Showing posts with label Koizumi Junichiro. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Koizumi Junichiro. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 17, 2024

No Conclusion on Stable Imperial Succession

Empress Suiko (推古天皇) (554 – 15 April 628)
Still skittish on female succession
 
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Diet failed to act on stable imperial succession by the end of the ordinary session of this year. Although the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the House of Councillors looked for a way to increase the members of the Imperial House, the parties could not reach an agreement.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was late in wrapping up their internal opinions, due to the slush fund scandal and its consequences. Looking at the opinions submitted by the parties, it is not easy to find a consensus between the conservatives and the other sectors of the Diet.

The Imperial House of Japan has 17 members, 12 of whom are female. They share official duties such as attending public events or visiting foreign countries. According to the Imperial House Law, only male members may succeed to the throne. Female members leave the House when they marry. Currently, Prince Hisahito of Akishino, a son of Crown Price Fumihito, is the youngest in the line of succession.

A supplementary resolution in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication in 2017 required the Diet to achieve “a full consensus of the legislative branch” for measures to stabilize imperial succession. The resolution also directed the government of Japan to consider allowing for a female-headed Imperial family.

In March 2021, former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga assembled an expert panel to examine succession issues. That December, the panel submitted the Prime Minister, now Fumio Kishida, a report that proposed two options to deal with the declining number of members in the Imperial House. Neither, however, addressed female succession.

One was to allow female members of the imperial household to retain their royal status regardless of marriage. Members of the Imperial House take on various obligations of the Imperial family such as attending cultural, academic, or sporting events, visiting areas devastated by natural disasters, and visiting foreign countries. As female members leave the House, those obligations are taken by fewer members. If female members stay in the house, the House would be sustainable.

A second was to allow males from former branches of the imperial family to regain their imperial status through adoption. Two years after the end of World War II, fifty-one people from eleven houses left the Imperial House. The second option would return their male descendants to the Imperial House.

Kishida submitted the report to both Houses of the Diet for further discussion in January 2022.

Each party first reviewed the report internally. Komeito approved both options as reasonable. The Japan Innovation Party, leaning conservative, also approved both options as realistic. Both parties are comfortable that the options do not include female succession. The conservatives hope to maintain the rule of paternal succession.

The Constitutional Democratic Party asked for further discussion of the first option because the report excluded the husband and children of female House members from royal status. The CDP also requested information on who among the male members of the former branches would consider rejoining the Imperial House through adoption.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) would allow a female emperor, or an emperor descended matrilineally from the Imperial Family. While the JCP hopes to pave the way to a female emperor, conservative lawmakers oppose that idea.

The last party that submitted its opinion was the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP approved both options in mid-April.

Concerning the requirement of “a full consensus of the legislative branch” in the Special Law for Imperial Abdication, both Houses sought an overall agreement at several meetings in May. At the first meeting, with the speaker and president of the Houses and representatives of parties in attendance, each party expressed its own opinion. The LDP added that a son of an adopted male member should be qualified as a successor. No consensus emerged.

In late May, both chairs of the Houses and each party held separate meetings with each party. There was no plenary meeting. The LDP is committed to exclusively male succession. The CDP and the JCP are willing to expand the line of succession to female members of the Imperial House and to male members in matrilineal lines.

Back in 2005, the Junichiro Koizumi administration convened an expert panel that submitted a report recommended that the possibility of a female or matrilineal emperor be easily understood by the people, be based on traditional values and ensure a stable succession system. However, after Prince Hisahito was born in 2006, the LDP turned against the idea of a female or matrilineal emperor.

A Kyodo News poll last April revealed that 90 percent of those polled supported the idea of a reigning empress. However, the current experts’ panel recommended that, considering the age and marital status of Prince Hisahito, the discussion over the imperial succession take place in the future. In short, the LDP and current experts oppose the concept of a female emperor, while the CDP and former experts for Koizumi administration embrace it.

To the extent that the Diet is now dealing with the Imperial Family, it is focused on how to reduce the family’s official duties. But once lawmakers begin to discuss who should share the duties of the Imperial Family, the question of succession is unavoidable.

Sunday, April 14, 2024

The LDP's Moral Hazard

No Punishment for the LDP President

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 8, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) recently announced punishments against the lawmakers who had been involved in the slush fund scandal that emerged last December. But for a few scapegoats, the punishments were light.

Of the 82 lawmakers with the former Abe or Nikai factions who admitted to failing to report surplus funds from ticket sales to fundraising parties, only 39 were punished. Prime Minister Kishida, as the president of the LDP, was not punished, leaving many frustrated.

Five former leaders of the Abe faction received the stiffest penalties. Four out of the five participated in discussions in the Abe faction in 2022 on whether to abolish the kickback system. Despite their leadership responsibilities, they took no action.

The harshest sanctions were imposed on the former chair of the Abe faction, Ryu Shionoya and the former leader of that faction’s House of Councillors’ membership, Hiroshige Seko. They were asked to leave the party. If they did not so within the allotted time, they would be expelled. Seko immediately left the party. Shionoya is considering whether to appeal: “I cannot accept that unjustly heavy penalty, which was imposed on the members of Abe faction making them scapegoats,” said Shionoya in a press conference.

Former Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Yasutoshi Nishimura, and former Education Minister, Hakubun Shimomura, received lighter penalties: they were suspended from party membership for one year. Former Chair of LDP Diet Affairs, Tsuyoshi Takagi, who succeeded Nishimura as the secretary general of the Abe faction in late August of 2022, was suspended from party membership for just six months.

Nishimura, Shimomura, and Takagi could run for re-election, but they will not have the official backing of the LDP until their suspensions end. If an election is called before then, they will face an uphill battle without financial support from the party.

As to the other 77 party members, they all avoided heavy penalties. Sanctions on the 77 were calibrated by the amount of funds they failed to report.

In contrast to the former leaders of the Abe faction, the former Chair of the LDP Policy Research Council, Koichi Hagiuda, and former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, were suspended only from leadership posts for a year; there was no suspension from party membership. Hagiuda and Matsuno have been important in the Kishida administration, which probably helped them escape more serious penalties. Seven lawmakers who were the leaders of Nikai faction or who failed to report funds in amounts over 20 million yen received the same one-year suspension from leadership posts.

Eight lawmakers who did not report surplus funds of between 10 and 20 million yen were suspended from leadership positions for six months. Seventeen others who did not report between five and ten million yen were merely reprimanded Forty-three lawmakers each of whom failed to report less than five million yen, were not punished at all. That is, the LDP did not impose any penalty on over half of the lawmakers involved in the scandal.

A few thoughts come immediately to mind. First, Kishida’s highest priority is reelection as LDP President. The power of the Abe faction has been an inconvenient truth for Kishida. Although discovery of the slush fund scandal was unexpected, it gave Kishida an opportunity to control that faction, but not to dismantle it. That would have posed too great a risk since it would solidify opposition to him.

Second, Kishida’s strategy in the scandal is to divide and rule. One of the lightly punished leaders, Haguida, has gained Kishida’s personal trust as evidenced by his temporary consideration for appointment as Chief Cabinet Secretary in last September’s cabinet reshuffle. The other, Matsuno, was Kishida’s original choice for CCS at the beginning of the Kishida administration. Kishida hopes to keep Hagiuda, who has many colleagues in Abe faction, and Matsuno close to him. The other – more heavily punished – leaders in the Abe faction did not have close relationship with Kishida.

Third, Kishida cannot punish too many lawmakers because he does not want to create too many enemies in the LDP. If the penalized lawmakers were to leave the party, it would take away votes in the Diet that Kishida needs to pass legislation. Kishida limited the heaviest penalties to the five leaders of the Abe faction. Shionoya and Seko must be the scapegoats to defend his administration from public criticism and further decline in his approval ratings.

Striking this balance between punishment and leniency in the LDP is unlikely to enable Kishida to salvage his administration from the quagmire of scandal. The punishments were far smaller than those in 2005, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi sanctioned the lawmakers who voted against a postal reform bill. Those lawmakers simply defied a policy of the president of their party and did not violate the law. This time, the lawmakers did break the law.

The lack of any punishment for Kishida brings a moral hazard. Kishida has led his faction since before the scandal was revealed last December. An accounting manager in his faction was indicted on a charge of failing to report 30 million yen of political funds. While the leaders of the Abe faction were punished for failing to meet their leadership responsibilities, Kishida escaped any.

It is difficult to punish the president. Even a light penalty, such as suspension from party leadership position, could lead to the resignation of the president, or Prime Minister. Yet a zero penalty can hardly be balanced against the heavy ones for the Abe faction leaders. The only reasonable choice is to step down. Kishida has not chosen this option.

“I have an impression why was he [Kishida] dropped,” said Shionoya in his press conference, “He should be responsible for something, at least in lights of his position as the LDP president or as the head of a faction.” The opposition parties are taking the offensive and pushing for a snap election to hear voters’ voices about LDP politics. While Kishida hopes to raise his approval rating with some achievements in the summit meeting with US President Joe Biden this week, public frustration against an irresponsible prime minister will stick around.

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Japan's Official Statements of Apology are only four

What is an official Japanese government statement? What would make a Japanese apology official? The following paper answers this question by pointing out the three war apologies that have distinction of a Cabinet Decision (kakugi kettei) behind them. This is approval by Cabinet, which is the executive of the Japanese government. No war apology can be said to have been approved by the Diet, which would also be official.

The article below does not mention the fourth Cabinet Decision on a war apology. This was in 2009 to the American former POWs (buried in a February 6, 2009 reply, #171-22 [English, Question III, #3], to a Dietmember). Written answers to questions made in the Diet are kakugi ketteis. This apology by implication and vagueness included ALL POWs of Imperial Japan during WWII. It is the first war apology to a specific group.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in all his war statements has been very careful not to have them Cabinet approved. Neither his address to the joint meeting of the U.S. Congress or at Pearl Harbor were Cabinet approved. This substantially weakens them, and implies that the words are more personal than state sanctioned. There is then room for improvement.

The Prime Minister's Statements on Understanding of History

By Junichiro Shoji, director of NIDS Center for Military HistoryNational Institute for Defense Studies Commentary, 18 February 2013. Provisional translation by Asia Policy Point. [National Institute for Defense Studies is a policy research institute under Japan's Ministry of Defense]

Introduction 

In a speech to a plenary session of the Upper House, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that he "would like to make a future-oriented statement that is appropriate for the 21st century," while, as with his first cabinet, continuing to follow the tenor of the "Murayama Statement," indicating Abe's intention to issue a new "Abe Statement." Abe has referred a number of times to the idea of an "Abe Statement" up to now, but this was the first time he mentioned the possibility in the Diet.

In this article, I will focus on three "Prime Minister's Statements" addressing Japan's historical understanding that received cabinet approval in order to identify their respective particular features and differences among them (these statements being divided between those receiving cabinet approval and those not needing it).

1) Murayama Statement

The "Murayama Statement," officially entitled "On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War's End," was a statement issued by Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on 15 August 1995, 50 years after the end of the Second World War, regarding Japan's recognition of its wartime history. The following is an extract from the statement.
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. 
The primary special aspect of this statement is Murayama's expression of "deep remorse" and "heartfelt apology" in regards to the "tremendous damage and suffering" inflicted on Asian and other countries through Japan's "colonial rule and aggression." Moreover, based on this recognition, Murayama expressed his commitment to peace and the renunciation of war to ensure that Japan never repeats this sorrow of history again.

Up to then, official documents, statements, speeches, and so on had often expressed Japan's "remorse," "apology," and "renunciation of war," but [the Murayama Statement] compiled all of these sentiments into one statement, and was given the weighty imprimatur of cabinet approval [kakugi kettei, emphasis added]. For example, in his policy speech to the Diet on 23 August 1993, then Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa stated, "I would like to express anew our profound remorse and apologies for the fact that past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people." Prime Minister Murayama himself in the "Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the 'Peace, Friendship, and Exchange Initiative,'" issued in August 1994, expressed similar sentiments.

The second aspect is that for the first time a reference to "following a mistaken national policy" was included in the Murayama Statement. Since a clear recognition was made of a "mistaken national policy," an animated debate subsequently ensued about who the main bearers of responsibility were and what the specific target policies and their timing were.

At that time, there were various views in Japan on the matter. For example, since disputes had arisen regarding historical understanding, the Resolution To Renew the Commitment to Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned From History (War Renouncing Resolution) that was issued by the Lower House in June 1995 adopted the following mediating language: "Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Member s in this House express a sense of deep remorse."

That is, the words "aggression" and "apology" were replaced by "acts of aggression" and "deep remorse" respectively. A sentence calling for "transcending the differences over historical views of the past war" was also added. Moreover, although Diet resolutions are meant, in principle, to be passed unanimously, since many members from both the ruling and the opposition parties absented themselves during the voting, it was the rare case of a resolution being approved by less than half the total number of Diet members.

Although the Murayama statement was said, for external consumption, to have been led by the prime minister's office, in actuality, the statement was carefully vetted by the Foreign Ministry as part of its long-term processing of post-war policy. Moreover, the target countries for the resolution, particularly China, South Korea, the United States, and Britain, were kept well in mind, and letters from Murayama were sent to those four countries at the same time as the statement was released. (See The Murayama Statement and MOFA, by Ryuji Hattori.)

Accordingly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson lauded the statement, saying, "The Japanese government has expressed deep remorse over their past history of colonial rule and aggression, and they have shown a positive attitude in apologizing to the peoples of Asia."

After that, the Murayama Statement policy was adopted and followed by successive cabinets, including those of the Liberal Democratic Party, and the policy has continued until today.

2) Koizumi Statements

On 15 August 2005, then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi issued a statement marking the 60th anniversary of the Second World War's end. It basically followed the Murayama Statement, but Koizumi's statement was significant because it was issued by an LDP prime minister. It is certainly true that certain quarters in both China and South Korea were dissatisfied with the Murayama Statement because it was issued under a Socialist Party administration.

Koizumi's statement had the following characteristics. First, the references to the wartime period in the Murayama Statement, particularly those that sparked argument, such as "following a mistaken national policy," "ensnar[ing] the Japanese people in a fateful crisis," and "eliminat[ing] self-righteous nationalism," are gone, and in their place, much more prominence is given to emphasizing Japan's postwar history of peaceful development (achievements as a peace-loving nation). 

Thus, Koizumi's statement points out that postwar Japan adopted a completely pacifist position, and has contributed to peace and prosperity in the world (international contributions) through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), and so on. The statement reads, "Japan's postwar history has indeed been six decades of manifesting its remorse on the war through actions." Koizumi's statement has a "new aspect not found in the Murayama Statement," and as shown by the path taken by Japan after the war, Japan's past remorse is expressed not only in words [but also by international contributions], and "by emphasizing that Japan's actual actions are proof of this, the statement is all the more persuasive" (Takakazu Kuriyama, Wakai [Reconciliation]).

Incidentally, in a BBC opinion survey in 2012, Japan was ranked as the top country for "having a positive influence on the world," and in a survey by an Australian think tank in 2012, Japan ranked 5th in a list of "peaceful countries."

On the other hand, in the history education and media in China and South Korea, compared with the Second World War and Japan's colonial rule, Japan's postwar course has not been taken up very much. The Japan-China History Research Committee (December 2006-December 2009), of which I was a member, addressed not only the wartime period but also ancient and modern history, including the postwar period. In that sense, it had epoch-making significance (although at the request of the Chinese side, the section in the committee's report dealing with postwar history was not publicly released). This committee was established based on an agreement with the Chinese side when Prime Minister Abe visited China in October 2006. The Chinese side "positively appreciated the fact that postwar Japan has consistently followed the path of a peaceful country based on freedom and democracy."

Second, based on postwar Japan's pacifism, Koizumi's statement declared, "I believe it is necessary to work hand in hand with other Asian countries, especially with China and the Republic of Korea, which are Japan's neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, to maintain peace and pursue the development of the region." While specifically naming China and South Korea, the statement penultimately concluded, "I intend to build a future-oriented cooperative relationship based on mutual understanding and trust with Asian countries."

At the Asian-African Summit (Bandung Conference) held in Jakarta in April 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi gave a similar speech, following the line of the Murayama Statement, but it was the first time a Japanese prime minister had referred to the matter of historical awareness at an international conference and expressed "remorse" and "apologies," making the speech exceptional.

Third, Koizumi's statement begins: "...I affirm my determination that Japan must never again take the path to war, reflecting that the peace and prosperity we enjoy today are founded on the ultimate sacrifices of those who lost their lives for the war against the their will. More than three million compatriots died in the war -- in the battlefield thinking about their homeland and worrying about their families, while others perished amidst the destruction of war, or after the war in remote foreign countries." Referring to the Japanese war dead, the statement expresses a remembrance of the Japanese who died as a result of the war and a desire for peace. This is an expression of Koizumi's logic (thinking) for visiting Yasukuni Shrine.

Prime Minister Koizumi's first visit to Yasukuni after becoming prime minister came in August 2001; because of his consideration of China, Koizumi made the visit on the 13th, ahead of the anniversary on the 15th. On that day, Koizumi issued a statement that began: "...Japan caused tremendous sufferings to many people of the world, including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering, particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region." This statement replaces the Murayama Statement's phrase "tremendous damage and suffering" with "immeasurable ravages and suffering." With the addition of the idea of an "incurable scar" and so on, Koizumi's statement was evaluated as going beyond the Murayama Statement. Although he continued to visit Yasukuni, Koizumi carried on the policy line of the Murayama Statement.

Moreover, when Koizumi visited China on 8 October, two months after his first Yasukuni visit, he went to the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (near Lugou Bridge), the first prime minister to do so since Murayama visited the Museum in 1995. "I looked at the various exhibits with a feeling of heartfelt apology and condolences for those Chinese people who were victims of aggression...We must look directly at our past history and must never cause a war again. Based on our remorse, Japan has been able to achieve prosperity as a peaceful country after the war," Koizumi said after he toured the museum. Koizumi expressed remorse and an apology more clearly than the Murayama Statement, which did not specify the other countries. The Chinese side highly appreciated Koizumi's remarks, and Chinese President Jiang Zemin said with surprise, "This is the first Japanese prime minister I can talk with to such an extent." Sources said that the Chinese side held expectations that Koizumi would not visit Yasukuni again (Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 July 2005). Thus, it has been pointed out that in response to Koizumi's subsequent repeated visits to Yasukuni, the main emphasis of China's criticism moved from the issue of historical understanding per se to the damage to the national sentiment of the suffering country.

3) Kan Statement


Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued a statement in August 2010, the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Korea. The statement referred only to South Korea, and it was the first statement issued by the Democratic Party of Japan.

Following the tenor of the Murayama Statement, Kan's statement made specific mention of Japan's colonial rule of Korea, and in reference to the March 1st independence movement [Samil Movement], the statement recognized the coerciveness of Japan's colonial rule: "...the Korean people of that time [were deprived of their country], and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule, which was imposed against their will...." Expressing consideration for the sentiments of the South Korean people, the statement also said, "Those who render pain tend to forget it, while those who suffered cannot forget it easily."

On the other hand, around half of the statement, particularly the latter half, declares that Japan and South Korea should build future-oriented ties based on the 2,000 years of exchanges and friendship between the two countries, while also recognizing the sorrowful periods in the past. Thus the statement declares: "Japan and the Republic of Korea have become the most important and closest neighboring nations now in the 21st century, sharing such values as democracy, freedom, and a market economy." Referencing the idea of an East Asian community, the statement also stressed the necessity of building a "partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace and prosperity of the region and the world."

Conclusion

As far as an Abe Statement, the specific timing and contents will be considered from now. Regarding the timing, it is said that, in accordance with custom, one option is the year 2015, which will mark the 70th year since the war's end. As regards the contents, Abe has stated, "We should issue a statement that is appropriate for one given 70 years after the war and which includes the postwar path taken by Japan and the path that should be taken from now." Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga has said, "We believe that a statement that is focused on a future-oriented outlook is necessary when we consider the stability, peace, and economies of Asia."

In other words, it is believed that the statement will aim for an "orientation towards the future," based on Japan's postwar course and not being solely tied to the past. It will likely reflect the transition, which I have taken up in this article, from the Murayama Statement, which took responsibility for Japan's wartime period, to the statements by Koizumi and Kan, which, while based on the sentiments of the Murayama Statement, also emphasized Japan's postwar path and future-oriented relations.

I had several opportunities to talk with scholars on the Chinese side through the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, and I found that, in actuality, even the Murayama Statement is not sufficiently known in China. And since the impressions produced by Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni ended up overshadowing the contents of his various statements and remarks, I was at first particularly surprised that members on the Chinese side said they wanted to read the full texts of Koizumi's statements and requested copies of them.

It is said that US President Bill Clinton, after reading an English translation of the Murayama Statement, praised it as being a "very courageous statement." From now, more efforts should be made to disseminate this series of statements by Japan's prime ministers more widely overseas.

References
· Kuriyama, Takakazu, Wakai -- Nihon Gaikou no Mondai (1) (Reconciliation -- Issues for Japanese Diplomacy), Gaiko Forum, January 2006.

· Hattori, Ryuji, Murayama Danwa to Gaimushou -- Shuusen 50 Shuunen no Gaikou (The Murayama Statement and MOFA -- Diplomacy in the 50th Year After the End of the War), in Nihonron: Gurobaruka-suru Nihon, ed., Tanaka Tsutomu, Chuo University Press, 2007.

· Shoji, Junichiro, Rekishi-Ninshiki o Meguru Nihon Gaikou -- Nitchuu Kankei o Chuushin To Shite (Japanese Diplomacy Regarding Historical Understanding -- Focusing on Japan-China Relations), Kokusai Seiji, No. 170, October 2012.

Sunday, May 19, 2013

Korea Scores a Milestone with President Park's Address to Congress


Dennis Halpin, former professional staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has recently become a Senior Fellow at Asia Policy Point. He is a retired Foreign Service officer who served in South Korea as U.S. Consul in Pusan and is a former Peace Corps volunteer in Korea. He is currently a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. The CSIS Korea Chair on May 14, 2013 published his essay below reflecting on the significance of the Park Geun-hye address to the U.S Congress on May 8, 2013.
~~~~~

Despite reports of a scandal involving a member of the Korean President's official party, the recent Washington visit of President Park Geun-hye scored some notable successes. Perhaps, most prominently, President Park's May 8th address to a joint meeting of the Congress demonstrated that the Republic of Korea is in the top rank of American allies. The last foreign leader to address Congress before her, in fact, was another Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, in October 2011 (There was no address by a foreign leader in the election year of 2012). With President Park's address, the Republic of Korea is now in fifth place (tied with Ireland and Italy) as to the number of times one of its leaders have addressed Congress. South Korea is behind only the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and Mexico in this regard.

More important, the Republic of Korea is unique among America's Asia-Pacific allies in having had six appearances by its presidents. Australia and the Philippines have only had three such occasions and Japan has never been given this honor (two Japanese Prime Ministers, Kishi and Ikeda, addressed House meetings but NOT joint meetings of both Houses of Congress).

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was widely expected to address a joint meeting of Congress during his 2006 visit. A letter from then-Chairman of the International Relations Committee Henry Hyde, a World War II veteran of the Pacific campaign, to then-Speaker Dennis Hastert, however, raised concerns about Koizumi's reported plans to visit the Yasukuni Shrine after his Washington visit. The shrine contains the spirit tablet of Hideki Tojo, mastermind of the Pearl Harbor attack, as well as other Class-A war criminals. While Hyde said that he welcomed Prime Minister Koizumi, on behalf of a major U.S. ally, addressing Congress, he added the concern that then visiting Yasukuni would be "an affront to the generation that remembers Pearl Harbor and dishonor the place where President Roosevelt made his 'Date of Infamy' speech." When the Hyde letter leaked to the Asian press, the informal plans to have an address to a joint meeting of Congress were dropped. President George W. Bush's trip with Prime Minister Koizumi to Graceland (Mr. Koizumi being an Elvis fan) ended up being the high point of that visit.

President Park also received a rare honor in being invited to address Congress so soon after her inauguration as the Republic of Koreas eleventh chief executive. It was common knowledge among Congressional staff in 2009, of which I was one, that, when President Lee Myung-bak first visited Washington in his official capacity, informal feelers sent out by the Korean Embassy for an address to the Congress were rebuffed.

Then Speaker Pelosi reportedly thought that it was premature for Lee, having served only a little over a year in the Blue House, to be given such an honor. President Lee had to wait until a return visit in 2011, and the successful passage of KORUS FTA, to be invited.

One of the reasons that President Park may have received this honor so early on in her tenure is her status as the first elected woman leader from East Asia. The failure to shatter the glass ceiling in the White House during the 2008 presidential campaign continues to be a source of severe disappointment for a number of American women, including those in political leadership positions. Honoring Confucian Korea which achieved this goal before the United States would, then, seem quite natural.

One hundred and nine foreign dignitaries and leaders have addressed joint meetings of Congress (and only two foreign dignitaries have addressed Joint Sessions of Congress the French Ambassador in 1934 on the 100th anniversary of the death of the Marquis de Lafayette and the Cuban Ambassador in 1948 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Cuban independence following the Spanish-American War of 1898). But among those one hundred and nine, only twelve were women. Two additional women addressed Congressional bodies prior to that: Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands addressed the Senate in 1942 and Madam Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China addressed the House in 1943.

President Park, thus, joins a small, elite set of women leaders, including Queen Elizabeth II, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who have been given the honor. She also is included in the smaller number of five Asia-Pacific women leaders who have appeared before the American Congress, including Madam Chiang Kai-shek, Philippine President Corazon Aquino, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard.

Thus, from several different perspectives, President Park's recent address to the Congress was historic. It also represented a major diplomatic achievement for the Republic of Korea.