Asia Policy Point
Saturday, May 2, 2026
APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 27, 2026
Reviving Nuclear Power in Japan
Japan Depends on Nuclear Power
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 27, 2026
The military attack on Iran by the United States and Israel and the ensuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have had a major impact on Japan’s economy. A shortage of naphtha, which must be shipped through the Strait, has limited Japan’s manufacture of medical equipment, and it is unclear how long the governmental subsidy on gasoline will last. While Sanae Takaichi’s government has said that Japan has enough oil reserves for the time being, the government is accelerating the resumption of nuclear power generation.
Energy has traditionally been the weakest point in Japan’s national security strategy. Japan has said that it attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 to secure oil in Southeast Asia without U.S. interference. As fuel for power generation shifted from coal to oil in the post-war era, Japan increasingly relied on oil imports from the Middle East. Currently, over 95 percent of imported oil comes from the Middle East, and most of it passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
An alternative to oil is nuclear power. Through 2010, Japan had built 54 reactors for nuclear power generation that supplied about 30 percent of all electric power in Japan. In 2011, however, the Great East Japan Earthquake severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant when protective structures failed, leading to several deaths and mass evacuations. The event seriously undermined Japan’s energy strategy. The government began to set strict limits for power companies to operate nuclear reactors or construct new ones.
Japan nevertheless took the course of resuming transmission at as many of the existing reactors as possible to secure stable and powerful electricity. The government did not take an alternative course developing renewable energy as European countries had done after the accident in Chernobyl 40 years ago this month.
The restart two weeks ago of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is an epoch-making event for energy supply in Japan. Reactor 6 at the plant began its commercial operation on April 16, 2026, for the first time since it paused operations in March 2012. The plant is known as one of the biggest nuclear power plants in the world with seven reactors that have the capacity for 8,212 megawatts of power.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant is owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which was responsible for the inadequate defenses of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to the 2011 earthquake and for the ensuing deaths and evacuations. Restarting the plant has been controversial. Although two reactors out of seven passed the examination by the Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) in 2017, the NRA issued an order to prohibit their operation in 2021 because of failure to take anti-terrorist measures.
The NRA lifted the prohibition order in 2023, and in December 2025, the governor of Niigata, Hideyo Hanazumi, approved resumption of the plant’s operation. TEPCO restarted Reactor 6 in January 2026 but paused the operation at least twice due to an unexpected alarm from a control rod and a leak of electricity on the land surface. Those malfunctions delayed commercial operation of Reactor 6, damaging TEPCO’s credibility. Reactor 7 is expected to start up again in 2029.
Even with the restart of Reactor 6, there is no place for nuclear waste to go. Japan has no final disposal site. Mutsu city, Aomori, has an interim storage facility to keep used nuclear fuel until it can be transferred to a nuclear recycling factory, which is planned to be finished in Rokkasho village, Aomori.
Although the interim facility in Mutsu was expected to accept 60 metric tons of used nuclear fuel from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in FY2026, the Governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, announced that he would not approve any new transfers of used nuclear fuel to the Mutsu facility in FY2026. Miyashita believed it was unpredictable whether the recycling factory in Rokkasho could pass an examination by the NRA. Japan thus has not established a credible recycling system for used nuclear fuel.
The government of Japan, meanwhile, is looking for a site to build a final disposal facility somewhere in the country. The government decided in 2000 that nuclear waste from nuclear power plants should be buried underground, a method known as geological disposal, but the government has not decided on a site.
To decide on a location, the government must take three steps: a survey of technical literature, a preliminary investigation, and a detailed investigation. The government will grant a two-billion-yen subsidy to a municipality that accepts the literature survey. Another seven billion yen is provided for a preliminary investigation.
The government has identified three possible sites: Suttsu Town and Kamoenai Village in Hokkaido, and Genkai Town in Saga. Ogasawara Village, Tokyo, has emerged as a fourth candidate, and the government on April 21 decided to have a literature survey which will take about two years. Although the three earlier candidates voluntarily stepped forward to accept the survey, Ogasawara has left the decision of accepting the survey to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). It made the first example to conduct a literature survey with initiative of the national government.
METI expects to survey Minamitorishima Island (Marcus Island) in the administrative area of Ogasawara village. Marcus Island is a tiny saucer-like coral atoll with a raised outer rim of between 5 and 9 m (16 and 30 ft) above sea level. It is 2,000 kilometers from mainland Japan.
The chief of Ogasawara village, Masaaki Shibuya, has reserved his decision on whether to go forward with a preliminary investigation after the literature survey is finished. There is no one among other three front runners that has decided to proceed to a preliminary investigation. METI is still far from deciding the location for final disposal site, which is needed for operating nuclear power plants in Japan.
It is obvious that the effort to build a whole new nuclear power generation system, including a disposal locale for nuclear waste, will not ameliorate the current concerns about energy supply. Construction will take many years. Nevertheless, the government of Japan does not want to stop focusing on nuclear power generation, fearing that it will lose its status as a major economic power in the world.
Monday, April 27, 2026
US-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE 2026
CHALLENGES TO THE
US-ROK ALLIANCE IN 2026
Thursday, April 30, 2026
8:15am to 5:00pm
THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
International Council on Korean Studies
Co-hosted with
Hudson Institute
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
IN PERSON ONLY
REGISTER HERE
LOCATION
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
AGENDA
(subject to change)
🎥 EVENT WILL BE RECORDED AND POSTED ON HRNK WEBSITE
Sunday, April 26, 2026
Asian Cuisine for Western Tables
Chop Fry Watch Learn:
Asia Policy Events, Monday April 27, 2026
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS: CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW REGIONAL MECHANISM FOR PRINCIPLED SECURITY. 4/27, 10:00am-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speakers: TBD. Lunch will be served.
POWER, RELIGION, AND IDEOLOGY IN NORTH KOREA. 4/27, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jonathan Cheng, China Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal; Jung H. Pak, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Moderator: Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies. PURCHASE BOOK
TRUMP, TAKAICHI AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF DETERRENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 4/27, Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speakers: Kenneth Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Moderator: Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government, Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
BOOK TALK: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM REVIVED TOTALITARIAN RULE IN CHINA. 4/27, 5:00-6:30pm (BST), Noon-1:30pm (EDT) VIRTUAL. Sponsor: School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Speaker: author Minxin Pei, Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College, Editor of China Leadership Monitor. PURCHASE BOOK
THE FUTURE OF THE GULF: COMMERCE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER OPERATION EPIC FURY. 4/27, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Jared Cohen, President, Global Affairs, Goldman Sachs and Co-Head, Goldman Sachs Global Institute; Moderator: Mike Gallagher, Distinguished Fellow.
Friday, April 24, 2026
Imperial Succession
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026
Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.
The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947. However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.
Sunday, April 19, 2026
APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026
📚Books of the Week📖
Asia Policy Events, Monday April 20, 2026
ISHIGAKI RESORT DEVELOPMENT AND THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (JST), Midnight-1:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Seiji Hayama, Director, Wild Bird Society of Japan; Tomoko Oda, Field Project Leader, Wildlife Group, Conservation Division, WWF Japan.
THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, FOUR DECADES LATER. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (JST), 2:00-3:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speaker: Karel van Wolferen, Former President, FCCJ. PURCHASE BOOK
PAKISTAN AT THE CENTER: A YEAR OF CHANGE AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR ISLAMABAD. 4/20, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Christopher Clary, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University at Albany; Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center; Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center. Moderator: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center.
STRATEGIC FORCES PRIORITIES: A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR DEB FISCHER. 4/20, 9:30-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS, HTK Series, Aerospace Security Project, Missile Defense Project, Project on Nuclear Issues, Defense and Security. Speakers: Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE), Chair, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces; Heather Williams, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department.
THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN WAR ON TURKEY. 4/20, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Serhat Güvenç, Head of Faculty of Economics, Administrative, and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University; Jason Campbell, Senior Fellow, MEI; Gönül Tol, Senior Fellow, MEI.
HOW THE IRAN WAR IS SHIFTING REGIONAL DYNAMICS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Yasmine Farouk is the Project Director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at International Crisis Group; Mirette F. Mabrouk is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute; Kenneth M. Pollack (Moderator) is Vice President for Policy at the Middle East Institute.
AI AND NATIONAL SECURITY: WHO'S REALLY IN CONTROL? 4/20, 6:00-7:15pm (BST), 1:00-2:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Joyce Hakmeh, Associate Fellow, International Security Programme; General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, Senior Consulting Fellow, International Security Programme; John Thornhill, Innovation Editor, Financial Times; Katja Bego, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme.
LESSONS FROM CANADA ON ALLIED BURDEN-SHARING IN GLOBAL WMD THREAT REDUCTION. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Troy Lulashnyk, Director General, Peace and Security Programs, Global Affairs Canada; Timothy Edwards, Director, Weapons Threat Reduction Program, Global Affairs Canada; Moderator: Brian Finlay, President and CEO, Stimson Center.
THE CHINESE ECONOMY AND FUTURE OF SINO-US ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 4/20, 3:30-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: School of International Service, American University. Speakers: Liqing Zhang, Professor of Economics, Director of Center for International Finance Studies and Former Dean of School of Finance with Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in Beijing, China; Randall Henning; Professor of International Economic Relations (IER) at SIS.
WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IMPACT ON ASIA'S SEA LANES. 4/20, 10:00am (SGT), 10:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speakers: Collin Koh Swee Lean, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS); John Bradford, Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnerships Fellow, Executive Director, YCAPS, Adjunct Senior Fellow, RSIS; Fang Yang, Asia Maritime Security Analyst at Ambrey; Adrian Ang U-Jin, Research Fellow and Coordinator, US Program within the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, RSIS, Nanyang Technological University.
Saturday, April 18, 2026
Takaichi Moves Forward without Concensus
PM Takaichi Grapples with a Divisive Agenda
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy PointFormer editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 13, 2026
Having passed the FY2026 budget bill, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will spend the rest of the Diet’s current session promoting her conservative agenda. This may include establishing a National Intelligence Council, criminalizing the destruction of Japan’s national flag, and reviewing Japan’s three critical security documents. Takaichi characterizes her agenda as “policies dividing public opinion into two.” Takaichi seems to have decided to be a divisive leader, uninterested in uniting the nation.
On January 19, Takaichi announced the dissolution of the House of Representatives. “I’m going to boldly grapple with issues that may divide national opinion,” Takaichi said, explaining her decision to dissolve the House. She interpreted the sweeping victory of her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House election on February 8 as total public support for her agenda.
Takaichi may have meant that she would tackle controversial issues without compromise, that is, to perform as the leader who makes progress toward her own ambitious goals. However, it soon became clear that her “divisive agenda” meant conservative policies, certain to meet opposition from liberal parties in the Diet. Having no majority in the Upper House, it is unclear how she and the LDP will bring her controversial policies to fruition.
National Intelligence Council
The Takaichi Cabinet has submitted to the Diet a bill to establish a National Intelligence Council (NIC). The council would research and discuss national security, including potential terrorist activity and foreign espionage in Japan. Members of the council would be the prime minister and her cabinet members whose ministries deal with national security issues.
The council would be supported by a bureaucratic organization called the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) -- the Japanese version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It would be an upgraded organization from the current Cabinet Intelligence and Research Agency and would integrate the functions of some intelligence sections in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the police agency. It is still unclear whether these ministries can share with another body the information that they collected for their own purposes.
Debate on the bill started in the Diet in early April. The minority parties are concerned that the new NIA will collect information about their political and campaign activities that would oppose the government that is in office. Takaichi insists that the legislation would not allow the government to violate the privacy of individuals and would not target the activities of civil groups.
However, the legislation contains no provision for oversight of the NIC’s activities, nor does the bill enable the Diet to operate as a check on the NIC or the NIA.
The Takaichi administration has proposed additional anti-espionage legislation to reinforce security against foreign spies. The coalition agreement between the LDP and Japan Innovation Party (JIP) last October included work on legislation that would require foreign agents to register with the government and to disclose their lobbying.
Punishment for Damaging the National Flag
Article 92 of Penal Code penalizes a person who damages the flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country with up to two years imprisonment or a fine of two hundred thousand yen. Although Article 92 is a part of the criminal law that deals with crimes against diplomacy, some right-wingers claim it is unreasonable for Japan’s criminal code not to include any punishment for damaging the flag of Japan.
This argument has resonated with Takaichi, and the LDP-JIP agreement from last October affirmed that they would pursue legislation to create the “crime of damaging Japan’s flag” during the 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. An opposition party, Sanseito, also support criminalizing damage to Japan’s flag as part of their “Japan First” agenda. This legislation is a high priority for the conservative voters who have supported Takaichi.
The LDP held its first meeting on the issue in late March. The legislative team, headed by former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, examined examples of similar legislation in foreign countries and anti-flag-desecration measures by former administrations in Japan. When Japan legislated Hinomaru (日の丸) as the national flag and Kimigayo (君が代) as the national anthem in 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that he did not intend to make damage to the Japanese flag a criminal offense.
The LDP and JIP hope to conclude their discussion of a bill by late April. However, they have not yet reached an agreement on what kind of damage to the Japanese flag should be punished. There are skeptics about criminalization. Liberal groups argue that doing so may violate freedom of thought or freedom of expression as described in Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Japan. Even some LDP members believe that the act should be remained in conceptual provisions and damaging Japanese flag should not be criminalized.
Arms Exports
Takaichi tends to see security policy in the context of money. Her administration is promoting arms exports since they contribute to economic growth. She intends to reduce the regulation of shipments that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology now cover. The implementation guidelines of the Three Principles allow arms exports for only five purposes: rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping.
The Takaichi government presented to the LDP in early April a draft of a regulation to ease restrictions on arms exports. The draft would replace the five functional categories with an export control regime that distinguishes between exports of “arms” and “non-arms.” “Arms” are weapons and lethal systems; the draft regulation would allow exports to partner countries. There would be no restrictions on exports of non-arms. The National Security Council is planning to revise the guidelines in late April with approval of the leading parties.
A controversial point in the draft is how the Diet is engaged in the decision on arms exports. The draft would require the administration to report to the Diet on arms exports only after the equipment has been exported. Post hoc reporting of arms sales is unusual. In the United States, the executive branch must give Congress advance notice and an opportunity to review proposed arms sales. In the UK, Parliament and even the courts have had roles in reviewing arms sales before they are concluded.
Takaichi’s idea is based on a notion that Japan can earn money and promote her conservative agenda by expanding arms exports. However, strictly refraining from these exports has been Japan’s traditional policy as a pacifist nation—an ethos adopted in the wake of the devastation of the war. One Komeito lawmaker quoted a 1976 comment by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Miyazawa: “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons.” No such pride or moral authority as a leader of Japan can be seen in Takaichi.
Tuesday, April 14, 2026
APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 12, 2026
West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East
By Mohammed Soliman, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute






