Asia Policy Events, Week of August 16, 2026

Asia Policy Point is on summer recess, like the U.S. Congress until August 31. We will, however, post some events weekly for our readers and members. If you want to receive these directly to your mailbox, you have to become a "member" of APP. An individual, nonshareable membership is only $105/year and includes our occasional papers of on Japanese politics and access to our office while visiting Washington. SIGN UP HERE.

Week of August 16, 2026

8/3~16 - Beidaihe Annual Summer Chinese leadership meetings, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, PRC. The list of invitees to the annual gathering, as reported by state media, suggests that China’s leaders are placing a heavy emphasis on science, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
8/10-14 - Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby visits Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia. First official trip to Southeast Asia as Under Secretary of War for Policy. MANILA SPEECH, PRESS CONFERENCE.
8/12 - South Korea's Supreme Court confirms a decision requiring Japan's Nippon Steel to compensate the relatives of a Korean national who endured forced labor under Japan's occupation at its Kamaishi Steelworks. 
8/13 - Russian President Vladimir Putin makes his first visit to one of four Russian-held western Pacific islands (Iturup, known in Japan as Etorofu) seized after WWII that Japan calls its Northern Territories.
8/14 – Memorial Day for Japanese Forces’ Comfort Women Victims, South Korea.
8/14 – 1991. South Korean comfort woman victim Kim Hak-sun became the first to give public testimony about her experience.

8/15 - 1945. Imperial Japan accepts the Potsdam Declaration and ceases combat operations. Shūsen-kinenbi (Memorial Day for the End of the War in Japan). National Memorial Service for the War Dead at the Nippon Budokan hall in Tokyo with the Emperor and prime minister. 
     As expected, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi did not make her usual visit Yasukuni Shrine and sent an offering instead. However, Upon arriving at Nippon Budokan hall to attend her first war memorial ceremony since taking office last year, Takaichi turned toward the Yasukuni Shrine across the road and bowed twice, clapped twice and bowed once in an apparent act of Shinto worship from a distance. She did visit the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery for War Dead down the street from the Yasukuni Shrine. Her Memorial statement also made no mention of "remorse." [APP wrote about Prime Minister Ishiba's reinsertion of "remorse" in the annual memorial statement after its removal by Prime Minister Abe.] Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, Minoru Kiuchi, economic and fiscal policy minister, Kimi Onoda, economic security minister, and Hitoshi Kikawada, in charge of issues related to Okinawa and the Northern Territories did visit the Shrine. Senior LDP officials -- Secretary General Suzuki, Haruko Arimura, head of its General Council, and Yasutoshi Nishimura, head of its Election Strategy Committee -- went to the Shrine as well. On the same day, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung emphasized in his remarks for Liberation Day "that Korea-Japan cooperation is more important than ever, The light of the new Korea-Japan relationship that we will create is To those who are still enduring pain in the shadows of history It must be able to be a source of warmth." 

8/15 -  USS George Washington departs the Pacific and expected to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East leaving the Western Pacific without an American aircraft carrier. Next day Trump orders the scaling back of the upcoming U.S.-South Korea exercises.
15 – Annual Far Eastern Prisoners of War (FEPOW) Day in Taiwan hosted by Taiwan POW Camps Memorial Society. 
8/15-16 - Panda Fest DC 2026, Washington, DC, outdoor Asian food festival with experiential activities, tastings, and market fairs.
8/17 - 1926. Centenary of the birth of late Chinese leader Jiang Zemin. Xi to speak at commemoration.
8/17 – Independence Day, National Holiday, Indonesia.
8/17-27 - 26th Annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with the U.S. and South Korea held in South Korea. On the 16th, Trumps tells Hegseth to scale them back!!
8/19 – 1945. Several dozen British, Dutch, and American senior officers including Lieutenant Generals Jonathan Wainwright and A.E. Percival located by the OSS at the Hsian POW camp, 150 miles north of Mukden (today's Shenyang, China).
8/20-21 - Religious Freedom in Asia: Representation, Restrictions and Rights hosted by the Asia Centre Bangkok.
8/21 – 1945. Japanese authorities decide to set up the Recreation and Amusement Association (RAA) for the benefit of Allied occupation troops modeled on the military government’s long-established Comfort Women system.

8/22-23 - Freedom 250 Grand Prix street circuit: NTT INDYCAR SERIES. First-ever automotive race around the National Mall and the historic streets of Washington, DC. Veterans of the NTT trade wars will be amused that Japan's NTT is now encircling the National Mall. 
8/23 - Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong gives an annual address to mark the independence of the city-state. 
8/23-27 - World Water Week.

KEIRIN: JAPAN'S WARRIORS ON BICYCLES. 8/17, 6:45pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society-UK. Speakers: Joe Truman, British Track Cyclist; author, Justin McCurry, Japan and Korea correspondent, The Guardian, War on Wheels: Inside Keirin and Japan’s Cycling Subculture; Moderator: Jim McCafferty, Director, Reynolds Technology. PURCHASE BOOK. NB: Keirin is a major off-budget source of funding (managed by METI) for Japan’s electronics industry.

BEYOND PYONGYANG: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MODERNIZATION, AND INEQUALITY IN NORTH KOREA. 8/17, 8:00-9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson, 38 North. Speakers: Martyn Williams, Senior Fellow, 38 North Program; Iliana Ragnone, Research Analyst & Managing Editor, 38 North Program; Moderator: Jenny Town, Director, 38 North Program.

THE HORMUZ IMPLICATIONS FOR ENERGY POLICYMAKING: JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA. 8/18, 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. Speakers: TERAZAWA, Tatsuya, Chairman and CEO, IEEJ, Japan; Jae-Seung Lee, Professor, Jean Monnet Chair in College & Graduate School of International Studies (CIS & GSIS), Korea University; Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program.

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S GENERATIONAL SHIFT: FOREIGN POLICY FUTURES. 8/18, 9:00-10:35am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Speakers include: Dante Schulz, Project Manager for Political and Security Affairs, NBR; Rohan Mukherjee, Assistant Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; Rajni Gamage, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore; Md. Tanvir Habib, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka; Moderator: Christopher Clary, Associate Professor of Political Science, University at Albany.

THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ CLOSURE: WHAT HAPPENS TO TRADE AND SHIPPING? 8/19, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE). Speakers: Simon J. Evenett, Professor of Geopolitics and Strategy, IMD Business School, Founder of St Gallen Endowment for Prosperity through Trade, University of St Gallen Switzerland; Dorota Lost-Siemińska, Director Legal Affairs and External Relations, International Maritime Organization (IMO); Moderator: Cecilia Malmström , Nonresident Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics (PIIE).

GOLDEN DOME: EARLY ASSESSMENT AND OPEN QUESTIONS. 8/19, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: David Mosher, Director of National Security Analysis - Congressional Budget Office; Steve Fetter, Professor, School of Public Policy - University of Maryland; Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Director - Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Co-Director - Africa Security Initiative, Moderator: Melanie W. Sisson, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology.

PRESS CONFERENCE: JAPAN'S SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD. 8/19, 11:00-Noon (JST), 8/18, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Ken Jimbo, Research Institute for Advanced Innovation and GeoStrategy (RAIS); Tomoyuki Furutani, (RAIS).

DIGITAL TAIWAN LECTURE SERIES – TAIWAN’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND THE 2026 LOCAL ELECTIONS. 8/19, 4:00-5:00pm (TST), 4:00-5:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Dr. Ching-Hsin Yu, Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University; Moderator: Yi-Chieh Chen, Research Fellow, ISDP’s Stockholm Taiwan Center.

CAN THE UNITED STATES RETAIN ITS SCIENTIFIC TALENT? 8/20, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Speakers: Adriana Bankston, Consultant & Advisor; Scientific Research Policy; Advocacy & Government Relations; Donna Ginthe, Roy A. Roberts & Regents Distinguished Professor of Economics Director, Institute for Policy & Social Research, University of Kansas; Shalin Jyotishi, Founder and Director, Future of Work and Innovation Economy Initiative; Moderator: Trelysa Long, Policy Analyst, ITIF.

DOES AUKUS STRENGTHEN AUSTRALIA’S SECURITY? 8/20 6:00-7:15pm (AEST), 4:00-5:15am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Lowy Institute. Speakers: Sam Roggeveen, Program Director Lowy Institute’s International Security Program; Jennifer Parker, Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute, Adjunct Fellow in Naval Studies at the University of Western Australia; Mihai Sora, Director of Research at the Lowy Institute. Fee 

North Korea Sending More Soldiers for Russia-Ukraine War

North Korea Doubles Down on Its Alliance With Russia, For Now

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published August 12, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has doubled down on his military and strategic alliance with Vladimir Putin and the Russian regime, betting that this axis will strengthen his own position for now. However, Kim’s strategic calculus depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and its economic and political impact on Russia. 

The flow of arms and soldiers from North Korea to Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to escalate, accompanied by a growing supply of North Korean labor to fill the gaps in Russia’s war-strained economy. And the North Korean economy is increasing its reliance on a largely unofficial transfer of Russian resources—food, energy, cash and military technology—offered as compensation for its support.

The latest sign of this deepening relationship came from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who revealed in a late July address that Russia planned to bring in an additional 30,000 troops and deadly ballistic missile launchers.

“Russia wants to receive another 30,000 troops from North Korea. Since June, preparations have been under way in Russia’s Voronezh region to receive them,” Zelenskyy said, though he did not reveal the source for this information, and it has not yet been independently confirmed.

A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks on Ukraine, an official at Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said on August 6.

The unit comprises about ninety North Korean personnel and is expected to be based in Russia’s Voronezh region, the official said. The United States is aware of the North Korean deployment, a source familiar with the issue told Reuters.

Forty North Korean missiles have already been supplied, at least two of which were launched at Ukraine last week during a deadly strike, the Ukrainian official said.

“This is a threat not only to Ukraine,” Zelenskyy said in his radio address. “Russia is helping North Korea learn how to wage war, improve its weapons and gain real combat experience in using them.” 

The Changing Nature of War in Ukraine and North Korea’s Role

There is some skepticism about these reports, as they have not been confirmed by other intelligence agencies. They also reflect Ukraine’s interest in pushing for more military support to counter missile strikes that are increasingly penetrating Ukrainian defenses, including calling on South Korea to lift restrictions on the sale of missile defense equipment directly to Ukraine.

“In my view, the Republic of Korea should have closer cooperation with Ukraine. We are open to this. We would very much like to receive support from South Korea in an area where we have a shortage. That is air defense systems,” Zelenskyy said in an interview with Ukrainian media posted to X on August 8. 

But analysts point out that these possible new deployments are consistent with the changing nature of warfare in Ukraine. When North Korea’s military assistance began more than two years ago, it first consisted of a huge flow of artillery shells and artillery guns, providing crucial help when Russian stocks were depleted by intense exchanges of artillery fire. It was followed by the deployment of 12,000–16,000 North Korean troops to help push back Ukraine’s incursion into the Russian territory of Kursk, carefully avoiding conflict within Ukrainian territory itself.

Now drones have partially replaced heavy artillery, with static lines of engagement on the ground and heavy casualties, combined with long-range deep attacks using missiles. 

“Russia and Ukraine are currently engaged in two battles,” explains Aihiro Makino, a security expert for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun. “Trench warfare on the front lines centered on the Donbas region, and long-range attacks targeting each other’s deep territories.”

North Korea has a role to play in both battles, says Makino, a long-time specialist on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean missiles are joining attacks on Ukrainian cities, and North Korea can send troops to the Donbas region, as it recognizes  Donbas as Russian territory (despite being seized from Ukraine)—although such a move would risk high casualties.

There are political risks for Kim if casualty levels reach tens of thousands. But he has already decided to embrace the several thousand deaths from the earlier deployment as a heroic mission. In April, the regime opened a lavish “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations,” which includes war trophies such as U.S. and German tanks and the graves of some 2,288 North Korean soldiers who fought in Kursk.

“Kim’s regime does not care about human lives,” says Fyodor Tertitskiy, a North Korea expert and author of Pyongyang on the Brink, now teaching at South Korea’s Ewha Womans University. “It does, however, care about its own survival, and it has calculated that Putin’s favor outweighs the risks,” he told this writer.

One added element to North Korea-Russia ties is the rapidly growing dispatch of North Korean workers, in the tens of thousands, many of them filling serious labor shortages in factories and other roles across Russia.

“Demand for North Korean labor remains high and is likely to stay high for the foreseeable future,” widely respected expert Andrei Lankov, who teaches at South Korea’s Kookmin University, told this writer. “North Korean workers are already widely employed in the civilian economy, where labor shortages are severe. They can also be used in areas close to the front line and employed in certain military industries.”

Kim’s Strategic Calculus

“The strategic calculus remains the same,” says Tertitskiy. “Putin wants to conquer Ukraine and welcomes Kim’s help, while Kim wants economic assistance and a counterbalance to China.”

Kim has so far managed to intensify his relationship with Moscow while also keeping close ties to North Korea’s traditional ally, China. High-level visits from senior Chinese officials have cemented their ongoing role in North Korea’s economy.

Measured by official trade statistics, China remains the overwhelming dominant player in North Korea’s foreign trade. China accounts for over 98 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade.

But official statistics do not calculate the huge, and in some cases larger, volume of unofficial trade, mostly to evade UN sanctions. Official data for Russia shows a tiny amount of trade—some USD 35 million in 2023, for example. But a recent report from South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy calculated that North Korea earned up to USD 14.4 billion from Russia from August 2023 to the end of 2025, mostly from payments for its arms and soldier supplies but also other illegal exports of food and fuel.

This does not count transfers of advanced military technology that have been kept secret but may already include air defense systems, satellite technology, drones, and early warning aircraft.

At the moment, Russian input into North Korea’s modest economic boom of late has been crucial. But in the longer run, argues Lankov, the two economies are not compatible. On the other hand, he says, “China needs many of the goods that North Korea is capable of exporting and therefore has a natural economic interest in buying North Korean minerals, seafood, and other products. In addition, China’s strategic interests require a stable North Korea. Beijing has a strong interest in preserving the status quo and maintaining a buffer zone along its border. For Russia, by contrast, North Korea’s strategic value is considerably lower.”

Implications of the Ukraine War

Kim’s investment in the alliance with Moscow is clearly a successful bet for now. But what happens if the war goes badly and the Russians are forced into a de facto political defeat in the form of a settlement that favors Ukraine? Or a prolonged stalemate that weakens Russia both politically and economically?

Even then, North Korea watchers all agree that the Kim regime is likely to survive that turn of events.

At this moment, the regime has not told the North Korean public that the war has reached a stalemate, says Makino. “Even if Russia is defeated, the public will be told that ‘Russia has won.’ North Korea’s rule is that ‘the Supreme Leader does not make wrong decisions.’”

Lankov shares that view. “North Korea is not tied to Putin’s Russia, and it never will be,” Lankov told this writer. “It is now in the ideal position of having two sponsors. North Korea, while living on a stable but modest Chinese pension, has won the Russian lottery. If the lottery money runs out, it will be bad, but hardly the end of the world, since the Chinese pension is here to stay.”But For the time being, the North Korea-Russia partnership remains strong and beneficial for both parties and likely to weather the changing nature of the war in Ukraine.

Gaming the Consumption Tax Cut in Japan

Dispute over Takaichi’s Proposed Consumption Tax Cut

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 6, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on July 30 that she would introduce legislation to reduce the consumption tax rate for food from eight percent to one percent. She hoped the reduction would take effect in April 2027 and continue for two years. The rate would return to eight percent in 2029. Although the national council she launched has not yet reached a consensus on this issue, Takaichi had before her two affordability options: a tax cut or a cash handout. Without meaningful discussion with others, Takaichi picked the former. Even some lawmakers in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposed Takaichi’s arbitrary decision.

A consumption tax cut was originally a plank in the platform of the opposition parties for the Lower House election in February 2026. Recognizing its appeal to the voters, Takaichi took a similar approach for the LDP but with the cut limited to food and to a two-year period, after which the eight percent rate would return. A refundable tax credit would then be introduced. That was Takaichi’s plan.

After achieving victory in last February’s Lower House election, Takaichi launched the multi-partisan National Council for Social Security to discuss and implement her plan. Why social security? That is because revenue from the consumption tax is designed to be spent on social security. The Japan Communist Party and Sanseito were excluded from the council because they had opposed the refundable tax credit. The council had an arbitrary nature from the beginning.

The council failed to reach a consensus. The leading parties, supposedly backed by Takaichi, proposed a reduction in the consumption tax rate on food from eight percent to one percent and an additional cash handout equivalent to the remaining one percent of the consumption tax. The parties sought the same economic effect as the complete elimination of the consumption tax on food. The opposition parties demanded the opposite of what Takaichi later proposed: a cash handout rather than any reduction in the tax rate.

The interim report that the council submitted to Takaichi on July 29 was nothing more than an enumeration of opinions of the parties. They all at least agreed on a cash handout based on family income starting in fiscal year 2029. The council effectively turned down a refundable tax credit because a tax credit would require complicated reform of the taxation system. The council replaced the credit with a cash handout.

It was the next day when Takaichi decided to pick the brains of the leading parties. She advocated for a de facto moratorium on the consumption tax on food for two years and the introduction of another cash handout based on family income. Takaichi tends to make unilateral decisions, leaving minority opinion behind, when she fails to achieve a consensus on an important issue. This habit was seen in the reform of the Imperial House Law in which she insisted on patrilinear succession to the throne of the Emperor.

Takaichi requested the LDP to approve her tax reduction/cash handout plan by early August. However, multiple disputes arose in a meeting of the LDP Research Commission on the Tax System on July 31. One controversy is whether Japan has the fiscal resources to support a tax cut. The moratorium on the consumption tax cut for two years will cost ten trillion yen. Takaichi has not revealed a viable resource for her policy, only referring to some vague reform in spending.

This ambiguity about the fiscal resources for a consumption tax cut has already caught the attention of the markets, which are decidedly skeptical. Although Takaichi reiterated that the tax cut would not require the government to issue more bonds, the long-term interest rate hit a new high in these past three decades. The Japanese yen kept depreciating, inviting coordinated intervention by the governmental authorities of Japan and the United States.

At the meeting of the LDP, lawmakers erupted in frustration. “Finding a resource for the tax cut must be our promise to the voters,” said former Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada, calling for a cash handout instead of a tax cut. Other lawmakers referred to the difficulty in the resumption of the tax rate two years later. An immediate return to eight percent from one percent will mean a noticeable tax increase for taxpayers. “I’ll be responsible for the resumption of the tax rate,” said Takaichi, but no one can guarantee that she will still be the prime minister in 2029.

Having seen an abrupt drop in the approval rating for her cabinet, Takaichi is bent on a consumption tax cut, convinced that the policy can restore her popularity. But the discussion on the consumption tax rate is showing signs of political struggle.

Tomomi Inada is one of the female leaders who would be expected as an alternative to Takaichi. She firmly protested the bill for easing conditions for retrial that was proposed by the Ministry of Justice. Another possible female leader, former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yuko Obuchi, stepped down as a core member of the LDP commission on the tax system. Both are frustrated with Takaichi’s arbitral process in deciding such highly important policy as consumption tax cut. 

This internal dispute on a single issue in the LDP reminds us of the sharp opposition over postal reform during Prime Minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi’s tenure in the early 2000s. Facing firm opposition from veterans in the LDP, Koizumi employed populism for his agenda backed by a high approval rate. He labeled those rivals “as protesting powers” against reform and accomplished the postal reform by ousting the protesters from the party. That was called “theater politics” in which a hero defeats bad guys. Can Takaichi be as clever as Koizumi in handling party politics?

The LDP officially approved Takaichi’s consumption tax cut plan on August 5. Takaichi’s allies in the party rallied for implementing her agenda. But some LDP lawmakers are still skeptical about cutting the consumption tax, which is a fiscal resource for welfare policies for aged people. There promises to be an intensive discussion on the tax cut bill in the fall session of the Diet.

Imperial Succession Undermined

josei tennō (女性天皇)

Takaichi Excludes Women from Becoming Emperor, Ignoring the Will of the People

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 20, 2026

Prime Minister Takaichi has been aggressively trying to expand the male line of succession to the Imperial Throne, but she is doing so in a way that undermines the constitutional basis of the Imperial Family. On June 10, the House of Representatives of the Diet passed a bill that amends the Imperial House Law (IHL) to permit the adoption of males of former imperial families. The Upper House approved the bill on July 17.  The law gives the male offspring of the adopted male (but not the male himself) a place in the order of succession to the throne of the Emperor. 

Since only some but not all the opposition parties approved the bill, the amendments cannot be said to reflect the unanimous opinion of the legislative branch.

Unanimity is a key constitutional principle for the Imperial Family in Japan. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of the Emperor is derived from the will of the people. The Japanese interpret this article to mean that the will of the people must be unanimous. When former Emperor Akihito abdicated the throne in 2019, the Diet attached a supplemental resolution on unanimity to the special law for the abdication.

That resolution required a discussion in the Diet to obtain a “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” on stable succession to the throne. The resolution contemplated a unanimous opinion that would reverse the declining number of Imperial Family members. This year, the Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both Houses of the Diet held a brief discussion and wrapped up a “unanimous opinion” and handed it to Prime Minister Takaichi on June 10. The opinion allowed female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and permitted the adoption of males of Imperial Family branches that had left the Family in 1947.

After delivery of the unanimous opinion, the Takaichi Cabinet proposed amendments to the Imperial House law to maneuver around the unanimity requirement in the 2019 supplemental resolution. The legislation includes two critical new measures relating to Imperial succession that were not part of the unanimous opinion.

One is to include the offspring of an adopted male in the line of succession to the throne. This amendment would codify Takaichi’s desire to maintain strict patrilinear succession. Not all males in the Imperial Family branches will qualify for adoption: eligible adoptees must be at least fifteen years old and cannot already be married or already have children. In the discussion of this provision in the Diet, members recognized that adoption of male members of the former Imperial Family would offset the current shrinkage in the Imperial Family. The unanimous opinion of the Diet did not include a discussion of the sons of an adopted male.

The second new element in the legislation is not to give the husband and children of female members that remain in in the family the status of Imperial Family members. These children could not in any case join the line of succession because they are in the female line. It is highly unusual for members of a family to be separated by legal status. Nevertheless, the draft recognizes only the mother as a member of the Imperial Family and excludes the father and the children. Again, this provision was not part of the unanimous opinion.

The Takaichi Cabinet submitted a draft of the revised IHL to the Diet on June 30. Takaichi asked the leading parties to make their best efforts to pass the bill in the current session of the Diet. The Committee on Rules and Administration of the Lower House discussed the bill for just three hours on July 10. The House Plenary Sittings passed the bill later that same day.

Notably, the top opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), voted yes on the bill. The party had originally opposed the idea of placing the male offspring of an adopted male in the line of succession. After hearing the explanation by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minoru Kihara, in the committee to the effect that the revised IHL would not affect or bind future succession discussions in the Diet, the CRA changed its vote to yes. Under the bill, future discussions occur only at thirty-year intervals.

In protest of the CRA’s decision, four CRA lawmakers walked out of the Plenary Sittings. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) voted no on the bill, arguing that the bill had become totally different from the unanimous opinion of the legislative branch. Even the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) coalition partner, quibbled with the provision in the bill that limited adoptions of male members to those no younger than fifteen. It can hardly be said that the bill represents the unanimous opinion of the Diet.

On July 17, the Upper House in its Plenary Sittings passed the bill by a vote of 184 to 57 – obviously not a unanimous view.  

Looking at the voting in both chambers, six parties approved – the LDP, JIP, CRA, the Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito. Five opposition parties voted in the negative – the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, the Social Democratic Party, and Okinawa Whirlwind. Team Mirai approved the bill in the Upper House but released its members in the Lower House to vote as they saw fit. Interestingly, the Conservative Party of Japan abstained.

It is still unclear why Takaichi has been so hasty in completing revisions of the IHL in the current session of the Diet. Popular sentiment is against the quick action. In the poll of Asahi Shimbun last month, 71 percent of respondents thought that legislation for adopting males in the male line did not need to be made soon. In a more recent Asahi Shimbun poll, 60 percent of respondents thought that the revised Imperial House Law had not received views of the people, while only 24 percent thought it had. 

The conservative lawmakers obviously hoped to maintain the imperial throne in the male line. It is likely that they wanted to act now while Takaichi enjoyed a high approval rating in the polls. They made it but possibly at the cost of that very approval rating. The same recent Asahi Shimbun poll revealed that the approval rating for the Takaichi Cabinet declined from 60 percent in June to 53 percent in July. The disapproval rose from 27 percent to 35 percent. This finding may reflect popular reaction to the part of Takaichi’s legislation that blocks the possibility of Princess Aiko becoming Empress.

In other results, a poll by Jiji Press found that 39.5 percent approved of placing the sons (and subsequent offspring) of an adopted male in the male line of succession, while 26.9 percent disapproved. 34.0 percent hoped to give Imperial Family status to the husband and children of a female family member who remained in the Imperial Family after marriage. A smaller number, 27.5 percent, did not.

Takaichi depends on conservative lawmakers for her political base. The vice president of the LDP, Taro Aso, is one of the greatest advocates for these revisions of the IHL. His younger sister is Princess Nobuko of Mikasa. Nobuko established a new family and separated from the Mikasa Family just two years ago, in 2025. According to the revised IHL bill, Nobuko could adopt a son whose offspring would be in the line of succession to the throne.

Looking back to Michinaga Fujiwara, who exercised great power in the Imperial Family in the eleventh century, former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is worried that the Aso family might be Fujiwara in Reiwa era. Michinaga left a tanka, a famous verse: “I realize this whole world is mine, only I ignore the eclipse of the moon.” Takaichi needs to keep Aso as her guardian in the LDP.

Noda also asked the government to take seriously the fact that the IHL excluded adoption to avoid disruption of the imperial lineage. Eleven former imperial families that lost royal status in 1947 are 36 to 38 degrees away from reigning Emperor Naruhito. Naruhito and they must reach back some six hundred years to find their common ancestor. 

Takaichi will now be remembered as a prime minister who prized patrilinear succession over the legitimacy of the throne. 

Trading Places

Joshua Walker

Congratulations to Joshua Walker who leaves the presidency of the New York Japan Society at the end of July 2026 to become head of the US Chamber of Commerce's international affairs department. He has also been appointed the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress' David M. Abshire Chair. The Center works closely with many Japanese organizations researching trade and security issues. Expect Joshua to acquire many more honors and board appointments while at the Chamber.

He is joining Jay Sapsford, the Chamber's Senior Vice President for Global Intelligence. Jay worked as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal and as the chief of staff to the Morgan Stanley's Japan's country head. He was the Journal's Washington Deputy Bureau Chief prior to joining the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Like Joshua, Jay grew up in Japan as the son of Christian missionaries. Both men are fluent in Japanese. 

The Chamber has a history of hiring Japan hands for its senior leadership positions. The best known example was Stanton Anderson who was a close friend of the Chamber's longtime president Thomas J. Donohue (d. 2024). The New York Times identified Anderson as "Japan's most influential lobbyist in Washington." As an adviser to Donohue, Anderson helped shape the Chamber’s pro-free trade policies and strong stand on tort reform. Both remain important interests of Japanese companies in the U.S. He served as the Chamber’s executive vice president and chief legal officer from 2003 to 2010 as well as chairman of the Chamber’s Campaign for Free Enterprise. Never during his tenure as a Chamber official did he resign or recuse himself from his consulting firm, his law firm, or his Japanese clients. He remained of counsel to the DC law firm McDermott Will & Emery and on the board of consulting firm Global U.S.A. Mr. Anderson, 84, passed away on Sunday, January 12, 2025, at his home in Santa Barbara, California.

Asia Policy Events, Week of August 9, 2026

Asia Policy Point is on summer recess, like the U.S. Congress. We will, however, post some events weekly for our readers and members. If you want to receive these directly to your mailbox, you have to become a "member" of APP. An individual, nonshareable membership is only $105/year and includes our occasional papers of on Japanese politics and access to our office while visiting Washington. SIGN UP HERE.

WEEK OF AUGUST 9, 2026

8/9 - 1945. Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki.
8/11 - Mountain Day, National Holiday, Japan

8/12 - Demise of Prophet Muhammad and Martyrdom of Imam Hassan, National Holiday, Iran

8/14 - International Memorial Day for Comfort Women. On August 14, 1991, when South Korean Kim Hak-sun became the first to give a public testimony about her experience as a comfort woman victim.
8/14 - Taiwan's annual 10-day Han Kuang military exercise ends.

8/15 - 1945. Imperial Japan accepts the Potsdam Declaration and ceases combat operations. Shūsen-kinenbi (Memorial Day for the End of the War in Japan). National Memorial Service for the War Dead at the Nippon Budokan hall in Tokyo with the Emperor and prime minister. Rightwing parliamentarians visit the Yasukuni Shrine. Possible visit to the war memorializing Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Takaichi. She visited last year, but was not PM.

8/15 - Independence Day, National Holiday, South/North Korea. Day off 8/17.

8/15 – Annual Far Eastern Prisoners of War (FEPOW) Day in Taiwan hosted by Taiwan POW Camps Memorial Society.

BEYOND THE STRAIT: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY. 8/11, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Carole Nakhle, CEO, Crystol Energy, Secretary General, Arab Energy Club; Robin Mills, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSI, CEO, Qamar Energy; Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; Moderator: Kate Dourian, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSI, Contributing Editor, MEES, Fellow, Energy Institute.

AN UPHILL CLIMB: PUSHING FOR AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN AFGHANISTAN. 8/12, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Ambassador Nasir A. Andisha, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, Afghanistan to the UN in Geneva; Palwasha Hassan, Executive Director, Mina's List; Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne, Former Deputy U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico and Argentina; Richard Bennett, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan; Annie Pforzheimer, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program, CNAS.

ISRAEL AND THE U.S. IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE: IS THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP FAILING? 8/13, 10:00-10:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program; Yael Lempert, Vice President for Outreach, Middle East Institute; Daniel C. Kurtzer, Lecturer and S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies, Princeton University; Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development, University of Maryland, College Park. 

SIX MONTHS AFTER EPIC FURY: THE STATE OF THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF. 8/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Behnam Ben Taleblu, Iran Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East; Ludovic Hood, Senior Fellow, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East; Zineb Riboua, Research Fellow, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. 

AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. 8/13, 1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Law Library, Library of Congress. Speakers: Law Library Staff. 

VISUAL ART REPRESENTATIONS OF WORLD WAR II IN THE PHILIPPINES: DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES OF A SHARED TRAGEDY. 8/15, 4:00-6:00pm (PHT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Ayala Museum, Manila, Philippines. Speaker: Jose T. Ricardo PhD, country's foremost scholar on the Second World War in the Philippines and the Asia-Pacific, specializes in military and diplomatic history, focus on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. 

The Osaka Capital

JIP Drags Down the Diet

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 26, 2026
 
The Diet finished its special session on July 25, approving the Backup Capital Act by a small margin in the Upper House at the last moment. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was not eager to enact it. It was the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP: Nippon Ishin-no Kai), that was the main supporter. The opposition parties suspected that JIP was pushing it solely for its own narrow interest. JIP’s persistence on the bill led to a confusing few days at the end of the session.
 
The Backup Capital Act is aimed at building an alternative “capital” of Japan to Tokyo, in case Tokyo suffers a major natural disaster. The law should also help decentralize businesses in Japan. A city interested in serving as a backup capital must meet several conditions, including a minimum population size, business concentration, or an agreement on coordination between the prefectural government and the city government. While some cities, such as Sapporo, Nagoya or Fukuoka, might qualify, Osaka is recognized as the leading candidate.
 
In connection with the Backup Capital Act, JIP has put another issue at the top of its reform agenda for the announced purpose of minimizing government expenditures.  This is the Osaka Capital Initiative, which would integrate the Osaka prefectural government with the Osaka city government. The integration would resemble the governmental system of the Tokyo metropolitan area. Appealing to the competitive sentiment of the people of Osaka against Tokyo, JIP sold the policy as making Osaka another capital of Japan.
 
Controlling the seats of the Osaka prefectural governor and the Osaka city mayor, JIP held two referendums on the Osaka Capital Initiative in 2015 and 2020, but the initiative was rejected by a small margin in both referenda. Although residents of the small cities in the Osaka prefecture supported the idea, those in Osaka city did not, because it seemed to have fewer benefits for them.
 
JIP has been looking for a third chance at the initiative. Their tactic is to connect the Osaka Capital Initiative with the Backup Capital Act, though the party leaders publicly explain that those two concepts are different. But the party has also explained that the Osaka Capital Initiative is a precondition for Osaka to be a backup capital and has declared a third referendum in the spring 2027. JIP’s leader and the governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, announced that he would resign as governor next spring and run again for election as his own successor. He plans to hold the election and the third referendum on the same day on the expectation that the initiative can ride his coattails.
 
Hence JIP’s enthusiasm for enacting Backup Capital Act in the special session of the Diet that closed on July 25. To have the “double voting” in Osaka next spring, the Diet had to pass the Act in this session. In a meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on July 7, Yoshimura reconfirmed that the LDP and JIP would enact the Backup Capital Act in this session and that JIP would leave behind its effort to reduce seats in the Diet.
 
No party other than JIP had any interest in a backup capital. When the chairman of a committee in the Lower House, who was from JIP, unilaterally began discussion of the Backup Capital Bill in late June, the opposition parties boycotted all the discussions. The Diet spent a week normalizing its discussions. Even the LDP was reluctant to pass the backup capital bill within the current session.
 
Takaichi came to the rescue of the bill in the final phase of the Diet session with her personal support. Takaichi was indebted to JIP for its support of the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act, which had been on her long-time political agenda. That statute was enacted on July 17. In return, Takaichi extended the term of the Diet session for 8 days and worked to pass the backup capital bill.
 
The opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the unilateral procedure used by the LDP and JIP to pass the bill in the Upper House -- where the two parties do not have a majority. Although the opposition parties demanded further discussion of the bill, the chairman of the committee, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, decided to finish discussion quickly and to take a vote on the bill. However, the chairman accepted a supplemental resolution to the bill that ruled out JIP’s planned double voting on the referendum and governor’s race. With this supplement, the bill was approved by a slight margin, supported by the LDP, JIP, Team Mirai and some independent lawmakers.
 
Yoshimura was not satisfied with the result. Holding votes for the third referendum on the Osaka Capital Initiative and for the Osaka gubernatorial election on the same day next spring is crucial for JIP to gain broad support from the voters. Immediately after the Diet passed Backup Capital Act, Yoshimura reiterated that he still planned to have the double vote next spring. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, accused Yoshimura of a lack of respect for the decisions of the Diet. What happens next spring in Osaka remains to be seen.
 
As seen in his unusually strong push for seat reduction in the House of Representatives, Yoshimura is too focused on his own agenda in Osaka to properly honor the Diet, which, after all, represents the whole interest of the people of Japan. The Osaka Capital Initiative is a typical populist issue to firm up the political base of the party, which is highly concentrated in Osaka. Thus, the Diet spent the last days of the extended session on enhancing JIP’s political fortunes – and those of Takaichi who relies on JIP’s support.