The Osaka Capital

JIP Drags Down the Diet

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 26, 2026
 
The Diet finished its special session on July 25, approving the Backup Capital Act by a small margin in the Upper House at the last moment. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was not eager to enact it. It was the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP: Nippon Ishin-no Kai), that was the main supporter. The opposition parties suspected that JIP was pushing it solely for its own narrow interest. JIP’s persistence on the bill led to a confusing few days at the end of the session.
 
The Backup Capital Act is aimed at building an alternative “capital” of Japan to Tokyo, in case Tokyo suffers a major natural disaster. The law should also help decentralize businesses in Japan. A city interested in serving as a backup capital must meet several conditions, including a minimum population size, business concentration, or an agreement on coordination between the prefectural government and the city government. While some cities, such as Sapporo, Nagoya or Fukuoka, might qualify, Osaka is recognized as the leading candidate.
 
In connection with the Backup Capital Act, JIP has put another issue at the top of its reform agenda for the announced purpose of minimizing government expenditures.  This is the Osaka Capital Initiative, which would integrate the Osaka prefectural government with the Osaka city government. The integration would resemble the governmental system of the Tokyo metropolitan area. Appealing to the competitive sentiment of the people of Osaka against Tokyo, JIP sold the policy as making Osaka another capital of Japan.
 
Controlling the seats of the Osaka prefectural governor and the Osaka city mayor, JIP held two referendums on the Osaka Capital Initiative in 2015 and 2020, but the initiative was rejected by a small margin in both referenda. Although residents of the small cities in the Osaka prefecture supported the idea, those in Osaka city did not, because it seemed to have fewer benefits for them.
 
JIP has been looking for a third chance at the initiative. Their tactic is to connect the Osaka Capital Initiative with the Backup Capital Act, though the party leaders publicly explain that those two concepts are different. But the party has also explained that the Osaka Capital Initiative is a precondition for Osaka to be a backup capital and has declared a third referendum in the spring 2027. JIP’s leader and the governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, announced that he would resign as governor next spring and run again for election as his own successor. He plans to hold the election and the third referendum on the same day on the expectation that the initiative can ride his coattails.
 
Hence JIP’s enthusiasm for enacting Backup Capital Act in the special session of the Diet that closed on July 25. To have the “double voting” in Osaka next spring, the Diet had to pass the Act in this session. In a meeting with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on July 7, Yoshimura reconfirmed that the LDP and JIP would enact the Backup Capital Act in this session and that JIP would leave behind its effort to reduce seats in the Diet.
 
No party other than JIP had any interest in a backup capital. When the chairman of a committee in the Lower House, who was from JIP, unilaterally began discussion of the Backup Capital Bill in late June, the opposition parties boycotted all the discussions. The Diet spent a week normalizing its discussions. Even the LDP was reluctant to pass the backup capital bill within the current session.
 
Takaichi came to the rescue of the bill in the final phase of the Diet session with her personal support. Takaichi was indebted to JIP for its support of the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act, which had been on her long-time political agenda. That statute was enacted on July 17. In return, Takaichi extended the term of the Diet session for 8 days and worked to pass the backup capital bill.
 
The opposition parties were adamantly opposed to the unilateral procedure used by the LDP and JIP to pass the bill in the Upper House -- where the two parties do not have a majority. Although the opposition parties demanded further discussion of the bill, the chairman of the committee, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, decided to finish discussion quickly and to take a vote on the bill. However, the chairman accepted a supplemental resolution to the bill that ruled out JIP’s planned double voting on the referendum and governor’s race. With this supplement, the bill was approved by a slight margin, supported by the LDP, JIP, Team Mirai and some independent lawmakers.
 
Yoshimura was not satisfied with the result. Holding votes for the third referendum on the Osaka Capital Initiative and for the Osaka gubernatorial election on the same day next spring is crucial for JIP to gain broad support from the voters. Immediately after the Diet passed Backup Capital Act, Yoshimura reiterated that he still planned to have the double vote next spring. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, accused Yoshimura of a lack of respect for the decisions of the Diet. What happens next spring in Osaka remains to be seen.
 
As seen in his unusually strong push for seat reduction in the House of Representatives, Yoshimura is too focused on his own agenda in Osaka to properly honor the Diet, which, after all, represents the whole interest of the people of Japan. The Osaka Capital Initiative is a typical populist issue to firm up the political base of the party, which is highly concentrated in Osaka. Thus, the Diet spent the last days of the extended session on enhancing JIP’s political fortunes – and those of Takaichi who relies on JIP’s support.

Takaichi’s Legislative Strategy Unites Opposition

Three Reasons for This Diet Session’s Unusual Procedure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2026
 
The Diet decided to extend the term of the current special session for eight days with approval of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Although these leading parties have been trying to pass all the bills submitted by Sanae Takaichi Cabinet before the end of the term set on July 17, the boycott of discussions by the opposition parties made it impossible. The opposition parties accuse Takaichi of mismanaging the Diet. This abnormality was brought about by Takaichi’s arrogant administration of the Diet, JIP’s insistence on its own agenda, and the opposition parties’ unusual unification against leading coalition.
 
Takaichi’s Capriciousness
This is a very unusual session of the Diet. The ordinary session 2026 was convoked on January 23 and ended the same day because Takaichi dissolved the House of Representative to hold a snap election. After the Lower House election on February 8, the Takaichi administration set a special session. Although a special session is ordinarily convoked for a few days to elect a new prime minister, Takaichi set a 150-day term from February 18 to July 17 to discuss the fiscal year 2026 budget and tackle other critical issues. The Diet did not work between January 23 and February 17.
 
During the final weeks in the current session, Takaichi was unwilling to attend the Diet discussion. After opposition parties criticized her for defamation in her LDP presidential campaign last October, Takaichi refused to answer their questions in the Diet. The opposition parties, holding a majority in the Upper House, boycotted the Diet discussion in late June and early July. The leading parties were unable to pass all the bills by July 17, the regular end of the current session.
 
Takaichi prioritized passage of the revised Imperial House Law and the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act in the final phase of the session. The LDP has not been active in extending the Diet session. Every year, lawmakers get back to their hometowns after the ordinary session to meet their supporters, to reinforce their political base, and to prepare for the next election. Extension of the Diet session will reduce their chances to cultivate their voters in the local districts.
 
The LDP nevertheless submitted a motion to the Diet to extend the term of the current special session for the passage of some important bills. The Diet Law provides that an ordinary session can be extended once and an extraordinary or special session twice. The LDP has a majority in the Lower House and not in the Upper House. If the two chambers of the Diet reach different decisions on an extension, the decision of the Lower House controls.
 
The extension of the current session for eight days was thus approved by the votes of   the LDP-JIP majority coalition in the Lower House. The opposition parties blamed the extension on Takaichi’s mismanagement of the Diet schedule. If she had not dissolved the Lower House, and if she had not refused the discussion on her defamation scandal, the parties would have had enough time to discuss all the bills. It was Takaichi who delayed the schedule.
 
JIP’s Insistence on Its Own Agenda
The opposition parties’ boycott of discussion was based on another reason. The leading coalition unilaterally decided to start discussion on the bills for reducing Lower House seats and for introducing a “backup capital” bill. Discussion on a bill usually starts with an overwhelming consensus among the parties. But in this case, the leading parties ignored the protest of the opposition parties. The two bills are strongly supported by JIP.
 
Established in 2012, the JIP had been a determined opposition party, pushing for political reforms. Forming the leading coalition with LDP led by Takaichi in 2025 changed everything. The JIP needed a cause to join the coalition and decided that reduction of Diet seats would be its top priority. JIP leader and the Governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, labeled the issue “political reform 101.” Yoshimura believed that the seat reduction would receive wide public support because it would lead to a reduction in governmental spending for the Diet.
 
Opposition parties had reason to oppose the bill. The bill includes the reduction of forty-five seats in the proportional districts of the Lower House. That reform of the election system would work against small opposition parties which are heavily dependent on proportional districts. It also did not make good sense for the House to reduce its seats at the initiative of the governor of Osaka. Not only the opposition parties but some lawmakers in the LDP were skeptical about the bill. Takaichi finally decided to postpone the seat reduction bill to the next session.
 
JIP still hopes to enact the Backup Capital Act in the extended term of the current session of the Diet. While the law enables local prefectures and cities to have stronger authority for governance as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government currently possesses, most lawmakers believe that the system of backup capital will help the Osaka Capital Initiative, which JIP has been promoting since its establishment.
 
Opposition parties have criticized JIP’s strong push for the bill, arguing that the law only benefits Osaka. They demand a detailed examination of the bill in the Diet, which requires weeks of discussion. Although the leading coalition passed the bill in the Lower House with the approval of Team Mirai, they have still not secured a majority in the Upper House. The leading parties have not yet decided whether to extend the term of the current session again.
 
If the LDP fails to enact the two bills for seat reduction and a backup capital, the JIP may lose its major cause for staying in the leading coalition with the LDP. Although the merits of leading coalition should be greater than leaving it, the JIP is worried about its political power shrinking, as they are growingly dependent on the LDP’s leadership. Voters in future elections may regard JIP as a supplemental group of LDP. It would be a major concern for the LDP whether the JIP stays or goes.
 
Unusual Unification of Opposition Parties
When the leading coalition unilaterally began discussion over the Lower House seat reduction and the Backup Capital Act, the opposition parties took united action to stop the unilateral procedure in the Diet. They requested impartial treatment of the bills by the leaders in both chambers. The possible crucial impact of seat reduction on small opposition parties made that concerted action possible.
 
The action included a wide range of parties. The highly conservative Sanseito and the far-left Japan Communist Party joined the frontline in protesting capricious management of the Diet by leading coalition. Adding to those two parties, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), and Team Mirai demanded that the chairman (from JIP) of a Lower House committee not start discussion on the seat reduction bill. When the chairman declared that discussion had begun, those opposition parties boycotted the committee.
 
Ironically, JIP’s push for a seat reduction bill unified opposition parties from the right to the left. This unification became a threat to the leading parties, causing them to think which other bills would be blocked by the opposition parties.
 
However, the opposition parties are not completely united against the leading parties. The CRA, DPP and Sanseito voted yes to revisions to the Imperial House Law, while JCP and some others opposed it. The National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act passed the Diet with the approval of DPP and Sanseito, but the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, JCP and Reiwa Shinsengumi opposed. The coalition of opposition parties is still limited to some specific bills.

Expanding Japan's Imperial Family

The Diet’s Unanimous Opinion on Maintaining the Imperial Family

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 8, 2026 Updated June 15, 2026

The Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both chambers of the Diet agreed to a draft of a “unanimous opinion” [立法府の総意] of the legislative branch to secure members of the Imperial Family. The draft proposes expansion of the family in two ways, adopting expert recommendations from 2021. First, female members of the family would be allowed to remain in the family after marriage. Second, male members of branches of the Imperial Family that were excised in 1947 could be adopted and thus re-enter the family.
 
The acting chair on this issue, Speaker of the Lower House Eisuke Mori, hopes to make these changes through amendments to the Imperial House Law by the end of the current session of the Diet on July 17. 
 
The Imperial House currently has 16 members, only three of whom are male and eligible to succeed to the throne. Members of the public, members of the Diet, and the imperial family itself are concerned that the family may dwindle. There is a near-term issue about lightening the responsibilities of each family member. The duties of the imperial family to participate in the life of the nation – such as participating in ceremonies of national events or official visits of foreign heads of state – are in fact extensive and occasionally burdensome. Spreading out these responsibilities by expanding the imperial family would be helpful to all.
 
Allowing married female members to remain in the family has the overwhelming support of all the parties. Article 12 of the Imperial House Law provides that a female loses her status as a family member when she marries. If female members could remain in the family, they could share the roles of the Imperial Family. The draft accordingly would allow all female members to stay after marriage. The draft also includes transitional measures to respect the will of female members who have been living their lives based on current law – i.e., not all female members may wish to stay in the family.
 
Whether the husband and children of a female member remaining in the family should also have the status of members of the Imperial Family has been a controversial point. While some lawmakers with Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) support such inclusion, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) oppose it. If the husband and children do not have the imperial status, possible questions are “Do they have the right of freedom of religion or political activities?” or “Can they spend the governmental funds for the Imperial Families?
 
The draft does not take a position on the status of husband and children and merely recommends adding a supplementary provision to the revised Imperial House Law that hopes to resolve the issue sometime in the future.
 
More divisive in the draft is a process for the Imperial Family to adopt a male from a branch of the former Imperial Family that had been excised in 1947. That former Imperial Family share the same ancestor of over 600 years ago with current Imperial Family. Article 9 of the Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits Imperial House members from adopting children to prevent members from disrupting the imperial lineage.
 
While the LDP and JIP approve of the adoption proposal, as do some conservative opposition parties, some CRA members have protested it. For them, an adoption without consent may violate the constitutional provision that prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Even some conservative scholars are skeptical about the idea of adoption.
 
Considering the CRA’s objections, the draft includes conditions on adoption. There would be a minimum age for adoption, which is supposed to be fifteen. The draft also demands a decision on who in the Imperial Family can adopt a child. Most importantly, an adopted child would not be eligible to succeed to the throne. With these conditions, the CRA accepted adoption. The draft also recommends the Diet to resolve that this rule for adoption should be subjected to ongoing reviews.
 
Complicating things, the Speaker Mori announced his own view in his press conference that male offspring of adopted children should have eligibility to succeed to the throne. That represented a conservative standpoint which insists on making paternal succession certain rather than the legitimacy of lineage concerning adoption. Some opposition parties firmly oppose Mori’s idea. Mori later explained that he was referring to an interpretation of the current law, and not binding future discussions.
 
The draft would not affect other Imperial Family rules. The draft unequivocally reconfirms the current order of succession to the throne. The first successor of Emperor Naruhito is Crown Prince Akishino, followed by his son, Prince Hisahito. Maintenance of the current order was a requirement of the experts’ report in 2021. That report separated discussion about provisions to enlarge the Imperial House from the line of succession.
 
The speakers distributed the draft to the parties on June 8 and concluded the draft as “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” with approval of seven parties out of all thirteen on June 10. The Emperor Abdication Special Law of 2017 demands such unanimity. The opinion was submitted to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Takaichi Cabinet is expected to submit a bill of revised Imperial House Law to current session of the Diet.

It is noteworthy that the Emperor Naruhito commented on securing Imperial Family members right after the Speakers wrapped up the unanimous opinion. “I hope it to be understood by the people,” he said in his press conference before leaving Japan to visit Europe on June 11. Although reserving judgement on the opinion, he clearly wants the process to be democratic and reflecting the views of the Japanese people. The emperor began his remarks by noting that the fundamental principle of the imperial family is "to share the joys and sorrows of the people."

 It is still unclear, however, whether the unanimous opinion will receive the full support of the people. Polls by news organizations find that the concept of the adoption of male members of former Imperial Family branches faces a certain amount of opposition. A substantial percentage of those polled support the right of female members to remain the in family after marriage.
 
There is a popular expectation that Aiko, the daughter of Naruhito, will succeed to the throne. The “unanimous opinion” would rule out this possibility. Takaichi revealed her opposition to a female emperor during a discussion in the Diet last March. “The time has not come for discussing it. It may destabilize imperial succession,” said Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister. This is a view more representative of Japan’s conservatives who believe that succession should be only along the male line than of its citizens.

The Future of Japan's Constitution

articles on Constitution

The Leading Coalition Accelerates a Constitutional Amendment

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 1, 2026

The leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) has accelerated its effort to amend the Constitution of Japan to deal with emergencies. The two parties claim that the discussion of proposed amendments is nearly wrapped up. However, some opposition parties expect further discussion. Even LDP lawmakers are divided over whether the Lower House or the Upper House should be the primary forum for debate. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi encourages the discussion, presenting herself as a brave leader grappling with a divisive issue – but with no clear hope of success.
 
An amendment to address emergencies that prevent the Diet from acting have taken at least two forms. One was a rough draft of an amendment that the Lower House Legislation Bureau submitted to the Commission on the Constitution of the House on May 14. The draft primarily would add a clause to the constitution that would, in the event of certain emergencies, allow Diet members to remain in office even after their terms expire. The amendment recognizes four categories of emergency: a major natural disaster, a major spread of infectious disease, social disorder by civil war and an armed attack of foreigners.
 
According to the draft, each of these emergencies can create an “election difficulty situation”: a time in which a national election cannot be held in broad geographic areas for a certain long period. Members of the Lower House have four-year terms, and six years are given to those elected to the Upper House. The draft of the amendment states that these terms will be extended in emergency. An election difficulty situation will be declared in advance by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet.
 
A second type of response to an emergency is also in the draft. It includes a controversial provision to authorize the Cabinet to issue an “emergency ordinance.” “In a special occasion in which it cannot afford to wait for legislation by the Diet,” the draft says, “the Cabinet can enact an emergency ordinance which is equivalent to a law.” Although the draft requires approval of the Diet after the ordinance is declared, there is no time limit on Diet action and thus no time limit on an emergency ordinance.
 
A member of the Lower House commission who represents the LDP, Yoshitaka Shindo, commented to the press that most parties agreed on the extension of terms of lawmakers in emergency and that issue can be said to be “pinned down.” Another commission member from the JIP, Nobuyuki Baba, said that all the talking points on the amendment have now been proposed and discussed. The two parties in the leading coalition hope to proceed to the next step of drafting a provision to initiate an amendment.
 
Opposition parties do not want to rush the process. The Centrist Reform Alliance disagreed with Baba’s notion that the discussion was over and that new measures were necessary to maintain the ordinary functions of the Diet in an emergency. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan already provides that the Cabinet can convoke an emergency session of the Upper House in a national emergency. The opposition parties believe that this existing power to gather the Upper House in an emergency session will ensure that the Diet will function even if the Lower House is empty.
 
Opposition parties are further skeptical about introducing the emergency ordinance. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, argued that the proposal for an emergency ordinance power was dropped in an agreement of five parties, including the LDP and the JIP, in 2024. Moreover, a situation in which the Diet would not work at all was unimaginable if lawmakers’ terms could be extended. The Japan Communist Party has pointed out that there was an imperial emergency ordinance in pre-war Japan that was issued in Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. That power confirmed that the emperor had the highest state power.
 
This concept of imperial authority ended after World War II. Article 41 of the constitution states that the Diet is “the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” If the Cabinet obtains the power to issue ordinances that are equal to a statute passed by the Diet, the relationship between the legislative and executive branch under the constitution will fundamentally be changed. The introduction of the executive branch’s power to declare an emergency ordinance would erode the status of the Diet as the supreme organ of state power.
 
An unignorable fact in the discussion over the constitutional amendment is that the leading coalition does not have even a simple majority in the Upper House. A super majority – a two-thirds vote – in each House of the Diet is necessary for a constitutional amendment to move forward. While the LDP and the JIP have that majority in the Lower House after the LDP’s sweeping victory in the February elections, they do not have even a simple majority in the Upper House.
 
The Upper House is focused on an entirely different constitutional issue. In the meeting of the Upper House Commission on the Constitution on May 20, the main topic of discussion was not the emergency clause but the election system. In Upper House elections, each prefecture has had its own seats. But with the decline of eligible voters, the districts of Tottori and Shimane were integrated into a single district, just as the Tokushima and Kochi were combined, for the 2016 election and thereafter. Members of the Upper House from both sides of the aisle have urged the elimination of such integrated districts
 
The LDP accordingly has proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish integrated prefectural districts. However, the top opposition party in the Upper House, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), does not believe that an amendment is necessary; rather, the Diet can achieve this end simply by amending the election laws. Komeito, as a partner of the CDPJ in the Lower House, supports this view.
 
The LDP and JIP have different priorities regarding a constitutional amendment. The JIP is focused on an emergency clause that would enhance executive power in a time of crisis. The LDP is going in a different direction, prioritizing electoral system reform in the Upper House. The LDP thinks it will be easier to reach a consensus there on election reforms than on the emergency clause amendment. 
 
As a lawmaker in the conservative bloc, PM Takaichi has presented herself as a firm proponent of the theory of constitutional amendments. “The constitution should occasionally be updated to meet contemporary demands,” said Takaichi to a recent meeting of supporters for constitutional amendment. She did not, however, provide any details on which provisions should be amended adding uncertainty to how the debate should proceed.

Imperial Succession

Diet Discussion on the Imperial Family Resumes

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026

Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15^th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
 
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
 
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
 
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
 
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
 
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12^th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
 
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
 
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
 
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
 
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
 
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
 
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
 
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947.  However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.

The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.

Policy? What Policy?

Vigorous Policy Discussion Missing in the Campaign

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 2, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s February 8th call for a snap election in the House of Representatives has dealt a blow to the campaigns of those parties that did yet have a fully built policy platform to present to voters. The only recourse for these campaigns has been to contest details about the consumption tax cut or about minor defense and foreign policies. Parties with populist agendas are exploiting public concern about the swelling number of foreign visitors. The campaigns are already in the second half.

The central feature of this campaign season is not policy debate, however, but the prospect that Japan may endorse its first female prime minister – and perhaps by a wide margin. News organizations have conducted several polls to predict the possibility that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) may achieve a simple majority in the Lower House, obviating the need for a coalition partner.

A poll by the Asahi Shimbun (telephone and online survey of approximately 370,000 people between January 31 and February 1) indicated a significant surge of support for the LDP that would take it from its current 196 seats to between 270 and 280. The media’s treatment of the campaign as a horse race – a phenomenon well known in other countries – has superseded meaningful discussion of policies that will determine Japan’s near-term future.

Management of Public Finances
The LDP has presented a campaign platform with five planks: 1) a strong economy, 2) the local community as the engine of Japan’s economy, 3) responsible defense and diplomacy strategies to strengthen the international order, 4) financial security for every generation and responsibility for future generations, and 5) a new constitution compatible with contemporary Japan. Of these, Takaichi has focused on the economy and defense policy.

The catchword for the Takaichi campaign is “responsible and proactive public finances.” What does “responsible” or “proactive” mean? Observers suppose that “responsible” means a national budget not dependent on the issuance of governmental bonds and that “proactive” means investments for the future. Takaichi thus promises that her administration will manage public finances without an excessive issuance of Japanese government bonds (JGBs).

But even during her so-far brief period as prime minister, Takaishi has favored more JGBs. Her FY2025 supplemental budget from last December totaled ¥18.4 trillion last December. The principal source of funding (63% to be precise) was the issuance of ¥11.4 trillion in JGBs. The FY2026 budget bill will set a spending record of ¥122.3 trillion, funded in part by the issuance of ¥29.5 trillion in JGBs, but it has not been discussed in the Diet yet as a result of Takaichi’s dissolution of the Lower House.

The LDP platform explains that “responsible and proactive public finances” means “producing a positive cycle in which further investment is possible through the sustainability of public finances, powerful economic growth and an increase in tax revenue.” The LDP aims to improve the balance of governmental debt against Japan’s GDP. Takaichi claims that she will begin fundamental reform of public finances by ending the annual tradition of a supplemental budget.

However, the prime minister has not proven her capacity to communicate smoothly with the markets. Reflecting investors’ fundamental concerns about Takaichi’s budget deficit, the market for long-term bonds has been declining ever since she took office last October. The rate on 10-year JGBs has steeply risen 60 basis points from 1.6 percent in late October to 2.2 percent in late January 2026. When she referred to exporters’ prosperity with yen’s depreciation, Japanese yen suddenly dropped against dollar early February. So far, there is little to suggest that Takaichi can implement her budget proposal “with the confidence of the markets.”

The opposition parties have not built a counterargument to Takaichi’s public financing plan. They have instead focused on such granular issues as whether a consumption tax cut should cover all consumption or be limited to foods, and whether the cut should be permanent or limited to two years. While most parties have not produced a plan to offset the decrease in revenues from a consumption tax cut, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposes to establish a governmental fund to cover the tax cut. Takaichi has not identified any fiscal resource to substitute for a consumption tax cut.

Diplomacy at the Center of the World
“We will resume our diplomatic standing at the center of the world by restoring the power of the economy and our defense systems,” says the LDP platform. It is not clear that in the last 80 years Japan has ever stood at the center of the world or shaped it in any significant way. The best guess is that Takaichi wants to revive former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s policy that Japan “flourish at the center of the world.”

There is nothing new in the content of her foreign policies. The LDP platform calls for strengthening relations with allied countries and the global south through shared values based on a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This policy incorporates the concepts of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. The platform cites as an example the Abe administration’s solution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea.

The LDP platform also stresses constructive and stable relations with China, but Takaichi has already worsened the relationship with her careless comment in November on the Taiwan contingency. Since then, the Japanese economy has suffered. China has taken counter actions, including advising its citizens not to travel to Japan and banning exports of dual use items to Japan. The Chinese have also indicated that they may restrict exports of rare earth minerals.

On other national security issues Takaichi has discussed defense spending in the context of active public investment in economic growth. The LDP platform proposes revisions to three national security documents and the removal of regulations covering exports of defense equipment. Takaichi also hopes to revise the three anti-nuclear principles that now prohibit Japan from possessing, producing, or introducing nuclear weapons.

The CRA has pointed out that the LDP’s hawkish coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), is behind these national security planks, and the CRA emphasizes its support for an exclusively defense-oriented policy. But the party is still explaining why it turned away from the traditional position of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, which opposed Abe’s 2015 security legislation to maximize Japan’s exercise of its right to collective self-defense.

Populistic Agenda for Foreigners
Some parties embrace xenophobic policies that would regulate foreigners, as if to say that Japan is suffering from a foreign invasion. But wide-ranging restrictions on foreigners are not feasible because the Japanese economy depends heavily on foreign workers and travelers. As a result, any new restrictions on foreigners would replicate traditional measures for travelers and immigrants.

The LDP would impose stricter controls on immigrants, a tax on foreign citizens, and a prohibition on real estate acquisitions by foreign investors. JIP and Sanseito are proposing an anti-spy act although such legislation could violate the privacy of Japanese citizens. Pressured by these two right-wing parties, Takaichi has said that she will protect privacy by strengthening governmental oversight of the legislation by establishing a new organization equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Japan’s economy is in fact highly dependent on foreign citizens. The Japanese government introduced a new system for foreign workers to make up for the shortage of Japanese labor brought about by Japan’s low birth rate. Foreign staff run most convenience stores in Tokyo. Foreign travelers and their heavy luggage regularly crowd trains in urban areas. These phenomena do not require xenophobic measures, but rather proper information for foreign visitors on how to abide by customs in Japanese society.

The CRA argues that it will establish an environment in which the Japanese and foreigners can live comfortably and with mutual respect. Although, as a practical matter, there are not many things that the Japanese government can do to reduce foreign presence, parties that say they will do something about it, like using the rallying cry, “the Japanese first,” are attracting voters. And voters supporting these attitudes are likely to help propel the LDP and its allied parties to garner a super majority of over 261 seats in the Lower House guaranteeing Takaichi’s premiership.

Will Scandal Upend Japan's Lower House Elections?

PM Takaichi Prepares for the Lower House Elections

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 26, 2026

Japan’s House of Representatives was dissolved on January 23. All the members of the House are up for election. The House is empty now. A general election to fill its 465 seats was officially announced on January 27, and voters will go to the polls on February 8. While the election itself requires voters to choose between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and another person to be the leader of Japan, the election presents deeper choices between the right and the center and between pressure groups and populism. (The parties on the left are not a realistic option.) The voters will consider the Prime Minister’s economic and security policies, as well as her political ethics. 
 
It will be a highly unusual election. This is the first time a prime minister has dissolved the Diet at the beginning of its annual ordinary session since 1966 when former prime minister Eisaku Sato dissolved the House to bolster popular support for his administration. The 2026 general election also will have the shortest timeframe; election day is only 16 days after the dissolution. The previous record was 17 days when former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved the Diet in 2021.
 
Just before the election campaign begins, polls conducted by news organizations showed that the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating had fallen. The decline appears to reflect public doubts about holding a snap election before the Diet has passed the FY2026 budget bill. In the poll by Mainichi Shimbun, 41 percent disapproved of the snap election, while only 27 percent approved.
 
A Vote for the Right or the Center
Takaichi is asking the voters to validate the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). The LDP’s previous coalition partner, Komeito, had been working as a brake on the LDP’s rightward drift, but the JIP identifies itself as an “accel” or accelerant of the move to the right. The JIP is now quickening the pass by calling on the LDP to promote such conservative policies as eliminating Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution of Japan, which prohibits maintaining armed forces and other “war potential”.
 
Takaichi has long been known as a hawkish figure among the LDP members; for example, she has advocated prime ministerial visits to the Shinto Yasukuni Shrine for Japan’s war dead. On several matters, the LDP-JIP government is taking positions further to the right than previous administrations led by Shigeru Ishiba or Fumio Kishida. Takaichi hopes voters will endorse her conservative agenda, similar to Shinzo Abe’s, including a review of the three principles for transferring defense equipment and of the three non-nuclear principles.
 
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito offer another choice for voters by establishing a new party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), in the Lower House. One of the two co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda, has explained that the new party will integrate centrist parties so that they can effectively challenge Takaichi’s right-wing administration.
 
Although the CDPJ on its own has been taking positions on the left and has in the past sought to cooperate with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) in elections, the new CRA is staking out positions on the center-right to attract moderate and conservative lawmakers. As former CDPJ lawmakers have left the party before joining the CRA, CDPJ’s leftist tradition was not succeeded to the CRA. Because the JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Social Democratic Party are unable to build a coalition on the left, the voters will have to choose between the right with the LDP-JIP coalition and the center with the CRA.
 
Populism or Solid Supporters
Recent elections in Japan are testimony to the advance of populism. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Sanseito embody this movement. They can attract young voters with eccentric policy proposals and video messages through social networking services.
 
Following its successful campaign in the Upper House election last summer, the DPP has been repeating its slogan: “We will increase your take-home pay.” The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, reached a deal with Takaichi last month to raise the threshold for the imposition of income tax to an annual income of 1.78 million yen. Tamaki is asking for even more in the campaign.
 
Sanseito focuses on xenophobic policies. Some conservatives worry about the increasing number of foreigners seen in the streets, trains and popular tourist destinations. Sanseito promises to deport low-skilled workers to their home countries and to regulate more stringently foreign investment in Japanese real estate. The party targets independent voters who lean conservative.
 
By contrast, the CRA is trying to distance itself from populism. The alliance is basing its campaign on support from established organizations. Candidates from the CDPJ have solid support from labor unions in the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Komeito lawmakers are backed by Soka Gakkai, which has about 20,000 votes in each single-seat district. Although the CRA is not popular with young and independent voters, the party nevertheless has a good chance to win single-seat districts around Japan.
 
The LDP has historically relied on several large organizations, including major corporations, local chambers of commerce, agricultural organizations, and associations of medical services to bring out the vote. But its leader, Takaichi, is now pursuing a populist agenda, including an increase in take-home pay and stricter regulation of the foreign presence in Japan. Takaichi’s strategy indicates that even the ruling party cannot depend entirely on its traditional supporters and must turn to the constituency of independent voters.
 
Campaign Policies
It is notable that Takaichi announced that she would consider a consumption tax cut. Although she had opposed it on the view that it would not have an immediate impact on the economy, she introduced a tax cut bill after pressure from opposition parties. Her policy change made the bond market skeptical of her economic and financial policies, resulting in a sudden increase in interest rate on long-term government bonds. The consumption tax cut has now become a critical issue in the election.
 
Consistent with the view of the LDP’s coalition partner, Takaichi is suggesting a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food. How the government will make up for the moratorium’s reduction in tax revenue is a discussion for later – after the election. The CRA has proposed a permanent consumption tax cut for food backed by a governmental fund. The DPP would cut the tax rate from ten percent to five percent.  The JCP, Sanseito, and Reiwa Shinsengumi have all called for a permanent abolition of the tax.
 
The CRA has prioritized every walk of life in the domestic economy, and not a nationalistic agenda such as a constitutional amendment, to present a clear contrast with the leading coalition. The LDP and the JIP also are emphasizing their efforts to combat inflation. To reduce contributions by the current working generation, the JIP is stressing the need for social security reform.
 
The Scandal Factor
The campaigns of three of the parties will likely suffer from negative public reaction to scandals or misdoings. First, the LDP has decided to give formal party backing to the lawmakers who were involved in the kickback fund scandal of some of the former factions in the party. Takaichi insists that those members who were re-elected in 2024 election have cleared the voters’ scrutiny. The LDP still rejects stricter regulation of political contributions, which the opposition parties highlight as evidence of the LDP’s unwillingness to engage in true political reform. 
 
Second, the Weekly Bunshun magazine reported in mid-January that the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU), formerly the Unification Church, has been working behind the scenes to establish Takaichi’s presidency of the LDP – and her prime ministership. Bunshun found that Takaichi’s name appeared 32 times in the FFWPU’s special reports to the “True Mother (Han Hak Ja)” between 2018 and 2022. The report also identified her as the best choice to be Japan’s prime minister. The opposition parties may demand that Takaichi explain her relationship with the FFWPU.
 
Third, the JIP allowed its local leaders to avoid paying their own health insurance premiums, an evasion scheme premised on the theory of an exception for board members of any incorporated association. The party has expelled these leaders, but the fallout will hurt the JIP’s effort to keep to its target of 38 seats in the Lower House. As seen in 2024 election, some scandals of the leading parties may slow down their campaigns.

Japan's Prime Minister Announces a Snap Election

https://craj.jp/

With a New Competitor

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 19, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on January 19 that she would dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) on January 23 and hold a general election of the House on February 8. In anticipation of Takaichi’s election decision, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito established a new party named Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) [中道改革連合] to cooperate in the coming election.
 
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), decided to hold gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Osaka on February 8 as well to promote the Osaka Capital Initiative, JIP’s unique policy. Although the prime minister and the major parties claim that the elections will promote the well-being of Japanese citizens, the politicians are takin these actions for their own survival.
 
Asking Public Endorsement for the Administration
In her press conference on the 19^th, Takaichi explained that she would ask voters for their fundamental support of her administration that was established only last October and of her decision to form a coalition with JIP. “This is a decision for the people to make on which direction Japan will go,” Takaichi said. The political vacuum created by a snap election, however, will delay the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill and measures to protect against price inflation. Takaichi dismisses this concern by claiming that they were included in the supplemental budget delivered last December.
 
Takaichi’s goal in the Lower House election is to achieve a simple majority -- 233 seats out of 465 -- for the LDP-JIP coalition. She indicated that she would resign if the coalition did not hit that target. But the leading coalition already has this majority. The premiership is always at stake in a Lower House election.
 
Takaichi thus will dissolve the Lower House for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo. This fact raises the question of why she wants a snap election. Moreover, the election will not change the composition of the Upper House where the leading coalition is short of a majority.
 
Takaichi must believe that the election will boost her coalition’s voting power in the Lower House, aligning the composition of the Lower House with her popularity in the opinion polls. Takaichi has repeated slogans from her 2025 platform such as “responsible and proactive public finances” and “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”
 
These policies require the approval of both chambers of the Diet. Takaichi has attempted to accelerate these policies by taking advantage of her high approval ratings in national polls. Also at issue in the election is her proposal of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food – a key populist issue. Consumers are deeply worried about the future of price inflation as reflected in a survey by the Bank of Japan, in which over 80 percent anticipate higher prices a year from now.
 
Another purpose of the snap election is to increase supporters around Takaichi. The LDP reportedly favors restoring “double nominations” of those lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal of the now-former Abe factions in the LDP.  The double nomination is a system that enables a candidate who lost in a single-seat district to nevertheless win a seat through a proportional district. The option was denied to most members of the now-former Abe faction in 2024 election. Takaichi surely hopes to fortify her position by making it easier for former allies of Abe to gain seats.
 
Takaichi also wants to solidify her right-wing position by obtaining the endorsement of the coalition she assembled last year. She refused to admit that it was a mistake for her to have let Komeito leave the leading coalition last October. If the election goes her way, Takaichi will have popular approval for a new coalition, and she will be able to promote such conservative policies described in the agreement with JIP as amending the self-defense provisions in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, limiting imperial succession to a patrilinear line, and endorsing the official use of nicknames instead of introducing separate surnames of married couples.
 
All this agenda can be achieved without a snap election, if Takaichi can get support from some opposition parties. There is speculation that she decided for an election because she: 1) had failed to persuade the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) to join the leading coalition, 2) China’s pressure on Japan would seriously impact Japan’s economy, and 3) was caught in her own scandal exposing her relationship with the former Unification Church.
 
Takaichi heavily relies on her popularity to remove those negative elements sticking around her administration. She needs a reassurance for her administration. Her message to the voters of the snap election must be “Do you love me, or someone else?” But it causes an accusation among parties that her decision for a snap election is abuse of power given to the prime minister.
 
Integration of Opposition Parties
Takaichi’s decision on a snap election had two unexpected side effects. Their impact on the coming election is hard to assess. The first was the combination of the CDPJ and Komeito in the Lower House, establishing the CRA. They published their policy platform on January 19, which included sustainable economic policy, formulation of a new social security model, building an inclusive society, realistic diplomacy and security policies and continuing reform of political funds and elections. Note that the combination is only in the Lower House; the CDPJ and Komeito remain as independent parties in the Upper House.
 
The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, and the Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, are co-leaders of the CRA. Both parties expect their Lower House members to leave their parties and join the CRA. CDPJ currently holds 148 seats in the Lower House and Komeito has 24. If all their members join the CRA, it creates a substantial group of 172 lawmakers in the House, which, while still a minority, can contend in a meaningful way with the LDP-JIP coalition, which holds 233 seats.
 
Noda revealed that he has been approaching Komeito ever since Komeito left the leading coalition with the LDP last October. Even though it was the biggest opposition party, the CDPJ unable to lead the opposition parties against the ruling LDP over the years. For its part, Komeito needed another partner to survive the next election, having rejected the support of the LDP. Both parties have some common policy concerns on their agendas, such as the regulation of corporate political donations and the introduction of selective separate surnames.
 
Noda and Saito stressed that their intention is to form a group of centrists. Komeito left the leading coalition to protest the ascendancy of right-wing leadership in the LDP led by Takaichi. The LDP went further rightward by launching its coalition with the JIP.  On the left, the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi pursue such eccentric policy positions as the total abolishment of the consumption tax.
 
The CDPJ and Komeito plan to position themselves between the right and left to offer an alternative to the LDP-led government. Noda and Saito plan to approach the DPP and moderate lawmakers in the LDP to join them.
 
Distinguishing themselves from the rise of populism in Japanese politics as seen in advance of Sanseito, the CDPJ and Komeito have several firm supporters. These include the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) for CDPJ and the Buddhist organization, Soka Gakkai, for Komeito. Backed by these groups, Komeito will support former CDPJ candidates in single-seat constituencies in the coming election. Komeito will focus on proportional districts and not field any candidates in single-seat districts. This decision could be a major threat to LDP candidates whose principal advantage in past elections has been the support of Komeito.
 
For all that, the new party could prove a disappointment. In the most recent poll by Asahi Shimbun, only 20 percent expected CRA to be a serious contender against the Takaichi administration; 69 percent thought that it would not be.
 
Local Election for Osaka to Become a Second Capital
The second by-product of Takaichi’s decision was the JIP’s unilateral decision to hold local elections in Osaka on the same day as the Lower House elections. The JIP’s leader, Hirofumi Yoshimura, resigned as Governor of Osaka and announced that he would run in the gubernatorial election – a race that was brought about by his resignation. He is doing so with the intent of gaining the voters’ endorsement of JIP’s “Osaka Capital Initiative.” The JIP’s vice-leader and the mayor of Osaka city, Hideyuki Yokoyama, took the same course.
 
The “Osaka Capital Initiative” aims to integrate the governments of the Osaka prefecture and Osaka city to create a special autonomous government in Osaka. The initiative is modeled on the government of metropolitan Tokyo. JIP sought voter approval of the initiative through referenda in 2015 and 2020, but voters rejected it twice. Yoshimura once said that he would not seek a third chance as a politician after the loss in the 2020 referendum.
 
Yoshimura’s frequent and sudden policy changes are within his discretion as JIP leader. When he decided that JIP would form a coalition with the LDP, Yoshimura shifted his legislative priority from the regulation of political donations to the reduction of seats in the Diet. His stepping down is recognized as a request for public endorsement of this policy change.
 
The voters in Osaka city will vote for three elections for the Lower House, governor of Osaka and mayor of Osaka on February 8. Yoshimura and Yokoyama expect high voter turnout for the triple elections. Some observers including JIP members ask why the two leaders feel the need to step down and run again in the by-election if it is simply for the purpose of gaining voter support for their unilateral policy change. Other major parties, including the LDP, will not field any candidates in the two elections.
 
Takaichi’s sudden decision to call a snap election for her survival induced unusual responses by other parties. Neither the election nor the responses will appeal to citizens who are frustrated with how the national government has managed economic and security policies. Rather, these events are for the politicians and parties themselves. A Lower House election costs 80 billion yen.
 
Abrupt moves in the new year reflect the situation in today’s politics in Japan, which is filled with populism, jingoism, and political maneuvering. The politicians’ actions distance the government and the parties from the Japanese who, the majority who suffer from the unstable economy.