The Abe Crisis: Does Anyone in Washington, DC Care?

By Daniel Sneider : Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University, APP Member

Tokyo Business Today [Toyo Keizai ] August 25, 2020

The longest serving Prime Minister in modern Japanese history may be on his way out of office, driven by a personal health problem and by a poorly managed response to a larger health and economic crisis. Back in the corridors of power of Japan’s principal ally, the United States, is anyone really concerned about the fate of Abe Shinzo? And if Donald Trump’s ‘friend’ leaves, does Washington have a chosen successor?

President Trump is, not surprisingly, almost completely consumed by his faltering election campaign, hoping for a boost from this week’s Republican convention. To be fair, his opponent, Vice President Joe Biden, fresh off a well-received Democratic convention show, also pays scant attention to Japan.

Still, President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are well aware of Abe’s health problems and possible departure from office, a former senior Trump administration official told me. “I am sure,” he insisted.

“I believe the U.S. government is tracking closely and is more informed than the general public regarding Abe’s health, particularly in the last 24 hours,” another senior former Trump official who managed alliance security relations told me early this week.

The State Department and the CIA are following developments very carefully and “that’s the kind of thing included in the PDB (President’s Daily Brief) and Trump takes his intelligence briefings 2-3 times a week, putting aside the quality of his understanding or level of interest,” a former official who worked on Asian security in both Republican and Democratic governments said.

Despite those reassurances, experienced policy makers question whether there is any serious engagement from the White House.

“The administration is completely preoccupied with trying to survive Trump’s terrible poll numbers, including Secretary Pompeo who is playing an unprecedented role in the Republican convention and domestic politics,” Michael Green, former national security advisor on Asia to President George W. Bush, told me.

“While bashing China is part of the administration’s survival strategy, that has not translated into focusing on allies for the White House. So, I doubt that there is much attention at the top to Abe’s fate or the post-Abe transition at this point.”

Below the highest levels of the administration, there is much greater awareness and even worry about what is happening in Tokyo. “U.S. policy officials and others with responsibility for ties with Japan are following this drama very closely and are in close touch with our embassy and other institutions tasked with reporting on political and other developments inside Japan,” says Evans Revere, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific.

Senior sub-cabinet level officials such as Deputy Secretary of State Steve Biegun or deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger “are watching with some concern, since Abe has been the cornerstone (and in many ways the architect) of their ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy,” agrees Green.

In the Trump administration, particularly as it heads deeper down the road of full-scale confrontation with China, Abe occupies a treasured position for his fealty to their goals. “There has long been a view,” the former senior Trump official dealing with security relations said, “that Prime Minister Abe is ‘as good as it can get’ in terms of supporting the alliance, having the right views on China.”

The weakening of Abe’s command of Japanese politics, however, is already having a visible impact to some American officials. While there are no worries about the underlying foundation of the alliance, “there is a broad resignation that things are already getting harder to implement in the twilight of Abe’s tenure,” observes Green, who is the Japan chair at Georgetown University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The cancellation of the Aegis Onshore radar and missile system is one recent example for American policy makers, signaling a possible slowdown in security cooperation in the post-Abe era.

The Abe succession question
Despite those concerns in the national security community, there is no evidence that Washington is lining up behind any one of the well-known list of Liberal Democratic Party stalwarts considered as possible successors to Abe.

“I don’t think the US Government has particularly special insights on succession because the Japanese and the LDP haven’t figured it out themselves,” says the former Trump security official. “I’m not aware of a strong preference as the likely candidates are known and generally regarded as having traditional views on the alliance,” he adds.

Green, a Republican policy maker who has publicly opposed Trump’s re-election, anticipates that the next Japanese administration will be less capable of implementing a tightening of security relations.

“I have heard no enthusiasm for any of Abe’s successors and a general wistful hope that maybe—just maybe—Abe might pull out another term,” says Green. “But that now seems all but impossible. There is no sense that Japan’s trajectory will change in geopolitical terms -- it’s all about who can execute. And nobody is seen as having the momentum that Abe did for his first five years.”

Does Trump have a personal preference, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, whom he has met? “I doubt he would even know Suga’s name,” says the Asian security expert who served in previous administrations. “He would want continuity with Abe, but it’s too much to imagine he’s concerned about anything before November 3 (US election day).”
The Biden view

Democratic nominee for President, Joe Biden, is not evidently devoting much time or thought to the Japanese political situation. But he is surrounded by experienced policy advisors on Asia who are knowledgeable about the alliance and will put a priority on repairing the damage done by Trump’s ‘America First’ isolationism. They are likely to back off from unreasonable demands for defense cost sharing and strengthen cooperation on issues like climate change, Iran and even open the door to reconsidering the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

“Every public utterance by VP Biden and those associated with him suggests that a Biden administration would place top priority on repairing, refurbishing, and reaffirming the central importance of America's alliances, particularly the one with Japan,” says former State Department East Asia hand Evans Revere, now associated with the Brookings Institution.

“Biden and his team know the damage that has been done and I have a high level of confidence they will take steps to restore the U.S.-Japan alliance-partnership to its rightful place as the centerpiece of the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific.”

The national security professionals inside the U.S. bureaucracy who manage the day to day relationship with Japan may be relieved to have a change of administration in Washington, regardless of who takes over in Tokyo, most observers believe.

“The U.S.-Japan relationship is sufficiently mature and the foundation of the alliance strong enough that it would not make much difference to those tasked with managing the alliance on the U.S. side who is in the kantei,” Revere argues.

“The bigger concern for those tasked with trying to keep the U.S.-Japan alliance on track these days is who is in the White House. President Trump's erratic, dismissive, and even contemptuous approach to allies and alliances has been a major problem for career officials, especially those who have dedicated their careers to strengthening our key alliances.”

A change in U.S. leadership may actually make the transition in power in Tokyo easier to manage. Given Abe’s intimate ties to Trump, he would face some challenges in forging a relationship with a Democratic administration in Washington.

“If Biden wins, a change of leadership in Tokyo will matter even less,” well known Japan watcher Tobias Harris told me. “In Tokyo, meanwhile, given the talk that Abe could be replaced by an elder caretaker - either (Deputy Prime Minister) Aso Taro or Suga - it seems that the alliance will be in fine hands for the next year, at which point the LDP could have a more open and contentious leadership fight to determine the direction of the post-Abe era,” believes Harris, author of The Iconoclast, a newly published biography of Abe, the first in-depth look at the Japanese leader in English.

For now, in Washington, the political drama in Tokyo will take a clear backseat to the main event at home – the November election.

GOP Foreign Policy Elites and Trump

Ruinous

Most Republican foreign policy elites were sure that Hillary Clinton would be president. And they were sure that there would be a continuity in American foreign policy. They were so sure, that they were willing to go on the record denouncing Donald Trump as unfit to be a world leader. Whereas their views were heart-felt, they were also tinged with ample self-interest. The Republican signatories of the many letters and articles of condemnation all wanted to be considered for positions in a Democratic Clinton administration.

This is a point unlikely to be missed by the Trump team who have demonstrated a deeply personal and ideologically protective approach to vetting the President-elect's advisers and appointees.

The letters and interviews dismissive of Trump by prominent Republican foreign policy experts have the potential to turn into a "hit list." Trump may chose vengeance over expertise and ban, ostracize, or just simply ignore these people.

All the signatories of the "never Trump" letters have considerable, hands-on foreign policy experience combined with deep ties to the elites of the countries of their expertise. They are people in which foreign capitals rely upon for access to Washington and to smooth the way for good relations.

This has now disappeared. For those who follow Asia policy, this is especially true. Asian states have been particularly reliant upon long-cultivated friends who move seamlessly between government and either consulting or think tanks to provide consistency and inside information. They are the "alliance managers." Relationships are maintained by consulting contracts and conferences.

It appears that Trump will drain this onsen.

Here links to the letters signed by GOP insiders.

A Letter From G.O.P. National Security Officials Opposing Donald Trump. New York Times. 8 August 2016.

Preserving U.S. Credibility in Asia: An Open Letter. Foreign Policy. 15 August 2016.

Republican Asia experts call Trump ‘ruinous'. Financial Times. 15 August 2016.

Statement by Former Republican Members of Congress. P2016. 6 October 2016..

Open Letter On Donald Trump From GOP National Security Leaders. War on the Rocks. 2 March 2016.

GOP Asia specialists have been quite alarmed and outspoken in their criticism of Trump. A number signed multiple letters. They took their lead from the titular "dean" of Washington Asia hands, former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage who said "I have nothing but disdain for Mr. Trump and what he says and the way he acts."

INTERVIEW: I'd choose Clinton over Trump: Armitage by Naoya Yoshino, Nikkei Asian Review. 11 March 2016.

He followed “If Donald Trump is the nominee, I would vote for Hillary Clinton,” Armitage told POLITICO in a brief interview. “He doesn't appear to be a Republican, he doesn't appear to want to learn about issues. So, I’m going to vote for Mrs. Clinton.”

Exclusive: Armitage to back Clinton over Trump by Michael Crowley, POLITICO. 16 June 2016.

Among the Asia experts, the most outspoken, with the greatest number of letters signed and interviews given to raise the alarm about a Trump presidency, was Michael Green, the Japan Chair at CSIS, Bush II's NSC Asia desk director, and Richard Armitage protegee. He is considered the go-to Japan specialist in Washington. Reportedly, the prime minister of Japan and other prominent Japanese officials have his personal number on their phone direct dial.

In After TPP: the Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific (Washington Quarterly 9 September 2016), Michael Green and his CSIS colleague Matthew Goodman defend the importance of TPP by using Trump as an example of the ignorant opposition: "When presidential candidate Donald Trump argued in the Republican primary debates on November 10, 2015, that the TPP is “a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone,” the other candidates reminded him that China is not in TPP, and that the whole point is to build alliances and partnerships to better enable the United States to compete with China." (pg. 24)

He also gave the following interviews to explain his position.

INTERVIEW/ Michael Green: Trump lacks judgment to be U.S. president by Taketsugu Sato, The Asahi Shimbun, 18 October 2016.

Why I Joined Other Republican Security Experts in Endorsing Hillary Clinton by Richard Katz, Tokyo Business Today, 9 September 2016. Full Interview

Six Reasons Why Trump Meeting With Kim Jong Un Is a Very Bad Idea, Foreign Policy, 18 May 2016.

Myths About Japan's Resistance to Collective Self-Defense

Hyuga - DDH 16 - Hyuga class helicopter destroyer

Reexamining "Myths" About Japan's Collective Self-Defense Change -- What critics (and the Japanese public) do understand about Japan's constitutional reinterpretation

By APP Member Bryce Wakefield, assistant professor of Japanese politics and international relations at Leiden University and Craig Martin, associate professor of law at Washburn University. The views expressed in this article are their own. 
First posted on Japan Focus, September 8, 2014


In a recent article in the Diplomat, Michael Green and Jeffrey Hornung claimed that critics of the Abe government’s “reinterpretation” of Japan’s constitution, to end the ban on the use of force for the purposes of collective self-defense, were “basing their opposition on myths about the change.” This allegation that resistance to the “reinterpretation” of Article 9 is based on nothing but “myths” is increasingly heard, and so it is worth examining their arguments, and the so-called myths that they purport to dismiss.

Green and Hornung argued that the changes to be made through the “reinterpretation” were actually slight and that the immediate implications were far less problematic than alleged. There is a grain of truth to this as it relates to imminent strategic consequences, but it also misses the essential point. Yes, at least in the short term, changes to the roles and the missions of the nation’s Self Defense Forces resulting from “reinterpretation” will probably be modest; and yes, the changes will not likely lead to militarism, regional adventurism, or various other scenarios that the article examines and dismisses. But this focus on the intended policy shifts misses the far more significant issues raised both by the unconstitutional nature of the move and the possible longer-term and profound systemic ramifications of the “reinterpretation.”

It is precisely because the immediate strategic implications of the Abe Cabinet’s announcement will probably be relatively modest that the implications for constitutional practice in Japan should be the focus of the debate. Perhaps the changing strategic environment in Asia will require Japan to consider relaxing some of the constraints imposed by Article 9. However, so fundamental a change to the nation’s constitution should only come after broad debate and pursuant to formal amendment procedures as provided for in the constitution. As explained below, the so-called “reinterpretation” process has in fact weakened constitutionalism, the rule of law, and fundamental principles of democracy in Japan, an argument that Green and Hornung, and many other defenders of the “reinterpretation”, never seriously address. In short, the harm is to the Constitution, and so focus on strategy is no answer.

Let us re-examine some of the “myths” that Green and Hornung so quickly dismiss.

“Abe is gutting the spirit of Japan’s peace constitution”

Green and Hornung maintain that Abe’s announcement is not undermining the spirit of Article 9, because in reality it is not really changing the official interpretation at all. They claim that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), a department within the Ministry of Justice that gives advice to the government and the Diet on the constitutionality of laws, has always acknowledged that Japan has a right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but that “collective self-defense was deemed inappropriate because it did not meet the CLB’s definition of ‘minimal’ defense” necessary for the defense of Japan. What has changed now, according to Green and Hornung, is that because of the evolution of the strategic environment, collective self-defense should be understood as being within the “minimal necessary use of force” required for the defense of Japan itself. Thus, they argue, the shift in the “reinterpretation” is not inconsistent with the original CLB position, and is thus not really a new interpretation of Article 9.

This is both misleading in what it does argue, and entirely disregards more fundamental arguments about the harm that will be caused to Article 9. To begin with problems inherent in the narrow point they make, it is simply incorrect to say that the recognition of a right to collective self-defense would not constitute a fundamental change in the meaning of Article 9. Their claim appears to confuse the distinction between individual self-defense (ISD) and collective self-defense (CSD), as those concepts are understood in international law. ISD, of course, is the use of force in defense of the state in response to an armed attack on that state. ISD has been understood to be permitted by Article 9 since Japan reemerged as a sovereign state in the early 1950s, following the postwar Allied Occupation. CSD, on the other hand, is the use of force by one state in defense ofsome other state in response to an armed attack on that other state, for example the American use of force against Iraq in defense of Kuwait in 1991. Green and Hornung’s argument that Japan may use force to assist other countries in order to better ensure Japan’s own security conflates these two concepts. The use of force by Japan in a true exercise of CSD would, by definition, not be for the defense of Japan, even if at some stage in the future such an action might improve Japan’s strategic or defensive situation.

It is true that the CLB has acknowledged that Japan, like all nations, has the right to use force in the exercise of CSD as a matter of international law; but it has also stated, on more than one occasion, that it is prohibited as a matter of constitutional law. According to the bureau’s earlier statements, Article 9, which renounces war and prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, makes the exercise of that international law right “impermissible under the constitution.” All that is permitted is the minimum force necessary to defend against an armed attack on Japan itself – an exercise of ISD. By eliminating the requirement that there be a direct attack on Japan as a pre-condition for Japan to lawfully use force in self-defense, the Abe Cabinet has therefore made a clear break with, and is in direct opposition to, prior and consistent understandings of the constitution.

A related argument that is often heard is that there has been a pattern of “reinterpretations” by government in the past with respect to defense posture and capabilities, and thus this “reinterpretation” is not unusual. As The Economist puts it, this was a “usual if rather shabby” process of constitutional change. But this too is entirely inaccurate. It is true that there have been incremental changes to Japan’s defense posture, but there has been a consistent understanding that such decisions on force adjustments fall within constitutional boundaries, precisely because they take into account the restraint embodied by the long standing interpretation that force may be used only for the direct defense of Japan. The government has never suggested that these defense posture adjustments constituted a “reinterpretation”, nor have they ever been understood to “reinterpret” Article 9. Government “reinterpretation” has simply never been recognized as a legitimate method of circumventing the legitimate amendment procedures and revising the longstanding interpretations of the constitution.

The difference in nature between past defense posture adjustments and the current “reinterpretation” becomes clearer upon a closer examination of those past shifts. The government has sought to reduce the restrictions on the deployment and use the military since the 1980s, and particularly after the Gulf War. However, many of these restrictions (such as the post-war ban on overseas dispatch of the SDF, rescinded in 1993) were established between the 1950s and the mid-1970s as political measures designed to deflate protest on the political left and to reassure the Japanese public sceptical after the war about military solutions to international problems. At the time they were conceived and often afterwards, the government was careful to note that such restrictions were not required by the constitution. Thus, the later dismantling of those restrictions, such as legislation eliminating the ban on overseas deployment of the SDF for involvement in UN peace keeping operations (PKO), did not constitute a “reinterpretation” of Article 9. The deployment of the SDF for PKO activity does not constitute a use of force under international law and did not implicate Article 9. Similarly, relatively recent overseas missions, such as anti-piracy operations, while they appear to political analysts as a type of CSD, in fact constitute no such thing, because they do not involve the use of force—a concept in international law that relates to relations between state actors. On the other hand, the deployment of the SDF to assist in the belligerent occupation of Iraq in 2003 may indeed have constituted a use of force, as the Nagoya High Court so held in a judgment in 2008—but that would be a violation of the Constitution, not an example of its “reinterpretation”.

Abe’s attempt at “reinterpretation”, shabby though it may be, is therefore far from usual. This point is often lost on historians, political scientists, and analysts interested in Japan’s defense policy, who focus less on the legal ramifications of change and more on the strategic or political implications. It is lost as well on some peace advocates and left-wing politicians in Japan, who have never fully accepted the 1954 interpretation that recognized the right to exercise ISD, or the legitimacy of an SDF as constituting the minimal “war potential” necessary for the defense of Japan. Seen from their perspectives, the current “reinterpretation” may seem to be simply a continuation of an incrementally more assertive (and possibly unconstitutional) defense policy. But from the perspective of the government’s own position on Article 9, this “reinterpretation” is unprecedented.

Green and Hornung also suggest that the current interpretation and understanding of Article 9 was itself based on a “reinterpretation”, and that, therefore, “if Abe’s decision was reached undemocratically, then the earlier interpretation being upheld by his opponents must be considered undemocratic as well.” But this too is misplaced. The CLB played an important role in developing the initial interpretation, it is true – but that was at the very outset of establishing the interpretation of a new constitution. While there was robust debate in the Diet as to what precisely Article 9 meant and exactly what it restricted, the government issued no clear and consistent opinion until the interpretation in 1954. That interpretation, as it related to the very limited right to use force for purposes of ISD, was reinforced by the Supreme Court, the branch of government with the constitutionally mandated authority to interpret the constitution, in the famous Sunagawa case in 1959. It has been further reinforced by more than six decades of consistent Diet testimony and policy precedent. Indeed, in 1991 there was enormous pressure upon Japan to contribute forces to the coalition engaging in collective self-defense in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and there was an acute sense that failure to do so would jeopardize Japan’s alliance with the U.S., but the CLB advised the Kaifu government that Article 9 prohibited any such move. The government, in compliance with that understanding of Article 9, therefore refused to participate in the military operations, and the no-use of force provision of Article 9 successfully operated to constrain government policy. There is no basis for arguing that the manner in which the original interpretation was established, shortly after the Constitution was promulgated and prior to any judicial consideration or serious policy development, is in any way similar to the “reinterpretation” by Cabinet fiat now at issue after six decades of entrenchment. It cannot be considered a serious comparison.

These rather technical arguments about the past CLB interpretation in any event miss the other ways in which the “reinterpretation” will potentially gut Article 9. In addition to now declaring that Article 9 no longer prohibits the use of force for purposes of CSD, key actors in the government and an “Advisory Panel” that Abe set up to “reconstruct the legal basis” for national security have suggested that Japan can and should use force in collective security operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council under Article 42 of the Charter. If that were to become the accepted interpretation of Article 9, which, it should be recalled, states in part that Japan “forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force for the settling of international disputes”, then Article 9 will in fact no longer renounce any sovereign right relating to the making of war and the use of force, despite its explicit language to the contrary. The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force by states, with three exceptions – or to put it another way, three sovereign rights – the use of force for ISD and CSD, and collective security measures authorized by the Security Council. Under the “reinterpretation” recommended by the panel, Japan would be permitted to engage in all three, and so Article 9 would not limit Japan from doing anything that international law does not already forbid. It is difficult to see that such a move would not be gutting the pacifist spirit and intent of Article 9.

“The decision starts a slippery slope for revising the constitution and removing Article 9”

The next “myth” that Green, Hornung and others take aim at is the so-called slippery slope argument. Abe’s defenders argue that there is no such slippery slope, and this move cannot be taken as leading to further erosion of Article 9. In emphasizing the modesty of Abe’s “reinterpretation”, they point to the fact that the prime minister has stated that the constitution would continue to prohibit collective security measures authorized by the UN Security Council. Leaving aside for a moment the fact that this limitation is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the text of the Cabinet Resolution, the larger point is that the process of reinterpretation destroys any sense of durable and meaningful constitutional constraints, which undermines not only Article 9, but indeed the entire constitutional structure. So the Cabinet Resolution places various conditions upon the exercise of CSD, upon which defenders of the process place great store. But given the precedent this process has established, these limits too are only binding, if one can call it that, until the next Cabinet resolution. These are not constitutional provisions or principles, but mere whims of the Cabinet of the day. If they can supplant a constitutional provision today, a much broader and more insidious Cabinet Resolution may do so tomorrow. Thus, the prospect of the process comprising the beginning of a slippery slope cannot be dismissed as mere myth. This process of “reinterpretation” by cabinet fiat makes a mockery of the entire notion of a constitution comprising the highest law of the land, which serves to bind future generations to consistent principles and values, and imposes meaningful constraints on the exercise of government power.

The slippery slope argument is further strengthened by considerations of motive. It is hard to dismiss the violence that the Cabinet Resolution does to the constitution as “merely” the product of a government with an overzealous defense agenda prioritizing narrow policy goals over respect for constitutional provisions. Rather, undermining the constitution appears to be a central goal of key actors within the government. Abe has actually suggested that the idea that constitutions are intended to limit government power is “old-fashioned.” In the recent negotiations with Komeito over the exact language of the Cabinet Resolution, many members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted the resolution to have fewer limitations. Meanwhile, LDP Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru has noted that the government should “start with a limited scope” in its interpretation of CSD so that it can “widen later.” The Abe Cabinet’s “reinterpretation” leaves precisely that possibility intact by at once eliminating the constitutional prohibition on CSD, but also adding ambiguous limitations and conditions, so that any decision on expanding the roles of the SDF will be merely political, not legal. Moreover, it has established the precedent that any provision of the constitution—not just Article 9—is subject to arbitrary government “reinterpretation.” Scholars have also argued that this is just one step towards more wholesale amendment down the road—that by twisting the meaning of the constitution, Abe is trying to ensure that it will be easier to claim later that the actual language of its provisions no longer reflect reality, and must therefore be formally amended. Whether or not that is the case, with reinterpretation acting as a de factomechanism for change, arguments about actual amendment would be moot.

“The decision was made undemocratically without transparency”

In arguing that it is merely a “myth” that the “reinterpretation” was made undemocratically and without transparency, Green and Hornung emphasize that cabinet discussions on CSD, “were reported upon daily by Japan’s media, enabling voters to be fully aware of the discussions.” But that does not address whether the prime minister or the cabinet properly subjected the process to transparent and democratic scrutiny. Yes, there was media attention. Indeed, few issues rile the media in Japan like government action on security policy. But on its own, media coverage of government statements on CSD does not imply transparency or adherence to democratic principles.

In fact, in his push for “reinterpretation”, Abe has pointedly attempted to circumvent any real public or political debate (transparency), and even more seriously, circumvented the constitutionally mandated amendment procedure, which in and of itself constitutes a violation of fundamental principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law (democratic principles). This begins with the circumvention of the amendment procedure. Article 96 of the Constitution provides for precisely how the Constitution is to be amended. Amendments must be initiated by the Diet, approved by two thirds of each house of the Diet, and then approved by a majority of votes in a general referendum. Comparative research has shown that Japan’s amendment process is less difficult than that of a number of other constitutional democracies, including the U.S. Indeed, the LDP did in fact begin laying the foundation for formal amendment in the years following 9/11. But when Abe’s attempts to mobilize support for amending Article 9 ran into stiff headwinds, he attacked the amendment procedure itself, seeking to make the constitutional amendment process little more difficult for the Diet than the revision of common statutes. When that effort failed, due in large measure to the backlash from lawyers and constitutional scholars, he chose to circumvent the amendment procedure altogether, moving to “reinterpret” Article 9. To dress up this wholly illegitimate process, he resurrected his extra-constitutional “Advisory Panel” of so-called experts, with a mandate to examine how Article 9 should be reinterpreted in light of the changing security environment.

The Advisory Panel, which included very few lawyers and only one constitutional law scholar, engaged in little constitutional analysis. Rather, it developed a result-oriented argument, reasoning that because Japan needs to do more to ensure its security, Article 9 must therefore mean that Japan can do more to defend itself and others. On the basis of this Report, the Abe Cabinet developed its resolution that constitutes the “reinterpretation” of Article 9. There was no prior debate on the content of this resolution in the Diet, no vote in the Diet, no referendum, not even consultation with either the Diet or the public. As already discussed above, it was an executive fiat by the Cabinet that purported to change the meaning of a fundamental principle of the constitution, in a manner that was not only inconsistent with the long-established and entrenched interpretation of Article 9, but that was irreconcilable with the explicit language of the provision. As further evidence of the departure from democratic principles, Abe made a political appointment of the new Director of the CLB, presumably to ensure that the CLB would in due course provide a supportive interpretation of the Resolution and laws passed to implement it. This political appointment of someone external to the CLB and the Ministry of Justice was contrary to deeply entrenched convention, and provoked criticism from past CLB directors. The entire process not only usurped the superior constitutional claims of both the Supreme Court and the Diet to constitutional interpretation, but was likely designed to make any future contrary interpretation by the Supreme Court that much more difficult and politically risky.

This process of “reinterpretation” was not only a violation of the constitutional amendment procedure, but it makes a mockery of the idea that the constitution can constrain the exercise of government power. It flies in the face of the notions essential to the rule of law: that all law must be passed and amended through democratic process, and that government is both subject to the law, and must exercise its authority as defined by and in accordance with the law. Pundits argue that the Diet will still have its say when it comes time to pass legislation implementing the new interpretation. But to suggest that this post hoc debate will justify the prior unconstitutional “reinterpretation” is to reveal a perverse understanding of deliberative democracy and the respective roles of the legislature and the executive in a parliamentary system, especially one where the formalseparation of powers is so clearly defined in its constitution. And to suggest that all these ills were cured by the fact that there was robust discussion in the media is just absurd.

Prime Minister of Japan's Schedule July 17-24, 2013

July 17, 2013 (Wed)

AM
08:46 Leaves ANA Crown Plaza Hotel Okinawa Harbor View in Naha
08:57 Arrives at Naha Airport
09:32 Leaves airport on ANA flight 1763
10:16 Arrives at Ishigaki Airport
10:26 Leaves airport
10:38 Arrives at Sugarcane Field in Ohama, Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture. Observes
10:44 Leaves field
11:07 Arrives at mooring pier in Hamasaki, Ishigaki. Boards Ishigaki Coast Guard’s patrol boat and observes. Encourages Coast Guard members
11:27 Leaves pier
11:41 Arrives at Maezato Park in Ishigaki. Gives street speech

/>

PM
12:10 Leaves park
12:16 Arrives at tavern in Ishigaki. Dines with Kosaburo Nishime, LDP Lower House Member
12:56 Leaves tavern
01:14 Arrives at Ishigaki Airport
01:15 In the airport’s special waiting room, Yoshitaka Nakayama, Mayor of Ishigaki
01:27 Shopping at the airport’s souvenir shop
02:34 Leaves airport on ANA flight 1792
02:56 Arrives at Miyako Airport
03:06 Leaves airport
03:15 Arrives at Air Self-Defense Force Miyakojima Sub Base in Miyakojima, Okinawa. Ministry of Defense’s Haruhiko Kataoka, Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff; and the commander of the base

03:27 Encourages personnel
03:31 Leaves base
03:50 Arrives at Kamamamine Park in Miyakojima. Gives street speech
04:17 Leaves park
04:28 Arrives at Miyako Airport
04:29 In airport paid waiting room, Kazuyuki Zakimi, Policy Chief, LDP Okinawa Chapter
04:58 Leaves Miyako Airport on Japan Transocean Air flight 566
05:34 Arrives at Naha Airport
06:24 Leaves airport on ANA flight 134
08:28 Arrives at Haneda Airport
08:43 Leaves airport
09:11 Arrives at private residence in Tomigaya

July 18, 2013 (Thurs)
AM
07:21 Leaves private residence in Tomigaya
07:49 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
07:56 Leaves station on Hayate 103 train
10:32 Arrives at JR Mizusawa-Esashi Station
10:35 Leaves station

PM
12:09 Arrives at temporary apartments in Rikuzentakata, Iwate Prefecture. Gives street speech
12:20 Leaves apartments
12:38 Arrives at Japanese restaurant Katsugyo Sugou in Ofunato, Iwate
01:37 Leaves restaurant
01:39 Arrives at Ofunato Yume Shopping Street. Parades and gives street speech
02:06 Leaves shopping street
03:06 Arrives before JA Bank Iwate Hanamaki-Kamaishi Branch in Kamaishi, Iwate. Gives street speech
03:26 Leaves place
04:17 Arrives in front of Tono Branch of LDP Iwate Prefectural Chapter in Tono, Iwate. Gives street speech
04:50 Leaves place
05:47 Arrives before Nahan Plaza in Hanamaki, Iwate. Gives street speech
06:20 Leaves plaza
06:29 Arrives at JR Shin-Hanamaki Station
06:56 Leaves station on Yamabiko 66 train
10:02 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
10:07 Leaves station
10:26 Arrives at private residence

July 19, 2013 (Fri)

AM
08:37 Leaves private residence
09:02 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
09:10 Leaves station on Nozomi 19 train
10:50 Arrives at JR Nagoya Station
10:53 Leaves station
10:54 Arrives at Kintetsu Nagoya Station
11:00 Leaves station on Kintetsu Limited Express
11:44 Arrives at Kintetsu Tsu Station
11:47 Leaves station
11:54 Arrives at Oshiro-Nishi Park in Tsu. Gives street speech

PM
12:22 Leaves park
12:29 Arrives at Chinese restaurant in Tsu
12:42 Has lunch with LDP Mie Prefectural Chapter’s President Jiro Kawasaki, and Chief Secretary Takashi Mizutani
01:14 Leaves restaurant
01:18 Arrives at Kintetsu Tsu station
01:27 Leaves station on Kintetsu Limited Express
01:47 Arrives at Kintetsu Yokkaichi Station
01:51 Leaves station
01:52 Arrives at Yokkaichi Public Park in Yokkaichi, Mie. Gives street speech
02:23 Leaves park
02:24 Arrives at Kintetsu Yokkaichi Station
02:48 Leaves station on Kintetsu Limited Express
03:01 NHK Interview
03:16 Arrives at Kintetsu Nagoya Station
03:17 Leaves station
03:18 Arrives at JR Nagoya Station
03:32 Leaves station on Nozomi 28 train
05:13 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
05:17 Leaves station
05:57 Arrives at south gate of JR Funabashi Station. Gives street speech
06:24 Leaves station
07:24 Arrives at private residence

July 20, 2013 (Sat)

AM
07:26 Leaves private residence in Tomigaya
07:49 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
07:56 Leaves station on Hayate 103 train
09:38 Arrives at JR Sendai Station
09:40 Leaves station
11:07 Arrives in front of city planning cultural complex facility Shoyo Plaza in Murayama, Yamagata Prefecture. Gives street speech
11:35 Leaves facility

PM
12:00 Arrives in front of roadside station Sagae Cherryland in Sagae, Yamagata. Gives street speech
12:27 Leaves roadside station
12:56 Arrives at JR Yamagata Station
12:58 In station master’s reception office, Toshiaki Endo, President of LDP Yamagata Chapter
01:12 Leaves station on Tsubasa 142 train
04:00 Arrives at JR Tokyo Station
04:04 Leaves station
04:36 Arrives at west gate of JR Kamata Station. Gives street speech
04:54 Leaves station
06:01 Arrives at north gate of JR Nakano Station. Gives street speech
06:15 Leaves station
06:52 Arrives in front of Kaminarimon in Asakusa, Tokyo. Gives street speech
07:07 Leaves Kaminarimon
07:45 Arrives in front of Akihabara Station. Gives street speech
08:04 Leaves station
08:28 Arrives at private residence

July 21, 2013 (Sun)

AM
11:09 At private residence in Tomigaya, Akitaka Saiki, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
11:46 Leaves private residence

PM
12:00 Arrives at Grand Hyatt Tokyo Hotel in Roppongi, Tokyo
12:03 Inside hotel’s Japanese restaurant, has lunch with Taro Aso, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
1:15 In private room of the hotel, Eiichi Hasegawa, Aide to the Prime Minister
02:05 Exercises at NAGOMI Spa and Fitness inside hotel
05:40 Leaves hotel
05:50 Arrives at Hotel Okura in Toranomon, Tokyo. Dines with secretary at Teppan restaurant Sazanka
07:33 Leaves hotel
07:39 Arrives at LDP headquarters
07:55 Takeo Kawamura, LDP Election Committee Chairman
09:45 In press conference room, makes appearances on TV news programs
10:30 Toshimitsu Motegi, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
10:35 In press conference room, appears on Internet video site Niconico Video
10:48 In press conference room, appears on TV and radio news programs
10:52 Interview with media outlets
10:54 Leaves party headquarters
12:08am (7/22) Arrives at private residence

July 22, 2013

AM
10:39 Leaves private residence in Tomigaya
10:56 Arrives at LDP Headquarters
11:01 Special Party Board Meeting
11:18 Shigeru Ishiba, LDP Secretary-General
11:32 Hiroyuki Hosoda, LDP Executive Acting Secretary-General
11:46 Takeo Kawamura, LDP Election Committee Chairman
11:59 Leaves headquarters

PM
12:02 Arrives at office
12:58 Leaves office
12:59 Arrives at National Diet
01:01 Chamber of Chairperson of Standing Committee
01:04 Party Leader Discussion with Natsuo Yamaguchi, Head of the New Komeito Party. Shigeru Ishiba; Yoshihisa Inoue, New Komeito Secretary General are present
01:23 Leaves National Diet
01:25 Arrives at office
01:48 Leaves office
01:51 Arrives at LDP Headquarters
02:00 Press conference
02:40 Masahiko Komura, LDP Vice-President
02:53 Leaves party headquarters
02:55 Arrives at office
04:49 Director of Yamaguchi Prefecture Barber Health Guild
05:12 Akitaka Saiki, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs; Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Junichi Ihara, Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau
05:50 Yoshihide Suga, Katsunobu Kato, Hiroshige Seko, Kazuhiro Sugita, Chief and Vice-Chief Cabinet Secretaries
07:00 Leaves office
07:02 Arrives at Japanese restaurant in Nagatacho, Tokyo. Dines with Kiyotaka Kato, Jiji Press Commentary Committee; Kenji Goto, journalist
08:57 Leaves restaurant
08:59 Arrives at The Capitol Hotel Tokyu in Nagatacho, Tokyo. In Japanese restaurant inside, informal talk with Shigeru Kitamura, Cabinet Intelligence Officer; Kazuho Tanaka, Director General of the Tax Bureau
10:20 Leaves hotel
10:39 Arrives at private residence

July 23, 2013

AM
09:35 Leaves private residence in Tomigaya
09:53 Arrives at office
10:03 Cabinet meeting
10:20 Ministerial Council on Monthly Economic Report and Other Relative Issues
10:59 Hakubun Shimomura, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
11:36 Isao Ijima, Cabinet Secretariat Adviser

PM
01:10 Yoshihide Suga, Katsunobu Kato, Hiroshige Seko, Kazuhiro Sugita, Chief and Vice-Chief Cabinet Secretaries
02:06 Yasumasa Nagamine, Foreign Ministry official
02:55 Akinori Eto, Senior Vice Minister of Defense; Hideshi Tokuchi, Director-General of the Defense Ministry’s Policy Bureau
03:29 Hiroya Masuda, Chairman of Postal Service Privatization Committee
05:09 Motonari Hatahara, Vice-Chairman of Yamaguchi Prefectural Assembly
05:22 Shigeru Kitamura, Cabinet Intelligence Officer; Kenichi Kinomura, Head of Defense Intelligence Headquarters enter
05:34 Mr. Kinomura leaves
05:45 Mr. Kitamura leaves
05:53 Leaves office
06:01 Arrives Aoyama Funeral Parlor in Minami Aoyama, Tokyo. Attends wake of Tokyo Governor Naoki Inose’s wife Yuriko
06:17 Leaves funeral
06:32 Arrives at Chinese restaurant in Roppongi, Tokyo. Dines with wife Akie
09:02 Leaves restaurant
09:18 Arrives at private residence

July 24, 2013 (Wed)

AM
09:41 Leaves private residence in Tomigaya
09:57 Arrives at office
10:13 Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; Norihiko Ishiguro, Director-General of the Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, Hajime Ishizu, Vice-Minister for Transport and International Affairs enter
11:45 Mr. Ishiguro and Mr. Ishizu both leave

PM
12:02 Mr. Sugiyama leaves
12:03 Akitaka Saiki, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs; Shinichi Yamanaka, Deputy Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
12:14 Yoichi Funabashi, Chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation; Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at Center for Strategic and International Studies () [Green’s thoughts on a possible Yasukuni visit, Japan Times July 16]
01:39 Takeshi Noda, Head of LDP Tax Research Commission
02:28 Taro Aso, Finance Minister; Yasushi Kinoshita, Vice Finance Minister enter
03:42 Mr. Kinoshita exits
03:46 Mr. Aso exits
03:47 Katsutoshi Kaneda, LDP Lower House Member
04:24 Yosuke Isozaki, Aide to the Prime Minister; Kenji Hiramatsu, Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau; Hideshi Tokuchi, Director-General of the Defense Ministry’s Defense Policy Bureau
05:06 Leaves office
05:21 Arrives at hair salon HAIR GUEST in Shibuya, Tokyo. Gets hair cut
06:44 Leaves salon
07:02 Arrives at Akasaka Excel Hotel Tokyu in Nagatacho, Tokyo. At restaurant inside, dines with news people
09:51 Leaves hotel
10:07 Arrives at private residence

On Message

Toshio Motoya

The Frenchman found it. The Englishman skewered it. And the Americans either puzzled over it or analyzed it. But the kicker is that one of America's most prominent Japan Alliance Managers repeated it, some of it.

No matter what you say, this interview of Japan's new Education Minister Hakubun Shimomura by real estate mogul and rightwing kingmaker Toshio Motoya is frank. Shimomura is a close ally of Abe and served as his deputy chief Cabinet secretary in 2006, during the prime minister's first term in office.

Motoya is best known for his "True Interpretations of Modern History" essay contest. The 2008 awardee was Japan Air Self Defense Force General Toshio Tamogami who wrote that the US, not Japan was the aggressor country in WWII. The General was promptly fired.

Shimomura is one of the signatories of the November 4, 2012 advertisement in the New Jersey Star Ledger disputing the "facts" that the Comfort Women were sex slaves. In addition to Prime Minister Abe, Shimomura is among the eight members of the Abe Cabinet plus the head of the LDP Policy Research Council who signed the ad.

Thus, Shimomura's views on the sources of Japan's national malaise and history are no surprise. He believes that the Japanese people must become "free of the postwar systems, consciousness, and Tokyo Trials historical viewpoint in order to make over Japan into a new country."

What is interesting, however, is his opinion as to why the first Abe Administration failed. It is a message that seems to be repeated so often that it looks like coordinated spin. Some are even certain that the Abe people have a coordinated public relations strategy.

Shimomura simply said Abe was done in by his liberal critics:

 There were two reasons for Prime Minister Abe’s resignation halfway through his term. The first was criticism from the mass media, which is steeped in the ideologies of the postwar regime. The media outlets - centered on the Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun newspapers - continue to affirm the current situation, based on socialist ways of thinking.

What is interesting is how often this explanation is heard in Washington.

Mike Green, Toyota Japan Chair at CSIS and formerly NSC Asia official, repeated this view at a Heritage Foundation event on December 10, 2012 program, Assessing the South Korean and Japanese Elections. He said (at around 1:20:40 on the video):

He [Abe] was extremely well regarded by not only by us but by the Australians, the Europeans. The whole problem he got into as Prime Minister over comfort women came around 2007 or 2008. And frankly, The New York Times, and The Left, just went at him, just went at him because inside Japan the Asahi Shimbun on the Left just hated him, not the political reporters but the editorial board in Asahi Shimbun hated him, hated him, and so I think there was a bit of importation of Asahi Shimbun and a little bit of Mainichi Shimbun views of Abe into the New York Times The LA Times that got big play: dangerous rightist, pal of Bush, and all that. Damaged his image with elites in the United State who didn’t see him the way we did in government where he was extremely strategic and effective…decisive. 

This was paraphrased, but reported as a quote, in Sankei Shimbun's "America Notes: Mistaken criticism of [Japan] tilting right, by Yoshihisa Komori, special editorial member in Washington" as:

I am afraid that, with new policymakers coming into the Obama administration in the second term, they will be influenced by views held by some in South Korea and send a warning to the Abe administration of shifting to the right. That would be a big mistake. It would surely destroy Japan's trust in the U.S." 

In the U.S., the leftist elite and the New York Times and Los Angeles Times have used the so-called comfort-women issue to attack the Abe administration as 'dangerously right-wing'. They did so without acknowledging Mr. Abe's strategic contribution at the gov-gov level. Such 'Abe bashing' was done by way of importing some of the techniques of the Asahi Shimbun, which anyway hates Abe. I would like them to refrain from such in the future.

There you have it, all have stayed on message that Abe's critics where too critical. He was just another victim of too much media scrutiny.

Later: See, "Japan not becoming right-wing, returning from the left: Left says Abe is wrong for being Right, but is their Right really Left?" Japan Business Press, February 11, 2013 by Yoshihisa Komori. This is his translation of his Sankei Shimbun article.