Sunday, November 1, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 2, 2026

CONNECTING STRATEGY TO IMPACT: THE NEED FOR RADIO FREE ASIA. 11/2, Noon-1:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Public Diplomacy Council of America (PDCA); Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU; Institute for Public Diplomacy & Global Communication, GWU; Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership & Policy, USC. Speaker: Bay Fang, President and CEO, Radio Free Asia.

BOOK TALK: ILLIBERAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CONFLICT OVER LAND IN CHINA. 11/2, 1:00-2:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: U.S.-Asia Law Institute (USALI), NYU School of Law. Speaker: author, Susan Whiting, Professor of Political Science, University of Washington. PURCHASE BOOK

AI POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONFERENCE: OPEN MODELS, GOVERNANCE, AND US-CHINA MILITARY COMPETITION. 11/2, 2:00-6:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers include: Steve Kelly, President, Perry-Shultz Center for Technology & Strategic Stability, Institute of Security and Technology; Michael Ortiz, Head of International Affairs, Reflection; Sam Bresnick, Research Fellow, Center for Security Emerging Technology, Georgetown University; Moderators: Jason Hsu, Senior Fellow, Hudson; Tsiporah Fried, Visiting Senior Fellow, Hudson; Riley Walters, Senior Fellow, Hudson.

Saturday, October 31, 2026

Takaichi Hawkish Agenda Behind High Popularity

Year One of the Takaichi Administration


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 26, 2026


One year has passed since the Diet elected Sanae Takaichi as prime minister on October 21, 2025. Takaichi has focused on building a “strong economy” with active investment, but she has yet to produce an obvious economic achievement. On the international front, she revealed herself as a novice in diplomacy, seriously damaging relations with China. Despite all this, she continues to maintain high approval ratings.
 
In her first policy speech to the Diet in October 2025, Takaichi introduced the slogan of “responsible and proactive public finances.” She listed 17 business sectors for investment, including AI, semiconductors, and the defense industry, on the theory that investing in security will spur economic growth in Japan. In April 2026, she opened weapons exports by eliminating the so-called “five categories” of permissible sales of military equipment. She also launched in June a plan for 370 trillion yen in investments by 2040.
 
But Takaichi has not been able to reverse growing price inflation that has been caused not only by wars in Ukraine and Iran but also by the depreciation of the Japanese yen. Her economic policies, including cutting the consumption tax on food, are not fiscally strong since there is so far no other source of revenue to offset the loss of tax revenue. The markets and the media have from time to time speculated that Japan might issue more government bonds, but even this speculation has eroded confidence in the Japanese yen and caused a surge in the long-term interest rate. Takaichi has insisted that she is not implementing a reflationary policy, but the markets remain skeptical.
 
Takaichi’s inability to implement policies is obvious in diplomacy. Since she commented in November 2025 on a contingency that might be triggered by action by China in Taiwan, China has been putting pressure on Japan to retract Takaichi’s statement. China has restricted trade with and tourism in Japan. China recently stressed Japan’s “new militarism,” citing its growing defense budget and the revision of its security policies. Regrettably for Takaichi, U.S. President Donald Trump recalled with Chinese President Xi Jinping a U.S.- China alliance in World War II that fought together to win the war (against Japan).
 
While praising Trump as the “only leader to bring peace and prosperity to the world,” Takaichi’s foreign policies are not always compatible with Trump’s. For domestic political reasons, she confirmed Japan’s support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) when Trump announced sanctions on the court. She was caught between the compassion of the Japanese people and U.S. hostility toward the ICC. She has otherwise tried to find common ground with the U.S. based on an old principle of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, a term invented by Takaichi’s political mentor, Shinzo Abe.
 
Closely watching the deterioration of Japan-China relations, Russia has put stronger pressure on Japan. Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first trip to one of the islands of Japan’s Northern Territory, Iturup, in August. Takaichi protested the visit, calling it “definitely intolerable.” Russia did not stop there. It detained a Japanese journalist for the Hokkaido Shimbun Press in Sakhalin on suspicion of spying for the Japanese government – a common Russian political tactic. Takaichi has denied that the journalist was a spy, but she has not had any direct communication with Putin so far.
 
Despite all these inadequacies in economic policy and diplomacy, Takaichi has a high popularity rating in the polls. In the poll of Yomiuri Shimbun in October, her cabinet had a 57 percent approval rating with a 30 percent disapproval – a 27 percent margin that politicians in most other countries, including the U.S., would envy. Although the survey was conducted right after the resignation of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana, after the revelation of a scandal threatening local municipalities with budget cuts for roads, that fact did not affect her popularity very much.
 
While the percentage of supporters who like her policies has declined, the biggest reason for supporting her was “because there is no other appropriate person.” She maintains support from younger voters through comments on social media. She does not favor any restrictions on AI technology, hoping to “make Japan the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” But it is a reality in Japan that cyberattacks on PHP through AI have shut down websites of major corporations.
 
Enjoying high popularity, Takaichi pursued a hawkish agenda in her first year. A good example was the enactment of the National Flag Vandalism Act, which garnered right wing support. She also championed revisions to the Imperial House Law, to allow the adoption of males in the male line of former imperial families – a goal of conservative groups that have long worked for imperial succession by males only. Undeniably, voters in Japan gave her this power in the Lower House election last February when Takaichi’s LDP gained an historical victory.
 
The Takaichi administration can be defined as an economy-oriented hawkish regime, which can be likened to the administrations of Shinzo Abe and Jun-ichiro Koizumi. Abe promoted Abenomics, a driving force for a demanding agenda that included the 2015 security legislation. Koizumi pushed for fiscal decentralization in what he called “trinity-in-unity reform,” and he stood with the U.S. in the war on terror. As far as a prime minister takes care of the people’s economic welfare, they will not complain about it.
 
Though she often invokes Abe, her former boss, as a model, Takaichi in fact seems to take Koizumi’s approach, using populism to restore faith in the LDP. The common ground among Koizumi, Abe, and Takaichi is the promotion of a hawkish agenda focusing public eyes on the economy. Perhaps this strategy is a requirement for a long-lasting administration in Japan.

The Trump Trap

Did Takaichi Make A Bad Bet On Donald Trump?

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published October 27, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Of all the leaders of America’s allies, from Europe to Asia, no one has invested more in seeking the favor of Donald Trump than Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae. She has met Trump three times in person during her first year in office and offered up tens of billions in investment pledges, while keeping mostly quiet when Trump sanctioned the International Criminal Court and its Japanese head and embraced Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s unconcealed attempts to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S.

Now, if the latest polls are accurate, Trump and his MAGA movement face a potentially devastating political defeat in the midterm elections for the U.S. Congress on November 3. While the scale of defeat remains to be seen, there seems little doubt that Trump will emerge weakened and isolated, both within and outside the United States.

Did Prime Minister Takaichi make a bad bet by snuggling so close to the mercurial American leader?

“No, I don’t think that Takaichi has made a mistake,” eminent American Japan scholar Richard Samuels told Toyo Keizai Online. “From Japan’s perspective, hugging the US and hedging against its abandonment makes sense and seems to be working. She is smart to do this for as long as she can,” said Dr. Samuels, who is the director of the Japan program at MIT, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Even if that is true – and most Japan hands in the U.S. share that view – it does not mean there are not huge risks for Japan that will be the result of the midterm vote. Much depends on what will be Trump’s state of mind if he suffers a serious political defeat.

One possibility, suggests a former senior State Department official, is that Trump will simply focus on cementing his legacy, mainly by building monuments to himself and continuing to enrich himself and his family through corruption, trade and investment deals with foreign powers, and pursuit of his enemies inside America.

“For a president with such a limited, highly personal conception of his role and opportunities, the prospect of spending his next two years in this way may well be quite attractive,” wrote former Economist editor Bill Emmott.

But it is also likely, some American analysts believe, that Trump will use his powers over foreign policy to engage in even more risky and provocative acts than he has already done. Trump’s brazen embrace in recent days of Russian leader Vladimir Putin may be a good indicator of what is to come.

These two alternative pathways are not mutually exclusive, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder told Toyo Keizai Online.

“There is definitely going to be legacy Don because that is who he is,” says Daalder, “but he will definitely also be unhinged.”

A weaker and more isolated Trump “will also become increasingly authoritarian and of the view that he and Xi (Jinping) and Putin should rule the world,” predicts the former senior official. Daalder believes that a trilateral summit with Putin and Xi on the sidelines of the November APEC summit in Shenzhen, proposed by the Russian leader, is highly likely. That summit could be focused on trying to impose a surrender on Ukraine on Russian terms, but Trump may just settle for the image of the three great leaders arm in arm.

“Trump needs to project power – and that increases the likelihood of him doing unhinged things,” says Daalder.

Escalation in the Iran war

The greatest challenge facing Trump after the elections – and maybe even before the vote – is how to get out of the quagmire of the Iran war. Trump is incapable of admitting making any mistake so his goal has been to find a way to declare victory and go home. But, says Daalder, the price of victory has gone up from some months ago when a deal with Teheran was at hand.

“Now it becomes more difficult,” argues the former U.S. envoy to NATO. Trump is likely to carry out a big military strike, presumably at the buried Iranian nuclear site at Pickaxe Mountain or the oil terminal on Kharg Island. “Trump may use a tactical nuclear weapon on either or both,” Daalder worries. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly called for a resumption of large-scale attacks, aimed at toppling the Iranian regime, after the U.S. election.

Escalation against Iran will trigger a widening retaliation against the Gulf states, further undermining global oil and gas markets and disrupting supply chains for chemicals and fertilizers. For Japan, this is a serious threat to economic growth plans, but Trump may not care about the broad economic crisis this could trigger.

After declaring ‘victory,’ Trump can then focus on the Western hemisphere, with an attempt to seize power in Cuba high on his list of targets, the former envoy to NATO predicts. “Even Greenland is not over,” he believes.

Another nightmare for Japan – a summit with Kim Jong Un

Another nightmare for Japan after a midterm defeat may be the increased prospect of a Trump summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. Recent remarks by Trump seemed to dampen the prospects of a meeting and Kim has little incentive to meet with him, most North Korea watchers believe. Recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status is no longer sufficient reason to hold a meeting.

“Trump has nothing he wants, other than the U.S. leaving South Korea,” a former senior State Department official told this writer. It is possible, the official says, that the Chinese and Russians may urge Trump in Shenzhen to seek a meeting with Kim to declare an end to the Korean war and begin to remove U.S. forces from South Korea. “If I were Kim, I would get Putin to carry his water on this and declare it a victory for peace,” the former official speculates. “I can see Trump falling for that.”

China bargain

Takaichi and senior Japanese officials are already alarmed by the prospect for a ‘grand bargain’ between Trump and the Chinese leader that could leave Japan effectively isolated. That bullet was mostly dodged when Xi visited Washington but the two leaders are planning to meet twice after the midterm elections – at the APEC summit in Shenzhen and then at a G20 summit held at a Trump golf resort in Florida.

As is increasingly clear, Trump’s anti-Chinese posture is mostly a performance for his voter base. Steps to engage in a full-scale trade war, and to seriously restrict the flow of high technology to China, have largely been abandoned. U.S. defenses in the Western Pacific have been drawn down, even before the Iran war. Post the elections, there may be little to stop Trump from seeking to cement an axis with China.

“Trump is also a little scared of President Xi and wants his approval,” Phillips O’Brien, a prolific analyst and professor of strategy at Britain’s St Andrews University, wrote recently. “In the end, Trump would be happy to see the Chinese dominate East Asia, especially if he can profit from it.”

Can Congress stop Trump?

Japanese officials may hope that a weakened Trump will face greater resistance after the election from the Congress, not only from victorious Democrats but also Republicans who see him as a political liability heading toward the 2028 presidential election. But some observers argue that Trump will simply go deeper down the road of political retaliation and dismissal of Congressional authority.

“We can expect extreme policies, ignoring of Congressional subpoenas, and rejection or dismissal of court orders as he adopts a highly confrontational approach to governing during his remaining time in office,” former senior State Department official Evans Revere told Toyo Keizai. “He may feel he has nothing to lose, especially since the Supreme Court has given him blanket immunity for his actions as President.”

What can Japan do?

In this post-midterm world, faced with an increasingly risky Trump presidency, what will Prime Minister Takaichi do?

“Japanese are far better off strengthening relations with Korea, with Australia, and with the Europeans,” argues Daalder, embracing the call of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney for middle powers to unite in the face of an unreliable U.S. Simply hoping that Americans will return to their leadership role and listen to allies is not enough.

But, he admits, “Japanese are trapped by their dependency, and so are many of the Europeans.” And in the case of Takaichi, the psychology of subordination to Washington is deeply embedded.

“By fawning all over Trump, Takaichi thinks she has him on her side,” Columbia University Emeritus scholar Gerald Curtis told Toyo Keizai Online. “But Trump only respects one thing and that is power. He is reassured she has no power. So he takes her for granted.”

Japan will not be alone in this dependency trap – Europeans are also hoping to keep the alliance alive. The difference, Curtis observes, is that “the Europeans have each other. The Japanese have nobody. Without the United States, Japan is stuck.”

Monday, October 26, 2026

Takaichi's Vulnerabilities

Yana’s Scandal Exposes Takaichi’s Weaknesses

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 18, 2026

After hesitating for two weeks, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi replaced her Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana, with Arata Takebe, a former state minister of agriculture. Takaichi’s two-week indecisiveness about Yana’s status revealed her weaknesses in two things: positioning her staff and Diet affairs. Her inability to act quickly stems from her lack of experience as the supreme leader of Japanese politics.

When the weekly magazines Daily Shincho and Weekly Bunshun (online edition) reported on September 30 on Yana’s speech and his pork-barrel (or reverse pork-barrel) politics, Takaichi, surprisingly, did not consider firing him. She said that he would make amends for the scandal by his hard work as minister. But once the magazines published other scandals that could violate other laws, Takaichi decided to move. It took two weeks for Takaichi to understand the seriousness of Yana’s conduct.

Lack of Close Allies
It is likely that Takaichi appointed Yana in the September reshuffle of her cabinet because he was one of her few allies. When Takaichi was the Chairwoman of the LDP Policy Research Council between 2021 and 2022, Yana supported Takaichi in his capacity as a director on agriculture policy. Takaichi respected Yana’s knowledge about agriculture policies. Yana submitted his proposal to be agriculture minister to Takaichi, and Takaichi accepted it.

Usually, a prime minister orders his or her staff to conduct thorough background checks on the people under consideration for ministerial positions. Yana made his troubling speech in May. Other doubts about Yana’s failure to follow election norms, such as a shuttlebus service to campaign rallies and financial awards to the campaign’s telephone solicitors, had arisen earlier during his election campaign in February. Takaichi could have (and should have) known about Yana’s inappropriate conduct before she appointed him as agriculture minister in September. Her failure must have meant that she did not have a staff to advise her on the backgrounds of her ministers.

While Takaichi was thinking about letting Yana stay at his position, LDP lawmakers were hoping for his quick replacement. Yana’s scandal had the feel of pork barrel politics, which LDP lawmakers are attempting to excise. Takaichi failed to realize that the LDP was concerned that Yana’s scandal would ignite broader criticisms of LDP politics.

During the time when the Ministry of Finance is formulating the national budget for the next fiscal year, ordinarily every December, local business leaders visit Tokyo to meet with their local Diet members to request appropriations for roads, bridges, ports, or other business infrastructure. If their request is granted, the local leaders will work for the lawmaker in his or her election campaign.
The lawmaker can ask the ministries how the budget is being allocated but cannot demand specific favors on the budget. However, consultations about the budget will exert pressure on the ministries. If a ministry has a project that requires the lawmaker’s political support, then the bureaucrats in the ministry can formulate a budget advantageous to the lawmaker. This is an interdependence between the politician and the bureaucrat.

Takaichi does not have experience as LDP secretary general, a position that oversees election and Diet affairs. Takaichi simply described Yana’s cynical speech as “unhip” in her discussions with opposition parties in the Diet. But Yana’s reference to the budget incident in his speech as an example of his influence over the budget was a necessary move for a lawmaker who lost in his single-seat district in the last election, even though it was inappropriate in a moral perspective. It must be hard for Takaichi to imagine Yana’s electoral weakness.

Novice in Diet Affairs

Another failure of Takaichi was that she did not decide to replace Yana until opposition parties united to attack Yana and Takaichi in the Diet. Typically, a prime minister replaces a minister mired in scandal on a Friday before it can affect the schedule and media coverage in the coming week. However, Takaichi let the matter linger and did not fire Yana until Wednesday October 14. She had to face harsh criticism from the opposition parties on the scandal and was held accountable for her appointment of Yana.

The highest priority for Takaichi in this Diet session is passing bills to cut the consumption tax on food. The LDP Diet Affairs Committee has had to scurry to schedule the discussion on the tax cut bill. Takaichi’s late decision on Yana jeopardized the schedule. The LDP Diet affairs team had to negotiate with the opposition parties on a new schedule and managed to reach an agreement to begin the discussion on October 20.

With no career in Diet affairs, Takaichi does not understand the delicacy of negotiations over the Diet’s schedule. The Diet has many unwritten rules. All the parties in the Diet share a common interest in a detailed examination of such significant issues as a consumption tax (and its reduction). The Diet often requires the prime minister’s attendance, which may often become a condition of taking the final voting for a bill. But Takaichi whines about the frequency of her appearances, frustrated that they interfere with her busy life of doing her make up, bathing in the early morning, and cooking.

The leading parties are discussing reducing the amount of time a prime minister must spend before the Diet. But it is up to Takaichi to manage the issues that need detailed consultation with the Diet.

Oddly enough, the approval ratings for the Takaichi Cabinet did not show a steep decline, even after she replaced Yana. Asahi Shimbun reported only a one percentage point decline to 50 percent, while Yomiuri Shimbun showed a two-point loss to 57 percent. These results indicate that many the Japanese do not understand Takaichi’s accountability for the appointment of Yana as agriculture minister.

Sunday, October 25, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday October 26, 2026

9TH ANNUAL IP DATA AND RESEARCH CONFERENCE. 10/26-28 (UTC), HYBRID. Sponsor: Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), World Intellectual Property (WIPO). Speakers: Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Associate Professor of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy, EPFL; Cecilia Jona-Lasinio, Full Professor of Applied Economics at LUISS Business School; Nik Nanos, Chief Data Scientist and Founder of Nanos Research.

UNDERSTANDING CHINA TODAY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES FROM TAIWAN AND WASHINGTON. 10/26, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: China in the World Program, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE); Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). Speakers: Becky Johnson, Chief of Staff, CIPE, Scott Kennedy, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Moderator: Catherine Tai, Director of China in the World, CIPE.

US–ROK SHIPBUILDING COOPERATION: TAKING STOCK AND CHARTING THE NEXT STEPS. 10/26, 2:00-4:00pm (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Jung-Gyu Shin, Director, Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Center (KUSPC); Sek Hwan “Andrew” Hong, President & CEO, HD Hyundai USA; Rear Admiral Ronald J. Rábago, USCG (Retired), Senior Vice President, Government Services, American Bureau of Shipping (ABS); Lawrence "Larry" Ryder, Senior Vice President, Shipbuilding Business Development, Hanwha Defense USA; Darcie Draudt-Vejares, Fellow, Korea Studies, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Matthew Reisener, Senior National Security Advisor, Center for Maritime Strategy (Moderator); Eric Labs, Senior Analyst, Naval Forces & Weapons, Congressional Budget Office; Cynthia R. Cook, Senior Fellow, Defense & Security Department, CSIS; Erik Raven, Managing Director, Defense Practice Area, Beacon Global Strategies. Moderator: J. James Kim, Director, Korea Program, Stimson Center; Lecturer, School of International and Public Affairs (EMPA), Columbia University.

THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE: COMMEMORATING 30 YEARS OF TAIWAN’S ELECTORAL SOVEREIGNTY. 10/26, 4:00pm (PDT), IN-PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. Speakers: David Chih-Hsiang Wu, Director-General of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office; Evan Dawley, Associate Professor of History at Goucher College; James Lee, Assistant Professor at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica; Thomas Shattuck, Senior Program Manager at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House; Heiner Janus, Project Lead and Senior Researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS); Moderator: Thomas B. Gold, Professor of Sociology Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley.

INNOVATION ON STEROIDS: WHAT ARE WE LEARNING FROM THE UKRAINE WAR? 10/26, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: MIT. Speakers: Erik Lin Greenberg, Associate Professor of Political Science, Co-Director, Wargaming Lab, MIT Security Studies Program; Gene Keselman, Principal Lecturer, Technological Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Strategic Management, MIT Sloan School.

SECURING THE FUTURE: U.S.-KOREA COOPERATION IN DEFENSE, AI AND TRADE. 10/26, 5:00pm (PDT), 8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Korea-Pacific Program, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Speakers: Kang Jung, Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Los Angeles; Colin Grabow, Associate Director, Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Henry Haggard, Principal, Seekonk Global Strategy Group; Stephan Haggard, Research Professor and Director Emeritus, Korea-Pacific Program, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy; Munseob Lee, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Chair in Korean Studies, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy; Stephen D. Sklenka, former Deputy Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

THE NEW U.S.-KOREA TRADE RISK LANDSCAPE: RECENT TRENDS IN TARIFFS, EXPORTS CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS FOR KOREAN COMPANIES. 10/26, 8:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Korea Society, Association of American State offices in Korea, and Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. Speakers: Katelyn Hilferty, Partner & Practice Lead, Morgan Lewis; Clinton Yu, Parter & Co-Chair, Arnall Gregory LLP; Moderator: Chris Kim, Managing Director, Stout.

If you would like to see the full week of Asia-relevant events and happenings, subscribe to the weekly Asia Policy Calendar. Only $100/year via this LINK.

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Takaichi's Agenda Stumbles

Takaichi Caught Between a Staff Scandal and U.S. Pressure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 12, 2026


Although Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is trying to focus on the economy during the Diet’s fall session, two unexpected issues, one domestic, the other international, have upset her agenda. Irritated about Takaichi’s handling of a scandal concerning the Agriculture minister, opposition parties have slowed the procedures for considering bills. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paralyzed Takaichi’s diplomacy with the U.S. despite her unwavering support for President Donald Trump. The prime minister now faces the hardest time since she took the seat a year ago.

In her October 5 policy speech, Takaichi introduced an old Chinese expression called Keisei-saimin [経世済民], which could be interpreted as “Good governance saves the people.” This saying became the etymology of “economy [経済]” in Japan. The faction led by former premier Noboru Takeshita, Keisei-kai [経世会], was named after this phrase. By using the idiom, Takaichi hoped to show her determination to decrease the consumption tax and tackle price inflation.

It was remarkable for Takaichi to refer to the political principle of the former Takeshita faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because it had been a political enemy of the former Abe faction, or Seiwa-kai [清和会], with which Takaichi herself had once been affiliated. Takaichi has begun to distance herself from Abe in other ways as well.  

In Diet discussions, she has distinguished her economic policy from past reflation policy. Reflation had been a fundamental element of Abenomics. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s demand that Japan stop the reflation has taken precedence. Thus, while keeping with such Abe-oriented diplomatic policies as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Takaichi is departing from other of Abe’s political stances.

Opposition parties are still skeptical about Takaichi’s economic policy. Komeito and the Democratic Party for the People have requested in Diet discussion a greater distribution of public benefits rather than a consumption tax cut to deal with price inflation. Takaichi has insisted that a consumption tax cut is the best policy in terms of sufficiency and swiftness. However, she has not yet answered the question of how she has found or will find fiscal resources for the tax cut. She has said only, “Don’t worry.”

Although Takaichi had expected to discuss economic policies in the Diet, opposition leaders did not allow it by asking why Takaichi had appointed Kazuo Yana as the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in her September cabinet reshuffling. Yana had boasted in May that, earlier in the year, he, as an individual Diet member, had cut the national government’s budget for road construction in two municipalities in his electoral district – in retaliation for their mayors’ support of Yana’s rival in the February Lower House election. Admitting his remarks were inappropriate, Yana retracted the comment, inviting further criticism about eating his words.

While a lawmaker can check the policies of ministries, influencing a specific policy may be incompatible with his obligations as a representative of all the people. Yana’s interference in national budget work to take revenge against the mayors was the opposite of that. Yana’s comment ignited a traditional skepticism of pork barrel shenanigans by LDP politicians through shadowy relationships with the ministries.

In response to a request that she dismiss Yana, Takaichi insisted on keeping him in his position, arguing that the budget had in fact been appropriately distributed to local governments. Although the prime minister usually replaces a cabinet member who becomes embroiled in scandal, Takaichi chose the opposite course. [Yana resigned Wednesday, October 14.]

Not only the opposition parties but also members of the LDP question her decision to retain Yana. LDP Executive Acting Secretary General, Koichi Hagiuda, criticized Yana’s speech as arrogant and intolerable. Opposition parties are united in sponsoring a censure motion in both chambers of the Diet. The opposition parties have a tough road ahead in the Lower House since the LDP has a majority, but they may have a chance to pass the censure motion with a majority in the Upper House. The opposition parties have also decided to refuse to discuss bills related to Yana in the Upper House. With this atmosphere it is uncertain whether Takaichi can get a consumption tax cut through the Diet.

Further pressure on Takaichi has come from the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio who announced sanctions on the ICC. “We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate,” Rubio said in a statement. The sanctions are highly unpopular in Japan ever since the ICC’s Japanese president was targeted with personal sanctions in August.

Takaichi left a short comment on her social media account, expressing a “deep concern” on the sanctions decision of the U.S. Japan also joined the joint statement of foreign ministers of European countries and Canada which regretted and strongly disagreed with U.S. sanctions. Takaichi endorsed the statement but has taken no further action at the leaders’ level so far.

By now, Takaichi is one of the few world leaders who wholeheartedly support Trump. In her meeting with him in October 2025, Takaichi praised Trump as the only leader who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. She even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Through such unstinting loyalty, Takaichi has put herself in a position in which her criticism of any Trump policy would not make sense.

The Diet begins discussion of economic measures at the Committee on the Budget in the Lower House this week. If Yana remains in place, Takaichi will be asked about her responsibility for naming him agriculture minister in which position he can control the budget for farmers or the price of rice. On the diplomatic side, the Trump administration seems to be aligning the U.S. with Russia in the war in Ukraine. Such a commonality of interests might lead to other coordinated actions, such as opposition to the ICC. Whether Takaichi can find a way to break through and preserve Japan’s independence deserves scrutiny.

Asia Policy Events, Monday October 19, 2026


10/17-19 - Annual Fall Rites held at the Yasukuni Shrine. Visits and offerings by rightwing Diet members and Cabinet officials. PM Takaichi does not visit as she has in the past.


BOOK TALK: TECH-GEMONY: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ECONOMY. 10/19, 9:30-10:30am (JST), 10/18, 8:30-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University Japan Campus. Speaker: author Brad Glosserman, Senior Advisor, Pacific Forum; Moderator: Robert Dujarric, Co-Director, ICAS, Temple University Japan Campus. PURCHASE BOOK

THE IRAN CRISIS STOCKTAKE: WHO CAN SUSTAIN THE PRESSURE? 10/19, 1:00-2:00pm (BST), 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Speakers: Ali Ansari, Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI; Burcu Ozcelik, Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security, RUSI; Jonathan Hackett, retired US Marine Corps interrogator; Mohammed al-Basha, independent Middle East analyst and founder, Basha Report Risk Advisory; Moderator: Jonathan Eyal, Associate Director, Strategic Research Partnerships, RUSI.

BOOK TALK: THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF IDEOLOGY ANALYSIS. 10/19, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Illiberalism Studies Program, George Washington University. Speakers: author Juliette Faure, Professor of Political Science, University of Lille; author, Mathew Humphrey, Professor of Political Theory, University of Nottingham; author, David Laycock, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://link.amazon/B06y2GvJJ

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY AND NUCLEAR POWER IN JAPAN. 10/19, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Speakers: Hisashi Yoshikawa, Project Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, University of Tokyo; Nobuo Tanaka, Chairman, Steering Committee, Innovation for Cool Earth Forum (ICEF); Moderator: Joseph E. Aldy, Professor, Harvard Kennedy School.

AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TO RESEARCH AND INNOVATION SECURITY: PROTECTING OPEN SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION. 10/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Bart Hogeveen, Senior Fellow & Director Europe, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Moderator: Melita Phachulia, Executive Assistant, Institute for Security & Development Policy.

PRESS CONFERENCE: HOW JAPAN CAN RESPOND TO A TAIWAN CRISIS. 10/20, 11:00am-Noon (JST), 10/19, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Professional Activities Committee, Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speaker: Katsuya Yamamoto, Director, Strategy and Deterrence Program and Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

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Sunday, October 11, 2026

Consumption Tax Cut is Back at the Forefront

The Extraordinary Session of the Diet Begins


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 5, 2026


An extraordinary session of the Diet was convoked on October 5 with closure scheduled for December 12. The top priority for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a consumption tax cut that would begin in April 2027. However, Takaichi faces the headwind of a scandal inside her administration and reservations about her diplomatic skills.
 
Ordinarily, such a Diet session in the fall is to discuss a supplemental budget for the Japanese economy or for dealing with an unexpected event such as a natural disaster. However, Takaichi has no plans so far to submit a supplemental budget bill. Indeed, she previously declared that she would not propose any supplemental budget and would integrate all the budget items into an annual budget that begins every April. Forgoing a supplemental budget should improve the efficiency of private business activities by improving the predictability of government spending.
 
Hence a consumption tax cut is the focus of this session. The Takaichi Cabinet made an official decision on the tax cut in mid-September: it will seek to reduce the consumption tax rate on food from eight percent to one percent for two years starting next April. The government will also establish a new system to subsidize job-hunting efforts by low-income families, instead of a refundable tax credit.
 
The leading coalition, the LDP and its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, forcing the two parties to seek some help from opposition parties. LDP and JIP expect Komeito, which left the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in September, to vote yes on the consumption tax cut bill.
 
However, the situation among the opposition parties is extremely complicated. The CRA lawmakers who had joined the party from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) have since established a new party, the Democratic Reform Association (DRA). The DRA and Komeito then have organized a parliamentary group in the Lower House. Although the CDPJ and Komeito have not launched a similar project in the Upper House and continue to work separately there, it is up to Komeito whether to take a position closer to the CDPJ or to the LDP on the consumption tax cut proposal.
 
In addition to enacting the consumption tax cut, the LDP/JIP coalition hopes to reduce the number of Diet seats. The JIP has been calling on the LDP to implement their agreement made in October 2025 to reduce the number of seats in the Lower House by ten percent. The two parties failed to pass such a bill in either the extraordinary session of last fall or the special session earlier this year. Several members of the LDP are skeptical of JIP’s hard push for seat reduction.
 
The seat reduction proposal has led to an unusual unification of the opposition parties because all 45 seats to be eliminated are in proportional districts of the Lower House and thus work against small parties. If the LDP and JIP decide to ignore opposition complaints and take advantage of their super majority in the Lower House to pass the seat reduction, Komeito may oppose the consumption tax cut bill in retaliation. A multi-partisan group of lawmakers, including some from the LDP, submitted their opinion to the council for election reform, which argued that the 45-seat reduction would be baseless.
 
Controlling the procedure in the Diet will be crucial for Takaichi, who is reluctant to join the Diet’s discussion of the bills. The newly appointed Chairman of the LDP Council on Diet Affairs, Hideki Murai, supports Takaichi’s hesitancy and may negotiate to reduce her appearances before the Committee on Budget. But if Murai fails, the opposition parties will be further emboldened to oppose the leading coalition.
 
The Committee on the Budget has been a venue for discussing political scandals. Weekly magazines have reported that, before taking the position as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana threatened some municipalities in his electoral district with cuts to their road construction budgets. The mayors of those cities supported another candidate in the last election in February. Yana’s possible involvement can be interpreted as blackmailing political opponents.
 
Yana is one of the lawmakers who received kickbacks from a former Abe faction in the LDP. His punishment was exclusion from a leadership position in the LDP for six months. Nevertheless, Takaichi allowed him to return to the leadership group by appointing him as minister in her cabinet reshuffle in September. She must have thought the kickback scandal was over. However, in an Asahi Shimbun poll, 68 percent considered it a problem that Takaichi had begun to appoint lawmakers embroiled in the funding scandal to ministerial positions. Mishandling of the Yana scandal may affect Takaichi’s approval rating.

Takaichi’s limited diplomatic skills have also raised concerns. A member of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa was arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of a robbery from and the murder of a Japanese woman. The government of Japan has expressed its extreme regret to the U.S. However, Takaichi has not taken the matter up with U.S. President Donald Trump. Takaichi once said (in what she must now recognize as a grave mistake) that Trump was the only person who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. If she remains wedded to this view, she will show her irresolution about protecting Japanese citizens, and her public image will deteriorate.
 
Takaichi still has not improved bilateral relations with China that resulted from her careless speech on the Taiwan contingency in the Diet last November. Some lawmakers are trying to normalize Japan-China relations. This is not within Takaichi’s repertoire. Her missteps in diplomacy will give challengers a window to consolidate their opposition to her reelection as the LDP president in the fall of 2027.

History, the hardest easy problem for Japan to resolve

How China Uses Wartime History Against Japan

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published October 7, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Beyond all the pageantry, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a strategic goal for his Washington visit – to undermine the American relationship with Japan. Xi succeeded, perhaps beyond his expectations.

Japanese policy makers saw this coming. They arranged a brief meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly between Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Donald Trump ahead of Xi’s arrival.

The meeting was empty of content but seemed reassuring. But the next day, Trump welcomed Xi by fondly recalling “the greatness that we had together fighting in World War Two” without mentioning the postwar alliance with Japan.

Xi followed the next day at the official banquet, making clear who was their common enemy. “Over 80 years ago, the Chinese and American people stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors,” Xi said, deliberately obscuring the fact that wartime China was led by the Nationalists, not their Communist foes. The official statements issued by both governments echoed the language of their status as wartime allies.

“Clearly, Beijing would like to drive a wedge between Trump and Takaichi,” respected scholar Mike Mochizuki told Toyo Keizai, “but Takaichi clings to Donald while Donald does not return the favor by calling her Sanae.”

This Chinese use of the wartime past is part of a broader campaign to increase diplomatic pressure on Japan and the Takaichi administration over the Prime Minister’s remarks on a Taiwan contingency and to push the Chinese characterization of Japan’s defense buildup as a renewal of Japanese wartime “militarism”.

Trump, thrilled by his role as a host to Xi, either ignored the Chinese strategic intent, or simply failed to understand the trap he had stepped into.

“Trump’s failure to grasp that the United States had allied with a different China and fought a different Japan will only invite more Chinese coercion,” commented Mireya Solis, the senior Japan expert at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington.

The Chinese wedge strategy may not be entirely effective. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains anchored in security establishments whose bonds have “deepened enough to prevent a U.S.-Japan estrangement even under Trump,” notes Mochizuki, affiliated with the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

But Japanese officials are clearly rattled. The Prime Minister’s office felt compelled to tell the Yomiuri Shimbun that during a short phone call between Takaichi and Trump after the Xi visit, the American president reassured her that he had not sided with the Chinese leader in his criticism of Japan and urged him to hold talks with the Japanese Premier. “I’d be surprised if Trump spoke in detail about Japan with Xi,” a recently retired senior State Department official told this writer.

China’s war on Takaichi

China’s criticism of Japan intensified in response to Takaichi’s victory in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election last October. Even before her remarks on a possible use of Japanese military forces in a Taiwan crisis, the Chinese were warning about the dangers of her administration as a triumph of the ‘new conservatives’ who favor defense buildup and cultivate close ties to pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Takaichi’s unapologetic views on the war were well known in Beijing. She made a splash in the Diet early in her career, in 1994, challenging then Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi for his bold statements acknowledging the war as an act of aggression. Later Murayama issued his statement on the 50th anniversary of the war apologizing for Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression.”

For Takaichi, this was unacceptable. “You can’t just apologize on my behalf without my consent,” she said in the Diet exchange, making it clear that she viewed the war as “legally justifiable.” In a later interview, she pledged to revise the Murayama statement, saying that Japan “fought wars for self-preservation and self-defense.”

When Takaichi met Xi on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Korea in late October, shortly after she took power, the Chinese leader pointedly challenged these views.

“We should widely promote the spirit of the Murayama Statement,” he reportedly told her, “which reflected on the history of aggression and apologized to victimized countries.”

In that sense, Takaichi herself has created the opportunity for China to use the wartime past to try to isolate and pressure Japan.

“Takaichi shares (former Prime Minister) Abe’s revisionist views of history but lacks Abe’s pragmatic and prudent judgement,” says Japan scholar Mochizuki. “So it is not surprising that China has linked Taiwan, Japanese imperialism, and Japan’s defense buildup together to criticize what they see as Japan’s neomilitarism.”

The Chinese use of the wartime past continued with the late September visit of former Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi linked the moment to the anniversary of the Tokyo war crimes trials.

"If Japan does not learn lessons from history and challenges the postwar 'Peace Constitution,' tries to revive its history of aggression and resurrect war criminals, it will not even be able to face the world, let alone move toward the future, and it will have no future," Wang said.

Behind this war talk, the Wang Yi talks with Iwaya are an effort to reach out to forces within Japan that believe Takaichi’s anti-China stance, and her overreliance on the relationship with the unreliable Trump, are a mistake. Iwaya, along with former Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, is among those clearly opposed to the Prime Minister’s policies toward China. Even more intriguing is the recent interview in Shincho by special advisor Imai Takaya calling on Takaichi to change her language on Taiwan and take a strategic view that does “not rely on the US for everything.”

The upcoming APEC summit meeting in China may provide a window to repair relations. But it will require Japan to act, a Japan that is increasingly isolated by China.

China’s use of the wartime past is nothing new

However the current maneuvers play out, it is important to recognize that the Chinese use of the wartime past is hardly new. In a comparative study of the formation of wartime historical memory that we conducted at Stanford University, our research detailed how the Chinese Communist Party shifted in the last few decades to construct a patriotic narrative to replace one that focused on the struggle against their Nationalist enemies.

In this patriotic narrative, the war serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it allows the current Chinese leadership to assume the role of a great power that helped found the United Nations and was part of a global “anti-fascist” struggle. And it emphasizes the struggle of a unified Chinese people against the Japanese invader, claiming to have been victors in that war.

“There is a growing sense in China that its suffering and its contribution to the overall victory in World War II haven’t been sufficiently appreciated,” historian Rana Mitter, the author of several important books on the war and Chinese memory, told The Wire China in a 2020 interview. “World War II has enabled the state to say, look, this is when China was able to stand up for itself and fight back against invasion.”

In recent years, “history is used by China, including war history and the history of the United Nations, to make the case for Chinese global leadership since 1945,” Harvard Kennedy School historian Mitter told a recent seminar in Europe. The message is that in the current turbulence of the world order, China can play the role it played in 1945 in creating that order.

Beyond the claim to global leadership, the Chinese have not hesitated to use the wartime memories to target Japan.

Last September, the Chinese hosted a huge commemoration of the 80th anniversary, featuring a military parade attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Xi chose this moment to again emphasize the war against Japan and the creation of a “national united front against Japanese aggression established at the initiative of the Communist Party of China.”

Paired with the celebration, the Chinese film industry premiered two slickly produced blockbuster films, both of which were aimed not only at the Chinese audience but also distributed globally, including on streaming services like Netflix. “Dead to Rights” was yet another account of the Nanjing Massacre, done relatively artfully. But “731,” an account of the infamous secretive Japanese biological and chemical warfare unit that performed ghastly experiments on Chinese and foreign prisoners, was directly aimed at Japan. The depiction of Japanese as evil barbarians, and the failure of the United States to prosecute these war crimes, was garishly depicted.

This clash surfaced at the United Nations in what seems like an obscure issue – the existence of a clause in the UN charter which refers to “enemy states,” namely Japan and Germany, allowing the Allied powers from World War II to take action against those former Axis powers without prior Security Council approval. It was designed as a temporary safeguard against the resurgence of militarism but is widely recognized as obsolete and without effect. The General Assembly voted twice to remove the clause but it requires an amendment of the Charter that China and Russia can block.

Prime Minister Takaichi called on the UN to remove this clause. After her address to the General Assembly, China’s deputy ambassador to the UN, Sun Lei, defended its existence, pointing to “proof that Japan’s re-militarization has become a real threat to regional and global peace and stability.”

These history wars are decades long, and they shift in response to the needs of foreign policy, in both Beijing and Tokyo. China has played the history card, again, and it remains to be seen how Japan will respond. For Japan, the U.S. under Trump is increasingly an unreliable actor. But however this plays out, the past will never really be forgotten.

Asia Policy Events, Monday October 12, 2026

Today is a national holiday in the United States, Canada, Japan, Cambodia, Fiji, and Samoa.

10/12 - IMF Flagship Book Launch: Shaping the Future of Asia: Opportunities and Challenges examines how the Asia-Pacific region can sustain its remarkable economic success as it confronts profound structural challenges to established patterns of economic development and growth.
10/12 – Sports Day, National Holiday, Japan.
10/12 - Columbus Day, National Holiday, US/Thanksgiving, National Holiday, Canada.
10/12-15 - 65th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-65), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
10/12-18 -  World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, Bangkok, Thailand. 

TRILATERAL US-JAPAN-TAIWAN COOPERATION ON PHYSICAL AI. 10/12, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Chair, Hudson. Speakers: Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, CEO, Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology; Ken Fukuda, Director for AI Industry Strategy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan; Emma Rafaelof, Director, Global Policy, Semiconductor Industry Association; Moderator: William Chou, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson.

THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE NEXUS. 10/12, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Cato Institute. Speakers: Hajar Hammado, Senior Policy Advisor, Demand Progress; Sascha Meinrath, Palmer Chair in Telecommunications, Penn State University; Alex Marthews, National Chair, Restore the Fourth; Patrick G. Eddington, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute. 

LANDMINES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DETERRENCE, AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. 10/12, 3:00-4:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson; Lieutenant General (Ret.) In-bum Chun, Senior Fellow, Association of the United States Army; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Advisor, Geopolitical Risk and Research, The Asia Group; Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

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Monday, October 5, 2026

Japan's Diplomacy Overshadowed

Takaichi Obscured by the Trump-Xi Summit

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 28, 2026


A week ago, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi hoped to display Japan as the leader of the Asia-Pacific region – backed by the unshaken support of the United States. She outlined her position during a 30-hour visit between September 21 and 23 to the United Nations in New York. She needs to rebuild her diplomacy, which has not been going very well since her comment on the Taiwan contingency last November. However, her effort was overshadowed by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.S. and his meeting with President Donald Trump at the White House.
 
The official purpose of Takaichi’s trip to the U.S. was to give her first speech at the annual General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In her address, Takaichi emphasized Japan’s commitment to the rule of law. “Since the end of the Second World War, Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has attached great importance to the rule of law in the settlement of any disputes,” she said. In this case, “rule of law” is a veiled reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
 
At home, Takaichi has received considerable backlash to her indecisive response to U.S. sanctions on Tomoko Akane, the Japanese president of the ICC. Takaichi needs to reverse the downward trend in the approval rating for her cabinet. By pledging unwavering support for the ICC, Takaichi distanced herself from Trump, who called the ICC “the out of control institution” in his speech to the UNGA.
 
Diplomacy based on democratic values is a crucial element for Takaichi to distinguish Japan from China. She promotes the concept of a “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific (FOIP) that was initiated by her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. When Abe proposed this doctrine in 2016, China was extending its power throughout the world under the brand name “One Belt One Road.” The brand covered China’s advance to the South China Sea, which was found unlawful by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, a month before Abe proposed the FOIP. Abe hoped to use the FOIP to counter China’s territorial aims.
 
Former premier Fumio Kishida revised the FOIP in 2023 to apply it to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Kishida reiterated that Ukraine today would be East Asia tomorrow. Takaichi has now updated the FOIP again to explain Japan’s effort to secure an international supply chain, which was impacted by the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and by China’s weaponization of rare earths exports. Thus, the FOIP is a diplomatic tool for Japan to use to counter China’s growing influence in the world.
 
Takaichi also quoted from the FOIP in her meeting with Trump at the U.N. Headquarters just before her UNGP speech on September 22. “I appreciate Donald’s strong commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance,” she said at the meeting. Takaichi tried to remind Trump of the fact that Japan should be the closest partner for the U.S. in Asia, hoping to deter Trump from making any excessive concessions on Taiwan in his meeting with Xi two days later.
 
However, rather than fostering the Japan-U.S. relationship, the meeting highlighted differences between Japan and the U.S. Takaichi told Trump that Japan had been and would in the future support the ICC, knowing that Trump was calling on countries to withdraw from it. Trump expressed concern about the depreciation of the Japanese yen. Takaichi did not refer to any discussion of Taiwan in her press conference after the meeting.
 
To her regret, the meeting between Trump and Xi on September 24 and 25 must not have been what Takaichi had hoped it would be. Xi urged Trump to oppose the independence of Taiwan, and Trump did not say how he had responded. Trump also did not say whether the U.S. would resume exporting weapons to Taiwan. “He understands very much how I feel,” Trump said after the meeting.
 
On regulation of artificial intelligence, on which both countries compete, Trump and Xi agreed to establish a body for bilateral dialogue. Both leaders hoped to minimize the difference between them. Fundamentally, however, both leaders were responding to domestic concerns. Trump must show that he can manage the China relationship to attract voters in the mid-term elections in November. For his part, Xi must show at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 that China is a great power equivalent to the U.S. Trump and Xi confirmed that they will have two meetings later this year, at APEC in China and at the G20 in the U.S..
 
Trump’s and Xi’s exchange of their views of World War II history – not necessarily those of trained historians – must have been a nightmare for Takaichi. In the welcoming ceremony, Trump noted the long-running close relationship between both nations – a contentious one that began only 50 years ago – and called them “allies in World War II,” a war that had ended 30 years earlier.” Xi replied at the state dinner that both nations “stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors.” The White House fact sheet on Xi’s visit also explicitly noted the wartime alliance.
 
Takaichi did not respond directly to their characterizations of history, stressing instead the firmness of the Japan-U.S. alliance even after the history of brutal warfare. In her speech to the UNGA Takaichi’s only historical reference was to call for the rescission of the “enemy states clauses” (Article 107 and parts of Articles 53 and 77) from the UN Charter, which apply to the Axis powers defeated in WWII, including Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, as well as Japan.
 
Takaichi and her rightwing supporters hope that time has obscured Japan’s war history of atrocities and criminality. They believe that the Abe administration’s active revision and questioning of historical facts has caused painful memories to fade. Today, they believe, Japan should be only remembered as the war’s loser – devastated by relentless bombing and two atomic bombs.
 
However, Xi took the opportunity to emphasize that China and the U.S. were allies against an invading Japan, creating a bond “forged in blood and fire.” Trump agreed. Japan’s lingering war history and insufficient apologies resonate with Americans as they do with the Chinese. The past year’s identification of American POW remains from the war found in Tokyo, Taiwan, and the Philippines* and the POW’s hometown burials have revived memories of Japanese viciousness.
 
The negotiations between the two major powers -- over Taiwan’s status, the development of AI, and the interpretation of history – presumably will take place, regardless of Japan’s concerns. Takaichi once described her diplomacy as “flourishing on the world’s center stage,” tracking the aim of former premier Abe. The Trump-Xi meeting, however, and whatever its long-term outcome, revealed that Japan is marginalized by practice and history in the U.S.-China power game.


*Remains of American POWs of Japan who died in Takao (Kaohsiung), Taiwan; Subic Bay, the Philippines; Cabanatuan, the Philippines; and Tokyo, Japan who were buried in mass graves as unknowns after the war in the Manila American Cemetery in the Philippines and the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii have been identified recently by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Hundreds of hometown burials with full military honors have taken place across the U.S. reviving memories of the War.