By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 16, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
On June 11, Japan’s Diet enacted a law to convert the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) from an independent consultative body to a special public corporation with stronger governmental oversight. The new law enables the Japanese government to participate in the selection of the council’s new members.
The Council historically has represented Japan’s scientific community. The new law takes effect in October 2026. The changes to the Council’s membership are controversial: some scholars are adamantly opposed, dubbing the law the “SCJ Control Act.”
The SCJ was established in 1949 as a special organization of the government of Japan to provide a scientific perspective on government actions. “Based on a belief that science constructs the basis of cultural state, SCJ is hereby established with consensus of scientists, upholding mission of peaceful reconstruction of our country, contributing welfare of human society, and supporting academic progress connected with world academy,” as the current SCJ Act states.
The Japan Academy (Nippon Gakushi-in) is another government-authorized academic organization. The Meiji government established Gakushi-in in 1879 to reward scientists who had made outstanding scientific breakthroughs. While the members of Gakushi-in have life-time membership, SCJ is limited to 210 members, who are frequently replaced.
One unusual decision of a prime minister in 2020 prompted proposals to reform the SCJ. Then Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga rejected six scientists as new members of the SCJ. The SCJ Act provides that the prime minister appoints the members of the SCJ based on recommendations from the council. Former prime ministers had previously approved all members recommended by the council as a matter of course. The six scientists rejected in 2020 were known to be critical of some government policies, and they are not the members of the SCJ up until now.
In March 2025, the government of Japan submitted the bill for the new law to replace current SCJ Act. Reflecting the view of the leading parties, mainly conservative ones, that a government organization contribute to the government, the bill stripped from the SCJ its status as a special organization in the Cabinet Office, which makes independent decisions and receives sufficient financial support.
The new law includes provisions to establish new sections in the council. They include a Member Candidate Selection Committee, a Selection Advisory Committee, and a Management Advisory Committee. The law requires the SCJ to abide by various conditions in selection of new members. In addition, the law sets up an SCJ Evaluation Committee in the Cabinet Office. This committee will evaluate SCJ’s annual self-assessment report on its activities, as well as reviewing the mid-term plans of the council.
The SCJ argued that the law should maintain the SCJ as a national academy in its statement in April. The statement proposed five elements necessary for the SCJ to be a true national academy: status as an academic representative of the state, public qualification, a stable financial base in the form of funding in the government’s budget, independence from government regulation of its activities, and autonomy and independence in selecting members.
Six former presidents of the SCJ issued a statement in May that the SCJ Act would not include those five elements and urged that the bill be abandoned.. They recommended maintenance of a cooptation system in the selection of new members, arguing that the new law would erode the SCJ’s academic independence with the government’s intervention in the management of the council.
The government never explained, even in the Diet discussion, why former prime minister Suga rejected the six scientists as new members in 2020. It merely repeated that the new law would guarantee higher independence and autonomy. Although the leading coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito, did not have a majority in the Lower House, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined them in passing the bill in the Lower House on May 13 and the Upper House on June 11.
At a press conference after the bill passed the Diet, one of the six former presidents who opposed the bill, Juichi Yamagiwa, the former President of Kyoto University, labeled the new law the “SCJ Disorganization Law.” “The reason for Suga’s rejection has not made clear and the law entails stricter control on academism,” said Yamagiwa.
The Suga administration was a loyal successor to the Shinzo Abe administration. Abe worked aggressively for constitutional amendment, but in the face of criticism by liberal scholars, his efforts failed. It is likely that the conservative lawmakers and the loyalist bureaucrats close to Abe were frustrated with the academic community in Japan.
Knowing that Suga’s rejection of the six scientists was an arbitrary decision against liberal scholars, they might have thought that they could control the SCJ by reviving the law. They did not choose a course of correcting Suga’s decision. Today’s Japanese government, not unlike the Trump administration in the U.S., appears not to appreciate scholarly advice from experienced scientists on national policies.
Wednesday, June 18, 2025
Japan's Science Council Politicized
Transformation of Japan’s National Academy through Governmental Oversight
Sunday, June 15, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, June 16, 2025
A CLOSER LOOK: RECENT SHIFTS IN THE U.S. SANCTIONS LANDSCAPE. 6/16, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Washington Foreign Law Society. Speakers: David Tannenbaum, Director, Blackstone Compliance Services; Manny Levitt, Associate, Holland & Knight; Moderator: Andrew McAllister, Partner, Holland & Knight.
KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS: WHAT TO EXPECT? 6/16, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Partner & Chair of the Defense & National Security Practice, The Asia Group; Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program, Stimson Center; Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Mark Lippert, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS.
A REDRAWN MIDDLE EAST? 6/16, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Vali Nasr, Professor, Johns Hopkins University; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.
THE VIEW FROM INDONESIA. 6/16, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speaker: Dino Patti Djalal, Former vice minister for foreign affairs, Indonesia.
BOOK TALK: THE GREAT TRADE HACK: HOW TRUMP’S TRADE WAR FAILS AND THE WORLD MOVES ON. 6/16, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speaker: author Richard Baldwin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, PIIE, Professor, International Economics, IMD Business School, Founder, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4mHk5JT
BOOK TALK: CHILD WELFARE AND PROBLEMS OF WELL-BEING IN JAPAN. 6/16, 6:30pm (JST) 5:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple University, Japan Campus; Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Kathryn Goldfarb, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Boulder. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3ZmKT8s
INAUGURAL LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN LECTURE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM BARR. 6/16, 4:00-5:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speaker: William Barr, former US Attorney General; Moderator: Adam J. White, Laurence H. Silberman Chair, Constitutional Governance, American Enterprise Institute.
RUSSIA'S INFORMATION CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE – INTENT, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS. 6/16, 9:30-11:00am (BST), 4:30–6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Speaker: Julia Voo, Senior Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, IISS.
A REDRAWN MIDDLE EAST? 6/16, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Vali Nasr, Professor, Johns Hopkins University; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.
THE VIEW FROM INDONESIA. 6/16, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speaker: Dino Patti Djalal, Former vice minister for foreign affairs, Indonesia.
BOOK TALK: THE GREAT TRADE HACK: HOW TRUMP’S TRADE WAR FAILS AND THE WORLD MOVES ON. 6/16, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speaker: author Richard Baldwin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, PIIE, Professor, International Economics, IMD Business School, Founder, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4mHk5JT
BOOK TALK: CHILD WELFARE AND PROBLEMS OF WELL-BEING IN JAPAN. 6/16, 6:30pm (JST) 5:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple University, Japan Campus; Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Kathryn Goldfarb, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Boulder. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3ZmKT8s
INAUGURAL LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN LECTURE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM BARR. 6/16, 4:00-5:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speaker: William Barr, former US Attorney General; Moderator: Adam J. White, Laurence H. Silberman Chair, Constitutional Governance, American Enterprise Institute.
RUSSIA'S INFORMATION CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE – INTENT, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS. 6/16, 9:30-11:00am (BST), 4:30–6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Speaker: Julia Voo, Senior Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, IISS.
The Republic of Korea’s New Leader and Japan
Will Cooperation Continue? Maybe
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 9, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
A major question in Japan is whether Japan can get along with South Korea’s new progressive leader, LEE Jae-myung, who once called Japan an “enemy country.” At present the Japanese government has no explicit differences with Korea’s Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP has so far avoided discussing Japan, especially on the history issues that have long divided the two countries. The current optimism about relations between the two countries reflects changes in each country’s domestic politics and national security policies. The history issues have not been resolved, however.
It is broadly recognized in Japan that the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea improved under the leadership of YOON Suk Yeol, Lee’s predecessor. Yoon was, however, impeached after his abrupt declaration of martial law last December. Yoon’s decision to compensate Koreans for wartime forced labor without seeking contributions from Japanese corporations silenced conservatives in Japan who had advocated for a hard line against Korean progressives. The greatest concern in Japan now is that Korea may go back to the time before Yoon – and reopen old wounds.
Lee refrained from negative remarks about Japan in his presidential campaign. Right after his victory, he even suggested that he would maintain the bilateral relationship forged by Yoon. “Policy coherence is especially important in managing relations between nations,” Lee said on the day he was sworn into office.
The Trump Administration’s tariff policy necessitates that South Korea make common cause with Japan. Moreover, to deal with North Korea, which is expanding its missile and nuclear capability and enhancing its ties to Russia, Lee will pursue “pragmatic diplomacy:” adjusting Korea’s foreign policies to account for the latest developments in international affairs. Japan and the U.S. are likely to be at the heart of Lee’s approach.
The Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, congratulated Lee on his victory. “This is the year of 60th anniversary from diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea, and I want to vitalize exchanges including non-governmental relationship. Enhancing cooperation between Japan and South Korea, or with the U.S., has a significance, as Japan shares such common issues as low birth rate, demographic concentration to the capital, and an alliance with America,” Ishiba said. He hopes for early meeting with Lee in the nature of “shuttle diplomacy.”
Ishiba and Lee had a telephone talk on June 9, in which Ishiba said he hoped to promote bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea based on the common ground the both countries had built. Both leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation in their bilateral relations, or their trilateral one including the United States, given the severe strategic environment.
Ishiba’s observations about common – and troubling – demographic conditions warrant serious attention. With respect to low birth rates, according to the Vital Statistics of Japan, the fertility rate (the number of babies that a woman delivers in her lifetime) was 1.15 in 2024, a year in which Japan hit a record low with fewer than 700,000 births. The situation is even more dire in the South Korea, which has the lowest fertility rate in the world: 0.75 in 2024. As to population trends, the capitals of Japan and the ROK are expanding at the expense of rural areas. Tokyo recorded the greatest population increase in 2024, while most of the other prefectures lost residents. In South Korea, half of the population lives in Seoul.
Beyond demographics, Japan and South Korea have common national security interests, which bring the United States into the picture. To protect its security environment, which is affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and to protect against China’s advances, Japan has been reinforcing its multilateral arrangements for security cooperation with like-minded countries in the region.
The security frameworks of both Japan and South Korea are based on alliances with the U.S. In his policy speech to the Diet last January, Ishiba extolled the leadership of Japan and the U.S. in building multi-layered regional security networks, including the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia, Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Philippines. For South Korea’s part, Lee said that he would “pursue pragmatic diplomacy with neighboring countries and boost trilateral Seoul-Washington-Tokyo cooperation.”
Bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea fell to their lowest point since World War II under the respective leaderships of Shinzo Abe in Japan and Moon Jae-in South Korea. That fall stemmed in large part from Abe’s revisionist view on history issues. Specifically, on the mobilization of “comfort women,” Abe in 2007 denied that Japanese officials had engaged in “coercion in narrow definition,” while emphasizing that brokers (that is, parties outside the government) had conducted “coercion in broad definition.”
Although Moon’s predecessor, Park Geun-hye, agreed with the Abe administration on a “final and irreversible” settlement of the comfort woman claims in December 2015, Moon was skeptical about the validity of the agreement. In fact, the relevant document was unique, unsigned, and unratified and existed only as two different “announcements” at a “joint press occasion.” In the absence of a conventional agreement, South Korean courts have continued to order Japan to compensate Korea’s former comfort women.
Yoon and Fumio Kishida ended the personal rivalry between the leadership of the two countries. However, domestic developments may cause Lee to take a hard line on the comfort woman issue. Even the dispute over wartime forced labor can reappear, if potential frustration against Japan grows among the people in South Korea. In 2018 and 2023, South Korea's Supreme Court dismissed the argument of Japanese corporations that compensation over the wartime forced labor was all settled.
Both countries also continue to dispute control over Takeshima Island (Dokdo in Korean). Meaningful cooperation with South Korea on national security matters will require the Ishiba administration to settle decades-long disputes over compensation of World War II comfort women and the conflicting territorial claims.
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 9, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
A major question in Japan is whether Japan can get along with South Korea’s new progressive leader, LEE Jae-myung, who once called Japan an “enemy country.” At present the Japanese government has no explicit differences with Korea’s Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP has so far avoided discussing Japan, especially on the history issues that have long divided the two countries. The current optimism about relations between the two countries reflects changes in each country’s domestic politics and national security policies. The history issues have not been resolved, however.
It is broadly recognized in Japan that the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea improved under the leadership of YOON Suk Yeol, Lee’s predecessor. Yoon was, however, impeached after his abrupt declaration of martial law last December. Yoon’s decision to compensate Koreans for wartime forced labor without seeking contributions from Japanese corporations silenced conservatives in Japan who had advocated for a hard line against Korean progressives. The greatest concern in Japan now is that Korea may go back to the time before Yoon – and reopen old wounds.
Lee refrained from negative remarks about Japan in his presidential campaign. Right after his victory, he even suggested that he would maintain the bilateral relationship forged by Yoon. “Policy coherence is especially important in managing relations between nations,” Lee said on the day he was sworn into office.
The Trump Administration’s tariff policy necessitates that South Korea make common cause with Japan. Moreover, to deal with North Korea, which is expanding its missile and nuclear capability and enhancing its ties to Russia, Lee will pursue “pragmatic diplomacy:” adjusting Korea’s foreign policies to account for the latest developments in international affairs. Japan and the U.S. are likely to be at the heart of Lee’s approach.
The Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, congratulated Lee on his victory. “This is the year of 60th anniversary from diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea, and I want to vitalize exchanges including non-governmental relationship. Enhancing cooperation between Japan and South Korea, or with the U.S., has a significance, as Japan shares such common issues as low birth rate, demographic concentration to the capital, and an alliance with America,” Ishiba said. He hopes for early meeting with Lee in the nature of “shuttle diplomacy.”
Ishiba and Lee had a telephone talk on June 9, in which Ishiba said he hoped to promote bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea based on the common ground the both countries had built. Both leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation in their bilateral relations, or their trilateral one including the United States, given the severe strategic environment.
Ishiba’s observations about common – and troubling – demographic conditions warrant serious attention. With respect to low birth rates, according to the Vital Statistics of Japan, the fertility rate (the number of babies that a woman delivers in her lifetime) was 1.15 in 2024, a year in which Japan hit a record low with fewer than 700,000 births. The situation is even more dire in the South Korea, which has the lowest fertility rate in the world: 0.75 in 2024. As to population trends, the capitals of Japan and the ROK are expanding at the expense of rural areas. Tokyo recorded the greatest population increase in 2024, while most of the other prefectures lost residents. In South Korea, half of the population lives in Seoul.
Beyond demographics, Japan and South Korea have common national security interests, which bring the United States into the picture. To protect its security environment, which is affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and to protect against China’s advances, Japan has been reinforcing its multilateral arrangements for security cooperation with like-minded countries in the region.
The security frameworks of both Japan and South Korea are based on alliances with the U.S. In his policy speech to the Diet last January, Ishiba extolled the leadership of Japan and the U.S. in building multi-layered regional security networks, including the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia, Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Philippines. For South Korea’s part, Lee said that he would “pursue pragmatic diplomacy with neighboring countries and boost trilateral Seoul-Washington-Tokyo cooperation.”
Bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea fell to their lowest point since World War II under the respective leaderships of Shinzo Abe in Japan and Moon Jae-in South Korea. That fall stemmed in large part from Abe’s revisionist view on history issues. Specifically, on the mobilization of “comfort women,” Abe in 2007 denied that Japanese officials had engaged in “coercion in narrow definition,” while emphasizing that brokers (that is, parties outside the government) had conducted “coercion in broad definition.”
Although Moon’s predecessor, Park Geun-hye, agreed with the Abe administration on a “final and irreversible” settlement of the comfort woman claims in December 2015, Moon was skeptical about the validity of the agreement. In fact, the relevant document was unique, unsigned, and unratified and existed only as two different “announcements” at a “joint press occasion.” In the absence of a conventional agreement, South Korean courts have continued to order Japan to compensate Korea’s former comfort women.
Yoon and Fumio Kishida ended the personal rivalry between the leadership of the two countries. However, domestic developments may cause Lee to take a hard line on the comfort woman issue. Even the dispute over wartime forced labor can reappear, if potential frustration against Japan grows among the people in South Korea. In 2018 and 2023, South Korea's Supreme Court dismissed the argument of Japanese corporations that compensation over the wartime forced labor was all settled.
Both countries also continue to dispute control over Takeshima Island (Dokdo in Korean). Meaningful cooperation with South Korea on national security matters will require the Ishiba administration to settle decades-long disputes over compensation of World War II comfort women and the conflicting territorial claims.
Sunday, June 8, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, June 9, 2025
REPORT LAUNCH: RUSSIA’S USE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 6/9, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Dr. Alexander Korolev, Senior Lecturer, Politics, International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney; Dr. Michael Rouland, Senior Strategic Advisor, Director, Research, Russia Strategic Initiative, US European Command; Colonel (ret.) Robert E. Hamilton, Ph.D., Head, Research, Eurasia Program, FPRI.
FUTURE OF WAR. 6/9, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy (FP Live). Speakers: Mara Karlin, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Professor of Practice, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution. Moderator: Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.
ISRAEL, CHINA, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC IN THE POST-OCTOBER 7TH MIDDLE EAST WITH, DIRECTOR OF SIGNAL GROUP. 6/9, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Council for a Secure America. Speaker: Carice Witte, Founder and Executive Director, SIGNAL Group.
WHY THE US NEEDS TO WIN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY RACE AGAINST THE CCP. 6/9, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Dr. Jason Kelly, CEO, Ginkgo Bioworks; Mike Gallagher, Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute.
SECURING EUROPE: WHAT SHOULD THE US PRIORITISE TO SUPPORT ITS CRITICAL SECTORS? 6/9, 2:00-5:30pm (CET), ), 8:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Science Business Network; Indra. Speakers: Robert de Groot, Vice-President, European Investment Bank; David Luengo Riesco, Head, Brussels Office, Indra; Manuel Aleixo, Cabinet Expert, Cabinet of Commissioner Zaharieva, European Commission; Martin Übelhör, Deputy Head of Unit, Innovation and Security Research, DG HOME, European Commission; Ethan Corbin, Director, Defence and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Kate Robson-Brown, Vice-President for Research, Innovation and Impact, University College Dublin; Sergii Nazarenko, Head, Office for Identification and Countering Threats to Critical Infrastructure Objects, NPC Ukrenergo; Nikolas Ott, Director, Cybersecurity and Defence Policy, Microsoft; Francesco Topputo, Full Professor of Space Systems, Politecnico di Milano; Verena Fennemann, Head, EU Office Brussels, Fraunhofer; Stijn Vermoote, Head of User Outreach and Engagement, ECMWF; Marco Brancati, Senior Vice President of Technology, Innovation & Systems Architecture - Space Division, Leonardo.
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND GLOBAL (DIS)ORDER. 6/9, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Speakers: Robert Falkner, Professor of International Relations, LSE; Katerina Dalacoura, Associate Professor in International Relations, LSE.
Saturday, June 7, 2025
Ms - Named
Discussion over Separate Surnames Begins
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 2, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Discussion over bills that would allow married couples to use separate surnames has begun in the Committee on Judicial Affairs of Japan’s House of Representatives. Three opposition parties have proposed their own respective bills, none of which has attracted majority support in the House because the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposes them. Despite domestic and international requirements for separate surnames, the Diet has failed to give married couples this flexibility.
Amid growing demands and international movements for gender equality, the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice released a draft in 1996 of a revised Civil Code to permit separate surnames. “When a married couple use each of their surnames before marriage, they need to decide at their marriage which name their children would use,” according to the draft. The couple themselves would be able to continue to use their unmarried names.
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued concluding observations in 2024, in which it recommended that Japan “amend legislation regarding the choice of surnames of married couples in order to enable women to retain their maiden surnames after marriage.” The convention had issued the same recommendation in 2003, 2009 and 2016.
The Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), one of the most influential supporters of the LDP, requested in 2024 that the government of Japan create a selective separate surnames system for women. Women in Japan may and do use their maiden names for business abroad, but legal inconveniences arise in foreign countries since their maiden names have no legal basis and are not described in their passports.
Nevertheless, conservative lawmakers in the LDP have blocked the amendment of the Civil Code, which currently requires a married couple to use one of their surnames, reflecting a concern that separate surnames would destroy the traditional shape of the family. They have not explained, however, how separate surnames will cause a family to collapse. Although some LDP lawmakers understand the necessity of separate surnames, the majority in the party has yet to do so.
With the decline of LDP power in the Diet after the October 2024 Lower House election, the opposition parties have tried to sustain momentum for amendment of the Civil Code. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) submitted a bill in April, which included the suggestions of the Legislative Council in 1996. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) proposed their own bill that would require a couple, as soon as they married, to register the surname that would be used for their children but that would allow the wife to use her unmarried surname.
The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) takes more conservative stance. Ishin’s bill would not allow separate surnames but would have a couple create a “common name” in family registration. The LDP decided against submitting their own bill in the current session of the Diet after long internal discussion.
Some conservative lawmakers, including Ms. Sanae Takaichi, argue that using a common name can be an alternative to separate surnames. Komeito favors a system for separate surnames, but thinks it is too early to resolve the issue.
It is not unusual for a Diet member to use their maiden name for their activities. For example, “real” name of Rui Matsukawa (LDP) is Rui Arai. While she discusses policies in the Diet as Rui Matsukawa, she needs to be Rui Arai in family registration or in foreign travel as a Diet member. Giving maiden name a legal status may be a good first step for lawmakers to make their political activities easier.
With no prospect that any one of the three bills from CDPJ, DPP, and Ishin could pass, the Chairwoman of the Committee on Judicial Affairs, Chinami Nishimura (CDPJ), has begun discussions in the committee on the surname issue. Of the 35 seats in the committee, the opposition parties hold 19. Two of the 19 oppose separate surnames. With these two members in dissent, the opposition parties cannot muster a majority to pass a bill.
If the Diet does not pass a bill by the end of the current session, the committee may discard some or all the bills or hold them over the next session. Chairwoman Nishimura reportedly aims to hold votes on the bills to draw a clear contrast between the ayes and the nays. The opposition continues to hold out remote hope that it can persuade enough LDP lawmakers to vote against the policy of their party.
In a May poll by Kyodo News, 71 percent of respondents supported a legal process for selective separate surnames, dwarfing the 27 percent who oppose the idea. Even if no bill passes the Diet, it will be good enough for the opposition: they can show, before the Upper House election in July, that the LDP was unable to deliver legislation favored by the majority of Japan’s citizens.
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 2, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Discussion over bills that would allow married couples to use separate surnames has begun in the Committee on Judicial Affairs of Japan’s House of Representatives. Three opposition parties have proposed their own respective bills, none of which has attracted majority support in the House because the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposes them. Despite domestic and international requirements for separate surnames, the Diet has failed to give married couples this flexibility.
Amid growing demands and international movements for gender equality, the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice released a draft in 1996 of a revised Civil Code to permit separate surnames. “When a married couple use each of their surnames before marriage, they need to decide at their marriage which name their children would use,” according to the draft. The couple themselves would be able to continue to use their unmarried names.
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued concluding observations in 2024, in which it recommended that Japan “amend legislation regarding the choice of surnames of married couples in order to enable women to retain their maiden surnames after marriage.” The convention had issued the same recommendation in 2003, 2009 and 2016.
The Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), one of the most influential supporters of the LDP, requested in 2024 that the government of Japan create a selective separate surnames system for women. Women in Japan may and do use their maiden names for business abroad, but legal inconveniences arise in foreign countries since their maiden names have no legal basis and are not described in their passports.
Nevertheless, conservative lawmakers in the LDP have blocked the amendment of the Civil Code, which currently requires a married couple to use one of their surnames, reflecting a concern that separate surnames would destroy the traditional shape of the family. They have not explained, however, how separate surnames will cause a family to collapse. Although some LDP lawmakers understand the necessity of separate surnames, the majority in the party has yet to do so.
With the decline of LDP power in the Diet after the October 2024 Lower House election, the opposition parties have tried to sustain momentum for amendment of the Civil Code. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) submitted a bill in April, which included the suggestions of the Legislative Council in 1996. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) proposed their own bill that would require a couple, as soon as they married, to register the surname that would be used for their children but that would allow the wife to use her unmarried surname.
The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) takes more conservative stance. Ishin’s bill would not allow separate surnames but would have a couple create a “common name” in family registration. The LDP decided against submitting their own bill in the current session of the Diet after long internal discussion.
Some conservative lawmakers, including Ms. Sanae Takaichi, argue that using a common name can be an alternative to separate surnames. Komeito favors a system for separate surnames, but thinks it is too early to resolve the issue.
It is not unusual for a Diet member to use their maiden name for their activities. For example, “real” name of Rui Matsukawa (LDP) is Rui Arai. While she discusses policies in the Diet as Rui Matsukawa, she needs to be Rui Arai in family registration or in foreign travel as a Diet member. Giving maiden name a legal status may be a good first step for lawmakers to make their political activities easier.
With no prospect that any one of the three bills from CDPJ, DPP, and Ishin could pass, the Chairwoman of the Committee on Judicial Affairs, Chinami Nishimura (CDPJ), has begun discussions in the committee on the surname issue. Of the 35 seats in the committee, the opposition parties hold 19. Two of the 19 oppose separate surnames. With these two members in dissent, the opposition parties cannot muster a majority to pass a bill.
If the Diet does not pass a bill by the end of the current session, the committee may discard some or all the bills or hold them over the next session. Chairwoman Nishimura reportedly aims to hold votes on the bills to draw a clear contrast between the ayes and the nays. The opposition continues to hold out remote hope that it can persuade enough LDP lawmakers to vote against the policy of their party.
In a May poll by Kyodo News, 71 percent of respondents supported a legal process for selective separate surnames, dwarfing the 27 percent who oppose the idea. Even if no bill passes the Diet, it will be good enough for the opposition: they can show, before the Upper House election in July, that the LDP was unable to deliver legislation favored by the majority of Japan’s citizens.
Sunday, June 1, 2025
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