The Osaka Capital

JIP Drags Down the Diet

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 26, 2026
 
The Diet finished its special session on July 25, approving the Backup Capital Act by a small margin in the Upper House at the last moment. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was not eager to enact it. It was the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP: Nippon Ishin-no Kai), that was the main supporter. The opposition parties suspected that JIP was pushing it solely for its own narrow interest. JIP’s persistence on the bill led to a confusing few days at the end of the session.
 
The Backup Capital Act is aimed at building an alternative “capital” of Japan to Tokyo, in case Tokyo suffers a major natural disaster. The law should also help decentralize businesses in Japan. A city interested in serving as a backup capital must meet several conditions, including a minimum population size, business concentration, or an agreement on coordination between the prefectural government and the city government. While some cities, such as Sapporo, Nagoya or Fukuoka, might qualify, Osaka is recognized as the leading candidate.
 
In connection with the Backup Capital Act, JIP has put another issue at the top of its reform agenda for the announced purpose of minimizing government expenditures.  This is the Osaka Capital Initiative, which would integrate the Osaka prefectural government with the Osaka city government. The integration would resemble the governmental system of the Tokyo metropolitan area. Appealing to the competitive sentiment of the people of Osaka against Tokyo, JIP sold the policy as making Osaka another capital of Japan.
 
Controlling the seats of the Osaka prefectural governor and the Osaka city mayor, JIP held two referendums on the Osaka Capital Initiative in 2015 and 2020, but the initiative was rejected by a small margin in both referenda. Although residents of the small cities in the Osaka prefecture supported the idea, those in Osaka city did not, because it seemed to have fewer benefits for them.
 
JIP has been looking for a third chance at the initiative. Their tactic is to connect the Osaka Capital Initiative with the Backup Capital Act, though the party leaders publicly explain that those two concepts are different. But the party has also explained that the Osaka Capital Initiative is a precondition for Osaka to be a backup capital and has declared a third referendum in the spring 2027. JIP’s leader and the governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, announced that he would resign as governor next spring and run again for election as his own successor. He plans to hold the election and the third referendum on the same day on the expectation that the initiative can ride his coattails.
 
Hence JIP’s enthusiasm for enacting Backup Capital Act in the special session of the Diet that closed on July 25. To have the “double voting” in Osaka next spring, the Diet had to pass the Act in this session. In a meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on July 7, Yoshimura reconfirmed that the LDP and JIP would enact the Backup Capital Act in this session and that JIP would leave behind its effort to reduce seats in the Diet.
 
No party other than JIP had any interest in a backup capital. When the chairman of a committee in the Lower House, who was from JIP, unilaterally began discussion of the Backup Capital Bill in late June, the opposition parties boycotted all the discussions. The Diet spent a week normalizing its discussions. Even the LDP was reluctant to pass the backup capital bill within the current session.
 
Takaichi came to the rescue of the bill in the final phase of the Diet session with her personal support. Takaichi was indebted to JIP for its support of the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act, which had been on her long-time political agenda. That statute was enacted on July 17. In return, Takaichi extended the term of the Diet session for 8 days and worked to pass the backup capital bill.
 
The opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the unilateral procedure used by the LDP and JIP to pass the bill in the Upper House -- where the two parties do not have a majority. Although the opposition parties demanded further discussion of the bill, the chairman of the committee, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, decided to finish discussion quickly and to take a vote on the bill. However, the chairman accepted a supplemental resolution to the bill that ruled out JIP’s planned double voting on the referendum and governor’s race. With this supplement, the bill was approved by a slight margin, supported by the LDP, JIP, Team Mirai and some independent lawmakers.
 
Yoshimura was not satisfied with the result. Holding votes for the third referendum on the Osaka Capital Initiative and for the Osaka gubernatorial election on the same day next spring is crucial for JIP to gain broad support from the voters. Immediately after the Diet passed Backup Capital Act, Yoshimura reiterated that he still planned to have the double vote next spring. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, accused Yoshimura of a lack of respect for the decisions of the Diet. What happens next spring in Osaka remains to be seen.
 
As seen in his unusually strong push for seat reduction in the House of Representatives, Yoshimura is too focused on his own agenda in Osaka to properly honor the Diet, which, after all, represents the whole interest of the people of Japan. The Osaka Capital Initiative is a typical populist issue to firm up the political base of the party, which is highly concentrated in Osaka. Thus, the Diet spent the last days of the extended session on enhancing JIP’s political fortunes – and those of Takaichi who relies on JIP’s support.

Takaichi’s Legislative Strategy Unites Opposition

Three Reasons for This Diet Session’s Unusual Procedure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2026
 
The Diet decided to extend the term of the current special session for eight days with approval of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Although these leading parties have been trying to pass all the bills submitted by Sanae Takaichi Cabinet before the end of the term set on July 17, the boycott of discussions by the opposition parties made it impossible. The opposition parties accuse Takaichi of mismanaging the Diet. This abnormality was brought about by Takaichi’s arrogant administration of the Diet, JIP’s insistence on its own agenda, and the opposition parties’ unusual unification against leading coalition.
 
Takaichi’s Capriciousness
This is a very unusual session of the Diet. The ordinary session 2026 was convoked on January 23 and ended the same day because Takaichi dissolved the House of Representative to hold a snap election. After the Lower House election on February 8, the Takaichi administration set a special session. Although a special session is ordinarily convoked for a few days to elect a new prime minister, Takaichi set a 150-day term from February 18 to July 17 to discuss the fiscal year 2026 budget and tackle other critical issues. The Diet did not work between January 23 and February 17.
 
During the final weeks in the current session, Takaichi was unwilling to attend the Diet discussion. After opposition parties criticized her for defamation in her LDP presidential campaign last October, Takaichi refused to answer their questions in the Diet. The opposition parties, holding a majority in the Upper House, boycotted the Diet discussion in late June and early July. The leading parties were unable to pass all the bills by July 17, the regular end of the current session.
 
Takaichi prioritized passage of the revised Imperial House Law and the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act in the final phase of the session. The LDP has not been active in extending the Diet session. Every year, lawmakers get back to their hometowns after the ordinary session to meet their supporters, to reinforce their political base, and to prepare for the next election. Extension of the Diet session will reduce their chances to cultivate their voters in the local districts.
 
The LDP nevertheless submitted a motion to the Diet to extend the term of the current special session for the passage of some important bills. The Diet Law provides that an ordinary session can be extended once and an extraordinary or special session twice. The LDP has a majority in the Lower House and not in the Upper House. If the two chambers of the Diet reach different decisions on an extension, the decision of the Lower House controls.
 
The extension of the current session for eight days was thus approved by the votes of   the LDP-JIP majority coalition in the Lower House. The opposition parties blamed the extension on Takaichi’s mismanagement of the Diet schedule. If she had not dissolved the Lower House, and if she had not refused the discussion on her defamation scandal, the parties would have had enough time to discuss all the bills. It was Takaichi who delayed the schedule.
 
JIP’s Insistence on Its Own Agenda
The opposition parties’ boycott of discussion was based on another reason. The leading coalition unilaterally decided to start discussion on the bills for reducing Lower House seats and for introducing a “backup capital” bill. Discussion on a bill usually starts with an overwhelming consensus among the parties. But in this case, the leading parties ignored the protest of the opposition parties. The two bills are strongly supported by JIP.
 
Established in 2012, the JIP had been a determined opposition party, pushing for political reforms. Forming the leading coalition with LDP led by Takaichi in 2025 changed everything. The JIP needed a cause to join the coalition and decided that reduction of Diet seats would be its top priority. JIP leader and the Governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, labeled the issue “political reform 101.” Yoshimura believed that the seat reduction would receive wide public support because it would lead to a reduction in governmental spending for the Diet.
 
Opposition parties had reason to oppose the bill. The bill includes the reduction of forty-five seats in the proportional districts of the Lower House. That reform of the election system would work against small opposition parties which are heavily dependent on proportional districts. It also did not make good sense for the House to reduce its seats at the initiative of the governor of Osaka. Not only the opposition parties but some lawmakers in the LDP were skeptical about the bill. Takaichi finally decided to postpone the seat reduction bill to the next session.
 
JIP still hopes to enact the Backup Capital Act in the extended term of the current session of the Diet. While the law enables local prefectures and cities to have stronger authority for governance as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government currently possesses, most lawmakers believe that the system of backup capital will help the Osaka Capital Initiative, which JIP has been promoting since its establishment.
 
Opposition parties have criticized JIP’s strong push for the bill, arguing that the law only benefits Osaka. They demand a detailed examination of the bill in the Diet, which requires weeks of discussion. Although the leading coalition passed the bill in the Lower House with the approval of Team Mirai, they have still not secured a majority in the Upper House. The leading parties have not yet decided whether to extend the term of the current session again.
 
If the LDP fails to enact the two bills for seat reduction and a backup capital, the JIP may lose its major cause for staying in the leading coalition with the LDP. Although the merits of leading coalition should be greater than leaving it, the JIP is worried about its political power shrinking, as they are growingly dependent on the LDP’s leadership. Voters in future elections may regard JIP as a supplemental group of LDP. It would be a major concern for the LDP whether the JIP stays or goes.
 
Unusual Unification of Opposition Parties
When the leading coalition unilaterally began discussion over the Lower House seat reduction and the Backup Capital Act, the opposition parties took united action to stop the unilateral procedure in the Diet. They requested impartial treatment of the bills by the leaders in both chambers. The possible crucial impact of seat reduction on small opposition parties made that concerted action possible.
 
The action included a wide range of parties. The highly conservative Sanseito and the far-left Japan Communist Party joined the frontline in protesting capricious management of the Diet by leading coalition. Adding to those two parties, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), and Team Mirai demanded that the chairman (from JIP) of a Lower House committee not start discussion on the seat reduction bill. When the chairman declared that discussion had begun, those opposition parties boycotted the committee.
 
Ironically, JIP’s push for a seat reduction bill unified opposition parties from the right to the left. This unification became a threat to the leading parties, causing them to think which other bills would be blocked by the opposition parties.
 
However, the opposition parties are not completely united against the leading parties. The CRA, DPP and Sanseito voted yes to revisions to the Imperial House Law, while JCP and some others opposed it. The National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act passed the Diet with the approval of DPP and Sanseito, but the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, JCP and Reiwa Shinsengumi opposed. The coalition of opposition parties is still limited to some specific bills.

South Korea's Autonomous Defense

South Korea Is Building for the Alliance and for Itself 

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 20, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

The United States and South Korea describe the latter’s defense buildup with the same enthusiasm but mean two different things. American officials call it “alliance modernization,” while South Korean officials increasingly call it “autonomous defense.” Neither side has much incentive to dwell on the difference, but it is getting harder to avoid.

As the Donald Trump administration tells it, South Korea is increasing defense spending and equipment procurement within the context of a redesigned U.S. strategy to restructure the roles of both U.S. and South Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

Modernization is the “administration’s shorthand for pushing U.S. allies to adapt to a changing regional security environment and shoulder more of the defense burden,” Brookings Institution’s Andrew Yeo observed last fall. Writing for the latest edition of KEI’s Korea Policy, Korea National Defense University’s In Hyo Seol described modernization as “a redistribution of roles on a foundation of converging military interests.” 

This framework is a more comfortable one for those concerned about friction between the United States and South Korea. Differences over specific issues, such as the timeline for returning wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean armed forces, can be more easily managed if both Washington and Seoul share the same goal of alliance modernization.

Autonomous Defense

But the reality is more complicated. South Koreans increasingly place their defense buildup and its key components within a different, though not entirely contradictory, policy framework called “autonomous defense.”

Autonomous defense traces its roots to the fear of abandonment in the 1970s, when then President Richard Nixon withdrew 20,000 troops from the peninsula during the Vietnam War. More recently, defense autonomy for South Korea means greater self-reliance, indigenous weapons procurement sustained by arms exports, and ultimately limiting the reliance on U.S. forces as a deterrent to North Korea. 

South Korean policymakers have long grappled with a persistent tension in defense policy between a desire for more autonomy and the reality of the operational indispensability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. “The goal of autonomy policy is to hold our own while being alliance compatible,” a senior South Korean official told the author on a recent visit to Seoul. In other words, South Korea hopes to shift the alliance’s internal balance of power, reduce technological dependency on U.S. defense systems, and build sufficient indigenous capability to make Seoul a more equal partner.

On the surface, the Trump administration’s goals of shifting a greater share of defense burdens to its allies and encouraging a more regional approach to security would seem to be compatible with South Korea’s preferences. But Washington has been clear about the limits: allies are expected to spend more, not to build alternatives.

The OPCON transfer initiative, for example, was initially targeted in 2012 but has since been replaced by a conditions-based threshold with no fixed timeline. The conditions range from South Korea’s own capability, both in equipment and command, to lead combined forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and most nebulous of all, the existence of a regional security environment that would be compatible with the transfer.

In 2019, the allies determined that South Korea met a minimum baseline capability and interoperability with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Further progress slowed until recently, when the Trump and Lee Jae Myung administrations agreed that a second stage, full operational capability, would be verified this year. Seoul seems likely to establish 2028 as a new target year for OPCON transfer to occur by. 

That push has been met, however, with resistance from the U.S. military, led by USFK Commander Xavier Brunson, who suggested earlier this year that this timeline was too optimistic. The U.S. Senate has backed that up by proposing tighter conditions for OPCON transfer. 

Arms Production and Exports

Similar tensions lurk not far below the surface when it comes to South Korea’s indigenous arms production and its successful export drive across Europe and Asia. Sales of armored vehicles, artillery, jet aircraft, and missile defense systems have transformed the country into a global leader of arms sales. Earlier this month, President Lee attended a NATO forum and suggested such weapons sales could underpin an evolution of South Korea-NATO ties. But senior Trump administration officials have seemingly pushed back on the notion that allies could or should replace reliance on American weapons.

“The simple fact of the matter is that no alternative country or countries can compete with the U.S. defense industrial base, either in quantity or quality,” Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby asserted on social media last week. The United States “makes the best equipment, and we make it at a scale that no plausible competitor can match,” Colby continued. Access to the U.S. defense industrial base “is a privilege, not a right.”

Thus, even in its most ambitious formulation, South Korea’s autonomous defense still involves maintaining the U.S. extended deterrence commitment in the face of threats from North Korea. Some sort of U.S. military presence makes that political commitment concrete.

“The withdrawal of USFK is not something we want to see,” a senior Lee administration official told this writer. “But if it becomes a reality for us, and we have to fend for ourselves, we need to block the threat of nuclear weapons.”

The most obvious way to do so—and the one that has attracted the most attention in American policy circles—is a South Korean nuclear weapons program. Alternatively, policymakers in Seoul are interrogating whether rapid changes in defense technology might create a reliable form of conventional deterrence. The first option is still beyond the pale, while the second is still a ways down the road.

“We are learning the lessons of the Ukraine and Iran wars,” the senior official explained, notably laser weapons and AI-powered defense systems that can “potentially intercept hundreds of missiles at one time.” 

For now, neither the United States nor South Korea has an interest in forcing the question. But indigenous production, export markets, command authority, and the first sketches of a conventional answer to nuclear coercion add up to more than burden-sharing.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 20, 2026

LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD: IMPACTS OF USAID'S WITHDRAWAL ON ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A REIMAGINED FUTURE. 7/20, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Environment & Sustainability Workgroup, Society for International Development, United States Chapter. Speakers: Monica Bansal, Co-Founder, One Earth Partners; Hadas Kushnir, Co-Founder, One Earth Partners; Shawn Peabody, Director of Partnership & Innovation, Environmental Incentives, LLC.

EU COMMISSIONER MICHAEL MCGRATH ON EUROPE’S DIGITAL FUTURE. 7/20, 11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Michael McGrath, European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection; Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council.

SHIFTING TO NEXT-GENERATION SUSTAINABLE AVIATION FUELS. 7/20, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: World Resources Institute (WRI). Speakers: Audrey Denvir, U.S. Lands Research Associate, WRI; Stephanie Searle, Senior Director of Programs, International Council on Clean Transportation; Sarah Chou, Decarbonization Manager, American Airlines; Stuart Johnson, Senior Business Development Associate, Infinium; Moderator: Dan Lashof, Senior Fellow, WRI.

WHERE THE IRAN CONFLICT GOES FROM HERE. 7/20, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Nate Swanson, Director, Iran Strategy Project, Atlantic Council; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in chief, Foreign Policy.

BACK TO THE BRINK: WHAT COMES NEXT IN THE U.S.-IRAN CONFLICT AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF DIPLOMACY? 7/20, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTURAL. Sponsor: National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. Speakers: Amb. Joey Hood, Former Acting Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, State Department; Former Consul General and Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; Former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia; Dr. Joseph Kechichian, Senior Research Fellow at the Office of the Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh; Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy; Co-Director, Middle East Energy Roundtable. 

THE FUTURE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. 7/20, 1:30-2:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Brookings. Speaker: Hon. Sara Jacobs (D-CA), Member, U.S. House of Representatives; Moderators: Alexander Noyes, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Brookings; Dafna H. Rand, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings.

CAPTIVE NATIONS SUMMIT 2026. 7/20, 4:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC). Speakers: Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; Jamie Fly, CEO, Freedom House; Daniel Twining, President, International Republican Institute; Damon M. Wilson, President and CEO, National Endowment for Democracy; Moderator: Ambassador Paula J. Dobriansky, Ph.D., Trustee, VOC; Vice Chair, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard University.

Japan and South Korea Grow Closer

The Trump effect on Japan–South Korea relations

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 12, 2026 at the East Asian Forum.

The August 2023 Japan–South Korea–US trilateral summit at Camp David provided powerful impetus for Tokyo and Seoul to restore warm ties, an undertaking initiated by former South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol.

The momentum in Japan–South Korea relations has continued, surviving changes in leadership in all three countries. Even the potentially disastrous pairing of a conservative nationalist government in Tokyo and a progressive administration in Seoul has not slowed the pace of the bilateral partnership’s deepening.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung sit at two ends of the political spectrum, but their May 2026 meeting in Lee’s hometown of Andong on 18-19 May, was marked by a spirit of warmth. Even Lee’s critics, who feared that his long-held harsh views on the legacy of Japanese colonial rule would reverse progress, were pleased.

Former Korean Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo was ‘quite impressed with how [Lee] handled South Korea–Japan relations after taking office’, noting that the meeting in Andong ‘went very well’ — a view shared by senior South Korean officials in off-the-record discussions.

This success can be credited to Japan and Korea’s shared challenges of hedging against both China and an unpredictable United States, with US President Donald Trump’s trade wars and military interventions sending shocks across both economies. Lee’s decision to avoid past sources of contention like wartime history issues with Japan can be read as a calculated effort to use closer ties with Tokyo to insulate South Korea from growing chaos in an unpredictable security environment.

The most powerful factor in this is the prospect of US withdrawal from global leadership under Trump 2.0. Another South Korean senior official noted off the record that South Korea and Japan have ‘shared anxieties about Washington’ and that ‘it is not about China’.

Senior South Korean officials are discussing the need for closer security ties with Japan in response to US retreat, including potentially finessing the territorial disputes by signing a non-aggression pact and moving towards a mutual defence treaty. While this would go beyond what most South Koreans would tolerate — and much less in Japan — its mere consideration is a remarkable sign of the impact of Trump-driven uncertainty.

This tightening is taking place without active US involvement at the highest level. While trilateral meetings are still being held among senior officials and statements are being issued with common views on regional and global security issues like North Korea, this is the product of institutional inertia created by former US president Joe Biden’s administration. There is no evidence of a connection between those official pronouncements and the White House and Trump has never expressed any interest in trilateral cooperation, nor is he eager to follow in Biden’s footsteps.

Despite the factors impelling closer ties, there are serious concerns in Seoul and Tokyo that the rhetoric of bilateral partnership has not been sufficiently reflected in concrete actions.

The most cited example of this is the potential admittance of South Korea to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a move which could forge closer trade and investment alliances and counter US mercantilism. While Seoul has expressed its interest in joining, it has yet to formally apply. Domestic politics remain a constraint, reflected in the ongoing restrictions on the purchase of Japanese seafood due to the Fukushima nuclear accident and its aftermath.

A similar dynamic is visible in the arena of defence cooperation. Japanese Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro visited Seoul in June 2026 and reaffirmed tightening defence ties and trilateral cooperation with the United States. But he was unable to get Seoul to sign off on a long-sought military logistics pact which would institutionalise joint operations. Lee told reporters earlier in June that public sentiment on history issues were the obstacle to signing what would otherwise be a logical agreement.

Beyond immediate issues, two policy areas — China and North Korea — could also drive the neighbours apart.

Lee has been careful to maintain good ties with Beijing, both in the economic realm and in potentially seeking China’s help in dealing with North Korea. The divergence between Lee’s policy towards China and the hostile state of Japan–China relations was noted at the Andong meeting.

Both governments share a commitment to the eventual denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. But Lee seems ready to back a possible Trump summit with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un which could offer de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status. Japan has always been fearful that this outcome could lead to a separation of the Korean peninsula from US extended deterrence commitments and leave Japan exposed to Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

The relationship also remains marred by the lingering issues of wartime history and justice that have been carefully put aside but not resolved. Compensation cases against Japanese companies for wartime workers in Japanese mines and factories continue to make their way through South Korean courts. Takaichi has carefully avoided doing anything to inflame Seoul, but it would only take a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine — something she did regularly for several decades — to relight the fires of South Korean patriotism.

For now, the path to improved ties looks open, thanks in large part to Trump and to a lesser extent to Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the question of how long it will remain so is far less certain.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 13, 2026

BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY: SAMURAI AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM. 7/13, Noon (JST), 7/12, 11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr. Rosina Buckland, Asahi Shimbun Curator: Japanese Collections, The British Museum.

CHINA AND THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES. 7/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Mary Lovely, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Claire Reade, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wei Liang, Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. 

NATO SUMMIT DEBRIEF: WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER ANKARA? 7/13, 10:45-11:30am (CDT), 11:45am-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: General Christopher G. Cavoli, 20th Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 19th Commander, United States European Command; Julianne Smith, Former US Permanent Representative to NATO; Leslie Vinjamuri, President and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

THE FIRST TARGET AUDIENCES: THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE FOUNDERS. 7/13, Noon-1:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Public Diplomacy Council of America. Speakers: Martha Bayles, Author, Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America's Image Abroad (2014); Caitlin Schindler, Author, The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition (2018); Eric Weiner, Author, Ben & Me (2024).

A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR BERNIE MORENO AND CHAIRMAN JOHN MOOLENAAR ON CONNECTED CARS. 7/13, 4:15-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman, Select Committee on China; Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-OH); Moderator: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, AEI.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 6, 2026

Asia Policy Point is not publishing a newsletter this week, Congress is in recess, and President Trump will attend the NATO Summit the 7th and 8th in Turkey. Apart from NATO's 32 members, Ukraine will attend along with four of NATO's Indo-Pacific partner states -- Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand -- as well as Middle East partners Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. On the 8th, the IMF will release an update of its World Economic Outlook.

JAPAN’S AI START-UP ECOSYSTEM AND TRENDS IN VENTURE INVESTMENT. 7/6, Noon-1:00pm (BST), 7:00-8:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speakers: James Riney, Founding Partner and CEO, Coral Capital; Jesper Koll, Expert Director, Monex Group and Japan Catalyst Fund; Bill Emmott, Visiting Fellow, Tokyo College, University of Tokyo.

A NEW ERA FOR OLD ALLIANCES: CHINA-NORTH KOREA AND US-SOUTH KOREA TIES IN 2026. 7/6, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea (NCNK). Speaker: Dr. Chung-in Moon, Former Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs and National Security to South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

PRESERVATION AS CONTINUITY: PROTECTING JAPANESE BUILT CULTURAL HERITAGE. 7/6, 6:45pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speaker: Andrea Carlson, Founder, Kominka Collective.

CRITICAL MINERALS AND THE FUTURE OF KOREAN INDUSTRY. 7/7, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Center (KIPEC). Speaker: Meredith Schwartz, Associate Fellow, Critical Minerals Security Program, CSIS.

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

China Strategy Isolates Japan

 Takaichi Goes It Alone at the G7

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 21, 2026
 
At this month’s annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit Meeting in Evian-les-Bains, France, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made it clear that she had a quite different concern on international issues than the other leaders did. The summit is traditionally a forum to reconfirm unity of the group to lead the world. Such was the case this year when the group reviewed progress to end the war in Iran. Takaichi, however, emphasized the vulnerability of industrial supply chains and competition with China’s trade strategy. Her tack gained no enthusiastic supporters among the G7 as an explicit supply chain policy would strain rather than ease international tensions.
 
It was obvious at the outset that the Iran war would dominate the discussions. Just before the leaders’ meeting began, the United States and Iran reached an apparent 60-day ceasefire (although not nearly a permanent solution). The memorandum of understanding (MOU) obligates Iran to use its best efforts to ensure safe passage of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days. (In fact, Iran has now closed the Strait.) To Iran’s benefit, the MOU also includes – again for a 60-day period – termination of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, plans (but no financial commitments) for a $300 billion reconstruction program, waivers of U.S. sanctions crude oil exports from Iran, and the return of frozen assets to Iran.
 
On the nuclear issue, Iran “reaffirmed” that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons; that is, Iran confirmed an earlier commitment. Iran and the U.S. also committed to develop a mechanism to dispose of Iran’s “stockpiled enriched material,” which could mean on-site down-blending, but the MOU does not rule out other disposition methods such as removal. The MOU allows – for the 60 days it is in effect – Iran to maintain its nuclear program and without any new sanctions from the U.S. The MOU does not mention missiles. By many accounts, the MOU considered a victory for Iran.
 
The G7 countries welcomed the deal as an attempt to normalize international relations and the oil trade. A leaders’ statement stressed that the deal was “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump,” noting efforts by France and the United Kingdom to resume maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The G7 chairman, French President Emmanuel Macron, described the summit as “a moment of unity, of quality discussion, and of genuine cooperation of the leaders.”
 
Upon receiving the news of the U.S.-Iran agreement, Takaichi welcomed it as a major step toward settling the situation in the Middle East. She emphasized the importance of implementing the agreement. But she did not offer any commitment by Japan to the reconstruction of Iran, including mine-sweeping in the strait. “Nothing has been determined for dispatching the Self-Defense Force,” Takaichi stated in a press conference. As readers know, the Constitution of Japan strictly limits sending troops to a battlefield.
 
On the sidelines of the summit, Takaichi had a five-minute conversation with Trump. In his press conference afterward, Trump limited his warmth to Japan by characterizing Takaichi as his “biggest fan.” Otherwise, Trump said, “I’ll be honest, Japan was not willing to get involved during the war.” There was no report that Takaichi affirmed her compliment of Trump in her visit to the White House in March, which was that “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world.”
 
Instead, Takaichi tried to pursue Japan’s interest by connecting the war in Iran with pressure on China. She put economic security at the center of Japan’s views in the G7 rather than joining with the other members in focusing on ending the war in Iran or post-war reconstruction. Although she proposed building a system of oil reserves for developing countries, Takaichi’s clear goal was to gain support for stockpiling critical minerals and lessening dependence on China. The G7 issued a declaration on supply chains for critical minerals, but it went only as far as to say that the group “will work together with partners to reduce critical dependencies and ensure that attempts or threats to weaponize economic dependencies fail.”
 
China immediately responded to that statement. “It’s leader’s latest G7 remarks on China were particularly obtrusive, exposing that its attempt to rally allies and stir up confrontation wins no support and is bound to fail,” said China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian. Lin said that Takaichi’s posture against China was a “glaring self-contradiction” and an instance of “Japan’s hypocrisy.” Despite her stated willingness to talk, Takaichi has made no serious effort to resume bilateral leaders’ talks and normalize economic relationship with China. Takaichi’s G7 diplomacy seems to have only exacerbated tensions with China.
 
It has not helped Takaichi that other G7 countries, suffering from Trump’s tariff policies, have approached China about trade deals that might restore their economic performance to the pre-U.S. tariff levels (or beyond). Macron visited China last December, calling for efforts to promote multinationalism with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing last January and agreed with Xi on advancing a strategic partnership between the two countries. Carney described relations with China as “more predictable” than those with the Trump administration.
 
Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Xi in Beijing also in January. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China in February. And Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to China in July 2024.
 
Even worse, from Takaichi’s perspective, Trump himself visited China in May, agreeing with Xi on building a relationship of strategic stability between the two countries. Takaichi is the only G7 leader who has not made a visit to China. All that she has been able to do was to visit the White House before Trump visited China. Japan finds itself uniquely isolated in its adversarial China policy. It is time for Takaichi to emulate her G7 colleagues and improve bilateral relations with China.