Sunday, June 16, 2024

Monday Asia Events June 17, 2024

COMPLEXITIES, DISCONTINUITIES, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF US INTERNATIONAL TAX RULES: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE. 6/17-18/2024, HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speakers Include: Kimberly S. Blanchard, Law Office of Kimberly S. Blanchard, P.C.; Kara L. Mungovan, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell; David G. Noren, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery; Paul W. Oosterhuis, Of Counsel, Skadden; John Bates, Principal, Deloitte; George Callas, Executive Vice President of Public Finance, Arnold Ventures; Chip Harter, Senior Policy Adviser (Ret.), Washington National Tax Services, PricewaterhouseCoopers; Michael J. Caballero, Partner, Covington & Burling; Ronald Dabrowski, Principal, KPMG; Layla J. Asali, Member, Miller & Chevalier; Paul W. Oosterhuis, Of Counsel, Skadden; Philip Wagman, Partner, Clifford Chance; Michael J. Caballero, Partner, Covington & Burling; Ronald Dabrowski, Principal, KPMG.

HOW DOES THE ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR END? A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DAVID SATTERFIELD. 6/17, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Ambassador David M. Satterfield, director, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy; Aaron David Miller, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: A CONVERSATION WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL JENS STOLTENBERG. 6/17, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Ambassador Mark A. Green, President, CEO, Wilson Center; Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General, NATO; Philip Reeker, Chair, Global Europe Program, Albright Stonebridge Group, Department of State.

IRAQ AND THE UNITED STATES: RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO OR CALM BEFORE THE STORM? 6/17, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy. Speakers: Sajad Jiyad, Fellow, Century International, Director, Shia Politics Working Group; Simona Foltyn, Independent Journalist, Documentary Filmmaker based in the Middle East; Mohammed Shummary, Professor, Al-Nahrain University, College of Political Science, Baghdad, Chairman, Sumeria Foundation for International Affairs; Steven Simon, Professor of Practice, Middle East Studies, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies of the University of Washington, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy Institute; Adam Weinstein, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute.

UKRAINE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. 6/17, 3:00pm (CEST), 9:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: International Crisis Group (ICG). Speakers: Alissa de Carbonnel, Deputy Director, Europe and Central Asia Program, ICG; Richard Gowan, UN Director, ICG; Simon Schlegel, Senior Analyst, Ukraine, ICG; Oleg Ignatov, Senior Analyst, Russia, ICG. 

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IS UNDER THREAT. HOW DO WE PROTECT IT? 6/17, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: William A. Galston, Ezra K. Zilkha Chair, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Vanessa Williamson, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Steven R. Levitsky, Professor of Government, Harvard University; Co-author, "How Democracies Die".

PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE: A LONG-RUN VIEW OF GLOBALIZATION. 6/17, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Speaker: Christopher M. Meissner, Professor of Economics, University of California, Davis, Author of One from the Many: The Global Economy Since 1850.

IRAN RAMPS UP ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 6/17, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Jonathan Ruhe, Director of Foreign Policy, JINSA; Gabriel Noronha, Fellow, JINSA, Former Special Advisor, Iran Action Group, U.S. Department of State.

REPORT RELEASE: DETERRING CHINA THROUGH NONMILITARY COSTS TO PRESERVE PEACE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT. 6/17, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: John Lee, Senior Fellow, Hudson; Thomas J. Duesterberg, Senior Fellow, Hudson. REPORT.  

A COMPARISON ON GENDER REPRESENTATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND ECONOMICS IN JAPAN AND THE UK. 6/17, 6:45pm (BST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Society UK. Speaker: Liliana Harding, Associate Professor, Economics, University of East Anglia.

Friday, June 14, 2024

The Option for a Snap Election in Japan has Disappeared

Nothing to see here

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun, You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 10, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

 
Some newspapers have reported that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has abandoned the idea of dissolving the House of Representatives (Lower House) and holding a snap election. This was seen as an option for Kishida to preserve his administration notwithstanding its low popularity. But considering public skepticism about Kishida’s handling of the slush fund scandal in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the party’s recent electoral defeats, this option is no longer viable.

The Asahi Shimbun reported on June 4 that Kishida was about to make a final decision not to call a snap election based on multiple sources in the Kishida administration. Yomiuri Shimbun followed Asahi the next day with a report that Kishida had told some of his allies of his decision.

Kishida had hoped to call for a general election at the end of the Diet session (June 23), by which time an official visit to the United States in April and a tax cut in June would have raised his approval ratings enough to secure his reelection When these events did not improve his popularity, Kishida was forced to give up that option.

“I am now involved in some political issues which cannot be postponed. I am thinking about nothing but to bring outcomes on those issues,” Kishida told reporters on the day Asahi published its story at the top of the front page. Kishida will focus now on achieving a positive economic cycle with wage and price hikes and on repairing public confidence in politics.

It is possible that both Asahi or Yomiuri interviewed Kishida. Both reports were based on unnamed sources inside the Kishida administration or the LDP. Politicians often seek anonymity in the media when they face an important decision, like calling a snap election. They leak information to reporters to control the situation.

The LDP’s loss of seats in all three by-elections, including the by-election in Tokyo in which the LDP could not even field a candidate, undermined Kishida’s credibility as a leader for an election. It was obvious to most lawmakers in both the LDP and Komeito that they would face disastrous consequences if Kishida called a snap election in the current political environment.

With no hope of fielding a winnable candidate in the Tokyo gubernatorial election next month, the LDP is seeking an opportunity to support incumbent, Yuriko Koike, who left the LDP seven years ago.

Kishida’s power to dissolve the Lower House is widely believed to stem from Article 7 of the Constitution. This Article provides that the Emperor may dissolve the House of Representatives “with the advice and approval of the Cabinet.” Lawmakers have long interpreted “advice and approval” to authorize a prime minister to call a snap election whenever he or she likes.

Article 69 presents another way to dissolve the Lower House. It states that, if the House passes a no-confidence resolution or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet will resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten days. If the Cabinet relies on Article 7 to dissolve the Lower House, the Cabinet can survive resolution a vote of no-confidence at least until the new Lower House is convened after a general election.

The prime minister’s exclusive authority to call a snap election is a matter of constitutional interpretation. But Kishida cannot do so unilaterally. Were he to try, the LDP leaders could immediately begin the process of replacing him as the president and passing a non-confidence resolution in the House of Representatives. Calling a snap election effectively requires the consent of the LDP leaders.

They are currently opposed to a snap election because it would benefit only Kishida and not the LDP. Kishida has alienated his closest ally, former prime minister Taro Aso, by negotiating a compromise with Komeito and the Ishin on revisions to the Political Funds Control Act. Through this compromise, as well as the decisions to dissolve his own faction in January and to attend the Political Ethics Council in the Diet in February, Kishida has eroded his political basis.

The LDP Secretary General, Toshimitsu Motegi, has not concealed his ambition to succeed Kishida. He has been traveling around Japan to publicize his work on political reform. Former prime minister Yoshihide Suga, who unwillingly handed his seat over to Kishida in 2021, has held nighttime meetings with LDP leaders, inviting speculation that he may be seeking a kingmaker role.

The only way for Kishida to survive this crisis is to improve his approval rating. However, there has been no significant boost to his popularity, even after the Diet passed a bill to increase the birth rate, a principal policy objective for Kishida. The system of tax cuts starting June is too complicated for the taxpayers to realize any benefit soon. And Kishida’s trilateral summit meeting with the leaders of China and Republic of Korea did not garner much public attention.

From the beginning of his administration, Kishida has been promoting his policies as a “new form of capitalism.” His goals included wage increases and the Digital Garden City Nations initiative. The slush fund scandal, however, has interrupted any progress toward these objectives.

Monday, June 10, 2024

Monday Asia Events June 10, 2024

ALL RECONSTRUCTION IS LOCAL: A FORUM ON THE EVE OF THE UKRAINE RECOVERY CONFERENCE. 6/10, 1:30-6:30pm (CET), HYBRID. Sponsor: German Marshall Fund  of the United States. Speakers: Alina Inayeh, Non-Resident Fellow, Bucharest office; Andrew Friendly, Vice President of Government Affairs and Public Policy, Autodesk; Andriy Moskalenko, First Deputy Mayor, Deputy Mayor for Economic Development, City of Lviv; Bogdan Zawadewicz, Head of Geopolitical Risk Analysis, Polish Development Bank; Bruce Stokes, Visiting Senior Fellow, Washington, D.C. office; Filiep Decorte, Chief, Programme Development Branch, UN-Habitat; Garry Poluschkin, Consultant, Country Coordinator for Ukraine, German Economic Team; Heather A. Conley, President, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C. office; Henrik Winther, Director, EU Neighborhood Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark; Jacob Kirkegaard, Senior Fellow, Bucharest office; Josh Rudolph, Senior Fellow, Head of the Transatlantic Democracy Working Group Washington, D.C. office; Larysa Marchenko, Partner, Strategy, Transactions, Ukraine Reconstruction International Lead, EY; Maksym Svysenko, Advisor, Chairman, Dnipro Regional State Administration; Marcus Lippold, Team Leader, Green Deal Ukraine Service; Mark D. Simakovsky, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, USAID; Martina Boguslavets, Head, Founder, MEZHA Anti-Corruption Center; Mark Speich, State Secretary for Federal, European, International Affairs, State of North Rhine-Westphalia; Meg Platt, Senior Development Manager, Washington, D.C. office; Nathanael Liminski, Minister for Federal, European, International Affairs, Media, State of North Rhine-Westphalia; Nataliia Katser-Buchkovska, Energy security, transition expert, Former Member of Parliament of Ukraine; Natalie Jaresko, Managing Director, Turnaround, Restructuring Strategy Practice, EY-Parthenon; Oleksiy Povolotskiy, Head Office, Energy Infrastructure Recovery, Supervisory Board Member, DTEK; Oleksandr Syenkevych, Mayor, City of Mykolaiv, Ukraine; Paul Costello, Senior Program Manager, GMF Cities, Berlin office; Penny Pritzker, Special Representative for Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction; Sergiy Orlov, Deputy Mayor of Mariupol, Ukraine; Taras Byk, Board Member, Agency for Recovery and Development; Valeriia Ivanova, Deputy Head, State Agency for Reconstruction and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine; Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Guido Goldman Distinguished Scholar, Berlin office; Viktor Pavlushchyk, Head, National Agency, Corruption Prevention of Ukraine. 

AVOIDING WORLD WAR III: MANAGING THREATS FROM RUSSIA, CHINA, AND AI. 6/10, 10:00-11:00am (CDT), 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Ian Bremmer, President, Eurasia Group & GZERO Media; Kevin Rudd, Australian Ambassador to the US; Zeenat Rahman, Executive Director, Institute of Politics.

U.S.-ROK BILATERAL DIALOGUE FOR STRENGTHENING U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE. 6/10, 1:00-2:40pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Speakers: Victor Cha, Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair; Park Cheol Hee, Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Lee Moon-hee, Senior Executive Director, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Yoo Ji Yeong, Senior Specialist, Center for Economic Security and Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Emily Benson, Director, Project on Trade and Technology and Senior Fellow, Scholl Chair in International Business; Ellen Kim, Deputy Director, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair.

UNDER PRESSURE: CHINA'S COERCIVE CAMPAIGN IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT. 6/10, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Project 2049 Institute. Speakers: Ben Lewis, PLA Tracker; Dan Blumenthal, American Enterprise Institute; Allison Schwartz, House Foreign Affairs Committee; Project 2049 Institute Chairman Randall G. Schriver; Project 2049 Senior Director Michael Mazza .

DEFINING TAIWAN AND BEING TAIWANESE: THE EVOLVING NATURE OF TAIWANESE IDENTITY & ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY. 6/10, 4:00-6:00pm (PST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley. Speakers: Evan Dawley, Associate Professor of History, Goucher College; Christine Lin, Director of Training & Technical Assistance, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS), University of California College of the Law, San Francisco; Chiaoning Su, Associate Professor, Oakland University; Director, Barry M. Klein Center for Culture and Globalization, Oakland University; James Lee, Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), Affiliated Researcher, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Cooperation on Japan’s Political Reform Bill

Fraught Relationships

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 3, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, reached a deal on a political reform bill with the leaders of Komeito and Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party) on May 31. Komeito and Ishin plan to vote this week for the LDP’s revised Political Funds Control Act (PFCA) in the House of Representatives. The bill is expected to pass the Diet by the end of the current session.
 
Kishida has been saying that he would make every effort to pass a bill in this Diet session. The agreement between the two parties is a step forward for Kishida in stabilizing his administration, which has been damaged by the slush fund scandal.
 
However, it is unlikely that the success in reaching a deal with Ishin will move the needle much on Kishida’s low approval ratings. An option for Kishida is to call a snap election at the end of current session of the Diet. This is not a realistic option as Kishida would need the basic support of the LDP, which he does not have.
 
A few weeks ago, the LDP and Komeito reached a rough consensus on a bill that would revise the PFCA. The agreement did not, however, resolve two issues. One was the yen threshold for the mandatory disclosure of the name and other details of a purchaser of tickets to a fundraising party. The current threshold is ¥200,000. The LDP would lower it to ¥100,000, but Komeito has insisted on a ¥50,000 threshold.
 
The second issue was regulation of the policy activities fund – money that a party gives to a lawmaker presumably for campaigning or other political activity, but neither the party nor the lawmaker is required to disclose any details about the use of the funds.   Komeito has urged that all the details of these funds be reported. The LDP has proposed only that the purpose of expenditures be disclosed. 
 
Since then and at the eleventh hour, Kishida has compromised. In a meeting with the Chief Representative of Komeito, Natsuo Yamaguchi, almost on the deadline day for legislation to be passed in the current session of the Diet, Kishida agreed to set the yen threshold for party ticket disclosures at ¥50,000. Kishida apparently acted on his own initiative without consulting LDP members who likely would have resisted.
 
Immediately after his meeting with Yamaguchi, Kishida unexpectedly met with the leader of Ishin, Nobuyuki Baba. Critical of the LDP’s response to the slush fund scandal, Ishin had submitted its own bill to amend the PFCA. The Ishin bill would require the disclosure of the receipts of the policy activity fund ten years after payments had been made. Kishida agreed to add this provision to the LDP bill.
 
“I offered an ambitious deal, because public confidence in politics would not be restored unless the bill passes the current Diet,” Kishida told reporters. The leaders of Komeito and Ishin were satisfied with each of their agreements with Kishida. “It was a great decision (of Kishida)” said Yamaguchi. Baba boasted that his party’s offer had been accepted by the LDP 100 percent.
 
Considering LDP’s lack of a majority in the Upper House, some cooperation with other parties is essential to move the LDP bill forward. With help from Komeito and Ishin, Kishida will be able to implement his promise to pass the bill in this session. For the LDP, the deal would allow fundraising parties and policy activity funds to continue albeit subject to some restrictions. 
 
Komeito has been reluctant to help the unpopular Kishida administration, but only through a coalition with LDP can the party exercise any influence in the government.
 
It was also unusual for Ishin to help Kishida. Ishin has distanced itself from the LDP to avoid becoming enmeshed in the inappropriate control of political funds. But the alternative to working with the LDP would be for Ishin to align itself with the opposition parties – the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the Japan Communist Party – a result that would be anathema to a conservative party such as Ishin. Defeats in the by-elections in Nagasaki and Tokyo in April also prompted Ishin to reconsider its stance as an opposition party.
 
The revised LDP bill does not include proposals from other opposition parties. The CDP has been arguing that the law should prohibit not only fundraising parties and the policy activity fund, but also donations from corporations and organizations. The head of CDP, Kenta Izumi, has said that the LDP bill falls short of fundamental political reform. The CDP is likely to criticize the cooperation among the LDP, Komeito and Ishin as “badgers in the same hole.”
 
The approach to the LDP bill will restructure political relationships in the Diet. Ishin is likely to move ever closer to the LDP. This will make Komeito uneasy. In any case, it remains unlikely that the cooperation among the three parties will rise to the level of electoral cooperation. Political coalitions often lead to integrated candidates in each electoral district. None of the three parties seem ready to do that.
 
While establishing a new cooperative framework in the Diet, Kishida generated more frustration in the LDP. On the day before his meetings with Komeito and Ishin, Kishida met with LDP Vice-president, Taro Aso, and Secretary General, Toshimitsu Motegi.  According to news reports, the party elders told Kishida not to compromise on the regulation of fundraising parties.
 
In the view of LDP members, Kishida decided to deal with Komeito and Ishin to preserve his administration at the expense of the financial needs of the LDP’s lawmakers. It is yet another unilateral decision by Kishida, which parallels with the dissolution of his faction in January and his attendance at the political ethics council in February. Kishida is becoming so isolated in his own party that calling a snap election is increasingly difficult.

Monday, May 27, 2024

The Fruit of the April By-elections

 Not Good News for Kishida


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 19, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

 
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is now reaping the bitter fruit of the LDP’s defeats in the three recent by-elections. The Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) coalition partner, Komeito, has refused to co-sponsor amendments to the Political Funds Control Act (PFCA). Kishida had announced that the amendments would be approved by the end of current Diet session. Some LDP leaders are skeptical of Kishida’s handling of the matter.

Although LDP and Komeito reached a rough agreement several weeks ago over revisions to the PFCA, they did not agree on two points: lowering the threshold for disclosing the identities of purchasers of fundraising party tickets and disclosing details about “policy activity funds.”

The LDP has proposed that the threshold for the disclosure of identities be 100,000 yen, but Komeito has insisted on 50,000 yen. The LDP also has proposed only modest changes to rules governing policy activity funds: parties would have to report only the sum of expenditures for each program, such as party events, elections, public relations, and research. This disclosure would be triggered only when a party transfers more than 500,000 yen to a lawmaker. Komeito would not agree to such minor reforms. 

Is the difference between 100,000 yen and 50,000 yen so large? Not really – but the difference can be crucial for the LDP and some lawmakers who have not found their footing in the coming election. The LDP would prefer to support vulnerable lawmakers than to support Kishida.

Komeito sees only a downside to supporting the LDP proposals. In the by-election in Shimane 1 district, Komeito supported an LDP candidate who lost by a wide margin to the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) candidate. The lesson that Komeito took was that a coalition with the LDP would work against them in future elections. Komeito might also have realized that any compromise on revisions to the PFCA would send a wrong message to the voters.

Kishida has been promising to restore public confidence in politics by restructuring the system of political fundraising and expenditures, including the addition to the PFCA of stricter rules on political funds. But when he approved the LDP’s draft of reforms, he did not take Komeito’s frustration into account. “It became an effective draft not to repeat the same scandal, and I will make it for restoring confidence for politics,” said Kishida as the LDP unilaterally submitted the draft to the Diet.

Komeito did not submit its own draft to avoid jeopardizing its relationship with the LDP. It is still possible that the LDP and Komeito will reach a deal as negotiations in the Diet continue. The CDP submitted its own draft co-sponsored with the Democratic Party for the People. The CDP draft includes complete abolition of the policy activity fund.

The polls in May showed the fundamental unpopularity of the Kishida administration. The approval rating for the Kishida Cabinet was 24%, two points down from April in the poll of Asahi Shimbun. The Yomiuri poll showed a 26% approval rating, up one point from April. In the poll of Mainichi Shimbunthe CDP overtook the LDP with 20% favoring the CDP and 17% the LDP. Kishida’s weak leadership in the negotiations over PFCA has solidified the unpopularity of his administration.

Kishida now is isolated not only from the LDP’s coalition partner but also from members of his own party. Former Minister for Digital Affairs, Takuya Hirai, has questioned Kishida’s leadership. “The LDP dug its own grave making the issue complicated by dissolving factions or imposing penalties on the lawmakers,” said Hirai. Kishida made the decisions on factions and penalties.

One of the lawmakers in the Abe faction who was penalized for his involvement in the slush fund scandal, Hakubun Shimomura, demanded that Kishida conduct another interview of a former prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, in order to reassess Mori’s role. Kishida had told the Diet that he had confirmed that Mori had no involvement. However, in a magazine article, Mori said that Kishida had not asked him about it.  Shimomura asked for a further investigation of Mori, citing Kishida’s responsibility as the president of LDP.

Kishida seems to be losing grip in the LDP. Kishida punished LDP lawmakers who were involved in the slush fund scandal. The former Chair of the LDP Policy Research Council, Koichi Hagiuda, was suspended from any leadership position for a year. However, Hagiuda was allowed to retain his position as president of the LDP Tokyo branch where he is expected to manage the campaign leading to the gubernatorial election in July. Although the LDP generally distinguishes local leaders from national leaders, Hagiuda’s position in Tokyo, notwithstanding his suspension at the national level, reflects something of a double standard.

Gaffes by LDP leaders have compounded the trouble facing the Kishida administration. The chairperson of the LDP Political Reform Council, Keisuke Suzuki, said that political reform was partly a political maneuver to weaken the LDP. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoko Kamikawa, was forced to retract her remarks in the Shizuoka gubernatorial campaign. Meeting with women voters, Kamikawa asked rhetorically, “What is a woman who would not give birth to” the candidate. Media reports suggested that Kamikawa regarded woman as the sex that gives birth but not one that has a choice in the matter.

Many are wondering who would replace Kishida. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Katsunobu Kato, indicated the possibility of his running for LDP president, if he were asked to do so. Shigeru Ishiba, who has received the highest polling numbers as a potential replacement, was reportedly asked to run, in a meeting with former Premier Junichiro Koizumi and his colleagues. Kishida’s own prospects for re-election this fall continue to dim.

Sunday, May 19, 2024

Incomplete Deal over Political Reform in Japan

Promises to keep

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 12, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point


Facing public criticism over the slush fund scandal, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, Komeito, on May 9 reached a rough agreement on reforming regulations governing political funds.

Although they agreed on new rules for greater transparency, both parties failed to agree on specific measures that are essential for the restoration of public confidence in politics. The limited reforms are unlikely to encourage voters to hold a better view of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s leadership skills or to increase their support of him. Thus, it seems likely that the LDP and Komeito will continue their discussions to bridge the gaps.

The two parties basically agreed to hold each lawmaker more accountable for the management of political funds. A new rule would require a lawmaker to submit a “certification” of his political funds report. If an accounting manager failed to account for funds properly and was found guilty in a court, and meanwhile the certification was found incorrect, the lawmaker could lose his Diet membership.

LDP and Komeito also agreed to lower the threshold for disclosing the identities of purchasers of fundraising party tickets and the value of the tickets—but they did not agree on a new threshold. Currently, a political organization must report the name of any contributor who purchases tickets worth 200,000 yen or more.

A new, lower yen threshold for tickets is also in limbo. Komeito has argued for a 50,000 yen minimum, the same amount that triggers disclosure of donations to a political organization. The LDP has insisted on a threshold of 100,000 yen out of a concern that disclosure of the identities of purchasers will affect their businesses and in turn discourage ticket purchases.

“Policy activity fund” is another point left unresolved. Each party receives an appropriation from the government that the party places in its policy activity fund.    Each party then allocates funds to individual lawmakers. Lawmakers are supposed to spend the funds on election campaigns, but, by virtue of an exception in the Political Funds Control Act, a party is not required to report how the transferred funds are spent.  Both parties agreed that the expenditures should be made public.

The manner of disclosure, however, remains in dispute. Komeito has proposed that each party submit a list of specific expenditures and their purpose. The LDP will agree only to the disclosure of categories of expenditures and not specific amounts or their purpose. The LDP argues that its approach protects “freedom of political activity.”  But the fund is a government appropriation – that is, it is funded by taxpayers. A party can hardly be responsible to the taxpayers unless it makes details of the fund public.

There have been reports that some LDP leaders have transferred funds to an “unregistered political organization,” which is mostly free from disclosure regulations.  In response, the LDP-Komeito agreement includes a new rule for the disclosure of transfers annually of ¥10 million or more to these unregistered organizations.

The agreement does not address political donations by companies and organizations. Although Komeito is willing to discuss this issue, the LDP firmly opposes any reforms that would change current arrangements. The opposition parties, including the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no-kai), call for a complete prohibition on these donations.

The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) demands a ban on any fundraising parties and the termination of the policy activity fund. To these ends, the CDP, together with the Democratic Party for the People, is preparing a bill to amend the Political Funds Control Act. As debate in both Houses continues, the unwillingness of the LDP-Komeito coalition to engage in political reform is becoming obvious.

The failure of the LDP and Komeito to reach agreement on a full range of political reforms can only be attributed to Kishida’s lack of leadership.

Kishida needed an agreement with Komeito on thorough political reform, especially after the bitter defeat in three by-elections in April. After returning from trips to France and South America, Kishida urged LDP leaders to accelerate the discussion with Komeito. However, the negotiations resulted in consensus only on modest reforms. Afraid that negative public reaction will imperil their chances in the coming election, some LDP lawmakers criticized the agreement for failing to demonstrate a commitment to political reform.

For his part, Kishida expressed satisfaction. “The parties wrapped up the measures for not repeating the same scandal,” Kishida told reporters. This response made him look like he is driving a car on automatic cruise control.

Moreover, his credibility is in doubt. A monthly magazine, Bungei Shunju, included an interview with a former head of the Abe faction, Yoshiro Mori. In Diet debates earlier this year, Kishida said he had asked Mori about the kickback system in the Abe faction. In his interview, Mori said that Kishida had never asked him that question. Kishida insisted that he could not confirm Mori’s involvement in the scandal.

Kishida’s inability to explain the entire scandal is at the core of the public’s frustration. In the first trial of the lawmakers and accounting managers of the LDP for failure to report surplus payments, Jun-ichiro Matsumoto, the former accounting manager of the Abe faction, did not say how or why the LDP’s leaders continued to discuss the kickback system. It is thus not the court, but political leaders who are responsible for investigating how the secret fund was controlled.

Monday Asia Events May 20, 2024

CAPTURING THE POWER OF PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH TECH INVESTMENT. 5/20
, 10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: McKinsey Global Institute. Speakers: Olivia White, Senior Partner, Director, McKinsey Global Institute; Rodney Zemmel, Senior Partner, Global Leader, McKinsey Digital.

SOUTHERN ASIA’S SECURITY LANDSCAPE: VIEWS FROM RISING ANALYSTS. 5/23, 10:30-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Anuttama Banerji, Researcher at the National Maritime Foundation; Haleema Saadia, Lecturer at the National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Research Fellow at the ROADS Initiative; Dr. Muhammad Shareh Qazi, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab Lahore; Ladhu R. Choudhary, Assistant Professor (Senior Scale) of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan.

INDIA’S PATH TO PROSPERITY: BOOK TALK WITH RAGHURAM RAJAN ON ‘BREAKING THE MOLD’. 5/20, 10:30am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings Institute. Speakers: Coauthor Raghuram Rajan, Katherine Dusak Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance, University of Chicago; Eswar Prasad, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development.

STRATEGIC SYNERGIES: INDIA-US TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION. 5/20, 11:00am-12:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Rudra Chaudhuri, Director, Carnegie India; Konark Bhandari, Fellow, Carnegie India; Daniel Markey, Senior Advisor, South Asia Programs, United States Institute of Peace; Vikram Singh, United States India Strategic Partnership Forum; Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow, Center for New American Security.

SOUTH KOREA’S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY - A DIPLOMATIC LAME DUCK? 5/20, 6:00pm (JST), 5:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Dr. Jeffrey Robertson, Associate Professor of Diplomatic Studies, Yonsei University, Non-Resident Fellow, Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI).

US POLICY ON IRAN: EXAMINING THE OPPORTUNITIES TO BUILD A NEW BIPARTISAN STRATEGY. 5/20, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow for US Foreign Policy, Middle East Institute; Goli Ameri, Vice Chair, Freedom House Board of Trustees; Alex Vatanka, Director of Iran Program, Middle East Institute.

UNRWA’S ROLE IN GAZA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. 5/20, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: William R. Deere, Director, Washington Office of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees; Merissa Khurma, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center; Andrew Hyde, Director, Senior Fellow Multilateral Financial Diplomacy, Powering Peace, Stimson Center.

POWERING UP: LOCALLY-LED APPROACHES FOR ADVANCING WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP AND GENDER EQUALITY IN ASIA. 5/20, 1:30-2:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Foundation. Speakers: Inthana Bouphasavanh, Director, Association of Development of Women and Legal Education, Laos; Udeni Thewarapperuma, Program Manager, Women’s Voice and Leadership, The Asia Foundation Sri Lanka; Rahpriyanto Alam Surya Putra, Director of Environmental Governance, The Asia Foundation Indonesia; Sumina Karki, Inclusive Governance Lead, The Asia Foundation Nepal.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSING THE RISKS AND IDENTIFYING MITIGATION STRATEGIES. 5/20, 2:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Rand Corporation. Speakers: Andrew Lauland, Senior International Defense Researcher; Professor of Policy Analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Michelle E. Miro, Information Scientist, Professor of Policy Analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School; Susan A. Resetar, Senior Operations Researcher; Rahim Ali, Senior Technical Analyst.

TO RUN THE WORLD: THE KREMLIN'S COLD WAR BID FOR GLOBAL POWER. 5/20, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author Sergey Radchenko, Fellow, Wilson E. Schmidt Distinguished Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Svetlana Savranskaya, Member, History and Public Policy Program Advisory Board, Director of Russia Programs, National Security Archive; William Taubman, Former Fellow; Bertrand Snell Professor of Political Science Emeritus, Amherst College.

OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2024 SOLOMON ISLANDS ELECTION. 5/20, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Kathryn Paik, Senior Fellow, Australia Chair; Alan Tidwell, Professor of Practice and Director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies, Georgetown University; Anouk Ride, Research Fellow, Australian National University; Anna Powles, Senior Lecturer, Centre for Defense and Security Studies, University of New Zealand; Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, Associate Professor, Department of Pacific Islands Studies, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa.

Sunday, May 12, 2024

Monday Asia Events May 13, 2024

THE WAY AHEAD TO SECURE TAIWAN’S RESILIENCE. 5/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Alexander Tah-Ray Yui, Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United State; Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Former Deputy Secretary of State; Elbridge Colby, Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development; Carolyn Bartholomew, Former Chairman, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission; Robert Daly, Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.

STRENGTHENING NATO'S EUROPEAN PILLAR. 5/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Max Bergmann, Director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and Stuart Center; Sophia Besch, Fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Mathieu Droin, CSIS Visiting Fellow; Sean Monaghan, CSIS Visiting Fellow.

THE INSIDERS’ GAME: HOW ELITES MAKE WAR AND PEACE. 5/13, 10:30 - 11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings Institution. Speakers: E.J. Dionne Jr., W. Averell Harriman Chair, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings; Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Brookings; Elizabeth N. Saunders, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings; Kori Schake, Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI.

CAN SOUTH KOREA SAVE UKRAINE? 5/13, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Korea Chair, CSIS. Speakers:  Mark F. Cancian, Senior Adviser, International Security Program; Chris H. Park, Program Coordinator and Research Assistant, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. 5/13, 1:00-2:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: United States Institute of Peace. Speakers: Erin West, Deputy District Attorney, REACT Task Force, Office of the District Attorney, Santa Clara County; Jacob Sims, Visiting Expert, United States Institute of Peace; Jason Tower, Country Director, Burma, United States Institute of Peace.

STRENGTHENING THE MIDDLEGROUND OF THE DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL LANDSCAPE. 5/13, 3:30-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: The Hon. William J. Lynn III, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Leonardo DRS, Former United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense; The Hon. Ellen Lord, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, US Department of Defense, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Textron Systems Corporation.

The Weak Yen Problem

No easy solution

By Takuya Nishimura
, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 6, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The yen-to-dollar exchange rate has moved in unusual ways over the past week. The foreign exchange market’s expectation that the gap between the low interest rate in Japan and the higher interest rate in the United States will not narrow soon has caused the yen to depreciate. Frustrated with this development, the Bank of Japan apparently has intervened at least twice in the FX market, once on April 29 and again on May 2, to increase the yen’s value against the US dollar. Yet so long as inflation persists in the US economy as it has done over the past few years, the weakness in the yen cannot be remedied, unless the BOJ plans to increase the inflation rate, which would complicate monetary policy.

The yen began its recent journey through the foreign exchange markets on April 26. At a press conference that day, the governor of the Bank of Japan, Kazuo Ueda, said that “Depreciation of yen has had no major influence on underlying inflation so far.” He insisted that monetary policy would not attempt to address foreign exchange rates. He also did not indicate when the Bank would start reducing its purchase of Japanese government bonds.

The market interpreted Ueda’s comments as a sign that the BOJ would not raise interest rates for the time being. That being so, the market believed that the wide interest rate gap between Japan and the U.S. would continue for some time. Money is generally supposed to flow to a currency with a higher interest rate. After the BOJ’s monetary policy meeting, at which the interest rate was left unchanged, the yen was sold, and the dollar was bought. At mid-day on April 29, the foreign exchange rate reached 160 yen against U.S. dollar for the first time since 1990.

A curious trend then began within the hour. The rate rose to 155 yen against dollar, dipped to 157 yen to the dollar, and then settled at 154 yen. These abrupt ups and downs invited speculation that the government of Japan had intervened in the foreign exchange market – unannounced. The Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Masato Kanda, refused to comment. However, looking at the BOJ’s account balance, news organizations reported that the BOJ was likely to have intervened at the request of Ministry of Finance. The BOJ’s estimated current account balance dropped 7.56 trillion yen between April 29 and 30. When this balance drops, foreign exchange firms will experience offsetting increases. However, between April 29 and 30, the firms’ balances increased between 2.05 and 2.3 trillion yen.

The 5 trillion yen gap between the BOJ and the firms is thought to be the amount of the BOJ’s intervention on April 29. This amount approached the BOJ’s largest single-day intervention of 5.6 trillion yen in October 2022.

But the unusual moves in the foreign exchange market did not stop there. After the likely intervention on April 29, the yen still exhibited gradual weakness. Just after the Federal Open Market Committee of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board announced, on the afternoon of May 1 (U.S. Eastern Daylight Time) and the early morning of May 2 in Japan time, that it would leave the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged, the yen suddenly rose from 157 yen against dollar to 153 yen. The consensus view is that the BOJ had intervened again to the tune of 3 trillion yen.

The market was surprised at the second intervention because the yen seemed to be appreciating. The U.S. announcement of no change to the federal funds rate had stimulated purchases of yen. The market previously expected BOJ to intervene when the exchange rate reaches 160 yen to the dollar. The second possible intervention on May 2 occurred before the rate had reached that level, thus clouding expectations of when the BOJ would defend the yen. The exchange rate rose further to 151 yen to the dollar on May 3, after the U.S. jobs report showed a slowdown in hiring. The U.S. Labor Department announced an increase in payrolls of approximately 175,000, well below predictions of approximately 243,000.

The BOJ appears to have intervened in the foreign exchange market because the negative impact of the weak yen on the Japanese economy cannot be ignored. “If excessive fluctuation occurred by speculations, it poses negative impact on people’s life. We firmly deal with it,” said Kanda when asked about the first intervention on April 29.

A weak yen causes the prices of imported goods to rise and exerts downward pressure on real wages. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has focused on returning the fruits of economic growth to the people, expecting that wages would rise faster than prices. He has also planned a tax cut for June. A depreciating yen may erode the effect of the economic policies of the Kishida administration, which is suffering from historically low approval ratings. Intervention in the foreign exchange market is unavoidable for the administration.

However, the effect of any intervention will be limited. The weak yen is the result not just of the interest rate gap between Japan and the U.S., but also of the relative strength of the two economies. Inflationary pressure is still strong in the United States. Wages are growing at a relatively high rate, encouraging consumption that leads to inflation. The Chair of the Fed, Jerome Powell, said in his press conference on May 1 that the members of the FOMC “do not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range for the federal funds rate until we have gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.” Alternatively, the members “are also prepared to respond to an unexpected weakening in the labor market,” he said.

The Fed has shown no sign of another increase in the target rate, but U.S. wages are still increasing. The BOJ’s intervention in the foreign exchange market has no realistic chance of narrowing the interest rate gap with the United States.

Intervention is not a popular tool for adjusting foreign exchange in the international economy. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said that currency interventions should occur only in “very rare and exceptional circumstances,” when markets are disorderly with excessive volatility. Whether the interventions will help the Kishida administration to survive the aftermath of the slush fund scandal is uncertain.

Sunday, May 5, 2024

Monday Asia Events May 6, 2024

STRENGTHENING TRUST WITH INDIA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2008 US-INDIA CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT. 5/6, 9:30-10:45pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Hoover Institution. Speakers: Condoleezza Rice, Tad and Dianne Taube Director, Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow, Public Policy, 66th US Secretary of State (2005-2009); David Mulford, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, US Ambassador to India (2004-2009); M. K. Narayanan, National Security Advisor of India (2005-2010); Nick Burns, US Ambassador to China, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (2005-2009); Eric Garcetti, US Ambassador to India.

WHAT LIES IN STORE FOR THE UN IN 2024. 5/6, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speaker: Dennis Francis, President of the United Nations General Assembly. [Press Club members only, broadcast on C-Span and via the Press Club]

INSIDE CHINA’S NEW DIPLOMATIC PUSH. 5/6, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy. Speakers: Evan Medeiros, Chair of Asian studies, Georgetown University; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in chief, Foreign Policy.

BEYOND THE SCIF: A CONVERSATION WITH REP. BRAD WENSTRUP (R-OH) ON AI AND BIOSECURITY. 5/6, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speakers: Dan Blumenthal, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Anna Puglisi, Founder, Puglisi Ventures; Anthony Ruggiero, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Ken Staley, Senior Counselor, Palantir; Dov S. Zakheim, Commissioner, National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology. 

UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES: NORTHEAST ASIA’S POSTWAR SETTLEMENT AND THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES. 5/6, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead Center for International Relations, Harvard University. Speaker: Sheila Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Studies, Council on Foreign Relations.

12 QUESTIONS FOR JONAS RÜEGG: JAPAN AND OCEANIC HISTORY. 5/6, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speaker: Jonas Rüegg, Senior Teaching and Research Assistant, University of Zurich, and Winner of the 2024 Modern Japan History Association Dissertation Prize.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND LOOMING THREAT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 5/6, 1:30-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Freedom House. Speakers: Svenja Hahn, Member of the European Parliament, Renew Europe Group; Julien Nocetti, Associate Fellow in the Russia / Eurasia and the Geopolitics of Technologies Centers, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri); Adrian Shahbaz, Vice President of Research and Analysis, Freedom House.

LAUNCH OF CHINESE HANDCUFFS: HOW CHINA HIJACKED THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA. 5/6, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Landon Derentz, Senior Director, Richard L. Morningstar Chair for Global Energy Security, Atlantic Council; Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Director, Center for Energy, Climate, and Environment; Erin Walsh, Senior Research Fellow for International Affairs.

HANOI’S PROMISES: VIETNAM’S REALITY AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. 5/6, 3:00-5:00pm (CET), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Freedom House. Speaker: Margaux Ewen, Director of the Political Prisoners Initiative.

MADE IN CHINA: WHEN US-CHINA INTERESTS CONVERGED TO TRANSFORM GLOBAL TRADE. 5/6, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: History and Public Program and Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, Wilson Center. Speakers: author Elizabeth O’Brien Ingleson, Assistant Professor in the International History Department, London School of Economics and Political Science; Margaret M. Pearson, Dr. Horace E. and Wilma V. Harrison Distinguished Professor, and Distinguished Scholar, Teacher, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/49KzqCE 

JAPAN’S FOREIGN POLICY AND GLOBAL POSITIONING: CHOICES, CHALLENGES, AND RISKS. 5/6, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT); 5/7, 8:00-9:15am (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor Asia Society. Speaker: Gideon Rachman, Chief Foreign Affairs Commentator, The Financial Times.

CHANGING CURRENTS: INNOVATION AND TRANSFORMATION FOR THE ASIA PACIFIC. 5/6,
9:00pm-1:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation. Speakers: Michael Wills, Executive Vice President, National Bureau of Asian Research; Yul Sohn, President, East Asia Institute; Gulshan Sachdeva, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Syaru Shirley Lin, Chair, CAPRIWei Shyy, Former President, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Bor-Sung Liang, Senior Director, Corporate Strategy & Strategic Technology, MediaTekJarret Su, Co-Head of Healthcare & Life Science, KPMG in Taiwan; Vita Chien, General Manager, AstraZeneca Taiwan; Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation; Grace Liu, Corporate Sustainability Officer, Acer; Nelson Chang, Chairman, Taiwan Cement; Shuhei Nomura, Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management, Keio University School of Medicine; Steven Pan, Chairman, Silks Hotel Group;
Kristoffer Berse, Dean, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman; Joe Huang, Director of Lean Planning for Volunteer Development, Buddhist Tzu Chi Charity Foundation.

Wednesday, May 1, 2024

Voters Strike a Blow Against the Kishida Administration

But not a knock out punch


By Takuya Nishimura,
Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 29, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

On Sunday, April 28, voters firmly rejected the Kishida administration and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In three by-elections of the House of Representatives, the LDP lost all three seats. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) won all three races.

The results reflect public frustration with Kishida’s handling of the slush fund scandal and the LDP’s slow progress on political reform. The elections dealt a significant blow to Kishida’s efforts to preserve his administration.

By-elections are held twice a year, ordinarily in April and October, when a seat of any district of both Chambers of the Diet is vacant, either by resignation of a lawmaker, death or for other reasons.

One of the three by-elections, the election in the Shimane-1 district, followed the death of the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hiroyuki Hosoda. Hosoda was the head of the Seiwa-kai faction, also known as the Abe faction, which was at the epicenter of the slush fund scandal. Hosoda was also suspected of having close ties to the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, the former Unification Church, and of having sexually harassed a female reporter.

In the one-on-one match-up in Shimane-1, Akiko Kamei of the CDP defeated Norimasa Nishikori of the LDP by a margin of 25,000 votes. It was almost the same as Hosoda’s winning margin in the last election in 2021. Swing voters who voted for Hosoda three years ago shifted to Kamei.

Kamei’s victory was the LDP’s first loss in this highly conservative district since the current election system was introduced in 1996. Although the Shimane branch of the LDP has been split since the gubernatorial election in 2019, the result of the by-election is widely interpreted as a protest by LDP supporters against Kishida’s indecisive handling of the slush fund scandal.

The second by-election, held in the Tokyo-15 district, filled a vacancy left by the resignation of the former LDP Representative, Mito Kakizawa. He stepped down after his arrest on suspicion of bribery in a mayoral election in Koto city, Tokyo. The LDP did not have a candidate on the ballot, and the election became a contest among nine candidates of the opposition parties.

Natsumi Sakai of the CDP won the race, with the support of the Japan Communist Party. Sakai’s victory showed that the CDP and the JCP can work together successfully in a race that does not include a LDP candidate. The Japan Innovation Party, or Nippon Ishin, took third in the race. A candidate supported by the popular governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike, came in fifth.

The third by-election was held in the district of Nagasaki-3 after the resignation of Yaichi Tanigawa. He had been indicted on charges of receiving over 40 million yen in kickbacks from the Abe faction. The LDP did not have a candidate in the race. The CDP’s Katsuhiko Yamada won the seat with 53,000 votes, twice the number of votes that Ishin’s candidate received.

The message of the results in Tokyo-15 and Nagasaki-3 is that voters who gave up on the LDP turned to the CDP, rather than to Ishin. Although the LDP did not field a candidate in two of the three districts, the LDP was seen as suffering defeats in three elections. “It was an extremely severe result. We hope to restore confidence through accumulating efforts for political reform and leading political agenda to solution,” said LDP Secretary General, Toshimitsu Motegi, on the night after the elections.

Defeat in Shimane was a particularly significant blow to the Kishida administration. Typically, the prime minister will join campaigns only for winnable districts in a general election. Kishida unusually campaigned in Shimane-1 twice. The LDP’s loss surely tarnished Kishida’s reputation.

The LDP tried to avoid outright voter rejection by not offering candidates in Tokyo-15 and Nagasaki-3. But the sweeping victory by the CDP and low voter turnout in those two districts showed considerable resentment of old-style LDP politics – the undisclosed use of political funds. The results in the two districts may signal a trend in other districts all over Japan. Indeed, they may mark the end of the era of LDP’s unilateral domination.

The results of the by-elections shocked LDP lawmakers. They will now be forced into close races in the next election. They will certainly oppose a snap election. An attempt by Kishida to call one in June would instigate a movement in the LDP to replace Kishida. Party members will look for a leader who can reduce the number of victims of an unpopular leader in next election.

So far, such a movement has not materialized. Leaders of the Abe faction had questioned Kishida’s leadership. But they have been inactive since they were subjected to severe penalties in the aftermath of the slush fund scandal.

Although Motegi or former Premier Yoshihide Suga have tried to rally some in LDP, there is not a movement for either. The most popular figure to replace Kishida, Shigeru Ishiba, has not decided to run for the presidential election. A strange silence has descended on the LDP. But it is likely that someone or something will ignite a movement against Kishida, as the party heads to the presidential election in the fall.

Even the CDP cannot be optimistic about the next general election. Their three victories were the result of LDP errors. A framework of electoral cooperation is essential if other parties are to replace an LDP administration. The Head of the CDP, Kenta Izumi, once told reporters that it would take five years for CDP to achieve a regime change. It is up to Izumi to build a viable strategy quickly to replace the LDP in the next general election.