Religion in Japanese Politics

Ask your average Japanese if he or she is religious, they will say no. Observe how they live their day and note the organizations they join, and your answer is different. Religious organizations and beliefs have considerable influence on Japanese politics. This is especially true of conservative nationalist groups that seek the restoration of an Emperor-focused government and society. On March 5, 2019, at Harvard University, Associate Professor of Asian Religions, North Carolina State University Levi McLaughlin discussed this topic. His presentation is only accessible via the audio above. He is the author of Soka Gakkai’s Human Revolution: The Rise of a Mimetic Nation in Modern Japan. He will speak on Friday, April 12th from 12:30-2:00pm at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

Can Abe revise Japan’s peace constitution? Unlikely

And it might not be on the agenda

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BY Ben Ascione is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. He is Japan and Korea editor at East Asia Forum and a research associate of the Japan Center for International Exchange in Tokyo and APP member

First appeared in the East Asia Forum, 24 July 2016

Since the 10 July upper house election in Japan there has been widespread speculation that the government will move to formally revise the country’s constitution including the Article 9 ‘peace clause’. This now appears possible since the Abe-led Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), along with its junior coalition partner Komeito and sympathetic micro-sized right-leaning opposition parties, controls the two-thirds majorities in both houses needed to take constitutional amendments to a referendum.

Never in the years since Japan’s postwar constitution was enacted in 1947 has it been formally amended. Even though the government has the requisite number of seats, forging an agreement with Komeito and persuading the broader voting public that constitutional revision is desirable will be no easy task.

While voters want the government to focus on revitalising the economy, there is absolutely no question that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe carries ambitions to revise Article 9. He was vocal about this during his first stint as prime minister in 2006–07. His book Towards a Beautiful Country characterises Japanese security policy as irresponsible pacifism. Research by Asia Policy Point shows that Abe and about half his cabinet members are affiliated with the Diet Members’ League to Promote Research on the Constitution, Sousei Nippon (Japan Rebirth) and Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), all of which give high priority to rescinding Article 9. Abe’s relationship with his grandfather — Nobusuke Kishi, a former prime minister, war criminal suspect and munitions minister under the wartime cabinet of Hideki Tojo — is also said to drive his convictions.

Komeito (meaning clean governance party) holds the balance of power and the LDP will have to reach an agreement with it to move forward on any constitutional amendment. Despite Komeito’s status as the junior partner, the LDP cannot afford to lose it. LDP leverage over Komeito is limited by an electoral cooperation arrangement, which sees Komeito voters supply between 5 and 20 per cent of the votes LDP candidates receives in single-seat districts in both houses in exchange for influence as a ruling party. Many LDP politicians’ seats would be under serious threat if this deal came unstuck.

Komeito was a political offshoot of the Nichiren Buddhist movement Soka Gakkai (literally value creation study association). Its founders, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi and Josei Toda, were arrested by the wartime military government for speaking out against the abuse of the educational process for militarist purposes. Makiguchi died in jail a martyr. This history imbues Komeito with pacifist values.

Soka Gakkai members, with their distinctive combination of Buddhism, modern humanism and electioneering savvy, have been willing to extend support to Komeito and qualify their absolute pacifist stance, as Levi McLaughlin has explained. Komeito supported the LDP in passing the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law after negotiating principles which limit the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) activities on UN missions to ceasefire areas rather than active conflict zones and curtail SDF use of weapons to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of SDF personnel. Komeito also supported the LDP in order to permit the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean to refuel US ships on route to Afghanistan under the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and to Iraq in 2003 to carry out humanitarian operations such as building schools and water purification.

Most recently Komeito supported the Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of Article 9 to permit limited forms of collective self-defence in July 2014 and the security-related bills last year that enabled this cabinet decision. Komeito’s rhetoric stalled the LDP and squeezed it for concessions by emphasising the need for long and wide debates rooted in concrete proposals and the need to bring the people along with these changes.

This allowed it to shift the focus of the conditions under which collective self-defence — a concept which is primarily focused on threats against targets other than one’s own country — so it could only be exercised in response to attacks that threaten the survival of Japan and the Japanese people’s constitutional right to ‘life, liberty and pursuit of happiness’. This focus on attacks threatening Japan contrasts sharply with the report in May 2014 by Abe’s hand-picked advisory group, which recommended a less restrained conception of the exercise of collective self-defence, before Komeito influence came to bear.

Komeito justified its stance to its support base by emphasising that it is a serious party and coalition partner willing to make compromises to exercise power and to continue to act as a brake on the LDP’s policy excesses. It maintained that the compromises made were better than the alternative of working from opposition. In a nutshell, Komeito brands itself as ‘the opposition within the government’.

Yet all of Komeito’s support for LDP security policies thus far has been justified within the framework of Article 9. A common rebuttal of critics who accuse Komeito of betraying its pacifist principles is that it has simply updated its pacifism to contemporary circumstances and in practical ways.

If Article 9 were to be amended, one option Komeito could possibly get behind would be to revise the second paragraph, which forbids the maintenance of ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential’ in order to affirm explicitly the constitutionality of the SDF, while maintaining the first paragraph under which the Japanese people renounce ‘the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’.

But a revision that seriously alters the spirit of Article 9 or outright rescinds it would surely be a no-go for Komeito that would seriously undermine its loyal support base.

Any LDP-Komeito agreement on constitutional revision will also need the support of the voting public to pass a national referendum, something that the LDP deliberately avoided talking about during the campaign period. Given strong public opposition, the government may focus on Abenomics economic policy for now and return to constitutional issues later in Abe’s remaining two years.

U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Presents on Capitol Hill

On June 9th, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation* held its now annual public forum on Capitol Hill featuring members of its U.S.-Japan Network for the Future (The Network).

This program, initiated in 2009, introduced its fourth two-year co-hort group in April 2016. The Network identifies American, emerging Japan scholars and provides them with tools to make their work policy relevant. Five of the 14 from the last “co-hort” group (III) were selected to present publicly papers on the challenges facing Japanese society. The Japanese government's Japan Foundation Center For Global Partnership underwrites this effort. Harvard Professor Emeritus Ezra F. Vogel* was the moderator. The topics discussed were: religion in politics, immigration, the new secrecy law, work culture, and Japan’s opposition party. A bound publication included 3-page essays by all 14 members of Co-hort III (2014-2016) on a greater range of political issues in Japan.

The five presentations portrayed Japan as a “normal” industrial democracy troubled by an ageing population and uncomfortable with change. Accommodating immigrants and women into its rapidly shrinking workforce are challenges both politically and socially. Internationally, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to evolve with mainstream political parities preferring low-budget structural reforms and reassurances to the U.S. over active participation in regional disputes.

The central point of the each presentation is as follows:

• Conflicts between LDP and the Democratic Party can not be understood without a knowledge of each party's religious affiliation: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – Shintoism and Komeito Party – Buddhism. 
• The Special Designated Secrets Law that passed in 2013 although initially controversial will not threaten Japan’s democracy.
• Japanese government could change the long-hours work culture by sending “change ambassadors” to companies to advocate for institutional reform.
• Japan’s political parties need to begin the discussion of immigration reform to address the growing demographic problem of low birth rates and ageing population.
• For the July 10th Upper House elections, the opposition Democratic Party could capitalize on the Abe Administration’s failing economic policies and the unpopularity of the security legislation.

“Network” Participants: List of 14
Bound Publication: New Perspectives on Japan from the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future (80 pages)

1. Japan’s Ruling Coalition Gets Religion
Levi McLaughlin, assistant professor of Religious Studies at North Caroline State University.

Conflict between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner the Komeito must be understood as a clash of religious commitments. Although a 2008 and 2010 World Values Survey by the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun suggests that only 26% of Japanese believe in any religion, two religious forces, Shintoism and Buddhism, do “play important roles in shaping policy and electioneering within the governing coalition of the LDP (Shintoism) and Komeito Party (Buddhism).” Religious parties and positions maintained by LDP politicians and the Soka Gakkai campaigners ensured electoral success for Komeito.
Paper: Japan’s Ruling Coalition Gets Religion

2. Japan’s Specially Designated Secrets Law and 21st Century Security
Emer O’Dwyer, associate professor of Japanese History at Oberlin College.

Japan’s Specially Designated Secrets Protection Law (SDS), passed by the Diet on December 6, 2013 (and coming into force December 10, 2014) provoked massive demonstrations that clogged the streets surrounding the Diet Building. These demonstrations have since died down. The law allows government agencies broad powers to designate secret information regarding defense, diplomacy, terrorism counter-measures, and espionage. In addition, government entitites are allowed to conduct background checks and seek prosecution for criminal use of state secrets. O’Dwyer concludes that the law is reasonable and that “democracy is safe in Japan” because the law is a natural response to strengthening the U.S.-Japan military alliance and to potential security threats from China.
Paper: SPECTRE in Japan

3. Changing Japan’s Long Working Hours: “Cool Japan” Meets Keidanren
Liv Coleman, associate professor of political science at the University of Tampa.

The Abe Administration has tried, with little success, “a mixture of soft regulation, financial incentives, and moral suasion” to reduce working hours and to promote family-friendly work places. Sixty percent of Japanese women quit their jobs by the time they have their first child. Work cultures have not changed due to “too much work, face to face meetings, and unawareness of directors on this problem.” Coleman encourages the government to introduce “‘change ambassadors’ to coach managers into a new way of thinking and asking questions about work productivity while taking a profoundly personal approach.” Institutional reforms needs to accompany individualistic guidance for altering the work culture.
Paper: Changing Japan’s Long Working Hours: “Cool Japan” Meets Keidanren
Yukatsu’ program to let civil servants leave early for second summer, Jiji 6/5/16

4. Immigration and the Upcoming Upper House Election
Michael Strausz, associate professor of political science at Texas Christian University.

Japan has the largest aging population (33%) in the OED, but an extremely limited immigration system. Japan’s Prime Minister and Diet have been reluctant to make significant changes to both the legal and cultural barriers. As the 2016 Upper House elections approach, Strausz observes that “it would be good for Japan if some political parties advocate an immigration policy.” In order to keep the work force of 87.2 million at the 1995 level, Japan “would need 33.5 million immigrants from 1995 through 2050.”
Paper: Immigration and the Upcoming Upper House Election

5. Japan’s Democratic Party and the July Upper House Election
Daniel M. Smith, assistant professor of comparative politics at Harvard University.

Prime Minster Shinzo Abe and his LDP hope to secure a large enough victory to move ahead with their goal of constitutional revision, which includes “loosening restrictions on the use of the Self-Defense Forces, a change many decry as unconstitutional.” The opposition Democratic Party has an opportunity to reverse recent electoral setbacks in the upcoming election if it manages to “simultaneously avoid competition with the remaining opposition parties in single-seat districts and convince disaffected voters to show up at the polls.” The previous success of the LDP has not been due to their policies, but rather the failure of any anti-Abe coalition, including the recently formed Democratic Party, Japan Restoration Party (later re-branded as JIP), and Tomorrow Party of Japan . If the opposition combined and focused on the weaknesses of Abe economic and security policy, the LDP could lose 156 seats in the House of Councilors (Upper House) this July.
Paper: The Challenge for Japan’s Democratic Party in 2016: Simultaneously Increase Coordination and Turnout

*APP members