Monday Asia Events April 15, 2024

 AN EXPERT ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTION. 4/15, 8:30-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea. Speakers: Duyeon Kim, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program & Visiting Professor, Center for a New American Security, Yonsei University; Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow & Professor of Politics Brookings Institution’s Center for Asia Policy Studies & Catholic University of America Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program & Visiting Professor Center for a New American Security & Yonsei University.

BOOK EVENT - WE WIN THEY LOSE: REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY & THE NEW COLD WAR. 4/15, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Matthew Kroenig, Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Dan Negrea, Former Senior Associate Non-resident, Project on Prosperity and Development. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3SWNz8M 

PROSPECTS FOR A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TECHNOLOGY, FINANCE, AND POLITICS. 4/15, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Lama Kiyasseh, Risk Management Officer, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Non-resident Scholar, Middle East Institute; Jessica Obeid, Founding Partner, New Energy Consult, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute; Youness Abouyoub, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science, University of England, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Institute. 

LOOKING NORTH: CONFERENCE ON SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC. 4/15, 10:00-1:45pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Sherri Goodman, Senior Fellow, Polar Institute, Wilson Center, Board Director, Atlantic Council; Kathleen Larkin, Arctic Security Officer, United States Department of State; Esther McClure, Director, Arctic & Oceans Policy, United States Department of Defense; H.E. Urban Ahlin, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States; H.E. Mikko Hautala, Ambassador of Finland to the United States; Ine Eriksen Søreide, Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, Stortinget; Former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

A CONVERSATION ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE INNOVATION AND THE SUMMIT OF THE FUTURE. 4/15, 12:30-1:45pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: H.E. Ambassador Antje Leendertse, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, Co-Facilitator of the Summit of the Future’s outcome document – the Pact for the Future; H.E. Neville Gertze, Permanent Representative of Namibia to the UN, Co-Facilitator of the Summit of the Future’s outcome document – the Pact for the Future; H.E. Ambassador Adonia Ayebare, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the UN, Coordinator at the UN in New York of the G77 + China; H.E. Alexia Latortue, Assistant Secretary for International Trade, Development, U.S. Department of the Treasury.

THE INSIDERS’ GAME: HOW ELITES MAKE WAR AND PEACE. 4/15, 12:30-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Georgetown University. Speaker: author Elizabeth N. Saunders, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/43T0P3g

RIKKI KERSTEN MEMORIAL SEMINAR. 4/15, 2:00-3:30pm (AEST), 1:00-2:30pm (JST), 12:30-2:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Australian National University. Speakers: Professor Llewelyn Hughes, ANU; Professor Sandra Wilson, Murdoch University; Dr Andrew Levidis, ANU; Emeritus Professor William Tow, ANU.

HIGH WIRE: HOW CHINA REGULATES BIG TECH AND GOVERNS ITS ECONOMY. 4/15, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: New York University. Speaker: author Angela Zhang, associate professor of law at the University of Hong Kong, director of the Philip K. H. Wong Center for Chinese Law. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4cZxubm

CATASTROPHIC DIPLOMACY: US FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY. 4/15, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: History and Public Program, Wilson Center. Speakers: author Julia Irwin, University of South Florida; Megan Black, Associate Professor of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Sarah B. Snyder, Member, History and Public Policy Program, Advisory Board. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3TfBifx

REFLECTIONS FROM MOSCOW AND UKRAINE: LESSONS FOR TAIWAN. 4/15, 5:00-6:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics. Speaker: Rear Admiral Philip Yu, U.S. Navy (retired), served as the U.S. defense attaché to the Russian Federation from 2020 to 2022.

LAND POWER IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 4/15, 8:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Speakers: LTC Tim Devine, Active Duty U.S. Army Strategist, U.S. Army Pacific; LtCol Zach Ota, Infantry Officer, Southeast Asia Regional Affairs Officer, United States Marine Corps, Operational Planner, U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific.

The illogical politics of Japanese security policy

Abe and Yasukuni: the illogical politics of Japanese security policy

Shinzō Abe’s recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine could jeopardise Japan’s strategic interests. 

By Rikki Kersten, Murdoch University  and APP member

first appeared in Asian Currents, The Asian Studies Association of Australia, February 2014.

When Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine on 26 December last year, it predictably caused outrage across the region. Many commentators described the visit as an act of provocation on the part of a diehard nationalist who was thumbing his nose at nations that had suffered Japanese invasion and atrocities during the Asia–Pacific war. Observers assumed that there was a direct connection between Abe’s unrepentant revisionism, and his intention to force Japan’s defence and security policy in the direction of a more ‘normal’, full-fledged capability. 

It is understandable to feel trepidation at the thought of what appears to be an unreconstructed militarist being in charge of creating a more assertive defence posture. This is especially unnerving when Japanese and Chinese paramilitary forces are engaged in cat-and-mouse manoeuvres in the East China Sea. 

But are we correct in assuming that revisionism and ‘normalisation’ are entwined in this way in contemporary Japanese security policy? Where does the Yasukuni visit fit in Abe’s elaboration of his security policy objectives? While Abe’s pursuit of security policy development has been 

dogged and consistent, it also features an undercurrent of political illogic that interferes with the linear association of revisionism and ‘normalisation’. The domestic political imperatives driving Abe’s visit to the contentious Yasukuni Shrine as a serving prime minister are quite clear. Abe is at the beginning of the second year of a four-year term. This means that, given the electoral cycle, he does not have to face the voters now for another three years. In other words: he can afford to do what is difficult or unpopular now because he has time before the electorate can exact its revenge. The advent of an untimely election for the governor of Tokyo on 9 February (following the disgrace of former incumbent Inose) has messed with this situation, as Tokyo elections engage roughly 10 per cent of Japan’s population and usually feature issues of national rather than purely local importance. But it seems that nuclear energy and social welfare are the frontrunner issues in 

that race. 

Despite Abe’s bluster of possessing a mandate to engage in what amounts to a normalisation agenda, security policy did not feature in his December 2012 electoral platform. Moreover, the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) landslide victory was more a product of opposition parties 

cancelling each other out, plus a healthy desire by voters to slap the Democratic Party of Japan for incompetence, rather than a resounding endorsement of Abe’s LDP. 

To put it another way: Abe’s security policy objectives in the domestic arena are clear, but they cannot be described as representative or popular. Even the LDP’s own coalition partner, the Komeito, has reservations about revising interpretations of the pacifist clause in the 1947 constitution.

Another domestic political imperative is the sequence of institutional reforms that Abe commenced in his first term in office in 2006–07 has continued with gusto as he enters the second year in his second administration.

Having set in place the legislative foundation for holding a referendum on constitutional revision in his first term, Abe has now put his foot down hard on the accelerator when it comes to institutionalising changes in Japan’s security policy. The pace has been breathtaking: the National Defence Program Guidelines withdrawn and revised; a Secrets Bill forced through parliament in December 2013 in a manner reminiscent of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis; formation of a National Security Council centred on the prime minister’s office; a new National Security Strategy that repurposes Japan's forces and hardware capabilities towards remote island defence and enhanced surveillance; and a clear declaration to revise interpretation of the constitution to allow Japan to participate in collective self-defence.

Buried within this plethora of security policy elaboration is something quite new for postwar Japan: securing greater offensive capability. This appears in the form of Japan creating its own marines, and considering the acquisition of cruise missile capability as a pre-emptive measure. Never has the line between defensive and offensive capability been so thin.

In the wake of the LDP’s success in the 2013 half upper-house election, Abe can enact his policy agenda without fear of being blocked in that chamber. We know that the Komeito is not fully on board with Abe’s entire suite of policy reforms, but Abe has already signalled in his January 2014 policy speech to parliament that he is willing to work with ‘responsible opposition parties’(meaning Your Party and the Restoration Party) to secure political legitimacy for reinterpretation of the constitution.

He appears willing to risk the relationship with the LDP’s coalition partner in order to get his way.

Despite Abe’s long-cherished goal of full legitimacy for a ‘more normal’ defence capability for Japan that is underscored by constitutional revision and patriotic affirmation from society at large, it seems he has accepted the lesser option of constitutional revision by interpretation without popular support. This is because he knows that public opinion and political interests will not support constitutional revision via the parliamentary and referendum route for the foreseeable future.

But while the political logic driving Abe at home seems clear enough, the picture blurs when we turn to the strategic consequences of his Yasukuni visit. In contemporary Northeast Asia, Japan requires two things:a firm ongoing commitment from the United States as Japan’s primary security guarantor, and positive relations with regional nations in order to counterbalance China’s growing weight in the region. Abe hopes to secure more autonomy for Japan as a security actor within the context of the US alliance system, but giving the United States reason to be disaffected with its ally Japan is surely not part of this picture.

Through the toxic combination of a revisionist questioning of Japan’s wartime atrocities and a visit to a place that enshrines A-class war criminals and promotes an unrepentant version of war history in its museum, Abe has undermined his own strategic objectives. His Yasukuni visit has led to what Kazuhiko Togo describes as the encirclement of Japan by disaffected nations ‘with China at the head of that queue’.1

At the same time, he has given the United States cause to regard its primary Asian ally as a security liability. The United States needs Japan to help manage China’s rise and contribute to power balancing, not provide China with cause to raise tensions even further.

And when we consider Abe’s companion objective of legitimising patriotism in contemporary Japan, Abe must accept that in Japan today most citizens want Japan to be a peace-building nation.

At the same time, many defence officials are running out of patience with the self-imposed restraints that prevent Japan from operating freely and responsibly in a difficult and responsibly in a difficult and threatening environment. This is particularly galling because no one can dispute, Japan has been an exemplary contributor to world peace and stability since 1945

Normalising Japan’s defence capability should mean enhanced security for Japan and the international community. But the linear trajectory of Abe’s revisionism as exemplified by his Yasukuni Shrine visit leads to isolationism and insecurity, which compromises the
objective of normalisation. Nothing could be less in Japan’s interests than this.

Reference
1. Togo Kazuhiko, ‘Abe shusho no Yasukuni sanpai de sai-fujo shita sengo Nihon no “nejire” wo kaijo saseyo’ (Let’s eliminate the contortions of postwar Japan that have resurfaced with Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine visit), NEOS, February 2014, p.57.

Rikki Kersten is Dean of the School of Arts at Murdoch University in Western Australia, and a specialist in Modern Japanese political history and security policy.

Abe's Nationalist Japan

Australian National University Professor and APP member Rikki Kersten was interviewed on June 2nd byABC News about the consequences of Abe's retrogressive views of Japanese history and society. His interpretations of the past affect not only relations with Japan's Asia neighbors, but also with Western allied nations. As Dr. Kersten points out,

If Japan continues to provoke mistrust in its agenda, if it's nationalism continues to offend ,Japan cannot hope to act effectively economically diplomatically, or even in security terms. It is that simple.

Although there has been a steady stream of articles and speeches trying to refute impressions of new Japanese rightwing revisionism by Abe government supporters, there is evidence to the contrary. He is either founder or a prominent member of many conservative nationalist parliamentary leagues and study groups such as Nippon Kaigi and Sosei Nippon.

Abe is, as noted by Sophia University Koichi Nakano on the video above, a "nationalist by conviction."

Professor Kersten will visit Washington, DC in July to exchange views with American colleagues.

Using belligerence to forget

On April 8th,  U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter gave a speech to CSIS outlining American military capabilities and plans in the Indo-Pacific region. [TRANSCRIPT] He emphasized that "U.S. interests in the region are enduring, and so also will be our political and economic presence." Five times "enduring" was mentioned in the speech.

He justified American presence in the region as a responsibility accompanied by values worth defending:

I'm more accustomed to listening to people question why the U.S. spends more on defense than the next 16 largest militaries in the world combined. This statistic is true and won't change much in coming years. It's also worth noting that most of the rest of the money that the world spends on defense is spent by countries that are allies and friends of the United States. These levels of defense spending are a reflection of the amount of responsibility that the U.S. and its friends and allies share for providing peace and security.

It was not, however, until nearly the last question in the Qs&As that he said something substantive about Japan. Australian National University Professor Rikki Kersten asked "how important is it for Japan to embrace collective self-defense for the American rebalancing to work effectively" [53.09 in the video above].

He responded that it would be very constructive for Japan to open the way to exercising its right to collective self-defense. "Japan's increasing awareness of their own abilities, their own capabilities and their increasing freeing of themselves from the strictures they imposed upon themselves some decades ago...is a constructive thing. They're doing that with respect to arms exports, with respect to the kinds of activities that they are willing to engage in internationally," he said, adding that "I think that's a good thing."

But then he added something unexpected. He implied that the militarily stronger Japan would supersede regional hesitations about trusting Japan. And this is the strategy that the U.S. is encouraging Japan to pursue.

It's part of the U.S.-assisted, if I may be so bold, process of healing and putting history behind in that part of the world. It gives Japan the opportunity to play a role that it can, which is a very constructive one around the world in security affairs. They are already involved in counter-piracy activities,  maritime domain awareness, and so forth. These are areas where the world has a need, and if Japan can be a part of fulfilling that need,  that is good for everyone.

This answer startled many. What exactly is the Defense Department doing to help Japan address its history of aggression and unhealed wounds? And how is this expected to encourage Japan's neighbors to welcome the country's more overt military presence? And does this mean that the United States will be signing on to Prime Minister Abe's constitutional change campaign?

Later: As reported by Kyodo in the Japan Times, April 9th.