Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military. Show all posts

Sunday, July 12, 2026

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 
The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II
By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York
PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.



1942: Crux of War
By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 
US Naval War College
PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.



Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail
By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,
European Council on Foreign Relations
PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.


*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*
Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement
They are simply new and interesting.

Sunday, June 14, 2026

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

D
espite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Sunday, May 12, 2019

Monday in Washington, May 13, 2019

THE U.S. ARMY HISTORY OF THE IRAQ WAR. 5/13, 9:00-11:00am. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Michael Gordon, Reporter, Wall Street Journal; Peter Bergen, Vice President of Global Studies and Fellows, New America; Kim Dozier, CNN Global Affairs Analyst and Contributor, Daily Beast; Kenneth Pollack, Resident Scholar, AEI; Seth Center, Senior Fellow and Director, Brzezinski Institute's Project on History and Strategy, CSIS.

WE KNOW WHO CAUSED CLIMATE CHANGE. 5/13, 11:00am. Sponsor: Institute for Policy Studies. Speakers: Patrick Bond, Professor of Political Economy, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa; Charles P. Abrahams, Founding Director, Abrahams Kiewitz Incorporated Lawyers, South Africa (joining via Zoom); Basav Sen, Climate Justice Project Director, Institute for Policy Studies. Livestream only

SOLVING THE INDIAN EQUATION: THE EVOLVING AND UNCERTAIN NATURE OF U.S.- INDIA TRADE TIES. 5/13, 11:00am-12:30pm. Sponsors: Association of Women in International Trade (WIIT); Atlantic Council. Speakers: Amb. Richard Verma, Vice Chairman and Partner, Asia Group, and Former U.S. Ambassador to India; Prof. Arvind Panagariya, Professor of Economics and Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, Columbia University. First Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog; Mark Linscott, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Senior Advisor Asia Group. Former Asst. USTR for South and Central Asia; Nisha Biswal, President, U.S.-India Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Stephan Becker, Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP; Moderator: Moushami P. Joshi, Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.

INVESTING IN WOMEN FOR A NEW ECONOMIC FUTURE. 5/13, 3:00-4:30pm. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Kathryn Kaufman, Managing Director for Global Women's Issues, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS.

IS THE RISE OF CHINA A THREAT TO THE REST OF US? 5/13, 6:30-8:30pm. Sponsor: Harvard Club of Washington, DC. Speakers: Syaru Shirley Lin, Adjunct Associate Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong; Harry Harding, Professor of Public Policy, University of Virginia, and Adjunct Chair Professor, College of Social Sciences, National Chengchi University. FEE

Sunday, May 5, 2019

Monday in Washington, May 6, 2019

MUST THE FEDERAL RESERVE RESTRICT ENTRY AND INNOVATION TO ENSURE FINANCIAL STABILITY? 5/6, 9:30am-Noon. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Bert Ely, Ely & Co.; Andrew Levin, Dartmouth College; Bill Nelson, Bank Policy Institute; Jerry Dwyer, Clemson University; Jamie McAndrews, The Narrow Bank; George Selgin, Cato Institute; Moderator: Paul H. Kupiec, AEI; Oliver Ireland, Morrison & Foerster.

GROWTH IN GLOBAL ARMS TRANSFERS AND MILITARY SPENDING. 5/6, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Aude Fleurant, Director, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme, SIPRI; Rachel Stohl, Managing Director, Stimson Center.

THE SENKAKU PARADOX: RISKING GREAT POWER WAR OVER SMALL STAKES. 5/6, 10:00-11:15am. Sponsor: CSIS. Speaker: author Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute; Dr. Thomas Karako, Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, Missile Defense Project, CSIS.

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KOREA POLICY FORUM: “NORTH KOREA AND MYANMAR: DIVERGENT PATHS”. 5/6, 2:00-4:00pm. Sponsors: GW Institute for Korean Studies; Sigur Center for Asian Studies, GW. Speakers: Andray Abrahamian, 2018-2019 Koret Fellow, Stanford University; Moderator: Jisoo M. Kim, Director, GW Institute for Korean Studies.

CHINA’S ROLE IN NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 5/6, 1:30-3:00pm. Sponsor: US Institute of Peace (USIP). Speakers: Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Founding Director Emeritus, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and Former U.S. Ambassador to China; Ambassador Joseph Yun, Senior Advisor, USIP, and Former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy; Daniel Russel, Vice President, International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, President, Korea Economic Institute of America, Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; Moderator: Jennifer Staats, Director, East and Southeast Asia Programs, USIP. 

Sunday, October 21, 2018

Monday in Washington, October 22, 2018

RUSSIAN DIMENSION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS. 10/22, Noon-2:00pm. Sponsor: Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, GTU. Speaker: Dr. Peter Clement, Visiting Senior Research Scholar, Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, former Deputy Assistant Director for Europe, CIA.

CAREFUL REVIEW OF ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 10/22, Noon-2:00pm, Lunch. Sponsors: Leadership, Ethics and Practice Initiative, Elliot School, GW; Institute for International Science and Technology Policy, GW. Speaker: Jason Matheny, Assistant Director, National Intelligence.

INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE: FROM BLUEPRINT TO REALITY. 10/22, Noon-1:30pm. Sponsor: Snowcroft Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Dr. Robert Dohner, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council; Dr. Ken Jimbo, Professor, Keio University; Dr. Cheol Hee Park, Visiting Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council; Dr. Akihiko Tamura, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Moderator: Dr. Miyeon Oh, Director and Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council.

THE NEW DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE: A CONVERSATION WITH EXELON CEO CHRIS CRANE. 10/22, 2:00-3:15pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Chris Crane, President and Chief Executive Officer Exelon Corporation; MODERATOR: David G. Victor, Co-Chair - Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate.
CHINA BUILDS FOR GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION. 10/22, 4:30-5:30pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speaker: Rick Fisher, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE THUCYDIDES TRAP: HOW RISING POWERS AND ESTABLISHED POWERS RELATE. 10/22, 6:30-8:45pm. Sponsors: US Former Member of Congress (FMC); Committee of 100; Elliott School, GW. Speakers: Dan Maffei, Former US Representative (D-NY), Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission; David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, Elliott School, GW; Robert Gee, Former Assistant Secretary of Energy, President, Gee Strategies Group LLC.

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

An Interview with Japan's Comfort Women Expert: YOSHIMI Yoshiaki



Reexamining the “Comfort Women” Issue 改めて慰安婦問題の本質を問う
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An Interview with Yoshimi Yoshiaki

Translated by Yuki Miyamoto
Introduction by Satoko Oka Norimatsu

First published in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 1, No. 1, January 5, 2014.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a leading historian of the Japanese military sex slavery system and author of Comfort Women, stresses three points in an interview held in late October of 2014, as part of the Japanese weekly Shūkan Kin’yōbi’s series of articles to counter-argue the prevailing trend in the Japanese mainstream media that inclined towards denying the history of the sex slavery itself, based on Asahi Newspaper’s correction of one of the witnesses Yoshida Seiji’s accounts in related articles published in early 1990’s. One, Yoshimi reasserts that Yoshida’s false accounts were not used at all in the making of Kono Statement, the Japanese government’s 1993 apology for and recognition of the Japanese military’s involvement in the sex slavery system. Two, the Japanese military was the main culprit in the crimes of mobilizing and confining women for forced sexual servitude. 

Three, the system was without a doubt one of sex slavery, as it deprived those women of the four kinds of basic freedom. The third point merits particular attention in light of the Yomiuri Newspaper’s November 28 announcement of retraction and “apology” for its use of the term “sex slave” in its earlier English-language reports. With the “apology,” Japan’s largest newspaper officially declared to the world that the women who were repeatedly raped by Japanese military members under the direct control of the military were not sex slaves. 

Japan’s public broadcaster NHK has also been known, according to the October 17 report of The Times, to have issued a set of directives called the “Orange Book” including one that instructed English-language reporters not to use the terms “sex slaves” and “be forced to.” Those moves, reinforcing the claims of the Abe administration, are precisely the kind of historical falsifications that Yoshimi fears may damage Japan’s international reputation. SR

Professor Yoshimi was the person who discovered the official documents revealing the Japanese Imperial Army’s inextricable involvement in the “comfort women.” He explains, from the perspective of an expert, what needs to be discussed and how to move forward in addressing this issue, while critiquing false reports and misinformation primarily from right wing media, which emerged after the Asahi Shimbun retracted its reports drawing on Yoshida Seiji’s testimony on the comfort women.

SK [Shūkan Kin’yōbi]: Ever since August 2014 when the Asahi Shimbun retracted its reports drawing on Yoshida Seiji’s testimony on the comfort women, press bashing has been directed against Asahi led by newspapers such as the Yomiuri and Sankei, followed by major weekly magazines. The media even called for retracting the “Kono Statement” [the 1993 statement, issued by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei] that acknowledges the involvement of the Japanese Imperial Army in the comfort women system.

Yoshimi: Yoshida’s testimony and the Kono Statement are unrelated. As early as 1993 at the latest, no one took seriously Yoshida’s testimony claiming that he had witnessed the Japanese Army’s forcible relocation of women in Jeju Island. The Kono Statement was not based on Yoshida’s testimony. Nor do scholars researching the comfort women issue draw on it for their argument. In short, Asahi’s retraction of Yoshida’s testimony due to its falsity should not affect the discussion. Nevertheless, based upon Asahi’s retraction, some label the comfort women issue a fabrication, and even deny the existence of comfort women themselves. I find this highly imprudent, though I fear that such assertions now prevail.

SK: Yet others criticize the Asahi Shimbun, because of its article based upon Yoshida’s testimony, for misinforming the world and therefore disparaging Japan.

Yoshimi: That is also untrue. The comfort women became known abroad because Kim Hak-soon a former comfort woman, came forward as a victim. I doubt that Yoshida’s testimony, made prior to Kim’s public appearance, was widely known. A journalist from the New York Times, who visited me when researching the issue, was unaware of Yoshida’s testimony. All things considered, what was crucial was that a victim identified herself in public. What is a lie is the very assertion that Yoshida’s testimony spread a false story throughout the world.

SK: Aren’t we losing the trust of neighboring countries because of the Asahi bashing?

Yoshimi: Not just our neighbors, but the international community. From the beginning, Prime Minister Abe has narrowly defined this problem as whether or not “the Japanese Army and Authorities forcibly relocated (abducted) women by the use of violence or threat.”

The Japanese Imperial Army as the Primary Culprit

SK: Abe’s point is “enforcement in a narrow sense,” isn’t it? That is to say, the problem is reduced to whether or not the Army and Authorities directly abducted women. Now that the Asahi has retracted its statements based on Yoshida’s testimony, the prime minister insinuates that no abduction occurred.

Yoshimi: Such an argument will invite more questions, logically—whether it is acceptable if women were kidnapped by deception or cajolement [rather than direct force or threat]. Or is it tolerable if it were human trafficking [involving cash payments]? The prime minister’s argument cannot address these questions. Even [historian] Hata Ikuhiko and right wingers have admitted that women were taken from the Korean Peninsula through kidnapping and human trafficking.

Kidnapping, human trafficking, and transporting victims beyond national borders were criminal acts at the time as well. When women were brought to a comfort station (Ianjo), the Army must have recognized its criminality as they examined women who were going into the station. What the Army should have done was to release those women and return them to their homeland, as they were obviously victims of illegal acts.

SK: Of course.

Yoshimi: Also, it was the Army that selected the traffickers who recruited the women. The Army should have arrested those traffickers who broke the law, and prosecuted them. Yet, none of them was pursued. The relationship between the Army and the traffickers indicates the Army’s culpability—it was an accomplice to abduction or human trafficking to transport the victims abroad.

Furthermore, none of these problems would have occurred if the Army had not established the comfort stations in the first place. The Army is, thus, the primary culprit while the traffickers are merely accomplices. There is no evidence indicating that the traffickers abducted women on their own independent of the Army.

Why Sex Slaves

SK: The fundamental issue of the comfort women does not lie in Prime Minister Abe’s argument concerning whether the women were forcibly brought into the comfort stations, that is, “enforcement in a narrow sense.” Is that right?

Yoshimi: That is right. What the international community pays attention to is not how those women were brought in, but the ways in which they were treated at the station. I have been arguing that there was no justification for depriving the women of freedom and confining them to the station. At the station, the women were deprived of four types of freedom: First, freedom of residence. Obviously, the women were brought to live in a room inside the station where they were forced to provide sexual services to the soldiers. Second is deprivation of freedom of movement. We have a fair number of orders from the comfort stations, and they indicate that leaving the station was strictly regulated or permission for going out was required. Some right wing critics insist that the women were free to go out as long as they obtained permission, but that is a preposterous argument. If permission was necessary to go outside, it means that they were not free.

SK: Don’t they understand such a simple logic? I am dumbfounded.

Yoshimi: The third kind of freedom is whether those women were free to decline having sexual intercourse. It is quite obvious that the circumstances did not allow them to turn down soldiers waiting outside in line only because “I am too tired” or “I don’t like him.” The fourth is lack of freedom to quit. None of the regulations at the comfort station, drawn up by the Japanese Imperial Army, mentions the right to discontinue their work, despite the fact that the Shōgi torishimari kisoku [Female Entertainers and Prostitutes Control Law in effect from 1900-1946] gave women the right to leave their job.

In the past, I twice discussed the issue with Hata Ikuhiko, but he still argues that the women had the freedom to quit, just as women, who were sold and trafficked, could obtain freedom when they paid off their debts. However, freedom to leave one’s job is the right to stop working whenever one wishes to do so. According to Hata’s reasoning, one is confined until paying off her debts, which is nothing but the system of slavery. When one is deprived of so many kinds of freedom, it is undoubtedly wrong. Regardless of the falsity of Yoshida’s testimony, the fundamental structure of the comfort women system remains unchanged. The fact that Asahi’s retraction caused such a big turmoil is beyond my comprehension.

Judgment from the International Community

SK: Those women were indeed sex slaves. This is the concern of the UN and other nations. Yet, the Japanese government continues to insist that they were not.

Yoshimi: The current administration tries to appeal to the international community, but they should know what damage they will bring on themselves by doing so. Other nations will lose confidence in Japan, and Japan will sacrifice its national interest. As a result, Japan will end up in a dire situation. Thus, downplaying the gravity of, or denying the responsibility for, the comfort women, I believe, results in degrading Japan’s reputation.

SK: Despite that, the Asahi bashing was intense and still prevents us from having this sort of calm discussion.

Yoshimi: One reason why a firm relationship between Japan and China, and between Japan and Korea, has not yet been achieved, I think, is Japan’s lack of historical awareness. This is why we need to “overcome the past” scrupulously. For this, we must properly resolve the comfort women issue. By doing so, we will create a new tradition in Japan, one in which we can take pride. Otherwise, Japan will isolate itself not only regionally in Asia, but also internationally around the globe and no one will take us seriously.

While the Kono Statement provides a fundamental framework for this country, some in the LDP demand revision of it. Revising would be impossible, as it would bring about serious diplomatic consequences. Instead, the current administration, I am afraid, will pretend to honor the Kono Statement overseas, while domestically denying or ignoring it. If this sort of attitude continues, I don’t see any bright future.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki is an historian at Chūō University. His book Comfort Women was published in Japanese in 1995. Translated by Suzanne O’Brien, it was published in English by Columbia University Press in 2000.

This article was translated by Yuki Miyamoto from the October 31, 2014 issue of Shūkan Kin’yōbi.

Miyamoto Yuki  is an associate professor, specializing in ethics, in the Department of Religious Studies at DePaul University. Since publishing her book, Beyond the Mushroom Cloud: Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility after Hiroshima (Fordham University Press) in 2011, she has been studying Minamata disease and people’s involvement in this environmental disaster (“Violence and Atonement in the Postindustrial Age: Minamata Patients, Hongan no Kai, and the Carving of Jizo Statues”).

Norimatsu Satoko is Director of the Peace Philosophy Centre, a peace-education organization in Vancouver, Canada, with a widely-read Japanese-English blog peacephilosophy.com on topics such as peace and justice, war memory and education in East Asia, US-Japan relations, US military bases in Okinawa, nuclear issues, and media criticism (To view English-language posts only click HERE). She is co-author with Gavan McCormack of Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, and an Asia-Pacific Journal editor.

Friday, July 30, 2010

USS Missouri

On Saturday, July 31 the US Navy will commission its seventh Virginia-class nuclear submarine, the Missouri, entering the 7,800-ton ship into service at a ceremony in Groton. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughheadwill be in attendance at the commissioning ceremony of USS Missouri. You can watch the ceremony live HERE.

The sub was partially built by Groton-based Electric Boat and will be based at Naval Submarine Base New London, joining three other Virginia-class subs there. A fifth, the North Carolina, is transferring to the sub base in Hawaii.

The most famous USS Missouri, an Iowa-class battleship, was commissioned in June 1944. About 15 months later it was the site of Japan's surrender to the Allied Forces, which ended World War II. The battleship was finally decommissioned in 1992 and is now a museum in Hawaii. The Battleship Missouri Memorial is located a ship’s length from the USS Arizona Memorial.