Showing posts with label Hudson Institute. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hudson Institute. Show all posts

Thursday, January 29, 2026

Trump’s Choice for Japan

Why Donald Trump Wants Takaichi to Win

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published January 26, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae wants the coming election to be a referendum on her personal leadership. In that contest, she has already won one vote – from U.S. President Donald Trump.

Is a clear victory for Takaichi the best outcome for the U.S? “Absolutely,” Kenneth Weinstein, an advisor to Trump, declared without hesitation.

Weinstein is the Japan Chair at the conservative Hudson Institute think tank and was the nominee to be Ambassador to Japan during the first Trump administration. In an interview with Toyo Keizai Online, he explained why a Takaichi triumph fits the Trump administration agenda.

“She is clearly focused on defense, national security, upgrading Japan’s security posture, upgrading Japan’s security capabilities, someone willing to work closely with the United States, and our allies, and willing to deepen the ties in the Indo Pacific that we in the United States have been less effective in doing,” Weinstein explained.

Clearly, Takaichi is seen as a loyal follower of Trump, one unlikely to challenge the U.S. as Europe and Canada are now doing in response to the military operations in Venezuela and the threat to seize Greenland.

“I don’t think the Takaichi administration is going to say a word about Greenland,” the distinguished American Japan scholar Gerald Curtis told Toyo Keizai. “Of all the allies, Japan is the one with which Trump has the least problems.”

American preference for Japan to be governed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is hardly unusual. But Takaichi is viewed as a significant improvement over the previous government of Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru who sought to create some distance from the U.S.

Instead, the Trump administration expects a victorious Takaichi government to rapidly increase defense spending and take on the responsibility for regional security in the Asia Pacific.

“We also need someone who understands the immense burdens that the Japanese people are going to have to bear in terms of their own national security,” Weinstein said. “And she is as good as it gets.”

The China question between Trump and Takaichi

For China hawks, like Weinstein, a strong Takaichi government is useful in bolstering those who are worried about an American retreat from Asia and a grand bargain with China’s Xi Jinping when the President goes to China in April.

“We need a strong leader and strong partner to keep us focused, on China, on the Taiwan challenge, on the Scarborough Shoal challenge,” the Hudson Japan chair who formally was the CEO of the think tank, told us.

Weinstein and other Japan hands are carefully critical of Trump’s failure to come to the open support of Takaichi after her comments on Taiwan and the massive pressure campaign mounted by China against her government.

But he and others dismiss fears that Trump is heading toward some kind of G-2 grand pact with China. They point to the attack on Venezuela and the pressure on Iran as moves that effectively strike at China which is dependent on those countries for oil.

They see the approval of arms sales to Taiwan and the recent trade agreement with Taiwan as further evidence that Trump is not planning on abandoning Taiwan in the pursuit of a deal with Xi.

Trump is seeking a bargain with Xi but not a grand alliance, Weinstein contends. His hesitation in backing Takaichi against China was tactical. “The president doesn’t want to have an open confrontation with China on the eve of his summit,” he said.

“Trump wants to strike a big deal with China,” Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair at Hudson, told this writer. “But this is not some game-changing G2 moment.” He compared it to the talks between Xi and former President Joe Biden in seeking strategic stability, one that avoids the difficult issue of Taiwan.

Takaichi’s “big mistake” was to undermine Trump’s desire to make this deal with Xi, observed Curtis, an emeritus professor at Columbia University. “I wasn’t surprised that he was upset with Takaichi and called her and told her to get out of this mess.”

If Takaichi manages a decisive victory in the February election – and there is no consensus on this among American Japan hands – she will then head to Washington for a meeting ahead of Trump’s April trip to Beijing.

But that meeting may be even more challenging for a stronger Takaichi than if she still leads a weak coalition government.

Curtis predicts that Takaichi will not focus on China in Washington. “She knows that is not a winning issue for her in dealing with Trump,” he told Toyo Keizai. “Trump is interested in money and he wants to have his 550 billion bucks. It is his money and she better get it to him.”

Trump of course is unpredictable but within the Trump administration bureaucracy, to the extent it plays a role in forming policy, the focus is on strengthening security ties. That is particularly true for those who want to push a harder line toward China and want Japan to vastly increase its defense spending.

“Both State and Defense are very interested in making effective cooperative deals with Japan and they think Prime Minister Takaichi is clearly the best person for that now,” said Cronin, a prominent security expert.

“From the Pentagon’s perspective, you are either helping deterrence against a China contingency or you are not,” he explained. “You have to look tough if you want to keep the peace. She has bought into that security paradigm.”

How the Americans see the election prospects

Among the Trump advisors, there is praise for Takaichi’s decision to call a snap election and, at this early stage, an expectation of a clear, even dramatic victory.

“It seems like an incredibly smart move politically,” Weinstein told TOE. “If the polling numbers stay where they are for her, she should have a resounding victory that will really change the shape of the Diet moving forward. It looks like a strong return of the LDP after the weaknesses shown in the Upper House elections not too many months ago.”

Even some non-Trump analysts share this assessment of the decision to go down this somewhat uncertain road.

“No election is free of risk but for Takaichi the risk of losing seats in an election held now would not be as nearly as great as the risk she would be facing by waiting too long,” argued Curtis, probably the most well respected observer of Japanese politics in the U.S. “Better to strike now with her public support at more than 70 percent, the political opposition in disarray, and public opinion polls and the LDP’s own election district by district analysis indicating the strong possibility that the LDP would win the 235 seats needed for a majority and perhaps garner as many as 260 seats.”

Both men attribute the prospects for victory to Takaichi’s personal appeal, not to the popularity of the LDP or her policy proposals for taxes or other domestic issues, even including her embrace of Trump-like anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Takaichi “is running a presidential style race,” said Weinstein. “I don’t see her running as the LDP,” he added. Others have compared her not to Abe Shinzo, her mentor, but to Koizumi Junichiro who won election a quarter century ago by running in some ways against the LDP as well as the opposition.

Takaichi’s popularity, in their view, seems to be due primarily to the uniqueness of her being the country’s first female prime minister, her image as a decisive and confident leader, and her ability to benefit from a rightwing shift among the Japanese public and among younger people in particular. Her ability to manage ties with Trump, and with South Korea’s Lee Jae Myung, as well as stand up to China has worked to bolster this image of a strong leader.

This assessment is not universally shared among American Japan experts who are also intrigued by the formation of a new centrist alliance of the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Komei party, whose loyal voters provided a key margin of victory for decades in their now broken alliance with the LDP.

Cronin, who is also based on the pro-Trump Hudson Institute, is more skeptical about a clear Takaichi victory next month.

“I think the assumption a couple of weeks ago was that she could ride her huge popularity and enlarge her majority in the Diet,” he told TOE. “But the politics now look challenging for her. She is facing a united opposition, she lacks a unified coalition, and she is facing a twin set of pressures from China and from the US, in terms of economics. She can still win a majority, but I wouldn’t bet on it.”

Whether Trump is even thinking much about this situation, given the focus on Greenland and his domestic battles, is doubtful. Nor is there much thought about the possibility that a rightwing nationalist government in Japan may head off in a very independent direction. But for now, the fact that Takaichi is Trump’s choice for Japan is undeniable.

Friday, October 4, 2024

LDP Chooses Ishiba for its Next Leader

The Occam's Choice Candidate

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
Special to Asia Policy Point, September 30, 2024

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected its former Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba as its 28th President on September 27. Ishiba immediately started forming his administration, inviting supporters in the election to join his team. After he is elected as the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan in tomorrow’s extraordinary session of the Diet, Ishiba says he will dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) and call a general election on October 27.
 
The presidential election was, as expected, a close race between Ishiba, Minister of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi and former Minister of the Environment Shinjiro Koizumi. Takaichi bested the other two with 181 votes in the first round, compared to 154 for. Ishiba and 136 for Koizumi. As the two leading vote-getters, Takaichi and Ishiba proceeded to a run-off, because no candidate among nine obtained majority votes.
 
Surprising enough for members of the LDP, Ishiba overtook Takaichi in the run-off by a narrow 21-vote margin, 215 to 194. Ishiba added 143 lawmaker votes, from forty-six in the first round to 189 in the run-off, while Takaichi received another 101, from 72 to 173. While each of 368 lawmakers had one vote, 6 were supposed to have abstained or their votes were invalid in the run-off. Ishiba’s greater increase in lawmaker votes indicates that lawmakers who supported the losers in the first round clearly preferred Ishiba. Of the 47 rank-and-file votes available, Ishiba received 26 and Takaichi 21.
 
Notwithstanding public criticism, obscure faction politics, as shown in the LDP’s slush fund scandal, it was the backstage moves of the factions that determined the result of the election, especially at the run-off stage.
 
LDP Vice-president Taro Aso, the leader of the eponymous Aso faction with 54 members, decided to support Takaichi a day before the voting and instructed his faction members to follow him. Takaichi’s surge among lawmakers’ votes in the first round, despite recent polls that had shown she had as little support in the Diet as Ishiba, was the result of the Aso faction’s support.
 
On the other side, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was concerned about Takaichi’s boost among the lawmakers. As a prime minister firmly committed to diplomacy, Kishida opposed the hawkish stance of Takaichi. For example, earlier she had promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. Kishida advised the 47 members of his former faction never to vote for Takaichi. Although the Kishida faction had been dissolved, former members collectively voted against Takaichi and supported Ishiba in the run-off.
 
As part of his rivalry with Aso as a would-be kingmaker, former prime minister Yoshihide Suga supported Ishiba in the run-off and persuaded young colleagues to follow him. In the first round, Suga supported Koizumi, for whom Suga is guardian.  The support of lawmakers who voted for Koizumi in the first round (95 votes) was supposed to go to Ishiba in the run-off. Although the former Abe faction (92 members) and the Motegi faction (47 members) expected to vote for Takaichi in the run-off, they seemed unable to act collectively.
 
Ishiba started building up his administration the day after the election. He appointed as Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, the Chairman of General Council in the Kishida Administration. Ishiba expects Moriyama, as the former leader of his own small faction, to balance the different interests in the LDP.
 
Moriyama in turn persuaded Aso to join Ishiba’s team as LDP Supreme Advisor. Ishiba invited Suga to come aboard as the LDP Vice-president as a way of, thanking him for his efforts to shift lawmakers’ votes to Ishiba in the run-off. Two hopeful kingmakers, Aso and Suga, now stand together at two of the highest positions, though nominal, in the party.
 
As for other members of the administration, their experience with defense policy seemed to be the main guidepost for Ishiba. In addition to Ishiba himself, the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, and LDP Chairman of Policy Research Council Itsunori Onodera are all former defense minister.
 
On September 25, the Hudson Institute published an essay by Ishiba on security policy. Speaking in his personal capacity (rather than as Prime Minister), Ishiba proposed revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement “to allow the Self-Defense Forces to be stationed in Guam to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of Japan and U.S.” The appointment of defense experts reflects Ishiba’s desire to strengthen Japan’s defense capability.
 
Unsurprisingly, Ishiba’s political enemies are not part of his administration. Ishiba offered Takaichi the position of chief of the General Council, but Takaichi declined. Ishiba also asked another hawkish presidential candidate, Takayuki Kobayashi, to serve as the LDP’s chief of public affairs, but he rejected the offer. Ishiba may well have offered them these positions as a nominal attempt at party unity but fully expecting that they would refuse, either because they felt the positions beneath them or because they wanted to avoid being co-opted by his administration.   
 
Elsewhere in his administration, Ishiba picked Seiichiro Murakami as the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. Murakami once called Shinzo Abe “public enemy.” Thus, Murakami’s appointment may stir anger among former allies of Abe in the party. Once the glow surrounding the new administration begins to dim, the struggles within the LDP may resume.
 
Although Ishiba in the past said that a general election of the Diet should occur after the traditional detailed discussion of his policies in the Diet, Ishiba has now shifted his stance to an earlier snap election. He made this decision on the advice of senior LDP leaders, including Moriyama, Kishida, and Aso. He has announced a general election of the House of Representatives on October 27.
 
October will be busy for the new prime minister. After his election in the Diet on Oct. 1, there will be: Ishiba’s policy speech on Oct. 4; discussion of those policies in a Diet plenary session on Oct. 7 and 8; dissolution of the House of Representatives on Oct. 9; Ishiba’s trip to the ASEAN Summit in Laos on Oct. 10 and 11; and proclaim on Oct. 15 a general election of the House of Representatives. The month ends with a snap election on the 27th. 

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BILL BROOKS OBSERVATIONS
Senior advisor at the Reischauer Center and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS since 2009, after retiring from the U.S. Department of State. For 15 years, he served as the head of the U.S. Embassy in Japan’s media analysis and translation unit.

My recollection of Ishiba is that he is one of the LDP's most seasoned defense policy wonks. But whether his policy vision for the Alliance and regional security is implementable is another matter. His proposed establishment of an Asian-style NATO arrangement has been considered and rejected as unworkable long ago due to the variety of diverse security interests in the region. ASEAN would prefer to remain unaligned, not choosing one side or the other. The US has long expressed no interest in such a security arrangement, and Japan is certainly not capable of putting a NATO-like scheme together. China would react strongly to any security arrangement that seeks to contain it or threaten it. 

Regarding a revision of the SOFA, such a proposal has been kicking around the LDP for decades and going nowhere. I don't think it will gain traction among the majority of the party. The US would continue to reject any revision, arguing that problems with the US forces in Japan can be resolved by administrative actions, such as a memorandum of understanding with Japan. 

The greater question is whether Ishiba will continue the defense policies of Abe and Kishida, including the defense buildup plan and other commitments to the Alliance that have pleased Washington. 

Tuesday, May 26, 2020

Blaming China

Behind Trump’s push to blame China

Trump administration mounts global campaign against China that harks to false WMD claims made before US invasion of Iraq

By DANIEL SNEIDER, Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent and APP member. This article originally appeared Monday in Tokyo Business Today.

Asia Times, May 26, 2020

The rhetorical clash between China and the United States over the Covid-19 pandemic escalated to new heights this past week. Harsh language and taunts are now a daily event, feeding growing concern that the war of words could lead to more serious tensions over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

Calls for “decoupling” from dependence on supply chains for vital medical equipment and technology produced in China took concrete form in new steps to block China’s Huawei telecom giant from using American-designed technology.

Both Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump face challenges to their legitimacy and political future from the pandemic and the two are equally eager to deflect responsibility for the crisis.

The Chinese regime has mounted an aggressive campaign to promote the superiority of its system and assert global leadership, despite widely held doubts about the veracity of its claims. It has hawked xenophobic propaganda blaming foreigners, even the US military, for the spread of the virus.

In Trump’s case, the urgency is even greater thanks to the presidential election campaign. The campaign now places central responsibility on China, labeling his Democratic Party opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, “Beijing Biden.”

This strategy was laid out in a confidential Republican strategy memo on April 17th that instructed candidates to accuse Democrats of being “soft on China” and to claim the virus is “a Chinese hit-and-run followed by a cover-up that cost thousands of lives.“

This election is going to be a referendum on China,” Trump advisor Peter Navarro predicted in a television interview this past week.

When Trump signed a trade pact with China on January 15, things were quite different. The trade deal was a centerpiece of a re-election strategy touting a booming economy and having put “America First.” And for the next two months, Trump issued a string of praises for China and Xi, lauding the handling of the virus.

Then came a stunning collapse of the stock market, a looming recession and rising infection rates. “Trump completely panicked after Covid and the economic collapse hit his campaign,” Jeffrey Bader, former Obama administration national security advisor on Asia, told me.

“He had to find a new villain. He had to come up with all these conspiracy theories about how the Chinese handled the virus. There is a whole disinformation campaign these guys are orchestrating.”

Trump is pushing for the US intelligence community to provide evidence to support this effort, according to reports in the New York Times and other publications, and confirmed to me by a senior intelligence official.

“Regarding Trump’s next steps, he has tasked the entire US intelligence community, including CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency], and DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], to search all of their files – intercepts, humint [human intelligence], whatever – to find out if China is responsible for COVID-19,” the senior official told me.

“When this kind of tasking takes place, it is almost certain there will be some type of ‘intelligence’ that can be overstated, manipulated, overblown, to make the case – any case.”

The official compared this to the pressure brought by former Vice President Dick Cheney on the CIA to provide evidence of an Iraq-Al Qaeda-9/11 link to justify the invasion of Iraq.

“While there is no denying the importance of determining how this came about,” he said, “it is equally hard to escape the conclusion that Trump will politicize the intelligence as a means of distraction from his own abysmal management and leadership in dealing with the pandemic. Of course, all of this is intended to serve one purpose: his re-election.”

In an unusual joint article in Foreign Policy, three former senior CIA officials warned against the politicization of intelligence by the Trump administration. They wrote:

“This pattern of politicization is particularly concerning now, as the country confronts the coronavirus pandemic. The answers to key intelligence questions – Did the coronavirus emerge from nature or escape from a Chinese lab? To what extent did the Chinese government misrepresent the scope and scale of the epidemic? – will have profound implications for the future of U.S. national security policy, especially concerning China." 

We know Trump’s preferred answers to those questions. What we don’t know is whether the career analysts in US intelligence agencies will be allowed to speak the truth when they uncover it.

Charge of Deliberate Speed

With Secretary of State Mike Pompeo leading the charge, the Trump administration is mounting a global  campaign against China, including a four-page letter sent to the World Health Organization accusing it of doing the handiwork of the Beijing regime.

In recent days, Trump and his close advisors have moved beyond their earlier attempts to pin Chinese responsibility on their suppression of information on the infection, or the lab-origin theory, to a bolder charge that the Chinese government deliberately spread the disease out into theworld.

In a tweet this past week, Trump accused China of “trying desperately to deflect the pain and carnage that their country spread throughout the world.” Trump advisor Navarro, a key figure in the anti-China policy, told ABC News this past week that “China sent hundreds of thousands of Chinese on aircraft to Milan, New York and around the world to seed” the virus. 

This theory was first laid out in a little-noted commentary by Lewis “Scooter” Libby, a former senior aide to Dick Cheney and now senior vice president at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank that has become the most important influencer of the administration’s China policy.

In the essay, published on April 29 in the conservative National Review, Libby argued that Xi and the Communist Party leadership were under increasing threat from multiple challenges – the protests in Hong Kong, the re-election of the pro-independence Taiwanese government, exposure of the suppression of Chinese Muslims and, most of all, the stumbling of the Chinese economy due to the Trump administration’s tough trade policy.

With Trump heading for re-election, party dissent against Xi was mounting, he wrote.The Covid-19 outbreak in China posed a new challenge for Xi. “As long as the virus raged primarily inside China – derailing only her economy, stigmatizing only her government – his troubles would soar. All the while, the world predictably would have leapt ahead, taking Chinese customers, stealing China’s long-sought glory.”

But the pandemic had a potential upside, Libby argued. Its spread diverted attention from the Chinese regime’s internal woes and “rendered disease-weakened nations more susceptible to China’s goods,” he wrote. Trump’s re-election was no longer certain and a weakened economy would impact US defense spending.

In Libby’s account, Xi went beyond simply taking advantage of an opportunity. The Chinese regime deliberately “let tens of thousands of travelers, infected among them, leave China and enter an unwary world.” All of this, he concludes, is part of the quest for world domination byXi’s inner circle. “A fever for Chinese primacy burns among them.” Libby is no stranger to the construction of this kind of narrative. 

He was Cheney’s point man in pressuring the CIA to support the false claims that Iraq was building weapons of mass destruction and had links to the September 11 attacks. He was convicted in 2007 of perjury and obstruction of justice for his attempts to discredit a diplomat who disputed those claims.

Surprisingly, Libby was pardoned in April 2018 by Trump, even though former President George W. Bush had refused to give a pardon, despite pleas from Cheney.“

Libby’s presentation has the feel and smell of yet another problem in the making,” said the senior intelligence official, comparing this to the Libby role in the Iraq war buildup.“

This is Scooter’s ‘wag the dog’ fantasy,” agreed another former senior intelligence official with long experience in Asia. 

He dismissed Libby’s belief that the Chinese leadership would have an interest in spreading the pandemic around the world.“

Party legitimacy, Xi’s position and China’s future depend on sustained growth, even if the rate of growth is much slower,” the former intelligence official told me. “Spreading CV19 could only further depress Chinese growth and accelerate realignment of supply chains in ways that disadvantage China. Chinese leaders understand that.”

Hudson Institute Connection

The alarm over China’s assertiveness is widespread in U.S. policy circles. But Hudson is home to a group of policy makers who articulate a much darker view of China as both a totalitarian state and one with long-term plans for global domination.

Writers like Michael Pillsbury, who enjoys access to the President, as well as Libby and others are based at the think tank. Vice President Mike Pence delivered a major hardline China policy speech in late 2018 at Hudson, as did Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in October 2019.

Hudson has also become the favored channel for Japan’s Abe administration to reach the White House. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has delivered several major addresses at Hudson, where Libby, a personal friend, introduced him. Hudson President Kenneth Weinstein, another Abe friend, has been nominated to be US Ambassador to Tokyo.

While Trump’s views of China seem mostly to reflect his obsession with trade imbalances and his neo-isolationist impulses, men like Pompeo, Navarro and Libby have deeply held views on the China threat.

“For the ideologues, this was their magic moment to overcome resistance,” Bader argues. “Trump went along with it because he needs an election plank. The true believers don’t know if Trump is going to win or not but they are putting as much in place as they can before November.”

Saturday, September 22, 2018

Role of South Korea in US-Japan Strategic Islands Defense

It is rare to get an honest answer from a Japanese as Korea is repeatedly and regularly ignored in their grand foreign policy or security visions.

Thus, it was startling and refreshing to hear Hudson Institute's Senior Fellow Jun Isomura give that rare answer. He brushed off cooperation with the Koreans because they are just too emotionally unstable.

He spoke at a September 21, 2018 program introducing Hudson's report U.S.-Japan Strategic and Operational Cooperation on Remote Island Defense, that gave lay recommendations for how the United States and Japan can strengthen their operational and strategic cooperation in defense of the Ryukyus. The writers believed that the U.S. would more likely come to the defense of the Ryukyus (Okinawa Prefecture, Pop 1.5 million), sparsely populated islets in the East China Sea, than of Taiwan, which is at the end of this island chain.

Below is the clip of Mr. Isomura explaining why Japanese leaders avoid including their Korean counterparts in regional plans.



Sunday, November 10, 2013

Prime Minister of Japan's Schedule September 23-30, 2013

September 23, 2013 (Mon)

AM
09:15 Departure from private residence in Tomigaya to attend Koreisai Festival
09:30 Arrive at the Imperial Palace
11:16 Departure from the Imperial Palace
11:35 Arrival at private residence

PM
04:10 Departure from private residence
04:38 Arrival at Haneda Airport
04:47 Interviews with media outlets on the presence of Japan in the international community and the North America visit

September 24, 2013 (Tue) (Local Time September 23)
Arrive Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Aiprort followed by an interview with CTV and a dinner hosted by Canadian Speaker of the Senate Noel Kinsella

September 25, 2013 (Wed) (Local Time September 24)
Attend a welcoming ceremony at the Capitol building followed by a summit meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper

Offers flowers at Ground Zero
September 26, 2013 (Thu) (Local Time September 25)
Arrive in New York City at the Pierre Hotel to attend a lunch hosted by the Hudson Institute and gives a speech; Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio also be in attendance. Afterwards, speak at the New York Stock Exchange, visit Ground Zero and attend a reception hosted by Japan Society

September 27, 2013 (Fri) (Local Time September 26)
Attend a summit meeting with Iranian President Rhouhani at the UN Millenium Hotel. Afterwards go the the UN General Assembly for a high level speech on nuclear disarmament. Finally, attend in a summit meeting with Pakistani politician and industrialist Naway Sharif

September 28. 2013 (Sat) (Local Time September 28)
Have breakfast and then go to JFK international Airport. Depart for Haneda at 4:50am

September 29, 2013 (Sun)

AM
10:00 At private residence (no visitors)
11:36 Departure from residence
11:44 Arrive at Shibuya salon “Hair Guest” for a haircut

PM
01:15 Depart from salon
01:26 Arrive at private residence
03:29 Meeting with Shigeru Kitamura, Cabinet Informtion Officer
04:39 Meeting with President of Mongolia Tsakhiaglin Elbegdorj

September 30, 2013 (Mon)

AM
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya
09:51 Depart from private residence
10:09 Arrive at the Imperial Palace for bookkeeping
10:18 Depart from the Imperial Palace
10:26 Arrive at office
10:27 Meeting with Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Saiki Akitaka
11:16 Meeting with Hiramatsu Kenji, Comprehensive Foreign Policy Director and Kozuki Toyohisa, General Director of the European Affairs Bureau
11:40 Isa Ijima, Cabinet Secretariat in attendance
11:59 Forest and Fisheries Permanent Secretary Yoshitsugu Minagawa in attendance

PM
12:15 Depart from office
12:51 Arrive at the Hotel Okura
01:05 Meeting with Prince Andrew of Britain on the Kensington Terrace
01:55 Depart from the Hotel Okura
02:00 Arrive at office
02:26 Meeting with Aso Taro, Chief Cabinet Secretary; Amari Akira, Finance Minister; and Chief Cabinet Secretary SugaYoshihide.
04:00 Meeting with Kitamura Shigeru, Cabinet Information Officer and Kinomura Kenichi, Minister of Defense Information
04:30 Kitamura leaves
04:48 Special Cabinet meeting begins
04:53 Special Cabinet meeting ends
05:12 Meeting with Tokuji Hideshi from the Defense Policy Bureau
06:45 Depart from office
09:24 Depart from the Imperial Palace
09:31 Arrive at office
09:49 Photo shoot with Deputy Ministers
10:01 Meeting with Deputy Ministers
10:46 Letters of appointment to parliamentary secretary
11:03 Commemorative photo with parliamentary secretary
11:36 Arrival at private residence
11:45 No visitors

Sunday, March 17, 2013

Prime Minister of Japan's Schedule Feb 11-17

February 11, 2012 (MON) NATIONAL FOUNDATION DAY

AM

Spend the morning at home in Tomigaya

PM
12:20 Lunch with Youji Ohashi, ANA Board Chair; and Kenneth Weinstein, CEO of the Hudson Institute at ANA Intercontinental Hotel
02:18 Akasaka Palace, Home of Prince Takamado, attend a funeral.
02:41 Home in Tomigaya

February 12, 2013 (TUE)

AM

07:00 Office
07:02 Mr. Kato, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
08:17 Mr. Kato leaves
08:23 Parliament
08:27 Ministerial meeting
08:59 Lower House Budget Committee

PM
12:02 Office
12:31 Meeting for an Exchange of Views with the Business Community on Overcoming Deflation
12:48 National Security Council meeting
01:06 Press interviews
01:09 Parliament
01:11 Lower House Budget Committee
05:07 Office
05:19 Receives a Visit from US Ambassador to Japan, Mr. John Victor Roos
05:40 Mr. Kitamura, Head of Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office
05:56 Mr. Manago, Administrative Vice Minister of Finance; Mr. Nakao, Director General of Finance Bureau, MoF.
06:38 Hotel New Otani; Attend Dinner Party of Mr. Urushihara, Komei Party’s Diet Affairs Chief
07:00 Dinner with Mr. Takashi Imai, Board Chair Emeritus of Shin Nittetsu; and Mr. Okuda, President Emeritus of Keidanren
08:30 Home in Tomigaya

February 13, 2013 (WED)

AM

08:39 Office
09:00 Tele conference with President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea
09:25 Mr. Sasae Ambassador for the U.S.; Mr. Saiki
10:01 Foreign Minister Kishida; and Defense Minister Onodera
10:45 Mr. Shimizu, Cabinet Office Deputy Minister; and Mr. Mochizuki, Director general of Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
10:51 Courtesy call from Abu Al Hassan of Kuwait

PM
12:13 Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sugita
12:19 Special Advisor for PM, Isozaki
01:07 Mr. Atiyah, Qatari Administrative Oversight Agency Director
01:18 He leaves
02:22 Parliament
02:24 Lower House Budget Committee
05:05 Office
05:10 Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga
05:30 Forum for Promoting Active Participation by Young People and Women
09:11 Home in Tomigaya

February 14, 2013 (THU) 

AM

07:29 Office
07:55 Teleconference with U.S. President Obama
08:16 Mr. Saiki and Mr. Sugiyama from MoFA
08:30 Mr. Seishiro Eto and Mr. Nobuo Kishi, LDP Diplomacy and Economic Cooperation Research Council President and Secretary General
08:54 Parliament
09:00 Lower House Budget Committee
09:36 Mr. Ichiro Aisawa, LDP Political Structure Reform Implementation Headquarters Chief
10:30 Office
10:56 MoFA Administrative Vice Minister Kawai; Mr. Saiki; Mr. Kozuki, European Affairs Bureau Director General
11:46 Courtesy Call from the Mayor of Fujinomiya City and Others

PM
12:31 LDP Secretary General Ishiba
12:52 Parliament
01:03 Lower House Plenary Sessionl
02:15 Lower House Chair Ibuki and Vice Chair Akamatsu; visit ruling party factions; Deputy PM Aso accompanies
02:34 Office
02:50 Mr. Soichiro Tahara, Journalist
03:28 Mr. Tahara leaves
03:55 Former PM Mori
04:26 New and Old Supreme Court Judges, Kaoru Onimaru and Masahiko Sudo
04:45 Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Kanazawa
05:10 Foreign Minister Marti of Indonesia
05:31 Courtesy Call from the Mayor of Obama City, Mr. Koji Matsuzaki
05:54 Meeting with the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Dr. Salam Fayyad
06:01 Foreign Minister Kishida; Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawai; Deputy Foreign Minister Saiki; MoFA North American Affairs Bureau Director General Ihara
07:00 Kawai, Saiki, and Ihara leave
07:15 Kishida leaves
07:33 Dinner with former Cabinet Office National Security Director Atsuyuki Sasaki; former Ambassador to the U.S. Ryozo Kato; and President of Sankei Shimbun Takehiko Kiyotake
09:18 Home in Tomigaya

February 15, 2013 (FRI)

AM

09:06 Office
09:08 Education Minister Shimomura
09:28 Ministerial Meeting
09:52 Parliament
10:01 Upper House Plenary Session
10:19 Office
10:28 Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawai; Saiki; and Ihara
11:17 All leave
11:31 Japan-Palau Summit Meeting

PM
12:04 LDP Headquarters
12:05 LDP Constitutional Revision Promotion Director, Kosuke Hori
12:47 Office
12:48 Ihara, MoFA
01:39 Minister of Economic Reform, Amari
02:11 Amari leaves
03:19 Education Rebuilding Implementation Council
04:47 Meeting ends
05:02 Mr. Kitamura, Director of Cabinet Intelligence; Mr. Kinomura, Director of Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and Mr. Manabe, Deputy Director General, MoD Defense Policy Bureau
05:14 Mr. Kinomura and Mr. Manabe leave
05:30 Mr. Kitamura leaves
06:03 Council of advisers for establishment of National Security Council
07:29 Meeting ends
07:46 Dinner with Satoshi Ishikawa, President of Kyodo News
09:56 Home in Tomigaya

February 16, 2013 (SAT)

AM

10:01 PM Residence
10:23 Interview with Jiji Press
11:10 Interview with the Washington Post

PM
12:07 Interview ends
12:28 LDP Headquarters
12:40 Lunch with secretaries at Japanese Restaurant Origami, the Capitol Hotel Tokyu
01:18 Exercise at Nagomi Spa and Fitness, Hotel Grand Hyatt Roppongi
05:08 Home in Tomigaya

February 17, 2013 (SUN)

AM

09:04 Jog around his home and Yoyogi Park
09:47 Home

PM
Home

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Listening to Abe

On Friday afternoon in the basement of CSIS, the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe will give a presentation (Webcast). He will have just come from lunch and talks with US President Barack Obama.

It will not the first time that Abe has given a speech in Washington. And it is likely he will deliver it in English. At the recent Davos conclave, he sent in an English-language message to the attendees. He observed that "democracy is on the wax among assin' nations."


Abe is again getting public relations advice from Tomohiko Taniguchi who was recently appointed Naikaku Shingikan (Cabinet Councillor) for Public Relations. In the first Abe Administration, Taniguchi was Deputy Press Secretary for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A former Nikkei reporter, Taniguchi has spent the last few years as an adviser to the head of JR Central Kasai and the company's magazine The Wedge. In 2006, Taniguchi gave a presentation on Abe's foreign policy at The Brookings Institution where he described Abe as "one of the most relaxed lawmakers, a very much approachable figure, thereby winning bi-partisan support."

Abe has spoken publicly a number of times in Washington: AEI (2004), Brookings (2005 and 2009), and Hudson (2010). At times he startles his audience with awkward references to American literature or values.

In 2004, speaking at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), he explained that Japan needed to change its Constitution and rid itself of the "mind control" imposed by the Americans.
Perhaps it was because of the trauma of defeat that postwar Japan looked upon its Constitution as an immutable code of laws. In this climate, the dominant sentiment was one that claimed that the Constitution should not be touched or changed in any way. In a sense, the whole nation was victim to a form of mind control. I believe that these tendencies must definitely be abolished.
Abe relaunched his political career at The Brookings Institution on April 17, 2009* with a speech entitled A New Era Requires a New Political Will.
Last time I gave a speech here was four years ago in 2005.  To end that speech, I quoted from Miles to Go, a book by Daniel Patrick Moynihan.  That quote went like this:  “Politics is almost always in some measure an argument about the future and persons claiming to be knowledgeable in this regard will almost always find an audience among politicians.”  For me, this quote means that you must have the courage to swallow bitter medicine if it is from someone really knowledgeable.  I am engaged in politics only to build a better future for Japan and for the world.

Most Americans would interpret that passage as a warning to be wary of those who claim to know the future as the only ones who believe them are politicians looking for a quick fix.

Still, he ended his speech identifying himself as a statesman, a topic that came up several times in his remarks.
In democracies, statesmen are a critical part of the system. They hear the vox populi, and do what ought to be  done, though it may be bitter, rather than easy to digest. Therefore, the strong wills of the statesmen count most. That is what I tell myself, every day when I wake up.
At the Hudson Institute in October 2010, Abe failed to understand that the founder of the Institute Herman Kahn was a proponent of thermo-nuclear warfare. He opened his luncheon speech by noting his “deep admiration for Dr. Herman Kahn, the founder of the Hudson Institute.” He said
The phrase that he coined, ‘thinking the unthinkable,’ has provided me much food for thought throughout my career as a member of the Diet. My own interpretation of the phrase 'thinking the unthinkable' is as follows: 'to provide hope for the future, based on a clear understanding of the past and an accurate perception of the present.'
The audience, which included Herman Kahn's daughter, wondered how the thought of surviving a thermal-nuclear war had provided Abe with “hope”?

*1996: Japan and the United States signed the “Joint Declaration of the Japan-US security”