By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 3, 2025
The last week of October 2025 was Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s diplomatic debut. Inaugurated barely a week before, she spoke with world leaders and attended multi-lateral conferences. Takaichi hoped to project Japan’s importance in international community. While she is still on her way to that goal, it became clear that her foreign policy will be based on that of her predecessors – mainly, Abe.
The Golden Age of Alliances
Takaichi prepared for her diplomatic week by focusing on U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit from October 27 to 29. In her meeting with Trump, Takaichi reminisced about his old friend and her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. She gave Trump a golf putter used by Abe and a set of gold-gilded golf balls, acknowledging Trump’s fondness of golf and gold. The two signed a document titled “Toward a NEW GOLDEN AGE,” named after a sentence in Trump’s inaugural address in January: “The golden age of America begins right now.”
In addition to the gift-giving, and without any explicit request from Trump, Takaichi described to him Japan’s initiative to increase its defense spending. Takaichi earlier had announced to the Diet that Japan would reach its defense budget target of two percent of GDP earlier than expected. Japan also will revise three defense documents signed in 2022 to increase its purchases of military equipment from the U.S. On this latter commitment, Takaichi took a page from Abe’s book. In 2018, as Trump was considering higher tariffs on Japanese cars, Abe bought F-35 fighter jets and other military equipment from the U.S.
Both leaders labeled the bilateral tariff agreement in July as a “great deal.” They exchanged a joint factsheet on the anticipated 60 trillion yen of investments in the U.S. by Japanese companies. The factsheet shows only “interest from companies.” One example of a possible investment is the construction of nuclear reactors and small modular reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. Notwithstanding the lack of firm commitments, the factsheet was a diplomatic card that Trump could play in a summit talk with President Xi Jinping of China after he left Japan.
Helped by Pragmatic Diplomacy
Abe’s legacy was not a resource for Takaichi in her meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Lee Jae Myung, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju on October 30. During his time in office, Abe had brought Japan-ROK relations to their lowest level since 1965, when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Note that while Abe was in office, a liberal, Moon Jae In, headed the ROK government. Moon was a political mentor of President Lee, just as Abe was of Takaichi.
The stage thus was set for renewed antagonism between the heirs to the Abe and Moon administrations. That drama did not take place, however. Takaichi was lucky enough on three points. First, Lee holds to the principle of “pragmatic diplomacy” and is trying to solidify relations with foreign countries. Second, Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, had improved bilateral relations with the ROK and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol. Finally, Japan and the ROK need to reinforce their trilateral security framework with the U.S. to counter the growing military alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea.
Takaichi and Lee promised to maintain a “shuttle diplomacy” with frequent visits to each other. In the ROK, Takaichi is widely considered a hawkish leader, who frequently visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, and who disagrees with both the Murayama Statement, which is an apology for Japan’s wartime aggression, and the Kono Statement, which admits the Japanese Imperial Armed Force’s role in trafficking women and girls. Avoiding these issues, Takaichi tried to build a personal relationship with Lee, expressing her preferences for Korean seaweed, Korean cosmetics, and Korean TV drama.
An Unusual Exchange on Domestic Issues
Takaichi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju on October 31 did not go as smoothly as the meetings with Trump and Lee. Both leaders met and shook hands without a smile.
Takaichi is one of the lawmakers who are close to Taiwan. She had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te in April. Lai immediately congratulated Takaichi on her election as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in early October, and her colleagues brought a message from her to Lai in their visit to Taiwan. Takaichi obviously is not a preferable counterpart for Xi.
Xi referred to the Murayama Statement as embodying a spirit of contrition that should be upheld. Takaichi expressed serious concerns over China’s escalation of maritime survey and military activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Island and in the South China Sea. She also criticized China’s oppression in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It was unusual for the leaders to discuss the domestic issues of their counterparts.
Although Takaichi hoped to make progress on some concerns, such as easing regulations on the import of sea products from Japan and taking greater safety measures for the Japanese in China, Xi did not offer any clear commitment. They at least agreed on maintaining an old bilateral diplomatic principle, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” a term originated in the first Abe administration.
Distance from Center Stage
In her first policy speech to the Diet on October 24, Takaichi invoked the Abe policy of a “Japanese diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.” The diplomatic week was the premiere of Takaichi’s role on that stage. It is a work in progress, as Takaichi insisted in her press conference at the end of the week that her diplomacy had just begun.
In one instance, on October 26, at the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Takaichi prompted collaboration between the Free and Open Asia Pacific (FOIP) and another framework, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The FOIP concept was invented by Abe in 2016. However, Takaichi’s proposed collaboration remains focused on traditional economic cooperation for building infrastructure. ASEAN still faces a choice between Japan and China as the country to cooperate with.
At another meeting, the APEC summit at Gyeongju on October 31, Takaichi proposed active investment to support innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology in order to enhance resilience in responding to natural disaster. In her policy speech to the Diet, Takaichi spoke of “investment for crisis management” and promised to make Japan “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” Nevertheless, there is no AI in Japan that is as prevalent in the world as ChatGPT or Copilot. So far, it is unclear how she will have Japan flourish on the world’s stage.
The Golden Age of Alliances
Takaichi prepared for her diplomatic week by focusing on U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit from October 27 to 29. In her meeting with Trump, Takaichi reminisced about his old friend and her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. She gave Trump a golf putter used by Abe and a set of gold-gilded golf balls, acknowledging Trump’s fondness of golf and gold. The two signed a document titled “Toward a NEW GOLDEN AGE,” named after a sentence in Trump’s inaugural address in January: “The golden age of America begins right now.”
In addition to the gift-giving, and without any explicit request from Trump, Takaichi described to him Japan’s initiative to increase its defense spending. Takaichi earlier had announced to the Diet that Japan would reach its defense budget target of two percent of GDP earlier than expected. Japan also will revise three defense documents signed in 2022 to increase its purchases of military equipment from the U.S. On this latter commitment, Takaichi took a page from Abe’s book. In 2018, as Trump was considering higher tariffs on Japanese cars, Abe bought F-35 fighter jets and other military equipment from the U.S.
Both leaders labeled the bilateral tariff agreement in July as a “great deal.” They exchanged a joint factsheet on the anticipated 60 trillion yen of investments in the U.S. by Japanese companies. The factsheet shows only “interest from companies.” One example of a possible investment is the construction of nuclear reactors and small modular reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. Notwithstanding the lack of firm commitments, the factsheet was a diplomatic card that Trump could play in a summit talk with President Xi Jinping of China after he left Japan.
Helped by Pragmatic Diplomacy
Abe’s legacy was not a resource for Takaichi in her meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Lee Jae Myung, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju on October 30. During his time in office, Abe had brought Japan-ROK relations to their lowest level since 1965, when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Note that while Abe was in office, a liberal, Moon Jae In, headed the ROK government. Moon was a political mentor of President Lee, just as Abe was of Takaichi.
The stage thus was set for renewed antagonism between the heirs to the Abe and Moon administrations. That drama did not take place, however. Takaichi was lucky enough on three points. First, Lee holds to the principle of “pragmatic diplomacy” and is trying to solidify relations with foreign countries. Second, Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, had improved bilateral relations with the ROK and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol. Finally, Japan and the ROK need to reinforce their trilateral security framework with the U.S. to counter the growing military alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea.
Takaichi and Lee promised to maintain a “shuttle diplomacy” with frequent visits to each other. In the ROK, Takaichi is widely considered a hawkish leader, who frequently visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, and who disagrees with both the Murayama Statement, which is an apology for Japan’s wartime aggression, and the Kono Statement, which admits the Japanese Imperial Armed Force’s role in trafficking women and girls. Avoiding these issues, Takaichi tried to build a personal relationship with Lee, expressing her preferences for Korean seaweed, Korean cosmetics, and Korean TV drama.
An Unusual Exchange on Domestic Issues
Takaichi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju on October 31 did not go as smoothly as the meetings with Trump and Lee. Both leaders met and shook hands without a smile.
Takaichi is one of the lawmakers who are close to Taiwan. She had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te in April. Lai immediately congratulated Takaichi on her election as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in early October, and her colleagues brought a message from her to Lai in their visit to Taiwan. Takaichi obviously is not a preferable counterpart for Xi.
Xi referred to the Murayama Statement as embodying a spirit of contrition that should be upheld. Takaichi expressed serious concerns over China’s escalation of maritime survey and military activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Island and in the South China Sea. She also criticized China’s oppression in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It was unusual for the leaders to discuss the domestic issues of their counterparts.
Although Takaichi hoped to make progress on some concerns, such as easing regulations on the import of sea products from Japan and taking greater safety measures for the Japanese in China, Xi did not offer any clear commitment. They at least agreed on maintaining an old bilateral diplomatic principle, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” a term originated in the first Abe administration.
Distance from Center Stage
In her first policy speech to the Diet on October 24, Takaichi invoked the Abe policy of a “Japanese diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.” The diplomatic week was the premiere of Takaichi’s role on that stage. It is a work in progress, as Takaichi insisted in her press conference at the end of the week that her diplomacy had just begun.
In one instance, on October 26, at the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Takaichi prompted collaboration between the Free and Open Asia Pacific (FOIP) and another framework, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The FOIP concept was invented by Abe in 2016. However, Takaichi’s proposed collaboration remains focused on traditional economic cooperation for building infrastructure. ASEAN still faces a choice between Japan and China as the country to cooperate with.
At another meeting, the APEC summit at Gyeongju on October 31, Takaichi proposed active investment to support innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology in order to enhance resilience in responding to natural disaster. In her policy speech to the Diet, Takaichi spoke of “investment for crisis management” and promised to make Japan “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” Nevertheless, there is no AI in Japan that is as prevalent in the world as ChatGPT or Copilot. So far, it is unclear how she will have Japan flourish on the world’s stage.
