South Korea's Autonomous Defense

South Korea Is Building for the Alliance and for Itself 

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published July 20, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

The United States and South Korea describe the latter’s defense buildup with the same enthusiasm but mean two different things. American officials call it “alliance modernization,” while South Korean officials increasingly call it “autonomous defense.” Neither side has much incentive to dwell on the difference, but it is getting harder to avoid.

As the Donald Trump administration tells it, South Korea is increasing defense spending and equipment procurement within the context of a redesigned U.S. strategy to restructure the roles of both U.S. and South Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.

Modernization is the “administration’s shorthand for pushing U.S. allies to adapt to a changing regional security environment and shoulder more of the defense burden,” Brookings Institution’s Andrew Yeo observed last fall. Writing for the latest edition of KEI’s Korea Policy, Korea National Defense University’s In Hyo Seol described modernization as “a redistribution of roles on a foundation of converging military interests.” 

This framework is a more comfortable one for those concerned about friction between the United States and South Korea. Differences over specific issues, such as the timeline for returning wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean armed forces, can be more easily managed if both Washington and Seoul share the same goal of alliance modernization.

Autonomous Defense

But the reality is more complicated. South Koreans increasingly place their defense buildup and its key components within a different, though not entirely contradictory, policy framework called “autonomous defense.”

Autonomous defense traces its roots to the fear of abandonment in the 1970s, when then President Richard Nixon withdrew 20,000 troops from the peninsula during the Vietnam War. More recently, defense autonomy for South Korea means greater self-reliance, indigenous weapons procurement sustained by arms exports, and ultimately limiting the reliance on U.S. forces as a deterrent to North Korea. 

South Korean policymakers have long grappled with a persistent tension in defense policy between a desire for more autonomy and the reality of the operational indispensability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. “The goal of autonomy policy is to hold our own while being alliance compatible,” a senior South Korean official told the author on a recent visit to Seoul. In other words, South Korea hopes to shift the alliance’s internal balance of power, reduce technological dependency on U.S. defense systems, and build sufficient indigenous capability to make Seoul a more equal partner.

On the surface, the Trump administration’s goals of shifting a greater share of defense burdens to its allies and encouraging a more regional approach to security would seem to be compatible with South Korea’s preferences. But Washington has been clear about the limits: allies are expected to spend more, not to build alternatives.

The OPCON transfer initiative, for example, was initially targeted in 2012 but has since been replaced by a conditions-based threshold with no fixed timeline. The conditions range from South Korea’s own capability, both in equipment and command, to lead combined forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and most nebulous of all, the existence of a regional security environment that would be compatible with the transfer.

In 2019, the allies determined that South Korea met a minimum baseline capability and interoperability with U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). Further progress slowed until recently, when the Trump and Lee Jae Myung administrations agreed that a second stage, full operational capability, would be verified this year. Seoul seems likely to establish 2028 as a new target year for OPCON transfer to occur by. 

That push has been met, however, with resistance from the U.S. military, led by USFK Commander Xavier Brunson, who suggested earlier this year that this timeline was too optimistic. The U.S. Senate has backed that up by proposing tighter conditions for OPCON transfer. 

Arms Production and Exports

Similar tensions lurk not far below the surface when it comes to South Korea’s indigenous arms production and its successful export drive across Europe and Asia. Sales of armored vehicles, artillery, jet aircraft, and missile defense systems have transformed the country into a global leader of arms sales. Earlier this month, President Lee attended a NATO forum and suggested such weapons sales could underpin an evolution of South Korea-NATO ties. But senior Trump administration officials have seemingly pushed back on the notion that allies could or should replace reliance on American weapons.

“The simple fact of the matter is that no alternative country or countries can compete with the U.S. defense industrial base, either in quantity or quality,” Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby asserted on social media last week. The United States “makes the best equipment, and we make it at a scale that no plausible competitor can match,” Colby continued. Access to the U.S. defense industrial base “is a privilege, not a right.”

Thus, even in its most ambitious formulation, South Korea’s autonomous defense still involves maintaining the U.S. extended deterrence commitment in the face of threats from North Korea. Some sort of U.S. military presence makes that political commitment concrete.

“The withdrawal of USFK is not something we want to see,” a senior Lee administration official told this writer. “But if it becomes a reality for us, and we have to fend for ourselves, we need to block the threat of nuclear weapons.”

The most obvious way to do so—and the one that has attracted the most attention in American policy circles—is a South Korean nuclear weapons program. Alternatively, policymakers in Seoul are interrogating whether rapid changes in defense technology might create a reliable form of conventional deterrence. The first option is still beyond the pale, while the second is still a ways down the road.

“We are learning the lessons of the Ukraine and Iran wars,” the senior official explained, notably laser weapons and AI-powered defense systems that can “potentially intercept hundreds of missiles at one time.” 

For now, neither the United States nor South Korea has an interest in forcing the question. But indigenous production, export markets, command authority, and the first sketches of a conventional answer to nuclear coercion add up to more than burden-sharing.

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of May 4, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

                By Jieun Baek, Doctorate Student of Public Policy, 

Oxford University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/5/2026)

Drawing on hundreds of hours of in-depth interviews with escapees from Pyongyang, Baek examines how members of this privileged class, granted access to forbidden information and superior material benefits, publicly uphold the regime despite their underlying discontent. Baek argues that this performative loyalty, born of fear and a desire to survive, masks a critical vulnerability within the regime’s core.

Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics: The United States and China in an Age of Indo-Pacific Transformation

By Kent E. Calder, Director, Edwin O. Reischauer Center 

for East Asian Studies

PURCHASE BOOK (2/7/2025)

Examines the strategic geography of the sea lanes from Northeast Asia through the Indian Ocean to Europe, through which much of the world's energy and information flow. Changing technology and economic patterns have profoundly transformed the global significance of those passageways since the end of the Cold War, with fateful consequences for the strategic calculations of both the United States and a rising China. A timely contribution to today's geopolitics.

Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work

By Alvin E. Roth, Professor, Stanford University and Harvard University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/12/2026)

Disagreements are fierce because arguments on both sides are often made in uncompromising moral or religious terms. Roth asserts that we can make progress on these and other difficult topics if we view them as markets—tools to help decide who gets what—and understand how those markets can be fine-tuned to be more functional. Markets don’t have to allow everything or ban everything. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 27, 2026

AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS: CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW REGIONAL MECHANISM FOR PRINCIPLED SECURITY. 4/27, 10:00am-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speakers: TBD.  Lunch will be served.

POWER, RELIGION, AND IDEOLOGY IN NORTH KOREA. 4/27, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jonathan Cheng, China Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal; Jung H. Pak, Distinguished Associate Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel; Moderator: Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies. PURCHASE BOOK

TRUMP, TAKAICHI AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF DETERRENCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 4/27, Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speakers: Kenneth Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Moderator: Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government, Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.

BOOK TALK: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM REVIVED TOTALITARIAN RULE IN CHINA. 4/27, 5:00-6:30pm (BST), Noon-1:30pm (EDT) VIRTUAL. Sponsor: School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Speaker: author Minxin Pei, Tom and Margot Pritzker '72 Professor of Government, Claremont McKenna College, Editor of China Leadership Monitor. PURCHASE BOOK

THE FUTURE OF THE GULF: COMMERCE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER OPERATION EPIC FURY. 4/27, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Jared Cohen, President, Global Affairs, Goldman Sachs and Co-Head, Goldman Sachs Global Institute; Moderator: Mike Gallagher, Distinguished Fellow.

Defending Asia Has Gotten Harder

Why Nuclear Deterrence in Asia Is Collapsing

By Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute, Scholar in Residence at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST), and APP Member.

First Published March 31, 2026 on The National Interest. 

As the 2027 “Davidson window” approaches, Washington appears less concerned about deterrence failure in Asia than at any point in recent years. The phrase, drawn from former US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Philip Davidson’s warning about China’s timeline for achieving combat readiness for a Taiwan contingency, once became shorthand for fears of imminent conflict, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Yet “deterrence” is scarcely mentioned in the US Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, the intelligence community’s capstone document. While it notes that Beijing’s ambitions over Taiwan remain undiminished, it asserts that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.” The intelligence community appears to have embraced a view of Xi Jinping’s strategy as gradual, positional, and political, aimed at tightening control over what Beijing calls a rogue province, even though the People’s Republic of China has never governed Taiwan.

Admiral Davidson’s warning was never a prediction of impending war. It was a caution about the convergence of two trends: China’s military modernization milestone in 2027 and a potentially declining US force posture, which could create a gap in deterrence. Ironically, on the eve of the People’s Liberation Army’s centenary in 2027, Washington risks becoming overly sanguine about the durability of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Although the Annual Threat Assessment reflects reasonable analytical caution, it risks strategic complacency.

Across both South and East Asia, structural trends are eroding deterrence. A fracturing international order, the expansion of conflict below the nuclear threshold, and the accelerating impact of emerging technologies are together undermining stability. This is no time to slacken efforts to shore up deterrence.

The Failure of Nuclear Deterrence

Recent conflicts suggest the stark lesson that while nuclear weapons may still deter large-scale war, they do not prevent conflict. Indeed, nuclear-armed states appear increasingly willing to incur risk by operating below the nuclear threshold. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the most obvious case. Had Kyiv retained its nuclear arsenal, it is difficult to imagine Russia prosecuting a prolonged war of aggression on its territory.

Iran provides a more recent example of deterrence failure. Tehran exposed its capabilities through premature use, delegated credibility to unreliable proxies, and lingered at a nuclear threshold sufficient to provoke an attack but insufficient to prevent it. What should have imposed caution instead created opportunity for its adversaries. Deterrence did not fail quietly; it collapsed visibly.

More broadly, deterrence is no longer reliably governing the space below major war. This was evident in South Asia in spring 2025.

After a terrorist attack in Pahalgam killed 26 civilians, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking deep inside Pakistan, including near sensitive military infrastructure. The episode demonstrated a higher tolerance for risk on both sides. It reinforced the parlous conclusion that even nuclear-armed rivals believe there is still room to engage in conflict without triggering nuclear escalation. Tensions continue to simmer on the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and last year was not the last time terrorism will prompt military reprisal. India’s subsequent shift toward compellence, outlined in Defence Forces Vision 2047, underscores this trend.

Across recent conflicts, from Ukraine to Iran, states are testing the limits of escalation, probing how far they can go without crossing nuclear red lines. Indeed, a Carnegie Endowment study of nuclear threats in recent years suggests that nuclear-armed governments have grown more adept at manipulating fears of nuclear exchange to pursue conventional aims. Some may think that even a tactical nuclear use might not elicit more than conventional retaliation.

That assumption is profoundly misplaced. As the line between coercion and conflict blurs, and as conventional and nuclear domains become increasingly entangled, ambiguity is rising. And with ambiguity comes a heightened risk of miscalculation. These pressures are global, but nowhere are they more dangerous than in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia’s Nuclear Paradox

North Korea has moved beyond deterrence by retaliation toward a doctrine that emphasizes early, limited use to control escalation. Its focus on tactical nuclear weapons, preemption, and potential pre-delegation lowers the threshold for nuclear employment. As Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un made clear in a speech amid the Iran conflict, North Korea’s “nuclear shield…drives the development of all sectors of the country” and guarantees “the dignity of the state, national interests, and ultimate victory.”

Russia acts as an accelerant. Its deepening alignment and“invincible alliance” with North Korea, its reliance on nuclear coercion, and its reported support for Pyongyang’s missile programs are contributing to a more interconnected and volatile deterrence environment. North Korean systems tested in Ukraine are already demonstrating improved survivability and maneuverability, as the KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles are increasingly able to evade interception.

China, meanwhile, is undertaking a rapid and opaque nuclear expansion. Whether Beijing seeks parity or something more ambitious, its trajectory, combined with possible movement toward a launch-on-warning posture, introduces new instability into crisis dynamics.

These trends are not isolated. They reinforce one another, creating an interlinked nuclear system that is more complex, less predictable, and harder to stabilize.

At the strategic level, deterrence still holds. The catastrophic costs of nuclear war continue to constrain major powers. But at the operational level, where crises unfold and decisions are made, deterrence is fragmenting. The central paradox of the current moment is that, as destructive capabilities grow, predictability declines.

The US’ Nuclear Credibility Gap

Credibility, the currency of deterrence, is also steadily fading. Allies increasingly question the reliability of US commitments, even as technological advances fail to deliver greater security. US force posture adjustments have compounded these concerns.

Taiwanese officials have warned that the expenditure of long-range strike systems such as Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) and Tomahawks erodes deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. South Korean officials have voiced similar unease over the redeployment of missile defense assets, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems, especially given the domestic political and economic costs Seoul previously incurred to host them.

At the same time, the credibility of US extended deterrence, the foundation of security for Japan and South Korea, is under growing strain. The longstanding question of whether the United States would risk Los Angeles to defend Seoul or Tokyo is no longer theoretical, but increasingly being asked in allied capitals.

South Korea is hedging by investing in nuclear-powered submarines, expanding its latent nuclear capability while remaining faithful to the nonproliferation regime. Tokyo, constrained by domestic politics, is strengthening its conventional strike capabilities while reassessing old assumptions, including the role of US nuclear weapons on its territory.

Deterrence rests not only on capability but also on trust and belief. And trust and belief are becoming harder to sustain.

Along with a decline in credibility is the questionable assumption that conflicts in Asia can be geographically contained. The Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea are increasingly interconnected. A Taiwan contingency, for example, would draw US and allied assets away from Korea, weakening deterrence on the peninsula and potentially inviting opportunistic action. In a multi-front scenario, even strong alliances can be stretched thin.

Emerging technologies are exacerbating these risks. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are compressing decision-making timelines, reducing the space for human judgment. What once unfolded over days may now occur in minutes. Advances in surveillance are making military movements more visible, increasing incentives for preemption. The logic of “use it or lose it” is becoming more salient. Even the undersea domain, long the foundation of secure second-strike capability, may become more transparent, undermining a key pillar of strategic stability.

Crises are moving faster than the institutions designed to manage them.

How to Strengthen US Nuclear Deterrence Without Breaking It

What, then, is to be done? There is broad agreement on the need to strengthen deterrence, but less consensus on how to do so. Some advocate deeper allied integration. For instance, tighter trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, enhanced missile defense cooperation, and a more unified defense of the First Island Chain are all prevailing lines of effort for bolstering deterrence in East Asia.

Others emphasize preparing for limited nuclear use, ensuring that alliances can absorb and respond without uncontrolled escalation. But there is also a growing recognition that overreliance on preemption and rapid escalation could sow crisis instability. Efforts to strengthen deterrence may inadvertently accelerate the very dynamics that make it fragile. The policy challenge is fortifying deterrence without breaking it.

Defense modernization programs that envision a “spine” of AI-enabled technologies across all domains, with a focus on resilience of the system, could also invite foes to paralyze the spine, or at least lead them to believe that they might be capable of doing so. Deterrence is no longer a slow-moving, bilateral system. It is a fast, interconnected, multi-actor environment shaped by nuclear modernization, technological disruption, and shifting political commitments.

The greatest danger is not that deterrence collapses outright, but that it fails in ways we do not anticipate. A misinterpreted signal. A limited strike. A decision made too quickly.

The Davidson window may never have been a countdown to war. But it was a warning about vulnerability, and that vulnerability has deepened rather than disappeared. The danger is not that deterrence collapses. It is that it fails in ways we fail to anticipate.