The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.