North Korea Sending More Soldiers for Russia-Ukraine War

North Korea Doubles Down on Its Alliance With Russia, For Now

By Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published August 12, 2026 on the blog of the Korea Economic Institute of America.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has doubled down on his military and strategic alliance with Vladimir Putin and the Russian regime, betting that this axis will strengthen his own position for now. However, Kim’s strategic calculus depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and its economic and political impact on Russia. 

The flow of arms and soldiers from North Korea to Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to escalate, accompanied by a growing supply of North Korean labor to fill the gaps in Russia’s war-strained economy. And the North Korean economy is increasing its reliance on a largely unofficial transfer of Russian resources—food, energy, cash and military technology—offered as compensation for its support.

The latest sign of this deepening relationship came from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who revealed in a late July address that Russia planned to bring in an additional 30,000 troops and deadly ballistic missile launchers.

“Russia wants to receive another 30,000 troops from North Korea. Since June, preparations have been under way in Russia’s Voronezh region to receive them,” Zelenskyy said, though he did not reveal the source for this information, and it has not yet been independently confirmed.

A North Korean missile unit has begun deploying to western Russia and could be equipped with up to 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks on Ukraine, an official at Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said on August 6.

The unit comprises about ninety North Korean personnel and is expected to be based in Russia’s Voronezh region, the official said. The United States is aware of the North Korean deployment, a source familiar with the issue told Reuters.

Forty North Korean missiles have already been supplied, at least two of which were launched at Ukraine last week during a deadly strike, the Ukrainian official said.

“This is a threat not only to Ukraine,” Zelenskyy said in his radio address. “Russia is helping North Korea learn how to wage war, improve its weapons and gain real combat experience in using them.” 

The Changing Nature of War in Ukraine and North Korea’s Role

There is some skepticism about these reports, as they have not been confirmed by other intelligence agencies. They also reflect Ukraine’s interest in pushing for more military support to counter missile strikes that are increasingly penetrating Ukrainian defenses, including calling on South Korea to lift restrictions on the sale of missile defense equipment directly to Ukraine.

“In my view, the Republic of Korea should have closer cooperation with Ukraine. We are open to this. We would very much like to receive support from South Korea in an area where we have a shortage. That is air defense systems,” Zelenskyy said in an interview with Ukrainian media posted to X on August 8. 

But analysts point out that these possible new deployments are consistent with the changing nature of warfare in Ukraine. When North Korea’s military assistance began more than two years ago, it first consisted of a huge flow of artillery shells and artillery guns, providing crucial help when Russian stocks were depleted by intense exchanges of artillery fire. It was followed by the deployment of 12,000–16,000 North Korean troops to help push back Ukraine’s incursion into the Russian territory of Kursk, carefully avoiding conflict within Ukrainian territory itself.

Now drones have partially replaced heavy artillery, with static lines of engagement on the ground and heavy casualties, combined with long-range deep attacks using missiles. 

“Russia and Ukraine are currently engaged in two battles,” explains Aihiro Makino, a security expert for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun. “Trench warfare on the front lines centered on the Donbas region, and long-range attacks targeting each other’s deep territories.”

North Korea has a role to play in both battles, says Makino, a long-time specialist on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean missiles are joining attacks on Ukrainian cities, and North Korea can send troops to the Donbas region, as it recognizes  Donbas as Russian territory (despite being seized from Ukraine)—although such a move would risk high casualties.

There are political risks for Kim if casualty levels reach tens of thousands. But he has already decided to embrace the several thousand deaths from the earlier deployment as a heroic mission. In April, the regime opened a lavish “Memorial Museum of Combat Feats for Overseas Military Operations,” which includes war trophies such as U.S. and German tanks and the graves of some 2,288 North Korean soldiers who fought in Kursk.

“Kim’s regime does not care about human lives,” says Fyodor Tertitskiy, a North Korea expert and author of Pyongyang on the Brink, now teaching at South Korea’s Ewha Womans University. “It does, however, care about its own survival, and it has calculated that Putin’s favor outweighs the risks,” he told this writer.

One added element to North Korea-Russia ties is the rapidly growing dispatch of North Korean workers, in the tens of thousands, many of them filling serious labor shortages in factories and other roles across Russia.

“Demand for North Korean labor remains high and is likely to stay high for the foreseeable future,” widely respected expert Andrei Lankov, who teaches at South Korea’s Kookmin University, told this writer. “North Korean workers are already widely employed in the civilian economy, where labor shortages are severe. They can also be used in areas close to the front line and employed in certain military industries.”

Kim’s Strategic Calculus

“The strategic calculus remains the same,” says Tertitskiy. “Putin wants to conquer Ukraine and welcomes Kim’s help, while Kim wants economic assistance and a counterbalance to China.”

Kim has so far managed to intensify his relationship with Moscow while also keeping close ties to North Korea’s traditional ally, China. High-level visits from senior Chinese officials have cemented their ongoing role in North Korea’s economy.

Measured by official trade statistics, China remains the overwhelming dominant player in North Korea’s foreign trade. China accounts for over 98 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade.

But official statistics do not calculate the huge, and in some cases larger, volume of unofficial trade, mostly to evade UN sanctions. Official data for Russia shows a tiny amount of trade—some USD 35 million in 2023, for example. But a recent report from South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy calculated that North Korea earned up to USD 14.4 billion from Russia from August 2023 to the end of 2025, mostly from payments for its arms and soldier supplies but also other illegal exports of food and fuel.

This does not count transfers of advanced military technology that have been kept secret but may already include air defense systems, satellite technology, drones, and early warning aircraft.

At the moment, Russian input into North Korea’s modest economic boom of late has been crucial. But in the longer run, argues Lankov, the two economies are not compatible. On the other hand, he says, “China needs many of the goods that North Korea is capable of exporting and therefore has a natural economic interest in buying North Korean minerals, seafood, and other products. In addition, China’s strategic interests require a stable North Korea. Beijing has a strong interest in preserving the status quo and maintaining a buffer zone along its border. For Russia, by contrast, North Korea’s strategic value is considerably lower.”

Implications of the Ukraine War

Kim’s investment in the alliance with Moscow is clearly a successful bet for now. But what happens if the war goes badly and the Russians are forced into a de facto political defeat in the form of a settlement that favors Ukraine? Or a prolonged stalemate that weakens Russia both politically and economically?

Even then, North Korea watchers all agree that the Kim regime is likely to survive that turn of events.

At this moment, the regime has not told the North Korean public that the war has reached a stalemate, says Makino. “Even if Russia is defeated, the public will be told that ‘Russia has won.’ North Korea’s rule is that ‘the Supreme Leader does not make wrong decisions.’”

Lankov shares that view. “North Korea is not tied to Putin’s Russia, and it never will be,” Lankov told this writer. “It is now in the ideal position of having two sponsors. North Korea, while living on a stable but modest Chinese pension, has won the Russian lottery. If the lottery money runs out, it will be bad, but hardly the end of the world, since the Chinese pension is here to stay.”But For the time being, the North Korea-Russia partnership remains strong and beneficial for both parties and likely to weather the changing nature of the war in Ukraine.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Takaichi's Mercantilism

Japan's PM Takaichi Heads to Europe

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 15, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi participates in her first Group of Seven (G7) summit in Evian, France from June 15 to 17. The meeting is the last stop for her; in the past few days, she has visited the United Kingdom and Italy. Her top diplomatic priority is securing Japan’s supply chain amid a volatile world order. Although Takaichi says she stands for a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage,” her diplomacy is in fact heavily dominated by her own interests.
 
The first stop on her trip to Europe was London from June 13-14. In a meeting with United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Takaichi shared her concern over export restrictions on critical minerals and urged bilateral cooperation on economic security, including strengthening supply chains.
 
Securing supply chains has been a core tenet of Takaichi’s diplomacy. In her individual meetings with the leaders of Vietnam, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines in May, Takaichi drew attention to the maintenance of supply chains while criticizing China for its export controls over critical minerals. Aspiring to strengthen her position on international economic security, Takaichi hoped to make up for her irregular comment on the Taiwan contingency last November, which deeply undermined Japan’s relations with China.
 
Takaichi and Starmer also confirmed acceleration of the development of next-generation fighter aircraft under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the UK and Italy. This is supposedly the main reason that Takaichi chose to visit London and Rome before the G7 summit.
 
Takaichi has sought to expand Japan’s international trade in defense equipment, expecting it to contribute to her economic growth strategy. She promoted trade in or joint development of destroyers with the Philippines and Australia. GCAP is in the same context. She once said that “Strategic investments that enhance resilience against potential crises are the core focus of the Takaichi Cabinet’s growth strategy.”
 
This approach reverses Japan’s longstanding reluctance to trade in military equipment.  “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons,” former prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa said when he was foreign minister in 1976. Takaichi now argues that times have changed and that trade with other countries in defense equipment would contribute to the growth of the Japanese economy.
 
While Takaichi was travelling in Europe, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. and Iran had reached a deal for ending the war. Takaichi posted on X that she would welcome the agreement as a key step toward a settlement and hoped for free and safe traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi must be wishing for the normalization of international trade. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” Takaichi said to Trump in her visit to the White House in March.
 
The Takaichi administration introduced a subsidy for gasoline as soon as the war in Iran started. To maintain public support for her cabinet, she formulated a supplemental budget to continue this subsidy earlier this month. A subsidy does not cure all ills, however. Opposition lawmakers have questioned Takaichi about oil import shortages that limit production of various goods that are indispensable for manufacturing and that cause prolonged price inflation.
 
That is why she is focusing her diplomatic efforts on securing the supply chain. It is expected that she would propose a joint stockpiling plan for critical minerals at the G7 summit meeting. Takaichi hopes to take the initiative to build a system in which like-minded countries can collaborate to strengthen supply chains. Her proposal would be a countermeasure to China’s coercive trade policy on critical minerals.
 
It is still unclear whether Takaichi’s initiative to secure the supply chain accelerates Plan B of Japan’s diplomacy, which is to move Japan away from excessive dependence upon the United States. It is true that Japan has been seeking alternatives in trade opportunities after Trump imposed additional tariffs in June 2025. The Iran war has proven that Japan cannot secure oil from the Middle East by relying on U.S. dominance in international security. Yet Japan’s national security is still fundamentally based its alliance with the U.S., as seen in efforts to grow the defense budget by current and former administrations.
 
Takaichi has yet to find an exit from Japan’s current diplomatic difficulties: the uncertainty of the Trump administration and the persistent diplomatic pressure from China. Although Takaichi stands by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which was invented by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to expand Japan’s role in the region, it no longer holds much sway. In the current war-based world order, the creation of a democratic bloc of countries may not guarantee stability or prosperity. The FOIP policy may appeal to Japan’s conservative base, but Takaichi does not have a viable grand strategy to give Japan a greater role on the international stage.
 
Turning our eyes to domestic politics, Takaichi faces scandals of her own. Her secretary is thought to be involved in a defamatory social media campaign strategy in the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party last October. Although she has denied any misdeeds in her campaign, the opposition parties have demanded that the secretary testify before a Diet committee. Although it may not violate any law, a defamatory strategy could damage Takaichi politically because she depends on support from SNS users.

Her approval rating has suffered a gradual decline according to polls of news organizations because of the defamation scandal or the shortage of naphtha. As former prime ministers have done, Takaichi hopes to achieve diplomatic gains that will change the direction of domestic headwinds. However, it is unlikely that she can attain success in her visit to Europe to a degree that would lead to a resurgence in public support. 

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Monday in Washington, May 13, 2019

THE U.S. ARMY HISTORY OF THE IRAQ WAR. 5/13, 9:00-11:00am. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Michael Gordon, Reporter, Wall Street Journal; Peter Bergen, Vice President of Global Studies and Fellows, New America; Kim Dozier, CNN Global Affairs Analyst and Contributor, Daily Beast; Kenneth Pollack, Resident Scholar, AEI; Seth Center, Senior Fellow and Director, Brzezinski Institute's Project on History and Strategy, CSIS.

WE KNOW WHO CAUSED CLIMATE CHANGE. 5/13, 11:00am. Sponsor: Institute for Policy Studies. Speakers: Patrick Bond, Professor of Political Economy, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa; Charles P. Abrahams, Founding Director, Abrahams Kiewitz Incorporated Lawyers, South Africa (joining via Zoom); Basav Sen, Climate Justice Project Director, Institute for Policy Studies. Livestream only

SOLVING THE INDIAN EQUATION: THE EVOLVING AND UNCERTAIN NATURE OF U.S.- INDIA TRADE TIES. 5/13, 11:00am-12:30pm. Sponsors: Association of Women in International Trade (WIIT); Atlantic Council. Speakers: Amb. Richard Verma, Vice Chairman and Partner, Asia Group, and Former U.S. Ambassador to India; Prof. Arvind Panagariya, Professor of Economics and Jagdish Bhagwati Professor of Indian Political Economy, Columbia University. First Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog; Mark Linscott, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Senior Advisor Asia Group. Former Asst. USTR for South and Central Asia; Nisha Biswal, President, U.S.-India Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Stephan Becker, Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP; Moderator: Moushami P. Joshi, Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.

INVESTING IN WOMEN FOR A NEW ECONOMIC FUTURE. 5/13, 3:00-4:30pm. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Kathryn Kaufman, Managing Director for Global Women's Issues, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, CSIS.

IS THE RISE OF CHINA A THREAT TO THE REST OF US? 5/13, 6:30-8:30pm. Sponsor: Harvard Club of Washington, DC. Speakers: Syaru Shirley Lin, Adjunct Associate Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong; Harry Harding, Professor of Public Policy, University of Virginia, and Adjunct Chair Professor, College of Social Sciences, National Chengchi University. FEE

Monday in Washington, May 6, 2019

MUST THE FEDERAL RESERVE RESTRICT ENTRY AND INNOVATION TO ENSURE FINANCIAL STABILITY? 5/6, 9:30am-Noon. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Bert Ely, Ely & Co.; Andrew Levin, Dartmouth College; Bill Nelson, Bank Policy Institute; Jerry Dwyer, Clemson University; Jamie McAndrews, The Narrow Bank; George Selgin, Cato Institute; Moderator: Paul H. Kupiec, AEI; Oliver Ireland, Morrison & Foerster.

GROWTH IN GLOBAL ARMS TRANSFERS AND MILITARY SPENDING. 5/6, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Aude Fleurant, Director, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme, SIPRI; Rachel Stohl, Managing Director, Stimson Center.

THE SENKAKU PARADOX: RISKING GREAT POWER WAR OVER SMALL STAKES. 5/6, 10:00-11:15am. Sponsor: CSIS. Speaker: author Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute; Dr. Thomas Karako, Senior Fellow, International Security Program and Director, Missile Defense Project, CSIS.

click to order

KOREA POLICY FORUM: “NORTH KOREA AND MYANMAR: DIVERGENT PATHS”. 5/6, 2:00-4:00pm. Sponsors: GW Institute for Korean Studies; Sigur Center for Asian Studies, GW. Speakers: Andray Abrahamian, 2018-2019 Koret Fellow, Stanford University; Moderator: Jisoo M. Kim, Director, GW Institute for Korean Studies.

CHINA’S ROLE IN NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 5/6, 1:30-3:00pm. Sponsor: US Institute of Peace (USIP). Speakers: Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Founding Director Emeritus, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, and Former U.S. Ambassador to China; Ambassador Joseph Yun, Senior Advisor, USIP, and Former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy; Daniel Russel, Vice President, International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, President, Korea Economic Institute of America, Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; Moderator: Jennifer Staats, Director, East and Southeast Asia Programs, USIP. 

Monday in Washington, October 22, 2018

RUSSIAN DIMENSION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS. 10/22, Noon-2:00pm. Sponsor: Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, GTU. Speaker: Dr. Peter Clement, Visiting Senior Research Scholar, Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, former Deputy Assistant Director for Europe, CIA.

CAREFUL REVIEW OF ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECT ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 10/22, Noon-2:00pm, Lunch. Sponsors: Leadership, Ethics and Practice Initiative, Elliot School, GW; Institute for International Science and Technology Policy, GW. Speaker: Jason Matheny, Assistant Director, National Intelligence.

INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC ARCHITECTURE: FROM BLUEPRINT TO REALITY. 10/22, Noon-1:30pm. Sponsor: Snowcroft Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Dr. Robert Dohner, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council; Dr. Ken Jimbo, Professor, Keio University; Dr. Cheol Hee Park, Visiting Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council; Dr. Akihiko Tamura, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Moderator: Dr. Miyeon Oh, Director and Senior Fellow, Asia Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center, Atlantic Council.

THE NEW DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL ENERGY AND CLIMATE: A CONVERSATION WITH EXELON CEO CHRIS CRANE. 10/22, 2:00-3:15pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Chris Crane, President and Chief Executive Officer Exelon Corporation; MODERATOR: David G. Victor, Co-Chair - Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy and Climate.
CHINA BUILDS FOR GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION. 10/22, 4:30-5:30pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speaker: Rick Fisher, Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs, International Assessment and Strategy Center.

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE THUCYDIDES TRAP: HOW RISING POWERS AND ESTABLISHED POWERS RELATE. 10/22, 6:30-8:45pm. Sponsors: US Former Member of Congress (FMC); Committee of 100; Elliott School, GW. Speakers: Dan Maffei, Former US Representative (D-NY), Commissioner, Federal Maritime Commission; David Shambaugh, Director, China Policy Program, Elliott School, GW; Robert Gee, Former Assistant Secretary of Energy, President, Gee Strategies Group LLC.

An Interview with Japan's Comfort Women Expert: YOSHIMI Yoshiaki

Reexamining the “Comfort Women” Issue 改めて慰安婦問題の本質を問う

click to order book

An Interview with Yoshimi Yoshiaki

Translated by Yuki Miyamoto

Introduction by Satoko Oka Norimatsu

First published in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 1, No. 1, January 5, 2014.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a leading historian of the Japanese military sex slavery system and author of Comfort Women, stresses three points in an interview held in late October of 2014, as part of the Japanese weekly Shūkan Kin’yōbi’s series of articles to counter-argue the prevailing trend in the Japanese mainstream media that inclined towards denying the history of the sex slavery itself, based on Asahi Newspaper’s correction of one of the witnesses Yoshida Seiji’s accounts in related articles published in early 1990’s. One, Yoshimi reasserts that Yoshida’s false accounts were not used at all in the making of Kono Statement, the Japanese government’s 1993 apology for and recognition of the Japanese military’s involvement in the sex slavery system. Two, the Japanese military was the main culprit in the crimes of mobilizing and confining women for forced sexual servitude. 

Three, the system was without a doubt one of sex slavery, as it deprived those women of the four kinds of basic freedom. The third point merits particular attention in light of the Yomiuri Newspaper’s November 28 announcement of retraction and “apology” for its use of the term “sex slave” in its earlier English-language reports. With the “apology,” Japan’s largest newspaper officially declared to the world that the women who were repeatedly raped by Japanese military members under the direct control of the military were not sex slaves. 

Japan’s public broadcaster NHK has also been known, according to the October 17 report of The Times, to have issued a set of directives called the “Orange Book” including one that instructed English-language reporters not to use the terms “sex slaves” and “be forced to.” Those moves, reinforcing the claims of the Abe administration, are precisely the kind of historical falsifications that Yoshimi fears may damage Japan’s international reputation. SR

Professor Yoshimi was the person who discovered the official documents revealing the Japanese Imperial Army’s inextricable involvement in the “comfort women.” He explains, from the perspective of an expert, what needs to be discussed and how to move forward in addressing this issue, while critiquing false reports and misinformation primarily from right wing media, which emerged after the Asahi Shimbun retracted its reports drawing on Yoshida Seiji’s testimony on the comfort women.

SK [Shūkan Kin’yōbi]: Ever since August 2014 when the Asahi Shimbun retracted its reports drawing on Yoshida Seiji’s testimony on the comfort women, press bashing has been directed against Asahi led by newspapers such as the Yomiuri and Sankei, followed by major weekly magazines. The media even called for retracting the “Kono Statement” [the 1993 statement, issued by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei] that acknowledges the involvement of the Japanese Imperial Army in the comfort women system.

Yoshimi: Yoshida’s testimony and the Kono Statement are unrelated. As early as 1993 at the latest, no one took seriously Yoshida’s testimony claiming that he had witnessed the Japanese Army’s forcible relocation of women in Jeju Island. The Kono Statement was not based on Yoshida’s testimony. Nor do scholars researching the comfort women issue draw on it for their argument. In short, Asahi’s retraction of Yoshida’s testimony due to its falsity should not affect the discussion. Nevertheless, based upon Asahi’s retraction, some label the comfort women issue a fabrication, and even deny the existence of comfort women themselves. I find this highly imprudent, though I fear that such assertions now prevail.

SK: Yet others criticize the Asahi Shimbun, because of its article based upon Yoshida’s testimony, for misinforming the world and therefore disparaging Japan.

Yoshimi: That is also untrue. The comfort women became known abroad because Kim Hak-soon a former comfort woman, came forward as a victim. I doubt that Yoshida’s testimony, made prior to Kim’s public appearance, was widely known. A journalist from the New York Times, who visited me when researching the issue, was unaware of Yoshida’s testimony. All things considered, what was crucial was that a victim identified herself in public. What is a lie is the very assertion that Yoshida’s testimony spread a false story throughout the world.

SK: Aren’t we losing the trust of neighboring countries because of the Asahi bashing?

Yoshimi: Not just our neighbors, but the international community. From the beginning, Prime Minister Abe has narrowly defined this problem as whether or not “the Japanese Army and Authorities forcibly relocated (abducted) women by the use of violence or threat.”

The Japanese Imperial Army as the Primary Culprit

SK: Abe’s point is “enforcement in a narrow sense,” isn’t it? That is to say, the problem is reduced to whether or not the Army and Authorities directly abducted women. Now that the Asahi has retracted its statements based on Yoshida’s testimony, the prime minister insinuates that no abduction occurred.

Yoshimi: Such an argument will invite more questions, logically—whether it is acceptable if women were kidnapped by deception or cajolement [rather than direct force or threat]. Or is it tolerable if it were human trafficking [involving cash payments]? The prime minister’s argument cannot address these questions. Even [historian] Hata Ikuhiko and right wingers have admitted that women were taken from the Korean Peninsula through kidnapping and human trafficking.

Kidnapping, human trafficking, and transporting victims beyond national borders were criminal acts at the time as well. When women were brought to a comfort station (Ianjo), the Army must have recognized its criminality as they examined women who were going into the station. What the Army should have done was to release those women and return them to their homeland, as they were obviously victims of illegal acts.

SK: Of course.

Yoshimi: Also, it was the Army that selected the traffickers who recruited the women. The Army should have arrested those traffickers who broke the law, and prosecuted them. Yet, none of them was pursued. The relationship between the Army and the traffickers indicates the Army’s culpability—it was an accomplice to abduction or human trafficking to transport the victims abroad.

Furthermore, none of these problems would have occurred if the Army had not established the comfort stations in the first place. The Army is, thus, the primary culprit while the traffickers are merely accomplices. There is no evidence indicating that the traffickers abducted women on their own independent of the Army.

Why Sex Slaves

SK: The fundamental issue of the comfort women does not lie in Prime Minister Abe’s argument concerning whether the women were forcibly brought into the comfort stations, that is, “enforcement in a narrow sense.” Is that right?

Yoshimi: That is right. What the international community pays attention to is not how those women were brought in, but the ways in which they were treated at the station. I have been arguing that there was no justification for depriving the women of freedom and confining them to the station. At the station, the women were deprived of four types of freedom: First, freedom of residence. Obviously, the women were brought to live in a room inside the station where they were forced to provide sexual services to the soldiers. Second is deprivation of freedom of movement. We have a fair number of orders from the comfort stations, and they indicate that leaving the station was strictly regulated or permission for going out was required. Some right wing critics insist that the women were free to go out as long as they obtained permission, but that is a preposterous argument. If permission was necessary to go outside, it means that they were not free.

SK: Don’t they understand such a simple logic? I am dumbfounded.

Yoshimi: The third kind of freedom is whether those women were free to decline having sexual intercourse. It is quite obvious that the circumstances did not allow them to turn down soldiers waiting outside in line only because “I am too tired” or “I don’t like him.” The fourth is lack of freedom to quit. None of the regulations at the comfort station, drawn up by the Japanese Imperial Army, mentions the right to discontinue their work, despite the fact that the Shōgi torishimari kisoku [Female Entertainers and Prostitutes Control Law in effect from 1900-1946] gave women the right to leave their job.

In the past, I twice discussed the issue with Hata Ikuhiko, but he still argues that the women had the freedom to quit, just as women, who were sold and trafficked, could obtain freedom when they paid off their debts. However, freedom to leave one’s job is the right to stop working whenever one wishes to do so. According to Hata’s reasoning, one is confined until paying off her debts, which is nothing but the system of slavery. When one is deprived of so many kinds of freedom, it is undoubtedly wrong. Regardless of the falsity of Yoshida’s testimony, the fundamental structure of the comfort women system remains unchanged. The fact that Asahi’s retraction caused such a big turmoil is beyond my comprehension.

Judgment from the International Community

SK: Those women were indeed sex slaves. This is the concern of the UN and other nations. Yet, the Japanese government continues to insist that they were not.

Yoshimi: The current administration tries to appeal to the international community, but they should know what damage they will bring on themselves by doing so. Other nations will lose confidence in Japan, and Japan will sacrifice its national interest. As a result, Japan will end up in a dire situation. Thus, downplaying the gravity of, or denying the responsibility for, the comfort women, I believe, results in degrading Japan’s reputation.

SK: Despite that, the Asahi bashing was intense and still prevents us from having this sort of calm discussion.

Yoshimi: One reason why a firm relationship between Japan and China, and between Japan and Korea, has not yet been achieved, I think, is Japan’s lack of historical awareness. This is why we need to “overcome the past” scrupulously. For this, we must properly resolve the comfort women issue. By doing so, we will create a new tradition in Japan, one in which we can take pride. Otherwise, Japan will isolate itself not only regionally in Asia, but also internationally around the globe and no one will take us seriously.

While the Kono Statement provides a fundamental framework for this country, some in the LDP demand revision of it. Revising would be impossible, as it would bring about serious diplomatic consequences. Instead, the current administration, I am afraid, will pretend to honor the Kono Statement overseas, while domestically denying or ignoring it. If this sort of attitude continues, I don’t see any bright future.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki is an historian at Chūō University. His book Comfort Women was published in Japanese in 1995. Translated by Suzanne O’Brien, it was published in English by Columbia University Press in 2000.

This article was translated by Yuki Miyamoto from the October 31, 2014 issue of Shūkan Kin’yōbi.

Miyamoto Yuki  is an associate professor, specializing in ethics, in the Department of Religious Studies at DePaul University. Since publishing her book, Beyond the Mushroom Cloud: Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility after Hiroshima (Fordham University Press) in 2011, she has been studying Minamata disease and people’s involvement in this environmental disaster (“Violence and Atonement in the Postindustrial Age: Minamata Patients, Hongan no Kai, and the Carving of Jizo Statues”).

Norimatsu Satoko is Director of the Peace Philosophy Centre, a peace-education organization in Vancouver, Canada, with a widely-read Japanese-English blog peacephilosophy.com on topics such as peace and justice, war memory and education in East Asia, US-Japan relations, US military bases in Okinawa, nuclear issues, and media criticism (To view English-language posts only click HERE). She is co-author with Gavan McCormack of Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, Rowman & Littlefield, 2012, and an Asia-Pacific Journal editor.