a divisive issue – but with no clear hope of success.
 
An amendment to address emergencies that prevent the Diet from acting have taken at least two forms. One was a rough draft of an amendment that the Lower House Legislation Bureau submitted to the Commission on the Constitution of the House on May 14. The draft primarily would add a clause to the constitution that would, in the event of certain emergencies, allow Diet members to remain in office even after their terms expire. The amendment recognizes four categories of emergency: a major natural disaster, a major spread of infectious disease, social disorder by civil war and an armed attack of foreigners.
 
According to the draft, each of these emergencies can create an “election difficulty situation”: a time in which a national election cannot be held in broad geographic areas for a certain long period. Members of the Lower House have four-year terms, and six years are given to those elected to the Upper House. The draft of the amendment states that these terms will be extended in emergency. An election difficulty situation will be declared in advance by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet.
 
A second type of response to an emergency is also in the draft. It includes a controversial provision to authorize the Cabinet to issue an “emergency ordinance.” “In a special occasion in which it cannot afford to wait for legislation by the Diet,” the draft says, “the Cabinet can enact an emergency ordinance which is equivalent to a law.” Although the draft requires approval of the Diet after the ordinance is declared, there is no time limit on Diet action and thus no time limit on an emergency ordinance.
 
A member of the Lower House commission who represents the LDP, Yoshitaka Shindo, commented to the press that most parties agreed on the extension of terms of lawmakers in emergency and that issue can be said to be “pinned down.” Another commission member from the JIP, Nobuyuki Baba, said that all the talking points on the amendment have now been proposed and discussed. The two parties in the leading coalition hope to proceed to the next step of drafting a provision to initiate an amendment.
 
Opposition parties do not want to rush the process. The Centrist Reform Alliance disagreed with Baba’s notion that the discussion was over and that new measures were necessary to maintain the ordinary functions of the Diet in an emergency. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan already provides that the Cabinet can convoke an emergency session of the Upper House in a national emergency. The opposition parties believe that this existing power to gather the Upper House in an emergency session will ensure that the Diet will function even if the Lower House is empty.
 
Opposition parties are further skeptical about introducing the emergency ordinance. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, argued that the proposal for an emergency ordinance power was dropped in an agreement of five parties, including the LDP and the JIP, in 2024. Moreover, a situation in which the Diet would not work at all was unimaginable if lawmakers’ terms could be extended. The Japan Communist Party has pointed out that there was an imperial emergency ordinance in pre-war Japan that was issued in Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. That power confirmed that the emperor had the highest state power.
 
This concept of imperial authority ended after World War II. Article 41 of the constitution states that the Diet is “the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” If the Cabinet obtains the power to issue ordinances that are equal to a statute passed by the Diet, the relationship between the legislative and executive branch under the constitution will fundamentally be changed. The introduction of the executive branch’s power to declare an emergency ordinance would erode the status of the Diet as the supreme organ of state power.
 
An unignorable fact in the discussion over the constitutional amendment is that the leading coalition does not have even a simple majority in the Upper House. A super majority – a two-thirds vote – in each House of the Diet is necessary for a constitutional amendment to move forward. While the LDP and the JIP have that majority in the Lower House after the LDP’s sweeping victory in the February elections, they do not have even a simple majority in the Upper House.
 
The Upper House is focused on an entirely different constitutional issue. In the meeting of the Upper House Commission on the Constitution on May 20, the main topic of discussion was not the emergency clause but the election system. In Upper House elections, each prefecture has had its own seats. But with the decline of eligible voters, the districts of Tottori and Shimane were integrated into a single district, just as the Tokushima and Kochi were combined, for the 2016 election and thereafter. Members of the Upper House from both sides of the aisle have urged the elimination of such integrated districts
 
The LDP accordingly has proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish integrated prefectural districts. However, the top opposition party in the Upper House, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), does not believe that an amendment is necessary; rather, the Diet can achieve this end simply by amending the election laws. Komeito, as a partner of the CDPJ in the Lower House, supports this view.
 
The LDP and JIP have different priorities regarding a constitutional amendment. The JIP is focused on an emergency clause that would enhance executive power in a time of crisis. The LDP is going in a different direction, prioritizing electoral system reform in the Upper House. The LDP thinks it will be easier to reach a consensus there on election reforms than on the emergency clause amendment. 
 
As a lawmaker in the conservative bloc, PM Takaichi has presented herself as a firm proponent of the theory of constitutional amendments. “The constitution should occasionally be updated to meet contemporary demands,” said Takaichi to a recent meeting of supporters for constitutional amendment. She did not, however, provide any details on which provisions should be amended adding uncertainty to how the debate should proceed.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of May 24, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

China's War on Faith

By Ambassador Sam Brownback (R-KS), Chairman, National Committee for Religious Freedom

PURCHASE BOOK (5/12/2026)

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spends billions of dollars annually to either control or exterminate people of all faiths. It is a strategic imperative for them. Christians, Buddhist, Muslims, Falun Gong, and more are seen as a threat to the control of China and the world by the CCP. 

The Modern Japanese Garden

By Stephen Mansfield, Author and 

Freelance Photo-Journalist based in Japan

PURCHASE BOOK (10/7/2025)

Japan has an immense diversity of garden designs, from animist-infused, prototypical stone arrangements placed in sacred groves, to extraordinary post-war innovations. Mansfield examines post-war shifts in attitudes towards the contemporary garden as they moved from status symbols and expressions of influence to spaces of healing, mediation, and connection to nature. The book contains brief essays from notable specialists in the fields of landscape design, garden aesthetics, and architecture, including Shyunmo Masuno, Japan’s leading garden designer.

Realizing Saudi Vision 2030: Governance, 

Institutions and Human Capital Development

By the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (ABOUT)

PURCHASE BOOK (2/19/2026)

A behind-the-scenes investigation into the current transformations taking place in Saudi Arabia. It comprises contributions from academics, researchers, policymakers and practitioners who have access to the decision-makers and relevant institutions in the country. Chapters focus on the remodeling of government entities, the creation of institutions, and the new opportunities made available for Saudis through human capital development initiatives, all key issues that are central to the Vision. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Monday in America, May 25, 2026

Ode for Memorial Day

By Paul Laurence Dunbar

1869

Done are the toils and the wearisome marches,

    Done is the summons of bugle and drum.

Softly and sweetly the sky overarches,

    Shelt’ring a land where Rebellion is dumb.

Dark were the days of the country’s derangement,

    Sad were the hours when the conflict was on,

But through the gloom of fraternal estrangement

    God sent his light, and we welcome the dawn.

O’er the expanse of our mighty dominions,

    Sweeping away to the uttermost parts,

Peace, the wide-flying, on untiring pinions,

    Bringeth her message of joy to our hearts.

Ah, but this joy which our minds cannot measure,

    What did it cost for our fathers to gain!

Bought at the price of the heart’s dearest treasure,

    Born out of travail and sorrow and pain;

Born in the battle where fleet Death was flying,

    Slaying with sabre-stroke bloody and fell;

Born where the heroes and martyrs were dying,

    Torn by the fury of bullet and shell.

Ah, but the day is past: silent the rattle,

    And the confusion that followed the fight.

Peace to the heroes who died in the battle,

    Martyrs to truth and the crowning of Right!

Out of the blood of a conflict fraternal,

    Out of the dust and the dimness of death,

Burst into blossoms of glory eternal

    Flowers that sweeten the world with their breath.

Flowers of charity, peace, and devotion

    Bloom in the hearts that are empty of strife;

Love that is boundless and broad as the ocean

    Leaps into beauty and fullness of life.

So, with the singing of paeans and chorals,

    And with the flag flashing high in the sun,

Place on the graves of our heroes the laurels

    Which their unfaltering valor has won!

🇺🇸

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.