Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts

Monday, October 26, 2026

Takaichi's Vulnerabilities

Yana’s Scandal Exposes Takaichi’s Weaknesses

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 18, 2026

After hesitating for two weeks, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi replaced her Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana, with Arata Takebe, a former state minister of agriculture. Takaichi’s two-week indecisiveness about Yana’s status revealed her weaknesses in two things: positioning her staff and Diet affairs. Her inability to act quickly stems from her lack of experience as the supreme leader of Japanese politics.

When the weekly magazines Daily Shincho and Weekly Bunshun (online edition) reported on September 30 on Yana’s speech and his pork-barrel (or reverse pork-barrel) politics, Takaichi, surprisingly, did not consider firing him. She said that he would make amends for the scandal by his hard work as minister. But once the magazines published other scandals that could violate other laws, Takaichi decided to move. It took two weeks for Takaichi to understand the seriousness of Yana’s conduct.

Lack of Close Allies
It is likely that Takaichi appointed Yana in the September reshuffle of her cabinet because he was one of her few allies. When Takaichi was the Chairwoman of the LDP Policy Research Council between 2021 and 2022, Yana supported Takaichi in his capacity as a director on agriculture policy. Takaichi respected Yana’s knowledge about agriculture policies. Yana submitted his proposal to be agriculture minister to Takaichi, and Takaichi accepted it.

Usually, a prime minister orders his or her staff to conduct thorough background checks on the people under consideration for ministerial positions. Yana made his troubling speech in May. Other doubts about Yana’s failure to follow election norms, such as a shuttlebus service to campaign rallies and financial awards to the campaign’s telephone solicitors, had arisen earlier during his election campaign in February. Takaichi could have (and should have) known about Yana’s inappropriate conduct before she appointed him as agriculture minister in September. Her failure must have meant that she did not have a staff to advise her on the backgrounds of her ministers.

While Takaichi was thinking about letting Yana stay at his position, LDP lawmakers were hoping for his quick replacement. Yana’s scandal had the feel of pork barrel politics, which LDP lawmakers are attempting to excise. Takaichi failed to realize that the LDP was concerned that Yana’s scandal would ignite broader criticisms of LDP politics.

During the time when the Ministry of Finance is formulating the national budget for the next fiscal year, ordinarily every December, local business leaders visit Tokyo to meet with their local Diet members to request appropriations for roads, bridges, ports, or other business infrastructure. If their request is granted, the local leaders will work for the lawmaker in his or her election campaign.
The lawmaker can ask the ministries how the budget is being allocated but cannot demand specific favors on the budget. However, consultations about the budget will exert pressure on the ministries. If a ministry has a project that requires the lawmaker’s political support, then the bureaucrats in the ministry can formulate a budget advantageous to the lawmaker. This is an interdependence between the politician and the bureaucrat.

Takaichi does not have experience as LDP secretary general, a position that oversees election and Diet affairs. Takaichi simply described Yana’s cynical speech as “unhip” in her discussions with opposition parties in the Diet. But Yana’s reference to the budget incident in his speech as an example of his influence over the budget was a necessary move for a lawmaker who lost in his single-seat district in the last election, even though it was inappropriate in a moral perspective. It must be hard for Takaichi to imagine Yana’s electoral weakness.

Novice in Diet Affairs

Another failure of Takaichi was that she did not decide to replace Yana until opposition parties united to attack Yana and Takaichi in the Diet. Typically, a prime minister replaces a minister mired in scandal on a Friday before it can affect the schedule and media coverage in the coming week. However, Takaichi let the matter linger and did not fire Yana until Wednesday October 14. She had to face harsh criticism from the opposition parties on the scandal and was held accountable for her appointment of Yana.

The highest priority for Takaichi in this Diet session is passing bills to cut the consumption tax on food. The LDP Diet Affairs Committee has had to scurry to schedule the discussion on the tax cut bill. Takaichi’s late decision on Yana jeopardized the schedule. The LDP Diet affairs team had to negotiate with the opposition parties on a new schedule and managed to reach an agreement to begin the discussion on October 20.

With no career in Diet affairs, Takaichi does not understand the delicacy of negotiations over the Diet’s schedule. The Diet has many unwritten rules. All the parties in the Diet share a common interest in a detailed examination of such significant issues as a consumption tax (and its reduction). The Diet often requires the prime minister’s attendance, which may often become a condition of taking the final voting for a bill. But Takaichi whines about the frequency of her appearances, frustrated that they interfere with her busy life of doing her make up, bathing in the early morning, and cooking.

The leading parties are discussing reducing the amount of time a prime minister must spend before the Diet. But it is up to Takaichi to manage the issues that need detailed consultation with the Diet.

Oddly enough, the approval ratings for the Takaichi Cabinet did not show a steep decline, even after she replaced Yana. Asahi Shimbun reported only a one percentage point decline to 50 percent, while Yomiuri Shimbun showed a two-point loss to 57 percent. These results indicate that many the Japanese do not understand Takaichi’s accountability for the appointment of Yana as agriculture minister.

Sunday, October 18, 2026

Takaichi's Agenda Stumbles

Takaichi Caught Between a Staff Scandal and U.S. Pressure

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 12, 2026


Although Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is trying to focus on the economy during the Diet’s fall session, two unexpected issues, one domestic, the other international, have upset her agenda. Irritated about Takaichi’s handling of a scandal concerning the Agriculture minister, opposition parties have slowed the procedures for considering bills. Meanwhile, U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) have paralyzed Takaichi’s diplomacy with the U.S. despite her unwavering support for President Donald Trump. The prime minister now faces the hardest time since she took the seat a year ago.

In her October 5 policy speech, Takaichi introduced an old Chinese expression called Keisei-saimin [経世済民], which could be interpreted as “Good governance saves the people.” This saying became the etymology of “economy [経済]” in Japan. The faction led by former premier Noboru Takeshita, Keisei-kai [経世会], was named after this phrase. By using the idiom, Takaichi hoped to show her determination to decrease the consumption tax and tackle price inflation.

It was remarkable for Takaichi to refer to the political principle of the former Takeshita faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) because it had been a political enemy of the former Abe faction, or Seiwa-kai [清和会], with which Takaichi herself had once been affiliated. Takaichi has begun to distance herself from Abe in other ways as well.  

In Diet discussions, she has distinguished her economic policy from past reflation policy. Reflation had been a fundamental element of Abenomics. But U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s demand that Japan stop the reflation has taken precedence. Thus, while keeping with such Abe-oriented diplomatic policies as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Takaichi is departing from other of Abe’s political stances.

Opposition parties are still skeptical about Takaichi’s economic policy. Komeito and the Democratic Party for the People have requested in Diet discussion a greater distribution of public benefits rather than a consumption tax cut to deal with price inflation. Takaichi has insisted that a consumption tax cut is the best policy in terms of sufficiency and swiftness. However, she has not yet answered the question of how she has found or will find fiscal resources for the tax cut. She has said only, “Don’t worry.”

Although Takaichi had expected to discuss economic policies in the Diet, opposition leaders did not allow it by asking why Takaichi had appointed Kazuo Yana as the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in her September cabinet reshuffling. Yana had boasted in May that, earlier in the year, he, as an individual Diet member, had cut the national government’s budget for road construction in two municipalities in his electoral district – in retaliation for their mayors’ support of Yana’s rival in the February Lower House election. Admitting his remarks were inappropriate, Yana retracted the comment, inviting further criticism about eating his words.

While a lawmaker can check the policies of ministries, influencing a specific policy may be incompatible with his obligations as a representative of all the people. Yana’s interference in national budget work to take revenge against the mayors was the opposite of that. Yana’s comment ignited a traditional skepticism of pork barrel shenanigans by LDP politicians through shadowy relationships with the ministries.

In response to a request that she dismiss Yana, Takaichi insisted on keeping him in his position, arguing that the budget had in fact been appropriately distributed to local governments. Although the prime minister usually replaces a cabinet member who becomes embroiled in scandal, Takaichi chose the opposite course. [Yana resigned Wednesday, October 14.]

Not only the opposition parties but also members of the LDP question her decision to retain Yana. LDP Executive Acting Secretary General, Koichi Hagiuda, criticized Yana’s speech as arrogant and intolerable. Opposition parties are united in sponsoring a censure motion in both chambers of the Diet. The opposition parties have a tough road ahead in the Lower House since the LDP has a majority, but they may have a chance to pass the censure motion with a majority in the Upper House. The opposition parties have also decided to refuse to discuss bills related to Yana in the Upper House. With this atmosphere it is uncertain whether Takaichi can get a consumption tax cut through the Diet.

Further pressure on Takaichi has come from the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio who announced sanctions on the ICC. “We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate,” Rubio said in a statement. The sanctions are highly unpopular in Japan ever since the ICC’s Japanese president was targeted with personal sanctions in August.

Takaichi left a short comment on her social media account, expressing a “deep concern” on the sanctions decision of the U.S. Japan also joined the joint statement of foreign ministers of European countries and Canada which regretted and strongly disagreed with U.S. sanctions. Takaichi endorsed the statement but has taken no further action at the leaders’ level so far.

By now, Takaichi is one of the few world leaders who wholeheartedly support Trump. In her meeting with him in October 2025, Takaichi praised Trump as the only leader who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. She even nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Through such unstinting loyalty, Takaichi has put herself in a position in which her criticism of any Trump policy would not make sense.

The Diet begins discussion of economic measures at the Committee on the Budget in the Lower House this week. If Yana remains in place, Takaichi will be asked about her responsibility for naming him agriculture minister in which position he can control the budget for farmers or the price of rice. On the diplomatic side, the Trump administration seems to be aligning the U.S. with Russia in the war in Ukraine. Such a commonality of interests might lead to other coordinated actions, such as opposition to the ICC. Whether Takaichi can find a way to break through and preserve Japan’s independence deserves scrutiny.

Asia Policy Events, Monday October 19, 2026


10/17-19 - Annual Fall Rites held at the Yasukuni Shrine. Visits and offerings by rightwing Diet members and Cabinet officials. PM Takaichi does not visit as she has in the past.


BOOK TALK: TECH-GEMONY: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY ECONOMY. 10/19, 9:30-10:30am (JST), 10/18, 8:30-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University Japan Campus. Speaker: author Brad Glosserman, Senior Advisor, Pacific Forum; Moderator: Robert Dujarric, Co-Director, ICAS, Temple University Japan Campus. PURCHASE BOOK

THE IRAN CRISIS STOCKTAKE: WHO CAN SUSTAIN THE PRESSURE? 10/19, 1:00-2:00pm (BST), 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Speakers: Ali Ansari, Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI; Burcu Ozcelik, Senior Research Fellow for Middle East Security, RUSI; Jonathan Hackett, retired US Marine Corps interrogator; Mohammed al-Basha, independent Middle East analyst and founder, Basha Report Risk Advisory; Moderator: Jonathan Eyal, Associate Director, Strategic Research Partnerships, RUSI.

BOOK TALK: THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF IDEOLOGY ANALYSIS. 10/19, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Illiberalism Studies Program, George Washington University. Speakers: author Juliette Faure, Professor of Political Science, University of Lille; author, Mathew Humphrey, Professor of Political Theory, University of Nottingham; author, David Laycock, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Simon Fraser University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://link.amazon/B06y2GvJJ

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY AND NUCLEAR POWER IN JAPAN. 10/19, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Speakers: Hisashi Yoshikawa, Project Professor, Institute for Future Initiatives, University of Tokyo; Nobuo Tanaka, Chairman, Steering Committee, Innovation for Cool Earth Forum (ICEF); Moderator: Joseph E. Aldy, Professor, Harvard Kennedy School.

AUSTRALIA’S APPROACH TO RESEARCH AND INNOVATION SECURITY: PROTECTING OPEN SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION. 10/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Bart Hogeveen, Senior Fellow & Director Europe, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Moderator: Melita Phachulia, Executive Assistant, Institute for Security & Development Policy.

PRESS CONFERENCE: HOW JAPAN CAN RESPOND TO A TAIWAN CRISIS. 10/20, 11:00am-Noon (JST), 10/19, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Professional Activities Committee, Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speaker: Katsuya Yamamoto, Director, Strategy and Deterrence Program and Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

If you would like to see the full week of Asia-relevant events and happenings, subscribe to the weekly Asia Policy Calendar. Only $100/year via this LINK.

Sunday, October 11, 2026

Consumption Tax Cut is Back at the Forefront

The Extraordinary Session of the Diet Begins


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 5, 2026


An extraordinary session of the Diet was convoked on October 5 with closure scheduled for December 12. The top priority for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is a consumption tax cut that would begin in April 2027. However, Takaichi faces the headwind of a scandal inside her administration and reservations about her diplomatic skills.
 
Ordinarily, such a Diet session in the fall is to discuss a supplemental budget for the Japanese economy or for dealing with an unexpected event such as a natural disaster. However, Takaichi has no plans so far to submit a supplemental budget bill. Indeed, she previously declared that she would not propose any supplemental budget and would integrate all the budget items into an annual budget that begins every April. Forgoing a supplemental budget should improve the efficiency of private business activities by improving the predictability of government spending.
 
Hence a consumption tax cut is the focus of this session. The Takaichi Cabinet made an official decision on the tax cut in mid-September: it will seek to reduce the consumption tax rate on food from eight percent to one percent for two years starting next April. The government will also establish a new system to subsidize job-hunting efforts by low-income families, instead of a refundable tax credit.
 
The leading coalition, the LDP and its partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, forcing the two parties to seek some help from opposition parties. LDP and JIP expect Komeito, which left the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in September, to vote yes on the consumption tax cut bill.
 
However, the situation among the opposition parties is extremely complicated. The CRA lawmakers who had joined the party from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) have since established a new party, the Democratic Reform Association (DRA). The DRA and Komeito then have organized a parliamentary group in the Lower House. Although the CDPJ and Komeito have not launched a similar project in the Upper House and continue to work separately there, it is up to Komeito whether to take a position closer to the CDPJ or to the LDP on the consumption tax cut proposal.
 
In addition to enacting the consumption tax cut, the LDP/JIP coalition hopes to reduce the number of Diet seats. The JIP has been calling on the LDP to implement their agreement made in October 2025 to reduce the number of seats in the Lower House by ten percent. The two parties failed to pass such a bill in either the extraordinary session of last fall or the special session earlier this year. Several members of the LDP are skeptical of JIP’s hard push for seat reduction.
 
The seat reduction proposal has led to an unusual unification of the opposition parties because all 45 seats to be eliminated are in proportional districts of the Lower House and thus work against small parties. If the LDP and JIP decide to ignore opposition complaints and take advantage of their super majority in the Lower House to pass the seat reduction, Komeito may oppose the consumption tax cut bill in retaliation. A multi-partisan group of lawmakers, including some from the LDP, submitted their opinion to the council for election reform, which argued that the 45-seat reduction would be baseless.
 
Controlling the procedure in the Diet will be crucial for Takaichi, who is reluctant to join the Diet’s discussion of the bills. The newly appointed Chairman of the LDP Council on Diet Affairs, Hideki Murai, supports Takaichi’s hesitancy and may negotiate to reduce her appearances before the Committee on Budget. But if Murai fails, the opposition parties will be further emboldened to oppose the leading coalition.
 
The Committee on the Budget has been a venue for discussing political scandals. Weekly magazines have reported that, before taking the position as Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Kazuo Yana threatened some municipalities in his electoral district with cuts to their road construction budgets. The mayors of those cities supported another candidate in the last election in February. Yana’s possible involvement can be interpreted as blackmailing political opponents.
 
Yana is one of the lawmakers who received kickbacks from a former Abe faction in the LDP. His punishment was exclusion from a leadership position in the LDP for six months. Nevertheless, Takaichi allowed him to return to the leadership group by appointing him as minister in her cabinet reshuffle in September. She must have thought the kickback scandal was over. However, in an Asahi Shimbun poll, 68 percent considered it a problem that Takaichi had begun to appoint lawmakers embroiled in the funding scandal to ministerial positions. Mishandling of the Yana scandal may affect Takaichi’s approval rating.

Takaichi’s limited diplomatic skills have also raised concerns. A member of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa was arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of a robbery from and the murder of a Japanese woman. The government of Japan has expressed its extreme regret to the U.S. However, Takaichi has not taken the matter up with U.S. President Donald Trump. Takaichi once said (in what she must now recognize as a grave mistake) that Trump was the only person who could bring peace and prosperity to the world. If she remains wedded to this view, she will show her irresolution about protecting Japanese citizens, and her public image will deteriorate.
 
Takaichi still has not improved bilateral relations with China that resulted from her careless speech on the Taiwan contingency in the Diet last November. Some lawmakers are trying to normalize Japan-China relations. This is not within Takaichi’s repertoire. Her missteps in diplomacy will give challengers a window to consolidate their opposition to her reelection as the LDP president in the fall of 2027.

Asia Policy Events, Monday October 12, 2026

Today is a national holiday in the United States, Canada, Japan, Cambodia, Fiji, and Samoa.

10/12 - IMF Flagship Book Launch: Shaping the Future of Asia: Opportunities and Challenges examines how the Asia-Pacific region can sustain its remarkable economic success as it confronts profound structural challenges to established patterns of economic development and growth.
10/12 – Sports Day, National Holiday, Japan.
10/12 - Columbus Day, National Holiday, US/Thanksgiving, National Holiday, Canada.
10/12-15 - 65th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-65), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
10/12-18 -  World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings, Bangkok, Thailand. 

TRILATERAL US-JAPAN-TAIWAN COOPERATION ON PHYSICAL AI. 10/12, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Chair, Hudson. Speakers: Jeremy Chih-Cheng Chang, CEO, Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology; Ken Fukuda, Director for AI Industry Strategy, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan; Emma Rafaelof, Director, Global Policy, Semiconductor Industry Association; Moderator: William Chou, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson.

THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE NEXUS. 10/12, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Cato Institute. Speakers: Hajar Hammado, Senior Policy Advisor, Demand Progress; Sascha Meinrath, Palmer Chair in Telecommunications, Penn State University; Alex Marthews, National Chair, Restore the Fourth; Patrick G. Eddington, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute. 

LANDMINES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DETERRENCE, AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. 10/12, 3:00-4:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair, Hudson; Lieutenant General (Ret.) In-bum Chun, Senior Fellow, Association of the United States Army; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Advisor, Geopolitical Risk and Research, The Asia Group; Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

If you would like to see the full week of Asia-relevant events and happenings, subscribe to the weekly Asia Policy Calendar. Only $100/year via this LINK.

Monday, October 5, 2026

Japan's Diplomacy Overshadowed

Takaichi Obscured by the Trump-Xi Summit

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 28, 2026


A week ago, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi hoped to display Japan as the leader of the Asia-Pacific region – backed by the unshaken support of the United States. She outlined her position during a 30-hour visit between September 21 and 23 to the United Nations in New York. She needs to rebuild her diplomacy, which has not been going very well since her comment on the Taiwan contingency last November. However, her effort was overshadowed by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.S. and his meeting with President Donald Trump at the White House.
 
The official purpose of Takaichi’s trip to the U.S. was to give her first speech at the annual General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In her address, Takaichi emphasized Japan’s commitment to the rule of law. “Since the end of the Second World War, Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has attached great importance to the rule of law in the settlement of any disputes,” she said. In this case, “rule of law” is a veiled reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
 
At home, Takaichi has received considerable backlash to her indecisive response to U.S. sanctions on Tomoko Akane, the Japanese president of the ICC. Takaichi needs to reverse the downward trend in the approval rating for her cabinet. By pledging unwavering support for the ICC, Takaichi distanced herself from Trump, who called the ICC “the out of control institution” in his speech to the UNGA.
 
Diplomacy based on democratic values is a crucial element for Takaichi to distinguish Japan from China. She promotes the concept of a “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific (FOIP) that was initiated by her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. When Abe proposed this doctrine in 2016, China was extending its power throughout the world under the brand name “One Belt One Road.” The brand covered China’s advance to the South China Sea, which was found unlawful by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, a month before Abe proposed the FOIP. Abe hoped to use the FOIP to counter China’s territorial aims.
 
Former premier Fumio Kishida revised the FOIP in 2023 to apply it to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Kishida reiterated that Ukraine today would be East Asia tomorrow. Takaichi has now updated the FOIP again to explain Japan’s effort to secure an international supply chain, which was impacted by the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and by China’s weaponization of rare earths exports. Thus, the FOIP is a diplomatic tool for Japan to use to counter China’s growing influence in the world.
 
Takaichi also quoted from the FOIP in her meeting with Trump at the U.N. Headquarters just before her UNGP speech on September 22. “I appreciate Donald’s strong commitment to the Japan-U.S. alliance,” she said at the meeting. Takaichi tried to remind Trump of the fact that Japan should be the closest partner for the U.S. in Asia, hoping to deter Trump from making any excessive concessions on Taiwan in his meeting with Xi two days later.
 
However, rather than fostering the Japan-U.S. relationship, the meeting highlighted differences between Japan and the U.S. Takaichi told Trump that Japan had been and would in the future support the ICC, knowing that Trump was calling on countries to withdraw from it. Trump expressed concern about the depreciation of the Japanese yen. Takaichi did not refer to any discussion of Taiwan in her press conference after the meeting.
 
To her regret, the meeting between Trump and Xi on September 24 and 25 must not have been what Takaichi had hoped it would be. Xi urged Trump to oppose the independence of Taiwan, and Trump did not say how he had responded. Trump also did not say whether the U.S. would resume exporting weapons to Taiwan. “He understands very much how I feel,” Trump said after the meeting.
 
On regulation of artificial intelligence, on which both countries compete, Trump and Xi agreed to establish a body for bilateral dialogue. Both leaders hoped to minimize the difference between them. Fundamentally, however, both leaders were responding to domestic concerns. Trump must show that he can manage the China relationship to attract voters in the mid-term elections in November. For his part, Xi must show at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 that China is a great power equivalent to the U.S. Trump and Xi confirmed that they will have two meetings later this year, at APEC in China and at the G20 in the U.S..
 
Trump’s and Xi’s exchange of their views of World War II history – not necessarily those of trained historians – must have been a nightmare for Takaichi. In the welcoming ceremony, Trump noted the long-running close relationship between both nations – a contentious one that began only 50 years ago – and called them “allies in World War II,” a war that had ended 30 years earlier.” Xi replied at the state dinner that both nations “stood shoulder to shoulder in the fight against Japanese militarist aggressors.” The White House fact sheet on Xi’s visit also explicitly noted the wartime alliance.
 
Takaichi did not respond directly to their characterizations of history, stressing instead the firmness of the Japan-U.S. alliance even after the history of brutal warfare. In her speech to the UNGA Takaichi’s only historical reference was to call for the rescission of the “enemy states clauses” (Article 107 and parts of Articles 53 and 77) from the UN Charter, which apply to the Axis powers defeated in WWII, including Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, as well as Japan.
 
Takaichi and her rightwing supporters hope that time has obscured Japan’s war history of atrocities and criminality. They believe that the Abe administration’s active revision and questioning of historical facts has caused painful memories to fade. Today, they believe, Japan should be only remembered as the war’s loser – devastated by relentless bombing and two atomic bombs.
 
However, Xi took the opportunity to emphasize that China and the U.S. were allies against an invading Japan, creating a bond “forged in blood and fire.” Trump agreed. Japan’s lingering war history and insufficient apologies resonate with Americans as they do with the Chinese. The past year’s identification of American POW remains from the war found in Tokyo, Taiwan, and the Philippines* and the POW’s hometown burials have revived memories of Japanese viciousness.
 
The negotiations between the two major powers -- over Taiwan’s status, the development of AI, and the interpretation of history – presumably will take place, regardless of Japan’s concerns. Takaichi once described her diplomacy as “flourishing on the world’s center stage,” tracking the aim of former premier Abe. The Trump-Xi meeting, however, and whatever its long-term outcome, revealed that Japan is marginalized by practice and history in the U.S.-China power game.


*Remains of American POWs of Japan who died in Takao (Kaohsiung), Taiwan; Subic Bay, the Philippines; Cabanatuan, the Philippines; and Tokyo, Japan who were buried in mass graves as unknowns after the war in the Manila American Cemetery in the Philippines and the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii have been identified recently by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency. Hundreds of hometown burials with full military honors have taken place across the U.S. reviving memories of the War.

Saturday, September 26, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday September 28, 2026

TAKEAWAYS FROM THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT: THE ECONOMIC SECURITY ANGLES. 9/28, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Sujai Shivakumar, Director and Senior Fellow, Renewing American Innovation, CSIS; Philip Luck, Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair, International Business, CSIS; Kate Koren, Deputy Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair, International Business, CSIS; Ilaria Mazzocco, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Trustee Chair, Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Lauryn Williams, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, CSIS.

THE SECOND TRUMP-XI SUMMIT: TAKEAWAYS FROM THE US, CHINA, AND RUSSIA. 9/28, 9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program, Stimson Center; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Director, China Program, Stimson Center; Peter Slezkine, Senior Fellow and Director, Russia Program, Stimson Center.

AF BRIG. GEN. TIMOTHY M. HELFRICH. 9/28, 1:00-2:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speaker: Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Helfrich, Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fighters and Advanced Aircraft, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Air Force Materiel Command; Moderator: Heather Penney, Director of Studies and Research, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

PROTECTING UKRAINE'S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE, FOCUSING ON WINTER, WAR, AND LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. 9/28, 2:00pm, 188 Russell Senate Office Building. Sponsor: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission). Speakers: Meredith Berger, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations, and Environment); Michael Kofman, senior fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Alex Riabchyn, Chief International and Sustainability Officer, Naftogaz Ukraine. 

BOOK TALK: IS CHINA'S ECONOMY BROKEN? 9/28, 4:00-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS. Speakers: author Logan Wright, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS, Broken China: How the Economic Miracle Shattered and What It Means for the World; Dinny McMahon, Head of China Markets Research, Trivium China; Tianlei Huang, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE); Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR); Moderator: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS. PURCHASE BOOK

CHINA’S LAW ON PROMOTING ETHNIC UNITY AND PROGRESS. 9/28, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speakers: Aaron Glasserman, Distinguished Fellow, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Tenzin (Tendor) Dorjee, Director of Research & Advocacy, Tibet Action Institute; Rayhan Asat, Senior Legal and Policy Advisor, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

JAPAN’S RESIDENCY RULES: WHAT HAS REALLY CHANGED AND HOW DO THEY COMPARE WITH OTHER PLACES? 9/28, 6:00-9:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS); Japan Expert Insights. Speakers: Yuta Kato, Certified Administrative Procedures Legal Specialist (Immigration Attorney), IMS Legal Professional Corporation; Maximilien Xavier Rehm, Postdoctoral Assistant, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University, Kyoto; Ben Tanaka, Founder, RetireJapan; Moderator: John Bradford, Executive Director, YCAPS.

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

Japan’s Opposition Cannot Hold Together

Centrist Reform Alliance head Junya Ogawa 
Japan’s Main Opposition Party Fragments


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 7, 2026


Japan’s largest opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), determined to dissolve and separate itself into two groups: the former Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and the former Komeito. Although the party had hoped to be an alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet, the CRA failed to find common ground between ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members on crucial policies, or to invite some members in other parties including the LDP. Fragmentation of the opposition will encourage Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to continue exercising arbitrary power to promote her conservative agenda.
 
Lower House members of the CDPJ and Komeito formed the CRA last January. It was an attempt to counter the LDP in Takaichi’s snap election in February by consolidating the votes of supporters of the CDPJ and Komeito. But the strategy failed because the voters regarded the merger as a maneuver not for confronting Takaichi’s policies but merely for the two parties’ survival. The CRA emerged from the February election with only 49 seats – a 70 percent loss from its pre-election seats of 167.
 
Although the CRA leaders expected the Upper House lawmakers in the CDPJ and Komeito to join immediately after the Lower House election, the Upper House members of the CDPJ hesitated. Members of Komeito, which had left the leading coalition with the LDP in the fall of 2025, were willing to join, but the CDPJ was reluctant because of basic policy differences. The CDPJ has taken liberal stances on security legislation that would include a right of collective self-defense right, construction of nuclear power plants, and building new military base in Okinawa. Komeito has stayed its conservative course on these issues. Neither party expressed much interest in compromise.
 
The CRA set a deadline for the merger at the end of August, to prepare a unified party able to compete in local elections in April 2027. But the local organizations of the CDPJ resisted an integrated campaign with Komeito since it had been an enemy for decades. The leaders of the CRA, CDPJ and Komeito officially agreed to abandon the merger in early September and to separate the party between its ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members.
 
The method of separation is unique and complicated. The former Komeito lawmakers will leave the CRA and return to Komeito. The former CDPJ members will join with the current CDPJ members in the Upper House to establish a new party. However, a single former CDPJ lawmaker will remain in the CRA to maintain its party status.
 
The CRA depended heavily on public funding to support its political activities. The party expects to receive 2.34 billion yen in 2026 and in fact has already accepted half the amount, 1.17 billion yen. If the CRA disappears, the rest of 1.17 billion yen will not be delivered. Hence one lawmaker in the CRA, which will be enough to maintain its eligibility to receive the remaining funds later this year. The leader of CRA, Jun-ya Ogawa, explained that the funding will be used to retire CRA’s debts for the election campaign in February.
 
The new party organized by the former CDPJ and CRA members will succeed to the funds assigned to the CRA shell. Komeito will not receive any of the funds. It is remarkable that the government will pay the funds to a single-member party that will not take any effective political activity. The CRA has in the past accused the LDP of mismanagement of its political funds, but the CRA is now vulnerable to criticism of its control of its own funds.
 
Regardless of former party memberships, it is expected that the lawmakers who leave the CRA will form a parliamentary group in the Lower House. However, those lawmakers still differ on some important policies. Whether and for how long the new parliamentary group can take integrated actions in the Diet remains to be seen.
 
The LDP, which does not have a simple majority in the Upper House, expects Komeito to cooperate on such issues as the consumption tax cut. Takaichi pushed her conservative agenda, including a national statutory prohibition on national flag vandalism, in the last session of the Diet. Takaichi and the LDP are likely to approach Komeito for support on defense budget increase or constitutional amendment. In the meantime, the opposition parties are further fragmented from the far right to the far left.
 
Historically, the CRA has had a much smaller presence in the Diet than other earlier opposition parties. In 1960s, during the Cold War era, the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, occupied 30 percent of the seats in the Lower House. The New Frontier Party, established after of its members left the LDP, won 31 percent of votes in Lower House election in 1996. The Democratic Party of Japan won 26 percent of seats in the election in 2000. By contrast, the CRA had only 10 percent of Lower House seats, and now these seats will be divided. Trouble in the opposition parties thus enhances the power of LDP – without the LDP having to do anything.

The CRA's break up is welcomed by the Takaichi's administration. The unraveling of the opposition, as witnessed in the combined CRA dissolution and the LDP win in the Okinawa gubernatorial election, will solidify Takaichi's rule. If the CRA had found a way to remain unified, it could have presented a meaningful alternative to the LDP and Takaichi's military build-up.

The CRA had received over 10 million votes among the proportional districts in the February election. Although this was only half of those for the LDP, they did represent 18 percent of the overall vote--no small voice in the Diet. The CRA did not consider the power of that political will in their rush to put an end to their union.

Sunday, September 13, 2026

Asian Art Events in September

PURCHASE BOOK
Jeju Biennale, SOUTH KOREA, 8/25-11/15, 2026.

Busan Biennale, SOUTH KOREA, 8/29-11/1, 2026.

Gwangju Biennial, SOUTH KOREA, 9/5-11/15, 2026.

BOOK TALK: KINKAKUJI AND KITAYAMA: SPACE, PLACE, MONUMENTS AND MEMORY IN JAPAN 1222-1994. 9/10, 7:00-8:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author, Thomas Conlan, Professor of East Asian Studies and History, Princeton University; Mimi Yiengpruksawan, Professor of Art History, Yale University; Moderator: Nick Kapur, Associate Professor of History, Rutgers University-Camden. PURCHASE BOOK

Autumn Asia Week New York, UNITED STATES. 9/10-18, 2026.

Geraldine Javier’s “State of the Nations” Exhibition at Silverlens Gallery, UNITED STATES. 9/10-10/24, 2026

CURATOR'S TALK: STROLLING TOGETHER IN THE WORLD OF CHINESE ART. 9/15, 6:30-8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: China Institute of America. Speakers: Annette Juliano, Research Associate, Institute for the Study of the Ancient World, New York University; Alfreda Murck, Visiting Professor, Department of Art History and Archaeology, Columbia University; David Sensabaugh, Head, Department of Asian Art, Yale University. 

BOOK TALK: IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE: ART IN OCCUPIED JAPAN. 9/23, 3:30-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Department of History of Art, University of Pennsylvania, UNITED STATES. Speaker: Alicia Volk, author, Professor, Japanese Art, Art History and Archaeology, University of Maryland. PURCHASE BOOK

Art Formosa (Taipei), TAIWAN. 9/25-28, 2026.

Ha Chong-Hyun: Retrospective, Asian Art Museum of San Francisco, UNITED STATES. 9/25, 2026-1/25, 2027.

Wednesday, September 9, 2026

Japanese Budget Disquiet

Takaichi’s Unlimited Budget Request Causes Concern


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 7, 2026

 
Japan’s Finance Ministry (MOF) closed budget requests from the ministries for FY 2027 at the end of August. Because Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi removed the limits on requests for investments in projects that could contribute to economic growth, the total number of requests significantly exceeded last year’s. These expanded budget requests, suggesting that Japan wants to provide more economic stimulus, have made the markets uneasy, as seen in the steep rise of long-term bond yields. The United States has warned Japan to adjust its fiscal policy to stop, if not reverse, these increases.
 
The MOF wraps up budget requests for the coming fiscal year at the end of August every year. The ministry examines these requests and formulates an annual budget bill by December. The Diet discusses the bill in its ordinary session normally convoked in January. The leading parties hope to pass the budget bill by the end of March; the budget would then govern projects in April or thereafter.
 
If the government needs to spend more on unexpected events, for example, recovery from a natural disaster or support for urgent economic stimulus, the government will formulate a supplemental budget in the fall. Takaichi wants to abolish the supplemental budget process to make the level of governmental spending more predictable for businesses. It is likely that her approach reflects the views of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), for which economic growth is everything.
 
Historically, an annual budget has been formulated based on MOF’s estimation of the government’s tax and other revenues over the next year. Embracing a well-known principle of “calculate income, regulate outgo,” the MOF allots portions of the expected revenue to every ministry. This allotment process effectively caps the budget request of each ministry. It is the reason the annual budget request is called a “ceiling.” Through the allotment process and the examination of budget requests, MOF controls government spending and has earned the status as “the most powerful ministry.”
 
METI-leaning Takaichi hopes to reform this system. Regardless of the estimate of next year’s revenue, she ordered each ministry to submit a budget request without regard to the ceiling, at least insofar as the ministry’s expenditures above ceiling would contribute to economic growth or crisis management. The Ministry of Defense made the largest ever request at 8.9 trillion yen for projects including the introduction of AI in command and control. METI increased its own requests to support businesses on AI, semiconductors, and robotics.
 
It is not strange that the total amount of budget requests hit a new record. It swelled to 143.06 trillion yen, exceeding the previous year’s total by 20.75 trillion yen. Uncapped requests for investment amounted to 12.17 trillion yen. The MOF explains that this amount is the sum of the annual budget and the supplemental budget in FY2027. However, the amount still exceeds the sum of these two budgets in FY2026, which was 140.61 trillion yen. There is no guarantee that the government will not need a supplemental budget for an unpredictable natural disaster next year.
 
The greatest concern, however, is Japan’s payments on its government bonds. The total estimated expenditures in FY 2027 for the redemption and payment of interest on outstanding government bonds is at a record high 36.63 trillion yen. With the recent trend of policy interest rate increases by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the payments for government bonds are expected to increase. The assumed yield rate for government bonds is 3.8 percent in FY2027, 0.8 percentage points higher than in FY2026.
 
Concern about Japan’s lack of fiscal discipline was immediately reflected in the long-term bond market. Bond prices fall as yields rise. The ten-year government bond yield hit three percent, the highest level in the last thirty years. It happened on the next day when the MOF closed budget requests. Expectations that the BOJ would hike the policy interest rate that the rise in crude oil prices would increase price inflation also caused bond yields to go up and bond prices to drop.
 
A rise in the long-term bond yield in Japan can be linked to a similar rise in the U.S. longer-term bond rate. U.S. Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent said on September 1 that he expected Japan to “do the right thing,” effectively pressuring the BOJ to raise the policy interest rate. Referring to the success of former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s reflationary policy in stimulating the Japanese economy, Bessent said that Japan “should actually let that run and stop the reflation” in his press conference after the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank chiefs in Asheville, North Carolina.  That is, Bessent implied, Japan should cease further stimulus and direct its fiscal policy toward lowering inflation.
 
A reflation policy typically consists of expansive fiscal policy and monetary easing. The Abe administration used this policy to get rid of deflation. It is obvious that the current problem of Japan’s economy is not deflation, but inflation. Nevertheless, Takaichi has decided that what was good for Abe will be good for her, and she is trying to mobilize the national budget for investments to spur even greater economic growth and to pressure the BOJ not to raise the policy interest rate. Her economic policy, called “Sanaenomics,” looks to be facing opposition from the markets and the U.S.

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

JAPAN UPDATE - View from Australia

                          Japan Update 2026

Australia-Japan Research Centre

Australian National University


Wednesday 9 September 

9 AM - 5 PM (AEST, UTC+10)

Tuesday 8 September

7 PM - 3 AM (EDT)

in-person and live streamed on Vimeo

Please indicate whether you will attend in person or online (via live stream on Vimeo) at the checkout. All attendees will receive a confirmation email with instructions for accessing both the in-person and online events


PROGRAM

Registration & tea and coffee (8:30-9:00am)

Welcome (9:00am)
Shiro Armstrong, Director, Australia-Japan Research Centre, The Australian National University

Introduction
Rebekah Brown, Interim Vice Chancellor of The Australian National University

Opening Keynote
Tim Ayres, Minister for Industry and Innovation and Minister for Science

Vote of Thanks
HE Kazuhiro Suzuki, Japanese Ambassador to Australia

The New Normal in Japan's Economy (9:45-10:45am)
Keynote: Koji Nakamura, Bank of Japan
Chair: Ippei Fujiwara, University of Tokyo and Keio University
Katrina Di Marco, Deputy Secretary, Treasury

Morning Tea (10:45-11:15am)

Foreign Policy and Political Choices (11:15-12:45pm)
Chair: Lauren Richardson, The Australian National University
Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia and Taipei School of Economics and Political Science
Naoko Eto, Gakushuin University
Tomohiko Satake, Aoyama Gakuin University
Evelyn Goh, The Australian National University

Lunch (12:45-1:45pm)

The State of Japanese Studies in Australia (1:45-3:00pm)
Keynote: Sawako Shirahase, University of Tokyo
Chair: Simon Avenell, The Australian National University
Nana Oishi, The University of Melbourne
Kent Anderson, The Australian National University
Carolyn Stevens, Monash University

Afternoon tea (3:00-3:30pm)

The Next 50 Years of the Australia–Japan Relationship (3:30-4:50pm)
Keynote: Peter Drysdale, The Australian National University
Chair: Geraldine Doogue, Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Kate Kitagawa, La Trobe University
Shiro Armstrong, The Australian National University
Melissa Conley Tyler, The University of Melbourne

Closing and Thank You (4:50-5:00pm)
Ippei Fujiwara, University of Tokyo and Keio University
Simon Avenell, Director, Japan Institute, The Australian National University

Saturday, August 29, 2026

An American Progressive View of Asia

Matt Duus
INTERVIEW: U.S. Progressive Leader Eyes Greater Cooperation with China

First published in JiJi Press, 8/17/2026, reprinted here for educational distribution

Washington, Aug. 17 (Jiji Press)--A United States guided by progressive foreign policy would seek to improve cooperation with countries around the world, including China, said Matt Duss, a prominent progressive thought leader in the United States, in an interview with Jiji Press this month.

   The recent electoral success of left-wing candidates in the United States has led to growing interest in progressivism within the country. Although progressivism is usually associated with domestic reforms intended to reduce inequality and increase social justice, its foreign policy tenets are less widely understood.

   "As a progressive, I take the ethic of solidarity seriously. I think we live in an interconnected world," said Duss, executive vice president at the Center for International Policy, a progressive think tank based in Washington. "Our security and prosperity should not come at the expense of the security and prosperity and safety of communities elsewhere."

   In terms of security, Duss calls for a re-evaluation of the U.S. force posture globally, saying that the presence of U.S. troops creates less stability in some regions such as the Middle East. He sought to reassure, though, that any changes to the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance would be done in close consultation with the Asian ally.

   "I think we need to pay close attention to the debate within Japan. There's obviously a lot of concern within Japanese society about the continuing U.S. troop presence. I think we should take that seriously with Japan as a partner democracy," he said. "I think one thing that we can promise is that a progressive administration would not act precipitously in making these decisions."

   Duss, who previously served as foreign policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders, arguably the leading voice in the American progressive movement of the last 10 years, says that, while he is sympathetic to the concerns of some in Asia over the rise of China, it is incumbent on the world's two largest economies to find ways to coexist to bring stability and safety to the region and the world.

   "But I think it's a mistake to characterize the (U.S.-China) relationship mainly as competition. There is going to be cooperation. I would hope there will be more cooperation than competition, and I think the United States needs to really press forward to identify those areas of cooperation."

   While citing climate change, pandemics, and global development as areas ripe for increased cooperation with China, Duss rejects the orthodoxy of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that China's massive global infrastructure project intended to connect emerging markets and developing nations with Beijing, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, is economic warfare.

   "Many people here in Washington see this as a threat," Duss said. "They see these regions as an arena of competition with China. I don't think it's necessarily right to characterize that all as competition."

   Overall, progressive foreign policy differs most from the trade and economic strategies of the past by focusing on the needs of working families and communities ahead of the "elite establishment."

   "I don't want to pit American workers in some kind of zero-sum competition against workers in China or Japan or anywhere else in the world. I think we need a kind of new global trade order that really puts the needs of workers front and center."

   While Duss foresees a significant shift in trade policy under a progressive administration, he does not stray far from long-standing strategy in terms of Taiwan, perhaps the most strategically sensitive issue in the U.S.-China relationship. Instead of saying how a progressive U.S. administration would react to an invasion of Taiwan, Duss emphasized the need to maintain the current admittedly "unsatisfactory" status quo.

   "I think the best course forward is to lower the temperature to make clear that the United States does not support any kind of military solution by either side, we maintain a 'One China' policy, (and) that this issue should be resolved peacefully," he said, largely echoing existing U.S. policy.

   While there will be points of disagreement between the United States and China, such as Taiwan or the "absolutely atrocious" treatment of its Uighur minority population, Duss asserts that preventing ties from worsening is in everyone's interest.

   "(In) a relationship that is so broad and multifaceted and so consequential for the entire global community, I think the focus needs to be on identifying areas of cooperation and coexistence between the United States and China," he noted.

Monday, August 24, 2026

Another Japan Resource

 

A NEW JAPAN RESOURCE

JapanHands

JapanHands is a free, online public resource highlighting Japan-focused organizations and events to (for) English-speaking audiences.

Through an online directory, an events calendar, and a newsletter, JapanHands says it "aims to cultivate a wider and more inclusive generation of  'Japan Hands' "—individuals with the knowledge, relationships, and experience to engage meaningfully in Japan’s interactions with the world community. It hopes to expose its viewers to a broad and sympathetic view of "things Japanese."

Organizations can register at no cost and post their events on the shared calendar. The public can freely access all listings, programs, and opportunities on the site. JapanHands is an open, inclusive hub for anyone interested in Japan-related activities in North America and beyond.

JapanHands is a passive site that depends upon the initiative of its viewers and participants to enroll their organizations and to publicize their events. Corrections and updates are also the responsibility of contributors.

Developed by the National Association of Japan-America Societies (NAJAS), in partnership with the American Friends of the International House of Japan (AFIHJ) and with generous seed funding from the United States–Japan Foundation, JapanHands represents a long-term investment in the infrastructure and public diplomacy that supports Japan’s engagement with the U.S. and the world.

Through these links, you can search the organization directory, browse for events, and subscribe to the newsletter for occasional updates. Here you can apply to list your organization in the directory. Currently, the directory is light on policy and academic organizations. Also not listed are the many Japanese governmental and business organizations that are in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles.

OTHER ONLINE RESOURCES ON THINGS JAPANESE