Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Can South Korea Hedge?

How South Korea Can Buy Alliance Insurance

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published April 28, 2026 on The Peninsula.

The case for South Korea hedging its relationship with the United States may be harder to dismiss. Washington’s trade policies and the economic consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran have raised the cost of close alignment at the same time they have weakened confidence in U.S. commitments. Seoul has options short of rupture, that include joining regional trade frameworks, arming Ukraine directly, and pursuing its own diplomacy with Iran on energy shipments.

“While the biggest threat to the alliance remains North Korea, the biggest challenge to the alliance now comes from the United States,” argues long-time Korea watcher [and APP member] Bruce Klingner. “Having bullied Seoul into a disadvantageous trade deal that violated the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement and the U.S. Constitution, the Trump administration is demanding more and promising less to its security and economic partners.”

“The U.S. may have degraded military deterrence by undermining the perception – in the minds of both allies and opponents – that Washington is a dependable security partner,” Klingner said.

This sense of unreliability is hardly confined to South Korea—it is felt by all U.S. allies. As Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria wrote recently, the United States has used allied security dependence “to squeeze them hard.” The response is not to break ties with the United States “but to accept that our interests are no longer as close as they once were, and that in current circumstances it cannot be a high priority to accommodate American wishes,” writes prominent British historian and commentator Lawrence Freedman.

The result, wrote Zakaria, is that allies “have decided to buy insurance, to protect themselves from an unreliable America.” In that spirit, below are three ideas for South Korea to develop an insurance policy against U.S. uncertainty.

Accelerate Application to Join CPTPP

The most urgent—and, in some ways, easiest—step toward greater independence for South Korea is to expedite its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The twelve-member economic and trade pact is the kernel of an alternative free trade system, particularly if it partners with the European Union, which is under discussion. It offers a comprehensive framework for addressing not only traditional trade markets but also supply chain cooperation, digital trade, and state-owned enterprises.

There are several advantages for South Korea in joining CPTPP. “The Iran war, rising protectionism and a deepening divide between the United States and China have reshaped the international economic order,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies President Choi Kang wrote in Joongang Ilbo. “For Korea, a mid-sized trading nation, survival now depends on diversifying markets and stabilizing supply chains. The CPTPP offers a network well suited to those goals.”

Aside from market gains, CPTPP membership would also cement the strategic partnership between South Korea and Japan, as well as with other partners who share similar issues with the United States, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

South Korean membership in CPTPP has been under discussion for some time. “Earlier this decade, Japan had given South Korea its very cold shoulder on entry,” Michael Beeman, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC [and APP member], told this writer. “Kishida-era warming in Japan-ROK ties seemed to have turned that around.”

The recent joint statement following the meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi indicated Japanese support for South Korea’s membership. “I don’t sense Japan’s posture is any longer a top obstacle,” says Beeman, author of Walking Out, an authoritative book on U.S. trade policy.

The greater obstacle seems to stem from South Korean domestic politics, driven by fears among agricultural producers and auto manufacturers that CPTPP membership will lead to greater competition from Japanese and other foreign producers. But supporters argue that structural adjustment assistance for vulnerable sectors could mitigate those effects and that the CPTPP could catalyze much-needed restructuring of South Korean industries.

Lift Restrictions on Arms Sales to Ukraine

A more controversial step would be for South Korea to lift long-standing restrictions on the sale of lethal weapons to countries engaged in active combat, and in particular to Ukraine. South Korea has provided indirect weapons support by selling weapons to allied states such as Poland and non-lethal systems to Ukraine, as well as other forms of aid and participation in NATO mechanisms to finance U.S. weapons to Ukraine. But there is an urgent need to intensify support for Ukraine, particularly in areas such as missile defense systems, because of the Trump administration’s decision to cut U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and divert weapons to the Iran war.

Changing South Korea’s policy on arming Ukraine would signal its readiness to take positions that differ from those of the United States and would immensely strengthen its ties with the European Union. Rather than acting on behalf of the United States, as some South Korean progressives argue, this would demonstrate South Korean independence of action and self-defense.

By bolstering Ukraine’s defense, South Korea would also strengthen its own security interests by preventing a Russian victory that would only drive North Korea and Russia closer together. Morally and strategically, it would balance the impact of North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine war.

An Independent Approach to Iran and Maritime Security

The Lee administration has taken initial, though still tentative, steps toward shaping an independent policy response to the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. But there are grounds to argue that South Korea, perhaps in tandem with Japan, should negotiate directly with the Iranian regime to seek exemptions for the passage of its stranded vessels.

One important initiative underway is President Lee’s decision to participate in the European-led multilateral mission to secure the free passage of ships through the strait once the war is over. Lee attended the recent international summit led by France and the United Kingdom and stated that South Korea was ready to make “substantive contributions” to this mission, including using South Korean military forces to clear mines and escort passage following a stable ceasefire.

If the Islamabad talks fail, the alternative may be a “broad based international coalition” that strikes a deal with Iran, wrote British strategist Freedman.

Given the uncertain outcome of the war and the collapse of even the pretense of direct talks, Seoul should accelerate its own diplomacy toward Tehran. Earlier this week, South Korean special envoy Chung Byung-ha traveled to Iran to meet with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi to request cooperation on the safe transit of all vessels, particularly Korean ships, through the Strait of Hormuz.

Conclusion

So far, however, Seoul has decided not to pay the toll fee requested by Tehran for ship passage. It may be time, however, to reconsider that decision, though it is likely to anger the Trump administration. The most effective approach would be to coordinate with Japan, which not only shares South Korea’s extreme dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas but also maintains its independent ties and diplomacy with Iran.

None of these steps is without cost. But the pressures driving them are unlikely to ease over the next three years, and the question for Seoul is not whether to create distance from Washington but how much, and on what terms.