The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.

Kishida’s Official Visit to the U.S.

No Surprises,  No History Here

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 14, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point 

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s official visit to the United States, April 8-12, was billed as an effort to keep the U.S. engaged in the Indo-Pacific. China’s aggressive behavior in the region may seriously affect Japan’s national interests, thus justifying a closer alliance with the U.S. The trip’s success, however, will be measured by its boost to Kishida’s popularity, now at an historic low. This may be difficult.

Kishida agreed with U.S. President Joe Biden that the Japan-U.S. alliance has reached unprecedented heights. The Joint Leaders’ Statement, released after the summit meeting on April 10, declared that the “core of our global partnership is our bilateral defense and security cooperation under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which is stronger than ever.”

The definition of the Japan-U.S. alliance has been revised several times. The treaty, signed in 1960, limited the role in the Far East of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan. Article VI of the treaty provides that “[f]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”

Then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (Shinzo Abe’s grandfather) determined that the “Far East” included “approximately north of the Philippines and the area surrounding Japan, including the area controlled by the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan).” His declaration came at a time when Japanese politicians could not call the Japan-U.S. relationship an “alliance [domei].” It was generally referred to as an “arrangement [kyotei]” or “relationship [kankei].”

The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1978 dealt with the response of U.S. Forces and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to an armed attack on Japan. The alliance was still limited to contingencies in Japan.

The Guidelines were revised twice. In 1997, both governments added responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The “areas surrounding Japan” was controversial; a public debate ensued on whether the term would violate Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 9 prohibits the exercise of collective self-defense. In the end, the alliance was extended from Japan to somewhere around it. At this time, Japanese officials began to refer to the alliance as an "alliance (domei)."

The second revision in 2015 extended the framework of cooperation to the world. The 2015 revisions stated that “Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.” Kishida signed the Guidelines in his capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The joint statement by Kishida and Biden, entitled “Global Partners for the Future,” can be read as an updated version of the 2015 agreement. The two leaders announced several new strategic initiatives, including upgrading the respective Japan and U.S. command and control frameworks. The upgrades will enable of the two countries to integrate their operations and capabilities and to have greater interoperability.

Another of Kishida’s initiatives is building relationships with like-minded partners in the region. AUKUS – Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. – will consider cooperation with Japan on advanced capability projects but not necessarily on the development of nuclear submarines. The joint statement refers to military exercises among the U.S., Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as to regular U.S.-Japan-UK exercises.

The target of the updated alliance is obviously China. Kishida and Biden confirmed their commitment to the development of AI, quantum technology, semiconductors, and biotechnology, as well as to secure supply chains of crucial minerals.

The joint statement welcomed the achievements of the Kishida administration, including an increase of the defense budget to two percent of GDP by FY 2027, the development of counterstrike capabilities, and its work in establishing a Joint Operations Command in JSDF.

It has been a question why Kishida, who presents as less hawkish than former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, would introduce these policies. Events after Kishida took office in 2021 support them, notably Russia’s attack on Ukraine, which generated public concern about authoritarian regimes including China and North Korea. In a poll taken by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2023, 90.5 percent of the respondents thought that the security situation in East Asia had gotten worse in recent years.

Kishida did not forget to include in the joint statement the U.S. commitment to defend Japan under Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In his address to a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress on the 11th, the day after the summit, Kishida observed that “Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow.”

Nine years ago, Abe also spoke about the Japan-U.S. alliance at a joint meeting of Congress (April 29, 2015, the birthday of late Emperor Hirohito). “Enemies that had fought each other so fiercely have become friends bonded in spirit,” he said, supporting the U.S. “rebalancing” for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. “We must make the vast seas stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans seas of peace and freedom, where all follow the rule of law,” said Abe.

“I detect an undercurrent of self-doubt among some Americans about what your role in the world should be,” said Kishida, encouraging the U.S. to continue playing its role in world affairs. Noting that freedom, democracy and the rule of law are in the Japan’s national interest, Kishida urged the U.S. to work together for these values and said that “You are not alone.”

Those might be the words Kishida said to himself in the airplane on his way home. Many in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are frustrated with Kishida’s decision not to punish himself for his role in the slush fund scandal. Public anxiety is swelling as Kishida attempts to tackle the country’s low birth rate. Consumer price inflation continues even after the Bank of Japan ended its negative interest rate policy.

Significantly, Kishida’s defense policy has not made it through debates in the Diet. In 2022, by contrast, revisions to three security documents, including one for counterstrike capabilities, were simply a decision of the Cabinet, and did not require major amendments of law.

The Abe administration faced strong opposition to his revisions to security legislation in 2015. Although Kishida has been active in reinforcing security policy, he lacks solid public support. A poll by Kyodo News, conducted after the Japan-U.S. summit, showed a small rise in the approval rate for Kishida’s Cabinet to 23.8 percent (+3.7 points), but it marked the sixth consecutive low below 30 percent. It is worth watching to see how Kishida will implement the words in his visit to the U.S.

Japan’s quiet rearmament

Shinzō Abe failed to overhaul Japan's pacifist constitution but the country will continue build its military might

by Jeff Kingston, Temple University Japan, APP member

Originally published in Prospect November 11, 2020 

In August, just four days after setting a record for the longest uninterrupted run as Japanese prime minister, Shinzō Abe announced that he would be resigning due to ill health. The 65-year-old had first been premier back in 2006, and had cut an instantly recognisable figure on the world stage—not only because of his distinctive quiffed hair, but also because of his approach to Japan’s wartime legacy. (Abe had visited controversial war memorials that honoured war criminals, and quibbled in Japan’s parliament, the Diet, about how much coercion was used to recruit the “comfort women” who were forced into wartime military brothels.) His more recent spell in office had begun in 2012, and he now signalled it was time to step aside, saying he didn’t want his worsening ulcerative colitis to interfere with his decision-making.

As well as giving Japan a level of stability at the top that it had not seen in years, Abe oversaw Japan’s recovery from the devastating earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima. His bold, multi-pronged “Abenomics” strategy promised to inject some life into the chronically anaemic Japanese economy; most experts were sceptical about its effectiveness even before Covid-19 struck. For a long time he enjoyed public standing as a man of action. Yet the once-popular leader had more recently dropped in the polls. He exited under a cascade of sordid revelations—cronyism scandals, cover-up allegations and close links with politicians indicted for bribery—which leave a tarnished legacy. For the man himself, however, there is little doubt what his biggest disappointment is: the failure to revise the pacifist Article 9 of his country’s constitution.

Written in 1947, under the supervision of the occupying Americans after the Second World War, Abe and other conservatives argue that Article 9 hampers Tokyo’s capacity to respond to the 21st-century challenges in its region, such as China’s hegemonic ambitions and North Korea’s nuclear weapons. In practice, Japanese governments—and the Abe government in particular—have circumvented the restrictions, but the deeper issue is more about identity: revising Article 9 was central to Abe’s ambitions to restore Japanese autonomy, pride and power. For those who regret the world’s turn towards nationalism and militarism in recent years, the collapse of the project might from a distance appear to offer a case study in hope. But does it really?

A family affair

Fundamental questions about Japan’s place in the world can be traced deep into the nation’s past. Between the early 17th and the mid-19th century, the country closed its doors under the policy of “Sakoku,” locking out most trade, diplomacy and other forms of international engagement, which ended only when US Commodore Matthew Perry forced his way in with a convoy of warships in the 1850s. At the turn of the 20th century, tentative democratisation and internationalism appeared to be advancing hand-in-hand, but the western-dominated world order remained profoundly racist towards Japan, and the effects of this—especially when compounded by the Great Depression—catapulted militarists into power. They shunted civilian politicians aside, moved first into Manchuria and then eventually into a wider war that aimed at the control of all China and subjugation of much of Asia and beyond, plunging Japan and the entire region into catastrophe.

The deep faultline over contested memories of the Second World War is the real starting point for today’s debate over Article 9. Liberals believe Japan’s wartime aggression was a tragic mistake, and they regard Article 9 as a guard against any resurgence of ruinous militarism, a reassuring talisman of the modern nation’s pacifist character. Conservatives like Abe want to rehabilitate this controversial history to allow contemporary Japan to become more assertive internationally.

The argument is both about symbolism and substance. The constitution’s practical strictures were sidestepped as long ago as 1954, with the establishment of the Ground Self-Defence Forces (GSDF)—to all intents and purposes an army, albeit one that operates with restraints. But that doesn’t detract from the intensity of pacifist sentiments. Indeed, it is precisely because the Article is so symbolic that it is—on both sides—a question of political identity.

For Abe, it was also about personal identity. Growing up in a powerful political family, he entered the Diet in 1993 two years after his father, a former foreign minister, had left. A couple of decades before, Abe’s great-uncle Eisaku Satō—who was, until the grand-nephew broke the record, Japan’s previous longest-serving PM—had successfully haggled with Richard Nixon to return administrative control of Okinawa prefecture, which since the Second World War had been commandeered by the US for military purposes. An even more significant influence, perhaps, was his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, who was also prime minister from 1957-60: as a wartime cabinet minister, he was heavily implicated in war crimes but never prosecuted.

“Under Abe, wartime history was literally rewritten in textbooks”

Abe treated the rewriting of wartime history as one aspect of unfinished family business. On his watch, school textbook accounts of forced labour, chemical and biological warfare, and the “comfort women” system have been toned down, pruned or removed, while in public discourse fellow revisionists artfully depict Japan’s 1931-45 rampage as a defensive war to liberate Asia from western colonialism. But the constitution was another aspect which rankled Abe even more. In office, grandfather Kishi resorted to literal strong-arm tactics in 1960 (having opposition politicians carried out of the Diet before holding a vote) in order to revise and extend the 1951 US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The process sparked mass demonstrations, and Kishi was ousted before he could realise his ambition to revise the constitution.

But that was 60 years ago. Kishi was operating in a nation still emerging from the immediate trauma of war, as well as the lingering shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The opportunities for his grandson to overturn the pacifist settlement, bolstered by fading memories, heightened regional threats and a less reliable ally courtesy of President Donald Trump should have been incomparably greater.

His biggest chance came in 2017, when his (traditionally dominant, if arguably misnamed) Liberal Democratic Party won a landslide victory that gave it, along with its coalition partners, two-thirds of the seats in both houses of the Diet. Here at last was the supermajority needed to push through a constitutional revision. But Abe had been too aggressive in his oft-stated desire to revise Article 9: polls recorded strong misgivings even among those who support that change about it happening on his watch. On top of this, his coalition partner, the Buddhist-affiliated Komeito, opposed any significant watering down of Article 9. Abe responded by incrementally whittling down his proposed amendments of the Article to a mere tweaking of the phrasing, adding a sentence recognising the nation’s military. But even this faced stubborn resistance. For most voters, more concerned about stagnant wages, rising taxes and a gathering recession, it looked like a distraction. Within Japan, there were never enough people who shared Abe’s fixation to overcome those who considered it an irrelevance or a bad idea.

After Abe formally stepped down on 16th September, his chief cabinet secretary Suga Yoshihide took over as prime minister, and is expected to remain in post until Abe’s term ends in September next year. In his former post, Suga was immensely powerful, combining the roles of chief of staff, government spokesman and party whip, acting as Abe’s pit bull in dealing with media critics and ensuring cabinet ministers stayed on message. Without Abe’s backstory and obsession, Suga is—like leaders around the world—currently more preoccupied with coronavirus and its economic fallout, which leaves constitutional reforms on the back-burner. Thus, Abe’s mission to revise the constitution has effectively been abandoned, but anxieties about North Korea, China and the US alliance persist. The country will now have to navigate them without having answered the question that underlay the whole constitutional argument: what is Japan’s place in the world?

Decades of double-think

Back in 1947, Washington wrote Article 9 into the constitution with a view to keeping a defeated and occupied foe at heel. But very soon, the US came to regret it—starting with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Japan’s prolonged colonial rule in Korea from 1910-45 meant that many veterans and officials had first-hand experience and knowledge that could have made it a useful partner. When the US demanded it rearm, Tokyo brandished Article 9 and shrewdly concentrated on industrial redevelopment. But it gradually began the manoeuvres that would make a fiction of the pacifist clause, establishing a relatively small, lightly-armed National Police Reserve in 1950, with 75,000 members; expanded to 110,000 men and renamed the National Safety Force in 1952; and then reconstituted and rebranded again as the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in 1954. Since then, under US pressure, Japan has gradually expanded its military capabilities while sidestepping constitutional constraints.

This strange situation—the existence of a powerful military which is theoretically banned by the constitution—clouds the Article 9 debate with cognitive dissonance. Japan now has a quarter of a million troops in uniform and, aside from the US 7th Fleet, the most advanced navy in Asia. On top of this, it has a large modern air force and an annual defence budget of about $50bn, which is similar to the UK and puts it in the top 10 nations for security expenditures.

Tokyo justifies this anomalous situation—while pleading compliance with its own constitution—through its membership of the United Nations, because the UN Charter gives every nation the right to self-defence. Abe stressed the absurdity of such sophistry to advance his demands to amend the constitution to reflect 21st-century realities and threats. Over the years numerous lawsuits against the article have been filed by citizens of very different leanings from Abe that have challenged the constitutionality of the SDF, notching up some victories along the way. But in the end, the Supreme Court has largely sided with the government’s interpretation. At the highest level, the country seems to have decided to have it both ways.

If this double-think has proved strangely durable domestically, there have been moments when it has looked like it could come unstuck diplomatically. During the first Gulf War (1990-1), Japan only contributed money in support of coalition forces, and it drew flak internationally for practising “ATM diplomacy” while leaving the heavy lifting to others, particularly embarrassing for a country so reliant on oil and gas imports from the Middle East. Unease about this “freeriding” saw Liberal Democratic Party heavyweights take up the cause of making Japan a more “normal nation” on military matters. The Diet passed legislation in 1992 allowing participation in UN peacekeeping operations under very strict rules of engagement. Later that year SDF members were dispatched in support of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and have participated in numerous peacekeeping missions since.

But this was never going to be enough for Japanese conservatives, or indeed for the US, which had originally imposed the constraints. In 1997, amid tensions between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan, US-Japan defence guidelines were negotiated, expanding what Tokyo was willing to do in support of the US in a conflict in the region. Previously, Japan was under no obligation to intervene, citing its constitutional constraints. The scope of Tokyo’s action under the newly-reciprocal arrangement was still limited to “areas surrounding Japan,” but this nonetheless created potential new licence for it to act to maintain peace or stability across the East Asia region. A military officially retained only for self-defence was later subject to more mission creep in the face of rising Chinese might—particularly in relation to tensions over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, claimed by both Beijing and Tokyo—and North Korea’s escalating nuclear arms programme.

“Although constitutionally pacifist, Japan still ranks in the top 10 nations of the world for security expenditure”

But the most drastic shift in Japan came under Abe, in 2014. On the anniversary of the establishment of the SDF, Abe unilaterally reinterpreted Article 9 to allow Japan to engage in collective self-defence, a stealth “revision” of Article 9, bypassing normal procedures for such amendments by simply changing the government’s interpretation, with potentially sweeping implications. Awkwardly, Abe’s handpicked constitutional scholars testified that the 2015 enabling legislation was unconstitutional, but the measure was forced through the Diet, and the Abe Doctrine came into being. Abe branded his country’s new stance “pro-active pacifism,” but this spin couldn’t draw its sting. The streets erupted with the largest protests since the 1960 rallies that had toppled his grandfather, with polls showing 80 per cent opposition to his security initiative.

In parallel, on the international stage, the US-Japan defence guidelines were again overhauled, greatly expanding once more what Japan agreed to do militarily in support of the US, while also removing the previous restriction to the East Asia region. The late US Senator John McCain—a former soldier and a powerful voice on defence—baldly spelled out that the new guidelines would commit Japan to sending in combat troops if conflict erupted on the Korean Peninsula, or if the US or its allies were under attack anywhere in the world. This was highly unpopular in Japan and Abe faced tough questioning in the Diet—but he prevailed.

By this point, Abe had radically changed the underlying terms of Japan’s defence policy. The logic now was collective self-defence, which in some ways resembles the logic that underpins Nato. This was a big shift, not at all welcomed by a public in fear of being dragged into conflict by Washington, and so Abe still had to tread carefully when it came to specific decisions about wielding real power. Earlier this year, Washington pressed Tokyo to join a US-led coalition patrol of the Persian Gulf; it wouldn’t have been hard for them to invoke “national interest,” since Japan imports nearly 90 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. But in the event, Abe—who was desperate to avoid a backlash that could snuff out his hopes of constitutional revision—demurred. Instead, he dispatched a single destroyer on an intelligence gathering mission, ostensibly acting separately from the US coalition while co-ordinating with it. When the most hawkish of Japanese prime ministers pulled back from an express request for help, the idea of Japan becoming like the UK, a dependable deputy sheriff to the US, was exposed as a pipe dream.

A monstrous paradox

Abe has come and gone, and pacifism is still a matter of national self-image. Anxiety about being dragged into war and Japan’s place in the world permeates popular culture, and yet here—as much as in politics—we can see a double-think at work. Just as the US hydrogen bomb test loomed over the launch of the Godzilla film series in 1954, four years ago Trump’s first presidential campaign provided a troubling backdrop to the latest instalment, Shin Godzilla. Trump had called into question the US commitment to the alliance with Japan, and suggested the country might want to develop its own nuclear weapons. The film, a blockbuster hit, portrays the Japanese government’s fumbling response to the notorious monster’s attack. The US comes across as an overbearing, self-seeking ally that puts its own interests ahead of Japan’s, threatening a nuclear attack on Tokyo to kill Godzilla in order to protect the US.

It’s only a film, and the bumper box office tallies arguably proved nothing other than the allure of an enduring, familiar monster. But some took it as embodying a feeling that Japan should get out from under the US thumb, stand alone and presumably rip up Article 9. Clearly, the public is anxious, and there is an abiding crisis of confidence that Abe didn’t quite dispel about Japan’s receding influence in a fraught region. The Trump years have only aggravated these anxieties since: Japanese confidence in US foreign policy plunged from nearly 80 per cent under Barack Obama to 24 per cent under Trump.

The 45th President is an aberration in many ways, but that did not harm him in an election where he held up better than expected. A poisonous campaign revealed an insular American mindset on both sides: Joe Biden may have been politer about traditional allies, but he didn’t talk about them much, nor in any sustained way did he challenge the presumptions of “America First.” Irrespective of the result, the US will remain in relative decline as a world power. Staking everything on it continuing to make sacrifices for Japan deep into the future looks like an obvious risk. And yet it was in his unwavering allegiance to a US partnership that Abe really ran aground, as his handling of the grievances of Okinawa demonstrates.

“Japan will not be shaken from pacifism by a nationalism that defers to the US”

Three quarters of a century after the devastating battle of Okinawa, American military facilities continue to cover around 17 per cent of the island’s land area, alienating locals because bases can be noisy, environmentally damaging and hotspots for crime. Two years ago, Okinawans voted against the US military presence in a series of local elections, installing the anti-base Independent Denny Tamaki as governor in a landslide victory over the pro-base candidate backed by Abe, a humiliation for a PM who had been determined to placate the Pentagon. In a local referendum held last year, 70 per cent of islanders voted against the construction of a new US base, and yet Abe proceeded with the ill-fated project anyway. As far as Abe was concerned, Japan lives in a dangerous neighbourhood and will inevitably, even as it builds up its own forces, continue to rely on US protection.

Herein lies a paradox that could be important for where Japan goes next. The country has an unequal, almost “client-state” relationship with the US in matters of foreign and security policies, and yet, for all their avowed nationalism, conservatives see the alliance as essential and the only option for countering the threats from North Korea and China. Progressives, by contrast, fear the country’s entanglement with the US could not only accentuate regional tensions, but also encroach on sovereignty, contravene the constitution and subvert democratic values. Abe and like-minded conservatives believe the days of pacifism are numbered: in a world of rising threats and fraying alliances, they argue it has already become a luxury that Japan can ill-afford. But just as deep-rooted pacifist norms come into contact with the reality that Japan’s increasingly well-armed country now has free rein to use force in all kinds of scenarios, so too the pro-Washington assumptions of right-wingers like Abe confront the unreliability and ebbing power of the US.

Japan alone?

The idea of “Japan alone” sends a shiver up the national spine, which renders a rupture of bilateral relations unlikely. Nonetheless, it is tempting to conclude that Shin Godzilla is more clear-eyed than politicians on either side of the constitutional divide. The film suggests relying on Japan’s own technological ingenuity, social cohesion, teamwork, indomitable spirit, and—yes—military power, but it does so on the assumption of a break with America.

In his 2020 biography The Iconoclast: Shinzō Abe and the New Japan, Tobias Harris concludes that despite his long tenure and control of the Diet, Abe leaves a slight and tenuous record as a statesman. As Abenomics sputtered and promises on gender equality and corporate governance went unfulfilled, the former prime minister squandered energy on his doomed efforts at constitutional revision.

From his own nationalist point of view, however, Abe leaves behind not only a country with a strengthened military but, thanks to the expanded US-Japan defence guidelines and enabling legislation, also greatly enhanced licence for his successors to use it. His failure to prevail in his symbolic struggle to bury pacifism might be better understood as his failure to understand that the strongest argument for doing so is America’s isolationist turn.

Japan will not be shaken out of its pacifist norms by a compliant conservative nationalism that automatically defers to the US. The pacifist clause was made in Washington all those years ago; it was slowly subverted at the behest of Washington in the long decades since and, if it is eventually abandoned, it seems a fair guess that the root cause will trace back to Washington once more. 

Abe After The Election

What To Do With Power?

By Daniel Sneider, Lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member

Tokyo Business Today, October 24, 2017

Shinzo Abe has once again defied his critics and proven himself to be one of the most skillful Japanese politicians of the post-war era. Facing scandals eroding his popular support, and a challenge from within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to his continued leadership, Abe opted for a frontal attack.

Calling early elections before his opponents were ready to seriously confront him, and taking advantage of the vague sense of impending crisis surrounding North Korea, Abe successfully re-established his power, in the country and in the ruling party.

Now the question is what Abe intends to do with that newly refreshed authority. Will he spend it on a possibly chimerical pursuit of his life-long goal of constitutional revision, or will he finish another part of his wartime time history agenda and make a peace treaty deal with Russia? How will he continue to manage the constant chaos created by U.S. President Donald Trump, who arrives shortly on his doorstep? And what indeed will happen with North Korea? Perhaps most important of all, can he ever fulfill his promises of economic revitalization of Japan?

“In policy terms, the impact of the general election will be limited,” predicts Tobias Harris, a leading American analyst for Teneo Intelligence. “The ruling coalition’s victory was a victory for stability and continuity,” he wrote just after the vote was counted. That means moving first on domestic policy issues such as passage of a supplemental and then general budget and a crucial decision on the Bank of Japan’s governorship. Constitutional revision will likely take a back seat to those priorities, Harris believes.

But Abe is a Prime Minster who sees foreign and security policy as his main legacy and those questions will be at the forefront of his concerns. Before tackling those other questions, however, it is important to understand what happened in this election. As exit polls make clear, once again, the Japanese voters present a paradox.

They supported the continuation of the LDP-Komei government but not its policies, nor even Mr. Abe personally. When it comes to constitutional revision, or tax policy, or even the purported threat of North Korea, the majority of Japanese voters either oppose Abe’s policies or do not fully share his views.

Rather, Abe has brilliantly exploited the electoral system that was created more than 25 years ago to drive the LDP out of power. The single member districts were intended to encourage the creation of a two-party system, to give voters a choice between two centrist parties in the style of American politics.

That worked well in 2009 when the Democratic Party of Japan offered a credible left of center alternative – and swept the vote. But the collapse of the DPJ administration splintered the opposition and now the system works instead to the advantage of an LDP that easily wins most of the SMDs despite the fact that it does not command a majority of votes.

Abe had a brief scare when Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike moved to try to fill the void created by the DPJ and set up a serious centrist alternative to the LDP. By calling the early election, Abe caught her off guard – and the campaign exposed her own arrogance and unpreparedness to lead a national party.

Ironically, it also destroyed the unwieldy DPJ and replaced it with a more cohesive leftwing party – one that may be very effective at mobilizing opposition to constitutional revision but, like the old Socialist Party, is unable to come to power by itself.

That leaves Abe in a somewhat odd situation. He has great power but he lacks the popular support to really wield it effectively.
When it comes to foreign and security policy, particularly relations with Japan’s only ally, the United States, a somewhat similar dilemma exists. Abe enjoys an almost unique position among American allies in having created a close relationship with President Trump. His senior advisors claim to wield an influence over Trump that is the envy of other U.S. allies. But that relationship depends on Abe consciously avoiding any challenge to Trump’s policies. Does his influence disappear the moment he crosses Trump?

The view of Trump inside the senior levels of Japanese officialdom, as conveyed to this writer in numerous conversations since coming to Tokyo last month, is typically pragmatic. There is no moral posturing about the threat to democracy posed by the Trump presidency.

Rather, as one Abe advisor put it to me, there are two basic conclusions held in Tokyo. The first is that Trump’s foreign and security policies are a mess, both in their content and in the lack of professional knowledge within the administration. Trump, in this framework, has no respect for the sovereignty of other countries, including Japan. However, the advisor goes on, after all we have to deal with this President -- we have no other choice.

That relationship will be put on full display on November 5 when Trump arrives for his brief visit to Japan. From a golf outing to private dinners, an audience with the Emperor, and a visit to Japanese and American military forces, the visit is designed to not only offer visual evidence of the close partnership but also to avoid any uncomfortable issues, such as trade. Officials on both sides are working overtime to ensure the success of the visit and there is no reason to think it won’t go well.

Under the calm surface, lies the iceberg of North Korea. Despite the talk of war that one hears increasingly in Washington – whether it is a preventive strike on North Korean missiles or other scenarios for conflict – Japanese senior officials continue to express confidence that the military option is not really on the table.

They see the threat of the use of force mainly as a tool to both press the Chinese into action and to deter the North Koreans from doing anything too provocative, such as testing a missile in the direction of the U.S. bases on Guam.

Indeed Japanese officials say they are more worried that Trump will make a deal with North Korea at Japan’s expense. They envision some kind of bargain in which North Korea agrees to halt the testing and development of long-range missiles that can reach the continental U.S. in exchange for a lifting of sanctions and perhaps a cutback in U.S. military exercises.

It is a deal that Trump could proclaim protects the U.S. and is the product of his policy of pressure, but one that would leave Japan and South Korea even more exposed to the nuclear blackmail and threat from North Korea.

Still, even those officials admit they worry about the possibility that Trump may opt for a military strike, one that would expose Japan to a possible North Korean response. Even in that situation, it is far from evident that Abe would defy Trump, a likelihood that concerns some Japanese policy makers. “Japan’s responsibility is to do something,” says a former Japanese senior foreign ministry official. “Japan should be more active and let Trump understand that you cannot destroy Japan.”

Anchored within the alliance system, there are some signs of Japan’s search for greater autonomy. Japan has asserted leadership in convening the talks among the signees of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the so-called TPP11 negotiations. Japanese negotiators are hoping to reach a deal among the TPP11 that can be announced at the Asia Pacific summit in Vietnam next month. Though Japan is hopeful that the U.S. will eventually return to join the TPP, they are also increasingly comfortable with playing this leadership role.

Abe also hopes to convene the long-delayed trilateral summit of Japan, China and South Korea in December. And he still is searching for a way to reach the long-sought agreement with Russia on a peace treaty, settling the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands. But that will require Abe to finally back down and agree to a territorial compromise along the lines of the 1956 talks – which he now has the power to do, if he wants.

These tentative steps toward Japanese leadership could fall apart, however, if Abe decides to use his newly restored power for the purpose of settling, at least symbolically, what he, echoing his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi, sees as the fundamental loss of Japanese sovereignty in the American-imposed constitution and its famous peace clause.

Mr. Abe has been compelled to offer a much watered down version of what he seeks to change in Article 9 – but he may chose to go back to the LDP’s original more ambitious goal of rewriting the entire clause.

It is evident, however, that a serious push for constitutional revision would trigger renewed tensions with China and South Korea, all amidst the North Korea problem. Nor is it clear that the Japanese public, not to mention the political system, is truly prepared to take on a long-stalled and potentially highly divisive debate about the postwar role of Japan in global security.

This election has once again put Abe in a position of almost unchallenged power, for now. But, as Spiderman put it, with great power comes great responsibility.

Japan’s constitutional rebirth or reincarnation?

By Jeff Kingston, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan. APP Member, Japan Times, May 13, 2017

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has boldly promised to revise the Constitution by 2020, to coincide with the Tokyo Summer Olympics, saying “That will be a year when a newly reborn Japan begins to move strongly forward.” However, the public doesn’t share his enthusiasm.

In terms of revising the Constitution, opposition is highest (50 percent) in the Asahi poll, followed by Nikkei’s 46 percent, Kyodo’s 37 and NHK’s 34. Support for revision ranges from 60 percent in the Kyodo poll (combining “necessary” or “somewhat necessary”) to 45 percent according to Nikkei, 43 percent from NHK (down 15 percent from 2002) and 41 percent in the Asahi. The Asahi Shimbun also reports that half oppose any revision at all under Abe.

For the war-renouncing Article 9, Asahi reports 63 percent as being opposed to revision; NHK gives 57 percent and Kyodo 47 percent. Those in favor of revising Article 9 range from 49 percent in the Kyodo poll to 29 percent in the Asahi and NHK’s 25 percent, down from 30 percent in 2002. NHK also reported that 82 percent found Article 9 very or somewhat useful for maintaining peace and security. Regarding the Self-Defense Forces, NHK found that 62 percent regard their existence as constitutional while 11 percent don’t, and 87 percent think that Japan is currently threatened, especially by North Korea and China.

Public attitudes may be discrepant, but Abe has an unprecedented opportunity to secure the two-thirds approval he needs in both houses of the Diet to set the stage for a public referendum, in which he would need only a simple majority to realize his long-standing dream.

The referendum law stipulates that a simple majority of votes cast can pass a revision, but it does not specify a minimum turnout of voters to validate a plebiscite. For example, revisions could be approved with the support of about 25 percent of eligible voters — about what the Liberal Democratic Party garners in national polls, in which turnout recently has hovered at just over half of eligible voters.

Abe hopes that this legacy project can be achieved by 2020, and with the “help” of Beijing and Pyongyang he might just pull it off. Coalition partner Komeito seems on board, but may prove difficult if Abe pushes for more on security than he is currently revealing.

Abe explained that he won’t get rid of Article 9, the provision of the Constitution that has talismanic significance for many Japanese despite successive LDP-led governments reinterpreting it over the decades to ease constitutional constraints on the SDF. These efforts culminated in the April 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines and later that summer in Abe’s collective self-defense legislation. That sequencing says a lot about Abe’s priorities, in that he sealed the deal with Washington first in a manner that subordinated the Diet’s role.

Abe hopes to add a proviso to Article 9 that would acknowledge the constitutionality of the SDF. In his opinion, it is deplorable that some constitutional scholars have cast doubts about whether the SDF are constitutional; they cite paragraph 2, which explicitly prohibits maintaining any armed forces or war potential. Whether they recognize the SDF or not, nearly all of Japan’s constitutional scholars believe Abe’s collective self-defense (CSD) legislation is unconstitutional. During Diet deliberations about the CSD legislation, even the LDP’s handpicked constitutional scholars raised such doubts — awkward testimony that nevertheless failed to deter Abe from his mission.

But since Abe is seeking clarification about the SDF in Article 9, shouldn’t he also include specific reference to the right to CSD and the three vague principles that ostensibly constrain Japan’s military actions? These principles grant the PM considerable discretionary authority to deploy the military if he alone determines that: 1) Japan or a country closely related with Japan is under military attack, which poses a threat to Japan’s existence and puts Japanese nationals’ lives, freedom and their right to pursuit of happiness in clear danger; 2) there are no other means to overcome the above-mentioned danger so as to ensure the existence of Japan and the protection of Japanese nationals, and; 3) the military engagement is limited to the “minimum necessary use of force.”

In focusing debate on declaring the SDF constitutional, Abe is avoiding the much more contentious issue of CSD and the new powers he gained to deploy troops overseas at Washington’s behest.

I have heard non-Japanese advocates of revision suggest that retaining Article 9 keeps Japan subordinate to the U.S., and thus it is crucial to revise it so that Japan can become an autonomous sovereign nation. I have no beef with Japan revising the Constitution according to the principles laid out in Article 96 for doing so. I think it is preferable to pursue formal revision rather than surreptitiously bypass such procedures as Abe has done. But will revising Article 9 really give Japan more autonomy? It seems more like Abe is kowtowing to the U.S. in order to bolster an alliance in which Japan gets its marching orders from Washington.

The other trial balloon released by Abe was his proposal to make free higher education a constitutional right, pandering to the opposition and public opinion to offset concerns about amending Article 9. But surely Abe must have more up his sleeve than this gimmick if Japan is to be reborn in 2020.

It is significant that Abe’s May 3 announcement was delivered at a Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi) event. This ultra-conservative lobby group is extremely influential in the Diet and its members have dominated Abe’s cabinets. They want to restore the Emperor’s political power and revise Article 24 of the Constitution, which protects gender equality and other individual rights. These conservatives argue disingenuously that gender equality is undermining traditional values and is thus responsible for Japan’s current social ills. Defining family values and obligations based on their antediluvian preferences would impose conformity at odds with Japan’s growing diversity and prevailing norms and values, while trampling on many citizens’ human rights.

Looking back at the LDP’s 2012 draft constitution, I wonder if Abe will preside over Japan’s rebirth or a reincarnation of pre-1945 Japan? For example, this draft version imposes extensive obligations and duties on citizens; privileges public order over individual rights; seeks to remove the preamble based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; mandates respect for the national anthem and flag; allows the prime minister to declare a state of emergency and bypass the Diet; requires family members to help each other; and designates the Emperor as head of state.

This is what Abe means when he pledges to overturn the postwar order. The stakes are high as Japanese consider his backward-looking vision for the future.

Can Abe revise Japan’s peace constitution? Unlikely

And it might not be on the agenda

click book to order

BY Ben Ascione is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. He is Japan and Korea editor at East Asia Forum and a research associate of the Japan Center for International Exchange in Tokyo and APP member

First appeared in the East Asia Forum, 24 July 2016

Since the 10 July upper house election in Japan there has been widespread speculation that the government will move to formally revise the country’s constitution including the Article 9 ‘peace clause’. This now appears possible since the Abe-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), along with its junior coalition partner Komeito and sympathetic micro-sized right-leaning opposition parties, controls the two-thirds majorities in both houses needed to take constitutional amendments to a referendum.

Never in the years since Japan’s postwar constitution was enacted in 1947 has it been formally amended. Even though the government has the requisite number of seats, forging an agreement with Komeito and persuading the broader voting public that constitutional revision is desirable will be no easy task.

While voters want the government to focus on revitalising the economy, there is absolutely no question that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe carries ambitions to revise Article 9. He was vocal about this during his first stint as prime minister in 2006–07. His book Towards a Beautiful Country characterises Japanese security policy as irresponsible pacifism. Research by Asia Policy Point shows that Abe and about half his cabinet members are affiliated with the Diet Members’ League to Promote Research on the Constitution, Sousei Nippon (Japan Rebirth) and Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), all of which give high priority to rescinding Article 9. Abe’s relationship with his grandfather — Nobusuke Kishi, a former prime minister, war criminal suspect and munitions minister under the wartime cabinet of Hideki Tojo — is also said to drive his convictions.

Komeito (meaning clean governance party) holds the balance of power and the LDP will have to reach an agreement with it to move forward on any constitutional amendment. Despite Komeito’s status as the junior partner, the LDP cannot afford to lose it. LDP leverage over Komeito is limited by an electoral cooperation arrangement, which sees Komeito voters supply between 5 and 20 per cent of the votes LDP candidates receives in single-seat districts in both houses in exchange for influence as a ruling party. Many LDP politicians’ seats would be under serious threat if this deal came unstuck.

Komeito was a political offshoot of the Nichiren Buddhist movement Soka Gakkai (literally value creation study association). Its founders, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi and Josei Toda, were arrested by the wartime military government for speaking out against the abuse of the educational process for militarist purposes. Makiguchi died in jail a martyr. This history imbues Komeito with pacifist values.

Soka Gakkai members, with their distinctive combination of Buddhism, modern humanism and electioneering savvy, have been willing to extend support to Komeito and qualify their absolute pacifist stance, as Levi McLaughlin has explained. Komeito supported the LDP in passing the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law after negotiating principles which limit the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) activities on UN missions to ceasefire areas rather than active conflict zones and curtail SDF use of weapons to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of SDF personnel. Komeito also supported the LDP in order to permit the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean to refuel US ships on route to Afghanistan under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and to Iraq in 2003 to carry out humanitarian operations such as building schools and water purification.

Most recently Komeito supported the Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of Article 9 to permit limited forms of collective self-defence in July 2014 and the security-related bills last year that enabled this cabinet decision. Komeito’s rhetoric stalled the LDP and squeezed it for concessions by emphasising the need for long and wide debates rooted in concrete proposals and the need to bring the people along with these changes.

This allowed it to shift the focus of the conditions under which collective self-defence — a concept which is primarily focused on threats against targets other than one’s own country — so it could only be exercised in response to attacks that threaten the survival of Japan and the Japanese people’s constitutional right to ‘life, liberty and pursuit of happiness’. This focus on attacks threatening Japan contrasts sharply with the report in May 2014 by Abe’s hand-picked advisory group, which recommended a less restrained conception of the exercise of collective self-defence, before Komeito influence came to bear.

Komeito justified its stance to its support base by emphasising that it is a serious party and coalition partner willing to make compromises to exercise power and to continue to act as a brake on the LDP’s policy excesses. It maintained that the compromises made were better than the alternative of working from opposition. In a nutshell, Komeito brands itself as ‘the opposition within the government’.

Yet all of Komeito’s support for LDP security policies thus far has been justified within the framework of Article 9. A common rebuttal of critics who accuse Komeito of betraying its pacifist principles is that it has simply updated its pacifism to contemporary circumstances and in practical ways.

If Article 9 were to be amended, one option Komeito could possibly get behind would be to revise the second paragraph, which forbids the maintenance of ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential’ in order to affirm explicitly the constitutionality of the SDF, while maintaining the first paragraph under which the Japanese people renounce ‘the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’.

But a revision that seriously alters the spirit of Article 9 or outright rescinds it would surely be a no-go for Komeito that would seriously undermine its loyal support base.

Any LDP-Komeito agreement on constitutional revision will also need the support of the voting public to pass a national referendum, something that the LDP deliberately avoided talking about during the campaign period. Given strong public opposition, the government may focus on Abenomics economic policy for now and return to constitutional issues later in Abe’s remaining two years.

Ignorance of Japanese politics and history begets

Obama bows at Hiroshima

Why Obama Is Shinzo Abe’s Enabler

 Mr. Obama has advanced the politically fraught and historically unsupportable notion that Japan has been the victim of its painful past, not the beneficiary of its difficult lessons.


By Dreux Richard, author of the forthcoming Every Human Intention: Japan in the New Century

New York Times, MAY 31, 2016

TSURUGA, Japan — Visiting Hiroshima last Friday, President Obama warned that overcoming the perils of global conflict and nuclear weapons will require a “moral revolution” sustained by “the radical and necessary notion that we are part of a single human family.” He omitted to mention that this notion has been the constitutional basis of Japan’s foreign policy since 1947. Future historians may conclude that Mr. Obama’s visit to Hiroshima provided a spectacle to help remilitarize the world’s wealthiest, most populous pacifist country.

Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s election in 2012, the Obama administration has relied on Japan to help escalate America’s military presence in Asia. The Abe administration has expanded Japan’s commitment to maintaining U.S. bases, relaxed restrictions on bilateral arms trading, and negotiated a framework for joint operations that makes America responsible for maintaining a regional balance of power that protects Japanese interests.

This restructuring of the U.S.-Japan alliance depends on the continued progress of Mr. Abe’s legacy project: removing language from Japan’s Constitution that forbids the use of force to settle international disputes. The Abe administration has been able to shed the prevailing interpretation of this article, widely understood to prohibit the international deployment of Japanese troops, but the language itself continues to restrict the scope of Japan’s military operations, including activities integral to the defense agreement Mr. Abe and Mr. Obama struck last year.

Eliminating these restrictions is ostensibly in the interest of peace, because the alternative to a rearmed Japan is an unchecked — and nuclear-armed — China. But this assessment leaves no room for the possibility that Japan’s military, among the best equipped in the world, has exerted a moderating influence on the region precisely because the Constitution has protected it from misadventure.

In supporting Mr. Abe’s effort to restore Japan’s ability to join and wage wars, Mr. Obama has chosen the wrong strategic partner. The next U.S. president will inherit an East Asia policy vulnerable to the uncertainties of Japan’s transition away from pacifism. Since 2012, Mr. Abe’s foreign policy decisions have harmed Japan’s relationships with its neighbors, including the U.S. ally South Korea. Several of his political appointees have proven scandal-prone in matters of diplomacy.

And Japan might not accept America’s strategic dictates. Firm supporters of Mr. Abe’s agenda see their efforts as the casting off of the final remnants of the American occupation, so that Japan can reclaim its own superpower status. In the ideological terrain of contemporary Japanese politics, the accommodation of American interests is chiefly opportunistic, and the underlying motive is often retrograde nationalism. Mr. Abe’s push to revise the Constitution has coincided with cabinet-level attempts to renegotiate history: Whether so-called comfort women used by Japanese soldiers during World War II were “sex slaves” or if their work was a form of indentured servitude; and how many Chinese civilians died in the Nanking Massacre in 1937.

For Japanese voters, these debates formed the political and social context of Mr. Obama’s visit. Questions of war memory dominated press coverage. According to a 2015 survey by Pew Research, 56 percent of Americans believe the atomic bombings were necessary; 14 percent of Japanese agree. By delivering an appeal for disarmament in a nation whose pacifist Constitution his Asian pivot has helped to controvert, Mr. Obama has risked lending credibility to the dangerous notion beneath Abe’s rhetoric: that Japan can best retain its identity as a peace-loving culture by embracing the restoration of its martial role in international affairs.

If it were the will of the Japanese electorate to adopt the Abe doctrine, then the question of how Mr. Obama’s visit has contributed to its legitimization would be academic. But nearly none of Abe’s policies, including revision of the pacifist Constitution, poll well. He nonetheless enjoys reliably favorable approval ratings, attributed by the center-right media to his carefully-cultivated public persona and by the left to calculated manipulation of the national psyche.

Mr. Abe’s attempts to claim Japan’s collective memory have been less than democratic. He has been at war with the press since he took office, and has been especially zealous about destabilizing the country’s foremost daily newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, chief antagonist of his most hawkish positions. He has responded to multiple Supreme Court decisions requiring reform of the nation’s broken electoral system with a plan calculated to delay changes for as long as possible, a manipulation intended to give him time to build an opposition-proof majority in Parliament, and to create the illusion of an overwhelming mandate to remove pacifist language from the Constitution.

For Mr. Abe, Mr. Obama’s visit also provided a distraction from an initial wave of policy failures related to his American pivot. Early attempts to expand Japan’s arms export business have produced tepid results; and in anticipation of rearmament, the branches of Japan’s military have engaged in a wasteful struggle for funding — U.S. arms dealers have responded by price- gouging the Japanese government.

In Hiroshima, Mr. Obama praised the U.S.-Japan alliance, saying it has taught both countries to cherish peace. He did not reflect on the 69 years of Japanese pacifism that have kept Japan out of war while the United States has waged several. By neglecting them, in a speech that touched so many old wounds, Mr. Obama has advanced the politically fraught and historically unsupportable notion that Japan has been the victim of its painful past, not the beneficiary of its difficult lessons.

Didn't Japan drive off this bridge once before?

NSC Secretariat pushes for use of collective self-defense in cases of economic threat

Mainichi Shimbun, 2/4/15


The secretariat of the National Security Council is drafting a proposal to allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense in cases of economic threats - even when there are no military threats - to Japanese citizens, the Mainichi Shimbun learned Feb. 3.

The proposal has drawn fire from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's junior coalition partner, Komeito, for its potential to stretch the definition of "threat" and expand the scope of Self-Defense Force (SDF) operations.

The National Security Secretariat's draft proposal allows for Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense if a situation is determined to be likely to cause economic damage to Japanese citizens, even if there is no expected military threat. It would expand the range of force indicated in a Cabinet decision passed in July 2014, and give the SDF the go-ahead to participate in minesweeping missions during wartime in the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle East. Komeito, however, is set to oppose broadening the scope of Japan's right to collective self-defense.

According to the July 2014 Cabinet decision, Japan's use of force is permitted only when "Japan's existence is threatened and there are clear dangers to its people's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness being fundamentally overturned." Existing laws, however, are based on the premise of individual self-defense, and permit the SDF to use force only when an attack has occurred, or if Japan is in an armed attack situation and in imminent danger. An armed attack situation in which an attack on Japan is predicted, meanwhile, does not grant Japan the right to use force under current legislation.

The National Security Secretariat aims for legislative amendments that would allow Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense if, for example, due to military attacks on another country, Japan is unable to import oil and suffers economic losses, putting Japanese citizens' assets in danger. Some suggest using the term "survival risk situation" to refer to such cases with relatively low levels of danger.

The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, however, indicated during Diet deliberations that the condition for the use of force by the SDF as established by the Cabinet decision is the level of probability that war would reach Japan. The latest proposal could infinitely stretch the definition of "danger,"and that possibility has provoked strong objections from Komeito, which argues that a new interpretation could be characterized as violating the Constitution and is inconceivable.

With some in the LDP also wary of making such a step, the proposal is unlikely to pass.

Senior ruling party officials had heretofore negotiated revision of security legislation behind closed doors, but the prime minister's office urged them to conduct talks publicly in order to speed things up so that draft bills can be submitted after nationwide local elections this spring. One senior party official said that no agreement was reached in behind-closed-doors negotiations, while a government source admitted that the government was searching for common ground that the LDP and Komeito could share to get the security-related bills off the ground.

The administration is also hoping that by setting the bar high initially in ruling party deliberations over the right to collective self-defense - an issue that has much of the Japanese public worried - the ruling party can later claim to that same public that it had reined in its aspirations regarding the use of force.

Ruling party deliberations on security legislation will begin between the LDP and Komeito on Feb. 13.

Abe ignores his Emperor - at his peril

‘Emperor Akihito favors an honest and long-overdue reckoning with Japan’s wartime past’

Interview by APP member, Peter Ennis of Dispatch Japan published January 23, 2015

Emperor Akihito raised many an eyebrow in Japan and abroad recently when he used his New Year message to urge Japan’s citizens to learn from history in this, the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. He specifically referred to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 as the start of the war, which many saw as a not-so-veiled swipe at Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and other advocates of a ‘revisonist’ view of history, who have tried to diminish Japan's responsibility for the hostilities in the Pacific that ultimately led to Japan’s destruction and surrender in 1945. The key passage in the Emperor’s message was:“This year marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which cost many people their lives. Those who died on the battlefields, those who died in the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those who died in the air raids on Tokyo and other cities-so many people lost their lives in this war. I think it is most important for us to take this opportunity to study and learn from the history of this war, starting with the Manchurian Incident of 1931, as we consider the future direction of our country.”The Emperor’s comment was initially overshadowed by the New Year’s festivities in Japan, but subsequently provoked a subdued but charged debate in intellectual and policy circles.

Below is the first of a two-part discussion about the controversy with Tokyo-based scholar and commentator Jeff Kingston. Professor Kingston is the director of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan, where he teaches courses on modern Japanese history, contemporary Japan, and Japan’s relations with Asia. He has been a regular contributor to The Japan Times since 1988. Kingston’s most recent book, Contemporary Japan, was published in 2012. He has a B.S. degree in foreign service from Georgetown University, and a PhD. in history from Columbia University.


DISPATCH JAPAN: Emperor Akihito referred to the Manchurian Incident of 1931 in several of his past birthday greetings, but never in a New Year’s message. Why do you think it is notable that he brought this up in his most recent New Year’s message?

KINGSTON: It is impossible to know what exactly Emperor Akihito intended with his 2015 New Year Thoughts. His comments were sufficiently vague to avoid giving the impression that he was infringing on constitutional limits that prevent him from weighing in on political issues.

The Imperial Household Agency carefully vets his remarks, so one can only speculate about the message he is trying to convey. In my opinion, the choice of topics is indicative, and must be considered in the context of Akihito’s track record on war responsibility. He has relentlessly crisscrossed the region over the past quarter of a century to express remorse to nations victimized by Japanese aggression.

Akihito has done more than all of Japan’s politicians combined to demonstrate that Japan is not in denial, and is contrite about the horrors it inflicted. Although revisionist politicians and the jingoistic press have worked hard to undermine the emperor’s reconciliation diplomacy, Akihito regards this as the unfinished business of the Showa Emperor (Akihito's father, Emperor Hirohito, who died in 1989), and persists in doing what he can in his circumscribed role.

His record suggests he favors an honest and long overdue reckoning. He has maintained his father’s post-1978 boycott of Yasukuni Shrine that was prompted by the enshrinement of 14 Class A war criminals at that time.

He also rebuked a Tokyo government official who explained to the monarch at an autumn 2004 garden party that he was in charge of enforcing a directive to teachers to stand and sing the national anthem (kimigayo) facing the national flag (Hinomaru). Akihito replied that this is not desirable, and should be left up to individual choice, comments he repeated in the Spring 2005 garden party. The Imperial Household Agency went into damage control mode, arguing that Akihito’s remarks held no political implications, even though they had clearly offered moral support to teachers who complained that their constitutional rights were being infringed on.

So when Akihito refers to the Manchurian Incident, he is weighing in on contemporary history controversies. Prime Minister Abe and like-minded revisionists seek to legitimize Japanese aggression, asserting that it was a war of Pan Asian liberation aimed at lifting the yoke of western subjugation. In addition, revisionists argue that it was a defensive war against escalating pressures from the western powers, the so-called ABCD (American, British, Chinese and Dutch) encirclement thesis.

But by pegging the war’s onset to 1931, Akihito inconveniently focused attention on the Kwantung Army’s plot in Mukden, which blamed ‘Chinese terrorists’ for a staged attack on Japan’s South Manchurian Railway, and used this as a pretext to launch a full-scale invasion and pacification of Manchuria.

This interpretation meshes with what scholars call the Fifteen Year War (1931-45), a reference to escalating Japanese aggression in China and a decision in 1940 to widen the war to Southeast Asia in order to secure the resources needed to subjugate China.

This narrative dismisses the Pan Asian liberation thesis as a fig-leaf for Japanese imperialism. Moreover, in 1931 Japan was not being encircled, but rather was carving off part of China to promote autarchy and prepare for the coming war with the US for hegemony in the Pacific. Ishiwara Kanji, the man who planned the Mukden Incident, was Japan’s foremost military strategist, and someone who had carefully studied the lessons of WWI. Total war meant a no-holds barred approach to winning, meaning that civilians were fair game and that economic sanctions were a weapon of war.

Ishiwara believed that Germany lost the war owing to economic sanctions that starved its war machine of what was required to wage war and thus became an advocate of economic autarchy. Manchuria had many of the resources Japan lacked that were crucial for its war machine, so taking it over was aimed at promoting autarchy and getting ready for the coming conflict. The Pan Asian thesis is more appealing to contemporary conservatives because it positions Japan as selfless and sacrificing for the benefit of others.

By contrast, the Manchurian thesis makes Japan look like a greedy predator, invading nations to secure resources and markets just like other imperial nations.

So Akihito’s apparently bland remarks actually resonate loudly in the arena of historiography. They position him in the camp critical of Japanese aggression, and critical of contemporary revisionists like Abe, who seek to rehabilitate Japan’s wartime past and assert a valorizing and vindicating narrative.

Akihito’s view represents the longstanding mainstream consensus in Japan (and elsewhere), but revisionists have bristled at this ‘masochistic’ history that singles Japan out for blame while overlooking Allied war crimes. They argue that the mainstream consensus is based on the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMFTE), a biased ‘victor’s justice’ narrative.

Judicial process at the IMFTE was indeed very flawed, and the guilty verdicts were preordained, but this doesn't mean that Japan’s military forces, or the architects of war called the Class A war criminals, were innocent. Revisionists often cite the dissenting opinion of Radhabinod Pal as exonerating Japan from the war crimes charges. A memorial to him is even located just outside the Yushukan Museum adjacent to Yasukuni Shrine, the talismanic ground zero for an unrepentant view of Japanese military aggression. In fact, Pal argued no such thing. He dismissed the IMFTE as lacking legal standing in international law, and for the baseless retroactive application of laws it allowed. But Pal readily acknowledged that Japan committed war crimes, and he lamented the fact that the Allies were not in the dock alongside the Japanese, sensibly pointing out that they should also be held accountable.

DISPATCH JAPAN: Why is this relevant to contemporary Japanese politics, and Japan’s national security policy?

KINGSTON: The judgments of the IMFTE, deeply flawed as they may be, are intrinsic to the Treaty of San Francisco that Japan signed to end the US occupation and make peace with the other signatories. In signing the treaty, Japan committed itself to accepting these judgments. Prime Minister Abe often talks about overthrowing the ‘postwar system’, one that most Japanese are rightly proud of. He is unhappy with the denunciatory view of wartime Japan and the US penned constitution, both essential elements of the postwar order that he believes humiliates Japan and keeps it subordinate.

In contrast, Akihito and most Japanese feel that Japan’s exemplary record in the second half of the 20th century brought redemption, and serves as the basis for the nation regaining its dignity. While Abe rails against the Peace Constitution, most Japanese see it as a reassuring touchstone of national identity. That is why his efforts to chip away at Article 9 are so unpopular. Hardly anyone in Japan supports Abe’s reinterpretation of Article. 9 to allow for collective self-defense, because they worry that Washington will drag them into war, and they understand that the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines will facilitate that scenario. Both governments keep postponing formal adoption of the guidelines precisely so they don’t become a liability to the LDP in elections.

DISPATCH JAPAN: So the political right finds itself in the interesting position of opposing the views of an Emperor in whose honor they claim to speak?

KINGSTON: The Emperor’s remarks highlight the horrors of war and send a strong anti-militarism, pro-peace message. He has enjoined Japanese citizens to reflect on the lessons of the past, perhaps because he has witnessed the culture wars since Abe came to power. Many Japanese and long-time Japan observers have expressed dismay about the recrudescence of self-righteous nationalism under Mr. Abe, who has emboldened right-wing extremists.

They have aggressively attacked liberal targets, such as the Asahi, and downplayed some of the more egregious examples of wartime Japan’s depredations, including the comfort women. Akihito is surely aware that Abe did nothing to repudiate colleagues in the Diet who worked to undermine the 1993 Kono Statement, in which Japan accepts responsibility and promises to atone for the sordid system of sexual slavery that involved tens of thousands of young women throughout Asia between 1932-1945. They were recruited through deception and/or coercion, both direct and indirect.

The Asahi’s admission that a handful of their reports on the comfort women over twenty years ago were based on the discredited testimony of Yoshida Seiji has been disingenuously used as a pretext to try to cast doubts on the nature and extent of this system and thereby promote a narrative of minimization and denial. Naturally, Team Abe is manipulating the Asahi affair for political advantage. This saga is, after all, more about politics than journalism, part of a larger culture war being waged by conservatives to redefine Japanese identity on their terms. The Asahi has long been the right’s main media adversary in this culture war and thus a prime target.

There is also the case of Net Uyoku (ultra-nationalists on the Internet) harassing former Asahi reporters and their university employers, threatening to harm students by deploying nail bombs if these former journalists’ contracts are not terminated. And the hate speech campaign promoted by the Zaitokukai (an organization devoted to denying rights to non-citizens – mostly Koreans – residing in Japan), harassing Japan’s zainichi (mostly Korean) community, again threatening death. Abe has tolerated this intolerance, and indeed has acted as cheerleader in chief for the anti-Asahi campaign. This is not the Japan that most Japanese feel comfortable with, and is not consistent with their national identity.

This is the context in which Akihito’s comments can be interpreted as a rebuke and warning.

Japanese high courts trip up the Abe government

The Australian National University's East Asian Bureau of Economic Research published on April 4th the following analysis of Japan constitutional issues by MIT's Michael Cucek (APP member) in its online publication, the East Asian Forum.

On 14 November 2012, Japanese prime minister Yoshihiko Noda issued a challenge to his rival, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president Shinzo Abe.

In return for voting with the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on a pair of pending bills and promising to cut the number of seats in the House of Representatives, Noda would call a national election. With the LDP nearly certain to win a big majority if an election were held, Abe agreed. The two problematic bills were passed, Noda dissolved the Diet and, one month later, the LDP won an overwhelming victory. Surprising many observers, the new Abe government went from strength to strength over its first months in office, with the public approval for both Abe and his party presaging a long run in power. Victory in a second election in July 2013, giving the ruling coalition control of both houses of the Diet, would eliminate an already marginalised opposition from the governing process.

There was, however, a catch.

In March 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the House of Representatives electoral map was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality under the law. A vote in the nation’s smallest district was worth 2.3 times a vote in the nation’s most populous one, a degree of difference the Supreme Court found intolerable. In order to avoid chaos the Supreme Court declared the map to be in ‘a state of unconstitutionality’ rather than strictly unconstitutional, giving the Diet a chance to rectify the imbalance before the next general election. As a goal, the Supreme Court demanded that the difference in voting strengths be reduced to below 2.0.

Despite the warning from the Supreme Court, the government and the LDP-led opposition dawdled. At the time Prime Minister Noda made his offer to dissolve the Diet, no map had been approved. The commission charged with redrawing the map had not even had a single meeting.

The impossibility of conducting an election that met constitutional requirements was not unknown to Abe and the LDP — the difference had risen in the interim to 2.43. Nevertheless, Abe took the possibly poisoned chalice of an immediate election when Noda offered it. His choice was not a particularly risky one. The 2.0 standard was entirely arbitrary, the Supreme Court having ratcheted down the disparity standard from 5.0 in 1976 to 4.0 in 1980 to 3.0 in 1990. Never once over that time had a court invalidated an election for violating the operative limit on vote disparity.

Furthermore, on 16 November, the last day of the Diet session, the ruling DPJ coalition and the LDP-led opposition joined forces to pass a sly LDP-authored workaround for the disparity problem. The so-called +0/-5 solution eliminated the problem surrounding the difference between the smallest and largest districts by eliminating the smallest districts altogether. The difference between the largest and smallest remaining districts would thus fall below the 2.0 standard. This plan, however, was not implemented in time for the December election.

Abe and the LDP calculated that the judiciary, which has historically shown great deference to the legislative branch, would back down, refuse to consider invalidating the election and, on the strength of the +0/-5 solution, throw the whole question back to the Diet.

Abe and the LDP’s calculations turn out to have been wrong.

In a series of stunning decisions starting on 7 March 2013, Japanese High Courts have turned the tables on the Abe government. Out of 16 cases filed, the courts have ruled the expected way only twice. Fourteen cases ended with the justices determining the election to have been unconstitutional, without question or qualification. In a post-war first, two courts ruled the election districts unconstitutional and invalidated the results.

Even more surprising were the justices’ arguments. The key point was not a violation of the ‘2.0’ standard; indeed, the decisions invalidating election results came in areas where this was not a problem. The key consideration for the justices was the contempt shown by the legislative branch for the judicial branch. Justice Junko Ikadatsu, who handed down the first of the historic decisions to invalidate an election result, said that by taking more than 18 months to even consider redrawing electoral boundaries, the legislature could not be said to have fulfilled its constitutional role. Justices of the Tokyo and Sapporo High Courts condemned the +0/-5 solution as being not at all what the Supreme Court had demanded.

The Supreme Court, which will take all the cases on appeal, is not expected to hand down its decision before the upcoming House of Councillors election. This means that in strict legal terms the Abe government can claim legitimacy from its victory in the tainted 2012 election and its projected landslide in the 2013 election. However, a penumbra of illegitimacy will descend over the Abe government once the Supreme Court finds the 2012 election unconstitutional. While previously unthinkable, such an outcome seems almost guaranteed given the preponderance of High Court decisions finding the election results unconstitutional (14 out of 16) and the Supreme Court’s own warnings in 2011.

Every action the Abe government takes from now on will face push back from an emboldened opposition. If the government tries to use the supermajority it holds in the House of Representatives to pass legislation rejected by the opposition-dominated House of Councillors, it will face a hailstorm of criticism from all quarters. As for the long-held dream of Abe and many other Diet members to amend the Constitution — in particular Article 9 — that is now out of reach. Yoshimi Watanabe of the Your Party has proposed that the Diet should now come together, draw a map that the Supreme Court can support, finish out the Diet session and then allow itself to be dissolved, setting up a double election in July.

Rather than backing off from a collision with the Supreme Court, the Abe government and the LDP seem to be doubling down. On 28 March, the day after the last of the unconstitutional rulings from the high courts, Prime Minister Abe accepted from the Council on House of Representatives Electoral Districts a new electoral districts map, one that the conservative newspaper Sankei Shimbun finds already in violation of the Supreme Court’s 2.0 standard. On 30 March, Ishiba Shigeru, the #2 official in the LDP, gave advance notice that if the House of Councillors rejects the new electoral map and other electoral reforms, the ruling coalition is ready to use its supermajority in the House of Representatives to override the decision of the upper house.

Japan has never seen a conflict between a popular government and a judiciary determined to protect its constitutional prerogatives. While it is nearly certain there will be no obvious signs of struggle like street protests, the ability of the Abe government to deliver on commitments, domestic and international, is now in question.

Michael Cucek is a Research Associate at the MIT Center for International Studiesand the author of the Shisaku blog on Japanese politics and society.