Showing posts with label JCP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JCP. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 5, 2026

Takaichi’s Legislative Strategy Unites Opposition

Three Reasons for This Diet Session’s Unusual Procedure


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2026

 
The Diet decided to extend the term of the current special session for eight days with approval of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Although these leading parties have been trying to pass all the bills submitted by Sanae Takaichi Cabinet before the end of the term set on July 17, the boycott of discussions by the opposition parties made it impossible. The opposition parties accuse Takaichi of mismanaging the Diet. This abnormality was brought about by Takaichi’s arrogant administration of the Diet, JIP’s insistence on its own agenda, and the opposition parties’ unusual unification against leading coalition.
 
Takaichi’s Capriciousness
This is a very unusual session of the Diet. The ordinary session 2026 was convoked on January 23 and ended the same day because Takaichi dissolved the House of Representative to hold a snap election. After the Lower House election on February 8, the Takaichi administration set a special session. Although a special session is ordinarily convoked for a few days to elect a new prime minister, Takaichi set a 150-day term from February 18 to July 17 to discuss the fiscal year 2026 budget and tackle other critical issues. The Diet did not work between January 23 and February 17.
 
During the final weeks in the current session, Takaichi was unwilling to attend the Diet discussion. After opposition parties criticized her for defamation in her LDP presidential campaign last October, Takaichi refused to answer their questions in the Diet. The opposition parties, holding a majority in the Upper House, boycotted the Diet discussion in late June and early July. The leading parties were unable to pass all the bills by July 17, the regular end of the current session.
 
Takaichi prioritized passage of the revised Imperial House Law and the National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act in the final phase of the session. The LDP has not been active in extending the Diet session. Every year, lawmakers get back to their hometowns after the ordinary session to meet their supporters, to reinforce their political base, and to prepare for the next election. Extension of the Diet session will reduce their chances to cultivate their voters in the local districts.
 
The LDP nevertheless submitted a motion to the Diet to extend the term of the current special session for the passage of some important bills. The Diet Law provides that an ordinary session can be extended once and an extraordinary or special session twice. The LDP has a majority in the Lower House and not in the Upper House. If the two chambers of the Diet reach different decisions on an extension, the decision of the Lower House controls.
 
The extension of the current session for eight days was thus approved by the votes of   the LDP-JIP majority coalition in the Lower House. The opposition parties blamed the extension on Takaichi’s mismanagement of the Diet schedule. If she had not dissolved the Lower House, and if she had not refused the discussion on her defamation scandal, the parties would have had enough time to discuss all the bills. It was Takaichi who delayed the schedule.
 
JIP’s Insistence on Its Own Agenda
The opposition parties’ boycott of discussion was based on another reason. The leading coalition unilaterally decided to start discussion on the bills for reducing Lower House seats and for introducing a “backup capital” bill. Discussion on a bill usually starts with an overwhelming consensus among the parties. But in this case, the leading parties ignored the protest of the opposition parties. The two bills are strongly supported by JIP.
 
Established in 2012, the JIP had been a determined opposition party, pushing for political reforms. Forming the leading coalition with LDP led by Takaichi in 2025 changed everything. The JIP needed a cause to join the coalition and decided that reduction of Diet seats would be its top priority. JIP leader and the Governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, labeled the issue “political reform 101.” Yoshimura believed that the seat reduction would receive wide public support because it would lead to a reduction in governmental spending for the Diet.
 
Opposition parties had reason to oppose the bill. The bill includes the reduction of forty-five seats in the proportional districts of the Lower House. That reform of the election system would work against small opposition parties which are heavily dependent on proportional districts. It also did not make good sense for the House to reduce its seats at the initiative of the governor of Osaka. Not only the opposition parties but some lawmakers in the LDP were skeptical about the bill. Takaichi finally decided to postpone the seat reduction bill to the next session.
 
JIP still hopes to enact the Backup Capital Act in the extended term of the current session of the Diet. While the law enables local prefectures and cities to have stronger authority for governance as the Tokyo Metropolitan Government currently possesses, most lawmakers believe that the system of backup capital will help the Osaka Capital Initiative, which JIP has been promoting since its establishment.
 
Opposition parties have criticized JIP’s strong push for the bill, arguing that the law only benefits Osaka. They demand a detailed examination of the bill in the Diet, which requires weeks of discussion. Although the leading coalition passed the bill in the Lower House with the approval of Team Mirai, they have still not secured a majority in the Upper House. The leading parties have not yet decided whether to extend the term of the current session again.
 
If the LDP fails to enact the two bills for seat reduction and a backup capital, the JIP may lose its major cause for staying in the leading coalition with the LDP. Although the merits of leading coalition should be greater than leaving it, the JIP is worried about its political power shrinking, as they are growingly dependent on the LDP’s leadership. Voters in future elections may regard JIP as a supplemental group of LDP. It would be a major concern for the LDP whether the JIP stays or goes.
 
Unusual Unification of Opposition Parties
When the leading coalition unilaterally began discussion over the Lower House seat reduction and the Backup Capital Act, the opposition parties took united action to stop the unilateral procedure in the Diet. They requested impartial treatment of the bills by the leaders in both chambers. The possible crucial impact of seat reduction on small opposition parties made that concerted action possible.
 
The action included a wide range of parties. The highly conservative Sanseito and the far-left Japan Communist Party joined the frontline in protesting capricious management of the Diet by leading coalition. Adding to those two parties, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), and Team Mirai demanded that the chairman (from JIP) of a Lower House committee not start discussion on the seat reduction bill. When the chairman declared that discussion had begun, those opposition parties boycotted the committee.
 
Ironically, JIP’s push for a seat reduction bill unified opposition parties from the right to the left. This unification became a threat to the leading parties, causing them to think which other bills would be blocked by the opposition parties.
 
However, the opposition parties are not completely united against the leading parties. The CRA, DPP and Sanseito voted yes to revisions to the Imperial House Law, while JCP and some others opposed it. The National Flag Vandalism Punishment Act passed the Diet with the approval of DPP and Sanseito, but the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Komeito, JCP and Reiwa Shinsengumi opposed. The coalition of opposition parties is still limited to some specific bills.

Saturday, July 12, 2025

Japan's Upper House Elections I

Parties Campaign on Three Policy Differences


By Takuya Nishimura,
APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 7, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s Upper House election season opened on July 3 with the vote to take place on July 20. This election is overwhelmingly about two issues: support of families suffering from price inflation and international relations, specifically with the United States. In addition, the management of political funds by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be front and center for many voters.

Protection against price inflation has largely taken the form of a debate over the consumption tax. Voters are divided over possible measures to reduce price inflation – so the parties have focused on this issue. In an NHK poll in May, 38 percent of respondants favored a consumption tax cut, while just two percent fewer, 36 percent, supported the current consumption tax rate. Eighteen percent wanted to abolish the consumption tax altogether.

Several opposition parties would reduce or eliminate the tax. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) proposes a zero percent consumption tax on food, which is their top priority. The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, insists that the government can eliminate this part of the consumption tax without an impact on government finances that would compel the issuance of new government bonds.

In a debate featuring party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2, Prime Minister Ishiba (the president of the LDP) asked Noda what financial resources would offset the consumption tax cut. Noda pointed to two areas: the surplus in the governmental funds that are reserved for special policy purposes and the foreign exchange fund special account. Noda also said that other, unspecified tax measures could be revised.

The CDPJ has estimated that eliminating the consumption tax on food would reduce tax revenues by five trillion yen a year. Noda said in February that his party had found a 7.8 trillion-yen surplus in governmental funds. He also argued that much more of the government’s profits in foreign exchange could be included in the government’s general account. And he asserted that the special purpose tax on wage increase would increase the government’s revenues by 0.7 trillion yen. In the CDPJ’s view, all these resources would make a consumption tax cut on food feasible.

Taking a different approach, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) calls for halving consumption tax rate (from ten percent to five percent) on all goods on a time-limited basis. The cut would continue until the growth in workers’ wages exceeds consumer price inflation. But the party has not identified as specific budgetary resource for this tax reduction as what the CDPJ listed.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) favors another route: reducing the consumption tax rate on all goods to five percent before taking it to zero. But the party has not announced when the consumption tax will be repealed. Reiwa Shinsengumi, a small party with liberal policies, says that the government can offset these rate cuts by raising other tax rates and issuing government bonds.

The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) does not look to the consumption tax rate to protect against the effects of inflation but rather focuses on reducing premium for social insurance.

In lieu of any changes to tax rates, the LDP and Komeito propose to distribute twenty thousand yen to everyone and an additional twenty thousand yen for each child or a low-income family. The parties dismiss consumption tax rate reductions as unviable. To that point, in the debate at the JNPC, the chief representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, asked Noda about what would happen when the government resumes the current consumption tax rate, which in a sense becomes a tax increase. Noda did not provide a clear answer.

Turning to international relations, the opposition parties are critical of Ishiba’s management of foreign affairs. Just a few days before the start of election campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his frustration with the bilateral tariff negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. “Dear Mr. Japan, here’s the story: You’re going to pay a 25 percent on your cars,” said Trump. He also complained about the small amount of Japan’s imports of American rice, particularly given the rice shortage in the Japanese market.

In a mixed message yesterday, July 7, Trump sent a letter to Ishiba, saying that a 25 percent tariff on all Japanese goods would apply on August 1 unless the countries reach an agreement before then. Trump had previously set a deadline of July 9 for the conclusion of tariff negotiations, so his letter extends the negotiating timeline. Interestingly, the deadline is ten days after the election.

In the JNPC debate, Noda asked Ishiba how he planned to resolve these negotiations. Ishiba did not specify a way forward but stressed that Japan’s unique position as the biggest national investor and biggest job creator in the U.S. “The success of Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel means that they can deliver good products with their technology and U.S. Steel’s labor force. I think our position with the U.S. is more about investment than tariffs,” Ishiba said. When Noda recommended another summit talk with Trump as soon as possible, Ishiba simply repeated that he would protect the national interests of Japan.

The Trump administration has demanded that Japan increase its defense budget to cover the costs of expanding its military and of hosting the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. At the JNPC debate, the Chairwoman of the Japan Communist Party, Tomoko Tamura, observed that a swollen military budget would not be compatible with social security policies. When Ishiba rejected Tamura’s argument for failing to recognize Japan’s security situation, Tamura accused Ishiba of ignoring suffering families.

On another foreign policy note, the debate covered Trump’s recent reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump compared those events to the recent U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities as tactics that ended a war. (In the case of Iran, a ceasefire would count as an ending.) Ishiba refrained from criticizing Trump. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, rejected the comparison.

The greatest single reason for the LDP’s major defeat in the Lower House election last October was the party’s mismanagement of political funds. That weakness remains. Ishiba failed to reach a consensus with the opposition parties on the regulation of donations from companies and organizations during the ordinary session of the Diet. The issue surely will weigh in the voters’ decision later this month.

The opposition parties have different views on the question of political donations. The Japan Innovation Party urges a total ban on corporate and organizational donations, while the CDPJ would allow donations from some organizations. The DPP fundamentally opposes any ban on donations. As seen in their mistake of fielding multiple candidates in single-seat districts such as Nara, Shiga or Fukui, the fragmentation of the opposition parties may help the LDP.